Norris v. Virginia State Council of Higher Education Reply Brief of Plaintiffs

    REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Richmond Division

ETHEL M. NORRIS, etc., et al 
v. CIVIL ACTION
STATE COUNCIL OF HIGHER EDUCATION 
FOR VIRGINIA, et al

NO. 365-70-R

S. W. TUCKER 
HENRY L. MARSH, III 
SEYMOUR DUBOW 
JAMES W. BENTON, JR.
HILL, TUCKER & MARSH 

214 East Clay Street 
Richmond, Virginia 23219

JACK GREENBERG 
JAMES M. NABRIT, III 
NORMAN CHACHKIN

10 Columbus Circle, Suite 2030 
New York, New York 10019

Counsel for Plaintiffs



TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

I The Evidence Clearly Establishes A Bi-racial
System Of Higher Education -------------------  1

II The Defendants Had Fair Notice Of Plaintiff's
Claims ---------------------------------------  4

III Community Pressures Favoring Segregation
Have Not Been Overcome---- ------------------- 5

IV The History Of Richard Bland College, As 
Reviewed In Its Brief, Does Not Negate
Racial Considerations------------------------  "7

V Two Colleges Cannot Live As Cheaply As One ---- 9
VI This Court Can Enjoin The Proposed Escalation

Without Invalidating Any Statute -------------  11
A. The Appropriations Act Does Not Mandate

Escalation-------------------------------  H
B, The Equitable Remedy May Not Be Circumscribed By The Statures Establishing 

Richard Bland As A Part Of William and
Mary-------------------------------------  11

VII The State Council May And Should Be Directed
To Devise A Plan Whereby Colleges Will Be 
Desegregated -------------------  15

l



TABLE OF CITATIONS
Cases

Page
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) --------------  16
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 -------  7
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas,

349 U.S. 294 (1955) ----------------- ---------- 14,16
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (I960) -----  17
Green v. School Board of New Kent County, 391
U.S. 430 ------------ ----- --------------------- 7

Haney v. County Board of Education of Sevier
County, 429 F. 2d 364 (1970).-------------------  14,15,16

Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965) —  14
Perkins v. Matthews, ____U.S.____ (No. 46,
October Term 1970) ----------------------------  17

Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246 (1941) --  12
Smith v. North Carolina State Board of Education

(4th Cir., Misc. No. 674, August 3, 1970) -----  15,16
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) -----------  2,3
Turner v. Goolsby, 255 F.Supp. 724 (S.D. Ga.

1965) -----------------------------------------  15,16
Tyrone, Inc. v. Wilkerson, 410 F.2d 639 (4thCir. 1969) ------------------------------------  12
United States v. The State of Georgia, et al

(N.D. Ga., C. A. #12972) ----------------- ------- 16
Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967) ----------  3
Witcher v. Peyton, 382 F.2d 707 (1967) ----------  3

OTHER AUTHORITIES
Code of Virginia, 1950, as amended, §23-9.6 -----  10
Fair Jury Selection Procedure, 75 YALE L. J.

322 (1965) ------------------------------------  3

ii



Page
Finkelstein, The Application of Statistical 

Decision Theory to the Jury Discrimination 
Case, 80 HARV. L. REV„ 338 (1966) -------------  3

Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprint
for the Perpetuation of the All-white Jury,
52 VA. L. REVo 1157 ' (1966 ------ ------ 3

Use of Peremptory Challenges to Exclude Negroes
from Trial Jury, 79 HARV. L. REV. 135 (1965) --  3

lii



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Richmond Division

ETHEL M. NORRIS, etc., et al
CIVIL ACTION

STATE COUNCIL OF HIGHER EDUCATION 
FOR VIRGINIA, et al

NO, 36 5-7 0-R

REPLY BRIEF

I

The Evidence Clearly Establishes 
A Bi-Racial System Q£ Higher Education

In. support of its argument that plaintiffs have 
failed to adduce any proof of a state-wide dual system of 
higher education, the brief of the State Council and the 
Governor asserts that Virginia State College has made a 
vigorous effort to secure white students and faculty members, 
that Richard Bland has since its inception in 1961 followed 
a "non-discrimination" admissions policy and that the 
record is devoid of evidence of any disparity of facilities 
among the various institutions of higher education.

