Copeland v. Martinez Petitioner's Reply to the Memorandum for the Respondent in Opposition
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1979
Cite this item
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Copeland v. Martinez Petitioner's Reply to the Memorandum for the Respondent in Opposition, 1979. ead8854e-ae9a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/26a3c069-5379-452d-ae99-f3a472a2cf8c/copeland-v-martinez-petitioners-reply-to-the-memorandum-for-the-respondent-in-opposition. Accessed November 23, 2025.
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I n the
(Hmtrt 0! % luttd* States
October T erm, 1979
No. 79-647
Barbara N. Copeland,
v.
Petitioner,
'Samuel R. Martinez, Director,
Community Services Administration.
PETITIONER’S REPLY TO THE MEMORANDUM
FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION
Jack Greenberg
James M. N abrit, III
Charles Stephen Ralston
B ill L ann L ee
Suite 2030
10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019
A lexander G. P ark
910 17th Street, N.W.
Suite 812
Washington, D.C. 20006
Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1979
No. 79-647
BARBARA N. COPELAND,
Petitioner,
v .
SAMUEL R. MARTINEZ, D i r e c t o r ,
Community Serv ices Admin is tra t ion .
PETITIONER'S REPLY TO THE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSTION
1. P e t i t i o n e r f i r s t notes that the govern
ment has responded t o v i r t u a l l y none o f the
arguments presented in the pet i t ion f o r w r i t o f
c e r t i o r a r i . Thus, the Memorandum in Opposit ion
does not mention, l e t alone address, the language
in Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820, 832 (1976) , h o ld
ing tha t § 200Qe_ 5 ( k ) gove rns the award o f
c ou n se l f e e s in a f e d e r a l T i t l e V I I a c t i o n .
2. S i m i l a r l y , the government quotes that
part o f Hal l v. C o le , 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973), which
no tes the genera 1 power o f the f e d e r a l c o u r t s
to award f e e s in bad f a i t h c a s e s , but f a i l s
- 2 -
to discuss H a l l ' s fu r the r h o ld ing , noted in the
p e i t i t i o n f o r c e r t i o r a r i , that
This [ the d iscuss ion o f genera l p r i n c i p l e s ]
does not end our in qu i r y , however, f o r even
where " f e e - s h i f t i n g " would be appropr ia te as
a matter o f e q u i t y , Congress has the power to
c ircums c r i b e such r e l i e f . In F le ischm ann
D i s t i l l i n g Corp. v . Maier Brewing C o . , supra,
f o r example, we he ld that § 35 o f the Lanham
Ac t . . . p r e c lu d e d an award o f a t t o r n e y s '
f e e s . . . . Since § 35 "m et icu lous ly d e t a i l e d
the rem ed ies a v a i l a b l e t o a p l a i n t i f f who
p ro v e s th a t h i s v a l i d t rademark has been
in f r i n g e d " Congress must have intended the
express remedial p rov is ions o f § 35 " t o mark
the boundaries to award monetary r e l i e f in
cases a r i s in g under the A c t . "
412 U.S. at 9-10.
3. The government a l s o does not d i s c u s s
Fleischmann D i s t i l l i n g Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co. ,
386 U.S . 714 ( 1 9 6 7 ) , wh i c h , p e t i t i o n e r u r g e s ,
d i r e c t l y governs th is case.
4. The Memorandum in Opposit ion ignores the
l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y o f the C i v i l Rights A t t o rn e y ' s
Fee Act o f 1976, which makes i t c l e a r that the
re levan t language o f 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which i s
i d e n t i c a l to that o f § 2000e-5 (k ) , i s an absolute
p r o h i b i t i o n o f an award o f f e e s t o the U n i t ed
S t a t e s . In ad d i t i on to those instances a l ready
noted in the P e t i t i o n f o r a Writ o f C e r t i o r a r i at
pp. 11-14, p e t i t i o n e r c a l l s the Court 's a t t en t io n
3
to the statement o f Congressman Drinan in i n t r o -
duct in g the b i l l t o the House s ubcommi 11 e e :
[U]nder these b i l l s the Federa l government
could never recover i t s a t to rney f e e s . On
the other hand, i t would be requ ired to pay
the cou n se l f e e s o f a p r i v a t e p r e v a i l i n g
par ty . . .
AWARDING OF ATTORNEYS' FEES, Hearing Before the
House Jud i c i a r y Subcommitte on C o u r t s , C i v i l
L i b e r t i e s , and the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f J u s t i c e ,
(94th Cong., 1st S es s . ) p. 53 (1975) (emphasis
added)
5. F i n a l l y , p e t i t i o n e r w ish es t o r e
emphas ize th a t j u s t because c ouns e 1 f e e s a r e
not awardable, i t does not f o l l o w that there is
noth ing to d e te r p l a i n t i f f s from f i l i n g m e r i t l e s s
T i t l e V I I su i t s against the f e d e r a l government.
The f a r g r e a t e r resources a v a i l a b l e to the United
S ta tes , the cost o f r e t a in in g counsel when there
i s l i t t l e prospect o f r e c o v e r in g f e e s , and the
power o f the court to award the other costs o f
1/ The Department o f Jus t ic e , in i t s testimony
in support o f the b i l l , in d ica ted that i t under
stood thay the United St ates could not recover
fees in a case covered by i t . See, test imony o f
Rex E. Lee, Ass is tan t A t to rney General f o r the
C i v i l D iv i s i o n , Hear ings , supra at pp. 176-177.
l i t i g a t i o n to the government are a l l substant ia l
p ro te c t ions against abuses o f the j u d i c i a l system.
CONCLUSION
In sum, p e t i t i o n e r urges that the d ec i s i o n
below is in d i r e c t c o n f l i c t with the dec is ions o f
th is Court in Brown v. G .S .A . , supra, and F l e i s c h -
mann D i s t i l l i n g Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co. , supra,
and th e r e fo r e should be r e v i ew ed .
R es p e c t fu l l y submitted ,
JACK GREENBERG
JAMES M. NABRIT, I I I
CHARLES STEPHEN RALSTON
BILL LANN LEE
Suite 2030
10 Columbus C i r c l e
New York, New York 10019
ALEXANDER G. PARK
910 17th S t r e e t , N.W.
Suite 812
Washington, D.C. 20006
Attorneys fop P e t i t i o n e r
MEILEN PRESS IN C — N. Y. C 219