Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. Labor/Community Strategy Center Supplemental Brief for Respondents

    No. 01-1054

In  The

Jiupm ne Court of the Itniteh s ta te s

Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation 
Authority , et a l,

Petitioners,
v.

Labor/C ommunity Strategy  Center , et al,

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS

Elaine R. Jones 
Director-Counsel 
Theodore M. Shaw 
Norman J. Chachkin 
NAACP Legal Defense & 

Educational Fund Inc ., 
99 Hudson Street, 16th floor 
New York, NY 10013 
(212) 965-2200

*E. Richard Larson 
Erica J. Teasley 
NAACP Legal Defense & 

Educational Fund, Inc . 
1055 Wilshire Boulevard, 

Suite 1480
Los Angeles, CA 90017 
(213) 975-0211

Constance L. Rice 
English, Munger & Rice 
1545 Wilshire Boulevard, 

Suite 800
Los Angeles, CA 90017 
(213) 989-1300

*Counsel o f Record 
Attorneys for Respondents



SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS

On February 19, 2002, following submission of 
Respondents’ Brief in Opposition to Certiorari in this matter, 
a group of proposed amici curiae, including Foothill Transit 
and other public corporate bodies within Los Angeles County, 
filed a Motion seeking leave to file an appended Brief in 
support of Petitioners.1 Although that Brief largely rehearses 
arguments made in the Petition, we believe that two points 
require a response.

First, amici identify their interest in this matter 
primarily as a concern about a hypothetical reallocation of 
revenues received by Petitioner MTA from sales taxes 
earmarked for public transportation (“Proposition A” and 
“Proposition C” funding):

As part of its authority, MTA controls a substantial 
pool of these funds and disperses them to the amici.

The Ninth Circuit ruling challenged here affirms 
a remedial order that will cost MTA many millions of 
dollars to implement. If MTA attempts to take 
Proposition A and C funds it otherwise would distribute 
to the amici to satisfy MTA’s court-ordered obligations, 
less funding would be available to the amici.

(Amici Br. at 2) (footnote omitted.)

This interest is not implicated by the Questions sought 
to be presented by Petitioners. Neither the Special Master nor 
the District Court decided that the remedy for MTA’s 
noncompliance with the Consent Decree should include

‘Although Respondents had consented to the filing of such 
a brief on behalf of Foothill Transit, proposed amici decided to 
submit a motion to this Court because “additional amici sought to 
join the proposed brief after that consent was given . .. [and] it was 
too late to obtain new consents from the parties” (Motion for Leave 
to File, at 1).



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reallocation of Proposition A or C funds. Rather, the Consent 
Decree itself provides that:

If MTA fails to meet the target load factors for 
all bus lines by the dates in paragraph 1 above, (except 
those exempted or deferred under paragraph 3 above), 
MTA shall meet the target as soon as possible and 
reallocate sufficient funds from other programs to meet 
the next lower target load factor as scheduled. The 
reprogrammed funds, which may include but not be 
limited to revenues from Propositions A and C 
discretionary funds, shall be used to meet the target 
load factors.

(Pet. 177a [emphasis added].) Thus, the possibility that 
Proposition A or C funds might have to be reallocated to meet 
MTA’s responsibilities under the Decree is no different from 
the situation in United States v. City o f  Yonkers, 856 F.2d 444 
(2d Cir. 1988), rev’d  on other grounds sub nom. Spallone v. 
United States, 493 U.S. 265 (1990), in which, Petitioner’s 
amici agree, federalism objections were not well-founded 
because the trial court’s order “simply ‘was carrying out the 
terms of the Consent Judgment,”’ Amici Br. at 14 n.10.

It bears remarking that reallocation of “Propositions A 
and C discretionary funds” is a remedy congruent with the 
original act by MTA that gave rise to this lawsuit: “MTA’s 
decision to spend several hundred million dollars [of 
discretionary funds] on a new rail line, foregoing an 
opportunity to reduce overcrowding problems on city buses, 
while at the same time increasing bus fares and eliminating 
monthly discount passes” (Pet. 3a [opinion below]).

Moreover, the Consent Decree (including the language 
quoted above) was entered in 1996 —  yet amici have never 
sought to intervene in this action or otherwise protect the 
interests they now claim are threatened by its enforcement. In



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any event, since MTA proposed the remedy of reallocating 
Proposition A and C funding in the Consent Decree itself, 
amici's representation that the ruling below gives MTA “less 
protection from [i.e., based upon] federalism principles than 
agencies found to have violated the law” {Amici Br. at 5) is 
sheer nonsense.

Second, even if we agreed— which we do not — with 
amici' s characterization of language in the ruling below, as 
approving a district court order that requires MTA to violate 
federal funding conditions that “might disqualify MTA from 
entitlement to receive funds” (Pet. 20a), this Court reviews 
judgments, not opinions. E.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., A61 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). 
And the judgment below affirms orders of the Special Master 
that explicitly allow MTA to meet federal program funding 
requirements even if that delays implementation of the remedy 
for its noncompliance with the Consent Decree. See Brief in 
Opposition to Certiorari, at 23-24.

In addition, as we pointed out in our Brief in Opposition 
to Certiorari (at 24-25), MTA informed the court below that it 
complied with the District Court’s order in 1999 by purchasing 
297 new buses. Not only was this accomplished, as we 
observed in the Brief in Opposition, without violating the terms 
of federal grant statutes, but we must presume that it was also 
accomplished without redirecting Proposition A or C funds 
away from amici —  or they would surely have advised this 
Court otherwise.



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CONCLUSION

Amici, like Petitioners, advance no meritorious reason 
for reviewing the judgment below. The Writ should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

Elaine R. Jones 
Director-Counsel 
Theodore M. Shaw 
N orman J. Chachkin 
NAACP Legal Defense &

*E. Richard Larson 
Erica J. Teasley 
NAACP Legal Defense & 

Educational Fund, Inc. 
1055 Wilshire Boulevard,

Educational Fund Inc ., Suite 1480 
99 Hudson Street, 16th floor Los Angeles, CA 90017
New York, NY 10013 
(212) 965-2200

(213) 975-0211

Constance L. Rice . 
English, Munger & Rice 
1545 Wilshire Boulevard, 

Suite 800
Los Angeles, CA 90017 
(213)989-1300

* Counsel o f Record 

Attorneys for Respondents