School Board of the City of Charlottesville, Virginia v. Allen Appendix on Behalf of Appellants
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1956
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. School Board of the City of Charlottesville, Virginia v. Allen Appendix on Behalf of Appellants, 1956. cb29694f-ad9a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/2ddf47d7-235d-456a-bb4f-bbf996e031ca/school-board-of-the-city-of-charlottesville-virginia-v-allen-appendix-on-behalf-of-appellants. Accessed November 23, 2025.
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APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit
No. 7303
T H E SCH OOL BO ARD OF T H E C ITY OF C H A R
LO TT E SV ILL E , V IR G IN IA , and FE N D A LL R.
ELLIS, D ivision Superintendent of Schools
of the City of Charlottesville, V irginia,
Appellants
v.
DORIS M A R IE ALLE N , et al.,
Appellees
Appeal from tlie United States District Court for the
Western District of Virginia, at Charlottesville
Jo h n S. Battle
Court Square Building
Charlottesville, Virginia
Jo h n S. B attle , Je .
Court Square Building
Charlottesville, Virginia
Attorneys for Appellants
J. L indsay A lm ond , Je.
Supreme Court Building
Richmond, Virginia
Attorney General of Virginia
H enry T . W ic k h a m
1407 State-Planters Bank Bldg.
Richmond, Virginia
Special Assistant to the
Attorney General
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I. Complaint ...................................................................................- 1
II. Answer ........... .............. .................................. ............................ 8
III. Order of District C ourt..... ........................................................ 11
IV. Opinion of District Court ....................................... ................ 13
V. A. Motion to Dismiss Fendall R. E llis ...........................-...... 23
B. Denial of Motion to Dismiss Fendall R. E llis ..............—. 23
C. Motion to Dismiss on Ground That State Has Not Con
sented to Be Sued...... ................... ..................................— 24
D. Denial of Motion to Dismiss on Ground That State Has
Not Consented to Be Sued .............. .............. — ...... -...... 25
VI. A. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit “ A ”— Petition to School B oard ....... 26
B. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit “ B”— Reply to Petition ............... 30
V II. A. Plaintiffs’ Witness George R. Ferguson ............ ...... — 32
B. Plaintiffs’ Adverse Witness Fendall R. Ellis ................ 35
V III. A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Evidence in Support of
Complaint ................................................................. 46
B. Denial of Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Evidence----- 47
IX . A. Defendants’ Exhibit No. 2— Deposition of Fendall R.
Ellis ...................................................... 49
B. Defendants’ Exhibit No. 3— Deposition of James H.
Michael, Jr................................................... 53
X . Testimony of Fendall R. Ellis on Cross, Redirect and Re-
cross-Examination ......................... 55
X I. Testimony of James H. Michael, Jr. on Cross-Examination 72
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit
No. 7303
T H E SCH OOL BO ARD OF T H E C ITY OF C H A R
LO TTE SV ILLE , V IR G IN IA , and FE N D A LL R.
ELLIS, D ivision Superintendent of Schools
of the City of Charlottesville, V irginia,
Appellants
v.
DORIS M AR IE A LLE N , et al.,
Appellees
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Virginia, at Charlottesville
APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS
APPENDIX I
CO M PLAIN T
1. (a ) The jurisdiction o f this Court is invoked under
Title 28, United States Code, Section 1331. This action
arises under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States, Section 1, and the Act of May 31, 1870,
Chapter 114, Section 16, 16 Stat. 144 (Title 42, United
States Code, Section 1981), as hereinafter more fully ap
pears. The matter in controversy exceeds, exclusive of
interest and costs, the sum or value of Three Thousand
($3,000.00) Dollars.
2
(b ) The jurisdiction o f this Court is also invoked under
Title 28, United States Code, Section 1343. This action is
authorized by the Act of April 20, 1871, Chapter 22, Sec
tion 1, 17 Stat. 13 (Title 42, United States Code, Section
1983), to be commenced by any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to redress the
deprivation, under color o f a state law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of rights, privileges and im
munities secured by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Con
stitution of the United States, Section 1, and by the Act of
May 31, 1870, Chapter 114, Section 16, 16 Stat. 144 (Title
42, United States Code, Section 1981), providing for the
equal rights of citizens and of all persons within the juris
diction of the United States, as herein after more fully
appears.
2. Infant plaintiffs are Negroes, are citizens o f the
United States and of the Commonwealth of Virginia, and
are residents o f and domiciled in the City of Charlottesville,
Virginia. They are within the statutory age limits o f eli
gibility to attend the public schools of said City, and possess
all qualifications and satisfy all requirements for admission
thereto, and are in fact attending public schools o f said City
operated by defendants.
3. Adult plaintiffs are Negroes, are citizens of the
United States and of the Commonwealth of Virginia, and
are residents of and domiciled in the City of Charlottesville,
Virginia. They are parents or guardians o f the infant plain
tiffs, and are taxpayers o f the United States and of said
Commonwealth and City. All adult plaintiffs having control
or charge of any unexempted child who has reached the
seventh birthday and has not passed the sixteenth birthday
are required to send said child to attend school or receive
3
instruction (Code of Virginia, 1950, Title 22, Chapter 12,
Article 4, Sections 22-251 to 22-256).
4. Plaintiffs bring this action in their own behalf and,
there being common questions of law and fact affecting the
rights of all other Negro children attending the public
schools in the City of Charlottesville, Virginia, and their
respective parents and guardians, similarly situated and
affected with reference to the matters here involved, who
are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring all
before the Court, and a common relief being sought, as will
hereinafter more fully appear, bring this action pursuant to
Rule 23 (a ) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as a
class action, also on behalf o f all other Negro children at
tending the public schools in the City of Charlottesville,
Virginia, and their respective parents and guardians, simi
larly situated and affected wdth reference to the matters here
involved.
5. Defendant The School Board of the City of Char
lottesville, Virginia, exists pursuant to the Constitution and
laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia as an administrative
department of the Commonwealth of Virginia discharging
governmental functions (Constitution of Virginia, Article
IX , Section 133, Code of Virginia, 1950, Title 22, Chapter 1,
Sections 22-1, 22-2, 22-5 to 22-9.3, Chapter 6, Article 1,
Sections 22-45 to 22-58, Chapter 6, Article 4, Sections 22-89
to 22-99, Chapters 7 to 15, Sections 22-101 to 22-330) ; and
is declared by law to be a body corporate ( Code of Virginia,
1950, Chapter 6, Article 4, Section 22-94).
6. Defendant Fendall R. Ellis is Division Superintend
ent of Schools o f the City o f Charlottesville, Virginia. He
holds office pursuant to the Constitution and laws of the
Commonwealth of Virginia as an administrative officer of
4
the public free school system o f Virginia (Constitution of
Virginia, Article IX , Section 133; Code of Virginia, 1950,
Title 22, Chapter 1, Sections 22-1, 22-2, 22-5 to 22-9.3,
Chapter 4, Sections 22-31 to 22-40, Chapters 6 to 15, Sec
tions 22-45 to 22-330). He is under the authority, super
vision and control of, and acts pursuant to, the orders, poli
cies, practices, customs and usages of defendant The School
Board of the City of Charlottesville, Virginia. He is made
a defendant herein in his official capacity.
7. The Commonwealth o f Virginia has declared public
education a state function. The Constitution o f Virginia,
Article IX, Section 129, provides:
“ Free schools to be maintained. The General Assem
bly shall establish and maintain an efficient system of
public free schools throughout the State.”
Pursuant to this mandate, the General Assembly of Virginia
has established a system of free public schools in the Com
monwealth of Virginia according to a plan set out in Title
22, Chapters 1 to 15, inclusive, of the Code of Virginia of
1950. The establishment, maintenance and administration
o f the public school system of Virginia is vested in a State
Board of Education, a Superintendent o f Public Instruc
tion, Division Superintendents of Schools, and County, City
and Town School Boards (Constitution of Virginia, Article
IX , Sections 130-133; Code of Virginia, 1950, Title 22,
Chapter 1, Section 22-2).
8. The public schools o f the City of Charlottesville, V ir
ginia, are under the control and supervision o f defendants,
acting as an administrative department or division of the
Commonwealth of Virginia (Code of Virginia, 1950, Title
22, Chapter 1, Sections 22-1, 22-2). Defendant The School
5
Board of the City of Charlottesville, Virginia, is empowered
and required to establish and maintain an efficient system of
public free schools in said City (Code of Virginia, 1950,
Title 22, Chapter 1, Sections 22-1, 22-5); to provide suit
able and proper school buildings, furniture and equipment,
and to maintain, manage and control the same (Code of V ir
ginia, 1950, Title 22, Chapter 1, Article 1, Section 22-97) :
to determine the studies to be pursued, the methods of teach
ing, and the government to be employed in the schools (Code
of Virginia, 1950, Title 22, Chapter 6, Article 4, Section
22-97, Chapter 12, Article 2, Sections 22-233 to 22-240.1) ;
to employ teachers ( Code of Virginia, 1950, Chapter 6,
Article 4, Section 22-97, Chapter 11, Section 22-203); to
provide for the transportation of pupils (Code of Virginia,
1950, Title 22, Chapter 13, Articles 1 and 2, Sections 22-
276 to 22-294); to enforce the school laws (Code of V ir
ginia, 1950, Title 22, Chapter 6, Article 4, Section 22-97);
and to perform the numerous other duties, activities and
functions essential to the establishment, maintenance and
operation of the schools o f said City ( Code of Virginia,
1950, Title 22, Chapter 1, Sections 22-1 to 22-10, Chapters
4 to 5, Sections 22-30 to 22-44, Chapter 6, Article 1, Sec
tions 22-45 to 22-58, Article 4, Sections 22-89 to 22-100,
Chapters 7 to 15, Sections 22-101 to 22-330).
9. Defendants, and each of them, and their agents and
employees, maintain and operate separate public schools for
Negro and white children, respectively, and deny infant
plaintiffs and all other Negro children, because of their race
or color, admission to and education in any public school
operated for white children, and compel infant plaintiffs
and all other Negro children, because of their race or color,
to attend public schools set apart and operated exclusively
for Negro children, pursuant to a policy, practice, custom
6
and usage of segregating, on the basis o f race or color, all
children attending the public schools of said city.
10. The aforesaid action o f defendants denies infant
plaintiffs, and each of them, their liberty without due process
of law and the equal protection o f the laws secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States, Section 1, and the rights secured by Title 42, United
States Code, Section 1981.
11. On May 17, 1954, the Supreme Court o f the United
States declared the principle that state-imposed racial segre
gation in public education is violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. A
formal demand has heretofore been made on behalf of plain
tiffs and all other persons similarly situated that defendants
conform to said decision and desist from the policy, practice,
custom and usage specified in paragraph 9 hereof. Notwith
standing, defendants, and each of them, refuse to act favor
ably upon this demand and purposefully, wilfully and delib
erately continue to enforce and pursue said policy, practice,
custom and usage against infant plaintiffs and all other
Negro children.
12. Defendants will continue to pursue against plaintiffs,
and all other Negro children similarly situated, the policy,
practice, custom and usage specified in paragraph 9 hereof,
and will continue to deny them admission, enrollment or
education to and in any public school operated for children
residing in said City who are not Negroes, unless restrained
and enjoined by this Court from so doing.
13. Plaintiffs, and those similarly situated and affected,
are suffering irreparable injury and are threatened with ir
reparable injury in the future by reason of the policy, prac
tice, custom and usage and the actions of the defendants
7
herein complained of. They have no plain, adequate or com
plete remedy to redress the wrong's and illegal acts herein
complained of other than this complaint for an injunction.
Any other remedy to which plaintiffs and those similarly
situated could be remitted would be attended by such uncer
tainties and delays as would deny substantial relief, would
involve a multiplicity of suits, and would cause further irrep
arable injury and occasion damage, vexation and inconven
ience.
