Harris County District Judge Sharolyn Wood's Motion to Intervene as Defendant

    TEE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COU. 
THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

MIDLAND-ODESSA DIVISION 

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN S 
' CITIZENS (LULAC), et al., 

Plaintifss, 

¥. NO. MO-88-CA-154 

JIM MATTOX, Attornev General 
of the State of Texas, et al., 

Defendants 

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HARRIS COUNTY DISTRICT JUDGE 
SHAROLYN WCOD'S MOTION TO INTERVENE AS DEFENDANT 
  

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: 

COMES NOW Sharolyn Wood, Judge 1 O0f the 127¢h" Judicial 

District Court of Harris County, Texas, ("Movant") and, pursuant 

to Rules 24(a) (2) ané 24(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, moves for leave to intervene in this cause of action 

as a party Defendant. in support of her. motion, Movant would 

show the following. 

1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 (a) (2) extends the 

right to intervene in a case to thcse timely intervenors who have 

an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the 

subject of the action, and who are so situated that the disposi- 

tion of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede 

their ability to protect that interest, and who are inadequately 

represented by existing parties. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

 



  

24 (b) allows the court to permit persons to intervene in a case 

if their claims or defense have a question of law or fact in 

common with the main action and if their intervention will not 

unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the 

original parties. 

2. Movant has a right to intervene as a Defendant in this 

action under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a) (2). This is a suit brought by 

the League of Latin Americans Citizens ("LULAC") and certain 

individual Mexican-American and black citizens of Texas which 

seeks to declare illegal and/or unconstitutional and null and 

void the State of Texas' legislatively mandated system of 

electing state district judges "at large" in forty-seven targeted 

counties and to impose a "single-member" district system by 

political subdivision of those counties along racial lines. 

3. As a state district judge, duly elected at large in 

November, 1988, to a four-year term of office in an expressly 

targeted county, Harris County District Judge Wood has a direct 

and substantial interest in the outcome of this suit in both her 

persoral and her official capacities in that she stands to have 

her election declared null and void and her tenure in office 

drastically truncated should Plaintiffs obtain the relief they 

seek. 

4. Movant also seeks to represent a vital interest 

peculiar to Harris County. The statutes of formation of the 

district courts of Harris County, and of very few other counties, 

 



  

have historically provided that the district courts shall have 

designated primary functions, such as the adjudication of family 

law or general civil disputes, or criminal cases, even though, in 

principle, each district court remains a court of general 

jurisdiction. Therefore, the effect of Plaintiffs’ obtaining the 

election of judges in single-member districts would be both more 

profound in Harris County than in virtually any other county in 

Texas and qualitatively different from in almost any other 

county. Either single-member districts would be divided along 

lines of specialization, as well as race, or the specialization 

system would be eliminated. In either event, the office of 

district judge in Harris County would be radically changed. Thus 

the re-structuring of the judicial election system in Harris 

County would have a singularly profound impact upon the presently 

sitting judges in Harris County, including Movant. Under these 

circumstances, Movant not only has a vital personal and official 

interest in the subject matter of this case, but she also is so 

situated that the disposition of the action will as a practical 

matter necessarily impair or impede her ability to protect her 

official and individual interests. 

5 In addition, Movant's official and individual interests 

are not adequately represented by the existing parties. Only the 

Texas Attorney General even purports to defend the interest of 

the State to Texas in maintaining the present judicial election 

system; and he has expressly disclaimed any representation of the 

 



  

interests of sitting state district judges in their personal 

capacities. Therefore, only Movant's official interests in this 

case are even colorably represented. Nor would the Court's 

granting the now pending Motion to Intervene of the Travis County 

Judges cause Movant's interests to be represented since thev 

cannot represent her personal interest in her tenure in office. 

Also Travis County lacks the judicial specialization of Harris 

County, so that, in that regard as well, Movant's interests must 

remain unrepresented unless her Motion to Intervene is granted. 

Finally, the record of this case clearly demonstrates that, in 

fact, there is no substantial opposition to the Plaintiffs suit, 

since no discovery whatsoever has been undertaken by the Defen- 

dants since the inception of this case in July, 1988, even though 

the cut-off date for discovery is now only six weeks away. 

6. Under the foregoing circumstances, Movant's interven- 

tion is also timely. Not only has the development of the case 

not yet begun, but also other Motions to Intervene, including the 

Motion of the Travis County Judges, have only recently been 

filed, are not opposed by any party, and are currently pending 

before the Court. 