This argument ignores the plain fact that Virginia 
has historically operated a racially dual system of higher 
education (PX #4, p. 1). Virginia State College and Norfolk 
State College which were created and maintained for the 
education of Negroes still enroll over 80% of the black 
students attending the four-year institutions in Virginia.



Although black students comprise 12,2% of the total enroll­
ment of the 15 four-year institutions, over 92% of the 
black students are enrolled in three institutions (Norfolk 
State, Virginia State and Virginia Commonwealth University) 
and the remaining 8% are attending the remaining 12 insti­
tutions. Ten of these 12 institutions have racial minorities 
of less than 1.5 per cent (App. I). See pages 2 through 6 
and 16 through 19 of plaintiffs' opening brief.

The defendants allege that over one-half of the 
34 institutions deviate less than 6% in black enrollment 
from a norm of 10.9% of the total enrollment, and cite 
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) in support of the 
proposition that a 10-15% deviation from the norm is not 
in itself proof of racial discrimination.

In the first place, this argument is based on 
an erroneous mathematical computation. For example, an 
enrollment with 4% black contains a 60% plus deviation 
from a norm of 10.9% black rather than a 6% deviation. 
Similarly an enrollment with 1% black contains a 90% plus 
deviation from a norm of 10.9% black rather than a 9% 
deviation, A correct analysis of che extent of the 
deviations shown by this record reveals a racially dual
system which is substantially similar to that in existence 
prior

/to the Brown decision.
Moreover, Swain itself was based on a similar 

mathematical error and has not been followed in subsequent 
decisions. In Swain, where Negroes had constituted 10%

2



to 15% of the panels drawn from the jury box in a county
with 26% Negroes in the total population, the Court stated
in justification for its holding the following conclusion:

"We cannot say that purposeful discrimina­
tion based on race is satisractorily 
proved by showing that an identifiable 
group is underrepresented by as much as 
10%." (380 UoS. at 208-209) .

What the Court characterized as an underrepresentation by
10% (that being read as a numerical difference between
the 26% of the population and the 10% to 15%, plus, of the
jury pool) was in all reality a diminution of representation
of Negroes by 30% of the number which proportionate
representation would require. See Whitus v. Georgia,
385 U.S. 545 (1967) which was favorably cited in Witcher v.
Peyton, 382 F„ 2d 70-7 (1967) . In Witcher, this circuit listed
the following as commentary critical of Swain: Finkelstein,
The Application of Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury
Discrimination Cases, 80 HARV, L, REV, 338 (1966); Comments,
Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional B1ueptint for the
Perpetuation of the All-white Jury, 52 VA, L. REV. 1157
(1966); Note, Fair Jury Selection Procedure, 75 YALE L„
J. 322 (1965); Note, Use of Peremptory Challenges to
Exclude Negroes from Trial Jury, 79 HARV, L. REV. 135
(1965). (382 F. 2d, at page 710).

In the instant case, defendants’ submission
to HEW (PX #4) and PX #7 conclusively demonstrate the
continued maintenance of a dual system, and the report
to HEW fails to provide any effective procedures for the

3



disestablishment of the dual character of the system.

II

The Defendants Had Fair 
Notice Of Plaintiffs' Claims

Paragraph 3 of the complaint (and particularly 
when read in the light of paragraph 10 and the complaint 
as a whole) points to the racial ddentiflability of Virginia 
State College as an institution for Negroes. The reader 
cannot avoid being told that the defendants (as agents of 
the state) presently maintain certain institutions of 
higher learning wherein all or virtually all of the 
students are of one race and certain instutions of higher 
learning wherein all or vitually all of the students are 
of the other race. Paragraph 3 plainly alleges that the 
defendants (presently) have the duty to desegregate the 
student body of every such institution,, The statement, 
in the present tense, that such duty exists is a state­
ment of non-performance. When this particular duty will 
have been performed, it will no longer exist.

Paragraphs 3, 10 and 16 and the prayer that the 
defendants be required to effectuate the racial desegre­
gation of the several colleges and universities ^paragraph 
20(c)) leave no doubt as to the plaintiffs' claims.