14. As a consequence o f the purposeful, wilful and delib
erate action o f defendants, in continuing, in violation of
their legal duty to plaintiffs, to segregate infant plaintiffs
and other Negro children on the basis o f their race or color,
plaintiffs are required to employ attorneys and undergo great
trouble, inconvenience and expense to litigate a vindication
of their constitutional rights.
Wherefore, plaintiffs respectfully pray that, upon the fil
ing of this complaint, as may appear proper and convenient,
this Court advance this action on the docket and order a
speedy hearing o f this action according to law and, and upon
such hearing:
(a ) This Court enter a preliminary injunction and/or a
permanent injunction restraining and enjoining defendants,
and each of them, their successors in office, and their agents
and employees, forthwith, from enforcing or pursuing
against infant plaintiffs and other Negro children similarly
situated the policy, practice, custom and usage specified in
paragraph 9 hereof, and/or any other policy, practice, cus
tom or usage of the same or similar purport, and/or any
action whether or not pursuant to said policy, practice, cus
tom or usage which precludes, on the basis of race or color,
the admission, enrollment or education of infant plaintiffs
8
or any other Negro child similarly situated to and in any
public school operated by defendants at the same time, and
under the same terms and conditions, and with the same
treatment, that similarly situated children o f any other race,
color or group are admitted, enrolled, educated or given
therein, upon the ground that any such policy, practice, cus
tom, usage, or action denies infant plaintiffs, and other
Negro children similarly situated, their liberty without due
process of law and the equal protection of the laws, secured
by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States, Section 1, and the rights secured by Title 42,
United States Code, Section 1981, and is for these reasons
unconstitutional and void.
(b ) This Court allow plaintiffs their costs herein, and
reasonable attorneys’ fees for their counsel, and grant such
further, other, additional or alternative relief as may appear
to the Court to be equitable and just in the premises.
APPENDIX II
ANSW ER
In answer to the complaint heretofore filed in this action,
defendants say:
1. Defendants deny the jurisdiction of the Court as set
forth in the allegations of Paragraph 1(a) of the complaint.
As to the allegations o f Paragraph 1 (b ) o f the complaint,
the defendants allege that the Court does not have jurisdic
tion in this action because the complaint does not state a case
or controversy upon which relief can be granted.
2. Defendants are not advised as to the truth o f the
allegations o f Paragraph 2 of the complaint and call for
strict proof o f all such allegations.
9
3. Defendants are not advised as to the truth of the alle
gations of Paragraph 3 of the complaint and call for strict
proof of all such allegations, except that defendants admit
the allegation of Paragraph 3 regarding the compulsory
school attendance law of Virginia.
4. Defendants deny the allegations of fact and the con
clusions of law contained in Paragraph 4 of the complaint,
and with respect to the allegations of said Paragraph 4 de
fendants state that if this be a class action as contended by
the plaintiffs, the only persons coming within said class are
Negro citizens of the United States residing in the Common
wealth of Virginia who are otherwise duly qualified for ad
mission to the public schools of Charlottesville, Virginia,
and who have applied for and been denied such admission.
5. Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 5 of
the complaint.
6. Defendants admit that Fendall R. Ellis is Division
Superintendent of Schools in the City o f Charlottesville,
Virginia, and that he holds office pursuant to the Constitu
tion and laws o f the Commonwealth of Virginia. Defend
ants deny all other allegations of Paragraph 6 of the com
plaint.
7. Defendants admit the allegations of Paragraph 7 of
the complaint.
8. Defendants admit that the administration of the public
school system of Charlottesville, Virginia, is administered
by them. The defendant Fendall R. Ellis denies that said
public schools are under his control and the defendant. The
School Board of the City of Charlottesville, Virginia, denies
that it is empowered and required to establish and maintain
an efficient system of public free schools in said City. The
10
defendants admit that their powers and duties are prescribed
by Title 22, o f the Code of Virginia but all other allegations
of fact contained in Paragraph 8 of the complaint are denied.
9. Defendants admit they are following state policy and
laws requiring the maintenance of separate schools for white
and Negro children, and assert that such state policy and
laws are valid and not repugnant to the Constitution of the
United States but to the contrary are within the police pow
ers o f the state. Defendants deny all other allegations of
Paragraph 9 of the complaint.
10. Defendants deny all the allegations of Paragraph 10
o f the complaint.
11. Defendants admit that on .May 17, 1954, the Su
preme Court of the United States held in the case of Brown
v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U. S. 483, and com
panion cases, that state-imposed racial segregation in public
education violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the Con
stitution but allege that such decisions in those cases are not
binding on this Court under the facts as they shall be dis
closed by the evidence in this case. Defendants further
assert that even under the aforesaid cases they are not re
quired to integrate the public schools of Charlottesville, V ir
ginia, and therefore the relief sought in the complaint should
be denied. Defendants deny the remaining allegations of
Paragraph 11 of the complaint.
12. Defendants deny that they are pursuing, or will pur
sue, a policy or practice in denial o f the rights of the plain
tiffs in this case.
13. Defendants deny all o f the allegations o f Paragraph
13 of the complaint.
11
14. Defendants deny all o f the allegations of Paragraph
14 of the complaint.
15. Defendants deny all o f the allegations in the com
plaint which are not specifically admitted in this Answer and
deny that the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief sought in the
complaint.
Defendants move that this action he dismissed upon the
following grounds:
(a ) Defendants allege that this action should be dis
missed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and
assert that this proceeding involves no case or con
troversy upon which relief should be granted:
( b ) The defendant the School Board of the City of
Charlottesville, Virginia, alleges that this action
should be dismissed as to it on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction over this party since the School
Board of the City of Charlottesville is an agency
of the State of Virginia and the state has not given
its consent to be sued in this action.
(c ) The defendant Fendall R. Ellis alleges that as to
him the complaint should be dismissed for failure
to state a claim against him upon which relief can
be granted.
APPENDIX III
ORDER OF DISTRICT COURT
This action having come on to be heard on July 12, 1956,
upon the complaint, the answer, and evidence offered by
the plaintiffs and the defendants, and the arguments of
counsel.
Upon consideration whereof, the court being of opinion
12
that the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief sought in their
complaint, and having set forth the reasons for its conclu
sions in a written opinion this day filed and made a part of
the record,
It is accordingly Adjudged, Ordered and Decreed
1. That the defendants, and each of them, their succes
sors in office, and their agents and employees, be, and they
hereby are, restrained and enjoined from any and all action
that regulates or affects, on the basis of race or color, the
admission, enrollment or education of the infant plaintiffs,
or any other Negro child similarly situated, to and in any
public school operated by the defendants.
2. That this injunction become effective at the commence
ment of the school term commencing in September, 1956.
3. That the plaintiffs recover from defendants their costs
in this action.
And the plaintiffs having moved the court that the defend
ants be required to pay the attorneys’ fees of counsel for the
plaintiffs in this action.
Now, therefore, upon consideration of said motion, the
same is denied, to which action o f the court counsel for the
plaintiffs except.
It is further Ordered
that this action remain upon the docket of the court and that
the court retain jurisdiction o f the same for such future
action, if any, as may be necessary therein.
The clerk of this court will send an attested copy of this
order to each of the following:
13
Mr. Spottswood W . Robinson, III,
Attorney at Law,
623 North Third Street,
Richmond, Virginia.
Mr. Oliver W . Hill,
Attorney at Law,
118 East Leigh Street,
Richmond, Virginia.
Honorable J. Lindsay Almond, Jr.,
Attorney General of Virginia,
Richmond, Virginia.
Honorable John S. Battle,
Attorney at Law,
Charlottesville, Virginia.
(s) John Paul
District Judge
APPENDIX IV
OPINION OF DISTRICT COURT
This suit is an outgrowth of the decision o f the Supreme
Court o f the United States in a group of cases in which
challenge was made to the laws of those states which require
that, in the operation o f the public school system, separate
schools be maintained for white and for Negro children.
On May 17, 1954, the Supreme Court handed down its
opinion under the style o f Brown, et al. v. Board o f Educa
tion of Topeka, et al. (reported in 347 U. S. 483) in which
it held that state laws which require the segregation of white
and Negro children in the public schools o f the state solely
on the basis of race were in violation of the Constitution of
14
the United States, in that they denied to Negro children the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Included in the group of cases covered by the
opinion in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka was one
arising in Virginia under the style of Davis, et al. v. County
School Board of Prince Edward County.
Following the rendition of the opinion above mentioned
the Court retained the cases on its docket for further con
sideration of the terms of such decrees as would be appro
priate to carrying out the holdings of the Court. After full
consideration, which included the hearing of argument of
all parties concerned, The Supreme Court on May 31, 1955,
handed down its further opinion in these cases. In this opin
ion the Court recognized that the variation in local condi
tions involved differences in the problems arising in apply
ing the principles enunciated by it and that it would be im
practicable to fix a definite date on which segregation in all
schools affected by its decision should cease. It made no
attempt to fix such a date. However it did state that, after
giving due consideration to the local conditions involved,
“ the courts will require that the defendants make a prompt
and reasonable start toward full compliance with our May
17, 1954 ruling.” The defendants in the instant case were
not parties to the litigation above referred to but the prin
ciples settled by that case are, of course, o f universal appli
cation.
In the instant case the plaintiffs are some forty three chil
dren of the Negro race who sue by their parents or guardians
as next friend and with whom these parents or guardians
have joined as plaintiffs in their individual capacities. The
complaint sets out that the suit is brought by the plaintiffs
in their own behalf and on behalf o f all other Negro children
attending the public schools in Charlottesville. The defend
ants are the School Board o f the City of Charlottesville and
15
Fendall R. Ellis, Superintendent of Schools o f that city.
Jurisdiction of this court is invoked under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution, the Act o f Congress of
May 31, 1870 (16 Stat. 144; 42 U. S. C. 1981) and under
Title 2'8 U. S. C. Section 1343. Without going into a dis
cussion of the several constitutional and statutory provisions
under which jurisdiction is alleged and without excluding
the applicability o f any of them, it is sufficient to say that
the provisions o f Title 28. Sect. 1343, plainly support juris
diction in this court. The decision of the Supreme Court in
Brown v. Board of Education o f Topeka, Supra, established
the right o f Negro children not to be discriminated against
on account of their race in admission to the public schools,
and the purpose of this action, as shown by the complaint,
is to redress the deprivation of that right. See 28 U. S. C.
1343 (3 ). The prayer of the complaint in brief substance is
that the defendants and their successors in office be enjoined
from enforcing the practice which has heretofore compelled
that Negro children and white children be educated in sepa
rate schools.
The case came on to be heard on the complaint and the
answer thereto, and on the testimony in open court from
several witnesses offered by each side. But neither the plead
ings nor the testimony of the witnesses present any sub
stantial issues of fact in the case. The answer of defend
ants admits that the policy and the law of the State of
Virginia require the maintenance o f separate schools for
white and Negro children and that they, the defendants, are
following that policy in the operation of the public schools in
Charlottesville. Defendants admit that they have taken no
steps whatever toward the abandonment or modification of
this policy. Such matters of defense as are presented in the
answer involve legal questions. To these the court has given
16
full consideration and has found none of them to offer a bar
to the relief sought by the plaintiffs.
The defendants first assert that the laws of Virginia
which require segregation in the public schools are not re
pugnant to the Constitution of the United States but are
within the police power of the state. This is merely a re
assertion of the contention which the Supreme Court struck
down in the case of Brown v. Board of Education. That the
defendants recognize this is indicated by the fact that they
do not press the subject in argument.
The answer embodies a motion to dismiss the action on
several stated grounds. The first o f these is a brief allega
tion that the court is without jurisdiction and that the pro
ceeding involves no controversy upon which relief should be
granted. This point was not argued and in my opinion, as
previously indicated herein, is without merit.