7. Since, therefore, Movant has direct, substantial, and 

legally protectable personal and official interests in this case; 

since she will be affected by the disposition of the case; since 

she is inadequately represented; and since she has moved in a 

timely fashion to intervene, she meets all criteria for 

 



  

intervention under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 (a) (2), and 

the Court should grant her Motion to Intervene as of right. 

8. Even if the Court should deny Movant's motion to 

intervene as of right, however, Movant fully meets the criteria 

for permissive intervention under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(b), since her 

claims and defenses, as set forth above, necessarily have 

numerous questions of both law and fact in common with the main 

action. Nor will her intervention unduly delay or prejudice the 

adjudication of the rights of the original parties, since there 

has been essentially no discovery to date and other motions to 

intervene have been very recently filed and are currently pending 

before this Court. 

9. The facts, arguments and authorities Movant would 

advance in support of her motion are more fully set forth in the 

accompanying Memorandum in Support of Harris County District 

Judge Sharolyn Wood's Motion to Intervene as Defendant, attached 

hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this reference. 

10. In the ‘event that the Court grants her Motion +o 

Intervene as Defendant, Movant seeks leave to file her Original 

Answer, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "B,"- as 

required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(c). 

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Harris County District Judge 

Sharolyn Wood prays that the Court will grant her motion to 

intervene as party Defendant in this cause of action and will 

 



  

grant her such further relief, in law and in equity, to which she 

may show herself justly entitled. 

Respectfully submitted, 

PORTER & CLEMENTS 

Fo Cugerne Clements AE U/C 

By: Wall pesyncosce 

J. Eugene Clements it 
700 Louisiana, Suite 3500 
Houston, Texas 77002-2730 

(713) 226-0600 

  

By: 
  

Darrell Smith 
Attorney at Law 

10999 Interstate Highway 10, 
#905 
San Antonio, Texas 78230 

(512) 641-9944 

ATTORNEYS FOR HARRIS COUNTY 

DISTRICT JUDGE SHAROLYN WOOD 

OF COUNSEL: 

PORTER & CLEMENTS 

John E. O'Neill 
Evelyn V. Keyes 
700 Louisiana, Suite 3500 
Houston, Texas 77002-2730 

(713) 226-0600 

Michael J. Wood 
Attorney at Law 

440 Louisiana, Suite 200 
Houston, Texas 77002 

(713) 228-5101 

 



  

I 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
  

hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Motion to Intervene has been served on all counsel of 
record by certified mail, return receipt requested, on this R [a # 
day of February, 1989, as follows: 

Ken Oden 

Travis County Attorney 
P. OO. Box 1748 

Austin, Texas 78767 

David R. Richards 

Special Counsel 
600 W. 7th Street 

Austin, Texas 78701 

Garrett, Thompson & Craig 
Attorneys at Law 

8300 Douglas, Suite 800 
Dallas, Texas 75225 

Rolando L. Ruiz 
Attorney at Law 

201 'N, St, Mary's, Suite 221 
San Antonio, Texas 78205 

Susan Finkelstein 
Attorney at Law 

201 N., St. Mary's, Suite 600 
San Antonio, Texas 78205 

Renea Hicks 
Assistant Attorney General 
P.O. Box 12548 
Capitol Station 
Austin, Texas 78701 

Mark H. Dettman 

Attorney at Law 

P. O.- Box 2559 

Midland, Texas 79702 

Ll 2 
  

Evelyn V. Keyés 

WO001/02/cej 

 



EXHIBIT 
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THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

MIDLAND-ODESSA DIVISICN 

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN § 

CITIZENS (LULAC)Y, et al., S 

Plaintiffs, : 

Vv. : NO. MO-88-CA-154 

JIM MATTOX, Attorney General : 

of the State of Texas, et al., § 

Defendants : 

S 

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF HARRIS COUNTY DISTRICT 

JUDGE SHAROLYN WOOD'S MOTION TO INTERVENE 

AS DEFENDANT 
  

Harris County District Judge Sharolyn Wood, Applicant for 

Intervention as Defendant ("Movant"), files this her Brief in 

Support of her Motion to Intervene, and would respectfully show 

the Court the following: 

