Reply Brief for Defendant/Intervenor/Appellant Harris County Judge Wood
Public Court Documents
March 8, 1990
94 pages
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Case Files, LULAC and Houston Lawyers Association v. Attorney General of Texas Hardbacks, Briefs, and Trial Transcript. Reply Brief for Defendant/Intervenor/Appellant Harris County Judge Wood, 1990. de2f078d-1b7c-f011-b4cc-6045bdd81421. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/2fbf655b-ad33-469e-b62e-5e3d1e496c47/reply-brief-for-defendantintervenorappellant-harris-county-judge-wood. Accessed November 08, 2025.
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VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS
Mr. Gilbert F. Ganucheau
Clerk of the Court
100 U.S. Court of Appeals Courthouse
600 Camp Street
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130
Re: No. 90-8014 and No. 90-9003; League of United Latin
American Citizens (LULAC) , et al., Plaintiffs-
Appellees, v. Jim Mattox, Attorney General of the State
Of Texas, et .al., Defendants, and Harris County
District Judge Sharolyn Wood, Intervenor-Defendant-
Appellant; In the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit (Appeal from No. M0O88-CA-154 in the
United States District Court for the Western District
of Texas, Midland-Odessa Division)
Dear Mr. Ganucheau:
Enclosed is the original and 7 copies of Judge Sharolyn
Wood's Reply Brief in the referenced case. Please verify filing
of this document by returning one copy file-stamped to me in the
envelope provided.
All counsel are being mailed a copy of this Reply Brief via
Federal Express mail (unless otherwise indicated below).
Thank you for your attention to this matter.
Sincerely yours,
Grn V-lopa
EVK/cdf
enclosures
cc: Mr. David C. Godbey, Jr.
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PorTER & CLEMENTS
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Page
Gilbert F. Ganucheau
h 8, 1990
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¢ *
Gilbert F. Ganucheau
March 8, 1990
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PorTER & CLEMENTS 4
Mr. Gilbert F. Ganucheau
March 8, 1990
Page =-4-
Mr. Daniel M. Ogden
Attorney at Law
900 Chateau Plaza
2515 McKinney Avenue
Dallas, Texas 75201
Hon. Richard Thornburgh
Attorney General of the United States
United States Department of Justice
fain Justice Building
10th & Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL
POR THE PIFTH CIRCUIT
Pa
J
NO. 90-8014 and
NO. 90-9003
LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS,
COUNCIL NO. 4434, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
VEXg&us
WILLIAM P. CLEMENTS, GOVERNOR OF THE STAT
OF TEXAS, at al.,
JUDGE SHAROLYN WOOD, ETC.,
n Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
Midland Division
PLY BRIEF FOR DEFENDANT/INTERVENCR/APPELLANT
"HARRIS COUNTY DISTRICT JUDGE SHAROLYN WOOD
PORTER & CLEMENTS
J. Eugene Clements
Ev vel; vn V. Keyes
500 NCNB Center
P, 0. Box 4744
Hous Phy Texas 77210-4744
(713) 226-0600
J)
o>
ATTORNEYS FOR BD aLoNL/INIns
VENOR/ /DEFENDANT JUDGE WOOD
TABLE OF CONTENTS
}
Page
TAB OF CON ENS ih tisnims on» Shninin Gis 08 ma TL hyo 1
i TABLE OF AUTHOR IMI ES. i dh ls od tes sas ad aia aig og ii
{ ADDRESS TO THE COURT. tt nevis vais ya ie, ud [Tp 0 i 1
SATE MEN OF FA nisisicin nisi aie sai Re gh 2
3 A. “Gingleg 1: ""Ceographic Compactness. ...... i. ...4% su 2
B.: Gingles 2: Political Cohesion. vu... iii, voi ys
A C. fiGingles 3:4 White Racial Bloc Voting... ........ lu 3
} D. The Zimmer A Pactors. . . .. Loi odoic), uli Joma 0 6
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES, ce. il or Eo Ling a Te 7
| I. The Plaintiff's And The District Court's
Application Of § 2 Of The Voting Rights Act
To County-Wide Single Judge Districts Is
| Fundamentally Erroneous. . .. .... « «ce nee Yat 7
A. It Is Impossible To Apply The Voting
Rights Act To The Judiciary Without
1] Violating Constitutional Principles
And Basic Principles Of Legal
Fired epee UL TERE IEICE So IEEE ESRC 8
i B. No Constitutional Remedy For Perceived
"Vote Dilution" In Judicial Elections
} Is Possible. voli gh ov. de utd EY. iy Ee Ld, 12
11. The Plaintiffs' And The District Court's
Statement Of The Law Regarding The Proof
! Of Vote Dilution Is Fundamentally Erroneous....... 16
A. The Plaintiffs' And The District Court's
Proof Of Racially Discriminatory Voting
i 1s Logically And legally Fallacious.......i... 18
B. "The Proper Application Of § 2(b) Of The
4 Voting Rights Act To Partisan Elections
1s Set Out In Thornburg v. Gingles,
White v. Regester And Whitcomb v.Chavis....... 21
i CON CL DS ON te» irl es Reis stain ole hols I WE CT gl Tg 25
“i Tw
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986)
Brooks v. Georgia State Board of Elections,
Civ. Ac. No. 288-146 (S.D. Ga. December 1, 1989)
Burford v. Sun Oil, 319 U.8.:315, 83 g.Ct.' 11098 (1943). ...
Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056 {3th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied sub nom Roemer v. Chisom, 109 S.Ct.
(1988) ("Chisom")
Chisom v. Roemer, Civ. Ac. No. 86-4057
(E.D. La. September 13, 1989) ("Roemer")
City of Mobile, Alabama v. Bolden, 446 U.S.
68, 100 8.Ct. 1480, 1500 (1930)
Clark v. Edwards, 725 F.Supp. 285 (M.D. La.
Mallory v. Evrich, 717.F.Supp. 540 (8.D. Ohic 1989)
Mallory v. ‘Eyrich,"839 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1988)
Marbury 'v, Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 80 (1803)
Martin v. Allain, 658 F.Supp. 1183 (S.D. Miss. 1987)
Martin v. Mabus, 700 F.Supp. 327 (S.D. Miss. 1988)
Reynolds y. Sims, 377 U.S.:533, 84 S.Ct. 1362 (19564)
Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 617, .:102..8S.Ct.
3272, 3275 (1982)
SCLC v. Siegelman, 714 F.Supp. 511 (M.D. Ala.
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 106 S.Ct.
2752 (1986)
United States V. Uvalde Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist.
625 F.2d 547, 553 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
451 °U.8.. 1002," 101 S.Ct. 2341 (1981)
Voter Information Project v. City of Baton Rouge,
612 F.2d 208 "(5th Cir. 1980)
Wells v. Edwards, 347 F.Supp. 453 (M.D. La. 1972),
aff'd, 409 U.S. 1095, 93 S.Ct. 904,
34 L.E4. 2d 679 (1973)
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 763, .765,
03 S§.Ct. 2332, 2338, 2339 (1973)
Whitcomb v. Chavig, 403 U.S. 124,791 s.Ct. 1858 (1971)... ..
Younger v. Harris, M01 U.S. 37. 91's8.0¢. 746 (1871)
UNITED STATES STATUTES
§ 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.5.C. §1973
- iii -
ec. er ele Ww eles se GT. #8» 0 we se ete
* ee oo oo eo
sie ce eo. @ @ ¢ Wiis ® ee
10
19-22
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
NO. 90-8014 and
NO. 90-9003
LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS,
COUNCIL NO. 4434, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
versus
WILLIAM P. CLEMENTS, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE
OF TEXAS, et al.,
Defendants,
JUDGE SHAROLYN WOOD, ETC.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
Midland Division
REPLY BRIEF FOR DEFENDANT/INTERVENOR /APPELLANT
HARRIS COUNTY DISTRICT JUDGE SHAROLYN WOOD
ADDRESS TO THE COURT:
Appellant Harris County District Judge Sharolyn Wood ("Judge
Wood") files this reply brief showing that the Brief of Appellee
the Houston Lawyers' Association ("HLA") contains serious factual
errors, that the application of the Voting Rights Act to the
judiciary is fundamentally erroneous, and that Appellees’
standard of proof of vote dilution is logically and legally
invalid.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Judge Wood hereby incorporates by reference the Statement of
the Case in her Appellate Brief at 3-19, principally because the
facts set out by the Houston Lawyers' Association ("HLA"), the
only Plaintiff that presented claims relating to Harris County
contain so many serious factual errors that she feels duty-bound
to reply.
A. Gingles 1: Geographic Compactness
The HLA claims that the testimony of its expert witness,
Mr. Jerry Wilson, that thirteen geographically compact majority
black judicial districts could be drawn in Harris County is
undisputed. HLA Brief at 3. This testimony was disputed at
trial and in Judge Wood's Appellate Brief on several grounds,
including the ground that it is mathematically impossible for
18.27% of the population of Harris County to constitute a majority
in 22% of the county's 59 Judicial districts, even “if every
voting age black in Harris County lived in a "safe" district.
Judge Wood's App. Brief at 10. The HLA also claims that LULAC
introduced "undisputed evidence at trial that at least nine"
black/majority judicial districts could be drawn in Harris
County. HLA Brief at 4 .n.2. Far from being "undisputed"
evidence, LULAC's map is an orphan document sprung on the defense
at trial and never testified to by any witness. Judge Wood's
App. Brief at 10 n. 4.
B. “Gilngles 2: Political Cohesion
No party to this case disputes the fact that blacks are
politically cohesive in Harris County. The question is whether
they are cohesive as a racial group or as a Political group. “All
parties agree that black voters in Harris County to the extent
they vote. in the judicial races are overwhelmingly straight
ticket Democratic voters. See Judge Wood's App. Brief at 9.
Testimony throughout the trial emphasized that black voters in
Harris County give at least 95% of their votes to the Democratic
candidate regardless of the candidate's race. See, e.g., TR. at
3-322 (testimony of Matthew Plummer); TR. at 3-209 (testimony of
Bonnie Fitch); TR. at 3-216 (testimony of Francis L. Williams);
TR. at 3-322 (testimony of Judge Mark Davidson).
C. Gingles 3: White Racial Bloc Voting
The HLA incorrectly claims that Judge Wood's expert, Judge
Mark Davidson, "conceded that voting in Harris County is racially
polarized." HLA Brief at 9. The BLA cites to .TR.. at 3-318.
Judge Davidson actually testified:
[I]t is clear that [the] number one [factor in deter-
mining success in Harris County elections over this
decade] is party affiliation. Anything, depending on
the year, between 84 and 85 and 93 percent of the vote
in a judicial race is based solely on party affilia-
tion.
TR. at 3-318-319. The HLA also claims that defendants expert
Dr. Delbert Taebel testified that voting in Harris County is
racially polarized. HLA Brief at 9 {citing TR. ‘at 5-268).
Dr. Taebel's testimony on cross-examination was actually:
0. Do Blacks and Whites in Harris County vote differently?
A. Not Black Democrats. I mean not White Democrats and
Black Democrats, they vote exactly the same.
S, I am asking you about White voters and Black voters.
Do they vote differently, by and large, in Harris
County? I am not asking you the reason, I am not
asking you the party.
A. Sure. You know, I said earlier that you always have
racial polarized voting.
TR. at 5-268. Dr. Taebel had previously testified
A. [Plolarized voting more or less means two different
groups vote differently and you are always going to
find that.
TR. at 5-248. Nevertheless, the HLA claims, as if it were a
meaningful statement, that "Blacks and Whites voted differently
in every election analyzed by both Plaintiffs’ expert]
Dr. Engstrom and [Defendants' expert] Dr. Taebel." HLA Brief at
8. The HLA also incorrectly claims that the black candidate lost
each election analyzed by Dr. Engstrom. HLA Brief at 8. In
fact, black candidates won two of those races.
The HLA further states that "the probability that these
election outcomes occurred by chance were less than 1 in 40,000."
Id. The HLA thus implies that there is only a 1 in 10,000 chance
that black electoral losses in Harris County are explained by
anything other than voters voting their racial preferences, when,
in fact, only race was factored into the analysis. The claim of
a i in 10,000 chance of error actually reflects only
Dr. Engstrom's assessment that the probability of his obtaining
solely by chance the "correlation coefficients" he obtained
between the demographic makeup of precincts and the vote for
certain candidates was less than 1 in 10,000. See: TR. at
3-75-76.
