Patton v. Mississippi Brief for Appellee

    In the Supreme Court of the United States 

OCTOBER TERM, 1947

No. 122

EDDIE (BUSTER) PATTO N , Petitioner 

vs.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

O N  W R IT  O F  C E R T IO R A R I T O  T H E  SUPREM E C O U R T  OF  

T H E  S T A T E  O F M ISSISSIP P I

Brief For the State of Mississippi, Appellee

Greek L. R ice, Attorney General 
By George H. Ethridge,
Assistant Attorney General



TABLE OF CASES CITED IN THIS BRIEF AND 
PAGES WHERE FOUND

Page
Edgar Smith vs. State of Texas, 311 U. S. 128, 132, 85 

L. Ed. 84............................................................ -..........  38
Edna W. Ballard vs. U. S., 91 L. Ed. (Advance) 195.......  41
Farrow vs. State, 91 Miss. 509, 45 So. 619....................—  36
Gibson vs. State of Miss. 162 U. S. 567, 40 L. Ed. 1078.... 36
Hale vs. Kentucky, 303 U. S. 613, 82 L. Ed. 1050 and 

case note at 1053 L. Ed.............................................-  33
Lewis vs. State of Mississippi, 91 Miss. 505, 45 So. 360.... 35 
Moon vs. State, 176 Miss. 72, 168 So. 476............. — ..... - 32
Norris vs. State of Alabama, 294 U. S. 587, 55 S. Ct. 579,

79 L. Ed. 1074................................................................  33
Pringle vs. State, 108 M. 802, 67 So. 455..........................  46
Pearson vs. State, 176 Miss. 9, 167 So. 644..................32,43
Ransom vs. State, 149 Miss. 262, 115 So. 208..................  50
Reynolds vs. State, 199 Miss. 409, 24 So. (2d) 781......... 31
Sauer vs. State, 166 Miss. 507; 144 So. 252....................... 50
Smith vs. State of Oklahoma, 140 Am. St. 688, 4 Okla.

Cr. Rep. 128 and case note in 140 Am. St. Rep., 688.. 34
Tollivar vs. State, 133 Miss. 789, 98 So. 342..................... 45

A



MISSISSIPPI CONSTITUTION OF 1890

Sections cited in this brief:
Section 264; Jurors must be registered and able to read 

and write; page 23.
Text of Section 264 of Constitution, page 23.
Section 241, Constitution, text of page 24.
Section 242, Constitution, text of page 24, 25.
Section 243, Constitution, text of page 25.
Section 244, text of pages, Brief; 25.
Qualification of voter— Need not be able to read and 

write, if he understands it or is able to give a reasonable 
interpretation thereof;

Section 248, text of page 25—Remedy if registration is 
denied by appeal to courts;

Section 26 referred to on page 44, 45 as to right to take 
shoes after arrest, page 44, 45.

STATUTES CITED IN THE BRIEF

Code of 1942, Section 1762, who are qualified to serve as 
jurors, page 4 to 26-27; Text of Section 1762;

Section 2505, Code of 1942, copy of special venire to be 
served on defendant or counsel one entire day, page 6;

Section 3224, voter may appeal from a denial of the right 
to register, page 25, 26;

Section 3228, appeal—May have bill of exceptions—pro­
cedure, page 25, 26;

Section 1764, who is exempt from jury duty, page 27.
Section 1765, who is exempt from jury duty as a personal 

privilege, page 27, Text of Section 1765, page 27;
Section 1766, list of jurors to be made up by board of

B



supervisors—men of sound judgment, good intelligence and 
fair character, able to read and write, registered voters, etc., 
page 27;

Section 1767—Jury list—how many put in jury list and 
jury box, page 28;

Section 1768—Certified copy of jury list to be given clerk 
of board of supervisors and put in the jury boxes, page 29;

Section 1772—Judge to draw names of jurors at each 
regular and special term of court, names of jurors to serve 
at the next term, etc., page 29;

Section 1772, text of statute, page 29;
Section 1774, jurors, if not drawn at term, judge may 

draw in vacation, page 29, 30;
Section 1777, sheriff to execute venire facias, page 30;
Section 1778, contempt of court not to perform jury duty, 

page 30 ;
Section 1779, number of grand juries, how drawn, etc., 

page 30;
Section 1780, foreman of grand jury and oath taken, im­

partiality, etc., page 30;
Section 1781, judge to charge grand jury, page 30;
Section 1794, procedure in case of insufficient jurors, non- 

attendance, etc., the court’s power, etc., page 31;
Section 1794, full text of; page 31;
Section 1796, challenge to affay none except for fraud or 

quashed, page 32;
Section 1798, jury laws directory, page 32.

C



EDDIE (BUSTER) PATTON

vs. No. 122

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

POINT I

The evidence is utterly insufficient to show that any race 
discriminate was practiced in selecting jurors for jury serv­
ice. It does not sufficiently appear that any registered 
negro had the qualifications to vote.

Constitution of 1890, Section 264, 241, and 248.

Code of 1942, Sections 1762, 1764, and 1784 and 1789.

See testimony B. M. Stephens, printed record, pages 3 
to 6; Addie Rivers, 6 to 12; Cicero Ferrill, 12 to 22; How­
ard Cameron, 23 to 31; Judge J. A. Riddell, 48 to 53; George 
Beeman, pages 54 to 57; Donovan Ready, 57 to 60; E. C. 
Gunn, 63 to 67; L. D. Walker, 63 to 68; 0. L. King, 69 to 73; 
William Wright, 74 to 79; Frank Kennedy, 80 to 84; W. Y. 
Brame, 85 to 86; See this brief, pages 1 to 16.

D



EDDIE (BUSTER) PATTON

vs. No. 122

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

POINT II

The statements and confessions of the defendant to the 
officers, and his pointing out articles taken from the de­
ceased and from his store or place of business was free and 
voluntary and the officer’s testimony in reference thereto 
is not disputed. The defendant might have testified on the 
objections thereto without testifying before the jury either 
on the objection or on the merits. No testimony disputes 
the officer’s testimony. See testimony of A. B. Ruffin, 
86 to 129, printed record; Martin, page 129 to 133; A. B. 
Ruffin, page 134 to 136; Martin Gunn, page 136; A. B. 
Ruffin again recalled, 136 to 141. See this brief, page 44, 
et. seq.

E



vs. No. 122

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

POINT III

The evidence shows overwhelmingly that the defendant 
is guilty. See printed record, pages 86 to 141.

See this brief, page 45 to end.

Ranson v. State, 149 Miss. 262, 115 So. 208, p. 50.

Sauer v. State, 166 M. 507, 144 So. 225, p. 50.

Hardy v. State, 143 M. 353, 108 So. 227, p. 50.

EDDIE (BUSTER) PATTON

F



In  the Supreme Court of the U nited States of A merica 
1947-1948 TERM

EDDIE (BUSTER) PATTON, Appellant

vs. No. 122

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, Appellee

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE

This is an appeal by certiorari from the judgment of the 
Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi affirming the 
death sentence for murder, by the appellant, of one Jim 
Meadors which case originated in the circuit court of Lau­
derdale County, Mississippi; there being a conviction on 
an indictment in due and regular form for said murder be­
fore a jury of the circuit court of Lauderdale County, Mis­
sissippi, which resulted in a death sentence for the appellant, 
from which he appealed to the Supreme Court of the State 
of Mississippi, where the judgment of conviction was af­
firmed. The opinion of the Mississippi Supreme Court 
affirming said conviction appearing in the record for the 
certiorari at page 227, et seq., abridged record, page 46, and 
the judgment of affirmance was entered on the minutes of 
said Supreme Court of Mississippi shown at page 237 (152 
of abridged record) of the record. I will not make a detailed 
statement of facts in the case, but will ask the court to read 
the full record as I do not agree with many statements in 
the brief for the appellant on the motion for certiorari, and 
especially statements with reference to the confession made 
to the officers of Lauderdale County, Mississippi. There 
is no evidence in the record to contradict the testimony of 
the officers as to its being free and voluntary, neither the 
appellant, defendant in the court below, nor any other 
witnesses introduced disputed any of the facts testified to 
by the said deputy sheriffs, and others who testified on be­

1



half of the State. The appellant chose not to testify al­
though a competent witness; and could have testified on 
or in the absence of the jury on the admissibility of the 
confession. Neither did he testify on the merits at all. He 
chose to be a silent party. It appears that Jim Meadors was 
operating a place of business about four miles south of the 
city of Meridian which was known, and spoken of, as a 
night club by some of the witnesses. It appears that this 
place of business was operatd from about 9 :00 or 10:00 A.M. 
until about 10:00 P.M., and a young lady who testified in 
the case worked in the said place in the day time but did not 
work at night. On the morning following the killing of 
Meadors, this lady went to the place of business to work 
and found the dead body of Mr. Meadors in the store and 
called for help, calling the sheriff’s office and also an under­
taking establishment in Meridian. The deputy sheriffs 
responded to this call and also an employee of the under­
taking establishment went to the place of business of the 
deceased to get the body to prepare it for burial, and they 
testified as to the facts that they found which led to the 
belief that the appellant was the killer. Without setting 
forth the evidence as to the condition of the body of the 
deceased, the finding of the peculiar tracks leading from 
the place where the killing occurred, and to the investiga­
tions made, I desire to say that the murder was one of 
peculiar brutality and clearly connected the defendant with 
the killing as the guilty agent. The original record from 
the circuit court to the Mississippi Supreme Court is very 
voluminous and it would consume quite a lot of space to 
set forth the testimony in detail.

When the case was called for trial in the circuit court of 
Lauderdale County, Mississippi, the defendant filed a mo­
tion to quash the indictment which appears in the abridged 
record for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United

2



States on pages 2 and 3, and page 16 of the original record 
from the circuit court of Lauderdale County to the Supreme 
Court of Mississippi. This motion to quash contained three 
grounds appearing on page 2 of the record for certiorari.

(1 ) . The defendant is a negro and has been indicted 
by the Grand Jury during the present term of this 
court for the murder of a white man, and that a large 
percentage of the qualified electorate of the county 
from which the jurors are selected is of the negro race, 
and no member of this race was listed on the general 
venire summoned for the first week of this court from 
which the Grand Jury was drawn and empaneled, nor 
on the venires for either of the other weeks of this court.