I. BACKGROUND 
  

Plaintiffs, the League of Latin American Citizens ("LULAC") 

and certain individual Mexican-American and black citizens of the 

State of Texas, have filed suit in this case seeking to have this 

Court declare Texas' system of electing ‘state district judges "at 

large" in targeted counties illegal or unconstitutional on the 

grounds that this system dilutes the voting strength of Mexican- 

American and black electors. Plaintiffs seek, further, to 

establish a system whereby every state district judge in each of 

 



  

47 targeted counties would be compelled to run in "single member" 

districts. Successful suit by Plaintiffs would, therefore, have 

a profound and highly debilitating effect on the entire judicial 

system of Texas and would vitally affect both the official and 

the individual interests of Movant, who is a sitting state 

district judge, duly elected "at large" in one of the targeted 

counties. Under the circumstances, therefore, Movant would show 

that her intervention in this case is both right and proper. 

IT. MOVANT IS ENTITLED TO INTERVENE 
AS A MATTER OF RIGHT UNDER FED.R.C1V.P. 244(a) (2). 
  

The Fifth Circuit holds that a movant must satisfy four 

requirements to be entitled to intervene as a matter of right 

under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a) (2): 

(1) the application for intervention must be timely; 
(2) the applicant must have an interest relating to the 
property or transaction which is the subject of the 
action; (3) the applicant must be so situated that the 
disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, 
impair or impede his ability to protect that interest; 
and (4) the applicant's interest must be inadequately 
represented by the existing parties to the suit. 

New Orleans Public Serv.,” Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 
  

732 F.24 452, 463 (5th Cir. 1984); see also Association of 
  

Professional Flight Attendants v. Gibbs, 804 F.2d 318, 320 (5th 
  

Cir. 1986). Movant's intervention satisfies all four require- 

ments, 

A. Movant's Intervention Is Timely. 
  

The timeliness of a motion to intervene must be determined 

from all the circumstances in the case. Gibbs, 804 F.2d at 320; 

 



  

Stallworth v., Monsanto Co., 558 P.2d 257, 263 (5th Civ. 19727). 
  

The Pifth Circuit holds: that four factors are relevant to 

timeliness: {1) the length of time the intervenor knew or 

should have known of his interest in the case before moving to 

intervene; (2) the prejudice that existing parties may suffer 

as a result of the intervenor's delay in intervening, if any; 

(3) the prejudice to the intervenor from denial of his motion to 

intervene; and (4) the existence of unusual circumstances. 

Gibbs, 804 F.2d at 320-21. Under these criteria, Movant's motion 

to intervene is timely. 

This suit was filed on July 11, 1988. Defendants' answer 

was not filed until September 26, 1988. On ‘October: 17,1988, 

before virtually any discovery was undertaken -- including no 

discovery on the part of Defendants -- this Court entered an 

order granting Defendants' request for a stay of further proceed- 

ings pending the United States Supreme Court's disposition of the 

petition for writ of certiorari filed in Chisum v. Edwards, 
  

839 F.24 1056 (5th Cir. 1988), a case in which the Supreme Court 

was asked to decide an issue critical also to the instant case, 

namely, whether the Fifth Circuit has correctly held that §2 of 

the Voting Rights ‘Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C.A. $1973, applies to 

state judicial elections. On. November .14, 1988, the Supreme 

Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari in Chisum v. 
  

Edwards, sub nom Roemer v. Chisom, U.s. yr 109 8.Ct... 390 
    

(1988) , and this court subsequently lifted its stay. 

 



  

To date, to Movant's best knowledge and belief, no deposi- 

tions have been taken in this case and only the very minimal dis- 

covery undertaken before the stay has been done, consisting in a 

single set of interrogatories from Plaintiffs to Defendants and a 

single request for production of documents. In addition, it is 

clear that the battle lines are still being drawn. This Court 

denied a Motion of Midland County for Leave to Intervene less 

than three weeks ago, on January 27, 1989; and it dismissed 

Governor William Clements as a Defendant two days later, on 

January 29, 1989. Other motions to intervene have been filed by 

certain individuals in Dallas County and by the District Judges 

of Travis County within the last two weeks and are now pending 

before the Court. Thus, it cannot be said that the case is at 

such an advanced stage that the present parties would be preju- 

diced by Movant's intervention. 

In addition, neither of the presently pending motions to 

intervene has, to Movant's knowledge, been opposed by any party. 

