Milliken v. Michigan Road Builders Association, Inc. Jurisdictional Statement and Appendix
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1987

Cite this item
-
Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Garner v. Memphis Police Department Brief for Appellees, 1977. 5f0ee3c1-b29a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/4874b79a-160c-4b8b-85d3-49a15745d911/garner-v-memphis-police-department-brief-for-appellees. Accessed August 27, 2025.
Copied!
INDEX Page Table of Authorities ................................... ii “ iii Statement of Issues Presented for Review ............... 1 Statement of the Case .................................. 2 Statement of the Facts ................................. 5 ARGUMENT I. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT OFFICER HYMON WAS JUSTIFIED IN USING HIS WEAPON TO APPREHEND EDWARD EUGENE GARNER...... 15 TENNESSEE V. FEDERAL LAW ..................... 21 II. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE HIRING, TRAINING AND SUPERVISORY PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES OF THE CITY OF MEMPHIS, MEMPHIS POLICE DEPARTMENT, THE MAYOR AND THE DIRECTOR OF POLICE OF MEMPHIS WERE ADEQUATE WITH RESPECT TO DEFENDANT HYMON AS A POLICE OFFICER......... 23 III. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE USE OF "HOLLOW POINT" AMMUNITION 3Y THE MEMPHIS POLICE DEPARTMENT DID NOT VIOLATE STANDARDS OF CIVIL CONDUCT SO AS TO SHOCK THE CONSCIENCE OF COURT......................................... 2 4 CONCLUSION ............................................ 2 6 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................ 26 l Table of Authorities Cases: Beech v. Melancon, 465 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1972) .. Cunningham v. Ellington, 323 F.Supp 1072 (W.D.Tenn 1971) ........................................ Davies Warehouse Company v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144 (1944) ..................................... Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249 (1942) Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2nd Cir. 1973) . Love v. Bass, 145 Tenn 522, 238 S.W. 94 (1922) .. McDonald v. Board of Education, 394 U.S. 802 (1944 Mattis v. Schnarr F.2d ..... Qualls v. Parrish, 534 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1976) . Rochin v. California, 343 U.S. 165 (1952) ...... Rosenberg v. Martin, 478 F.2d 520 (2nd Cir. 1972) Scarborough v. State, 168 Tenn. 106, 76 S.W.2d 106 (1934) ....................................... Smith v. Jones, 379 F.Supp. 201 (M.D.Tenn. 1973) . Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) ................ United States v. Jarboe, 513 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975) United States v. Van Roeder, 435 F.2d 1004, (10th Cir. 1971) ........................................ Page 16, 20, 21 16 17 17 25 16, 22 17 17, 18 22 24 25 16 21 19 22 22 Wiley v. Memphis Police Department, 548 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir.‘ 1977) ............................... 16, 17, 21, 22 STATUTES: T.C.A. §40-808 3, 13, 15, 16, 23 - i i 28 U.S.C. §1331 .................................. 2 28 U.S.C. §1343(3) 2 42 U.S.C. 1981 ................................... 2 42 U.S.C. 1983 ................................... 2 42 U.S.C. 1985. ................................... 2 42 U.S.C. 1986 ................................... 2 42 U.S.C. 1988 ................................... 2 28 U.S.C. Rule 52(a) 21 AUTHORITIES: Restatement of Torts §131(1934) .................. 17 i l l IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT NO. 77-1089 CLEAMTEE GARNER, ET AL, Plaintiff-Appellant VS . MEMPHIS POLICE DEPARTMENT, ET AL, Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District court for the Western District of Tennessee Western Division BRIEF FOR APPELLEES STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1. Whether the District Court erred in finding that E. R. Hyman, an officer of the Memphis Police Department, acting under Color of Law was justified in using his weapon to apprehend Edward Eugene Garner a fleeing felon to prevent his escape. 1 2. Whether the District Court erred in finding that the hiring, training, and supervisory practicies and" procedures of the City of Memphis, Memphis Police Department, the Mayor and the Director of Police of Memphis, were adequate with respect to the employment of defendant Hyman as a police officer. 3. Whether the District Court erred in finding that the use of "hollow point" ammunition by the Memphis Police Department did not violate standards of civilized conduct so as to shock the conscience of the Court. STATEMENT OF THE CASE This is a civil rights action brought by Cleamtee Garner on April 8, 1975, in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3) and 1331, to seek redress for the fatal shooting of his son Edward Eugene Garner on October 3, 1974, by an officer of the Memphis Police Department. Named as defendants were the Memphis Police Department, City of Memphis, Tennessee, Wyeth Chandler, Mayor of Memphis, Jay W. Hubbard, Director of Police of Memphis and E. R. Hyman, Police Office of the City of Memphis. 