The HLA also claims that black Democratic district judge
candidates in Harris County were successful in only. 12.5% of the
contested races they ran. HLA Brief at 33. Judge Wood pointed
out in her Appellate Brief that the Plaintiffs' selective
analysis of judicial races ignored two 1978 races of Judge Routt
and Judge Peavy, who were both elected over white opponents and
have continued to be returned to office ever since. Judge Wood's
App. Brief at 14, 45. Dr. Engstrom's cherry picking of races for
analysis ignores these two judges, who have together won 6
elections (3 opposed) and are unopposed in 1990. The HLA further
falsely claims that Judge Davidson corroborated Dr. Engstrom's
testimony that all black judicial candidates fell in the bottom
quarter of the vote... HLA Brief at 33. Judge Davidson actually
testified that black candidates finished all over the spectrum.
TR. 3-294-295, 3-317-318.
Finally, the HLA claims that Judge Wood's evidence that
individual races, insofar as they are not determined solely by
straight-ticket voting, are determined by swing voters affected
by such factors as campaign tactics, bar poll results,
endorsements and the like, is unsupported by the record, "legally
incompetent," and has been held by the Supreme Court to be
entitled to little or no. veight. HLA Brief at '356 {citing
Bazemore vy. Friday, 478 U.S, 385 (1986)). .The record, which is
replete with evidence supporting this point, speaks for itself.
The HLA's claim that Dr. Taebel testified that analysis of the
impact of such factors on election results would be an impossible
task is. incorrect. HLA Brief at 37. Dr. Taebel actually
testified that statistical analysis of such claims would be
impossible. TR. at 5-274. Furthermore, the Supreme Court did
not hold in Bazemore that factors besides statistical analysis
are irrelevant to racial discrimination claims. It held the
opposite, namely
In this case the Court of Appeals failed utterly
to examine the regression analysis in light of all the
evidence in the record. '.!. ."Setting out the range of
persuasive evidence offered by petitioners demonstrates
the error of the Court of Appeals in focusing solely on
the characteristics of the regression analysis.
478 U.S. {at 401, 403, 106 S.Ct. at 3009-10 (emphasis added).
This Court should similarly hold that the District Court erred in
focusing solely on regression analysis.
D. The "Zimmer" Factors
The HLA claims that the Court made findings of historical
discrimination "supported by evidence of stark socioeconomic
disparities between Blacks and Whites residing in Harris County."
HLA Brief at 13. This is false. The "equity chart" cited by the
HLA as support for this finding was not relied on by the District
Court and is an orphan exhibit never testified to by anyone and
objected to before and at trial by Judge Wood. See Wood's
Supplemental Record Excerpt at 4-6.
The alleged "enhancing factors" found by the District Court
and alluded to by the HLA--a county-wide district and majority
voting--are exactly the type found by the Clark v. Edwards court
to be non-probative of vote dilution in judicial elections. 725
F.Supp. at 301.
The HLA claims the District Court "made no findings regard-
ing the use of racial appeals in judicial campaigns in Harris
County." HLA Brief at 15. This is false. The District Court
held correctly that "the Plaintiff-Intervenors did not present
evidence of racial appeals" in Harris County. Slip. Op. at" 73.
The testimony of black witnesses that white racism is shown by
black candidates' belief that they will enjoy greater success if
they are not racially identifiable (HLA Brief at 15 n.16) was not:
credited by the court.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
i. The Plaintiffs' And The District Court's Application Of
§ 2 Of The Voting Rights Act To County-Wide Single
Judge Districts Is Fundamentally Erroneous.
The Plaintiffs in general and BLA in particular argue that
§ 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 142 U.85.C. 81973, applies to
county-wide single judge districts. t The essence of the
Plaintiffs and particularly the HLA's argument is that the
legislative history of § 2 does not expressly exclude judicial
elections, that this Court has already held that § 2 applies to
the judiciary in Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1988)
("Chisom"), cert. denied, sub nom, Roemer v. Chisom, 109 S.Ct.
390 (1988), and that other courts have followed the Fifth Circuit
in sc holding. "HLA Brief at 21-22 (Citing Clark v. Edwards, 725
F.Supp. 285 (M.D. La. 1988); Martin v. Allain, 658 F.Supp. 1183
(S.D. Miss. 1987); Brooks Vv. Georgia State Board of Elections,
Civ. Ac. No. 288-146 (S.D. Ga. December 1, 1989): ‘and 'SCIC v.
Siegelman, 714 F.Supp. 511 (M.D. Ala. 1989)).% Judge Wood
1 A copy of the Act as amended in 1982 is attached hereto as Appendix "A".
2 Since Judge Wood has been unable to locate Brooks and the Plaintiffs
attached no copy to their Brief, Judge Wood requests ‘that this Court
attach no weight to the HLA's quotation from that case at pages 24-25 of
its Brief.
acknowledges that the cited cases hold that § 2 of the Voting
Rights Act applies to judicial elections, as do Mallory v.
Eyrich, 839 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1988), Chisom Vv. Roemer, Civ. Ac.
No. 86-4057 (E.D. La. September 13, 1989) (on remand from Chisom
v. Edwards) ("Roemer"), a copy of which is attached hereto as
Appendix "B," Martin v. Mabus, 700 F.Supp. 327 (S.D. Miss. 1988)
(on remand from Martin v. Allain), and Mallory v. Eyrich, 117.F.
Supp. 5210 (S.D.Chio 1989) (on remand). However, the HLA
entirely ignores the contorted reasoning and misapplications of
legal principles in those cases which have attempted to justify
the application of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act To judicial
elections and the warnings and hesitancy of those trial courts
which have been so forced to apply the Act. These cases make it
clear just why application of the Voting Rights Act to the
judiciary is fundamental constitutional error.
A. It Is Impossible To Apply The Voting Rights
Act iTo The Judiciary . Without Violating
Constitutional Provisions And Basic Princi-
ples Of Legal Construction.
The application. of § 2 '©f the Voting Rights Act *o the
judiciary requires that judges be defined as "representatives"
within the meaning of the Act. However, the definition of judges
as "representatives" is problematical because the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment mandates the
application of the principle of one-man, one-vote to the election
of representatives. Reynolds 'v., Sims, 377 U.S. 533,.84 s.Ct.
1362 (1964). The problem is important both because judgeships
are, in fact, not created or apportioned on a one-man, one-vote
basis and because any remedy for vote dilution that conforms to
the one-man, one-vote principle would necessarily fundamentally
alter the thrust of the judicial election system. The problem
was stated succinctly by the Clark court:
Although the Court of Appeals squarely held in
Chisom v., Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1888); that
elections for judicial office are subject to Section 2,
it cannot be gainsaid that judicial elections are
different from other, particularly legislative,
elections. Judicial districts are created, not by
reason of population, but for the purpose of the
administration of justice in a particular jurisdiction.
Judgeships are added, not because of population, but
because of caseload. The boundaries of district courts
are jurisdictional, not related to population. Judges
are charged, not with making legislative or social
policy, but with the duty of deciding individual cases
according to the law, even when it is unpopular to do
SO.
Hence, it has been recognized that the "one-man
vote" principle of legislative apportionment does not
apply to judicial elections. Wells v. Edwards, 347
F.Sapp.. 453 (M.D. La. 1972), "aff’aq, 409 U.S. 1095, 93
S.Ct. 904, 34 L.Ed. 24.679 (1973); see also Voter
Information Project v. City of Baton Rouge, 612 F.2d
208 (5th Cir. 1980).
725 F.Supp. at 294 (emphasis in original).
Every court that has attempted to solve the conflict between
the concept of judges as representatives and the concept of
judges as servants of the people holding offices created to serve
the fair and efficient administration of justice has been forced
3 The Roemer trial court, on remand following this Court's decision in
Chisom, 839 F.2d 1056, that § 2 of the Voting Rights Act applies to
judicial elections, noted the inconsistency between Wells' holding that
judges are not representatives and therefore the "one-man, one-vote"
principle does not apply, and this Court's holding that judges are
representatives for purposes of the Voting Rights Act but that the
principle of one-man, one-vote still does not apply. It nevertheless
acknowledged that it was bound by the law of the case to apply the Act to
the judiciary. Slip Op. at 37-38, attached hereto as Appendix "B."
into unsound legal reasoning. Chisom, for example, never
mentions Reynolds and simply holds that Wells is limited to
complaints seeking reapportionment of judicial districts on the
basis of population deviations rather than race and therefore
does not apply. 839 F.2d at 1061. Siegelman, following Mallory,
states,
The concept of one-person, one-vote addresses the ratio
Of citizens to their elected officials. It "is ‘a
philosophy distinct from that of vote dilution, which
addresses the relative weight of those citizens' votes
after the ratio of citizens to elected officials has
been determined. Furthermore, in contrast to the
concept of one-person, one-vote, which is based on the
Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment,
the concept of vote dilution is additionally based on
an act of Congress, section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
714 F.Supp. ate 521. Mallory itself states that the scope of
Reynolds v. Sims does not extend to Voting Rights Act cases
because legislative reapportionment, and not race, was at issue
in Reynolds and because
the one-man, one-vote cases address an equal protection
problem directly under the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Plaintiffs' section 2 claim involves the construction
of an Act of Congress, a different task from construing
and applying a provision of the Constitution.
B39. F.2d at 277-278.
The flawed argument that justifies the application of the
Voting Rights Act to the judiciary but not the principle of
one-man, one vote 1s contradicted both by case law and fundamen-
tal legal principles. First, § 2 of the Voting Rights act itself
derives its legitimacy from the power granted Congress under the
14th and 15th Amendments to enact laws enforcing the provisions
of those amendments. United States V. Uvalde Consol. Indep. Sch.
Dist., "625. F.24 547, '553 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 45] U.S.
10 =
1002, +101. S.Ct. +2341 (1981). Indeed, the Supreme Court has
expressly traced the authority for holding vote dilution uncon-
stitutional to the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613,617, ,102 8.Ct. 3272,
3275 (1982); City of Mobile, Alabama v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 68,
100 S.Ct. 1490, 1500 (1980). Therefore the claim that the equal
protection clause does not apply to Voting Rights Act violations
is false. Moreover at least as early as White v. Regester, 412
U.8. 755,W768, 765, 93 S.Ct. '2332,..2338, 12339 (1973), *he Supreme
Court recognized the applicability of Reynolds to Voting Rights
Act cases. Thus, the election of representatives under Voting
Rights Act cases must conform to the one-man, one-vote principle.
Yet, as. the Clark court. pointed out, the application..of ~The
one-man, one-vote principle to judicial elections contradicts the
very function and purpose of the judiciary. There is thus an
inescapable conflict between interpreting judges as
"representatives" for Voting Rights Act purposes and the consti-
tutional requirements governing the election of representatives.
Moreover, the notion that the Voting Rights Act is independent of
the fourteenth amendment or that it overrides that amendment is
false: a statute which conflicts with the constitution is void
under the most basic principles of legal construction dating from
Marbury wv. Madisen,i'l Cranch- 137, 179 2 L.Ed. 60, 74 {1803Y.
Therefore, either § 2 of the Voting Rights Act does not extend to
the judiciary, or, insofar as it extends to the judiciary it dis
void. The : application of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act to
judicial elections is thus fundamentally erroneous.
No Constitutional Remedy For Any Perceived
"Vote Dilution" In Judicial Elections Is
Possible.
Judge Wood argued in her Appellate Brief at 22-24 that any
remedy for vote dilution that results in the creation of
subdistricts, either for election purposes only or for jurisdic-
tional, venue, and jury selection purposes as well, would
necessarily violate the Constitution, and she hereby incorporates
those arguments by reference. There is also an extremely serious
question whether the use of the federal courts to force the
fundamental restructuring of a state's judiciary violates
principles of comity, equity, and federalism set forth in Younger
V. Harcis, 40} U.S. 37, 21 S.Ct." 746 (1271) and Burford v. Sun
oil, 319 "U.S. 315, 63 S.Ct. 1098 (1943). . Those trial courts
which have been forced to deal with the issue of a remedy for
"vote dilution" in judicial elections have, with only one
exception (which will be addressed below), raised the same
concerns and have come to the conclusion that "violations" of any
such statutory rights cannot be equitably or constitutionally
remedied.