To the contrary, the Texas Attorney General, the only Defendant 

in this case who represents the interests of the State of Texas, 

filed a brief ten days ago, on February 7, 1989, stating that he 

does not oppose the intervention of either the Dallas County 

individuals or the Travis County District Judges. If the 

Defendant charged with representing the interests of the state 

has not opposed such intervention on any grounds, then, a 

fortiori, he does not believe that intervention is untimely; nor,   

 



  

if the parties themselves do not oppose intervention at this 

stage, should the Court make a finding that intervention is 

untimely. 

Under these circumstances, it is clear that this case is 

still in its very early stages and that no party will be preju- 

diced as regards the timeliness of Movant's intervention. By 

contrast, Movant runs a substantial risk of having her interests 

severely compromised in her absence from this case, for the 

reasons set forth below. Therefore, he criteria of timeliness 

are met and Movant should not be denied the opportunity to 

intervene on such grounds. 

B. Movant Has a Direct, Substantial, and 
Legally Protectable Interest Relating to the 
Subject of the Action. 

  

  

  

Movant is a ‘duly elected state district judge presently 

presiding over the 127th Judicial District Court of Harris 

County, Texas. Harris County elects its state district judges to 

the bench in at-large elections and is an express target of the 

instant suit. In addition, Harris County is unique among all the 

counties of Texas in that the formation statutes of its district 

courts : provide for specialization from court to court, even 

though, in principle, each of the district courts fulfilling 

these specialized functions retains general jurisdiction. Thus, 

Harris County has district judges who, for example, preside only 

 



over family law or probate cases, although they are all elected 

to the office of district: judge. If a single-member judicial 

election system were imposed on Harris County, therefore, the 

effect would be profound. Not only would district judges be 

required to run in single-member districts within the county, but 

also either some of those districts would elect family judges 

while others elected probate judges, for example, or the entire 

system of specialization would have to be overthrown. In either 

case, the effect on Movant, both as a sitting judge and as a 

potential candidate for election under the new system, would be 

immediate and wrenching. Movant, therefore, as a state district 

judge presently sitting in a target county, and especially as a 

judge sitting in the only district in Texas with specialized 

state courts, and as one who plans to run for re-election, has a 

uniquely vital and Jjusticiable interest in the outcome of this 

suit, in both her official and her individual capacities. 

The question whether a sitting judge has an interest in a 

case brought to have the system under which he was elected 

declared illegal and unconstitutional has been very recently 

addressed by the United States District Court for the Northern 

District of Illinois. Williams v. State Board of Elections, 696 
  

P,5upp. 1563 {N.D.. 111.7 1988). In Williams, exactly as :in the 
  

instant case, black and Hispanic residents of Cook County, 

Illinois brought an action for vote dilution under the Voting 

Rights Act seeking to abolish the at large judicial election  



  

system in Cook County and replace it with a single-member 

district scheme. The Williams Court observed that if the 
  

Plaintiffs were to prevail and the Court were to declare all 

existing Jjudgeships vacant or were to truncate the terms of 

sitting judges the tenure of most elected judges in Cook County 

would be drastically reduced, Id. at 1571. Following a lengthy 

and thoughtful discussion of the question whether elected sitting 

judges have a property or other due process interest in the 

retention of their office, the Court concluded that they had "at 

the very least a colorable claim to their office" and, as such, 

"might have an equitable interest in the timing and nature of the 

relief to be ordered by the court." Id. at 1572. 

Williams is on all fours with the instant case. Should the   

Plaintiffs prevail in this case and obtain the relief they seek, 

the existing method of electing district judges would be declared 

"unconstitutional and/or illegal, null, and void" and the State 

of Texas and the Texas Board of Elections would be "permanently 

enjoined from calling, holding, supervising or certifying any 

further elections for district judges under the present at large 

scheme." Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint at 9. Not only 

would such an outcome cause immediate and profound chaos in the 

state judicial system, but it would directly affect the vital 

interests of Movant by declaring her status as an elected state 

district judge illegal and her election "null and void." 

Therefore it is beyond question that Movant has a direct, 

 



  

substantial and legally protectable interest relating to the 

property -- her tenure as an elected state district judge -- or 

transaction i~- the election of state district judges at large, 

especially as that system is effected in Harris County -- which 

is the subject of this cause of action. 