2 The suit alleges that defendant Hyman violated the constitutional rights of Edward Eugene Garner when he shot and killed Garner in attempting to apprehend him while fleeing from a private residence at 739 Vollintine, Memphis, Tennessee. The other defendants were sued on the grounds that their failure to exercise due care in the hiring, training and supervision of defendant Hyman made them equally responsible for Garner's death and all defendants were sued on the grounds that their use or authorization to use the "hollow point" bullet further caused the deprivation of Garner's rights under the Constitution and Laws of the United States. On May 23, 1975, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss which was overruled on August 13, 1975. Thereafter, on September IS, 1975, defendants filed their answer denying liability; any violation of the Federal Civil Rights Statutes; and any deprivation of the deceased's constitutional rights. In further answering, defendants alleged that the actions of defendant E. R. Hyman were governed by Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-808. After preliminary hearings for discovery and motion for production of documents, the case came on for trial on August 2, 1976, before the Hon. Harry W. Wellford, 3 sitting without a jury. The plaintiff's proof included testimony of the plaintiff himself, Cleamtee Garner, father of the deceased, Edward Eugene Garner; Talton Douglas Enoch, an architect who made a model of the scene of the shooting, David Michael Cordero, an ambulance driver for the City of Memphis Eire Department who transported Garner to the hospital; Ann Stepp, employee of the City of Memphis Hospital who introduced hospital records covering the condition of Garner following the shooting; Leedell Anderson, owner of the home that was broken into by Garner; Dan L. Jones, Chief of Detectives, Shelby County Sheriff's Department who testified as an expert relative to when an officer is justified in using his revolver to apprehend a fleeing felon; John A. Coletta, Captain, Memphis Police Department, Commander of the Training Bureau; Eugene L. Barksdale, Inspector, Memphis Police Department, who also testified as an expert relative to when a police officer was justified in using his revolver to apprehend a fleeing felon; Dr. J. T. Francisco, Shelby County Medical Examiner; and the reading of portions of pretrial discovery deposition of defendant E. R. Hyman. At the conclusion of plaintiff's proof on August 4, 1976, the court granted defendants' motion for a Directed Verdict as to defendants Hubbard and Chandler and a partial Directed Verdict as to the City of Memphis and the Memphis Police Department with regard to hiring practices. 4 Defendants' proof consisted of testimony of J. W. Hubbard, former Director of Police, Memphis Police Department, defendant E. R. Hyman; Velton J. Rogers, Probation Officer, Memphis and Shelby County Juvenile Court; Leslie Burton Wright, Officer, Memphis Police Department; F. J. Wheeler, Sergeant, Memphis Police Department, and C. A. Russell, Sergeant, Memphis Police Department. At the close of the trial, the court requested proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law which were submitted by counsel for both sides. On September 29, 1976, the court handed down its Memorandum Opinion indicating a judgment should be rendered for all defendants on all issues. On September 30, 1976, a judgment was entered in accordance with the Memorandum Opinion and on October 27, 1976, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS On the evening of October 3, 1974, Edward Eugene Garner broke into the Leedell Anderson home at 739 Vollintine, Memphis, Tennessee, for the purpose of committing a robbery. (App. 151, 258, 259, 268). Daisey Bell Statts, 737 Vollintine, a next door neighbor, observed evidence of a break-in and called the police. (App. 151, 266) Although the Statts house was not the one being broken into, the address of 737 5 Vollintine was given to the police. (App. 151, 745, 746, 747) . A call went out by radio over the police network to the police car in Ward 128 that was manned by Defendant Hyman and Patrolman Leslie Wright directing them to proceed to 737 Vollintine where there was a prowler inside (App. 151, 152, 744, 745, 804, 805). Upon arriving at 737 Vollintine, the officers saw Daisey Bell Statts standing on her porch pointing to the house next door. (App. 152, 746, 747, 809) Defendant Hyman questioned her about the situation and