It is further moved on behalf of the defendant, School
Board of the City of Charlottesville, that the action be dis
missed as to it on the ground that the School Board is an
agency of the State of Virginia and the state has not
given its consent to be sued in this action. The Code of
Virginia, Sect. 22-94, provides :
“ The school trustees of each city shall be a body
corporate under the name and style o f ‘The School
Board of the City of ----- --------- ’ , by which name it
may sue and be sued, contract and be contracted with,
and purchase, take, hold, lease, and convey school prop
erty, both real and personal. * * * ”
Counsel for defendants urge that this statute granting
permission to sue a School Board is intended to apply only
to actions in the courts o f the state. However the statute
itself contains no such limitation. Its terms are compre
17
hensive in that it makes a School Board suable without lim
itation as to the forum in which or the persons by which it
may be sued. Nor does there appear to be any other statu
tory provisions or any decision o f the courts of the state
which impose on Sect. 22-94 the limitations now suggested.
In support o f their position defendants rely upon certain
expressions in the opinion in the case of O ’Neill v. Early,
208 Fed. (2d) 286, which arose in this Circuit and in which
the opinion was written by Parker, Chief judge. This was a
case in which a public school teacher sued a superintendent
of schools and a School Board for damages for breach of
contract for failure to re-employ the plaintiff as a teacher.
In affirming dismissal of the action by the District Court
the Circuit Court did so on the ground that no jurisdiction
existed in the Federal Court, in that the purpose of the action
was to establish liability against the state payable out of
public funds, and was plainly a suit against the state. In the
course of the opinion this language is used, and is apparently
that on which defendants rely:
“ The fact that the state has authorized the defendant
school board to sue and be sued is immaterial, since it
has not consented to suit in the federal court. (Citing
cases) Even if it had consented to be sued in the federal
court, jurisdiction is lacking since no federal question
is involved and there is no diversity o f citizenship in a
suit which, although nominally against state officers, is
in reality a suit against a state.” ( Citing cases )
Examination of the opinion from which the above quota
tion is taken seems to make it clear that because the remedy
sought was a money judgment, which would have had to be
paid from state funds, the Court considered the action to be
one against the state. But the case in all its aspects is so
far different from that before this court as to give it no
18
applicability here. It is certain that the court did not mean
to say that a state school board could not be sued in a federal
court under any circumstances. In fact the same court with
the same judges sitting and in an opinion also written by
Parker, Chief Judge, upheld a suit against a school board
where the plaintiff charged a violation of his constitutional
rights. Alston v. School Board of City of Norfolk, 112 Fed.
(2d) 992. Also in Corbin v. School Board of Pulaski
County, 177 Fed. (2d) 924, and in Carter v. School Board
of Arlington County, 182 Fed. (2d) 531, this same Circuit
Court entertained suits against local school boards where
violation o f constitutional rights were charged.
It is true that it does not appear that there was raised in
any of these cases the point now urged upon this court,
namely, that the suit is one against the state and that there
fore the court is without jurisdiction. Neither does it appear
that this defense was offered in any of the four cases de
cided by the Supreme Court under the reported title of
Brown v. Board of Education, supra, including the case of
Davis v. School Board of Prince Edward County. Consid
ering the strenuous nature o f the defenses offered in these
cases it seems strange that this defense, which if valid would
have been a complete defense, was overlooked. However
this may be it seems clear that the contention made is with
out merit. It has long been settled that suits against state
officers to restrain the enforcement of state laws which con
travene the Federal Constitution are not suits against the
state. See Dobie on Federal Procedure, Sect. 133, where in
treatment of this subject it is said:
“ Such suits are treated as suits against the officers,
not against the state; so they do not come within the
prohibition o f the Eleventh Amendment. This princi
ple, applied by the Supreme Court in a long series of
19
decisions, is now well established.” ( Citing numerous
cases)
And, of course, where the subject matter of a suit is the
protection of rights secured by the Constitution of the
United States the federal courts have jurisdiction. In
Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378, suit was brought
against several officials o f the State of Texas including the
governor of the state. The Supreme Court held that even
the governor of a state was subject to the process of the
federal courts for the relief of private persons when by his
acts under color o f state authority he invades rights secured
to them by the Federal Constitution, and that the suit was
not one against the state ; the Court, speaking through Chief
Justice Hughes, saying (p. 393) :
“ The District Court had jurisdiction. The suit is not
against the state. The applicable principle is that where
state officials, purporting to act under state authority,
invade rights secured by the Federal constitution, they
are subject to the process of the federal courts in order
that the persons injured may have appropriate relief.”
citing Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 155, 156, and
other cases.
In Looney v. Crane Co., 245 U. S. 178, which was a suit
against the Secretary of State and the Attorney General of
the State of Texas to enjoin the enforcement of a taxing
statute alleged to be in violation of the Constitution of the
United States, the Supreme Court closes its opinion (by
Chief Justice White) with this paragraph (p. 191).
“ There is a contention to which we have hitherto
postponed referring, that the court below was without
jurisdiction because the suit against the state officers to
enjoin them from enforcing the statutes in the dis
20
charge of duties resting upon them was in substance
and effect a suit against the State within the meaning
of the Eleventh Amendment. But the unsoundness of
the contention has been so completely established that
we need only refer to the leading authorities. Ex parte
Young, 209 U. S. 123; Western Union Telegraph Co.
v. Andrews, 216 U. S. 165; Home Telephone & Tele
graph Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U. S. 278”
The answer also includes a motion to dismiss the action
as to Fendall R. Ellis, Superintendent o f Schools of the City
of Charlottesville, who is a named defendant. This motion
also must be denied. The court takes notice of the fact that
the Division Superintendent of Schools, whether in a city
or county, exercises a greater influence over the operation
o f the schools than anyone else, including the School Board.
The powers and duties o f the Division Superintendent,
which are fixed by the State Board of Education, are broad
and extend to almost every detail in the management of the
schools. To dismiss this official as a defendant might well
nullify, or certainly lessen, the effectiveness of any decree
that is entered here by making it non-applicable to the per
son having a large share in the responsibility for carrying it
out.
Finally the defendants have moved that the action be dis
missed on the ground that plaintiffs have not made a case
appropriate to the relief sought, in that no evidence has been
introduced showing that the school authorities o f Charlottes
ville have ever denied the application of any Negro child for
admission to any school in the city or that such an applica
tion has been made by any Negro. This motion rests on the
tenuous support of the failure of any individual Negro child
to file a formal application for admission to a school hereto
21
fore reserved for white children. Under the pleadings and
the evidence in the case it is plain that the motion to dismiss
on this ground is without merit and must be denied.
The evidence shows that in October, 1955, the plaintiffs
in this case, through their attorneys, addressed a communi
cation to the School Board of Charlottesville and to Mr.
Ellis, the Superintendent of Schools, in which they referred
to the ruling of the Supreme Court in its opinions of May 17,
1954, and May 31, 1955, and then said:
"'‘W e therefore call upon you to take immediate steps
to reorganize the public schools under your jurisdiction
so that children may attend them without regard to
their race or color. * * * As we interpret the (Supreme
Court) decision, you are duty bound to take immediate
concrete steps leading to early elimination of segrega
tion in the public schools. * * * W e further request that
you will give us an early reply setting forth your initial
plans for desegregation.”
Several weeks later the School Board made its reply in
a communication which, while giving no direct answer to
plaintiff’s requests, made it clear that it intended to pursue
the policy of segregation for the school session of 1955-56;
and as to the future it gave no assurance whatever. In fact
the School Board’s reply, while plainly evasive, nevertheless
gave the distinct impression that it was making no plans to
discard the policy of segregation at any time. This is con
firmed by the admissions made at the hearing o f the case
that no steps whatever have been taken to this time to com
ply with the ruling of the Supreme Court. The prayer of the
complaint is in substance that the defendants be enjoined
from continuing to maintain segregated schools. The de
22
fendants have refused to agree to abandon the practice of
segregation and have made it plain that they intend, if pos
sible, to continue it. Under this state of facts the plaintiffs
are undoubtedly entitled to maintain this action and to have
the relief prayed for.
It only remains to be determined as to the time when an
injunction restraining defendants from maintaining segre
gated schools shall become effective. The original decision
o f the Supreme Court was over two years ago. Its supple
mentary opinion directing that a prompt and reasonable
start be made toward desegregation was handed down four
teen months ago. Defendants admit that they have taken no
steps toward compliance with the ruling of the Supreme
Court. They have not requested that the effective date of
any action taken by this court be deferred to some future
time or some future school year. They have not asked for
any extension o f time within which to embark on a program
o f desegregation. On the contrary the defense has been one
of seeking to avoid any integration of the schools in either
the near or distant future. They have given no evidence of
any willingness to comply with the ruling o f the Supreme
Court at any time. In view of all these circumstances it is
not seen where any good can be accomplished by deferring
the effective date of the court’s decree beyond the beginning
of the school session opening this Autumn. Even though
the time be limited it is not impossible that, at the school ses
sion opening in September of this-year, a reasonable start be
made toward complying with the decision of the Supreme
Court.
D istrict Judge
August 6, 1956
23
APPENDIX V
A.
M OTION TO DISMISS FENDALL R. ELLIS
(Tr. pp. 6-7)
Mr. A lmond : Thank you, Sir.
On behalf o f this defendant, the Division Superintendent,
we move, as to him, that the complaint be dismissed for
failure to state a claim against him upon which appropriate
relief could be granted; also that he is not a proper party
to this proceedings, and if the Court should hold that he is
a proper party, certainly he is not a necessary party, which
latter phase o f the argument, as I understand it, would ad
dress itself to the sound discretion of the Court.
B.
DENIAL OF M OTION TO DISMISS
FENDALL R. ELLIS
(Tr. pp. 14-15)
T he Court: Mr. Attorney General, I think your motion
will have to be denied.
I don’t know too much about the operation of the school
system but I know the school board is made up of citizens
selected for their public spirit, who meet occasionally and
go over the school budget and make recommendations to the
City Council and lay out certain policies.
But at the head of any school in any city is the County
Superintendent o f Schools. I f he has nothing to do with
admission of pupils in one school or the other, then he cannot
run any danger whatever o f any violation o f any decree that
this Court should enter, if it should enter one.
But the purpose o f this Act is to reach the persons who
might be influential in having determination over what
24
children shall enter what schools and to restrain them from
the exercise of discrimination on account of race; and
I do know enough about the school system to know that the
Division Superintendent, County and City Superintendents,
are the most influential persons in the conduct of the schools
either in any county, or city, and that the intimate knowledge
of the schools, of what is going on in the schools, is not
ordinarily possessed by the average school board; and I
think the injunction, if one should be granted, should reach
every person who might have any influence or power in the
determination of the assignment, or refusal, of children to
particular schools.
As I said a minute ago : if the City Superintendent does
not have such influence, does not take any such part, does
not attempt to do so, then he runs no risk of having violated
any injunction. That would be a question of fact.
I don’t know exactly how they run the city schools in
Charlottesville or to what extent the City Superintendent
is influential, but judging from my own observation, par
ticularly in my own locality, the City Superintendent is the
real power behind the schools.
So he won’t be hurt, if he is retained as a party, if he
does not violate any injunction which might be granted.
I think I might keep him in.
C.
M OTION TO DISMISS ON GROUND THAT STATE
HAS NOT CONSENTED TO BE SUED
(Tr. p. 16)
Mr. Battle : Your Honor please: This petition was filed
by certain persons against “ The School Board of The City
of Charlottesville, Virginia; and Fendall R. Ellis, Division
25
Superintendent of Schools o f the City o f Charlottesville,
Virginia.”
The petition alleges that the School Board is an admin
istrative arm of the Commonwealth of Virginia, in the
operation of the schools.
Substantially the same allegation is made with reference
to the Superintendent of Schools; and I understand that
process was served upon the Superintendent and upon the
Chairman of the School Board.
W e wish to move the Court to dismiss this action as being,
in effect, a suit by individuals against the Commonwealth of
Virginia, in contravention of the Eleventh Amendment to
the Constitution.
D.
DENIAL OF M O T IO N TO DISMISS ON GROUND
TH A T STATE HAS N O T CONSENTED TO BE SUED
(Tr. pp. 36-37)
T he Court: I have read this Answer and I saw that
defense drawn up. I was surprised, certainly, that that
question, if it had any validity it would not have been raised
in the Supreme Court; and assuming that it had, it is evi
dent the decision of the Supreme Court held it to be of no
merit.