The Clark court held itself obliged to apply the Voting
Rights Act to judicial elections because of this court's holding
in Chisom, even though that holding conflicted with its own
reasoning. 725 F.Supp. at 294; see supra at 4. The court then
held that under Voting Rights Act criteria, illegal vote dilution
existed in Louisiana district courts, family courts, and icourts
of appeal. 725... F.Supp. “at 287, 302, After assessing the
practical impossibility of addressing vote dilution through
judicial redistricting on a population basis, the court concluded
If the method of electing judges . . . leads to vote
dilution in some districts, then the remedy should be
in the form of modifying the system so that it cannot
lead to vote dilution, rather than creating
subdistricts or otherwise modifying only certain
judicial districts. Obviously, all judicial elections
are held in districts, therefore, it is to the district
elections that the court must look to determine whether
the election system produces violations of Section 2.
If violations are found, however, our task is to revise
the system, not to tinker with the "guilty districts."
Legislative districts serve no governmental purpose
except equal representation and they are easily
revised. District a judicial districts ‘are, however,
jurisdictional and they serve an important governmental
function which has nothing to do with population.
Id. at 295. The court's "solution" was, therefore, to enjoin
further elections under Louisiana's statutory election system and
to advise the governor and legislature to find one. 725 F.Supp.
at 303. Judge Wood can find no further record of this case.
The Mallory ‘trial court on. remand similarly devoted an
extensive argument to the dangerous and unprecedented implica-
tions of applying § 2 of the Voting Rights Act to the judiciary,
emphasizing the intractability of principles of reapportionment
under the fourteenth amendment when applied to judicial
elections. 717 F.Supp. at 542-545. The court observed that the
parties had consented to judgment and decided the court must
remedy the situation while denying it an opportunity to decide
whether a violation existed. 4. at 1543. In the court's own
view, the matter involved fundamental considerations of the
relationship between the federal courts, the state legislature,
the state constitution and the ability of a trial court to follow
the instructions of an appellate court and should be reviewed by
- 13%
an appellate court and the United States Supreme Court. Id. at
542.
The Siegelman court similarly wrote:
This Court seriously questions the propriety and wisdom
of utilizing the Voting Rights Act to restructure
judicial election schemes, including the judicial
system challenged herein. It appears to the court that
there 1s a real possibility that no fair, reasonable,
and equitable remedy can ever be fashioned to redress
whatever section 2 violations may exist in the instant
case.
714 F. Supp. at 8521. 'The court suggested that the ‘defendants
take an immediate interlocutory appeal of its liability finding
to the Eleventh Circuit, stating that it involved ‘a controlling
question of law as to which there was substantial ground for
difference of opinion. 714 F.Supp. at 522 'n.28. Judge Wood can
find no indication that the defendants heeded the court's advice.
The only opinion setting out a court-devised remedy for vote
dilution in judicial elections of which Judge Wood is aware other
than Judge Bunton's Interim Plan which suffers from blatant
defiance of the equal protection clause and of principles of
comity and federalism, as argued in Judge Wood's Appellate Brief
at 46-48--is that of the Martin court on remand. The Martin
court predicated its plan solely on the "basic principle of
equity" that a remedy "be commensurate with the right that has
been violated," on unnamed "additional considerations in judicial
cases that require greater emphasis on some facts," and on the
"clear" rule that the "one-man, one-vote doctrine is not
applicable to judicial districts." 700 F.Supp. at 331-32. Like
Judge Bunton, the Martin court blithely disregarded federalism,
equal protection, and due process problems in devising its remedy
“14 =
for perceived statutory violations. For example, the court
imposed a district residency requirement for candidates but not a
subdistrict residency requirement because
Winning judicial candidates will not be serving their
sub-districts, they will serve the whole district, and
they will be applying the law in an unbiased manner
rather than representing their supporters. Therefore,
the successful candidates should not be swayed by
political views of their "constituency" as is desirable
among legislative candidates.
700 F.Supp. at.332«33. The Martin court failed to explain why
judges will not "represent" their subdistrict constituents, who
alone would have the power to turn them from Office, while
legislators not only will but should be swayed by the political
views of their constituents. The Martin decision, as well as
Judge Bunton's below, should serve as a caution against
illogical, inequitable, and unconstitutional intrusions into the
restructuring of state judiciaries by the federal courts in order
to "remedy" perceived statutory violations.
The solution to the dangerously sophistical turn that courts
have taken in applying the Voting Rights Act to judicial elec-
tions is for this Circuit to reverse itself and declare that, on
reconsideration, the Voting Rights Act cannot apply to the
Judiciary or, at least it cannot apply to county-wide single
judge election districts. Judges are not "representatives" of
4 It may be that the cases cited actually misinterpret the scope of Chisom
and that that case should simply be limited to its direct holding that
where five of six state geographical judicial districts elect one state
supreme court justice each and the sixth district elects two justices at
large in such a way as to submerge the vote of a geographically compact
(Footnote Cont'd)
racial constituencies. That is why they do not render racially
biased justice. It is also why the principle of one-man,
one-vote does not apply to them. 1£, indeed, judges were
representatives, the principle of one-man, one-vote would
necessarily apply to judicial elections and would radically alter
the apportionment of judicial districts in ways which conflict
with the function and purpose of the judiciary and which either
would not address the concerns of minority plaintiffs or would
violate constitutional principles.
II. The Plaintiffs' And The District Court's Statement Of
The Law Regarding The Proof Of Vote Dilution Is
Fundamentally Erroneous.
Judge Wood previously discussed the correct standard of
proof of vote dilution cases and the District Court's erroneous
standard in her Appellate Brief at 24-39 and hereby incorporates
that discussion by reference. Despite that discussion, the
Plaintiffs, and specifically the HLA, continue to rely upon
racially polarized voting as "the lynch pin of a Section 2 vote
dilution claim." HLA Brief at 26. By this they mean not only
that racially polarized voting is essential to a Section 2 vote
dilution claim but that it is sufficient to establish illegal
(Footnote Cont'd)
racial minority beneath the vote of a white majority, § 2 of the Voting
Rights Act applies and requires that the same single-judge judicial
election system be used uniformly throughout the state. See 839 F.2d at
1057-58. Limited to the factual situation where an exception to a
uniform statewide election system is made which has the effect of
diluting the votes of a racial minority, Chisom's application of the
Voting Rights Act to the judiciary loses much of its pernicious effect.
Perhaps if Chisom had been prosecuted as a fourteenth amendment case, the
Court would not find itself in the bag Chisom created.
-' 356 =
vote dilution. Indeed, the "HLA expressly states, "Once a
plaintiff meets the Gingles three-pronged test, impermissible
vote dilution is shown." HLA Brief at 19. The HLA insists that
the critical element in vote dilution, racial bloc voting, is
"usually proven by statistical evidence" and that "neither
causation nor intent" is relevant to the proof of the existence
of bloc voting. HLA Brief at 27. Specifically, "the reasons
black and white voters vote differently have no relevance to the
central inquiry of § 2." HLA Brief at 28 (quoting Thornburg v
Cingles, 478 U.S. 30, 63 (1986) .° The HLA then claims that
reference to the "Senate Factors" or "Zimmer" factors (and to
nothing else) is allowed to "buttress" the proof. 1d. at 19-20.
Finally, the Plaintiffs point out that the District Court found
that once the Plaintiffs proved the first. two prongs of the
Gingles test and the "Zimmer" factors point to vote dilution "it
1s unimportant whether a White bloc vote, which is sufficient
usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate, is made up
by Democrats or Republicans." HLA Brief at 11 (citing Slip Op.
at 79-80). All evidence regarding the actual local determinants
of election results is expressly held to be legally incompetent
and irrelevant (See, e.9., HLA Brief at 20), including the
overwhelming evidence in this case that the primary cause of
5 As Judge Wood and Attorney General Mattox have pointed out, the quoted
passage is from a plurality section of Gingles authored by Justice
Brennan, which was expressly rejected by the majority of the Supreme
Court. Judge Wood's Appellate Brief at 28-33; Attorney General's Reply
Brief at 5.
district judge election results in Texas, and particularly in
Harris County, is partisan voting, not racist voting: that in
Harris County 95-97% of black voters vote the straight Democratic
ticket regardless of the race of the candidate; that 58% of the
district judges in Harris County are Democrats, elected with
black ‘support; ‘that very few blacks are constitutionally
qualified to run for state district judge or have run in district
judge elections; that when they do they face no racist campaigns
and since 1984 invariably win the Democratic primary; and that
black district judge candidates have won 32% of all Harris County
races in which they have run.
A. The Plaintiffs' And. The District Court's
Proof Of Racially Discriminatory Voting Is
Logically And Legally Fallacious.
The Plaintiffs' reductive standard of proof of illegal vote
dilution argument is simple but fallacious. Their claim is
essentially that illegal vote dilution exists whenever as a
result of white voting black candidates are not usually able to
elect the representatives of their choice. HLA contends without
proof that this white voting is necessarily and inevitably racial
bloc voting which exists whenever the black-preferred candidate
does not win a particular race; and the election system itself
has racially discriminatory results unless the black-preferred
candidate usually wins. ® In other words, white racial bloc
The Plaintiffs and the District Court actually add a twist to the proof
of vote dilution which the HLA does not acknowledge in its brief: they
define "black-preferred candidate" as the "black candidate" in order to
(Footnote Cont'd)
voting is simply defined in terms of black electoral loss; and
any shortfall of black victories from proportional representation
by blacks is "proof" that the system has racially discriminatory
results.
In her ‘plurality opinion in Gingles, Justice O'Connor
pointed out the circularity in the definition of white racial
bloc voting in terms of the extent of the racial minority's
electoral success, and she correctly foretold its inevitable
result:
If the minority can prove that it could constitute a
majority in a single-member district, that it supported
certain candidates and that those candidates have not
usually been elected, then a finding that there is
"legally significant white bloc voting" will necessari-
ly follow. Otherwise, by definition, those candidates
would usually have won rather than lost.
106 S.Ct. at 2788. Justice O'Connor argued that such a standard
of proof of illegal vote dilution was inconsistent with the
"results" test employed by the Court in White wv. Regester, 412
U.S. 755,93 8.Ct. 2332 (1973) and Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S.
124, 91 S.Ct. 1858 (1971) and codified by Congress in § 2(b), as
well as with the direct wording of the proviso, to § 2(b)ivhich
states,
Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a
right to have members of a protected class elected in
numbers equal to their proportion in the population.
(Footnote Cont'd)
achieve the desired "proof" that whites vote against blacks in races in
which blacks run and, then, when blacks fail to support a black
candidate, they count the race as an exception rather than as proof that
their fundamental assumption is wrong. Judge Wood pointed out this
inconsistency in the Plaintiffs' and District Court's standard of proof
of racial bloc voting in her Appellate Brief at 36-37.
“i 18 =
42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (West Supp. 1988) (emphasis in original).
The proof of vote dilution claims insisted upon by the Plaintiffs
(and adopted by the District Court) is fundamentally erroneous
both in logic and in law, as Justice O'Connor foresaw.
Similarly, Justice White, in rejecting Justice Brennan's
non-causal reductionist standard of proof of racial bloc voting
in Part III-C of the Gingles opinion--the standard which the
Plaintiffs essentially adopt--' expressly noted the tension
between that standard of proof and Whitcomb, the only Supreme
Court case which had specifically addressed partisan elections
under the results test later codified in § 2(b). Gingles, 106
S.Ct. at 2784 (White, J. dissenting in part). Therefore, if we
are to understand the standard of proof of vote dilution claims
under the "results" test as codified in § 2(b) and as at least
five members of the Supreme Court understood it in Gingles, we
must return to the language of § 2(b) and to the cases from which
it was derived.
7 The Plaintiffs depart from Justice Brennan's standard of proof by
defining "black-preferred candidate" as "black candidate" in black/white
races, rather than as the candidate who receives the majority of black
votes. However, when blacks fail to support the black candidate, the
Plaintiffs (and the district court) inconsistently change their
definition of '"black-preferred" candidate to accord with Justice
(Footnote Cont'd)
B. The Proper Application Of § 2(b) Of The
Voting Rights Act To Partisan Elections Is
Set Out In" Thornburg v. Gingles, White wv.
Regester And Whitcomb v. Chavis.