she said, "they are breaking in next door" (App. 152, 746, 747, 809). Hyman then returned to the car, got his flashlight, advised his partner what was happening, and then proceeded south along the west side of the house at 739 Vollintine. (App. 152, 747, 748, 809) Patrolman Wright then moved the squad car to the curb, called the police depatcher to advise they were on the scene, picked up his flashlight and moved toward the east side of the house. (App. 152, 809, 810) Defendant Hyman became aware that there was a light on inside the house as he proceeded down the west side towards the rear. (App. 152). As he approached the southwest corner of the house Hyman heard the back screen door slam 6 and reaching the corner of the house he saw a figure running from the back of the house to the back of the lot where a cyclone fence extended across the south boundary of the property. (App. 152, 748, 749). The backyard of 739 Vollintine was completely encircled by fencing. (App. 152, 751). There was a three to four foot chicken wire fence supported by boards which ran in a north to south direction along the west side of the backyard and was situated between Hyman and the cyclone fence which appeared to Hyman to be approximately six or seven feet high (App. 152, 751, 753, 755, 756). As defendant Hyman was standing at a point near the southwest corner of the house, he could also observe that a garbage can had been placed under a window on the back side of the house and the glass was broken out of the window in the rear. (App. 152, 153, 758). Hyman could also make out a clothesline and the outline of objects in the backyard between him and the fleeing subject. (App. 153, 755) . Defendant Hyman shined his flashlight along the fence and spotted Edward Eugene Garner in a stooped position next to the cyclone fence near the southwest corner of an out building located in the southeast corner of the yard. (App. 153, 354, 752) He did not appear to be armed, but Hyman could not be certain of this at the moment. (App. 153, 760) 7 Defendant Hyman immediately shouted "halt" and identified himself. (App. 153, 752). Garner paused moment arily and then as Hyman started in his direction and toward the chicken wire fence, Garner sprang to the top of the cyclone fence extending half of his body and his head over the fence when Hyman fired his service revolver hitting Garner in the right side of head. (App. 153, 753, 754) The area to the south beyond the fence was in darkness and there was poor illumination in the Anderson backyard. (App. 153, 749, 750). Hyman was not familiar with this particular location or neighborhood, having lost his way in proceeding to the site. (App. 153, 746). Patrolman Wright, in the meantime, had proceeded along a picket fence on the other side of the house and heard Defendant Hyman yell "Halt" in a loud voice, following which there was a pause. (App. 153, 810). As Patrolman Wright approached the southeast corner of the house, he heard a shot. (App. 153, 810). Wright then flashed his flashlight along the fence until he picked up Garner whose body was draped on the fence, the torso, arms, and head draped over the south side and the legs draped over the north side right in the bend of the body. (App. 153, 812) Wright apparently did not hear Hyman's earlier indication to get Garner when Hyman first located him with his flashlight 8 as Garner paused before attempting to scale the fence. (App. 153, 154). An ambulance was called and Garner was transported to the hospital where he never fully gained consciousness. (App. 154, 812) It was later determined that after .breaking into the Anderson house, Garner ransacked the bedrooms and removed a ring and a wallet containing a small amount of cash. (App. 154, 269, 270) Less than two months prior to October 3, 1974,- Garner who was 15 years old, was placed on probation by the Juvenile Court in Memphis in connection with an adjudication of Juvenile Delinquency stemming from a charge of burglary which his parents had investigated and reported. (App. 154, 791) Previously, Garner was placed on probation by Juvenile Court on November 1, 1971, in connection with a lesser charge of burglary, and he had also been charged with violation of curfew set by the Juvenile Court. (App. 154, 788) The boy's father conceded that his son was somewhat of a problem for him, particularly since he (the father) worked at night. (App. 154, 183, 184, 208) When the father was notified of the boys death following the shooting he indicated to the police that he had been expecting something like this 9 to happen. (App. 828, 829) At the time of his death, the alcohol content in the blood of Edward Eugene Garner was .09 which is just under the standard for adults established by Tennessee Law on the presumption that one is acting under the influence of an