In addition to that, I recalled— and which I looked up,
again— the statute which makes the school board a corpo
rate entity, with the right to sue and be sued; and I also
recall that, within the past year, several lawyers, Members
of the Legislature, had advocated repeal of the Statute per
mitting the school board to be sued, as one of the methods
of evading compliance with the Supreme Court decision.
So I began to look into the question, myself, and I came
to the ‘tentative’— of course— conclusion that there was no
26
validity to that defense. O f course, I came to that ‘tentative,’
as I say, conclusion, without hearing argument. But I have
heard the arguments of you Gentlemen this morning and I
am, still, of that opinion that I reached previously: that the
defense is without merit.
This is not a suit against the State.
The policy of the State has been fixed by the decision of
the Supreme Court, policy of segregation decision o f the
Supreme Court.
This is merely a suit against a group of the local School
Board to prevent them from discriminating against these
plaintiffs in the exercise of certain rights which the Supreme
Court decision granted to them; similarly, the suits on what
is called the “ Civil Rights Act,” and I have never heard they
have been considered to be suits against the State, where
local officers have been sued for violation o f the civil rights
of the defendants, to be a suit against the State.
This is a suit very similar, of a very similar nature, if not
o f an exact nature.
The motion to dismiss on that ground will be denied.
APPENDIX VI
A.
PLAINTIFFS’ EXHIBIT “A”
(Tr. pp. 39-42)
PE TITIO N
T O : The School Board of the City of Charlottesville,
Virginia, and Mr. Fendall R. Ellis, Division
Superintendent of Schools:
W e represent the following named children, their parents
or guardians. These children are o f school age and attend,
27
or are eligible to attend, public elementary or secondary
schools under your jurisdiction:
Doris Marie Allen and Shirley Elizabeth Allen, infants, by
Mason C. Allen and Mary Allen, their father and mother,
respectively, and next friend,
Linda E. Arnett, an infant, by Bennie M. Arnett, her mother
and next friend,
Cynthia Cooper, an infant, by Granville Cooper and Bertha
Cooper, her father and mother, respectively, and next friend,
Carolyn M. Dobson, an infant, by Sarah B. Brooks, her
guardian and next friend,
Robert L. Drakeford, an infant, by Robert C. Drakeford,
his father and next friend,
Olivia L. Ferguson, an infant, by George R. Ferguson, her
father and next friend,
Charles D. Fowler, III, an infant, by Charles D. Fowler, Jr.,
his father and next friend,
Marshall H. Garrett, Paul C. Garrett and Russell K. Gar
rett, infants, by Marshall T. Garrett, their father and next
friend,
Gloria Hamilton and Melvina Hamilton, infants, by Ger
trude Hamilton, their mother and next friend,
Jacqueline Harris and June Harris, infants, by Alois Har
ris, their mother and next friend,
Jasper Jones, Jr., an infant, by Ruth P. Jones, his mother
and next friend,
William Ware Jones, an infant, by Lucille W . Jones, his
mother and next friend,
28
Alfred Martin, John J. Martin, Donald Martin and Kenneth
Martin, infants, by Julia Martin, their mother and next
friend,
Nathaniel T. Maupin, an infant, by Moses C. Maupin, his
father and next friend,
Reginald Moss, Jr., Jacqueline Moss and Patricia Moss, in
fants, by Reginald R. Moss and Hazel Moss, father and
mother, respectively, and next friend,
Katheryne Robinson, Roberta Robinson and Rodney Robin
son, infants, by Rodney L. Robinson, their father and next
friend,
Alfred Saunders and Judy Saunders, infants, by Alfred
Saunders and Mary Saunders, their father and mother, re
spectively, and next friend,
Joyce A. Smith, Carolyn E. Smith, infants, by William M.
Smith, their father and next friend,
Rudolph Taylor, Louise L. Taylor, Dorothea A. Taylor,
Morris E. Taylor and Lamilla Taylor, infants, by Louise
Taylor, their mother and next friend,
Marvin L. Townsend, an infant, by Thelma Townsend, his
mother and next friend,
Roberta Whitlock, an infant, by Robert C. Whitlock, her
father and next friend,
Sherman R. White, an infant, by Randolph L. White, his
father and next friend,
Robert S. Wicks, Jr., an infant, by Robert S. Wicks, Sr.,
his father and next friend,
Roland T. W oodfolk and Ronald E. Woodfolk, infants, by
Mary A. W oodfolk, their mother and next friend,
29
Roland H. Young, an infant, by Howard Barnes, his guard
ian and next friend.
On May 17, 1954, the Supreme Court o f the United
States ruled that racial segregation in public school is a vio
lation of the Constitution of the United States, The Su
preme Court reaffirmed that principle on May 31, 1955, and
directed “ good faith compliance at the earliest practicable
date.” You have the responsibility o f reorganizing the
school system under your jurisdiction so that children of
school age attending and entitled to attend public schools will
not be denied admission to any school or be assigned to a
particular school solely because of race or color.
W e, therefore, call upon you to take immediate steps to
reorganize the public schools under your jurisdiction so that
children may attend them without regard to their race or
color.
The May 31st decision of the Supreme Court, to us, means
that the time for delay, evasion or procrastination is past.
Whatever the difficulties in according our clients their con
stitutional rights, it is clear that the school board must meet
and seek a solution to that question in accordance with the
law of the land. As we interpret the decision, you are duty
bound to take immediate concrete steps leading to early
elimination of segregation in the public schools.
Please rest assured o f our willingness to serve in any way
we can to aid you in dealing with this question. W e further
request that you will give us an early reply setting forth your
initial plans for desegregation.
Respectfully submitted,
(s ) Oliver W . Hill
Oliver W . Hill, o f Counsel
30
B.
PLAINTIFFS’ EXHIBIT “B”
(Tr. pp. 43-45)
C H A R LO TT E SV ILL E PU BLIC SCHOOLS
406 Fourteenth Street
Charlottesville, V irginia
October 17, 1955
Mr. Oliver Hill
Hill, Martin and Robinson
623 North Third Street
Richmond 19, Virginia
Dear Mr. H ill:
I am enclosing a Resolution adopted by the School Board
of the City of Charlottesville at its regular meeting on Oc
tober 8 in reply to a Petition received from you on October 6,
1955.
Very truly yours,
(s ) Fendall R. Ellis
Fendall R. Ellis,
Superintendent.
FR E/ds
Enclosure.
Whereas, the School Board of the City of Charlottesville
has received a Petition from Hill, Martin and Robinson,
counsel for “ certain children, their parents and guardians”
listed in said Petition “ requesting an early reply.”
Now, therefore, be it resolved, That the Board submit the
following reply:
31
The School Board believes that it was not the intent of
the Supreme Court’s decision of May 17, 1954, and subse
quent decrees o f May 31, 1955, to disrupt a system of public
education. Therefore, the problem confronting the Board is
to find a solution which will conform to the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the law and be acceptable to parents and
taxpayers who use and support the public schools. Such a
solution can be found only after sober reflection over a
period o f time.
The position of the School Board with reference to this
problem is stated in the following Resolution adopted by the
Board on July 8, 1955 :
“ Whereas, It is the policy o f the State Board o f Educa
tion that the public schools o f the Commonwealth open and
operate throughout the coming school session as heretofore,
“ Be it further resolved, That this Board constitute itself
a committee of the whole to begin promptly a study o f the
future operation of the City’s public school system in the
light of the Supreme Court decrees o f May 31, 1955 and
such other decisions and decrees as may affect future opera
tions of the public schools.”
And he it further resolved, That the Petition aforesaid
be, and it hereby is, referred to the Committee of the Whole
for consideration and study, with such recommendations as
the Committee may have to be made as a part o f its Report
to this Board.
October 13,1955.
32
APPENDIX VII
A.
PLAINTIFFS’ WITNESS GEORGE R. FERGUSON
(Tr. pp. 47-51)
George R. Ferguson, called as a witness on behalf o f the
plaintiffs herein, being first duly sworn, testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAM INATION
By M r. H il l :
Q Will you state your name, address and occupation,
please?
A George R. Ferguson, 908 Page Street. Mortician.
Q Mr. Ferguson, what country are you a citizen of ?
A The United States of America.
Q O f what racial identity ?
A Negro.
Q Do you have a child ?
A One child.
Q What is the age of the child ?
A 14.
Q Does the child attend the public schools o f Charlottes
ville ?
A Yes.
Q Or did she attend the public schools o f Charlottesville
for the school session, 1955-1956?
A She did.
Q State the name of your child, please?
A Olivia Louise Ferguson.
33
Q And you and she were one o f the petitioners to the
School Board ?
A Yes.
Q And one o f the complainants in this case ?
A Yes.
Q Will you state what school your child attended during
the school session, 1955-1956?
A Burley High School.
Q And in the years prior to that, what school or schools
did your child attend ?
A Jefferson Elementary School.
Q Was last year the first year she attended high school?
A Second year.
Q Prior to going to Burley, she attended the Jefferson
High School? I mean, Jefferson Elementary School.
A First seven grades.
Q And both of those schools are located in the City of
Charlottesville and come under the jurisdiction of The
School Board o f the City o f Charlottesville ?
A Jefferson under the jurisdiction of the Charlottesville
Board; Burley, joint Board, Albemarle County and City of
Charlottesville.
Q Was there, during the school year o f 1955-1956, and
school year o f 1954-1955, any other high school to which
your child would have been permitted to attend ?
A No.
Q Will you state your address, Mr. Ferguson?
A I gave my business address. My residence address is
702 Redd Street.
34
Q Where is that?
A In the southwest section of the City.
Q O f Charlottesville?
A That is right.
Q Now, the Burley High School, where your child
attended last year, what is the racial designation o f pupils
who attend there, or do you know the racial designation of
pupils who attend there ?
A Negro.
Q Do any white children attend that school ?
A Not that I know of.
Q And the Jefferson High School, what is the racial
designation o f the children who attend that school? The
Jefferson Elementary School?
A Negro.
Q Now, are you familiar with some of the other plain
tiffs in this suit ?
A Yes, I am.
Mr. H il l : I guess the simplest thing would be just to
call their names and ask you whether or not you know them.
Q Do you know Mason Allen and Mary Allen ?
A Yes, Ido.
Q Do you know their children ?
A Yes.
Q Will you state their racial designation ?
A Negroes.
Mr. A lmond: W e will admit all of them are Negroes,
referring to the complaint.
35
Mr. H il l : Defendants admit that the complainants are
all Negroes.
Q (By Mr. Hill, continuing) I will ask you, Mr. Fer
guson, if you have seen these names ?
A Yes, I have.
Q And all o f these people are residents of the City o f
Charlottesville ?
A Yes.
M r. A lmond : W e will admit that, too.
Mr. H il l : The only other question: whether or not the
defense admits these parents have children eligible to attend
school ?
Mr. Battle : I think you had better go ahead and prove
your case.
Mr. H il l : Will you admit these children are eligible to
attend the public schools o f Charlottesville ?
Mr. Battle : As far as we know. W e don’t controvert
that.
Mr. H ill : All right.
Mr. H il l : That is all. You may cross-examine.
Mr. A lmond: No questions, Your Honor.
B.
PLAINTIFFS’ ADVERSE WITNESS
FENDALL R. ELLIS
(Tr. pp. 52-66)
Fendall R. Ellis, called as an adverse witness, under Rule
40, being first duly sworn, testified as follows:
36
CROSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr. H il l :
Q W ill you state your name, address and occupation?
A My name is Fendall R. Ellis. I live at 1505 Rutland
Avenue, Charlottesville, Virginia. My occupation is Super
intendent o f Schools of the City of Charlottesville, Virginia.
Q And you are one of the defendants in this suit ?
A I am.
Q Now directing your attention, Mr. Ellis, to early in
October 1955, I will ask you whether or not you and the
School Board did not receive this Petition? (Handing docu
ment to the witness)
A W e received it.