In 1982 Congress amended § 2 of the Voting Rights Act to
require proof of the "totality of the circumstances test" by the
"results" test "as provided in subsection (b)," which it added to
the Act. Pub. L. 97-205, 96 Stat. 134; gee Appendix "A." As
this Court itself observed in Chisom, «839 F.2d at 1062, the
language of § 2(b) of the Voting Rights Act, which interprets the
"totality of the circumstances test" mandated by § 2(a), derives
"almost verbatim" from White, which states:
To sustain ["claims that multi-member districts are
being used invidiously to cancel out or minimize the
voting strength of racial groups"] it is not enough
that the racial group allegedly discriminated against
has not had legislative seats in proportion: to its
voting potential. The plaintiffs' burden is to produce
evidence to support findings that the political
processes leading to nomination and election were not
equally open to participation by the group in
question--that its members had less opportunity than
did other residents in the district to participate in
the political processes and to elect legislators of
their choice. Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, at 149-50, 91
S.Ct. at 1872.
White, 412 U.S. at 765-66, 93 S.Ct. ‘at 2339 (emphasis added); cf.
Appendix "A" at 42 U.S.C.A. § 2(b). This passage from White, in
turn, cites Whitcomb as its authority. The citation is signifi-
cant because Whitcomb is the only Supreme Court case that has
listed factors in partisan elections which justify a finding that
the political processes leading to nomination and election are
(Footnote Cont'd)
Brennan's definition. See notes 8 and 9 supra and Judge Wood's App.
Brief at 28-29, 36-37.
-iia] ig
not equally open to participation by a racial group and that the
group has less opportunity than other residents in the district
to participate in the political process and to elect legislators
of their choice. Thus the Whitcomb factors are an essential
supplement to the Gingles threshold analysis of vote dilution in
partisan elections under the results test.
The passage from Whitcomb on which White relies in setting
out the results test later codified in § 2(b) reads:
We have discovered nothing in the record or in the
court's findings indicating that poor Negroes were not
allowed to register or vote, to choose the political
party they desired to support, to participate in its
affairs or to be equally represented on those occasions
when legislative candidates were chosen. Nor did the
evidence purport to show or the court find that
inhabitants of the ghetto were regularly excluded from
the slates of both major parties, thus denying them the
chance of ‘occupying legislative seats. It appears
reasonably clear that the Republican Party won four of
the five elections from 1960 to 1968, that Center
Township ghetto voted heavily Democratic and that
ghetto votes were critical to Democratic Party success.
Although we cannot be sure of the facts since the court
ignored the question, it seems unlikely that. the
Democratic Party could afford to overlook the ghetto in
slating its candidates. . . . Nor is there any indica-
tion that the party failed to slate candidates satis-
factory to the ghetto in other years. Absent evidence
or findings we are not sure, but it seems reasonable to
infer that had the Democrats won all of the elections
or even most of them, the ghetto would have had no
justifiable complaints about representation. The fact
is, however, that four of the five elections were won
by Republicans, which was not the party of the ghetto
and which would not always slate ghetto candidates--
although in 1962 it nominated and elected one repre-
sentative and in 1968 two representatives from that
area. If this is the proper view of this case, the
failure of the ghetto to have legislative seats in
proportion to its population emerges more as a function
of losing elections than of built-in bias against poor
Negroes. The voting power of ghetto residents may have
been "cancelled out" as the District Court held, but
this seems a mere euphemism for political defeat at the
polls.
On the record before us plaintiffs position comes
to this: that although they have equal opportunity to
participate in and influence the selection of candi-
dates and legislators, and although the ghetto votes
predominantly Democratic and that party slates candi-
dates satisfactory to the ghetto, invidious discrimina-
tion nevertheless results when the ghetto, along with
all other Democrats, suffers the disaster of losing too
many elections... .i. But’ we have not yet deemed it a
denial of equal protection to deny legislative seats to
losing candidates, even in those so-called "safe"
districts where the same party wins year after year.
403 U.S. at 149-153, 91 S.Ct. at 1872-74 (emphasis added).
The passage from Whitcomb which was relied on by White is
the same passage cited by Justice White in his dissent to Part
I11I-C of Justice Brennan's opinion in Gingles, 106 S.Ct. at 2784.
It also leads directly to a passage cited by Justice O'Connor in
her Gingles plurality opinion, in which she opined,
The "results" test as reflected in Whitcomb and
White requires an inquiry into the extent Of The
minority group's opportunities to participate in the
political processes. See” White, supra, 412 U.S. "at
766, 93 S5.Ct., at 2339-40. Vnile electoral success is
a central part of the vote dilution inquiry, White held
that to prove vote dilution, "it is not enough that the
racial group allegedly discriminated against has not
had legislative seats in proportion to its’ voting
potential,” 412 U.S... at 765-766, 93 S.Ct., at 2339-40,
and Whitcomb flatly rejected the proposition that "any
group with distinctive interests must be represented in
legislative halls if it is numerous enough to command
at least one seat and represents a minority living in
an area sufficiently compact to constitute a single
member district." 403 U.S., at 156, 91 S.Ct., at 1875.
White, Whitcomb and five members of the Gingles Court were clear
and emphatic that the proof of illegal vote dilution in partisan
political races requires much more than a mere showing that black
Democratic candidates supported by black voters have not usually
been elected.
Whitcomb is on all fours with the instant case as a partisan
race in which blacks had free access to party nominating and
election procedures and were free to vote for candidates of their
choice except that, unlike Harris County, the Whitcomb Plaintiffs
were not usually successful in electing the candidates of their
choice. Therefore, exactly the same considerations apply; and
those considerations demonstrate beyond all doubt that Texas'
county-wide state district judge election system does not violate
8 2 of the Voting Rights Act in any county at issue, specifically
including Harris County, since the Plaintiffs did not carry their
burden of proof with respect to any. of the factors listed in
Whitcomb.
Since: the Plaintiffs in this case have entirely failed to
prove anything other than that when bivariate regression analysis
is applied to selected white/black races those races emerge as
racially polarized (a test which deliberately excludes as
irrelevant the realities of local partisan politics) and that the
percentage of black district judges in the target counties is
less than the percentage of blacks in the total voting age
population of those counties (a "test" of vote dilution which is
specifically prohibited by § 2 of the Voting Rights Act as
amended), they have failed to establish any violation of the
Voting Rights Act in the target counties, and the District
Court's conclusion that they have is fundamentally erroneous. In
addition, reference to White and Whitcomb and the Defendants'
proof in this case establishes conclusively why the Plaintiffs
have proved no vote dilution claim in regard to Texas district
judge elections: those elections are fully open to blacks and
their results are determined by partisan voting, not racial
voting, indeed by partisan voting in which blacks, as straight-
ticket Democratic voters, have uniformly maximized their politi-
cal strength and, in most counties, including Harris County, (58%
of whose district judges are Democrats) have usually succeeded in
electing the (Democratic) candidate of their choice. This is
more than the law requires.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Judge Wood requests that the
Court reverse the decision of the District Court and render
judgment in her favor. In addition, it has been brought to Judge
Wood's attention that the Court's Order of January 11, 1990, is
being interpreted as requiring the legislature to act to devise a
remedy without awaiting adjudication of the merits of this case
by the highest court of appeal. Judge Wood therefore requests
that the Court expressly declare that all remedial activities by
the District Court are stayed pending all appeals of the merits
and that likewise no action by the legislature is required
pending appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
(PORTER & CLEMENTS
QE MI. re ie A
. Eugene Clements
velyn V. Keyes
3500 NCNB Center
P.O. Box 4744
Houston, Texas 77210-4744
(713) 226-0600
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT/
DEFENDANT /INTERVENOR HARRIS
COUNTY DISTRICT JUDGE SHAROLYN
WOOD
“DB wu
OF COUNSEL:
Darrell Smith
Attorney at Law
10999 Interstate Hwy. 10, #905
San Antonio, Texas 78230
(512) 641-9944
Michael J. Wood
Attorney at Law
440 Louisiana, Suite 200
Houston, Texas 77002
(713) 228-5105
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
"a
I hereby certify that on the K— day of March, 1990, 2 true
and correct copies of the above and foregoing document were
served on counsel of record in this case by Federal Express mail,
unless otherwise indicated, addressed as follows:
Mr. David C. Godbey, Jr.
Mr. Robert H. Mow, Jr.
Hughes & Luce
2800 Momentum Place
1717 Main Street
Dallas, Texas 75201
Mr. John L. Hill, Jr. (Houston Express Delivery)
Mr. Andy Taylor
Liddell, Sapp, Zivley, Hill & LaBoon
3300 Texas Commerce Tower
Houston, Texas 77002
Mr. Seagal V. Wheatley
Mr. Donald BR. Philbin, Jr.
Oppenheimer, Rosenberg, Kelleher & Wheatley
711 Navarro Street, 6th Floor
San Antonio, Texas 78205
Mr. Mark H. Dettman
Attorney at Law
200 West Wall
Midland, Texas 79701
Mr. Gerald H. Goldstein (1st class United States mail)
Goldstein, Goldstein & Hilley
29th Floor, Tower Life Bldg.
San Antonio, Texas 78205
Mr. Joel H. Pullen (lst class United States mail)
Kaufman, Becker, Pullen & Reibach
2300 NCNB Plaza
300 Convent Street
San Antonio, Texas 78205
Mr. R. James George
Mr. John M. Harmon
Ms. Margaret H. Taylor
Graves, Dougherty, Hearon & Moody
2300 First RepublicBank Tower
515 Congress
Austin, Texas 78767
Mr. William L. Garrett
Garrett, Thompson & Chang
8300 Douglas, Suite 800
Dallas, Texas 75225
Mr. Rolando L. Rios
Ms. Susan Finkelstein
Attorneys at Law
201 N. St. Mary's, Suite 521
San Antonio, Texas 78205
Ms. Gabrielle K. McDonald
Matthews & Branscomb
301 Congress Ave., Suite 2050
Austin, Texas 78701
Mr. Renea Hicks
Mr. Javier Guajardo
Special Asst. Atty. Generals
Supreme Court Bldg., 7th Floor
1401 Colorado Street
Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 78701
Mr. Edward B. Cloutman, II
Mullinax, Wells, Baab & Cloutman
3301 Elm Street
Dallas, Texas 75226-1637
Ms. Sherrilyn A. Ifill
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, ‘Inc.
99 Hudson Street, 16th Floor
New York, New York 10013
Mr. E. Brice Cunningham (lst class United States mail)
Attorney at Law
777 South R.L. Thornton Freeway
Suite 121
Dallas, Texas 75203
Mr. Michael Ramsey (Houston Express Delivery)
Ramsey & Tyson
2120 Welch
Houston, Texas 77019
Mr. Daniel J. Popeo (lst class United States mail)
Mr. Paul D. Kamenar
Mr. Alan M. Slobodin
1705 N. Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Mr. Paul Strohl (lst class United States mail)
Attorney at Law
100 Founders Square
900 Jackson Street
Dallas, Texas 75202
Mr. Daniel M. Ogden
Attorney at Law
900 Chateau Plaza
2515 McKinney Avenue
Dallas, Texas 75201
Hon. Richard Thornburgh
Attorney General of the United States
United States Department of Justice
Main Justice Building
10th & Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530
End, Ld Lie
Evelyn V. Keyés
WO006 /02 /cdf
42 §1971
Note 138a
of electing school board members as unconstitu-
tionally diluting votes of black voters in parish
and depriving black citizens of opportunity to
elect black people to board, where compromise,
which began added three members to serve for
two-year period and single member districts in
1980 instead of 1982 fully comply with federal law
and beginning in 1982 would comply with state
law, in the interim, compromise eliminated need
for trial and possible appeal of two long-pending
actions and no opposition had been filed to decree.
Moch v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd.
D.C.La.1980, 533 F.Supp. 556.
142. Three judge court
Even if state appellate court justice had, private
right of action under federal voting rights statutes,
he was not entitled to impanelment of three-judge
court, absent provision for impaneiment of three-
judge court in particular voting rights statutes
upon which justice relied. Pincham v. Illinois
PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE 14
Judicial Inquiry Bd. N.D.II1.1988, 681 F.Supp.
1309.
172. Invalidation of discriminatory law
Although a case involving discriminatory ad-
ministration of a statute would ordinarily be
remedied by eliminating the particular offensive
activity and enjoining further discrimination,
plaintiffs in the instant case, black voters challeng-
ing the composition and method of selection of
city school board, demonstrated that the statutory
scheme for selection to the board had been pur-
posefully and systematically utilized to exclude
blacks from the opportunity to participate in the
educational policy-making process; accordingly,
the only effective remedy in this case was to
invalidate Ga.Laws 1915, p. 848. Searcy Vv.