intoxicant. (App. 154, 663, 692) Although Garner was about five feet four inches tall and weighed probably in the neighborhood of 100 to 110 pounds at death, Hyman stated that at the time he was pursuing him he looked to be about 17 or 18 years old, in the neighborhood of 5'5" to 5'7" tall and weighing less than 130 pounds. (App. 154, 355, 658) The blood alcohol content was sufficient to slow his reaction (App. 154, 664). Defendant Hyman, at the time he was attempting to apprehend Garner, could not be certain whether there was an accomplice in the house or in the area, and whether the accomplice might be armed. (App. 155, 758, 776, 777) The area by the cyclone fence in the back of the yard was not illuminated, and the area south of the fence was very dark at the time defendant Hyman was trying to apprehend Garner. (App. 155, 749) He could detect only traces of tall underbrush and trees on the other side of the cyclone fence. (App. 155, 333, 334) He did not know the lay of the land in this area which was only a few blocks from the Garner home. (App. 155, 750) 10 Defendant Hyman testified that the reason he fired at Garner was because he knew that he would not be able to apprehend him on foot. (App. 754, 756) The factors that he considered were his difficulty in getting through the cluttered backyard, Garner already being half way over the six foot chain link fence, and his concern about his ability to scale the six foot chain link fence due to his own size, his foot wear, having a flashlight in one hand and a pistol in another and the other paraphernalia on his person, the area being dark, his uncertainty about the terrain on the other side of the cyclone fence, and the concern that there may have been an accomplice in the house who may be armed. (App. 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759) Plaintiff's expert witness, Eugene Barksdale, testified that if a police officer, in pursuing a fleeing felon, is sure that he cannot apprehend the subject, it is his duty under state law to use whatever means is necessary to apprehend him, which would include use of his weapon. (App. 478) He further testified that the officer should pursue the subject on foot without firing his weapon only if he knows beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual is not armed. (App. 478) Captain John Colletta of the Memphis Police Department also testified as an expert witness on the question of when an officer was justified in using his 11 firearm in attempting to apprehend a fleeing felon. In response to a hypothetical question covering a factual situation identical to circumstances surrounding the shooting of Edward Eugene Garner, be stated that in his opinion, Hyman was jusitified in using his pistol in view of the fact that this would be the only means of apprehending Garner who was fleeing from a private residence after having burglarized the same. (App. 633) After full investigation of the incident of October 3, 1974, and a review of same by the Memphis Police Firearms Review Ward, no disciplinary action was taken against Hyman nor was any action taken by the Shelby County Grand Jury, although the matter was presented to it. (App. 155, 724, 726, 764) There is nothing in the record to indicate that defendant Hyman had any propensity toward precipitous or reckless use of firearms as a police officer or otherwise. (App. 155) The training methods used and the subject matter taught at the Memphis Police Department Training Academy in the area of the use of firearms and deadly force, are generally consistent with those used by other police departments and the FBI Academy. (App. 155, 635, 636) Memphis police instructors received training at the FBI Academy. (App. 155, 405) They taught police to fire at the largest target 12 present, usually the trunk or torso area, the "center mass". (App. 155, 156, 449, 450) Police were given instruction also by legal advisers on the Tennessee law with respect to the use of lethal force. (App. 156, 424) Regulations published by the Memphis Police Department in connection with the "Use of Firearms and Deadly Force", effective at the time were somewhat more restrictive than Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-808, which deals with the lawful means by which a fleeing felon may be apprehended. (App. 156, 423) Prior to October 3, 1974, the Memphis Police Department decided to make a study of various types of ammunition following complaints by officers that the "round nose" type ammunition they were issued for their service revolvers was not sufficiently effective in stopping or neutralizing individuals with whom they were confronted in dangerous situations. (App. 156, 595, 596, 728, 729) This followed an episode in which a police officer was killed (and a Federal Probation Officer wounded) by an apparently beserk man