C. Disposition of This Action May, as 
a Practical Matter, Impede Movant's 
Ability to Protect Her Interests. 

  

  

  

Having found that sitting state judges do have a legally 

protectable interest in a suit challenging the legality and/or 

constitutionality of the system under which they were elected, 

the Williams court went on to conclude that such judges have an 
  

interest in their continued tenure in office sufficient to 

require that they receive due process before it is taken away and 

that their absence from a proceeding challenging the system under 

which they were elected would likely impair their ability to 

protect thelr continued tenure, 696 F.Supp. at 1572. The Court 

stated that if the judges sought to intervene it would let them. 

Id. Since, however, they had not so sought, the court found 

their interest in the case to be sufficiently great that they 

should be Joined to the case. Ja. at 1572-73. The Court 

therefore ordered the joinder as necessary parties of all sitting 

judges whose terms could be truncated or whose right to run in a 

subsequent election could be affected by a judgment in the case. 

Id. at 1573. For exactly the same reasons, Movant is so situated 

in the instant case -- as an elected state district judge in a 

target county whose election is subject to being declared null 

 



  

and void should Plaintiffs obtain the relief they seek -- that 

the disposition of the action in her absence would, as a 

practical matter, impair or impede her ability to protect her 

vital interests which are at stake in this matter. 

  

  

Dh. Movant's Interest is Inadequately 
Represented by the Existing Parties to 
the Suit. 
  

The Fifth Circuit holds that the burden on an intervenor to 

show inadequacy of representation is "slight." Bush v. Viterna, 1 Y Pp g 
  

740 7.24 350, 355 «(5th Cir. 1984), In this regard the Fifth 

Circuit follows the United States Supreme Court, which has held 

that the burden of making a showing of inadequate representation 

"should be treated as minimal." Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 
  

404 U.S." 528, 538 n.10,.92 5.Ct., 630, 636 n.10 (1972). .The Fifth 

Circuit further holds, however, that when the ultimate objectives 

of the intervenor and the party on whose side he seeks to 

intervene are the same the presumption arises that the inter- 

venor's interests will be adequately represented by the existing 

party. Bush, 740 F.2d at 3535, In such a case, the intervenor 

must show "adversity of interest, collusion, or non-feasance by 

the existing party to overcome the presumption of adequate 

representation.” Id. at 356 (quoting International Tank Termi- 
  

nalg, Ltd. wv. MIV Acadia FPoregt, 579 F.24 964, 967 (5th Cir. 
  

1978). 

In the instant case, the ultimate objectives of Movant are 

not identical with those of the present Defendants. Therefore, 

 



  

no presumption arises that her interest are adequately represent- 

ed and only a minimal showing of inadequacy of representation 

need be made. That showing is easily made from the record 

itself. 

Among existing Defendants, only the Attorney General of 

Texas professes to represent the interests of sitting state 

district judges, and he has averred that he represents the 

interests of such judges only in their official capacities. 

Defendants' Response to Motions to Intervene by Dallas County 

Plaintiff/Intervenors and Travis County Defendant/Intervenors at 

1. Moreover, the Texas Attorney General has declined to oppose 

the motion to intervene filed by the District Judges of Travis 

County, Texas on the express grounds that "such judges have not 
  

heretofore been represented in their individual capacities." Ida. 
  

(emphasis added). Thus, the Texas Attorney General himself has 

pointed out that he represents only the interests of the State of 

Texas and not the individual interests of elected judges. He has 

also acknowledged that sitting district judges do have individual 

interests pertinent to this case. By distancing himself from 

those interests, therefore, he is acknowledging that they will 

not be adequately represented, or represented at all, unless, of 

course, intervention is granted. Since Movant; like the Travis 

County Judges, has both an official and an individual interest in 

this case and both interests are vital, it follows that she has 

vital interests which are totally unrepresented by the present 

parties. 

10 

 



Moreover, although the interests of the Travis County 

District Judges whose Motion to Intervene is now pending before 

this court are complementary to Movant's interests, the Travis 

County Judges have expressly stated that they represent no one's 

interests but their own. In. their Motion to Intervene, the 

Travis County Judges state that, should their intervention be 

allowed, any discovery they request or participate in will be 

limited to Travis County alone and not extended to any other 

target county. District Judges of Travis County's Motion to 

Intervene at 4-5. Again, in their Original Answer, attached to 

their Motion to Intervene, the Travis County District Judges 

state that they make no contentions or assertions regarding any 

other county except” Travis County. District Judges of Travis 

County Original Answer at 3. 