(This allegation is not sustained by the proof, which shows 
very few negroes, if any, were qualified jurors.)

(2 ) . That the general venire or venires issued for 
this term of court, from which the Grand and Petit 
Juries were selected, did not contain the name or names 
of a single member of said race qualified for jury 
service.

(3 ) . That for a great number of years and especially 
since 1935, and during the present term of court and 
in making up the jury box from which jurors have 
been selected, empanneled, and sworn, there has been 
in this county a systematic, intentional, deliberate and 
invariable practice on the part of administrative officers 
to exclude negroes from the jury lists, jury boxes and 
jury service, and that such practice has resulted and 
does now result in the denial of the equal protection 
of the laws to this defendant as guaranteed by the 14th 
amendment to the U. S. Constitution.

Upon this motion, much testimony was taken, but there 
was no definite showing as to how many negroes were regis­
tered in Lauderdale County and how many were able to 
read and write, nor how many of those who were registered 
were of age for jury duty and how many were disqualified 
for jury service under the laws hereafter referred to or how

3



many complied with the requirements for jury service under 
section 1762 of the Mississippi Code of 1942 which reads as 
follows:

“Every male citizen not under the age of twenty-one 
years, who is a qualified elector and able to read and 
write, has not been convicted of an infamous crime, or 
the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors within a period 
of five years and who is not a common gambler or 
habitual drunkard, is a competent juror; but no per­
son who is or has been within twelve months the over­
seer of a public road or road contractor shall be com­
petent to serve as a grand juror. But the lack of any 
such qualifications on the part of one or more jurors 
shall not vitiate an indictment or verdict. However, 
be it further provided that no talesman or tales juror 
shall be qualified who has served as such tales juror or 
talesman in the last preceding two years; and no juror 
shall serve on any jury who has served as such for the 
last preceding two years; and no juror shall serve on 
any jury who has a case of his own pending in that 
court; provided there are sufficient qualified jurors in 
the district, and for trial at that term.”

Other statutes of the State of Mississippi bearing on 
the qualifications will be referred to hereafter. After the 
motion to quash had been heard and overruled, the de­
fendant made a motion for a special venire which was sus­
tained and a venire was summoned by the sheriff from the 
qualified persons subject to jury duty and rendered to the 
court. Whereupon, the appellant moved to quash this 
special venire for several reasons, among which was that no 
negroes were summoned on the special venire, by the sheriff, 
and also because the names of the jurors were not drawn 
from the jury box of the county which had been refilled 
under provisions of law less than thirty days from the be­
ginning of the trial. This motion was also overruled by the 
court and the jury was empanneled and questioned at 
length, and found to be fair and impartial by the trial court,

4



which holding was also affirmed by the Supreme Court of 
the State of Mississippi. The substance of the proceedings 
are set forth and the statutes are referred to and also court 
decisions hereafter in this brief.

A large amount of testimony was taken upon this motion 
in which the circuit clerk, the deputy circuit clerk, sheriff, 
chancery clerk and five members of the board of supervisors 
and other persons testimony was taken.

It appeared therefrom that a very few negroes had regis­
tered as voters in the said county, and most of these who 
had registered were either doctors, lawyers or teachers in 
the public schools or those who were beyond sixty years of 
age and were not required to serve as jurors.

The motion was overruled by the Court, and then a mo­
tion for a special venire facias was made which appears on 
page 18 of the record, which motion was sustained by the 
Court. In the order sustaining the motion for a special 
venire facias the Court recited as shown on page 26 of the 
original record:

“And it appearing to the court that the jury box of 
the county has been refilled by the supervisors less than 
30 days ago: Because said jury box was exhausted.”

The Court thereupon directed the clerk of this court to 
issue to the sheriff of the county a venire facias directing 
the said sheriff to summon from the body of the county 
one hundred persons qualified for jury service, summoning 
twenty from each of the supervisors districts, the writ to be 
returnable before the court on the 27th day of February, 
1946, at 9:00 o’clock A.M., and that when same had been 
executed, a certified copy thereof with the sheriff’s return 
thereon showing upon whom the writ had been served and 
upon whom not served, together with a certified copy of the 
indictment in this case, be upon or delivered to the de­

5



fendant or his counsel for one entire day before the trial as 
required by Section 2505 of the Code of 1942.

The defendant duly excepted to the action of the Court 
in ordering the said jurors summoned from the body of the 
county instead of having them drawn from the jury box.

Prior to the filing of the motion for a special venire a 
motion for change of venue was filed and heard.

These various orders and motions seem to have been 
placed irregularly in the record instead of being placed in 
consecutive order.

Considerable testimony was offered on the motion for 
change of venue, and change of venue was denied; there­
upon, the defendant, through his counsel, filed a motion to 
quash the special venire so ordered and directed to be issued 
from the county at large, in which motion four grounds are 
set forth as reasons for quashing, the first ground being that 
the sheriff did not draw, list or summon any member of the 
colored race, although there are members of the colored race 
qualified for jury service, and that the action of the sheriff 
in reference thereto was in pursuance of a well defined and 
invariable policy followed for years by administrative of­
ficers in this county of excluding negroes from jury service 
and discriminating against them in the selecting, drawing, 
listing, and summoning of jurors, and thus denies to the 
defendant the equal protection of the laws guaranteed to 
him by the 14th amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States and the laws of the Constitution of the State 
of Mississippi.

The second ground was that the special venire was im­
properly and wrongfully and illegally ordered drawn and 
summoned from the body of the county instead of being 
ordered drawn from the regular jury box of the county.

6



The third ground was that the writ of venire facias should 
not have issued to the sheriff for service but that the court 
should have appointed someone to serve it, or to be deliv­
ered to the coroner or other officer designated by law for 
service, because of the fact that the sheriff’s office, that is 
his deputies, are interested in the conviction of this de­
fendant and that they claim to have secured from him a 
confession of his guilt.

The fourth ground was that the sheriff selected and listed 
the names of persons he desired to summon under the writ 
or a large part of them before the writ was issued and did 
not go into the various beats and summon at random or 
without predetermination the requisite number of persons 
for jury duty.

A great deal of testimony was taken on the motion to 
quash, as will appear hereafter, but at the end of the testi­
mony the judge overruled the motion to quash.

The testimony on motion to quash the indictment and on 
the ground of the motion to quash the special venire based 
upon the failure to have negroes placed in the jury box from 
which juries are drawn, made up and empanneled.

It appears that after the Court had appointed Honorable 
T. J. McDonald and L. J. Broadway to defend the appellant 
that the defendant, by some means, secured the employ­
ment of Mr. Broadway as a hired attorney; and after the 
request of this attorney, Mr. McDonald was relieved from 
further participation in the trial, but Mr. McDonald had 
participated in the motion to quash the indictment and to 
quash the special venire and in the motion for the change of 
venue.

It appears from the voluminous testimony on the motion 
to quash the indictment and the motion to quash the special

7



venire that there were very few negroes registered which is 
required by Section 264 of the Constitution; and, conse­
quently, there were extremely few negroes who could 
qualify as jurors, and the circuit clerk estimated the num­
ber of male negroes possibly qualified for jury service at 
twenty-five, there being in his estimate only fifty qualified 
negro voters in the county, who had paid their poll taxes 
and were thus qualified, at fifty, one-half of which he 
thought were women voters, and the other twenty-five be­
ing largely composed of negroes who were teachers in public 
schools, physicians, lawyers or otherwise excusable from 
jury service, and who would not likely be put in the jury box 
because of the expense of summoning as jurors those who 
have the right to be excused, and thus they were omitted 
from the jury lists and jury boxes in order to save expenses.

The testimony further shows there were from 9,000 to 
12,000 voters in Lauderdale County altogether from which, 
excluding negroes, would leave from 9,000 to 11,050 white 
registered voters, approximately one-half of which would 
be women.

T he Evidence on M otion to Quash

The first witness introduced on the motion to quash the 
indictment was B. M. Stephens, who was connected with 
the City Identification Bureau and a resident of the city of 
Meridian who had formerly been sheriff for four years be­
ginning in 1932 and had been a supervisor for eight years 
of District 3 in said county beginning in 1924.

He testified that during his term as supervisor there were 
no registered negro voters qualified for jury service in that 
district.

Another witness (Mr. King) who is now a supervisor 
serving his second term in that district testified that there

8



was only one negro registered voter in said district, and that 
this negro voter was a medical doctor; and, consequently, 
he could not be required to serve on the jury. He also tes­
tified that during his term of services as supervisor and 
sheriff that he had not observed any negro jurors serving 
in the Circuit Court. He testified that during his official 
term he was required to attend the Circuit Court and hear 
the Circuit Judge charge the Grand Jury, and that he did 
not think any negroes had served on the jury.

Mrs. Addie Rivers, Deputy Circuit Clerk, testified on 
the motion that she had been such deputy since 1942, and 
that she had charge of or access to the registration books of 
voters every day in the week; that she had never checked 
the books to see how many negroes were registered, and 
that sometime during her services Mr. Ferrill, the Circuit 
Clerk, had been requested by someone making up Federal 
juries to get such person some colored qualified electors, 
and that they only checked boxes in District 1 in which the 
city of Meridian is situated and principally inside the city, 
and that they found eight qualified negro jurors in that dis­
trict; that they did not check all the precincts, but con­
formed to the request of the Federal authorities to get eight 
or ten negroes qualified for jury service.

She testified further that she had not registered the 
colored voters who were registered; that Mr. Ferrill had 
that authority, and that they had never registered a negro 
without checking the color but that she had not registered 
any.

Mr. Ferrill, the Circuit Clerk, was introduced on the mo­
tion, and his testimony begins on page 58 of the record. 
He became Circuit Clerk on the 20th day of January, 1943, 
beginning by serving an unexpired term of Mr. Bledsoe, who 
had died, and that he was since re-elected Circuit Clerk;

9



that he attended the Circuit Court at each term of the 
Criminal Court to hear the judge’s charge to the Grand 
Jury, and that he did not recall any negroes serving on the 
Grand or Petit Juries; that prior to his appointment to fill 
the vacancy mentioned, he had been a Deputy Chancery 
Clerk; that when the board of supervisors made up their 
lists of jurors which were to serve in the Circuit Court it 
was a custom of the Chancery Clerk’s office to turn the list 
over furnished by the board to one of the stenographers to 
have entered on the minutes, and they did not pay particular 
attention to the names so furnished by the board of super­
visors, and that he did not know whether any negroes were 
placed on the lists by the members of the board of super­
visors, but that he does not remember any negroes serving 
on the jury during the times he was either Deputy Chancery 
Clerk or Circuit Clerk.

