Westinghouse Electric Company v. Vaughn Brief in Opposition

    No. 80-276

I n  the

Bnpxmx (Emtrt at %  Initpis
October Teem , 1980

W estinghouse E lectric Corporation,
Petitioner,

Christine V aughn  and M arion Gee,
____________  Respondent,

ON 'WRIT OP CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OP APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

J ack  Greenberg 
0 . P eter Sherwood*
Clyde E. Mu rph y  

Suite 2030 
10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019 
(212) 586-8397

J ohn  W alker

1191 First National Bldg. 
Little Rock, Arkansas 72201

Z im m ery  Crutcher, J r .
M ays , Crutcher & B rown 
One Union National Plaza 
Suite 836
Little Kook, Arkansas 72201 

Attorneys for Respondents
'■ Counsel of Record



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Table o f  A u t h o r i t i e s  ............................................ .. i i

Statement o f  the Case ....................... .. 1

Summary o f  Argument . .............. ............................... 3

Argument: Reasons f o r  Denying the Writ . .  4

I .  The P e t i t i o n  f o r  C e r t i o r a r i  
D i s t o r t s  the Record and Mis­
construes  the Holdings o f  the 
Court Below ............................................

I I .  The Eighth C i r c u i t ' s  Holding 
that the Defendant F ai led  to  
F u l f i l l  i t s  Evident iary  Burden o f  
■Art icu lat ing  a Leg it im ate  Non- 
d i s c r im in a to ry  Reason f o r  P la in ­
t i f f ' s  D i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n ,  and, i t s  
A l t e r n a t iv e  Holding that Even i f  
Such Reasons Were Found to  Have 
Been A r t i c u la t e d  the Record 
Supported a Finding that the 
Reasons Were a Pretext  f o r  D is ­
cr im inat ion ,  are Consistent  with
the D ec is ions  o f  th is  Court . . . .  10

I I I .  The Holdings o f  the Eighth C i r ­
c u i t  are Consistent  with the 
D ec is ions  o f  Other C i r c u i t s  ........  17

Conc lusion ................................................................. 23

i -



TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases :

Board o f  Trustees  v ,  Sweeney, 439 U.S. 
24 (1978) .......................... ..........................., 2 ,1 4 ,1 5 ,1 7

Brown v.  Gaston Dyeing Machine C o . ,
457 F .2d 1377 (4th C ir .  1972) 
c e r t ,  denied ,  409 U.S 862 (1972) ,___  8,14

Burdine v.  Texas Dept, o f  Community 
A f f a i r s ,  608 F.2d 563 (5th  C ir .  
1979) c e r t ,  granted 48 U.S.L.W. 
3820 (U.S.  Sup. Ct. June 17,
1980 (No. 79-1764) .  ................... ............., . . .  18

Coleman v .  Missouri  Pac. R. C o . , 622
F .2d 408 (8th  C ir .  1980) . . . . . ___ . . . .  19,21

Furnco C onstruct ion  Corp. v .  Waters,
438 U.S 567 (1978) ......... .................... .. 2 , 1 0 ,1 1 ,1 2 ,

13 ,15,17 ,21

I n te r n a t io n a l  Brotherhood o f  Teamsters 
v.  United S tates ,  431 U.S. 324 
(1977) .......................................................... . 6 ,7

James v.  Newspaper Agency Corp. , 591
F . 2d 579 (10th Cir .  1979) .............. .. . . .  18,21

K entrot i  v. F ro n t ie r  A i r l i n e s ,  I n c . ,
585 F .2d 967 (10th C ir .  1978) ___ ____ 18,20

Loeb v.  Textron ,  I n c . ,  600 F.2d 1003 
(1st  C ir .  1979) ................................... . . . .  18,19

- 11 -



Page

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v .  Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973) ..................................... .. 2 ,1 0 ,17 ,21

Middleton v.  Remington Arms C o . ,  I n c . ,
594 F .2d 1210 (8th C ir .  1979) . . . ____ 10

Patterson  v.  American Tobacco C o . , 586
F.2d 300 (4th  C ir .  1978) .......................... 18,20