Williams, C.A.Ga.1981, 656 F.2d 1003, rehearing
denied 668 F.2d 532, affirmed 102 S.Ct. 1605, 455
U.S. 984, 71 L.Ed.2d 844.
SUBCHAPTER I-A—ENFORCEMENT OF VOTING RIGHTS
§ 1973. Denial or abridgement of right to vote on account of race or color
through voting qualifications or prerequisites; establishment of viola-
tion
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a
manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the
guarantees set forth in section 1973b(£)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b)
of this section.
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the
totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomina-
tion or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to partic-
ipation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in
that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to
participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The
extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State
or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That
nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class
elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.
(As amended Pub. L. 97-205, § 3, June 29, 1982, 96 Stat. 134.)
1982 Amendment. Pub. L. 97-205 redesignated
existing provisions as (a), in subsec. (a), as so
redesignated struck out the comma following
“voting”, substituted ‘in a manner which results
in a denial or abridgement of” for “to deny or
abridge”, inserted *, as provided in subsection (b)
of this section” following “in contravention of the
guarantees set forth in section 1973b (f)(2) of this
title”, and added subsec. (b).
Effective Date of 1982 Amendment. Section 6
of Pub. L. 97-205 provided that: “Except as
otherwise provided in this Act, the amendments
made by this Act [enacting section 1973aa-6 of
this title, amending this section and sections 1973b
and 1973aa-la of this title, and enacting provi-
sions set out as notes under this section and
sections 1971, 1973b, 1973aa-1a and 1973aa-6 of
this title] shall take effect on the date of the
enactment of this Act [June 29, 1982.”
Short Title of 1982 Amendment. Section 1 of
Pub. L. 97-205 provided: “That this Act [enact-
ing section 1973aa—6 of this title, amending sec-
tions 1973, 1973b, and 1973aa-1a of this title, and
enacting provisions set out as notes under this
section and sections 1971, 1973b, 1973aa-1a, and
1973aa—6 of this title] may be cited as the ‘Voting
Rights Act Amendments of 1982".
Legislative History. For legislative history and
purpose of Pub. L. 97-205, see 1982 U. S. Code
Cong. and Adm. News, p. 177.
Cross References
Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handi-
capped Act, construction of not to impair any
right guaranteed by this subchapter, see section
1973ee-5 of this title.
West's Federal Practice Manual
Inquiry and jurisdiction, sec § 12293,
One man, one vote, see § 12284.
Law Review Commentaries
Anti-subordination above all: Sex, race, and
equal protection. Ruth Colker, 61 N.Y.U.L.Rev.
1003 (1986).
15 PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
Home rule cities and municipal annexation in
Texas: Recent trends and future prospects. Rob-
ert R. Ashcroft and Barbara Kyle Balfour, 15 St.
Mary's L.J. 519 (1984).
“Official English”: Federal limits on efforts to
curtail bilingual services in the states. 100 Har-
vard L.Rev. 1345 (1987).
State employee discrimination claims—is the
conflict between Title VII and Section 198 re-
solved? 61 Notre Dame L.Rev. 88 (1986).
The crown jewel of American liberty: The right
to vote; What does it mean under the amended
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act? Bobby M.
Rubarts, 37 Baylor L.Rev. 1015 (1984).
The effects of Sections 2 and 3 of the Voting
Rights Act on minority voting practices. 28
How.L.J. 589 (1985).
The future of the Fifteenth Amendment.
Emma C. Jordan, 28 How.L.J. 541 (1985).
The perpetuation of racial vote dilution. Ho-
ward Ball, 28 How.L.J. 433 (1985).
The status of minority voting rights. Roy W.
Copeland, 28 How.L.J. 417 (1985).
Vote dilution, discriminatory results, and pro-
portional representation: What is the appropriate
remedy for a violation of Section 2 of Voting
Rights Act? 32 U.C.L.A.Law Rev. 1203.
Notes of Decisions
Appointment of school board members 25
Attorney fees 10a
Burden of proof 8a
Cause and effect 27
Construction with other laws 2a
Court plans 17
Dilution
Generally 12
Rectification 12a
Discriminatory purpose 13
Disproportionate impact 13a
Election 16
Factors considered 18
Intent 6a
Laches 23
Location of polling place 15
Particular plans in compliance 19a
Particular plans not approved 19b
Persons entitled to maintain action 24
Reapportionment plans 19
Remand 20
Representatives 16a
Residency requirements 22
Results test 14
Review 21
Showing necessary to establish violation 26
1. Constitutionality
One-man, one-vote cases under equal protection
clause do not control cases brought under Voting
Rights Act. Mallory v. Eyrich, C.A.6 (Ohio)
1988, 839 F.2d 275.
1982 amendment to this section proscribing not
only those voting practices directly prohibited by
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 15, but also any practice
imposed in a manner which results in denial of the
right to vote on account of race does not conflict
with or contract any right protected by the Con-
stitution, and nothing in t!
explicitly or implicitly proh
for voting rights violatio
amendment to this section
v. Marengo County Com’
F.2d 1546, appeal dismissec
S.Ct. 375, 83 LEd2d :
F.Supp. 33.
Even if this section prohi
es and procedures that cr
sults could be regarded as I
section was not unconstitu
v. City of Lubbock, CAT
rehearing denied 730 F.2d
Application of “results”
Act as amended in 1982
plan which was effective
proved February 18, 1982
ples of fundamental due pr
ment. Knox v. Milwauke
tion Com’rs, D.C.Wis.19
Provision of the Voting
state from tampering wit
group is a constitutional ¢
authority under the enfo
Fourteenth and Fifteenth
v. Collins, D.C.Tenn.198
firmed 791 F.2d 1255.
Ainendment to Votin;
which precludes impositic
in manner which results i
vote on account of race d
enforcement power unde
Jordan v. Winter, D.C.
807, affirmed 105 S.Ct
L.Ed.2d 343.
2. Purpose
U. S. v. Uvalde Con
Dist. 625 F.2d 547 [ma
nied 101 S.Ct. 2341, 45
858.
Although Voting Ri
§ 1973 et seq.] is intend
nation against minority
their opportunity for pa:
process, it does not pu
compel minority represe
bodies that is proportior
the political unit; nor
analysis ever imposed st
al success. Seastrunk v
772 F.2d 143.
Purpose of Voting Ri
cal process of all mea
minority voting power,
from elective to appoir
Hugh, E.D.Va.1988, 6°
Voting Rights Act w
tive participation by ra
tion process, securing n
all qualified citizens to
guarantee that an ind
diluted. Wesley v. Cc
F.Supp. 802, affirmed
Voting Rights Act a
imposition of voting ¢
which results in abrid
account of race or. cc
ensure desired results
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esr: 2STFer Cover UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT TL
Ep 2 2 i Gi
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA '< fé/%
Ly TE RONALD CHISOM, pT AL.
CIVIL ACTION VERSUS
NO. 86-4057 CHARLES E. ROEMER, ET AL.
SECTION "A"
OPINTON
SCHWARTZ, Jv
This matter came before the Court for nonjury trial. Having the parties:
considered the evidence,
memoranda ang the applica-
ble law,
To the €xtent any of the
Court Justices from a
ScP 131989
CAE OF ETRY es
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U.S.C. 8 1973 (West Supp. 1989)2
42 U.S.C. 8 1983 (West 1981)2
Secured by the fourteenth?
2/
and fifteenth+
+ and under the Civil Rights Act,
» for alleged violations of rights
amendments of
1/ Section 2 provides in pertinent part:
(a)
procedure shall be
any State or Political
right
ib) A violation
section is
No voting qualification or site to voting or standard,
Prerequi-
Practice, or imposed or applied by
subdivision in a in a denial or abridg- of any citizen of to vote on account of race or
section in that its members have less Opportunity to participate in the political Process and elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a Protected class have been elected to office in the State or Political subdivision is one cir- cumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes
members of ga
umbers equal to their proportion in the Population.
Section 1983 Provides in Pertinent part:
Secured by the
action at law, suit Proceeding for redress.
Privileges or
Constitution shall be liable to the party inj
under color of any stat- regulation, custom, or
and laws,
ured in an
in equity, or ‘other
The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part:
“Dw
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the federal Constitution. ®
I. The present Supreme Court Districts and
Population; Minority or majority?
The Louisiana Supreme Court,
Presently consists of seven Justices,
Court Districts.
the black voting
the highest Court in the state,
elected from Six Supreme
The state imposes a
majority-vote requirement for election to the Supreme Court.
No State shall make
which shall abridge the immunities of citizens
or enforce any law
Privileges or
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or Property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
4
The right of cj
to vote shall no
the United States
account of race, colo
tion of servitude.
5 Declaratory relief is also
The fifteenth amendment provides in pertinent part:
tizens of the United States t be denied or abrid
or by any Sta
I, or previous condi-
ged by
on
sought under 28 U.S.C. 88 2201
and 2202, which Provide in perti nent part:
(a) In a case of
within its jurisdiction,
of the United States,
an appropriate Pleadin
rights or other legal
actual controversy
« + . any court
upon the filing of
g, may declare the
relation of any interested Party seeking such declara- tion, whether or
or could be sought
6 See Pre-Trial Order Stipulation 19 at P. 28.
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not further relief is
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ects two Justices.” These two positions are elected in staggered
elected on a State-wide basis,
as stated
No parish lines are cut by the
The Louisiana Con-
7 ee Pp re-Trial Order Stipulations 18, 21 at Pp. 28-29, 8 €e Pre-Trial Order Stipulations 3=6, p. 24. ee also
La. Const. of 1974
+ art. 5, ss 3,4 8 22A; LSA-RS 8 13:101 (West
1983).
i Bp) See id. no. 12 at P. 26,
Va
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districts.22
The New Orleans metropolitan area is composed of Orleans Parish, which has a majority black electorate, and several subur- ban parishes which have majority white electora
March 3,
tes.
Only 2.1 percent of the black registered voters in the First District resided in Plaquemines ang St. Bernard Parishes.
235,797 (30.51)
582,223
. ’ 118,882 (29.46)
692,974
.
32,232 (19.46)
410,850 . ’ 81,361 (29.99)
861,217
’ 160,711 (27.36)
556,383
78,660 (21.76)
4,205,900
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See id. no. 24 at p. 29,
See id. no. 13 at’'p. 26,
Voting Age Population
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(2) For the parishes in the First Supreme Court
District:;:s
Parish Total Black
population population (%)
Total VAP Black VAP (%)
Jefferson 454,592 63,001 (13.86) 314,334 37,145 (11.82)
Orleans 557,318 308,149 (55.27) 397,183 193,886 (48.81)
Plaquemines 26,049 5:540.423.27) 16,903 3,258 (19.27) St. Bernard 64,097 2,411.4 :3.76) 44,352 1,508 ( 3.40)
As of March 3, 1989, registered voter data compiled by the
Louisiana Commissioner of Elections indicated the following popu-
lation characteristics:
(3) For the six Supreme Court election districts:
District Total registered voters Black registered voters (%) 5
492,691
158,714 (31.8%) 2 285,469
76,391 (26.8%) 3 379,951
74,667 (19.7%) 4 208,568
59,140 (28.4%) 5 464,699
318.239 {25.7%) 6 305,699
70,178 (23.0%)
(4) For the Parishes in the First Supreme Court
District: 2s
Parish Total registered voters
Black registered voters (%)
Jefferson 202,054
25,064 (12.4%)
Orleans 237,278
127,296 (53.6%)
Plaquemines 14,574
2,796 (19.2%)
St. Bernard 38,785
Yl S58 4.0% TOTAL 492,691
156,714 (31.8%)
15 See Pre-Trial Order Stipulation 15 at Pe. 27,
16 ee id, no. 16 at P. 28.
with a Population of 600,843;:19 District § Total p opulation
Percent Deviation
1 1,102,253
[-16.54 $]%0
2 582,223
= 310%
3 692,974
+15.33' §
4 410,850
-31.62%
5 861,217
+43.33
6 556,383
=. 7.40 &
Percentage deviations appear to have been Calculated as
follows:
% deviation = factual district pop.