He testified further that it was the custom of the mem­
bers of the board of supervisors in making up the lists of 
jurors to check the registration and poll books, the poll 
books being principally used because the poll books showed 
not only the same persons registered upon the registration 
books but also showed whether the voter had paid his poll 
taxes in time to qualify him as an elector; that he did not 
know whether any negroes had been drawn during this 
period or not; that he did not know who was put in the 
boxes, but that he had never seen a negro serving on the 
jury. He also testified with reference to the request from 
Federal authorities for some negro registered voters in 
Lauderdale County; that it was the custom of the Federal 
authorities to put a few negro electors in the lists of jurors 
selected for the Federal Court, Meridian being one place 
where the Federal Court was held.

He also further testified that there were forty-nine voting 
precincts in the whole county, and that in District 1, in

10



which Meridian is situated, there were five voting precincts 
in the territory outside the City of Meridian. The Circuit 
Clerk states that he doesn’t think there were over fifty 
negro qualified electors, but he had never checked to ascer­
tain definitely, and that most of the negro registered voters 
that he knows were either preachers or teachers in the public 
schools or persons over sixty years of age.

It appears also from the testimony that the jury box filled 
at the April meeting of the board of supervisors became 
exhausted, and that the box was refilled.

Mr. Howard Cameron, the chancery clerk, testified that 
he had been chancery clerk since January, 1936, and prior 
to that time he was deputy chancery clerk beginning in 
April 1933. He testified that the members of the board of 
supervisors each go into the circuit clerk’s office and there 
secure a registration roll from the circuit clerk and from 
this roll they prepare a list of jurors in their respective dis­
tricts and after the list is prepared it is then turned over to 
the chancery clerk, and the chancery clerk has it copied and 
entered on the minutes of the board of supervisors which 
they then compile and certify a copy of this list and trans­
mit it to the circuit clerk.

He was then asked if he had a very clear judgment of the 
number of qualified electors in the county and stated that 
he had his own opinion, but had been rudely shocked on 
several occasions; that it was a strictly personal opinion; 
that it was a hard thing to say how many registered voters 
were in the county, but he thinks there were between 8,000 
and 10,000, but he did not know definitely.

He was then asked as to the number of registered voters 
of the negro race who were qualified electors in the county 
and said:

11



“When you say qualified electors, I presume you 
mean those who are registered and those who have paid 
their poll taxes; also those whom the supervisors feel 
are competent from the standpoint of being unbiased 
and fair-minded?”

When he was asked to give an estimate of the number 
of the negro race registered as voters, he said:

“Frankly, I have never given it any consideration, 
but I am of the opinion that there are several hundred 
of them.”

He testified further that he had never made an investi­
gation at all, but that he did know for a fact that there were 
negroes on the registration rolls and that he did know for a 
fact that there had been negroes to vote in Lauderdale 
County.

His testimony taken altogether shows that he had no 
definite knowledge as to the number of the negro race regis­
tered as voters and had never made any investigation along 
that line.

He further testified that he attended the criminal court 
to hear the judge charge the Grand Jury, and he never re­
members to have seen a negro serving on the Grand or Petit 
Juries.

Mr. W. Y. Brame, sheriff of the county, testified on the 
motion the same as to negro jurors or registered voters, and 
had no definite or clear judment about the matter, but 
thought there might be forty or fifty negro voters in the 
county.

He testified that the board of supervisors in making up 
the jury lists frequently checked the books in his office to 
see if people had paid their taxes after finding their names 
on the registration books; that the usual practice was to 
take the poll books rather than the registration books, the

12



poll books being duplicates of the registered voters and con­
taining additional information as to whether poll taxes had 
been paid by the 1st day of February.

The sheriff is required to make up lists of those who have 
not paid by February 1st and keep them as a record for the 
use of the election commissioners in revising poll books to 
see who are qualified electors.

The examination of all these witnesses is quite prolix and 
it is exceedingly difficult to state briefly and accurately the 
full purport of their testimony.

Mr. Tom Johnson, a member of the board of supervisors 
of District 2 of the county, testified on the motion. He 
testified that he had served as a member of the board of 
supervisors continuously since 1928, and had been out some 
years prior to that, the first term beginning in 1904. He 
testified that he made a search of the registration books in 
making up a jury list, and he didn’t remember of a single 
negro voter in his district; that he searches the books every 
time the jury list is made up because the law requires that, 
and he didn’t recall any negro voters at the time the last 
jury box was made up about thirty days before the witness 
testified. He also testified that he attended the Circuit 
Court to hear the judge’s charge to the grand jury and 
public officers and didn’t remember seeing any negro jurors 
empanneled and serving at any of the terms of court. He 
testified that there were five hundred or six hundred voters 
in his district; that in making up his list he had never had 
it in mind with reference to negro voters because he did not 
have any darkies of consequence in his beat, and had 
enough trouble going through the registered voters who 
were qualified in making up his jury lists; that in making 
up the jury list he tried to find men who have good intelli­
gence, fair character and sound judgment; and that there

13



are naturally a lot of men in his district who have never 
served on juries.

Judge J. A. Riddell, of the Lauderdale County Court, 
testified that he had been, prior to his election as county 
judge, practicing law since 1931 but had a license to practice 
since 1916 but had served for twelve years as county super­
intendent of education of this county and one term in the 
State legislature and about sixty days as county prosecuting 
attorney; that he had attended the circuit court at the 
criminal terms to hear the judge charge the grand jury in 
Lauderdale County during all this time mentioned; that he 
didn’t know of any negroes who had been called from the 
box and sought to be qualified or who had been qualified 
and taken as a member of the Grand Jury in Lauderdale 
County; that he had attended the circuit court more than 
the average person because since 1916 he had a license to 
practice and had some business in the courts and was inter­
ested in the courts; and that he had not seen any negroes 
serving on the juries.

Various other witnesses were called and the general effect 
of all their testimony is that there were very few qualified 
negroes capable of serving on Grand or Petit Juries, and 
that no one had seen such negroes serving on juries during 
such time as they testified about.

To sum up the testimony in a nut shell, it appears that 
there were from 9,000 to 12,000 registered voters in Lauder­
dale County, and not more than about sixty negroes regis­
tered who had paid their poll taxes and thus qualified to 
vote. It is not shawm in this record how many of these 
registered negroes can read and write, so as to qualify as 
jurors for under section 244 of the Constitution of Missis­
sippi any person can register and vote although unable to 
read and write, if he can understand it when read to him or

14



give a reasonable interpretation of it when it is read to him. 
Under section 24S of the Constitution, he may appeal if im­
properly denied registration, and may appeal through all 
the courts including the U. S. Supreme Court. There is 
not a word of testimony showing that any negro applied to 
the circuit clerk for registration as a voter and had been re­
fused registration when qualified by law to vote, the negro 
generally being indifferent to voting.

The circuit clerk was called as a witness, as above stated, 
but he was not interrogated about how many negroes sought 
to register and how many had been refused registration, 
if any at all.

I desire to call the Court’s attention to the testimony of 
Mr. Donovan Ready, page 57 of the abridged record. This 
witness is a public accountant, and had been employed by 
the board of supervisors to check the qualifications of voters 
for the years 1941 and 1942, at which time there was a con­
test as to whether the Wine and Beer Law, prohibiting sales 
of wine and beer in Lauderdale County had been carried in 
an election for that purpose. He made this check in 1944 
to cover that period, and made a very careful and pains­
taking investigation to report to the board of supervisors on 
the said matter. He could not tell exactly how many negroes 
were registered or voted for that purpose, but thinks there 
were somewhere around thirty-five or forty, possibly be­
tween fifty and sixty, that he would say between thirty and 
sixty colored electors were qualified at that time. He tes­
tified that they were registered and had paid their poll 
taxes in the period required to be qualified, and at that 
time the largest part of them were preachers and school 
teachers so far as he knew about these voters’ occupations. 
He could not tell how many were under sixty years of age; 
that he thought a great many were over sixty. Some were,

15



but not many; that he knew most of them and that is why 
he knew they were colored, stating:

“ They don’t indicate on the record that they were 
colored, but they were mostly colored preachers, as I 
say, and colored teachers and they were middle age on 
the average. There were some probably over sixty, but 
I wouldn’t say a great number of them were.”

He further testified that they were predominantly preach­
ers and teachers who were the better educated negroes of 
the county, and that better than half of them were preach­
ers.

The District Attorney also examined many of the wit­
nesses as to the motion for a change of venue, and the proof 
was overwhelming that there was no pre-judgment of the 
case by the mass of people of the county. The same thing 
was shown in the examination of the witnesses on the mo­
tion to quash the special venire. From all the testimony in 
the case it is manifest that the defendant could get as fair 
a trial in Lauderdale County as in any other county in the 
state.

Facts Concerning the T rial on the M erits

The deceased, Mr. J. L. Meadors, was operating a club or 
place of business about four miles south of the city of Me­
ridian on Highway 45. He was about fifty years of age, 
and was last seen alive by his wife about six o’clock in the 
morning which he was killed. Somewhere near 11: 00 o’clock 
that morning, Mrs. J. L. Taylor, a witness for the state who 
worked for the deceased and was his sister-in-law, went to 
the store to resume her work there and found the body of 
the deceased lying on the floor of the club or store dead.

She did not know how long he had been dead. She knew 
the defendant, who had formerly worked for Mr. Meadors 
but who had quit about two weeks before.

16



When she found the body, she called the sheriff’s office 
and she then called the Williams Funeral Home, telling 
them of the finding of the body, and they came out about 
11:00 o’clock—in other words, as soon as they were notified 
and as soon as they could get there, and the body was re­
moved to the Williams Funeral Home.

She testified as to the bloody condition of Mr. Meadors’ 
head and face and blood around the body, the head of the 
body being somewhat under the corner of the counter, and 
she described the position of the body.

She also identified a lunch box belonging to Mr. Meadors 
in which he kept the money taken in the business which he 
carried with him when he left the business to go to his 
home.