Si lberhourn v.  General  Iron  Works C o . ,
584 F .2d 970 (10th C ir .  1978) .............. 17,18

Taylor v.  P h i l ip s  I n d u s tr ie s ,  I n c . ,
593 F . 2d 783 (7th C ir .  1979) ................  18,20

Turner v .  Texas Instruments,  I n c . ,  555
F. 2d 1251, (5th C ir .  1977) .............. .. 18

Vaughn v.  Westinghouse E l e c t r i c  Corp . ,
471 F. Supp. 281 (E.D. Ark.
1979) .....................................................................  passim

Vaughn v.  Westinghouse E l e c t r i c  Corp . ,
620 F .2d 655 (8th C i r .  1980) ............ passim

Whack v .  Peabody & Wind Engineering Co . ,
595 F . 2d 190 (3rd C ir .  1979) ................  18,21

Whiting v.  Jackson State  U n iv ers i ty ,
616 F . 2d 116 (5th C ir .  1980) ................  18,21

S t a t u t e s :

42 U.S.C.  § 2000e et seq.  , T i t l e  
VII o f  the C i v i l  Rights Act o f  
1964, as amended ................................. 1,5



No. 80-276

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

October Term, I960

WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION,

P e t i t i o n e r ,

v.

CHRISTINE VAUGHN and MARION GEE,

Respondent.

On Writ o f  C e r t i o r a r i  to the United States  
Court o f  Appeals f o r  the 

Eighth C i r c u i t

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case presents  quest ions concerning  the 
proper a l l o c a t i o n  o f  the burden o f  producing e v i ­

dence in a lawsuit  brought pursuant to  T i t l e  VII



2

o f  the C i v i l  Rights Act o f  1964, and whether the 

D i s t r i c t  C ou r t 's  o p in ion  in  t h i s  case may be he ld  

to  be c l e a r l y  erroneous .  The Eighth C i r c u i t  he ld  

that the D i s t r i c t  C ou r t 's  op in ion  was co n s i s t e n t  
w i th  the  d e c i s i o n s  o f  t h i s  Court  in  McDonnell  
D oug las  Corp .  v .  G r e e n , 411 U .S .  792 ( 1 9 7 3 ) ;  

Furnco Construct ion  Corp. v .  Waters , 438 U.S. 567 

(1978),  and Board o f  Trustees  v .  Sweeney, 439 U.S. 

24 (1978 ) .  Reviewing the record  and the D i s t r i c t  

C ou r t 's  reason ing ,  the Court o f  Appeals he ld  that 
th e  l ow er  c o u r t  c o r r e c t l y  c o n c l u d e d  t h a t  the  

de fendant,  Westinghouse Corporat ion ,  f a i l e d  to  
meet i t s  burden  o f  a r t i c u l a t i n g  a l e g i t i m a t e  

nondiscr iminatory  reason f o r  the d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n  
o f  the p l a i n t i f f .  Moreover,  the Court o f  Appeals 

noted that even i f  the D i s t r i c t  Court had found 
the  re a s o n s  a r t i c u l a t e d  by W e s t in g h o u s e  t o  be 

l e g i t i m a t e  and n o n d i s c r i m i n a t o r y ,  t h e r e  was 
s u f f i c i e n t  ev idence in the record  to  f ind those 

re a s o n s  t o  be a p r e t e x t  f o r  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n .

The E ig h th  C i r c u i t  d e n i e d  th e  d e f e n d a n t ' s  
p e t i t i o n  f o r  rehearing en banc or by the panel ,  
and the defendant subsequently f i l e d  i t s  p e t i ­
t i o n  For Writ Of C e r t i o r a r i .



SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The p e t i t i o n  f o r  a w r i t  o f  c e r t i o r a r i  should 

be denied f o r  three reasons :  (1 )  The p e t i t i o n e r  
has d i s t o r t e d  the record  and misconstrued the 

hold ings  o f  the Courts below in a manner which 
obscures  the issues  and the f ind ings  in  th i s  c a se ;  

(2 )  The Eighth C i r c u i t ' s  ho ld ing  that in seeking 
t o  r e b u t  t h e  e m p l o y e e ' s  prima f a c i e  c a s e  by 

a r t i c u l a t i n g  a l e g i t i m a t e  n o n d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  
reason ,  the employer bears the burden o f  showing 

by a p r e p o n d e r a n c e  o f  the  e v i d e n c e  tha t  the  
l e g i t im a te  reason e x i s t s  f a c t u a l l y ;  as w e l l  as i t s  

a l t e r n a t iv e  ho ld ing  that even i f  such reasons were 
found to  have been a r t i c u l a t e d ,  the record  sup­

ported  a f in d in g  that the reasons were a pretext  
f o r  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ,  are  c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  the 

d e c i s i o n s  o f  t h i s  Court;  (3 )  The ho ld ings  o f  the 
E igh th  C i r c u i t  a r e  f u l l y  c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  the 

d e c i s i o n s  o f  the o ther  C i r c u i t s .



- 4 -

ARGUMENT

Reasons For Denying The Writ

I .  THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DISTORES THE 
RECORD AND MISCONSTRUES THE HOLDINGS OF THE 
COURT BELOW.

Ignor ing  the f u l l  and accurate  statement o f
the f a c t s  by the two cour ts  below, see 620 F.2d at

656-657 (Pet .  App. B at 2 - 6 ) ; —̂ 471 F. Supp. at
283-290 (Pet .  App. A at 2 - 3 1 ) ,  the p e t i t i o n e r  now

s e r i o u s ly  d i s t o r t s  the re c o rd  and has misconstrued
the hold ings  o f  those Courts in i t s  quest f o r  new

f a c t u a l  f in d in g s  in  t h i s  Court.  This e f f o r t  f a i l s
to re c o g n ize  that t h i s  Court simply does not s i t

to  r e s o l v e  d isputed i s su es  o f  f a c t .
F i r s t ,  f o l l o w in g  a t r i a l  t o  the Court o f  f i v e

2/days, the D i s t r i c t  Court— c a r e f u l l y  considered  
the ev idence  be fo re  i t  and concluded that " .  . .

1/ C i ta t io n s  in t h i s  form r e f e r  to  the appendix 
to  the p e t i t i o n .

2 /  The H o n o r a b le  R i c h a r d  S. A r n o ld ,  United  
S t a t e s  D i s t r i c t  Court  Judge  f o r  the  E a s te r n  
D i s t r i c t  o f  Arkansas,  assumed the o f f i c e  o f  Judge 
o f  th e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  Court  o f  Appeals  f o r  the  
Eighth C i r c u i t  on March 7, 1980.



5

the p roo f  i s  more than s u f f i c i e n t  to e s t a b l i s h  a 
prima f a c i e  c a s e " .  471 F. Supp. at 284 (Pet .  Ap. 

A at 5 ) .  In support o f  t h i s  c o n c lu s io n  the Court 
noted a wealth o f  ev idence ,  in c lu d in g  the h igh ly  

c r e d i b l e  testimony o f  Ms. Wilma Donley,  id .  at 285 
(Pet .  App. at 9 - 1 2 ) ;  a c a r e f u l  c o n s id e r a t io n  o f  

the testimony o f  p l a i n t i f f  Vaughn and the defen­
d a n t ' s  w i tn e s s e s ,  i d . at 289-290 (Pet .  App. A at 

) ;  a review o f  the e x h i b i t s ,  id .  at 289; and a 
v i s i t  to the Westinghouse plant by the Court,  id .  

at 287; as w e l l  as a h igh ly  persuasive  s t a t i s t i c a l  
case  p o in t in g  to  the d is c r im in a tory  p r a c t i c e s  o f  

the defendant ,  and concluded that the defendant 
had :

. . . simply f a i l e d  to  persuade t h i s  Court
that  i t s  p r o o f  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  overcome 
p l a i n t f f ' s  prima f a c i e  case with respect  to
Ms. Vaughn's d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n .