firing at random at others. (App. 156, 597) Tests were conducted by the Firearms Section of the Memphis Police Department under the auspicies of Captain John Coletta who recommended a change to a "hollow point" projectile or bullet as more effectively in "neutralizing" or incapacitating 13 an individual and less likely to penetrate through a target and thus continue in flight to the possible harm of others. (App. 156, 596) During the term of Police Director Hubbard, the Memphis Police Department thereafter, following consideration of the Coletta recommendation, changed to the use of "hollow point" ammunition, specifically .38 Special Caliber Remington 125 Grain, semi-jacketed hollow point. (App. 156, 157, 728, 729, 730) Hubbard also established a Firearms Review Board to investigate incidences wherein police employed a firearm. (App. 157, 714) "Hollow point" ammunition is used by many other police departments throughout the United States and by the FBI, although it is more lethal in its effect. (App. 157, 594) A key factor in the injury producing effect of a bullet is the part of the body it strikes and the point of entry. (App. 157, 595) The particular type of ammunition used by the Memphis Police had a greater wounding producing potential with greater velocity than was formerly utilized, and was more accurate. (App. 157) "Hollow point" ammunition produces more injury than- round nose ammunition, all other factors being equal, but state and local Medical Examiner and County Coroner, Francisco, could not state the type of ammunition used in this particular episode would have made 14 any difference in bringing about Garner's death in light of the place where _the bullet struck and the point of entry. (App. 157, 670, 671, 697, 698) There is no evidence introduced tending to indicate any personal involvement whatsoever by Director Hubbard or Mayor Chandler in the episode in controversy, or in any failure on their part with respect to police hiring procedures regarding the employment of Hyman as a police officer. (App. 157, 158) There was evidence to the effect that Hyman was, prior to this episode, a competent police officer, indeed, that he was the type of person who was a desirable police recruit by reason of his education, background, ability, and his race. (App. 158) There was no evidence indicating insufficient or inadequate police hiring methods or standards. (App. 158) ARGUMENT I. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT OFFICER HYMON WAS JUSTIFIED IN USING HIS WEAPON TO APPREHEND EDWARD EUGENE GARNER. T.C.A. §40-808 provides as follows: "Resistance to Officer - If after notice of the intention to arrest the defendant, he 15 either flee or forcibly resist, the officer may use all the necessary means to effect the arrest." This state statute and the regulations promulgated by the Memphis Police Department based upon the statute permit the use of lethal force by a police officer in the apprehension of persons fleeing from the commission of certain felonies. This statute does not authorize the use of a weapon in every instance and a determination of whether the fleeing felon could have been apprehended by less drastic means is a question for the trier of fact. Love v. Bass, 145 Tenn. 522, 238 S.W. 94 (1922); Scarborough v. State, 168 Tenn. 106, 110, 76 S.W.2d 106, 107 (1934). The constitutionality of this statute was upheld by a three judge district court in Cunningham v. Ellington, 323 F.Supp. 1072 (W.D.Tenn. 1971). It was further considered and upheld in Beech v. Melancon, 465 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1972) and Wiley v. Memphis Police Department, 548 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir. 1977) . The regulations of the Memphis Police Department followed T.C.A. §40-808. Officer Hymon was entitled to assume the constitutionality of this statute. As this Court said in Beech v. Melancon, supra, at page 426: "...State statutes like federal ones are entitled to the presumption of constitutionality until their invalidity is judically declared. 16 Davies Warehouse Company v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 153, 64 S.Ct. 474, 479, 88 L.Ed. 635 (1944) and see also McDonald v. Board of Education, 394 U.S. 802, 808, 809, 89 S.Ct. 1404, 22 L.Ed. 2d 739 (1969); Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249, 257, 63 S.Ct. 225, 87 L.Ed. 246 (1942)." The only court thus far to hold unconstitutional a statute similar to Tennessee's is the Eighth Circuit in Mattis v. Schnarr, ______________ F.2d ______________. In commenting on the decision, this Court in Wiley said that holding such a statute unconstitutional "extends to the felon unwarranted protection, at the expense of the unprotected public." Judge Weick went on to say: "We agree with the dissent in the Eighth Circuit case (Mattis