She also identified the hammer used in the place of busi­
ness of Mr. Meadors for breaking coal, and with which the 
proof shows the deceased had been beaten by someone, the 
hammer being principally used for breaking coal for the 
heater.

She also identified a hat found in the store or club on the 
morning after the body was discovered which belonged to 
the appellant, and identified the defendant stating that 
they called him Buster instead of Eddie.

This witness did not work at night, and usually came to 
work there about 10:30, but did not go on the morning in 
question until around 11:00 o’clock, and described the 
scene as best she could about the body. The record shows 
this witness was deeply affected, and had to pause at times 
before she could resume her testimony, stating she was very 
nervous.

Mr. J. A. Stroud was called for the State. He works for 
the Williams Funeral Home as an embalmer, and handled 
the body of the deceased, Mr. Meadors.

17



He identified the clothing that the deceased had on which 
was introduced in evidence and described the condition of 
the clothing.

He examined the body for wounds, and stated that the 
body was bruised and beaten, his head being very badly 
beaten. He testified that he had gashes and cuts all over 
his head and face; that there were fifteen from the neck up, 
running from one inch to one and one-half inches from the 
base of his neck to the top of his head; that there were a 
couple of scratches on the face running from an inch to an 
inch and one-half to two inches in length; and that ones on 
the top of his head went very deep.

The state next introduced Mr. A. B. Ruffin, deputy 
sheriff of Lauderdale County.

He testified that on the 11th day of February, 1946, he 
had a call to make an investigation as to the dead body that 
was found at Rock Hill, which body was Mr. Jim Meadors; 
that he reached there about 11:00 o’clock; that he went in 
response to a telephone call from Mrs. Taylor; that Russell 
Danner and he went out there; that when they drove up to 
the front the ambulance had just driven up ahead of them; 
that he, Russell Danner and the two boys who worked with 
the ambulance walked inside and found that the place was 
terribly torn up. That a lot of broken bottles and things 
like that were there and blood was all over the place; that 
they found Mr. Meadors with his head lying partly under­
neath the counter on top of a case of Seven-Up bottles, 
partly filled; and he described the surroundings of the 
body, etc.

He testified that he called the coroner and held an in­
quest, and during the time they were searching the place for 
evidence of anything that would lead to the reason for the

18



killing, or for clues, and that they searched the place pretty 
thoroughly.

He found a hat underneath the ice box and testified that 
the long ice box was made into the counter. The hat which 
they found underneath the ice box was identified in the evi­
dence as belonging to the defendant. They searched inside 
the building for the money and did not find it nor did they 
find the tin box which was introduced in evidence and 
called a lunch box, which proof shows Meadors had and 
which afterwards was found in the custody of the defendant.

He testified that they searched on the outside of the build­
ing, and found some tracks; that whoever made the tracks 
was running, and that the tracks were a long distance apart, 
the distance between the tracks being estimated at about 
five feet; that they wrere suspicious looking; and that these 
tracks were what they found first.

He testified further that the tracks seemed to make more 
pressure on the toes, and that casts were made of these 
tracks; that one of the heels in the tracks was run over, 
what is known as a run-over heel; that this run-over heel 
was on the right foot; that he also made a cast of the left 
foot which was introduced as evidence.

He further testified that later in the day the defendant 
was arrested; that at the time he was arrested the shoes were 
taken off of him, and he "was wearing a pair of shoes with a 
part of the heel on the right shoe with a soft part in the 
center, which was indicated in the cast.

He testified further that the left shoe did not have any 
heel at all and had a rough, soft rubber sole.

The defendant then made objection that this testimony 
was a violation of sections 23 and 26 of the Mississippi Con­
stitution ; that if the officers took the shoes from this man,

19



and he testified that they did, no comparison could be made 
with the case or no evidence made to show that they were 
made by one and the same tracks until its admissibility is 
properly determined, which objection was overruled.

Mr. Ruffin, the deputy sheriff, testified that he had found 
a hat belonging to the defendant in the night club or store 
under the ice box; that he did not know at the time whose 
hat it was, and spent some little time asking people as to 
whom the hat belonged, and finally learned that it belonged 
to the defendant.

He saw the tracks, as indicated above, and their peculari- 
ties and had casts made of these tracks which appeared to be 
running as above stated. On this information he had reason 
to believe that the appellant was then guilty, and they ar­
rested the appellant and took the shoes from his feet and 
tested them and placed them in the cast and they fit the 
cast exactly.

Witnesses describing the peculiarities of the shoes and of 
the tracks and the casts made together with the information 
as to the hat belonging to the defendant was sufficient to 
justify the appellant’s arrest and were reasonable grounds 
to believe that he had committted the felony.

The appellant, under questioning by the officers, ad­
mitted the hat belonged to him and made a full and com­
plete confession as to the killing and the incidents of the 
killing and the methods used in the killing.

The appellant, then, after questioning, carried the officers 
to a place about half a mile northwest of the place of the 
killing and showed them clothes hidden in a pine top or 
brush heap which was the coat of deceased in which was 
wrapped some other garments of the deceased and also the 
lunch box described in the evidence which the deceased had 
used as a container for his money while at his place of busi­

20



ness and conveying it to his home for safekeeping at night, 
and in this lunch box were some other little articles described 
by the witness.

Another deputy carried the appellant to the place where 
the clothes were pointed out, and the testimony showed that 
this confession was not induced by threats or promises or 
hope of reward, and was clearly admissible.

The appellant also carried the officers to another point, 
some distance from where the clothes were found, where the 
money was hidden, and he confessed that he had secreted 
the money at that place, and that he had taken it from the 
place of the deceased at the time of the killing.

The defendant confessed to the officers in detail as to the 
means and methods of the killing which showed it to be a 
brutal and unprovoked murder.

On the night of the killing, the appellant carried the shirt 
and pants to a dry cleaner in the city of Meridian to have 
them dry cleaned and pressed, and the pants had indica­
tions of blood on them, and in the pants pocket was a ticket 
with appellant’s name on it which showed the pants and 
shirt were to be delivered on Tuesday, the day following 
the placing of them in the dry cleaning establishment for 
cleaning and pressing.

The appellant had on clothes that were fresh when he 
was arrested, and stated to the officers that he had just 
changed clothes Monday night after the pants and shirt had 
been left for cleaning and pressing. The officers had gotten 
this information by the confession of the appellant or by 
his statement in answer to questions, and they called the 
owner of the pressing shop to come down to the shop so they 
could get the clothing which the appellant had left there. 
This was after the closing hour of the shop, and the owner

21



of it left his home and went to the shop and delivered the 
pants and shirt to the officers, who were deputy sheriffs, 
and these were introduced in evidence.

There was a great deal of testimony introduced, and the 
defendant did not testify at all either on the preliminary 
objection to the admission of his confession and the state­
ments made by the appellant and the production of the 
articles in Court and the introduction of them in evidence 
although the defendant had opportunity should he have 
desired to testify to any facts that might have existed in­
ducing the confession when that was offered in evidence 
without testifying if he did not want to testify on the merits. 
In other words, the testimony of the officers, as shown, is 
utterly without dispute. There is, therefore, nothing doubt­
ful about the appellant’s guilt of the murder and of his doing 
the things testified to by the officers.

A person has a perfect legal right to testify in his own 
behalf should he desire to do so or he has a right to remain 
silent and stand on the State’s evidence, but if he exercises 
this latter right, then the jury is entitled to draw every 
reasonable conclusion that the evidence warrants; and, 
therefore, the evidence should be accepted as being true 
unless it is inherently improbable or false. Such is not the 
case in the evidence involved here.

Argument

I submit that there are many facts in the original volumi­
nous record that are not set forth in this Statement of 
Facts.

The first point in the argument of the appellant is that 
the lower court erred in overruling the appellant’s motion 
to quash the indictment against him on the ground of sys­
tematic exclusion of qualified negroes from jury service,

22



and in so ruling, denied to the appellant his rights of due 
process of law and equal protection of the laws granted him 
by the State Constitution and the 14th amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States. In other words, the 
appellant, seriously argues the exclusion of negroes from the 
jury box and the special venire selected by the Sheriff.

This argument should not have been injected into this 
case on the facts contained in this record and under the laws 
of the State. I say this with due regard and friendship for 
the attorneys for the appellant who injected this question 
into this record, and do not doubt that they felt called upon 
to do so, and did so out of a regard for what they thought 
they should do in this case. Nevertheless, there was no 
probability at all that under Section 2464 of the Constitu­
tion negro jurors could be obtained under any reasonable 
method of drawing the jury in this case.

The record shows that there were some 9,000 to 12,000 
registered voters in Lauderdale County and that only from 
30 to 60 of these were negroes qualified to vote; but no 
showing was made as to how many could read or write as 
required by Section 264 of the Constitution and the major 
part of the negroes who were registered were not subject 
to jury duty under the laws of the State, being either over 
age or excusable for other reasons and could not be com­
pelled to serve had they been singled out and summoned.

I desire, before going into the authorities on this proposi­
tion, to call attention to some provisions of the Constitution 
and the laws of this state. The State, of course, has the 
right to say what qualifications jurors shall have to admin­
ister the high trust involved in jury duty.

Section 264 of the State Constitution reads as follows:
“No person shall be a grand or petit juror unless 

qualified elector and able to read and write; but the

23



want of any such qualification in any juror shall not 
vitiate any indictment or verdict. The legislature shall 
provide by law for procuring a list of persons so quali­
fied, and the drawing therefrom of grand and petit 
jurors for each term of the circuit court.”

There is no legal method of compelling any person to 
register or vote or to qualify for jury service under this 
section of the Constitution. The term in the above section 
“ unless a qualified elector and able to read and write” is to 
be construed in connection with the provisions on the fran­
chise contained in article 12 of the Constitution and par­
ticularly with reference to Sections 241, 242. 243 and 244 
of the Mississippi Constitution.