(ideal distric
= idea} district
t Population)
POP.) x 100
nd exhibits, the
cate any definition of the
apart from reference t ideal district"
© Population. See Weber Report,
Defendants Exhibj
urt therefore accepts the
Parties’ Stipulation as to the "ideal district" With the
understanding that other factors of i
Suggest s i
Stipulated that District 31 Shows a -8,27%
deviation from the "ideal district." See Pre
Stipulation 14, 'p. - However, the definitji
district is to take the
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With population Size as the only stipulated indicia of an "ideal district", the Court further finds that a district con- sisting of just Orleans Parish would demonstrate an dPpProximate =7.2% deviation from the idea) district, ang a district of Jefferson, Plaquemines ang St. Bernard Parishes would demonstrate an approximate -9,3% deviation from the ideal district, 22 By contrast,
The defendants argue that a fairly drawn district could consist of Plaquemines, St. Bernard and Orleans Parishes, with &
21 See United States' Exhibit 47. The March 3, 1989 voter
registration data does n Ot alter the number and/or identity of
the majority black Precincts. See United States! Exhibit § 22 See United States' Exhibit 48. The March 3, 1989 voter
registration data does n Ot alter the number and/or identity of
the majority black Precincts. See United States’ Exhibit 6.
ata yielded the same Report, Table M, Pp. 50
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deviation of only 1.1% from the ideal district, 2+ Such a
district is also geographically compact, but would have a black voter registration of only 45.3%. Moreover, a district thus
"ideal district" were based upon Population alone, no single member district may fairly be drawn in which blacks would consti- tute a majority of the voting age Population and registered
voters. Either Jefferson Parish or Orleans Parish would have to be isolated in Such a districting scheme, leaving a second dis- trict with an atypically low voter populat ion, Moreover, to
date,
ideal" result. zs It appears the only way to provide a sizable single member distric t
24 See Weber Report, p. 53.
25 Any such redistricting would best be done by the state
legislature, which may revise the Supreme Court districts by a
2/3 vote of each house. See Pre-Trial Order Stipulation 11,
Ps 26.
26 This should not be construed as a determination at this time
by the Court that if a remedy were required the Court must adhere
to parish boundaries in Creating new districts.
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generally upon the Scope of evidence to b € considered ang upon the use of Statistical data. The Court will next discuss the historical background of minorj
Present claims,
-10-
tion and vote dilution in those other types of elections. 2~ In particular, judicial elections as contrasted to those other elec- tions are characterized by lower turnout, higher roll-off rates, and by less voter interest.
The number of candidates for judicial
offices is Particularly low in the election Years when the terms of incumbent judicial officers expired. However, the Court has
also considered the testimony, statistical evidence, and expert
reports pertaining to other elections, and the Court generally
finds that such evidence is consistent with the import of data
from judicial elections, even though the Court is inclined to
give evidence relating to judicial elections greater weight.
In analyzing Statistical data,
Place on election day, but such evidence is not available.
best available data for estimating the Participation of vari
Exhibit 2, Pp. 2-10. the Court finds much of
owledge of which the Court
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groups in the electorate is sign-in data contained in the offj-
cial records of the Parish Registrar of Voters. The best indica-
tor of participation is obtained by dividing the number of per-
sons who signed-in to vote by the number of persons in the voting
age population.
In the absence of exit poll, sign-in, and voting age pPopu-
lation data,
techniqu
Because this analysis Produces only an estimate
of voting behavior, the Court finds it should consider, but is
not necessarily in a Position to consider, what factors are
Present in the analysis, such as: the number of cases; varia-
tions of the independent ang dependent variables; the timing of
atical equation showing how variables are
related." np, Anderson, D. Sweeney and T. Williams, Statistics for
Business and Economics, 406 (24 EQ. 1981). The variable being
Predicted by the mathematical equati percentage of the vote won by each candidate) is the dependent
variable. The variables used to predi
€ independent variables. In this case,
the independent variables are the percentages of voters who are
black or white. See Weber Report, Defendants Exhibit 2, pp. 10-
11.
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gram. A further challenge is to avoid becomin
"numbers game"
However, no better data is provided, and the Court has given the Statistical data considerable weight, 2°
In any event, whether testimony, Stipulated data, or Statis- tical analysis is cited
the race of the Candidates,
the political Process. A. Access to the Political Process -- Effect of Pagt Discrimination 30
onal reservations regarding use of much
ical analyses here Presented, whic h reservations S$ opinion on Plaintiffs: See Chisom v. Edwards, 690 F. Supp.
1524, 1528 ¢ n. 25 (E.D. La.), v acated 850 F.24 1051, reh'g
denied, 857 F.2d 1473 (stn Cir. 1983).
30 Monroe v. City of w Cir. Aug, 30, 1989), Suggests that the Court
Thornburg totality the Plaintiffs fail
all three elements of the
initial 3-part test in Thornbur . i the following findings, in part to Provide a ful} record of
findings and in part beca
i Overlaps t
bloc voting.
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hampered by vestiges of past discrimination, »2 The Court's his-
Louisiana has had a past history of 0
bearing upon the right to vote. In this regard, the Parties
to most facts found by the th
Major wv, Treen 3»
Stipulated32
» and the
grandfather" Clause?* tq allow whites, but not similarly situated blacks, to Vote even
qualify. 1n 1823.
In the
Je See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106 s. Ct. 2752,
2776,"%3 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986),
32 See Pre-Trial Order Stipulations 36-38, Ps 38, 33 574 P. Supp. 325 (E.D. La. 1983),
34 In Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 35 S.Ct. 926, 59
L.Ed. 1330 (1915), the Supreme Court ruled that "grandfather"
clauses violated the Fifteenth Amendment. The state then amended
i
"grandfather" Clause with a an applicant "give a reasonab
Ir state constitution as a " lana v. United
States, 380 U.S. 145, 85 S« Ct. 817, 13 L.Ed.2d 709 (1965), the
Supreme Court held the "interpretation" test to b
of illegal disenfranchisement.
35 See Smith v. Allwright, 321 v.8. 649% L.Ed. 1593 (1944).
y 84 8, Ct. 1052, 8s
-14-
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1950s, Louisiana instituted "citizenship" tests and anti-single-
shot voting laws.3s In 1959, the State Democratic Party adopted
a majority vote requirement for election of party officers.>”
The State of Louisiana is also subject to Special provisions of the Voting Rights Act because in 1965 it employed a "test or
device," as defined in the Act
Vote.
from the
The federal examiners then listed a total of 26,978 persons as eligible to vote in those
of that number 25,138 (93.138 percent) were black.
of January 1, 1989,
parishes; ?°
AS
15,432 persons remained on the voting rolls
as federally listeqd voters, who are Presumed not otherwise
registered to vote, 4° At the time of Plaquemines"
36 For a description of single-shot bullet v Thornburg v. Gin les, 478 U.s. at 38, n. § n. 5; City of Rome v. United States, 446 u.s. 156, S. Ct. 1548, 1565 n. 19, 64 L.EQd.2d4 119 (1980).
37 See Pre-trial Order Stipulation 42 at p. 39,
38 See 42 U.s.C. 8 1973d; Pre-Trial Order Stipulation 44,
PP. 39-40.
39 See 42 U.S.C. 8 1973e(b); Pre-Trial Order Stipulation 44,
Pp. 39-40.
40 See 42 uU.s.c. s 1973e(a); Pre-Trial Order Stipulation 44,
Pp. 39-40.
«15
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designation, only 96 black Persons in the Parish were registered to vote. However, by October 1967, federal examiners hag listed 1,254 black persons in Plaquemines Parish, resulting in ap increase in the number of black bersons registered to vote in Plaquemines Parish from 96 to over 1,300.42
In sum, notwithstanding historic disenfranchisement, voter registration since 1965 has demonstrated genera lly increased par- ticipation by black voters, and today no state action or laws Prevent black Participation in the electoral Process. 1In the Summer of 1984,
» black voter registration now exc
registration in Orleans Parish.
2. The History of the Redistricting Plan He
For the past 110 Years,
« In each of the
» 1921 ang 1974, this
41 See Pre-Trial Order Stipulation 45, p. 40.
“16+
The district
St. Bernard,
metropolitan or quasi-metropolitan area.
Each delegate to the con- vention, whether elected or appointed » had the right to Select committee assignments, 43
None of the blacks chose to be on the
A listing of the names, districts of the black 4 @ this Opinion, Table 4
cords of the 1973
le
Louisiana Constitutional Convention,
6 and 35, Ru 51. -17~
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all of whom were white.
The voting record of black delegates for the districting Plan and its amendments shows the following:
for the amendment, eleven against, ang one absent.
Another amendment Proposed that after January 1, 1975, the legislature divide the first district (Jefferson,
amendment, a white delegate argued:
We have seven Supreme Court Justices, Yet we have six Supreme court districts, two being elected from one. If I follow the feeling of this right, we argued single member districts. Why
exception here,
that district on e is going to have two Justices ang the
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are going to have one? Why not have Séven districtgy+s
» and seven against.
The final districting Plan
Districts,
delegate vote of eight for the fina) pl an,
absent, 4s
The present districting may now
re-Trial order Stipulation 31, pp. 37-38.
Stipulation does not acc The parties: count for the twelfth .
1973¢ (1982). See also Chisom v. Edwards,
+1525 & n. 4 {E.D. Ia. 1988).
See Pre-trial Order Stipulation 11, DJ 28 and note 15 Supra.
-19-
has sadly figured Prominently
example,
in Louisiana's history, ¢» For
Louisiana enforced a policy of racial Segregation in public education Prior to 1954,
» NO black persons were admitted to law school in Louisiana. At the present time, Louisiana operates two
Southern University attended by virtually all of the State's public black law Student population and the
Public law schools:
academically Superior LSU Law School, attended by most of the white public student Population, =2
Judges Association. The Court further accepts the testimony of
45 The Court will not detail here the parties Stipulations in
this regard, appearing in th e Pre-Trial Order as Stipulations 3¢-
45 at pp. 38-40 and 893-99 at Pp. 53-54,
50 See U United States v. State of Louisiana, {E.D. La. 1988.) 692 F. Supp. 642
51 In making these findings, the Court takes judicial notice of
facts in the record of Proceedings before the three judge Pane}
in United States v. State of Louisiana, Civil Action 80-3300.
-20-
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4. Recent Access to Political Candidacy
————==°0t Access
2eY Black candidacy is a relative]
Parties
Y recent Phenomenon, and the Stipulations detail the extent to which blacks have been
unsuccessful in their bids for judicial off ice and/or have not run for Judicial office.
unsuccessful black judicial Candidates, including Civil District
Court Section "yw
who testifieg regarding
"L" of the 14th Judicij
S
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;
t
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wi
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pe
obscuring his race. Additionally, Mr. Zeno's opponent was an area attorney who had been a State legislato r for aPProximately five to seven Years and had good name recogni
Parish. Mr.
keep the white
Council also testified
hat Melvin Zeno encountered. Mr. Lombard ran Opposite Fox McReithen, a candidate with great name recognition due to the fact that his f ather was a former governor of the state.
«+ Lombard would have made
53 See Transcript Pp. 81.
54 See Transcript D.i92.
Appendix to this opinion, Table 6.
“33
In addition, the Court heard testimony from
Court Section "I"
rl
from November 2, » through November 19, 1979, Nevertheless, the significance of black candidacy must be : remarked, however recent its development.
*
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.
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Be
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a
Judge Revius Ortique chose to run
—
ast
i
e” against three white candidates, including Present Justice Pascal one of the more "liberal"
compete with Justice Marcus,
Calogero,
Justices, rather than to
one of the more "conservative"
56
See Appendix Tables 1 and 3.
-23-
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judges, because like Justice Calogero, Judge Ortique hag no prior judicial eéxperience at that time. Ear) J, Amedee Competed against four white candidates for t he other Position. However, in light of the candidates"
black communities,
, their Participation Suggests increa
judicial candidacy.
It is true that since January 1978, a Position in the First Supreme Court District has been fililegd by contested Primary elec- tions in 1980 and 1988, and there were no black candidates in either of the elections.
The
and lacking Proba- tive value; if black candidates do not run and increase their notoriety, they Surely cannot win.
Notwithstanding Louisiana's history of discrimination, the recent careers of several Of New Orleans! black Politicians dem- onstrate the increaseqd access minority me
Political Processes,
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against a white candidate to a seat from District 1 of the 4th Circuit Court of Appeal (Orleans Parish). at the time of his election, Mr. Morial was a judge on the Orleans Parish Juvenile Court, a position to which he was appointed in 1970. He served on the court of appeal until 1977 when he resigned to become Mayor of the City of New Orleans.