Mr. H il l : May it please the Court, Governor Battle
wants this —
T he Court: (Interrupting) Did you identify the Peti
tion?
Q (By Mr. Hill, continuing) Did you receive this
Petition from the named citizens of the City of Charlottes
ville, who are also complainants in this present action, is that
correct ?
A Yes.
T he Court : What is the substance of it ?
Q This was a Petition, was it not, Sir— I will ask you
to read the prayer of the Petition to the Court.
A After the listing o f certain names, the prayer of the
Petition seems to be :
“ We, therefore, call upon you to take immediate steps to
reorganize the public schools under your jurisdiction so that
37
children may attend them without regard to their race or
color.”
T he Court : Let me see that.
Mr. H il l : W e would like to have this marked “ Plain
tiffs’ Exhibit ‘A ’ ” and then move its admission.
Reporter’s Note : Plaintiffs’ Exhibit A was filed, (Page
38) and fully set forth (Page 39) herein.
Mr. H il l : (Repeating) Now, may it please the Court,
I move the admission of this document, Plaintiffs’ Exhibit
A, in evidence in this case.
T he Court: All right.
Mr. H ill : Simultaneously, I would like to ask to with
draw this and substitute a copy.
Q (By Mr. Hill, continuing) Mr. Ellis, how long have
you been Division Superintendent of the Charlottesville
Public Schools, o f Charlottesville, Virginia?
A In the City o f Charlottesville ?
Q Yes, Charlottesville?
A Since July 1st, 1953.
Q And where else have you been ?
A Wythe County, Virginia, July 1, 1945 to June 31,
1953.
Q Since you have been Superintendent of Schools in
Charlottesville, what has been the practice of the adminis
tration and school board in the City of Charlottesville so far
as placing students, with respect to their racial identity ?
A At the present time, we have six elementary schools,
five of which are attended by white children and one of
which is attended by negro children: we have a high school,
38
which is attended by white children, and a high school,
jointly owned and operated by the City o f Charlottesville
and County o f Albemarle, which is attended by negro chil
dren.
Q At any time since you have been Superintendent, from
1953 up to the end of the last school year here in June of
1956, would a negro child, upon application, have been ad
mitted to any school in the City of Charlottesville, otherwise
qualified to attend a school in the City of Charlottesville ?
M r. Battle: W e object.
T he Court : I don’t think he has completed the question,
yet.
Mr. Battle : I beg your pardon.
Q (By Mr. Hill, continuing) Restating the question,
I will ask you, again, if at any time since you have been
Superintendent of Schools, in the City of Charlottesville, if
a negro child of parents residing here in the City of Char
lottesville, within the age limits, who applied for admission
to a school, would that child have been admitted to any school
in the City of Charlottesville, regardless whether elementary
or high school ?
Mr. A lmond: We object.
T he Court: What is your objection, Mr. Almond?
Mr. A lmond: During the time o f Counsel’s question,
the policy now contended against, was conducted under sanc
tion of law, well settled, even by the Supreme Court o f the
United States. That is one ground of our objection, as to
the propriety and relevance of the question. The other is, it is
not what “ has been done,” in the past: the question is, as
to the policy that would be invoked or used for a session of
39
school, that is not in session but that will be in session, in
all probability, in September.
T he Court: Mr. Attorney General, the answer to the
question is perfectly obvious, and a harmless one. W e all
know negroes have been compelled to attend negro schools in
Virginia, in pursuance to statutory law of the State, which
was the statutory law of the State until nullified by the
Supreme Court decision.
W e also, all know that local school authorities have not
felt free to follow the Supreme Court decision, themselves,
without some direction from State authorities, or something
of that sort; and that the policy of segregation still exists
generally over the State.
Don’t we all know that ?
In fact, the very purpose of this suit is to bring about a
change in that situation, isn’t it ?
Mr. Battle: If Your Honor please, but this witness—
if I may express my thought?— this witness is being asked
to answer “ What would have been the situation had a cer
tain thing occurred ?” and this witness—
T he Court: (Interrupting) During what period of
time?
Mr. Battle : During the period of time indicated in the
past.
Mr. H ill : From 1953 up to last June.
Mr. Battle: W e submit that the witness is not compe
tent to answer that question. He has no discretion over the
question of admission of pupils.
T he Court : Oh, that is your objection ? You are not ad
mitting he has anything to do with the admission o f school
children?
40
M r. Battle: Yes.
Mr. H ill : I asked, by whose order it was done. I asked,
what was the fact ?
Mr. Battle: Y ou asked “ what would have happened, if
a certain thing happened ?”
T he Court: He may answer. If he doesn’t know what
happened, he can say he doesn’t know.
Q (B y Mr. Hill, continuing) Answer the question,
please.
A What is the question ?
Mr. H ill : Read the question, please.
T he Reporter reads the question.
Q (By Mr. Hill, continuing) Now the letter merely is
a covering letter, sending the resolutions, was it not, Sir ?
A Yes.
Q Will you read, for the benefit o f the Court, the reso
lution? and that resolution, Sir, was in response to this
Petition referred to as Plaintiffs’ Exhibit A, is that correct?
A Yes.
(Reading) “ Whereas, The School Board o f the City of
Charlottesville has received a Petition from Hill, Martin and
Robinson, counsel for ‘certain children, their parents and
guardians’ listed in said Petition ‘requesting an early reply.’
“Now, therefore, he it resolved, That the Board submit
the following reply:
“ The School Board believes that it was not the intent of
the Supreme Court’s decision of May 17, 1954 and subse
quent decrees of May 31, 1955 to disrupt a system o f public
education. Therefore, the problem confronting the Board
is to find a solution which will conform to the Supreme
41
Court’s interpretation of the law and be acceptable to par
ents and taxpayers who use and support the public schools.
Such a solution can be found only after sober reflection over
a period of time.
“ The position of the School Board with reference to this
problem is stated in the following Resolution adopted by the
Board on July 8,1955 ;
“ Whereas, It is the policy of the State Board of Education
that the public schools o f the Commonwealth open and op
erate throughout the coming school session as heretofore,
“Be it resolved, That the School Board of the City of
Charlottesville operate the public schools of the City for
the school year 1955-56 on the same basis as heretofore, and
“ Be it further resolved, That this Board constitute itself
a committee o f the whole to begin promptly a study of the
future operation of the City’s public school system in the
light of the Supreme Court decrees of May 31, 1955 and
such other decisions and decrees as may affect future opera
tions of the public schools.”
“And he it further resolved, That the Petition aforesaid
be, and it hereby is, referred to the Committee of the Whole
for consideration and study, with such recommendations as
the Committee may have to be made as a part of its Report
to this Board.
“ October 13, 1955.”
Q (By Mr. Hill, continuing) Now pursuant to law,
under your supervision, a budget is submitted to the City
Council for the operation o f the public schools in the school
year, 1956-1957, and which is submitted in about March, is
that not right, Sir?
A It is required, by law, to be submitted before April
1st; ordinarily, it is submitted well before that.
42
Q And in pursuance o f your duties and functions, you
and the School Board made your proper plans for the en
suing year, and prepared your budget, did you not ?
A A budget was prepared, with the advice and counsel
of the School Board, as required by law: was submitted to
the City Council, for 1956-1957, and has been approved.
Q And necessarily, you formulated your plans for the
conduct of the schools for the session, 1956-1957, did you
not?
A What do you mean by that ?
Q Well, I mean that, by the time you submitted your
budget, you pretty well knew what you proposed to do, as
far as operation of the schools for 1956-1957, did you not?
I mean, you project your plans into the future and you base
your budget and everything under the proposed operation
of your schools for the coming year, is that correct ?
A That is true: the budget is based on the number of
teachers you expect to have and other considerations.
Q And the general plan of operation for the coming
year, and that is one reason for having a “ budget,” so you
could plan ?
A I think so.
Q And you did do that, did you not ?
A Yes.
Q Well, on or about April 6, 1955, you received a letter
from me, did you not ?
A Yes.
Q Asking you, generally — referring to this previous
communication with you— and asking you what you pro
43
posed to do concerning the school year, 1956-1957, with
respect to desegregation of schools, is that correct ?
A Yes.
Mr. H il l : If the Court please, Counsel had planned to
produce the copy but was unable to find it, so we will just
handle it in this manner:
Q (By Mr. Hill, continuing) I will show you a letter
dated April 13th, written on the stationery of the School
Board of the City of Charlottesville, and signed by you, and
ask you : Is that not the reply that you sent in response to
my inquiry of April 6th, 1956?
A Yes.
Q And this is the response, that was signed by you ?
A Yes.
Q And it was the response made by the School Board ?
A This gives the action of the School Board, in compli
ance with your request.
Mr. H il l : Now I ask that this be marked Plaintiffs’
Exhibit C, and I will offer it in evidence.
Plaintiff’s Exhibit C, last above referred to, filed.
Q (By Mr. Hill, continuing) Now Mr. Ellis, I will ask
you to read Plaintiffs’ Exhibit C, which has been offered in
evidence, to the Court, please.
A (Reading)
“ School Board of the City of Charlottesville
“ Office o f the Superintendent
“ Charlottesville, Virginia
“ 406 Fourteenth Street
“ April 13, 1956
44
“ Mr. Oliver W . Hill
Hill, Martin and Olphin
118 East Leigh Street
Richmond 19, Virginia
“ Dear Mr. H ill:
“ In reply to your letter o f April 6, I wish to advise that
the School Board at a meeting on April 12 passed the follow
ing Resolution:
“ On motion duly made and carried, the Board instructed
the Superintendent to notify Mr. Hill that no action had been
taken in this matter beyond that about which he had been
previously notified.
“ Very truly yours,
“ (s) Fendall R. Ellis
Fendall R. Ellis,
Superintendent”
FR E/ds
Q (By Mr. Hill, continuing) Now the sum and sub
stance of that is : the situation is just as it was in October,
when we first petitioned, is that correct ?
A (N o reply)
Mr. Battle : He didn’t say.
Mr. H ill : But I asked him about it.
A “ The situation” is a very broad term. I don’t know
just what you mean by it?
Q All right, Sir. I will ask you this: does the School
Board of the City of Charlottesville plan, at this time, to
desegregate the City School for the school term 1956-1957?
A No.
45
Q Or any other period foreseeable, in the foreseeable
future that you know o f ?
A No plan has been approved, as indicated in that letter
■— resolution.
M r. H ill : That is all, Sir.
T h e Court : Just a minute, Mr. Ellis.
E X A M IN A T IO N B Y T H E CO U R T:
Q Mr. Ellis, —-
T he Court: (Interrupting) First, do you Gentlemen
have any examination?
Mr. A lmond : W e may put him on, in chief, Your Honor.
T he Court : All right.
Q (By The Court, continuing) What is the school pop
ulation of the City of Charlottesville ?
A The school population at the last session, 4350 chil
dren.
Q Which includes white and negro children ?
A Both white and negro children.
Q In what proportions ?
A In elementary, approximately 2450 white and 750
negro.
Q And you said the total was, how much ?
A About 4350.
Mr. Battle : I have the exact figures. Maybe Mr. Ellis
— if he can refer to them ?
46
T he Court: Yes. I will be glad to have him do so.
Mr. Battle : ( Hands document to the witness )
A (Referring to document) 2436 white children.
Q (By the Court, continuing) In the grade schools?
A Elementary grades, first seven grades; and 761 negro,
enrolled in elementary school: 897 white, 281 negro children
in the high schools. (Returning document to Mr. Battle)
Q That was for the last session ?
A Yes, sir.
T he Court : That is all I wanted to ask the witness.
(Witness excused)
Mr. H ill : Plaintiffs rest. Your Honor.
APPENDIX VIII
A.
M OTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF EVIDENCE
IN SUPPORT OF COMPLAINT
(Tr. p. 66)
Mr. A lmond : At this stage o f the proceedings, Plain
tiffs having rested, put on their case in chief, we ask the
Court to entertain a motion to dismiss the complaint as on
the evidence introduced in support thereof, they have not
made a case, under the law and the evidence, appropriate to
the relief sought: * * *
47
B.