In section 241 of the Constitution, it is provided:

“ Every inhabitant of this state, except idiots, insane 
persons, and Indians not taxed, who is a citizen of the 
United States, twenty-one years old and upwards, who 
has resided in this state for two years, and one year in 
the election district, or in the incorporated city or town 
in which he offers to vote, and wrho is duly registered, 
as provided in this article, and who has never been 
convicted of bribery, theft, arson, obtaining money or 
goods under false pretense, perjury, forgery, embezzle­
ment or bigamy and who has paid on or before the first 
day of February of the year in which he shall offer to 
vote, all poll taxes which may have been legally re­
quired of him and which he has had an opportunity of 
paying according to law, for the two preceding years, 
and who shall produce to the officers holding the elec­
tion satisfactory evidence that he has paid such taxes, 
is declared to be a qualified elector; but any minister 
of the gospel in charge of an organized church shall be 
entitled to vote after six months’ residence in the elec­
tion district, if otherwise qualified.”

Under Section 242 of the Constitution of Mississippi it is 
provided:

“ The legislature shall provide by law for the regis­
tration of all persons entitled to vote at any election.”

24



It cites further the oath that parties securing registra­
tion must take, in which oath he must swear that he is 
not disqualified for voting by reason of having been 
convicted of any crime named in the Constitution as a 
disqualification to be an elector, and that he will an­
swer truthfully all questions pertaining to the right to 
register and vote.

Section 243 provides for:

“A uniform poll tax of two dollars, to be used in aid 
of common schools, and for no other purpose, is hereby 
imposed on every inhabitant of this state, male or fe­
male*, between the ages of twenty-one and sixty years, 
except persons who are deaf and dumb, or blind, or who 
are maimed by loss of hand or foot, etc.”

Section 244 provides that:

“ On and after the first day of January, 1892, every 
elector shall, in addition to the foregoing qualifications, 
be able to read any section of the Constitution of this 
state; or he shall be able to understand the same when 
read to him, or give a reasonable interpretation thereof. 
A new registration shall be made before the next en­
suing election after January the first, 1892.”

Section 248 of the Constitution provides for an appeal 
from a refusal of registration, and has an important bearing 
on the question involved in the first Assignment of Error 
argued by the appellant. The section reads as follows:

“ Suitable remedies by appeal or otherwise shall be 
provided by law, to correct illegal or improper regis­
tration and to secure the elective franchise to those 
who may be illegally or improperly denied the same.”

The Legislature has provided this method of appeal, and 
every voter has the right to appeal the registrar’s decision 
denying him to right to vote and have a judicial hearing 
thereon, and this right he may exercise to the utmost limit

*The word female was not in the original Constitution but was inserted 
after the adoption o f woman suffrage.

25



by appealing to every court including the Supreme Court 
of the United States. See Code of 1942, Section 3224, and 
3228.

As stated in the beginning of this brief, there is no proof 
whatever that any negro was denied the right to register or 
to vote in Lauderdale County.

The Circuit Clerk is the registrar under the law, and 
from his refusal an appeal may be taken to the circuit court 
and from thence to the State Supreme Court and from 
thence to the United States Supreme Court. This being 
true, the officers in making up the jury lists did not have 
more than one-half of one per cent of the registered voters 
to select any negroes from, and the law does not require any 
particular person to be selected for jury service from the 
lists of registered voters of the county.

Mississippi has never authorized women to sit on juries, 
and the record shows that approximately fifty per cent of 
the voters who are registered are women.

I will now refer to some of the statutes involved to show 
that the application to quash the indictment and to quash 
the special venire are utterly without merit, and should not 
be raised in this case, because there is no showing in the 
record that there was any qualified negroes under Section 
1762 of Mississippi Code 1942. There may be cases, and 
no doubt are, where counsel should raise the question for 
the protection of his client, and I would not criticize the 
raising of the question in some cases where there was a 
probability of securing classes of persons who were not on 
the jury lists or in the jury box.

Section 1762 of the Code of 1942 provides that:

“Every male citzen not under the age of twenty-one 
years, who is a qualified elector and able to read and

26



write, has not been convicted of an infamous crime, 
or the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors within a 
period of five years, and who is not a common gambler 
or habitual drunkard, is a competent juror; but no 
person who is or has been within twelve months the 
overseer of a public road or road contractor shall be 
competent to serve as a grand juror. But the lack of 
any such qualifications on the part of one or more 
jurors shall not vitiate an indictment or verdict.”

It also provides for talesmen of a jury, etc., which is not 
pertinent here.

Section 1764 provides who shall be exempt from jury duty, 
and includes all physicians, osteopaths and dentists actually 
in practice, all teachers and officers of public schools and 
locomotive engineers actually engaged in their vocation; 
and a large number of other persons including all ministers 
of the gospel and Jewish rabbis actually engaged in their 
calling, all officers of the Government of the United States, 
all lawyers practicing their profession, and others numerous 
in said section.

Section 1765 provides who are exempt as a personal 
privilege, and reads as folows:

“Every citizen over sixty years of age, and everyone 
who has served on the regular panel within two years, 
shall be exempt from service, if he claims the privilege; 
but the later class shall serve as talesmen and on special 
venire, and on the regular panel, if there be a deficiency 
of jurors.”  (Emphasis added.)

Section 1766 provides for the making of the list of jurors 
by the board of supervisors at the April meeting of each year 
or at a subsequent meeting if not done at the April meet­
ing, and they shall select and make a list of persons to serve 

'  as jurors in the Circuit Court for the twelve months be­
ginning more than thirty days afterwards, and provides 
that as a guide in making this list they shall use the regis-

27



tration book of voters, and shall select and list the names 
of qualified persons of good intelligence, sound judgment, 
and fair character, and that they shall take them as nearly 
as they conveniently can, from the several supervisor’s dis­
tricts in proportion to the number of qualified persons in 
each, excluding all who have served on the regular panel 
within two years. It also provides that the Clerk of the 
Circuit Court shall put the names from each supervisor’s 
districts in a separate box or compartment, kept for the 
purpose, which shall be locked and kept closed and sealed, 
except when juries are drawn. It also provides that the 
board of supervisors shall cause the jury box to be emptied 
of all names therein, and the same to be refilled from the 
jury list as made by them at said meeting. It then pro­
vides if the jury box shall at any time be so exhausted of 
names as that a jury cannot be drawn as provided by law, 
then the board of supervisors may at any regular meeting 
make a new list of jurors in the manner herein provided. 
It is then made the duty of the Circuit Clerk and the 
registrar of the voters to certify to the board of supervisors 
during the month of March of each year under the seal of 
his office the number of qualified electors in each of the 
several districts in the county.

In the present case the box, as made up at the April term, 
became exhausted during the year, and was refilled less than 
thirty days before the time of the drawing of the special 
venire and empaneling of the Grand jury.

The list of jurors made up under this chapter does not 
require the listing of every voter as a juror, but limits the 
number that may be listed in such list unless there be a de­
ficiency of jurors in which case the court may order a greater 
or less number to be listed. (Section 1767.)

28



Section 1768 provides:

“A certified copy of the lists shall be immediately 
delivered by the clerk of the board of supervisors to the 
clerk of the circuit court, and shall be by him carefully 
filed and preserved as a record of his office; and any 
alteration thereof shall be treated and punished as pro­
vided in case of the alteration of a record.”

As already stated, the county contained from 9,000 to 
12,000 registered voters. The law limits the number that 
could be selected, and no more than eight hundred can be 
put on the list unless ordered by the Circuit Court because 
of the reasons mentioned.

Section 1772 of the Code provides:

“At each regular term of the circuit court, and at a 
special term if necessary, the judge shall draw, in open 
court, from the five small boxes enclosed in the jury 
box, slips containing the names of sixty-two jurors to 
serve as grand and petit jurors for the first week and 
thirty-six to serve as petit jurors for each subsequent 
week of the next succeeding term of the court, drawing 
the same number of slips from each and every one of 
the five small boxes if practicable, and he shall make 
and carefully preserve separate lists of the names, and 
shall not disclose the name of any juror so drawn; but 
only thirty-six names shall be drawn for each week or 
any term where a grand jury is not to be drawn. The 
slips containing the names so drawn shall be placed by 
the judge in envelopes, a separate one for each week, 
and he shall securely seal and deliver them to the clerk 
of the court, so marked as to indicate which contains 
the names of the jurors for the first and each subse­
quent week. If in drawing it appears that any juror 
drawn has died, removed or ceased to be qualified or 
liable to serve as a juror, the judge shall cause the slip 
containing the name to be destroyed, the name to be 
stricken from the jury list, and he shall draw another 
name to complete the required number.”

Section 1774 provides if this is not done in term that the

29



judge may draw them in vacation, if convenient; and if he 
does not, and whenever jurors are required for a special term 
and the judge shall so direct, the clerks of the circuit and 
chancery courts and the sheriff shall, at the time they should 
have opened the envelopes, draw the jurors for the term of 
court, and make and certify the lists thereof; and the clerk 
shall issue and deliver to the sheriff the proper venire facias.

Section 1777 of the Code provides that the sheriff shall 
forthwith execute the venire facias by summoning each 
juror at least five days before the first day of court either 
by personal service or by leaving a written notice at his 
usual place of abode; and he shall make return of the venire 
on the first day of the term, and this section provides for 
fining of jurors if they do not attend as commanded unless 
they show good cause.

By Section 1778 it is made a contempt of court not to 
perform the duties as to juries when so listed and summoned.

Section 1779 provides that the number of grand jurors 
shall not be less than fifteen nor more than twenty, in the 
discretion of the court; and that they shall be drawn from 
the list of persons in attendance as jurors on a separate slip 
of paper, and the names from each supervisor’s district shall 
be placed in a separate box or compartment, in open court, 
and shall be drawn out by the person designated by the 
judge, the number directed by the court; and said names 
shall be drawn from each box in regular order until the 
number designated is drawn, and the jurors whose names 
are so drawn shall constitute the grand jury, and be em­
paneled and sworn as such. The court shall poll the jury 
to ascertain whether any juror is directly or indirectly in­
terested in the illicit sale of vinous, malt or spirituous 
liquor.

30



The court then appoints a foreman of the grand jury 
under Section 1780, and that section prescribes their oath 
which it will be seen is very strict in securing impartial 
action by the grand jury, and each member of the grand 
jury must also take an oath to the same effect.

Section 1781 requires the circuit judge at each term of 
the criminal court to charge the grand jury concerning its 
duty and to expound the law to it as he shall deem proper, 
and he shall give it in charge certain actions mentioned 
therein.

Section 1783 provides that all county officers shall attend 
the criminal term of the circuit court and hear the judge’s 
charge to the grand jury and the judge’s charge to such 
officer.