471 F. Supp. at 290 (Pet .  App. A at 30) .
For example, the evidence demonstrated that

th e  d e fe n d a n t  had a h i s t o r y  o f  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n
3/

go ing back to  the e f f e c t i v e  date  o f  T i t l e  V I I .—

3/  July 2, 1965.



6

The Court found that at that t ime, " . . .  almost 

no b lacks  were employed by the defendant Westing-  
house" .  Id_. at 284 (Pet .  App. A at 5 ) .  Simi­

l a r l y ,  n o t i n g  t h a t  the  s i t u a t i o n  had changed  
r a t h e r  s l o w l y ,  t h e  C our t  went on t o  f i n d  tha t  

presen t ly  only 3 o f  22 o f f i c e  and c l e r i c a l  em­
p l o y e e s  were  b l a c k ;  no b l a c k s  had e v e r  been 

employed as superv isors  in the d e fend ant ' s  o f f i c e  
f o r c e ;  on ly  2 o f  25 or 26 superv isors  who he ld  

e n t r y - l e v e l  management jobs  were b la c k ;  and that 
w h i l e  the  d e f e n d a n t ' s  o v e r a l l  w o r k - f o r c e  was 

roughly re p r e s e n t a t iv e  o f  the p r o p o r t i o n  o f  b lacks  
and whites  in  the re levant  popu la t ion ,  b lacks  were 

a lm os t  e x c l u s i v e l y  c o n c e n t r a t e d  in  p r o d u c t i o n  
j o b s ,  "which are lower paying" .  Id.  at 284 (Pet.  

A at 6 ) .
S i m i l a r l y  t e l l i n g  was the  C o u r t ' s  f i n d i n g  

that g iven  the high number o f  b lacks  applying f o r  
jobs  at Westinghouse; the d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e ly  low 

numbers o f  b lacks  ob ta in in g  p o s i t i o n s ;  and the 
i n a b i l i t y  o f  the d e fen d an t ' s  personnel  manager to 

exp la in  these f i g u r e s ;  " [T ]h e  in fe r en ce  i s  very  
s t r o n g  in d e e d  tha t  the number o f  b l a c k  p e o p l e  

h i red  i s  being a r t i f i c i a l l y  depressed" .  Id.  at 
284 (Pet .  App. A at 7 ) .  Accord,  In te r n at io n a l



7

Brotherhood o f  Teamsters v.  United S t a t e s , 431 U.S. 

324, 339, n . 20 (1977).

The C o u r t ' s  o p i n i o n  g o e s  on t o  c i t e  a d d i ­
t i o n a l  s t a t i s t i c a l  evidence  support ive  o f  p l a in ­

t i f f ' s  p a r t i c u l a r  cla im, in c lu d in g  the fa c t  that 
o f  65 persons discharged between 1972 and 1978, 39 

or 60% were b la c k ,  "a f i g u r e  fa r  above the o v e r a l l
p ro p o r t i o n  o f  b lack  employees,  which now i s  at a

4 /high o f  about 24 or 25%."— I d . at 285 (Pet .  A 

at 9 ) .  <3,.__
^  -- \  J 0  a  j  i  Q «- v i v O-

In the context  o f  t h i s  type o f  s t a t i s t i c a l  
data the Court s u c c i n c t l y  expressed i t s  view with 

resp ec t  t o  the fa c t  that no s p e c i f i c  q u a l i f i c a ­

t i o n s  had been set out by the employer f o r  e i th e r  

p r o d u c t i o n - l i n e  jobs  or  superv isory  jo b s .

S u b je c t iv e  c r i t e r i a  f o r  employment are 
not i l l e g a l  in themselves but the fa c t  that 
an employer has continued to  use them, with 
the danger o f  d i sp a ra te  treatment that they 
e n t a i l ,  i s  a f a c t o r  to  be considered .

4 /  See 471 F.  Supp.  at 284 -1 8 5  ( P e t .  App. A 
at 7-9)  f o r  a d d i t io n a l  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  the r a c i a l  
s t r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f  the  d e f e n d a n t ' s  w o r k f o r c e .