4



Ill

Community Pressures Favoring 
Segregation Have Not Been Overcome

Although the William and Mary Board of Visitors 
asserted that this record does not show that community 
pressures prevented black students from attending Richard 
Bland, its brief was strangely silent on the question of 
pressures on white students.

The Virginia State officials testified that, 
since 1965, Virginia State College has made an active and 
vigorous effort to recruit white students (Tr. 1, p. 69).
Its chief recruitment officer has attended class-night 
programs throughout the surrounding area, cooperated and 
coordinated with the guidance counselors at the area high 
schools, utilized the white faculty members from various 
departments to go out into the high schools to recruit 
white students (id., p. 68), and exposed the white students 
who visit the campus to the white faculty members and 
students on the campus (id., p, 68i. He further testified 
that if Virginia State is going to attract white students, 
they are going to come from an area wi'-hin commuting 
distance of the college (id., p. 71). Notwithstanding the 
extensive recruiting efforts in this area, most of the 
white students attend Richard Bland rather than Virginia 
State College (id., p. 71). During the 1970-71 session, 
more than 92% (821 out of 891) of the white undergraduate
students commuting to Virginia State or Bland attended Bland,

5



The white parents and students selecting a
college usually ask first of all the percentage of white
at Virginia State and if they [the white students] can
attend Virginia State tid, , p, 62) <,

"This has been one question that is 
usually asked. What is the percentage 
of whites there? I think they asked us 
that first above everything else. It 
gives the impression if you had more 
white students others would not mind 
coming, " (Id.. , p„ 62 ) .
According to Dr. Russell, there would be social 

pressures on the white parents who contemplated sending their 
children to Virginia State and those whose children were in 
attendance at State if Richard Bland is escalated to four- 
year status (Id., p. 102). The evidence clearly indicated 
that the escalation, of Bland to four-year degree granting 
status "would definitely hinder the recruitment of white 
students" at Virginia State (Id., p. 77),

Notwithstanding the appreciably lower annual 
tuition cost at Bland ($400 as against $6905, only fourteen 
black commuting first and second year students elected to 
join the virtually all-white student body at Bland where 
the administration and faculty are all white, The over­
whelming majority of the black students from Southside 
Virginia who attend college at Petersburg pay the higher 
price to attend the traditionally Negro college. The 
"open admissions" policy of the colleges and the 
recruiting efforts by Richard Bland and by William and 
Mary have proved as ineffective in overcoming community 
mores and habits of racial segregation as was "Freedom

6



of Choice" in the public free schools.
The necessity of a showing of pressure or

coercion exerted against students or parents of either
race was obviated by the Supreme Court as early as 1954:

"In the field of public education, the 
doctrine of separate but equal has no 
place." Brown v. Board of Education, 347 
U.S. 483.

and again in 1968:
"In the context of the state-imposed 
segregated pattern of long standing, the 
fact that in 1965 the Board opened the 
doors of the former 'white' school to 
Negro children and of the 'Negro' school 
to white children merely begins, not ends, 
our inquiry whether the Board has taken 
steps adequate to abolish its dual, 
segregated system." Green v. School Board 
of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 437.

IV

The History Of Richard Bland 
College, As Reviewed In Its 

Brief, Does Not Negate Racial Considerations

The Higher Education Study Commission, in its 
1965 Report to the General Assembly, did not envision the 
escalation of Richard Bland as William and Mary and Bland 
suggest in their brief at pages 17 and 18. This Commission 
recommended that four two-year branches of senior 
institutions should be incorporated into the state system 
of community colleges, namely:

Danville Division of Virginia Polytechnic 
Institute

Eastern Shore Branch of the School of General 
Studies of the University of Virginia

7



Patrick Henry College of the University of 
Virginia

Richard Bland College of the College of 
William and Mary (PX #10, p. 40)

The State Council of Higher Education concurred 
in this recommendation. None of these four institutions 
has yet achieved four-year status. Only Richard Bland 
has sought to override the determination of these bodies.

The other institutions which have recently become 
four-year colleges (Clinch Valley, George Mason and 
Christopher Newport) were escalated in accordance with the 
plans of the State Council (Id. , pp. 2"1, 28 and 41) .