It will be seen from a careful study of these sections that 
they are designed to secure a fair and just administration of 
the law, and to secure fair trials and prevent malicious prose­
cutions, etc.

Section 1794 of the Code provides that:
“ If at any regular or special term of a circuit court 

it appears that jurors have not been drawn or sum­
moned for the term, or for any part thereof, or that the 
jurors have been irregularly drawn or summoned, or 
that none of the jurors so drawn or summoned are in 
attendance, or not a sufficient number to make the 
Grand Jury and three Petit Juries, the court shall im­
mediately cause the proper number of jurors to be 
drawn from the box and summoned, or, if there be not 
a jury box to be drawn from, the court shall direct the 
requisite number of persons qualified as jurors, to be 
summoned to appear at such time as the court shall 
appoint, and the court shall thereupon proceed as if 
the jurors had been regularly drawn and summoned.”

The empaneling of the Grand Jury is conclusive of their 
competence, Reynolds vs. State, 199 Miss. 409, 24 So. (2d)

31



page 781; see Moon vs. State, 176 Miss. 72, 168 So. 476. 
In Moon vs. State, 176 M. 72, it was held that during the 
thirty days of the box was refilled a drawing from the box 
could not be had. See Sec. 1784, Code 1942; Pearson vs. 
State, 176 M. 9, 167 So. 644.

In the case before us there was no jury box available 
under the decisions of our court and the jurors could not be 
drawn from the box during the thirty day period when the 
box w'as refilled for a court which was held during that 
period.

By section 1796 of the Code, a challenge to the array shall 
not be sustained, except for fraud, nor shall any venire 
facias, except a special venire facias in a criminal case, be 
quashed for any cause whatever.

There certainly could be no fraud in the manner in which 
the special venire was drawn, and consequently it could not 
be quashed.

By Section 1798 of the Code the jury laws are directory 
merely, and it is only where there is a departure from the 
statutory scheme in the manner that prejudices the rights 
of the party that the jury will be abated for any irregularity.

It is submitted that under these various statutory pro­
visions that in this case on its peculiar evidence a- question 
of failure to have negroes on the jury or summoned as 
jurors is without prejudice.

I call the Court’s attention to the remarkable fairness of 
the jury that was empaneled in this case to try the case 
without prejudice, without any desire to do anything except 
what was right and proper under the law. They were exam­
ined at great length and were examined with reference 
among other things as to whether they would give a negro 
a fair trial where the killing was a killing of a white man,

32



and also as to whether they would require an extreme case 
or a very strong case before they would inflict the death 
penalty.

It is seldom you see where the question is raised on 
whether the jury would inflict the penalty of death in case 
of guilt, the matter being entirely in the discretion of the 
jury if they believe the case of murder has been made out. 
I have strongly been impressed with these juries’ statements 
and views that would require an extraordinary case of mur­
der before they would inflict the death penalty, and no com­
plaint can be justly made of the jury who actually tried the 
case and no question at all as to the guilt of the appellant 
on the facts and evidence.

The murder was one of peculiar atrocity, and was in­
spired by a desire to rob the deceased. The fact that he 
was brutally beaten to death seemed, from this record, to 
have been done merely to secure the money and suppress 
the evidence that would exist of robbery.

I am aware that the Constitution of the United States 
as construed by the Supreme Court of the United States 
makes a willful or purposeful discrimination against negroes 
or other classes will cause the Supreme Court to reverse a 
case where the record shows that a considerable number of 
negro voters existed in the jurisdiction where the crime was 
committed were eligible for jury service, and that it is not 
permissible to discriminate by purposeful desire not to have 
a particular class on the jury. This matter was specifically 
decided in the case of Norris v. the State of Alabama, 294 
U. S. 587, 55 S. Ct 579, 79 L. Ed. 1074, and Hale v. Ken­
tucky, 303 U. S. 613, 82 L. Ed. 1950, under which case the 
rule was announced:

“A systematic and arbitrary exclusion of negroes 
from grand and petit jury lists because of their race

33



and color constitutes a denial to a negro charged with 
crime of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”

Attention must be given in studying these cases to the 
language used by the Federal Court solely because of their 
race or color.

In the report of this case in the 82nd L. Ed. (page 1053) 
there is a case note with reference to the violation of the 
constitutional rights in criminal cases by unfair practices 
in selection of grand or petit juries; and at page 1055 under 
the heading “Application of a Rule to a Particular Race or 
Class” and sub-heading “Negroes” , many cases are cited 
dealing with unfair practices by leaving races entitled to 
jury service off the lists or out of the enrollment of those 
who are discriminated against.

These is also an elaborate case note in 52 A. L. R. 916 
appended to the case of Passar v. County Board reporting 
this case as being a Minnesota case with a case note ap­
pended (page 919).

I desire to call the Court’s attention to the language used 
in the Am. St. Report case note quoted from Smith v. State 
(Oklahoma) 4th Okla. Crim. Rep. 128, 140 Am. St. 688, in 
which the following language was used by the Supreme 
Court of Oklahoma:

“ The 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States does not require the jury commissioners, 
or other officers charged with the selection of juries, to 
place negroes upon the jury list simply because they are 
negroes. The allegation that the jury was composed 
solely of white men does not violate the 14th Amend­
ment to the Constitution of the United States, and 
proof of that fact would not support the motion. The 
ground upon which the decisions of the Supreme Court 
of the United States rest is not that negroes were not 
selected to sit upon juries, but that they were excluded

34



therefrom solely on account of their race or color. In 
other words, there is no law to compel the jury com­
missioners, or other officers of the court, to select or 
summon negroes as jurors. They can select any per­
sons whom they regard as competent to serve as jurors 
without regard to their race or color, but the law pro­
hibits them from excluding negroes solely on account 
of their race or color. Therefore the judge should have 
heard the testimony, and, if he found from the evidence 
that there was an agreement among the jury commis­
sioners to exclude negroes from the jury panel simply 
because they were negroes, or that the officers charged 
with the duty of selecting and summoning said jurors 
had refused to select or summons negroes on the jury, 
and had excluded them therefrom solely upon the 
ground that they were negroes, then the judge should 
have sustained said motion. There is no law requiring 
an officer to place negroes on the panel simply because 
they are negroes. It is his duty to select the best jurors 
without regard to race or color. When this is done, the 
law is satisfied.”

This language is taken from 140 Am. St. Rep. 688, which 
I verified by comparison.

Our own court was in accord with the Oklahoma court 
upon this question as shown by Lewis v. State, 91 Miss. 
505, 45 So. 360, quoted from in appellant’s brief. In this 
Lewis case our court, speaking through Justice Mayes, said:

“There is nothing in our jury law which does not 
apply with equal force to all citizens, whatever be their 
race or color. It is a mistaken impression, which seems 
to have become prevalent, that in order to constitute 
a valid jury there must be some negroes in the jury list. 
Such is not the case. A jury may be composed entirely 
of negroes, or it may be composed entirely of white 
persons, or it may be composed of a mixture of the two 
races; and in either and in any case it is a perfectly 
lawful jury, provided no one has been excluded or dis­
criminated against simply because he belongs to one 
race or the other.”

35



Our court has also held in Farrow v. State, 91 Miss. 509, 
45 So. 619, in accordance with the Federal Court:

“That where a county board of supervisors, in select­
ing a list of persons qualified for jury service, knowingly 
and in accordance with a well established practice, and 
for the purpose of depriving negro citizens of participat­
ing in the administration of justice, and intentionally, 
keep off the names of negroes from such list, an indict­
ment returned by a grand jury drawn from such jury 
list should be quashed.”

These cases show clearly that where the omission or ex­
clusion of negroes from the jury list was solely for the pur­
pose of preventing negroes serving as jurors in the court and 
not where the board of supervisors in making up the jury 
lists selects merely the jurors for their mental and moral 
qualifications; that is to say, selects men of good intelli­
gence, sound judgment and fair character, from those who 
have registered and qualified to vote. However, our statu­
tory and Constitutional provisions have been twice before 
the United States Supreme Court since 1890, the statutes 
being substantially the same on this question now as then.

In Gibson v. State of Miss., 162 U. S. 567, 40 L. Ed. 1078, 
our statutes and Constitution were upheld upon this ques­
tion, the opinion being written by that eminent jurist, 
Justice Harlan, which appears on page 1078 of the Law 
Edition Reports. The Court, after citing earlier cases which 
had held that discrimination against the negro because of 
race or color alone would render a proceeding a denial of 
equal protection and due process of law, said:

“ The cases cited were held to have decided that the 
statutory enactments referred to were constitutional 
exertions of the power of Congress to enact appropriate 
legislation for the enforcement of the 14th Amendment, 
which was designed, primarily, to secure to the colored 
race, thereby invested with the rights, privileges, and 
responsibilities of citizenship, the enjoyment of all the

36



civil rights that, under the law, are enjoyed by white 
persons; that while a state, consistently with the pur­
poses for which the amendment was adopted, may con­
fine the selection of jurors to males, to free-holders, to 
citizens, to persons within certain ages, or to persons 
having educational qualifications, and while a mixed 
jury in a particular case is not, within the meaning of 
the Constitution, always or absolutely necessary to the 
enjoyment of the equal protection of the laws, and 
therefore an accused, being of the colored race, cannot 
claim as matter of right that his race shall be repre­
sented on the jury, yet a denial to citizens of the African 
race, because of their color, of the right or privileges 
accorded to white citizens of participating as jurors in 
the administration of justice would be a discrimination 
against the former inconsistent with the amendment 
and within the power of Congress, by appropriate 
legislation, to prevent; that to compel a colored man 
to submit to a trial before a jury drawn from a panel 
from which were excluded, because of their color, men 
of his race, however well qualified by education and 
character to discharge the functions of jurors, was a 
denial of the equal protection of the laws; and that 
such exclusion of the black race from juries because of 
their color was not less forbidden by law than would be 
the exclusion from juries in states where the blacks 
have the majority, of the white race because of their 
color.” (Emphasis by the Court.)