v. Schnarr), which was highly critical of the majority opinion for not following the decisions of other Circuits and for embarking on a new course which should have been left to the state legislatures where it belongs. The legislative bodies have a clear state interest in enacting laws to protect their own citizens against felons, and a right, if not a duty, to do so. When the burglar escapes pursuit he is free to commit other fellonies. The dissent appro priately pointed out; 'In 1934 the ALI, in its First Restatement of Torts, modified the common law principle permitting the use of deadly force to effect the arrest of a felon. Restatement (First) of Torts §131 (1934). This modification was abandoned in 1948, however, and the common law rule was readopted. The 1966 Appendix to the Second Restatement of Torts justifies this abandonment on the grounds that the modification contained in §131 had, from its inception, lacked any support other than dicta and argument by analogy.' 17 The dissent further states: 'There is no constitutional right to commit felonious offenses and to escape the consequences of those offenses. There is no constitutional right to flee from officers lawfully exercising their authority in apprehending fleeing felons.' The majority opinion of the Eighth Circuit in Mattis does not suggest how law enforcement officers are to make the on-the-spot constitutional analysis called for by its proposal and still react quickly enough to meet the exigencies of an emergency situation. How can a police officer ever know, reasonably or otherwise, whether the felon will use force against others if he is not immediately apprehended? If it clearly the prerogative of the state legislature to decide whether such restrictions on the use of force are consonant with public policy." Another factor which the Courts consider in reviewing the actions of a police officer in cases such as this is the risk involved. When Officer Hymon arrived on the scene, he talked to the next door neighbor who pointed to the house in question and said: "They are breaking in." (emphasis added) (App. 152, 746, 747, 809) He could readily assume that there were at least two people involved, if not more. The Court in its Memorandum Opinion found that Officer Hymon could not be certain whether there was an accomplice in the house or in the area and whether the accomplice might be armed. (App. 155) Officer Hymon did not know whether Garner had committed only a so-called "property crime" or whether persons in the home which he forceably entered might 18 have been endangered. (App. 160) As to the question of whether Garner was armed the Court found from the testimony that although it did not appear to Officer Hymon that he was armed, Officer Hymon could not be certain at the moment he was pursuing him. (App. 153) In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S..1, 23 (1968), the Supreme Court said as follows: "We are now concerned with more than the governmental interest in investigating crime; in addition, there is the more immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him. Certainly it would be unreasonable to require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties. American criminals have a long tradition of armed violence, and every year in this country many law enforcement officers are killed in the line of duty, and thousands more are wounded." In his Memorandum Opinion, Judge Wellford concluded that the real and principal issue in this case was whether defendant was justified in using his weapon to apprehend Garner as the only reasonable and practicable means of apprehending him or preventing his escape. (App. 159) He went on to say: "... Garner was clearly a felon and Hymon could not be sure that he was only a juvenile. After having been ordered to halt and knowing that he was confronted by a police officer, 19 Garner recklessly and heedlessly attempted to vault over the fence to escape, thereby assuming the risk of being fired upon. -Under the circumstances Garner was knowingly, directly and proximately contributing to his own injury and death, taking into account all factors present. There was very little' opportunity of identification of Garner for purposes of future arrest if he escaped. VI. Hymon realized there were several obstacles between him and Garner at the moment Garner made what evolved into a fatal effort to scale the chain link fence. He was uncertain about the time required for him to reach the area from which Garner made his desperate leap, and he was reasonably concerned about the remote prospects of locating Garner once he disappeared into the brush and undergrowth out in the reaches of darkness and in an area unfamiliar and unknown to Hymon. Hymon (and his partner), up until the moment of firing, had followed good police procedures in