The notion that a four-year course at Bland 
would cost a thousand dollars less than at Virginia State 
is illusory. There is no evidence of what the tuition 
charge would be at Richard Bland if it is escalated. 
Certainly„ the increased, size of the institution, the cost 
of additional equipment necessitated by escalation and the 
increased size and complexity of the faculty (including 
many with specialized training required for third and fourth 
year courses) would cause an increase in the operating costs 
and the tuition charges of a four-year Richard Bland.
There is no reason to presume that the State Council, with 
its thorough analysis of all available information and 
its educational expertise, did not consider these factors, 
especially in view of its expressed concern that competent 
students not be deprived of higher educational opportunities 
because of high student costs.

Moreover, there is no reason to assume that the

8



Council overlooked the availability of Interstate Highways 
85 and 95 when it assessed the commuting third and fourth 
year students' time and distance factors between their 
respective homes and Virginia State College, as did Dean 
McNeer (Tr, III, pp. 128-9) when he acquiesced in the 
suggestion of counsel that any student living south of 
Richard Eland College would have to drive twenty minutes 
longer to get to Virginia State College than he would to 
get to Richard Bland, (Tr. Ill, p, 116),

The fact is inescapable that only with respect 
to Richard Bland are there persistent attempts to circum­
vent the studies and recommendations of the expert 
commissions. The administrative and legislative mechanisms 
calculated to spur the expansion of Bland are without 
parallel. They are and have been unique measures to meet 
the unique situation of a traditionally black college 
situated where it can serve Southside Virginia,

V

Two Colleges Cannot 
Live As Cheaply As One

The William and Mary Board argues that there is 
no evidence that "Richard Bland College would be favored 
by the General Assembly of Virginia to the detriment of 
Virginia State College," This argument overlooks the 
action of the General Assembly m  disregarding the 
decision of a vast array of educational expertise when it 
made funds available for the escalation of Richard Bland.

9



All of the agencies which had thoroughly
studied the problem of meeting the higher educational 
needs in the Petersburg area had concluded that Virginia 
State College was the institution best suited to serve 
as the four-year degree-granting institution in that area, 
and had recommended that Bland be made a part of the 
Community College system of Virginia,

The Higher Education Study Commission's Report 
in 1965, the State Council of Higher Education in its 10 
year master plan for higher education released in 1967, the 
State Council's 1966-68 and 1968-70 Biennial Reports to 
the General Assembly, and the testimony of the State Council 
officials during the 1970 session of the General Assembly 
all had opposed the escalation of Bland. These Councils, 
their staffs and their advisory committees had concluded 
that it was educationally unsound to overlap similar levels 
of programs and degrees in the same area and that Virginia 
State College was the institution best able to expand 
to accommodate the anticipated enrollment growth for the 
area. .

In rejecting these findings and recommendations 
of the educational experts, including those who are 
charged by law not to act as the representative of any 
particular region or institution (Code §23-9,3), the 
General Assembly ordained that whatever resources would 
henceforth be available for third and fourth year college 
education in the Petersburg area would be divided between 
Bland and Virginia State, if not indeed concentrated at 
Bland.

- 10 -



VI
This Court Can Enjoin The Proposed Escalation 

Without Invalidating Any Statute

A
The Appropriations Act Does Not Mandate Escalation

From the testimony of Dr. Paschall (Tr. Ill, pp. 97- 
100) and from the Resolution passed on February 16, 1970 by the 
Board of Visitors of the College of William and Mary (Paschall 
X #2), we learn that just as had been done with respect to 
Christopher Newport College, the Board of Visitors proposed to 
the General Assembly, then in session, through the House 
Appropriations Committee, "the escalation of Richard Bland 
College to the status of a four-year undergraduate degree­
granting institution, the third-year level program leading to 
the degree to be instituted in 1971-72 and a fourth-year program 
to be offered in 1972-73, . . . all being subject to the availa­
bility of adequate resources". (Paschall X #2). The Resolution, 
as submitted to the General Assembly, required -

"That upon the completion of the preparation 
of the concentration programs," for which there 
would be available qualified faculty, adequate 
physical facilities and library holdings, and 
justifiable registration, "these programs be 
submitted to the Board of Visitors for approval, 
and subsequently transmitted to the State 
Council of Higher Education for its approval".