DENIAL OF M OTION TO DISMISS
FOR LACK OF EVIDENCE
(Tr. pp. 73-76)
Mr. H ill : May it please the Court —
T he Court: (Interrupting) Nevermind.
Mr. Attorney General, I don’t think it is a matter of
material importance as to whether or not each child has
made application to a school.
This group has made, filed with the School Board, what
they call a “ Petition,” asking them to adopt the policy of
desegregating the schools under the Supreme Court decision.
If they had, the School Board had replied in the affirmative
to that request, then there would have been the question o f
admission of the children to particular schools, no child to
certain schools they had not, heretofore, been allowed to
enter and the question of individual applications might arise.
But the Board refused to state that they would adopt a
policy of desegregation. If I heard correctly their answer
to these Petitioners, it was that they intended, for the pres
ent, to continue the policies which they had followed in
years past.
Well, that being the case, of course there was no room for
application or reason for individual applications to the
School Board. They presented the question to the School
Board and the School Board said, in effect, they intended
to continue segregation in the public schools o f this City, and
I think that was a sufficient basis for the suit.
I agree with you that, if these plaintiffs succeed in getting
a favorable decree, it doesn’t mean that every school door
is going to be thrown open to everybody that is going to
rush into it. It may be that certain schools are already
48
crowded; and while other schools have adequate facilities, it
may be that certain applicants for admission to the high
school will be found not to be qualified for admission to the
high school.
There are various valid reasons why a particular child,
negro child, might not be allowed to enter any particular
school that it desired, but that reason must not be because
he is a Negro. It must be some valid reason, o f a different
sort.
Now 1 agree with you on that.
And I don’t think any decree would be sweeping enough
to say to “all” o f the negro children in Charlottesville: “ You
can go— next September, you can go to whatever school you
want to.” It might be that there were reasons, say, of resi
dence : they may want to go to a school distant— in a distant
part o f the City, from where they reside, where another
school is available to them; and it might be the policy of the
City to have children, at particular points of the City to go
to particular schools.
I understand them to say there are five white schools in
the City, and one elementary school. It might have been the
policy for years,— I don’t know whether it is required by
City Ordinance or not; I am not certain of that, but it has
been the policy for a great many years to designate certain
areas o f the City— north or east o f certain areas, and cer
tain residents to attend certain schools— and that will keep
them from flocking into the newest school and crowding
into one particular school. They try to equalize the facilities
o f the schools, as much as they can.
But those are reasonable discriminations.
That is an example, and I cite that as an example. The
qualification of a pupil for high school or any other school,
is a legitimate reason— considering the application.
49
And then, a decree would not mean there is a free choice
o f every negro, or white child, to go to a school their par
ticular fancy might dictate.
But first, the policy of discontinuing the segregated
schools has been proposed here to the School Board and as
I understand it, they answered they intended to continue,
for the present, segregated schools in accordance with their
past policy, and I think that was a sufficient basis for the
suit, and I think, in that respect, the plaintiffs have proven
their case. So,—
I cannot grant your motion to dismiss.
APPENDIX IX
A.
DEFENDANTS’ EXH IBIT No. 2 — DEPOSITION
OF FENDALL R. ELLIS
(Tr. pp. 87-92)
Fendall R. Ellis, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
(1 ) I was born in Chesterfield County, Virginia, on
March 5, 1910, and have resided in Virginia all my life. I
was educated in the public schools o f Chesterfield County,
received a Bachelor o f Arts degree from the College of W il
liam and Mary in 1931, and a Master of Arts degree from
the University of Virginia in 1935. I have been connected
with the public school system of Virginia for 22 years. From
1945 to 1953 I served as Superintendent of Schools1 in
Wythe County, Virginia, and since July, 1953, have been
Superintendent of Schools in the City of Charlottesville, in
which position I am now serving.
(2 ) In accordance with the provision of Virginia law
so
that the school budget for the ensuing year shall be prepared
by the Superintendent, with the advice and approval o f the
School Board, and submitted to the City Council on or be
fore April 1, the 1956-57 school budget for the operation of
the Charlottesville public schools was submitted to City
Council on March 26, 1956, and approved by City Council
on April 16, 1956. The approval of the school budget well
in advance o f the beginning of the next school session is
necessary in order to give time in which to make plans and
preparations for the operation of the schools during the
ensuing year. O f necessity, neither the School Board nor
the Superintendent could make any plans for the operation
of the schools except on the basis on which they heretofore
have been operating.
(3 ) Preparations for the operation of the schools begin
ning in September have been completed. Teacher contracts
have been entered into and decisions have been made con
cerning the assignment of teachers to schools, classrooms,
and the grades and subjects they are to teach. Teacher loads
with reference to the number of pupils to be assigned to a
teacher of specific subjects and classes have been determined.
This embraces the utilization of all classroom space avail
able for the accommodation of the eligible school population
of the City o f Charlottesville. Formulation of these plans
annually is one of the principal duties required of me in
order to set up and follow through with an orderly pro
cedure in administering the public school system. This plan
ning requires much time and thought, as well as consultation
with principals of the various schools and the teachers there
in. A sudden change o f these plans would not only occasion
great difficulty, but would be most disruptive and impracti
cal, considering the small amount o f time available be
tween now and the opening of the schools in September.
51
(4 ) The assignment o f pupils to grades and sections of
grades in the elementary schools and subjects and sections
of subjects in the high school is an important and compli
cated process in the Charlottesville schools. Assignments
are not made simply on the basis o f a certain number of
pupils to each classroom but, rather, on the basis o f the needs
of the individual child. The child’s records, his special inter
ests, and his academic strengths and weaknesses are among
the factors considered in his placement. Teachers and prin
cipals confer on this matter and frequently the Director of
Instruction and Visiting Teachers are consulted. At times
the Superintendent o f Schools participates personally in
these decisions.
(5 ) This important responsibility has been executed for
the coming session. The assignment of pupils in the elemen
tary schools was made at the close o f the 1955-56 session in
such a way as to make full use of all regular classrooms
available in the city schools. The assignment of high school
pupils to subjects and sections of subjects was started during
the month of May, 1956, with registration of pupils entering
the eighth grade, which is the first year o f high school.
(6 ) Most o f the teachers and some o f the other person
nel who participate in the assignment of pupils are not avail
able for consultation relative to any change o f plans which
would be occasioned by court decree and to a large extent
would not be available for the cooperation and assistance
necessary prior to the opening of schools in September.
(7 ) I am convinced from my years o f experience in
school administration that any sudden change of plans
which would involve the transfer o f children at this time
from one class to another class or from one school to another
school would be most disruptive of orderly procedure and
52
prove of harmful effect in the administration of the public
school system.
(8 ) I am naturally deeply concerned not only over the
administrative effects o f such transfers but over the feelings
and reactions of the patrons of the public school system rela
tive to this subject. In my judgment, many patrons would
withdraw their children from the public school system in the
event that any plan for integration was sought to be put into
effect without thorough and comprehensive exploration and
consideration of all the difficulties involved by the School
Board, the administrative and instructional staff, and the
patrons themselves. I am convinced also that requests for
transfers from areas or divisions of the public school system
where integration would take effect to those areas or divi
sions, if any, not so affected would create an administrative
problem making it impractical and, in my judgment, impos
sible to accommodate the facilities available to the exigencies
of the situation which would arise in such event. Transfers
from one school to another without ample time for essential
planning and preparation would, in my judgment, create a
situation of imbalance not only with reference to pupil load
per teacher but would produce, in all probability, the neces
sity of engaging a larger teaching staff. The latter would
create considerable embarrassment relative to budgetary
matters and to appropriations already made for the coming
session.
I have read the affidavits o f Mayor Weinburg, Mr. Good
man, Chairman of the School Board, and Mr. Michael, a
member of the School Board and subscribe to the statements
therein contained.
(s ) Fendall R. Ellis
Fendall R. Ellis
53
B.
DEFENDANTS’ EXH IBIT No, 3 — DEPOSITION
OF JAMES H. M ICHAEL, JR.
(Tr. pp. 118-121)
James H. Michael, Jr., being first duly sworn, deposes and
says:
(1 ) I was born in Charlottesville, Virginia, in 1918, and
have lived in Virginia throughout my life. I am a practicing
attorney and a member of the Charlottesville Bar and for
approximately four years I have been a member of the
School Board for the City of Charlottesville. I have a wide
acquaintance in the City and feel that I am thoroughly con
versant with public opinion and sentiment therein. As a
member of the School Board, I have been deeply concerned
over the situation relative to the efficient administration and
functioning of the public school system in the City of Char
lottesville.
(2 ) It is my conviction that the problems arising as a
result of the decision o f the Supreme Court o f the United
States in the school segregation cases are of such magnitude
and complexity as to invoke the best constructive thought
of which the school administration officials are capable in
order to preserve, as far as possible, an efficient administra
tion of public education for the benefit o f the people and all
of the children within the jurisdiction of the school division
here concerned.
(3 ) The budget for the school year to begin in Septem
ber, 1956, has been prepared and submitted by the Division
Superintendent pursuant to State law and procedure and
approved by the Council for the City of Charlottesville.
54
(4 ) The essential administrative steps and procedures
relative to the opening of the schools in September have
been worked out, pupil assignments have been made, teacher
contracts have been entered into, registration of pupils for
high school instruction for the ensuing year have been com
pleted, the facilities available have been utilized on the basis
o f pupil needs and requirements and I am convinced that a
disruption of the plans already made would under the neces
sities o f the situation be productive of confusion, and would
seriously militate against orderly and efficient administration
o f the educational process to the lasting detriment of the
school children of the City of Charlottesville.
(5 ) The administrative problems set out in the affidavit
o f the Superintendent of Schools are, in my opinion, prob
lems o f first magnitude requiring for their solution intimate
contact with the parents and pupils involved in the City
school system and the time necessary to determine with rea
sonable accuracy the shifts of pupil population from one
school to another. This raises the question of the distribu
tion of teachers and the number o f teachers required, the
matter of available space in the various individual schools
and curriculum adjustments, the solution to all of which will
require, in my judgment, many months of careful consid-'
eration.
(6 ) From the beginning I have been seriously concerned
about the question of public support for our school system,
which question is to me the basic question involved in this
issue. I consider that the function of our School Board is
to provide the best education possible consonant with the
support which we receive and I am gravely fearful o f any
substantial diminution of that public support. In my opinion
the effect in the City of Charlottesville of integration of the
school system would unquestionably be to diminish severely
55
the support the population o f Charlottesville is presently
willing to afford to its school system. Such a lessening of
public support to the degree which I believe to be inevitable
if integration be ordered would result in our operating a
third or fourth class school system.
(7 ) I have read the affidavits o f Mayor Weinburg, Mr.
Ellis, Superintendent of Schools, and Mr. Goodman, Chair
man of the School Board, and subscribe to the statements
therein contained.
(s ) James H. Michael, Jr.
James H. Michael, Jr.
APPENDIX X
TESTIMONY OF FEND ALL R. ELLIS ON CROSS,
REDIRECT AND RECROSS-EXAMINATION
(Tr. pp. 93-116)
CROSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr. H il l :
Q Now Mr. Ellis,— ?
Mr. H il l : (Interrupting) May it please the Court, o f
course we object to all of the parts o f the Affidavit which
deals with anything other than purely administrative mat
ters. W e regard that entirely as irrelevant to the proceed
ings.
Q (By Mr. Hill, continuing) Mr. Ellis, at the present
time, under your present operations contemplated for 1956,
do you assign pupils to schools, say, the McGuffey School ?
A On the basis o f geographical location of their resi
dences.
Q As a matter of fact, the City of Charlottesville is di
56
vided into five geographical areas, for elementary school
pupils ?
A That is correct,
Q And the children living within any of these particular
geographical areas attend that particular elementary school,
do they not?
A They do.
Q Now at the present time, this only applies to white
children, is that correct ?
A That is correct, in practice.
Q And negro children from all over the City attend the
one elementary school and the one white school ?
A I didn’t get — ?