investigating an apparent burglary in progress by a person or persons unknown, who may or may not have been armed. In a split second, Hymon was called upon to make a fateful and difficult decision in the face of what reasonably appeared to be a successful effort to flee from arrest or apprehension from a felony scene. Hymon did not know whether Garner had committed only a so-called "property crime" or whether persons in the home which he had forceably entered might be or have been endangered. The Court concludes that Hymon was justified in thinking that once Garner scaled that fence, he would escape and that he, therefore, acted in compliance with lawful requirements in the use of potentially lethal force to prevent the escape of a fleeing felon. See Beech v. Melancon, supra. There was no reasonable alternative apparent it he were to prevent the escape or to effect the arrest. VII. One particularly difficult aspect of this case was the age and size of young Garner. Hymon was called upon in making a reasonable decision to weigh the factor, together with the potentiality of inflicting a fatal wound, in making 20 an arrest, in preventing an escape, under these circumstances. This factor, together with the eventual (but not then realized) fact that Garner was unarmed, made Hymon's decision to fire both difficult and agonizing. The Court has taken these considerations into account in concluding, nevertheless, that Hymon acted within his responsibility as a reasonable police officer. He certainly acted without any malice, predisposition, or racial animus towards Garner. He also acted within general guidelines afforded him as a Memphis Policeman, and the policy has been one essentially established by the Tennessee legislature, which has been determined to be a constitutionally acceptable one." Although the factual situations differ slightly, the findings here are consistant with those in Beech v. Melancon, supra; Wiley v. Memphis Police Department, supra; and Smith v. Jones, 379 F.Supp. 201 (M.D.Tenn. 1973), and should not be upset unless clearly erroneous. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a), 28 U.S.C. TENNESSEE LAW v, FEDERAL LAW Appellant contends that the District Court relied solely upon Tennessee law standards without reference to relevant federal constitutional standards to determine whether the defendant officer's use of deadly force violated plaintiff's civil rights. Speaking to this issue, this Court in Wiley v. Memphis Police Department said: 21 "In Qualls v. Parrish, 534 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1976), this Court, in an opinion written by Judge McCree, cited Love v. Bass, supra, with approval and held that the law of the state should be considered in determining the federal law to be fashioned to determine the liability of the officers. There the Court stated at 694: 'Our principal reason for agreeing with the district court that the Tennessee rule should be made the federal rule in this case is that a decision to the contrary would be unfair to an officer who relied, in good faith, upon the settled law of his state that relieved him from liability for the particular acts performed in his official capacity. Most of the state courts that have considered this question follow the old common law rule that deadly force may be used by a police officer only -when he has reasonable grounds to believe that the persons he is attempting to arrest has committed a felony.'" As in the Wiley case, there can be no question that Officer Hymon and his partner had reasonable gounds to believe that Garner had broken into a private residence. Hymon pursued him as he was fleeing from the scene of the crime. Again, as this Court said in Wiley: "... Since the burglars were still being hotly pursued they are regarded as being engaged in the commission of the burglary at the time of the pursuit. United States v. Jarboe, 513 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Van Roeder, 435 F.2d 1004 (10th Cir. 1971) . " 22 II. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE HIRING, TRAINING AND SUPERVISORY PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES OF THE CITY OF MEMPHIS, iMEMPHIS POLICE DEPARTMENT, THE MAYOR AND THE DIRECTOR OF POLICE OF MEMPHIS WERE ADEQUATE WITH: RESPECT TO DEFENDANT HYMON AS A POLICE OFFICER. In its Memorandum Opinion the Court found that the training methods used and the subject matter taught at the Memphis Police Department Training Academy in the area of the use of firearms and deadly force are generally consistant with those used by other police departments and the F.B.I. Academy. (App. 155) Memphis Police instructors received training at the F.B.I. Academy. (App. 155, 405) Police were given instructions by a legal advisor on the Tennessee law with respect to the use of lethal force. (App. 424) Regulations published by the Memphis Police Department in connection with the "use of firearms and deadly force" effective at the time were somewhat more restrictive than T.C.A. §40-808. (App. 156, 423) The Court further found that there was no evidence of any failure on the part of Director Hubbard or Mayor Chandler with respect to hiring procedures regarding the employment of Hymon as a police officer. (App. 157, 158) There was evidence to the effect that Hymon was a competant officer and the type person who was a desirable police recruit by reason of his education, background, ability, and race. (App. 158) 23 III. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE USE OF "HOLLOW POINT" AMMUNITION BY THE MEMPHIS POLICE DEPARTMENT DID NOT VIOLATE STANDARDS OF CIVIL CONDUCT SO AS TO SHOCK THE CONSCIENCE OF THE COURT. It should be noted that "hollow point" ammunition is used by many other police departments throughout the United States as well as the F.B.I. (App. 157, 594) In its findings the Court stated as follows: "IX. The choice by the Memphis Police Department to utilize the particular type of ammunition for service revolvers at the time in question was undertaken after consideration and study. There were plausible reasons for its conclusion that a more effective type might be utilized for the protection of the police officers and in the general welfare, even though there was involved a greater potential for serious injury, severe wounding, or even death to an intended target in connection with its use. Perhaps a different type ammunition with less "wound producting potential", as Dr. Francisco described it, would be preferable if this Court were called upon to make this decision; but this is not the issue to be decided. Plaintiff's counsel concedes in his memorandum and proposed conclusions that the Court must rather determine whether the Memphis Police Department's decision to utilize the "hollow point" bullet with a high velocity is such conduct as to "shock the conscience of the Court", citing Rochin v. California, 343 U.S. 165 (1952), the "stomach pumping" case. Interestingly, Justice Douglas a renowned civil libertarian, in a concurring opinion observed 'Yet the Court now says the rule that a majority of states have fashioned (to admit such evidence of narcotics pumped from the stomach) 24 violates the "decencies of civilized conduct" to that I cannot agree.' 432 U.S. 178. (See also the concurring opinion of Justice Black). The other two cases cited by plaintiff in support of his contention in this respect appear inapposite as pertaining only to police mistreatment of a prisoner in custody. 5/ [5/ See plaintiff's proposed conclusion No. 6, citing Rosenberg v. Martin, 478 F.2d 520 (2nd Cir. 1972) and Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2nd Cir. 1973).] The Memphis Police Department's conduct in selecting ammunition in question does not violate standards of civilized conduct so as to shock the conscience of the Court; it is similar to policies in use and established by many other jurisdictions and was not adopted merely for purposes of inflicting excessive punishment or denying due process. 6/ [6/ This conclusion is reached even if the Hague Declaration of 1899 may imply a contrary standard.] Rather, it was considered action with a policy toward minimizing hazards to the police and to citizens in situations or resisting or fleeing felons subject to lawful apprehension, or in situations were the life or safety of a police officer or an assaulted citizen might even be at stake. X. In this case, moreover, plaintiff has not shown a proximate and direct relationship between the police choice as to type of ammunition used and the particular effect on Edward Eugene Garner at the time and place and in these particular circumstances. The Court concludes, moreover, that it would not have been of any consequence in this unfortunate death as to whether the type of bullet utilized in 1974 or the type utilized in 1972 before the change was employed. For all that was demonstrated in the evidence, the place in the head and brain where impact occurred and the manner of Garner's wounding would have produced death in any event no matter which type of bullet was used. At least plaintiff failed in his burden to demonstrate otherwise." (App. 161, 162, 163) 25 f CONCLUSION It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed. Respectfully submitted, CLIFFORD D. PIERCE, JR. City Attorney City of Memphis City of Memphis Suite 3500, 100 North Main Building Memphis, Tennessee 38103 (901) 5232363 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Brief has been served by United States mail, postage prepaid, to Avon N. Williams, Jr., Esquire, and Maurice E. Franklin, Esquire, Attorneys at Law, 1414 Parkway Towers, Nashville, Tennessee 37219. This 26