- 8 -

471 F. Supp. at 285 (P et .  App. A at 9 ) . —/

The d e fe n d an t ' s  p e t i t i o n  r e l i e s  on the not ion  
that the C our t [s ]  below required  the defendant to 

e s t a b l i s h  " o b j e c t i v e  standards"  f o r  d i s q u a l i f i c a ­

t i o n  o f  employees as a p r e r e q u i s i t e  to  meeting i t s  

burden o f  " a r t i c u l a t i n g  a nondiscr iminatory  re a ­

son"  f o r  the d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n  o f  the p l a i n t i f f .  
However,  n e i t h e r  o f  the  C ou r ts  b e l o w  imposed 

such a requirement.  In fa c t  the D i s t r i c t  Court 

s p e c i f i c a l l y  r e j e c t e d  such a c o u r s e ,  s e e  471 

F. Supp. at 291. (Pet .  App. A at 33 ) ,  and the 

Court o f  Appeals made no mention o f  such a stan­

da rd .  R a t h e r ,  b o t h  C o u r t s  fou n d  t h a t  in  l i g h t  
o f  the s t a t i s t i c a l  and documentary ev idence ,  and 

the c o n f l i c t i n g  nature o f  testimony o f f e r e d  at 
t r i a l ,  th e  d e f e n d a n t s  d i s p u t e d  s t a te m e n t s  r e ­

g a r d i n g  p l a i n t i f f ' s  p oor  p r o d u c t i o n  d id  not 
s u f f i c e  t o  overcome p l a i n t i f f ' s  strong prima f a c i e  

case .

5 /  Compare Brown v.  Gaston County Dyeing Machine 
Co. , 457 F . 2d 1377, 1383 (4th Cir.  1972) c e r t , 
denied 409 U.S. 862 (1972) " . . .  [ t ]h e  lack o f  
o b j e c t  i v e  g u i d e l i n e s  f o r  h i r i n g  and p r o m o t i o n  
and the f a i l u r e  to  post  n o t i c e s  o f  job  vacancies  
are badges o f  d i s c r im in a t i o n  that serve to c o r ­
robora te ,  not to  rebut ,  the r a c i a l  b ias  p ic tured  
by the s t a t i s t i c a l  p a t t e r n  o f  the  com pany 's  
work force .  "



9

This
C i r c u i t  at

v iew  i s  
620 F .2d

w e l l - s  t a t e d  
at 660 (Pet.

by the  E ig h th
App. B at 16) :

[w]e in te r p r e t  the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s  d e c i s i o n ,  
as c l a r i f i e d  by i t s  May 23, 1979, o rd er ,  t o  
s t a t e  t h a t  a l th o u g h  r e a s o n s  were  a r t i c u ­
l a t e d ,  i  ■ e . , p o o r  p r o d u c t i o n ,  g i v e n  the 
o p p o s i n g  e v i d e n c e  concern ing  product ion  and 
the absence o f  o b j e c t i v e  prod uct ion  c r i t e r i a ,  
W e s t in g h o u s e  f a i l e d  t o  d e m o n s t r a te  the  
l e t i t i m a c y  o f  i t s  a r t i c u l a t e d  r e a s o n  by a 
p r e p o n d e r a n c e  . . . ' A f f i r m a t i o n s  o f  good 
f a i t h  in  making i n d i v i d u a l  s e l e c t i o n s  are 
i n s u f f i c i e n t  t o  d i s p e l  a pr ima f a c i e  case  
o f  s y s t e m a t i c  e x c l u s i o n . '  I n t e r n a t  i o n a l  
B r o th e r h o o d  o f  T eam sters  v .  United S tates ,  
431 U.S 3 2 4 ,  343  n . 24 ( 1 9 7 7 )  ( q u o t i n g  
A le x a n d e r  v .  L o u i s i a n a , 405 U .S .  625 ,  632 
(9172).  (emphasis added)

Thus,  th e  p e t i t i o n  d i s t o r t s  the  r e c o r d  by 
f a i l i n g  t o  a d e q u a t e l y  in f o r m  t h e  Court  o f  the  
bas is  f o r  the lower C o u r t ' s  ho ld ing  and further  

misconstrues  that ho ld ing  by erroneously  a s s e r t in g  
the  a d d i t i o n  o f  c a t e g o r i c a l  burdens  w hich  the  

Court did not impose.