Q (Interrupting) I say, the City is regarded as a one
single unit for admission o f negro elementary school chil
dren, to the Jefferson School, is that correct?
A It has so operated.
Q And unless something is done about it, that is the way
it will operate in September, is that correct ?
A That is correct.
Q And the same thing is true with respect to the Burley
School ?
A Yes.
Q As to high school pupils ?
A That is true.
Q Now up to the present time, in your contemplated
operation in September, the City is regarded as one single
unit for the admission o f white children to the Lane High
School, is that correct ?
57
A All white children at high school level, who wish to
attend a public school, are attending Lane.
Q And your proposed operation in September, all white
children to Lane and all negro children to Burley, is that
correct ?
A I would presume so, yes.
Q Now what is so difficult about the change o f operation
for the same number of pupils, to permit negro children liv
ing in the Venable School District to go to that School ? Why
is that so complicated a procedure ?
A The matter of pupil assignments has been made and,
as stated in my Affidavit, the placement of children involves
the consultation with and agreement of a number of people
involved, who are not presently available. And I have stated,
that the disruption of what has been planned, with the sub
stitution of something else, would be a difficult administra
tive matter.
Q What we want to get at, Mr. Ellis, is— what is so
difficult, administratively, about admitting all the children
who live in the Venable area, as that is the only school in
that area as it now, presently, is districted— that is the only
school over there ?
A It is the only school in that district.
Q Well, what is so difficult, administratively, about per
mitting those children to go to that school ?
A What do you mean by “ those children ?”
Q The children living in this geographical district that
you have already set up ?
A In the matter of classrooms in the schools, as present
ly set up, all available classrooms will be occupied and if
some other system of assignment were initiated at this time,
58
there would have to be some restudy o f physical accommoda
tions and the effect on them of any change in assignments.
Q There are not going to be any more children, regard
less o f what plan you use, there are not going to be any
more children ?
A No more in the total enrollment.
Q And you are not going to have any more classrooms ?
A Well, there would be no more in the total in number.
I think there might be fewer. I don’t know.
Q All right, Sir. And if some children are taken from
one school, there would be room in the other school, and the
thing will equalize itself over the City, don’t you think ?
A If you think of it as dealing with a certain number
of things that can be placed in one place or another place,
I concur with what you say; but if you think in terms o f the
welfare of particular individuals, who are placed some place
for a particular reason, or reasons, it appears to be another
matter.
Q The only thing you take into consideration at the
present time is placing white children in a particular school
district, in the particular geographical area they live ?
A Unless they are sent to some special class, for a spe
cial reason, outside the district.
Q The majority of the children there, attend? and the
particular school depends on the geographical district in
which they live, whether they be highly intelligent or very
stupid, is that correct?
A That is, generally, correct.
Q I am talking about the “ white” children at the pres
ent. What I am trying to find out: you say it is going to be
59
such a big problem. What is this “ big problem,” adminis
tratively ?
A Is it permissible to read you, again, the statement I
made?
Q Yes, sir. You mean, you want to refer to your state
ment?
A I think it is covered in that statement.
Mr. Battle, Junior: (Hands document to the witness,
Defendants’ Exhibit No. 2)
(Intermission, while the witness examines Exhibit)
A Will you repeat your question ?
T he Reporter reads the question.
A One of the several phases of it, one phase is, as I
have indicated, the accommodation o f available space to the
children to be served. I have stated that, in our arrange
ments in planning for next year in the placement of children
in the grades, in the elementary schools, and in the subjects
and sections of subjects in high schools, that we have made
full use of the teaching staff, which we anticipated we
needed and which have been employed; and full use of all
classrooms; and I am saying that the re-doing of that would
be a large task, administratively.
Now, I indicated, on the assignment of children, why they
were assigned to particular grades or sections of grades and
subjects and sections of subjects, and indicated there is con
siderable consultation and study on the part of teachers, who
have taught the children; and visiting teachers, who work
with them and the Superintendent on the assignment of
those children.
Q May I interrupt you a moment? You are speaking
about the elementary school children, there ?
60
A I am speaking of both.
Q With reference to the elementary school children, in
spite of all that, still the fact remains that, up to this time,
these children were sent to the one school in this district, is
that correct ?
A That is correct.
Q So, up to this time, all these factors have not been re
garded as too relevant, have they ?
A They have. There are many sections, at the particu
lar grade school you are referring to, with five sections of
the First Grade, last year. It is not a matter of just assign
ing a child to a grade, but a “ section” o f a grade.
Q Let’s take the Second Grade: gives you an oppor
tunity to have experience with the children, the same evalu
ations are made of the white and negro children in the
schools ?
A Yes.
Q So you know, whatever these particular factors are
you take into consideration, you know those in regard to all
Second Grade children, negro as well as white, at the pres
ent time, do you not ?
A That basic information I think you refer to, I would
say “ Yes” to that.
Q Then what would be so difficult about assigning the
children on the basis of the same factors that you know
about, all of them in the respective schools ? That is what I
am trying to find out.
A Well, one factor, and a very important factor, is the
matter that teacher-contracts have been entered into and
plans for the operation of the schools are completed, on the
same basis on which they have heretofore operated; and if
61
we, at this time, made a radical departure from that plan of
operation, I am not all sure that we have the correct number
of teachers to take care o f it, because of factors which might
arise over which the School Board, itself, and Superintend
ent, would have no control. So we may have, for such op
eration, either too many or too few teachers.
M r. A lmond : Have you finished, Mr. Ellis?
He keeps cutting you off.
M r. H ill : I don’t mean to cut you off.
Q (By Mr. Hill, continuing) You merely employ teach
ers under contract by the School Board to teach, is that
correct ?
In other words, if you employ “ Mary Jones,” who last
year taught the Second Grade at McGuffey’s School, but
this year, for reasons you deem sufficient, you want to send
“ Mary Jones” to the Burley School to teach the Third Grade,
there is nothing in your contract with teachers to prevent
you?
A Nothing in our contract to prevent us from trans
ferring a teacher from one assignment to another. How
ever, it has been my practice not to make such transfer with
out, first, talking to the teachers and securing their approval
or agreement on such transfer.
Q All I am getting a t: administratively, there is noth
ing to prevent you from doing it ?
A (N o reply)
Q What is your answer ?
A My position is, it would be exceedingly difficult to do
it. I don’t know that you can say it is “ impossible” to do
anything, but I say, this involves great difficulty.
Q Now boiling it down, is it not a fact you just don’t
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want to put negro children in schools with white children?
Isn’t that the whole basis o f your “ problem,” your “ big
problem ?”
A The basis o f the problem is public reaction to it, of
course, which I think you hit on.
Q And that is your “ major problem,” is it not? what
you put in here as:
“ I am naturally deeply concerned not only over the admin
istrative effects o f such transfers but over the feelings and
reactions o f the patrons of the public school system relative
to this subject.”
That is the problem, is it not ?
A I say that that is the basic problem, because “ Public
Schools” are supported by the “ Public,” and must therefore
conform to the general wishes o f those people who support
them.
Q And if you regarded the climate of opinion for the
admission of negro and white children in the same school is
to be favorable, it would be no “ problem,” administratively,
is that not true, Mr. Ellis ?
A No, that is not true.
Q Wouldn’t be any great problem?
A There are two problems that we are talking about and
the existence of one negates the existence of another.
Q Well then, assume the elimination of one in order that
we can concentrate on the other ?
A But I have not agreed to the elimination of it.
Q I say, assuming the climate o f public opinion was
favorable to the integration of negroes in the schools, you
would have no great administrative problem, isn’t that true ?
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A Are you talking about “ next September ?”
Q I am talking about “ September 1956.”
A The climate of opinion, although I think is the most
important factor in this problem, whether it be in Charlottes
ville or anywhere else, does not rule out the administrative
problems we have been talking about, if you expected those
administrative problems to be taken care of in a very short
time.
Q You say, “ could be taken care of in a very short
time?”
Mr. Battle : You said that.
Mr. A lmond : W e object, Your Honor, as misleading.
Mr. H il l : This is cross-examination, Your Honor.
Q (B y Mr. Hill, continuing) I say, isn’t it true, Mr.
Ellis, these administrative problems wouldn’t be of any great
moment, they could be solved by your present Staff, in a
reasonably short period o f time, if you regarded the public
feeling as being favorable?
A I would say the administrative problems would con
tinue to be substantial, regardless, if you are thinking in
terms of “ September 1956” . I would say the administrative
problems would continue to be substantial problems, if they
are to be solved over such a short period o f time, regardless
of public opinion, because we don’t know, and I don’t know
of no way in which we would know the number involved in
this situation.
Q Mr. Ellis, how long would it take you— it wouldn’t
take you very long to find out the number of these children,
who reside in the respective geographical districts that have
already been laid out? As a matter of fact, in a day or so
64
you could determine where each child in the City o f Char
lottesville lives, in respect to its geographical district ?
A I could determine, within a reasonable time, the resi
dence of any children now attending school.
Q And you would know how many children were avail
able for any particular school in a reasonable length of time,
and you know the capacity of the school, so there would be
nothing of great moment there, to make a decision about
that, is there ?
A There is, in this sense: you seem to be assuming that
we would— we have districts, as you have said, for the five
white schools, and we do not— and all negroes presently are
attending the negro elementary school— but from your ques
tion, you evidently assume we will close the negro school
and that they will go to all five districts presently set out.
Q No, sir, I do not. I assume that you will utilize all
six o f your schools, in the future as you have in the past,
except race would not be a factor for admission to any
school.
A If we have five zones now, involving five schools, the
problem would be a six-zone situation, would it not? instead
o f finding out who lives in the five zones ?
Q Would there be any great problem there ?
A I think it would require the adjustment of all the
zones in the City.
O How long would it take you to re-zone the City, to
increase the Zones from five to six, how long would it take
you, do you think ?
A When we built two additional schools and entered
them, in 1953, we spent about a year on re-zoning, from
three schools to five schools, for the white children.
65
Q Well, you have had nearly two years, knowing some-
ing was going to take a year, and nine months certainly since
you got our Petition. What have you done with reference to
thinking about re-zoning the schools in that period of time ?
A W e have not re-zoned.
Q Have you made any plans for re-zoning?
A No definite plans.
Q You have made some “ tentative” plans ?
A No. The Board and I have felt that, in the absence
o f any State policy in this matter, that it was not possible
for us to evolve a formal plan for meeting this problem,
without some guidance and direction and policy from the
State.
Q Well, Mr. Ellis, irrespective of what the State does
about it, so far as formulating a plan, announcing a plan,
you are not going to have any more schools, immediately,
are you ?
A Any more schools in Charlottesville ?
Q In Charlottesville?
A W e have no plans for any— no immediate plans for
building additional school buildings.
Q So in any consideration you have given this matter
you must have considered using the existing six schools, did
you not ?
A That would be correct, yes.
Q And so, any tentative plans you made, involved the
use of these schools, did it not ?
A I have not said we made “ tentative plans.”
Q I understood you to say you hadn’t made any “ formal
plans.” I said “ tentative plans.” But during the past year,
66
you haven’t made “ any” plans for the elimination of segre
gation, is that correct ?
A In the schools— that is substantially correct. So far
as evolving a formal plan is concerned, the School Board,
as I have said, has been concerned about it but has felt, in
the absence of State action, it was not in a position to evolve
a formal plan.
Q One final question: Here, in the latter part of your
Affidavit, on page 4, you make much of the fact that some
of the “ patrons” will ask for transfers from one school to
another— and I assume you are talking about “ white pa
trons.” As a school administrator, you know in any number
of communities school boards make very definite and fixed
plans as to “ no transfer,” isn’t that correct ?
A They may make such a regulation, if they want it,
yes.
Q And if such regulation were put into effect, that you
had to go to school in your geographical district, you would
have no problem of people asking for transfer from one
school to another ?
A No. But the other side o f that problem is the side
that worries us. W e are not interested in getting into a sit
uation, if we can help it, which will cause a large number of
parents to withdraw their children from school.