The Board of Visitors did not suppose that the General Assembly
would repeal so much of Code Section 23-9.6 as requires the
approval of the State Council or, literally, empowers the Council
with the approval of the Governor "to limit any institutions to
such curriculum offerings as conform to the plans adopted by the 
Council".

11



The General Assembly did not alter Code Section 23-9.6. 
It did not command the Board of Visitors to escalate Richard 
Bland with or without the approval of the Council. It merely 
provided the financial means by which escalation could be accom­
plished if, after assessing the entire problem and being 
satisfied that means were at hand to deal with it, the Board of 
Visitors would seek and obtain the permission of the Council to 
escalate,. Such was the understanding of Dr. Paschal! and the 
Board of Visitors. Presumptively, such was the legislative 
intent„

In the light of these facts, this case in its 
jurisdictional aspect is on "all fours" with Phillips v. United 
States, 312 U.S. 246 (1941), where (at page 252) the Court 
stated:

"Some constitutional or statutory provision is 
the ultimate source of all actions by state 
officials. But an attack on lawless exercise 
of authority in a particular case is not an 
attack upon the constitutionality of a statute 
conferring the authority even though a misreading 
of the statute is invoked as justification."

The Court in that case went on to hold that a three-judge court
is not properly convened merely Decause a state official seeks to
invoke a statute as a defense against a charge of questioned
conduct. "In other words-" the Court said, "the complaint must
seek to forestall the demands of some general state policy, the
validity of which he challenges," Supra, at 253 [emphasis added]
See also Tyrone, Inc, v . Wilkerson, 410 F. 2d 639, 4th Cir, 1969)

12



In Phillips, the Governor of Oklahoma invoked his 
constitutional and statutory authority to declare martial law 
and call out the national guard to forestall "any forcible 
obstruction of the execution of the laws or reasonable appre­
hension thereof" and, under color thereof, sought to enforce 
claims against the Grand River Dam Authority to the work of 
which the United States had allotted twenty million dollars.
These state statutory provisions were held insufficient to in­
sulate him from the jurisdiction of the single federal judge to 
enjoin the Governor's lawless conduct.

Here, the appropriations act merely provides the 
financial means by which Bland may be escalated, provided other 
requirements of state and federal law will be met. It likewise 
is insufficient to insulate the Board of Visitors from the power 
of veto which state law vests in the State Council of Higher 
Education with the approval of the Governor or from the require­
ments of the Fourteenth Amendment that the proposal to escalate 
will not be made and that the exercise of the power of veto will 
not be declined if, as here, escalation will defeat the Constitu­
tional rights of the plaintiffs.

B
The Equitable Remedy May Not Be Circumscribed 
By The Statutes Establishing Richard Bland As 

A Part Cf William and Mary
Plaintiffs urge the Court to provide for the merger 

of Richard Bland College into Virginia State College or the 
community college system. Such a transfer to retard the perpet­
uation of a dual system of higher education in the Petersburg

13



area would be a matter of remedy, not substance, and does not
require the convening of a three judge court.

The Court, exercising its traditional equity power,
may effect such relief without questioning the constitutional
validity of the state statute which establishes Richard Bland
as a part of William and Mary College. In Brown II, 349 U.S.
294 (1955), the Court stated:

"In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, 
the courts will be guided by equitable prin­
ciples. Traditionally, equity has been 
characterized by a practical flexibility in 
shaping its remedies and by a facility for 
adjusting and reconciling public and private 
needs. These cases call for the exercise of 
these traditional attributes of equity power."
Id. at 300.
The Court in the later case of Louisiana v. United 

States, 380 U.S, 145, 154 (1965) expressly stated that "the 
court has not merely the power but the duty to render a decree 
which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory 
effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the 
future".

In rejecting the notion that state law can limit the
fashioning of relief, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
in Haney v. County Board of Education of Sevier County, 429 F.
2d 364, 368 (1970), stated that:

"Appellees' assertion that the District Court . . .
is bound to adhere to Arkansas law, unless the state 
law violates some provision of the Constitution, is 
not constitutionally sound where the operation of 
the state law in question fails to provide the 
constitutional guarantee of a non-racial unitary 
school system. The remedial power of the federal 
courts under the Fourteenth Amendment is not limited 
by state law."