Israel Augustine, a black lawyer, was unopposed in his 1981 election to an Open seat on District 1 of the 4th Circuit Court of Appeal (Orleans Parish). At the time of his election,
Mr. Augustine was Serving as a member of the Criminaj District Court of Orleans Parish. Joan Armstrong, a black lawyer,
ment following Morial's resignation in 1972 to run for the 4th Circuit Court.
tices Calogero and Marcus in 1978. Judge Ortique was serving as
when he defeateq a white challenger for Divi- Sion H of the court in 1979,
an ad hoc judge,
He was unopposed for reelection in 1984.
285"
of appeal. No black
In 1988, Dennis Dannel became the first and only black Person in this cen- tury to defeat a white incumbent candidate in a contest for the
-26-
Ne
T
o
r
e
SR
S
C
S
N
In this century,
St. Bernard or Plaquemines Parish, but since 1978
sons have been candidates for a judgeship in the parishes of
St. Bernard and Plaquemines. In this century,
has been elected to the First or Second City Court for New
Orleans. Since 1878,
contested election to pParish-wide office in st. Bernard,
Plaquemines and Jefferson.
The above facts show many areas of judicial office in
black candidates have not participated.
not prepared to make a blanket finding of restricted access to candidacy, given recent significant strides in this area.
Judges, blacks have crossed race lines,
5. Other Thornburg Factors
The Court further notes that there is no suggestion or
record evidence of racial overtones Or appeals in Judicial or other elections, nor of a lack of responsiveness on the part of Judges or other elected officials to the Particularized needs of the members of the minority group.
B. Analysis of Racial Bloc Voting and Cohesion
1. The Judiciary
Since 1976, candidates for judicial office do not run in bartisan elections. Instead, al} candidates for all of the
offices to be elected on a given date run in the open Primary
-27-
no black person has served as a judge in
no black person
no black candidate has been elected in a
However, this Court is
+» NO black per-
.
.
.
ti
e
Gi
s
n
—
—
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i
h
.
a
'
election. However, a candidate's Politic al party enrollment jis indicated on the ballot.
ity of the Vote in the Primary,
Compete in a general election. Parish -wide judicial offices are elected to a designated Position.
a. Elections for Supreme Court Justices from the Pirst
District
Since January 1978,
tions. However
% of Black ¥ of White Voters for Voters for Winning Winning
Year Election Winner Candidate Candidate 1974 General Calogero 98.3 71.0 1980 Primary Marcus 77.5 69.7 1988 Primary Calogero 59.9
64.7
57 See Weber Report, Appendix B PP. B-1, 2 and 3.
Homogeneous Precinct Analyses show:
%¥ of Black $ of White Voters for Voters for Winning Winning Candidate Candidate
96.4 71.0
Year Election Winner
1974 General Calogero
a NG
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1980 Primary Marcus 75.3 69.3
1988 Primary
.
a
Calogero 50.3 64.9
Unweighted Regression Analyses suggest:
%$ of Black $ of White Voters for Voters for Winning Winning Winner Candidate Candidate
.
-
.
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22
d
hl
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T
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s
28
5
Election
General Calogero 98.6
71.7
Marcus
Calogero
58 See Trial Transcript P. 30.
59 For election results, see Appendix in this Opinion, Table 5.
A majority of the black vote in Orleans would have to be 50% of
53.6%, or 26.8% of the black vote.
-29-
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special election, it appears that there was a black crossover in the election for the second Supreme Court seat in t he First
District. In that election, Mr. Amedee, the only black
Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds there is no pat- tern of racial bloc voting in the four most recent elections for Supreme Court Justice from the First Supreme Court District.
b. Other Judicial Elections
Since January 1978, in the Parishes that constitute the
First District, there have been 51 instances in which one of the
See Appendix in this Opinion, Table 5,
-30-
only. Most importantly, however, the minority candidate of choice has been elected in 62.7% o
Ecological regression analyses for 34 judicia
Primaries and 10 general elections)s2
always support the black candidate,
always Support the white candidate.
In addition, the Court heard testimony from Melvin Zeno who received significant endorsements from white Jefferson Parish
61 See Appendix Table 2.
62 See Un
63
ited states: Exhibit 16.
————
See Tr ial Transcript, Pp. 67-68.
-31-
There are two city courts in New Orleans for which judges
are not elected on a parish-wide basis.
All persons residing on the West Bank of the parish in
the 15th ward (Algiers) are eligible to vote for one member of
the Second City Court for New Orleans.
Black persons
have participated as candidates against white persons for 3 of
the contested Positions and in 4 of the elections held to £111
those positions.
S white opponent. For
example, both former Mayor Ernest Morial and state Senator Bill Jefferson endorsed white candidate Lambert Hassinger in his bid
for reelection to Traffic Court against Dannel.®+
2. Exogenous Elections
In the 1987 Primary election for Secretary of State,
were two black candidates and seven
there
white candidates. *® Weighted ecological regression analysis for the 1987 Primary
64 Se Times-Picayune 11/2/88, at B-3; 11/7/88,
65 ee Appendix Table 6.
0
at B-2,.
-32-
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it
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comprise the First District, to finish as the Plurality winner. He received a majority of the
Additional Findings
In First District elections, there is a majority-vote requirement and staggered terms; single-shot voting is not allowed.
~wide offices Such as mayor,
school board posts.
Roll
gh to Prevent black candidates from winning elections in which white candidates Participate,
-33~
SE
7
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office (President, vu.s. Senate, Governor, ang Mayor). Factual Conclusion
ority group.©®® The overall Present reality in the Court's view is not a Picture of racial Polarization to the detriment
lusion, the Court has given great - Ronald E. Weber and
Dr. Robert Ss. Miller.
67 While the Court's conclusion applies to the entire four-
parish area of the First District, the Court finds that its
-34-
4
As this Court Previously Stated:
Whether Dr. Engstrom's analysis in this case comports with what even the Plurality was approving in Thornburg is unclear. while Dr. Engstrom centered his analysis in this case on the race of the candidates, the pPlu- rality stated that "the Trace Of ‘the candidate Per se is irrelevant to racial bloc voting analysis." . ; S. Ct. at 2775. But of. ia.
. at 2775-7s ("Because i i jority voters
as
Thus, while election ang Support of black candidates ig important in the totality of circumstances, it is not determinative of a finding of racial cohesion Or racially Polarized voting.
While blacks Support black candidates to a large degree, and whites white candidates,
and while the evidence demonstrates the relatively small number of black persons holding office,
conclusion is
Orleans Parish
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ble. If only subsection
choice. The Political reality in South Louisiana is that the support of the black community is a very important factor in the Success of any Political candidate. It is rare that one may suc- ceed without jit. es®
Conclusions of Law
There are two issues of law:
l. Whether the multimember district system in Louisiana's First Supreme Court District violates Section 2(a) of the Voting Rights Act; and
2. Whether the multimember district in Louisiana's First
violates the Fourteenth ments to the United Sta
83
The Court will address each issue in turn.
1. The Voting Rights Act
With respect to the first issue, the Fifth Circuit has pre- viously determined in this litigation that section 2 generally applies to judicial elections. ®® However, the Parties raise a
(a) applies, defendants suggest only
the Court in
aken into
consideration the 109 sti fact set forth in paragraph
7 of the Pre-Trial Order of March 29, 1989
69 Chisom v. Edwards, 839 Fp. 2d 1056 (5th cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 390 (1988).
-36-
Nos
Aa
—
—
—
—
—
—
i
a
And
A
w
d
wha
o
J
.
Voting Act instituting the
never been overruled and the law of the case
viability.
intentional acts of discrimination are prohibited. 1f both sub- sections apply, plaintiffs may prevail "by demonstrating that under a totality of the Circumstances, a challenged election law Or procedure has the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on the basis of race. "7° In other words, under subsection (b), a "results test" may be used to evaluate the challenged election law or Procedure.
However, defendants contend the resolution of this case is not governed by section 2(b) of the Act. Defendants assert that section 2(b) of the Voting Rights Act enshrines the "one man, one Principle as the touchstone test, which should not be used to analyze Judicial elections, because the “one man, one vote"
Vv. Edwards,
347 F. Supp. 453 (M.D. La. 1972) » aff'd 409
U.S. 1095, 93 s. Ct. 904, 34 L.Ed.24 679 (1973).
The Wells litigation Pre-dates the 1982 amendments to the
"results test." However, Wells has
is silent on Wells!
<
LF
T
R
ll
i
70 839 F.2d at 1059,
37
.
.
>
A
L
oa
and that therefore Plaintiffs Voting Rights Act claims must be dismissed. However, since the tenor of the Pifth Circuit's opin- ion in this case suggests otherwise » this Court is bound by that opinion as the law of the case.
Accordingly, this Court has evaluated the facts before it under the rules of Gingles and its Progeny.72 As stated by the Fifth Circuit:
It has been Ww
"multi- member district and at-large voting schemes may operate to minimiz cancel out the voting Strength of racial minorities in the [Citing Gingles) Such schemes are not, however, Per se violations of section 2. [citation omitted) Westwego Citizens for Better Government v. City
Fa 24 1201 {Sth Cir. 1989),
of Westwego, 872
This Court must undertake Searching practical evaluation of Past and present
a
a
reality," with "functional view of the Political Process." Id. at 1204 (quoting Gingles).
71/ See Thornburg v. Gin les, 478 U.s. 30, 106 Ss. Ct, 2152, 92
L.Ed. 2525 (1986) and cases cited in this Court's Opinion of
July 28, 1988, Rec. Doc. no. 52, 690 F, Supp. 1524 (B.D. La.
1988).
-38-
(1) that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district; (2) that it is Politically cohesive; ang (3) that the white majority Votes sufficiently in a bloc to enable it to usually defeat the
minority's Preferred candidate because the minority's submergence
-member district impedes the minority's ability to elect its chosen representatives.
in a white multi
See 478 U.S. at 50-51, 106 S. Ct. at 2766-67, 92 L.Ed. 24 46-47; Campos wv. City of Baytown, 840 F.24 1240, 1243 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109
S.Ct. 3213 (1989).
respect of section 273 and include: the state's history of voting discrimination; the extent of racially Polarized voting; the state's use of such voting practices as unus
election districts,
shot Procedures; 7+
9g section 2 of the See S. Rep. No. 97-417, 97th
Cong. 2d sess. 28 (1982), usccan 1982, pp. 206-07, cited in
Thornburg v. Gingles, Supra, 106 S. Ct. at 2759-60.
74 Bullet (single-shot) voting is defined in Gingles, 106
S. Ct. at 2760 Nn. S,
-39-
Lesponsiveness to minority needs; and the viability of voting qualifications.
greater weight. Nevertheless, as Previously indicated, the Court is of the opinion Plaintiffs have failed to Prove by a
preponderance of the evidence, the existence of racial bloc voting as a matter of law.7s
This conclusion is Critical because multi-member districts and at large election schemes, are not per se violative of minor- ity voters: rights.” Plaintiffs must Prove that the use of a multi-member electoral Structure operates to minimize or cancel out their ability to elect their preferred candidates. This, the Plaintiffs have not done.
75 See Westwego, 872 F.2d at 1206; Cit V. City of Gretna, 834 F.2d 4
izens for a Better Gretna 96 (5th Cir. 1987).
76 To hold otherwise, expert reports of Drs. w
the Court would be required to ignore the to do. eber and Miller which the Court declines
77 Thornburg v. Gingles,
Supra, 106 S. Ct. at 2752.
-40-
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non-judicial elections shows that the blacks have had full access
to the political Process and routinely elect their preferred can-
didates, often times joining forces with a significant portion of
the white electorate, and Creating significant Crossover voting.
Plaintiffs would have the Court Create an amoeba
In concluding, the Court stresses that the plaintiffs
goal appears wholly contrary to the éxpress proviso in Section 2
that "nothing in this section establishes a right to have
[blacks] elected in numbers equal to their Proportion in
Population."
2. The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
With respect to the second issue, "multimember districts are
not per se unconstitutional, nor are they necessarily unconstitu-
tional when used in combination with single-member districts in
other parts of the State." White wv. Regester, 412 v.s. 755,
S. Ct. 2332, 2339 (1973). Proof of racially discriminatory
intent or Purpose is required to show a violation under either
the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment. Rirksey v. City of
Jackson, Miss., 663 F.24 659 (5th cir. 1981).