O f course, that is just an assumption on your part, that
“ a large number o f parents will withdraw their children
from school.”
All I am trying to find out from you is: there is easily
available to you and the School Board a method by which
you don’t have to be confronted by a lot of problems in trans
ferring one child from one school to another, because you
say that is easily possible by putting in a “ no transfer rule ?”
67
A It is what you are after—-if you are not going to have
transfers you are not going to have the problem of transfer,
but you may be more interested in maintaining the schools
than with not dealing with the problem of transfer.
Mr. H ill : That is all.
REDIRECT EXAM INATION
By Mr. A lmond :
Q This was referred to in your Affidavit. I don’t know
but I assume you are familiar with the situation. Therefore,
I will ask you a few questions along this line:
I understand that the high school which is attended by
the negroes is the Jackson Burley High School?
A That is correct.
Q Is that a high school o f recent or old construction ?
A That high school was built in 1950; so it is, relatively,
a new school.
Q How many negroes, negro pupils from the City of
Charlottesville attend the Jackson Burley School, if you
know, or as near as you can approximate ?
A 281, last Session, if my memory is correct, which I
think it is.
Q Is that facility owned by the City o f Charlottesville ?
A Owned jointly by the City of Charlottesville and the
County of Albemarle.
Q Is it located within the City limits, or within the
County ?
A Within the City limits.
Q And is it, or not operated under a joint agreement
between the County of Albemarle and the City of Char
lottesville ?
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A It is.
Q May I ask you to state, if you know, whether or not
the City has a substantial investment in that school ?
A The City has an investment o f about $600,000.00 in it
and the County a similar amount.
Q I am not asking you about the quality o f the facilities
but state whether or not it is superior to any other school in
operation, in which the City o f Charlottesville participates—
or does it approximate superiority? I am talking about the
facilities and other things furnished there, educational op
portunities and physical facilities o f the plant, itself ?
A Its facilities, physical and educational, are comparable
and equivalent to any school operation we have in Charlottes
ville, in my opinion.
Q If you desired to do so, or were under compulsion to
do so, could the City of Charlottesville operate that facility
on an integrated basis, without due reference to and consid
eration of the agreement which it has with its mutual opera
tor, the County of Albemarle ?
A It seems to me we are involved in that: my answer is
“ No.”
Q Let’s assume, therefore, there would be a migration
o f— what did you say ?
A 281.
Q (Continuing) — of 281 pupils from that school to
other schools in the City of Charlottesville — to the Lane
High School, which is the only high school for white chil
dren in Charlottesville— assume a migration o f that pop
ulation, at Burley, could you— since arrangements have al
ready been made, assignments made— could you possibly
69
accommodate that population, added to what you have in the
Lane School, Lane High School, now?
A No.
Mr. A lmond: That is all.
RECROSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr. H ill :
Q You tell this Court, Mr. Ellis, if 281 white children
came in the City of Charlottesville, between now and Sep
tember, they wouldn’t be accommodated in the High School
of Charlottesville?
A That is not the question.
Q But I am asking you : if 281 white children came in
the City of Charlottesville, between now and September,
they would not be accommodated in the high schools in
Charlottesville ?
A There are not physical facilities sufficient in scope to
accommodate them; if you want to accommodate them with
adequate space and facilities, the space wouldn’t be avail
able to accommodate that many more children at the Lane
High School.
Q The fact is, if 281 white children migrate to Char
lottesville, eligible to attend high school, wouldn’t you and
the School Board make accommodations for them ?
A W e have not had that problem.
Q But you would, if confronted with it ?
A (N o reply)
Q You haven’t had the problem of 281 negro children
migrating to the high school ?
A Repeat your question.
70
Q You haven’t had the problem of 281 negro children
requesting admission to the Lane High School? But you
answered the question.
A My answer was “ No,” for 281 additional, whether
they be white or colored, 281 additional, at the Lane High
School.
Q Now what, in your contract— or what would stop you
from sending white children to the Burley High School, if
the administration o f the Charlottesville Schools require it?
A What ? In whose contract ? My contract ?
Q Whatever contract ?
A You mean, the contract between the County of Albe
marle and the City of Charlottesville ?
Q That is right, or whoever it is with?
A Well, the agreement for the operation of the Jackson
P. Burley High School is a joint agreement. The building
was built, jointly, by the County of Albemarle and the City
of Charlottesville. The school now is operated jointly by
the two Boards. In view of the County’s financial interest
in it, in view of the fact they pay half o f the cost o f it and
the City half of it, I can’t see how you could take an action
regarding the operation of the Burley High School, one
party to the agreement, without consultation and under
standing with the other party to the agreement.
T he Court : Is there anything in the contract that says
that school shall be used exclusively for white children ?
A No, sir.
T he Court: Doesn’t the City of Charlottesville have as
much to do with that school as the County does ?
A If I may answer your first question? There is, in the
Minutes, in the planning o f this school building, that it is a
71
building provided for “negro” children. I think you said
“ white,” inadvertently.
T he Court: I did say “ white.” That is correct. It was
an inadvertence on my part.
But what I am getting at, is there any basis for this as
sumption that you have made, that all o f those 281 students
who now reside in. the City of Charlottesville and go to this
high school, would be dispossessed from that school and go
over to the white school ?
A I have made no “ assumption” on that. I merely an
swered the question: if 281 came, could we take care of
them? and I said “ No.”
T he Court: Then maybe the assumption wasn’t yours;
maybe it was Counsel’s.
Q (B y Mr. Hill, continuing) All I was trying to bring
out, Mr. Ellis, is that you merely made an agreement with
Albemarle County to take care o f certain Charlottesville
school children, under the existing laws at that time, is that
correct ?
A I think that is correct ?
Q And the continuance o f that policy, o f taking care of
part of the Charlottesville Public School children at Burley,
in nowise violates the contract ? The only difference between
before, some white and some might be negro?
A (N o reply)
Q In other words, you are not changing your contract,
you are merely educating children in a school— and that is
what you agreed to do— jointly, is it not?
A It is a jointly operated school.
Q And what you agreed to do was to educate some of
the City of Charlottesville people in a jointly operated school ?
72
A Yes.
Q And if you send some white children over there, you
are doing the same thing ?
A You would still be educating children, I would think.
Mr. H il l : That is all, Sir.
(Witness excused)
APPENDIX XI
TESTIMONY OF JAMES H. MICHAEL, JR.
ON CROSS-EXAMINATION
(Tr. pp. 123-129)
CROSS-EXAMINATION
By M r. Carter :
Q I think that you say, in Paragraph (2 ) o f your affi
davit, Mr. Michael, that the decision— I will read it (Read
ing)
“ It is my conviction that the problems arising as a result
o f the decision o f the Supreme Court o f the United States
in the school segregation cases are o f such magnitude and
complexity as to invoke the best constructive thought of
which the school administration officials are capable in order
to preserve, as far as possible * * *”
et cetera. May I ask you just what the School Board has
done, what “ constructive thought” has the School Board
given to this problem ?
A W e have felt, and feel, that deriving approximately
30 per cent o f our support from State funds, we must op
erate in accordance with State policy. W e have done so, and
are doing so at this point.
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Q In other words, you have given no “ constructive
thought” to it, because the State has not decided to change
its policy, is that your answer ?
A I refer you to the record, there.
Q Now what plans on “ constructive thought,” what
plans, specifically, has the School Board made to comply
with the Supreme Court’s decision, if anything ?
A W e have made no specific plan to comply with the
Supreme Court’s decision.
Q And what has the School Board done in regard to the
budget, on the question o f your compliance with the Su
preme Court’s decision, and the fact that the budget has
already been made ?
A It has this to do with it : the budget provides funds
for the overall operation of the schools, the school system;
particularly, it provides funds for the employment o f teach
ers : those teachers are employed in terms of a distribution
of pupils, which has been worked out and against which the
listing of teachers was prepared. A change in that distri
bution of pupils might very well mean that we would need
more money in order to operate the same school system dur
ing the coming year.
Q And might not, might it not ?
A It might not.
Q You don’t know what it is going to do until you
attempt to make a plan, do you ?
A One assumption is as valid as the other.
Q I agree with you. But let’s go into the “ other:” I
think you deal, in your Paragraph (4 ), with pupil assign
ments, registration o f pupils and teacher contracts, facilities,
and that sort of thing. In your opinion, couldn’t you reas
74
sign the pupils, redistrict your City, reassign them teachers,
in order to effect compliance with the Supreme Court de
cision ?
A In the sense that lines might be drawn on a map of
the City, converting it into six districts, with some consid
eration to the location of students, which matter would have
to be determined, it could be done; but it would not, in my
judgment, be in the interest of, in the better interest of any
school child in the City of Charlottesville.
Q W hy?
A Because these pupils have been assigned, in terms of
their needs, in terms o f the particular qualifications which
teachers of given sections have, and reassigning on an un
considered basis might very well rob a particular child, or
particular children of the benefits which we have tried to
work out with the present assignment.
Q Let’s go back to this reassignment basis— reassign
ment, on basis o f needs, Mr. Michael: children who are
going to your Jefferson School, elementary school for ne
groes, they are assigned from Grades 1 to 2. What consid
eration have you given to their needs, other than the fact they
are colored ?
A I don’t understand your question.
Q What needs have you taken into consideration in the
assignment to negro schools,— to Jefferson, other than the
fact they are colored ?
A I think a great many needs have been taken into con
sideration.
Q What other ? There are no other schools for negroes
to go to ? Where else could they go ?
A Either I don’t understand your question or you don’t
understand my answer. What I am saying is this: there
75
are sections, in the Jefferson School, in various— in the vari
ous grades: pupils are assigned to those grades, in a par
ticular section, because of the benefit one section may have
for the particular pupil. If that particular pupil were to be
hastily reassigned to another school, we don’t know whether
we could get him into the same section of another school, into
a section affording him the same benefits. Those are the
things I refer to as being part o f the administrative diffi
culties.
Q But the difficulty with that, Mr. Michael, is that you
have made no effort even to see whether these are problems
or not problems, so far as you are concerned you have not
even looked at the facts to see what you could do with the
assignments, say, o f negroes from Jefferson to Venable—•
so how can you make that assertion on behalf o f the school
administration, since you haven’t even considered the prob
lem?
A First, I am scarcely a “ school administrator.” I am
a member o f the School Board. Secondly, in answer to your
question, we are subject to the State’s policy in this matter.
Q All right. One (I hope) final question: I am now
dealing with Paragraph (6), and when you talk about “ dimi
nution o f public support,” you say “ that is the basic question
involved,” would you explain that, please?
A I say, that is the basic question involved, to me. I
don’t know whether other people share my opinion, but to
me, the basic question in this whole issue, and I gather that
possibly the Court does not concur, but the basic question is
whether or not we will continue to have the willing public
support for our public school system that we now have, and
I don’t want to diminish, in any way, that willing public
support.
Q Mr. Michael, what have you done to— or have you
76
done anything at all, to find out what the public sentiment is ?
Have you done anything to try to educate the public in the
community to accept the Supreme Court’s decision, or what
has the School Board done ?
A W e have not taken any steps towards educating the
people of Charlottesville in this matter. I believe I am com
petent to say, from my knowledge of the people o f Char
lottesville, however, that integration in the public schools of
this City, would gravely diminish the present willing public
support of that school system.
Q Well, as a lawyer, I assume that you will, you and
the members of the School Board and public officials— that
the School Board will, eventually, follow the law, and this
raises the question of— if you are concerned that desegre
gation will diminish public support— are you making “any”
plans to educate the public? You should realize you must,
eventually, desegregate the schools. What plans are you
making for doing something about educating the public in
desegregating the schools, or anything else?
A W e have made no plans towards educating the public
W e don’t feel that that is a function of the local School
Board.
Q Well, when do you think you will be in a position to
make plans to desegregate the schools ?
A I think that position will come when we have a State
policy that will permit our freedom of action, we do not
presently have.
Mr. Carter : All right.
Thank you very much.
(Witness excused)
M r. A lmond : That concludes the presentation of the
defense, Your Honor.