Where the Texas Attorney General admits that the individual 

interests of the sitting state district judges are not presently 

represented in this suit; where the Travis County District 

Judges, as intervenors, expressly state that their contentions, 

assertions, and intended discovery are and will be limited to 

Travis County; and where Movant, as a state district judge 

presently sitting in Harris County, Texas, has a clear and 

pressing justiciable interest in the outcome of this case, it is 

patently evident that Movant has an interest which only she, 

among all the present parties and applicants for intervention, 

can represent and that, if her motion to intervene is denied, her  



  

interest will not be adequately represented. It is also evident 

that, under such circumstances no presumption of adequate 

representation by present parties arises since there are no 

parties whose goals are the same as Movants. A total lack of 

representation of Movant's justiciable interests is, necessarily, 

inadequate representation. 

There is yet another reason, however, why Movant is not 

adequately represented, even in her official capacity, by the 

existing parties. This Court has observed that the Texas 

Attorney General is presumed to represent the interests of the 

State: of Texagy'and that, absent’ allegations: of collusion, 

nonfeasance, or adversity of interest, the Attorney General is 

presumed to represent those interests adequately. Order denying 

Motion of Midland County for Leave to Intervene at 5. In support 

of this ‘point of law thei Court cites Kneeland 'v. National 
  

Collegiate Athletic Association, 806 F.2d 1285, 1288 (5th Cir. 
  

1987) {citing Bush v. Viterna, 740 F.24 350," 355 (5th Cir. 
  

1984)). It follows that insofar as Movant's interests coincide 

with the interests of the State of Texas, the Texas Attorney 

General 1s presumed to represent at least those interests 

adequately. However, Movant would show that, for the reasons set 

forth below, even to the extent her interests coincide with the 

interests of the State of Texas those interests will still not be 

adequately represented by the Texas Attorney General. 

The interests of the State of Texas remain so far undefined 

by any documents filed in this case. Presumably, however, they 

12 

 



  

consist in the state's interest in maintaining the State of 

Texas' judicial election system as promulgated by its legislature 

and approved by its citizens. Nothing in this case, however, 

indicates that the Attorney General will, in fact, vigorously 

defend the present judicial election system or has, to date, done 

so. 

Even to this day, six weeks before the agreed discovery 

cut-off date in this case, the Texas Attorney General has, to 

Movant's knowledge, conducted no discovery whatsoever on the 

extremely vital and sensitive issues at stake in this case, 

notwithstanding the magnitude of the case and its capacity for 

deeply touching the political interests of all the citizens of 

this state, not merely those who, like Movant, stand to De 

immediately and directly affected. In light of the record as it 

stands, the defense the Texas Attorney General has provided for 

the vital’ interests of this state amounts to only token opposi- 

tion at best and, at worst, to no opposition at all. Thus, in 

light of the state of the record, this suit must be accounted 

inadequately defended by any legal standards. Moreover, based 

upon the absolute absence of any defense in this case, Movant 

strongly believes that this suit is without substantial opposi- 

tion. "Nonfeasance" in these circumstances means the total 

omission or failure of a party to defend the case. Therefore, if 

Movant's information and belief are correct -- as the state of 

the record implies they are -- any presumption of adequate 

representation of her interests, or indeed of adequate represen- 

13 

 



  

tation of the interest of the State of Texas in maintaining its 

present judicial election system, is rebutted by the nonfeasance 

of Defendants. It follows inexorably that Movant's interests are 

not adequately represented by the present Defendants. 

In ‘addition, If Movant's beliefs are correct, Movant's 

intervention is absolutely indispensible to permit 311 of the 

evidence to be presented and to permit any fair record to" bea 

assembled. Therefore her intervention will clearly make a very 

significant contribution to the full development of the factual 

and legal issues in this suit. The final criterion for Movant's 

intervention as a matter of right in this case is thus met, and 

she is entitled to intervene in order to ensure that her vital 

justiciable interests are represented in this suit. 

ITI. MOVANT'S INTERVENTION IN THIS CASE IS 
ALSO PERMISSIBLE UNDER FEDERAL RULE 24 (b). 
  