Vv. Davis,
Washington
voting strength of Plaintiffs. 1It is clear that an invidious
discriminatory purpose was not a factor at all in the legislative
ld)
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=
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. enter judgment in favor of defendants dismissin
decision to Provide a multi-member district for the Louisiana First Supreme Court District. Such being the Case, plaintiffs have failed to Prove any constitutional violation from the opera- tion of the Present voting Scheme.
For the foregoing reasons, the Clerk of Court is directed to
g Plaintiff's
claims.
[3%
New Orleans, Louisiana, this day of September, 1989.
ad llnD
CJ
UNITED STATES DISTRICT ne
-42-
Ye
e
me
A
3
Judicial
Parish Court am
Jefferson District 24
Juvenile
Orleans Civil
Criminal
Juvenile
Crim. Magistrate
Municipal
Traffic
Plaquemines District 25
St. Bernard District 34
Orleans 4th Circuit, Plaquemines at-large St. Bernard (court of appeal)
Orleans 4th Circuit,
1st District
(court of appeal)
Plaquemines
St. Bernard
Jefferson
TABLE 1
Offices Electegd on a Par
in the
First Supreme Court District
4th Circuit,
2nd District
(court of appeal)
4th Circuit,
3rd District
(court of appeal)
Sth Circuit,
lst District
(court of appeal)
Number of
of judges
15
ish-wide Basis
Number of
black judges
vo
B
a
TABLE 2
Election of Minority Candidates ted Elections for Judicial Positions
Judgeship/
District
Supreme Ct.
Dist, 1
24th
25th
34th
Orleans Civil]
Orleans Crim.
IV Circuit
At-Large
IV Circuit
Dist. 1
IV Circuit
Dist. 2
IV Circuit
Dist. 3
V Circuit
Pist. 3
Orleans Juvenile
New Orleans
Municipal
New Orleans
Traffic
New Orleans
First City
Jefferson
Juvenile
TOTAL
Percentage of
Elections Where
Winner is Preferred
by Minority Bloc
100%
71%
100%
100%
56%
29%
75%
75%
100%
0%
20%
75%
100%
50%
0%
62.7%
Total
Number of
Elections
59
Number
Black
VS. White
Elections
W
o
h
.
O
O
23
TABLE 3
Ecological Regression Analyses? for 34 Elections?
Percent of Vote for
Black Candidate
Black
Black White
Election Candidate Office Voters Voters
ORLEANS PARISH
1978
Primary Wilson Criminal Mag. 32 2 Primary Douglas Juvenile Ct. Sec. B 57 3 Young Juvenile Ct. sec. B 24 2 1979
Primary Ortique Civil Dist. Div. H 97 14 General *Ortique? Civil Dist. Div. Ng 99 13
Primary Young Juvenile Ct. Sec. E 65 5 General Young Juvenile Ct. Sec. E 80 25 Primary Pharr 1st. City Ct. Sec. C 6 2 1980
Primary Young 1st City ct. Sec. A 72 4 General Young 1st City ct. Sec. A 92 15
3 This table is set forth in Pre-trial order Stipulation 78,
PP. 48-50. voter sign-in data, by precinct and by race, is not
available from the State of Louisiana for ‘elections conducted
Prior to January 1, 1988.
2 The elections in bold print are ou elections. An, "outcome 4
"*" Indicates a winning candidate.
“A
Thomas
Julien
Wilson
Julien
Davis
Dorsey
*Johnson
Young
Douglas
Douglas
Dannel
Gray
*Gray
Blanchard
Magee
Wilkerson
*Magee
Dannel
McConduit
*McCondui t
Douglas
1st City ct. Sec. C
Crim. Dist. Piv. I
Crim. Dist. Div. I
Crim. Dist. Div. 1
Civil Dist. Div. D
Civil Dist. Div. F
Civil Dist. Div. 1
Juvenile Ct. Sec. C
Crim. Dist. piv, B
Crim. Dist. piv. B
Juvenile Ct. Sec. A
Juvenile Ct. Sec. A
Juvenile Ct. Sec. A
Crim. Dist. Div. ga
Civil Dist. Div. Pp
Civil Dist. Div. F
Civil Dist. Div. F
Juvenile Ct. Sec. D
Municipal ct.
Municipal ct.
4th Cir. Court of
Appeal, Dist. 1
94
39-41
31
88
97
51-52
85
46
72-74
88
20
69
96
72-75
75
22
92
84
71
84
53-54
17
13-15
9-10
35
12-13
21
12
27
21-22
Civil Dist. piv. G
Civil Dist. Div. G6
Municipal ct.
Traffic Ct.
Traffic ct.
Traffic ct.
JEFFERSON PARISH
Juvenile Ct. Div. A
District 24 Div. L 100-104
Fa
ni
a?
L
N
TW
“t
as
?
1
i
i 4
i.
1
|
.
AVERY C. ALEXANDER, Vice Chairman of the Convention, Dele-
gate elected from Legislative District 93 (Renner
Parish, Louisiana)
GEORGE DEWEY HAYES, Delega
e, Ea
te elected trict 63 (Baton Roug St Baton Rou
ALPHONSE JACKSON, JR., Delegate elected from Legislative
District 2 (Shreveport, Caddo Parish, Louisiana) JOHNNY JACKSON, JR., Delegate elected from Legislative Dis-
tricot 101 (New Orle ans, Orleans Parish, Louisiana) LOUIS LANDRUM, SR. » Delegate elected from Legislative Dis-
trict 91 (New Orleans, Orleans Parish, Louisiana)
» JR., Delegate appoint ed to represent
the Civil Service (New Orleans, Orleans pa rish, Louisiana)
DOROTHY MAE TAYLOR, Delegate appointed to represent Racial
Minorities (New Orleans, Orleans Parish, Louisiana. THOMAS A. VELAZQUEZ, trict 97 (New Orleans
GEORGE ETHEL w
trict 102 (New Orleans
MARY E. WISHAM, Delegate elected from Legi No. 67 (Baton Rouge, East Baton
Delegate elected from Le gislative Dis- » Orleans Parish, Louisiana)
Slative District Rouge Parish, Louisiana)
» Jefferson
~
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
a
.
t
r
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
Candidate
Ortique (B)
Calogero
Redmann
Sarpy
Amedee (B)
Marcus
Borsetta
Garrison
Samuel
TABLE 5
1972 Special Elections Results for the Two Seats
from the First District
Total vote (%) Orleans vote (%)
27,648 (14.0)
67,256 (34.1)
22,262 (11.3)
79,796 140.5)
196,962
11,872 ( 5.8)
78,810 (38.7)
35,272 (17.3)
52,249 (25.7)
25,476 (12.5)
203,679
21,744 (20.7)
34,473 (32.8)
10,542 (10.0)
38,256 (36.4)
105,015
8,997 ( 8.4)
46,629 (43.4)
19,728 (18.4)
26,055 (24.2)
5,994 ( 6.6)
107,403
Orleans vote as
a proportion of
the total vote
78.6
TABLE 6
Secretary of State Results in 1987 Primary for Parishes in the First Supreme Court District
Candidate Jefferson Orleans Plaquemines St. Bernard Total Cutshaw 24,097 12,936 1,564 5,854 43,911 Lombard 27,081 71,146 2,002 4,026 104,255 McKeithen 41,091 29,613 2,680 11,452 84,836 Rivers 1,233 2,889 11) 365 4,598 Tassin 16,039 6,545 825 2,877 26,386 Others 17,789 10,802 1,396 4,102 34,089
Source: Official Return from Louisiana Office of Secretary of State
8
11
TABLE 7
Orleans Parish
Election Results for Parish-wide Offices Involving Black vs. White Candidates Weighted Regression Analysis
1980-19884
Date of
% Black % White
Election Office Candidates Vote Vote
09-13-80 School Galman (B) 21.6 2.5 Board (2) *Koppel 12.0 41.7 *Spears (B) 26.0 20.5 Watson
2.7 9.6 *Zanders (B) 26,3 7.2 White Others 2.0 8.8 Black Others 9.4 9.9
02-06-82 Civil Bush (B) 6.9 1.9 Sheriff *D'Hemecourt 15.1 42.8 Ivon
8.5 33.2 *Valteau (B) 69.5 22.1
Mayor Ali
0.3 0.2 *Faucheaux 0.3 80.5 Fertel
D2 0.5 Jefferson (B) 8.0 5.2 *Morial (B) 80.8 12.8 Waters (B) 0.3 0.2
Councilman *Barthelemy (B) 52.7 26.7 At-Large (2) Dee
1.9 8. *Giarrusso 32.9 42.1 Koppel
12.5 25.1
4 The information contained in this table is taken from
Weber's Report, Defendants" Exhibit 2, PP. 33-37 and Appendices C
and E and Engstrom's Report, Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, Table 1, van
designates a winning candidate. Weber's Report sets forth both
03-20-82
09-11-82
11-02-82
06-18-83
09-29-84
Criminal
Dist. Ct.
{Div. 1)
Civil
Sheriff
Mayor
Criminal
Dist. Ct.
(Div. I)
School
Board (2)
School
Board (1)
Civil
Dist. Ct.
(Dist. D)
U.S. Congress
{Dist. 2)
School
Board (1)
District
Attorney
Civil
Dist. Ct.
(Div. F)
*Julien (B)
Kogos
Meyer
Scaccia
Wilson (B)
*Wimberly
D'Hemecourt
*Valteau (B)
Faucheaux
*Morial (B)
Julien (B)
*Wimberly
Jeffrion (B)
Lombard (B)
*Loving (B)
*McKenna (B)
Pope
Rittiner
*Robbert
McKenna (B)
*Robbert
Davis (B)
*Pl Rosa, L.
Augustine (B)
*Boggs
Morrison
Lodrig (B)
Torregano (B)
Beverly
Charitat
*Glapion (B)
*Higbee
Hirsch
Lombard (B)
West (B)
Zanders (B)
*Connick
Marcal
Reed (B)
Dorsey (B)
*Roberts
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Juvenile
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Juvenile
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{Div. ©)
School
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Criminal
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Juvenile
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Criminal
Sheriff
Civil
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Clerk
Criminal
Dist. Ct.
Clerk
Recorder of
Mortgages
Registrar of
Conveyances
Mayor
Harris
*Johnson (B)
*Douglas (B)
Myers
*Ouinlan
Dannel (B)
*Gray (B)
*Horton
Martin
Ducote
*Mule
Young (B)
*Glapion (B)
Higbee
Douglas (B)
*Quinlan
*Gray (B)
Horton
Aubrey (B)
*Foti
Ghergich
Begg
Ciamarra
Douglas (B)
*Foley
Carroll
*Lombard (B)
Bogan (B)
*Demarest
*Lewis (B)
Merrity
*Schiro
Watermeier
*Barthelemy (B)
Hardy
*Jefferson (B)
LeBlanc
Lombard (B)
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03-01-86
09-29-86
11-04-86
10-24-87
03-08-88
Councilman
At-Large (2)
Civil
Dist. Ct.
Div. F)
Criminal
Dist. Ct.
{Div, J)
Registrar of
Conveyances
Civil
Dist, Ct.
(Div. F)
School
Board (2)
Municipal
Court
Judge
Juvenile
Court
(Sec. D)
School
Board (1)
Municipal
Court
Judge
4th Circuit
1st Dist.
Civil
Dist. Ct.
(Div. G)
*Bagneris (B)
Detweiler
*Giarrusso
Kent
*Taylor (B)
Williams (B)
*Hawkins
*Magee (B)
Wilkerson (B)
Blanchard (B)
*Cannizzaro
Lewis (B)
*Schiro
Hawkins
*Magee (B)
Evans (B)
*Koppel
*Lambert-Busshoff
Lombard (B)
*McKRenna (B)
Williams (B)
2anders (B)
White Others
Black Others
*Comarda
Fitzsimmons
*McConduit (B)
Dannel (B)
*Lagarde
*McKenna (B)
Lambert-Busshoff
Comarda
*McConduit (B)
Douglas (B)
*Plotkin
Barnett
Cresson
Exnicios
*Glarrusso
*Hughes (B)
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04-16-88 Civil
Dist. ct.
(Div. Gg)
Municipal Ct.
Judge
Traffic ct,
Judge
School Board
(2)
11-08-88 Traffic ct.
Judge
*Giarrusso
Hughes (B)
*Glancey
Julien (B)
*Dannel (B)
*Hassinger
Hughes (B)
Gagliano
*Koppel
*McKenna (B)
*Dannel (B)
Hassinger