Further on in this same opinion, page 1079 of the Law 
Edition, the Court said:

“We may repeat here what was said in Neal v. Dela­
ware, 103 U. S. 370, 385, 386 (26: 567, 569, 570), 
namely: that in thus construing the statute ‘we do 
not withhold from a party claiming that he is denied, 
or cannot enforce in the judicial tribunals of the state, 
his constiutional equality of civil rights, all opportunity 
of appealing to the courts of the United States for the 
redress of his wrongs. For, if not entitled, under the 
statute, to the removal of the suit or prosecution, he 
may, when denied, in the subsequent proceedings of 
the state court, or in the execution of its judgment, any

37



right, privilege, or immunity given or secured to him 
by the Constitution or laws of the United States, bring 
the case here for review.”

In this provision the Court held that our Constitutional 
and statutory provisions were not discriminatory on their 
face, and that there was nothing in that case that showed 
discrimination by administrative officers of the State.

It, therefore, clearly appears that where the juries are 
fairly selected and where all the voters of the State are not 
required to be placed in the jury box or jury lists, but may 
be selected from such registration lists for their qualities of 
intelligence, morality and patriotism are like causes.

In Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U. S. 213, 42 L. Ed. 1012, 
our statutes and Constitution on the subject were again 
reviewed and held to be valid. In this opinion at page 1015 
of the Law Edition, page 222 of Official Edition, the Court 
in discussing the Constitutional laws of Mississippi said:

“Restrained by the Federal Constitution from dis­
criminating against the negro race, the convention dis­
criminated against its characteristics and the offenses 
to which its weaker members were prone. But nothing 
tangible can be deducted from this. If weakness were 
to be taken advantage of, it was to be done ‘within the 
field of permissible action under the limitations im­
posed by the Federal Constitution,’ and the means of 
it were the alleged characteristics of the negro race, not 
the administration of the law by the officers of the 
state. Besides, the operation of the Constitution and 
laws is -not limited by their language or effects to one 
race. They reach weak and vicious white men as well 
as weak and vicious black men, and whatever is sinister 
in their intentions, if anything, can be prevented by 
both races by the exertion of that duty which volun­
tarily pays taxes and refrains from crime.”

One of the later cases by the Supreme Court of the United 
States is that of Edgar Smith v. State of Texas, 311 U. S.

38



128-132, 85 L. L. Ed. page 84. In this case the United States 
Supreme Court held that:

“A charge of racial discrimination in the selection 
of grand jurors is supported by evidence that in a 
county in which negroes constitute over 20 per cent of 
the population and almost 10 per cent of the poll-tax 
payers, and a minimum of from 3,000 to 6,000 of them 
measure up to the statutory qualifications for grand 
jury service, only 18 of 512 persons summoned over an 
8-year period for grand jury duty were negroes, that 
of the 18 the names of all but one were so far down on 
the list from which the grand jury was made up as to 
render it unlikely that they would be reached, that in 
fact only five ever served, and that of these five the 
same individual served three times, so that only three 
individual negroes served at all, whereas 379 of the 494 
white men summoned actually served, and of 32 grand 
juries impaneled only five had negro members, and that 
while two of the three commissioners who drew the 
panel for the grand jury by which defendant was in­
dicted denied that they intentionally, arbitrarily, or 
systematically discriminated against negro grand jurors 
as such, one said that their failure to select negroes was 
because they did not know the names of any who were 
qualified, and the other said that he was not personally 
acquainted with any member of the negro race.”

In this case and in other cases in the United States 
Supreme Court it has been held that where there were a 
large number of negroes qualified for jury service, and none 
over a long period had been selected to so serve, the Court 
would treat this as sufficient evidence of discrimination. 
The Court has also held that it would decide for itself the 
facts involved in the case where Federal rights, privileges 
or immunities are involved in the case.

In the second syllabus in this case this rule was announced 
as follows:

“On an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United 
States from a conviction of crime in a state court on

39



the ground of invasion of constitutional rights, the 
Supreme Court will, notwithstanding a state court has 
held the evidence insufficient to establish such invasion, 
determine for itself the sufficiency of the evidence.”

In studying these cases it should be borne in mind the 
facts as to whether negroes are qualified to serve on juries 
merely because they were registered voters and on the 
other hand where the juries are to be selected as in Missis­
sippi because of their good intelligence, sound judgment 
and fair character and where they must also be registered 
voters able to read and write under the Constitution of the 
State. It should also be borne in mind that there is no way 
to compel negroes or others to register; that is optional. 
Also, there is nothing to prevent them from registering and 
qualifying for jury service.

If our laws provided that all registered voters should be 
entitled to serve on juries there would be a serious question 
in this case although the number actually registered was 
exceedingly small—not exceeding one-half of one per cent 
of the total registered voters. But as the statute has limited 
the number that can be selected in one year from the total 
registered voters and requires the board of supervisors to 
select those “ of sound judgment, good intelligence and fair 
character” the board is charged with the duty of selecting 
those who are best suited and qualified to render safe and 
efficient service in the jury box. There are very many 
registered white voters able to read and write and having 
the qualities of “good intelligence, sound judgment and 
fair character” who cannot be placed in the box or on the 
list and who may never serve in the capacity of jurors al­
though they possess all the necessary educational and moral 
qualifications required.

The Federal Constitution prohibits the exclusion of a race 
or class from the jury box, but it does not require any par­

40



ticular jury to be composed of all members of the class or 
race involved, and much depends on the State law as to who 
will be qualified or who will be treated as available for jury 
service. The chief object is to get a fair and impartial jury. 
This is a Constitutional guaranty, and when the jury is such, 
the verdict should not be disturbed for mere technical errors 
in their selection.

In many of the states, women serve on juries under the 
State Laws and Constitution, while in many other states 
they do not serve, and the Supreme Court in the late case 
of Edna W. Ballard v. United States, 91 L. Ed., (Adv.) 
Page 195, held that where women were permitted to vote 
under State Constitution Laws and were systematically and 
continuously excluded from serving as jurors in certain ter­
ritories or parts of the State was a discrimination against 
women which rendered the indictment and judgment void. 
This case originated in the Federal Court and in the State 
court, but was pointed out that the Federal Court by 
statutes of the United States followed State procedure as 
to he selecting and impaneling of juries. On page 196 of 
this L. Ed. Advance Opinions of the Court said:

“We are met at the outset with the concession that 
women were not included in the panel of grand and 
petit jurors in the Southern District of California where 
the indictment was returned and the trial had; that 
they were intentionally and systematically excluded 
from the panel. This issue was raised by a motion to 
quash the indictment and by a challenge to the array of 
the petit jurors because of intentional and systematic 
exclusion of women from the panel.”

Further on, at page 197, in discusing the rights of jury 
trials as conceived in this country, it is said:

“ The American tradition of trial by jury, considered 
in connection with either criminal or civil proceedings, 
necessarily contemplates an impartial jury drawn from 
a cross-section of the community. . . . This does not

41



mean, of course, that every jury must contain repre­
sentatives of all the economic, social, religious, racial, 
political and geographical groups of the community; 
frequently such complete representation would be im­
possible. But it does mean that prospective jurors 
shall be selected by court officials without systematic 
and intentional exclusion of any of these groups. Rec­
ognition must be given to the fact that those eligible 
for jury service are to be found in every stratum of 
society. Jury competence is an individual rather than 
a group or class matter. That fact lies at the very heart 
of the jury system. To disregard it is to open the door 
to class distinctions and discriminations which are ab­
horrent to the democratic ideals of trial by jury.”

It will be seen by an examination of all the many cases 
cited in this brief that the discrimination must be because 
of an intentional denial of persons or classes or races en­
titled to serve on juries for the purpose of denying such 
groups, persons or races the right to participate in the ju­
dicial administration of the laws of the country.

I submit that as the law of Mississippi requires the jurors 
to be selected from a list of registered voters able to read and 
write, and this list to be recorded in the chancery clerk’s 
office, immediately after being selected as a matter of public 
recorded that a challenge of the legality of the jury should be 
made, not in a particular case, but in a general proceeding 
in all persons may join either with the movement to quash 
or those who wish to sustain the board of supervisors in 
resisting the motion to quash and that this must be done 
within sixty or ninety days. The laws of the State are 
designed to get reasonably qualified jurors of fair disposi­
tion and intelligence rather than by numbers or proportions 
and similar unsuitable standards.

Reading a case without studying the factual basis often 
misleads because the Court frequently uses broad language 
to express their decisions wThich is supported by the basic

42



facts of the particular case but might not be applicable to 
other case having different factual basis.

When the Constitutional and statutory provisions of 
Mississippi are considered and applied properly to the facts 
in this case, the manner of selecting the grand jury which re­
turned the indictment and the selection by the sheriff and 
his deputies of a special venire afford no reasonable basis 
for upsetting the action of the Court in this regard.

I deem it unnecessary to enter into the many other ques­
tions and cases cited in the brief of the appellant. Only a 
few authorities will be noticed in addition to what I have 
said which I conceive to be the only questions that should 
engage the attention of the court in considering this ap­
peal.

On the point that the jury should have been drawn from 
the box notwithstanding less than thirty days had passed 
since the box was refilled, our Supreme Court expressly 
passed upon this propositon in Pearson v. State, 176 Miss. 9, 
167 So. 644, speaking through Judge Anderson, construed 
the statute involved, and expressly held that the jury and 
the box were not available for selecting a jury for a period 
within thirty days from the date of refilling the box.

The counsel for the appellant criticised this opinion as 
being unsound and contrary to the real purpose of the 
statute. Counsel, of course, has a right to his personal 
opinion, but the judicial and other departments of the 
government must and should follow the decisions of the 
Supreme Court of the State in construing the statutes. The 
Court has a right and is under duty to declare the law ac­
cording to its judgment after considering the facts and the 
arguments and prior authorities of the State.

The case of Lee v. State, referred to by counsel on page 26

43



of his brief, was a case where more than thirty days had ex­
pired between the filling of the box and the drawing of the 
special venire, and the court in that case held that where 
more than thirty days had expired the jury box was avail­
able for drawing of jurors although thirty days had not ex­
pired when the term of Court began.

The two cases are in no way inconsistent, and the Court 
should follow the Pearson case because the court below was 
obliged to do so and probably had this case in mind when 
directing the special venire to be drawn from the body of 
the county.

There is nothing improper in this, and it is in aeordance 
with the law.

The sheriff is a high official of the county and will be 
presumed to have done his duty conscientiously, fairly and 
impartially.