  

Should the court find that, despite the arguments and 

authorities set forth above, Movant is not entitled to intervene 

as a matter of right in this action, the Court has discretion to 

order that she be permitted to intervene as a party Defendant 

under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(b). Permissive intervention is proper when 

an intervenor's claims or defenses have questions of law or fact 

in common with the main action and intervention will not unduly 

delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’ 

rights. Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(b) (2). In such a case, intervention is 

discretionary with the court. Id.; New Orleans Public Service, 
  

732 F.24 at 470-71. 

14 

 



  

Movant's elaine and defenses obviously have many questions 

of both law and fact in common with the main action in that 

Plaintiffs seek the overthrow of the present system of electing 

Texas state district judges by popular vote in targeted districts 

where judges are ‘elected "at large,” and Movant is a sitting 

Texas state district court judge duly elected at large in one of 

the targeted districts. Thus, the instant case intimately 

involves her interests in both her personal and her official 

capacities, and the application of the law to facts derived from 

and affecting her personal situation will contribute materially 

to the resolution of this case. Nor, for the reasons set forth 

above, will Movant's intervention cause any prejudice or delay to 

the present parties in this case. Therefore all criteria of 

permissive intervention are met and Movant should be permitted to 

intervene, even if the Court does not find that she is entitled 

to intervene as of right. 

For all the foregoing reasons, the Court should find that 

Movant's intervention in this case is both right and proper. 

Respectfully submitted, 

ro & CLEMENTS 

yo IE Vm 
J. i” ES 
Adm. No. 

700 Louisiana, Suite 3500 
Houston, Texas 77002-2730 

{713) 226-0600 

  

  

ATTORNEY FOR HARRIS COUNTY 

DISTRICT JUDGE SHAROLYN WOOD 

15 

 



  

OF COUNSEL: 

PORTER & CLEMENTS 

John BE. O'Neill 
Evelyn V. Keyes 
700 Louisiana, Suite 3500 
Houston, Texas 77002-2730 

(713) 226-0600 

Michael Wood 

Attorney at Law 

400 Louisiana 

77002 Houston, Texas 

(713) 228-5101 

  

Darrell Smith 

Attorney at Law 

Adm. No. 

10999 Interstate Hwy 10, #905 
San Antonio, Texas 78230 

(512) 641-9944 

  

 



CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
  

I ‘hereby {certify that -a true and correct copy. of the 
foregoing Original Answer has been served on all counsel of 
record by certified mail, return receipt requested, on this 
day of February, 1989, as follows: 

Ken Oden 

Travis County Attorney 
P. OC. Box 1748 
Austin, Texas 78767 

David R. Richards 
Special Counsel 
600 W. 7th Street 

Austin, Texas 78701 

Garrett, Thompson & Craig 
Attorneys at Law 

8300 Douglas, Suite 800 
Dallas, Texas 75225 

Rolando L. Ruiz 
Attorney at Law 

201 N, St.Mary's, Suite 221 
San Antonio, Texas 78205 

Susan Finkelstein 

Attorney at Law 

201 N. St. Mary's, Suite 600 
San Antonio, Texas 78205 

Renea Hicks 
Assistant Attorney General 
P. OO. Box+12548 
Capitol Station 
Austin, Texas 78701 

Mark H. Dettman 

Attorney at Law 

P.O. Box 2559 

Midland, Texas 79702 

  

Evelyn V. Reyes 

WO001/03/cej  



EXHIBIT 
B 

 
 

 



  

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

MIDLAND-ODESSA DIVISION 

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN 

CITIZENS (LULAC), et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

¥. NO. MO-88-CA-154 

JIM MATTOX, Attorney General 
of the State of Texas, et al., 

Defendants 

SHAROLYN WOOD, Judge of the 

127TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 

of Harris County, Texas, 

Applicant for 
Intervention 

as Defendant. Wh
 
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ORDER 

Harris County District Judge Sharolyn Wood's Motion to 

Intervene as Defendant having come on for consideration, and the 

Court having reviewed the Motion and the arguments in support 

thereof, as well as the documents filed in opposition thereto, if 

any, the Court is of the opinion that said Motion to Intervene 

should be granted. It is therefore 

ORDERED that Harris County District Judge Sharolyn Wood's 

Motion to Intervene as Defendant is hereby GRANTED. The Clerk of 

this Court is hereby directed to file State District Judge 

 



CN « 

  

Sharolyn Wood's Original Answer, attached to said Motion, in the 

above-styled and numbered cause of action. 

SIGNED this day of ; 1989. 
  

  

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

WO001:04