14



It is appropriate to note that in Haney, supra, at 
369, the court found no error in the district court's decree 
annexing one school district to another. See also Turner v. 
Goolsby, 255 F. Supp. 724, 730 (S.D. Ga. 1965) where the district 
court exercised its equity power to place the school system of 
Taliaferro County, Georgia in receivership in order to redress 
constitutional rights of Negro children.

This Court certainly has the power to fashion relief 
that will eliminate the perpetuation of the dual system of higher 
education in the Petersburg area in particular and in the 
Commonwealth of Virginia as a whole.

VII
The State Council May And Should Be DirectedTo Devise A Plan Whereby Colleges Will Be Desegregated

The defendants contend that a state agency may not be 
ordered to prepare a general desegregation plan if it is not 
authorized by state law to execute such plan. (Brief of State 
Council and Governor, pp. 24-25). They point to the July 31,
1970 order and memorandum of decision in Smith v. North Carolina 
State Board of Education (4th Cir., Misc. No. 674) filed on 
August 3, 1970 by the Honorable J. Braxton Craven, Jr., United 
States Circuit Judge, wherein a single judge of the Fourth 
Circuit stayed an order of the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of North Carolina which had directed the 
North Carolina State Board of Education to instruct local school 
boards with respect to the preparation of plans for converting

15



to unitary non-racial school systems. They suggest that the 
Smith case reflects the law of the Circuit.

In Haney v. County Board of Sevier County, supra, the 
Eighth Circuit held that an argument similar to the one the 
defendants advance here "is not constitutionally sound where the 
operation of the State law in question fails to provide the 
constitutional guarantee of a non-racial unitary school system"„ 
(429 F. 2d at 368o)

The statutory three-judge district court in Turner v. 
Goolsby, 255 F„ Supp 724 (S.D. Ga. 1965) placed the school 
system of Taliaferro County, Georgia in receivership, appointed 
the State School Superintendent as Receiver and through that 
officer achieved racial desegregation.

In an unreported order filed December 17, 1969 in 
United States v. The State of Georgia, et al, (N.D. Ga., C.A. # 
12972) , three of the judges of the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Georgia enjoined the State Board of 
Education from the payment of public funds to those local school 
districts which failed to measure up to certain standards 
established for the desegregation process.

The theory advanced by the defendants here would mean 
that if the state legislature did not look ahead and provide 
effective procedures under state law for the effectuation of 
federal rights, the federal courts would be powerless to pro­
vide remedies„ This is contrary to both the spirit and letter 
of Brown II, supra, Louisiana, supra, and Haney, supra. See 
also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), Gomillion v. Lightfoot,

16



364 U.S. 339 (1960), and Perkins v. Matthews U.S
(No. 46 October Term 1970). The Constitution of the United 
States is_ the Supreme Law of the land.

S. W„ TUCKER 
HENRY L. MARSH, III 
SEYMOUR DUBOW 
JAMES W. BENTON, JR.
HILL, TUCKER & MARSH

214 East Clay Street 
Richmond, Virginia 23219

JACK GREENBERG 
JAMES M. NABRIT, III 
NORMAN CHACHKIN

10 Columbus Circle, Suite 2030 
New York, New York 10019

Counsel for Plaintiffs

C E R T I F I C A T E
I certify that copies of the foregoing reply brief

were mailed to R. D. Mcllwaine, III, Esquire, P. O. Box 705, 
Petersburg, Virginia 23803, counsel for Board of Visitors of William and Mary in Virginia, et al; Edward S. Hirschler, 
Esquire, and Everette G„ Allen, Jr., Esquire, 2nd Floor, 
Massey Building, Fourth and Main Streets, Richmond, Virginia 23219, counsel for The Visitors of Virginia State College; 
William G. Broaddus, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, 
Supreme Court Building, Richmond, Virginia 23219 , counsel for 
State Council of Higher Education for Virginia, et al; and to 
the Honorable John D. Butzner, Jr., Richmond, Virginia, the 
Honorable Walter E. Hoffman, Norfolk, Virginia, and the 
Honorable Robert R. Merhige, Jr., Richmond, Virginia, members of Three-Judge Court, this 8th day of February, 1971.

Respectfully submitted

7

17