When the evidence in this case is examined the testimony 
of the sheriff and the deputies who selected and summoned 
the special venire make absolutely certain that fairness was 
used and that the sheriff had no interest in the suit to pro­
cure any result in the trial; but, on the contrary, selected 
men whose testimony is in the record and shows that the 
jury desired to act strictly in accordance with justice and the 
law.

On the trial on the merits counsel complains of the taking 
of the shoes worn by the appellant after he had been ar­
rested and fitting them into the casts made of the tracks 
found running from the scene of the killing and having 
peculiarities with which the shoes worn by the appellant 
corresponded precisely. Counsel seemed to think that by 
taking the shoes it was an unlawful search and seizure in 
violation of his Constitutional rights and that it made him

44



give evidence against himself contrary to Section 26 of the 
Constitution.

I take it that there is no doubt about the law that a per­
son may be arrested wherever a felony has been committed 
and there is probable cause to believe that the person ar­
rested committed the crime. Code 1942, Section 2470.

When the sheriff’s deputies went out to the scene of the 
killing and investigated the building and around the build­
ing, they found a hat under the ice box which was identified 
as the hat belonging to and worn by the appellant and 
which the appellant subsequently admitted was his hat and 
which there is no proof to dispute in this record. The fact 
that the appellant had previously been employed by the 
deceased and the tracks of a peculiar nature were discovered 
apparently made by a person running at full speed as shown 
by the evidence was certainly sufficient to constitute prob­
able cause to arrest the appellant. Code 1942, Section 2470.

When the hat was found, inquiry was made and some 
time spent in finding out whose hat it was, and dependable 
information was secured that it belonged to the appellant. 
This being true, the arrest was a lawful arrest considered 
solely by the facts discovered prior to the arrest.

When the arrest was made the shoes were taken from the 
feet of the appellant as it was lawful to do after the arrest, 
the law being that when a person is arrested he may be 
searched and anything taken from him that tends to estab­
lish the crime or which tends to facilitate his escape.

In Toliver v. State, 133 Miss. 789, 98 So. 342, Toliver 
had been arrested by an officer, and his automobile was 
searched without a search warrant or any affidavit for a 
search warrant, and the car was found to contain intoxi­
cating liquor which was prohibited by law. It was con­

45



tended in that case that the law of search after an arrest 
did not apply to the car but was limited, if lawful at all, 
to the search of the person. But the Court held that the 
search was authorized and that the car was a means of 
facilitating an escape and that the officer had a right to 
take the car and take the contents into his possession, and 
if the contents showed a violation of the law the evidence 
was admissible.

In the case of Pringle v. State, 108 Miss. 802, 67 So. 455, 
Pringle was arrested and a letter taken from his person of 
an incriminatory nature, and the Court held an incrimina­
tory letter found on the accused was admissible though 
wrongfully obtained after his arrest.

In Williamson v. State, 140 Miss. 841, 105 So. 479, Wil­
liamson was traveling on the highway when met by an 
officer who asked him what the kegs in the car contained, 
and Williamson replied that the kegs contained whiskey 
before arrest or search was made, whereupon the liquor was 
seized without a warrant and introduced in evidence as a 
violation of prohibition laws.

In Bird v. State, 154 Miss. 493, 122 So. 539, it was held 
that where a person was arrested the taking from a person 
of a hack saw and other articles at the time of arrest for 
burglary was admissible in evidence.

In Watson v. State, 166 Miss. 194, 146 So. 122, valises 
and the contents thereof found in an automobile searched 
by the officers having probable cause to believe that the 
traveler whom they arrested was guilty of a felony were 
lawfully secured and hence admissible in evidence.

The evidence obtained by the comparison of the shoes 
worn by the defendant with the tracks found near the place 
of the crime and which fitted said tracks and also corre­
sponded with the casts made by the deputy sheriff of the

46



said tracks, and the tracks and the shoes having the same 
pecularities made certain or reasonably so that the shoes 
worn by the defendant made the tracks near the scene of 
the crime.

Subsequent to such arrest, the appellant admitted that 
he committed the crime, and pointed out to the officers, as 
indicated above, where the clothing, lunch box and other 
things were hidden and to another place where the money 
which appellant confessed was taken from the lunch box 
used by the deceased and was carried away and secreted.

Furthermore, on the very day of the crime appellant 
carried his shirt and pants to the cleaners, as above stated, 
in the Statement of Facts and his statement to the officers 
being made freely and voluntarily and all of the evidence of 
the State being uncontradicted there can be no doubt of 
appellant’s guilt.

The crime was one of peculiar atrocity and deserves the 
most severe punishment authorized by law. This being true 
no mere technical ruling or decision even if error would war­
rant reversing this case.

The Court has often decided that it would not reverse a 
case where guilt was conclusively established. The whole 
object of the law is to secure to every defendant a fair trial 
and also a fair trial to the prosecuting power to the end that 
justice may be done according to law.

Counsel for the appellant at page 15 of their brief states:
“ Testimony presented before the Special Commit­

tee to Investigate Senatorial Campaign Expenditures, 
1946— 79th Congress at hearings held in Jackson, Mis­
sissippi, on the 2d, 3d, 4th and 5th days of December, 
1946, showed a state-wide condition of intimidation 
by State officers of large blocks of Negroes who at­
tempted to register and vote in a recent primary held 
in that State.

47



“ In 1946, Mississippi passed a law exempting vete­
rans from payment of poll taxes under certain con­
ditions. A great movement of Negro veterans took 
place all over the State to register to vote. There were 
66,972 discharged Negro veterans in Mississippi and 
practically 100 per cent of them could read and write.”

This statement is not contained in the record nor is it 
justified by anything contained in the record. There is no 
testimony whatever in the record to show that there was 
any state-wide intimidation or that any negro anywhere 
had sought registration and was refused by any officer his 
right to register. In the trial court, various officers were 
examined and it could easily have been ascertained from the 
circuit clerk and others whether or not any negro had been 
refused registration. If he should be he has his right of 
appeal to the courts under the Constitution of the State 
referred to in this brief of mine already. This right of appeal 
would extend to final right of appeal to the United States 
Supreme Court. Furthermore there is no evidence that in 
1946 that there was a great movement of negro veterans all 
over the State to register or vote. Nothing of that kind 
appears in this record and certainly it is not a matter of 
which the court would take judicial notice. On page 18 of 
the appellant’s brief , it is stated: “From the testimony of a 
deputy sheriff in the instant case, it was ascertained that 
petitioner, an ignorant Negro youth, was taken to the local 
jail and placed in the office at approximately 1 p.m. on the 
afternoon of his arrest (R. 137). He was kept in this se­
cluded office and was denied any opportunity to contact an 
attorney. . . . He was forced to remain so confined in the 
presence of numerous policemen and other law enforcement 
officials whose powers in his mind undoubtedly were greatly 
magnified, until about 8 or 8:30 that night. During all this 
time he was denied food and drink.” I submit that a care­
ful reading of all the evidence bearing on the matter does

48



not show that he was denied food and drink or that he was 
continually questioned during a long period. The evidence 
does not support this statement. He further states, “He 
was made to strip off his clothing and lie on the floor naked. 
There was some testimony which would lead to an inference 
that he was actually beaten. While on the floor he was 
continually told that he was lying; that he might as well 
tell the truth and that they were going to get it out of him 
anyhow.” This last statement he refers to page 158 and 
page 336-179 of the record which is not the printed record 
but appears to have been in reference to the typewritten 
copy of the abridged record from which the printed copy 
of the record is made. I ask the court to carefully read the 
full testimony contained in the typewritten record at these 
pages and it will appear therefrom that the defendant was 
not maltreated or abused while in the custody of the officers 
and that his treatment was not different from that usually 
accorded to prisoners while officers are legitimately investi­
gating crime and especially crimes of murder.

The State did not introduce all of the officers who par­
ticipated in the investigation and the attorney for the de­
fendant made the following statement: “ If the Court please, 
I submit that if that is all he is going to offer, with the man 
being lots of times, when this witness wasn’t present, he is 
the only one so far that has been offered on it, and the other 
officers were present; that he would have to show by all of 
those officers that none of them offered him any induce­
ments. We don’t have to show anything in connection with 
it until the proof is offered to show it is entirely voluntary. 
He has introduced here only one witness and one who was 
present only a part of the time, covered by the investigation 
and interrogation of this defendant.’ The Court stated. 
“Mr. Broadway, the Court is not in a position to direct the 
State’s case. It can rule on what is before him at the time

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it is offered and that, I think, is as far as the Court can go. 
The Court is not permitted to force the State to put on a 
witness.” And on page 173 of the typewritten record, the 
Court stated: “All the Court can do is rule on what is before 
him. That is as far as I can go. If you wish to offer any 
proof, of course, you are at liberty to offer any proof, put on 
any officer you care to. I can’t make you put on any proof, 
or make the; State put on any.”

The defendant did not testify himself as to any of the 
matters complained of in the investigation by the officers 
in the jail and elsewhere and the defendant did not testify 
on the merits either. This being true, the testimony of the 
State’s witnesses must be accepted as the truth of what 
occurred during the investigation at the jail; at the carrying 
of the defendant to places where he pointed out articles that 
he had taken from Mr. Meadors or his place of business. The 
jury are the judges of the weight and worth of the testimony 
and the jury’s finding of fact cannot be disturbed if sup­
ported by evidence. All inferences and conclusions of fact 
are for the consideration of the jury. See Ranson vs. State, 
149 Miss. 262, 115 So. 208; Sauer vs. State, 166 Miss. 507, 
144 So. 225; Hart vs. State, 115 So. 887; Hardy vs. State, 
143 Miss. 352, 108 So. 727, and the many cases collected in 
Volume 5, Miss. Digest, annot. (West Pub. Co. edition) 
Criminal Law, Key No. 741 to 757, inclusive.

I therefore submit that the judgment should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

Greek L. R ice, Attorney General

By George H. Ethridge,
Assistant Attorney General.

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CERTIFICATE

I, George H. Ethridge, Assistant Attorney General of the 
State of Mississippi, hereby certify that I have this day 
mailed postage, prepaid a true copy of the above and fore­
going brief for the Appellee to Counsel for Appellant, 
Honorable Thurgood Marshall at his post office address at 
New York City, New York.

This the 29th day of October, 1947.

GEO. H. ETHRIDGE,
Assistant Attorney General.

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