10

I I .  IN HOLDING THAT THE DEFENDANT FAILED TO 
FULFILL ITS EVIDENTIARY BURDEN OF ARTICULA­
TING A LEGITIMATE NON-DISCRIMINATORY REASON 
FOR PLAINTIFF'S DISQUALIFICATION, AND, THAT 
EVEN IF SUCH REASONS HAD BEEN ARTICULATED 
THE RECORD SUPPORTED A FINDING THAT THE 
REASONS WERE A PRETEXT FOR DISCRIMINATION, 
THE DECISION OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT IS CON­
SISTENT WITH THE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT.

The Eighth C i r c u i t  he ld  that in seeking to  
rebut the employee's  prima f a c i e  case by a r t i c u ­

l a t i n g  a l e g i t i m a t e  n o n d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  r e a s o n ,  
" [T ]h e  employer bears the burden o f  showing by a 
preponderance o f  the ev idence  that the le g i t im a te  

reason e x i s t s  f a c t u a l l y . "  620 F.2d at 649 (Pet.  

App. B at 1 3 ) .  The Court  t h e r e f o r e  a d d r e s s e d  
i t s e l f  t o  the s p e c i f i c  e v id en t iary  showing n eces ­

sary in  order  to  comply with th is  C ou r t 's  pre ­
s c r i p t i o n  th a t  the  e m p loy er  " a r t i c u l a t e  some 

l e g i t i m a t e ,  n o n d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  r e a s o n  f o r  the  
employee 's  r e j e c t i o n . "  McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.  
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).

In Furnco Construct ion  Corp. v.  Waters, 438 

U.S. 567 (1978),  t h i s  Court addressed the issue
o f  the nature o f  evidence necessary  to  rebut a 

prima f a c i e  case .  There can be no d ispute  that



11

the d e c i s i o n  in Furnco, expressed  the view that 
the a r t i c u l a t i o n  o f  a l e g i t im a te  n o n d i s c r m in a t o r y  

reason was synonymous with o f f e r i n g  p r o o f  as to  
that reason.

When the prima f a c i e  case i s  understood in 
the l i g h t  o f  the o p in io n  in McDonnell 
D o u g l a s , i t  i s  ap p aren t  t h a t  the  burden 
which  s h i f t s  t o  the  e m p loy er  i s  m ere ly  
t h a t  o f  p r o v i n g  t h a t  he based  h i s  em ploy ­
ment d e c i s i o n  on a l e g i t i m a t e  c o n s i d e r a ­
t i o n ,  and not  on an i l l e g i t i m a t e  one such 
as race .

Furnco Construct ion  Corp. v.  Waters, supra, 438
U.S. at 577.

The e s s e n t i a l  f law in  the d e fend ant ' s  p e t i ­
t i o n  i s  i t s  c o n t e n t i o n  tha t  the  mere a s s e r ­

t i o n  o f  a p r o p o s e d  r e a s o n  i s ,  i n  e v e r y  c a s e ,  
s u f f i c i e n t  to  rebut the prima f a c i e  case .  Nothing 

in  Furnco  s u p p o r t s  such  a v i e w .  Indeed  t h e r e  
are few i f  any s i m i l a r i t i e s  between Furnco and the 

c a s e  at b a r .  For exam ple ,  p e t i t i o n e r  a s s e r t s  
that s in ce  the Court in Furnco, re fused  t o  i n ­

v a l i d a t e  the s u p e r i n t e n d e n t ' s  e v a l u a t i o n  f o r  
s e l e c t i o n  o f  b r i c k l a y e r s ,  that the s u p e r v i s o r ' s  

disputed eva luat ion ,  should have been s u f f i c i e n t  
in Vaughn to  rebut the p l a i n t i f f ' s  prima f a c i e



- 12 -

c a s e .  T h i s  v iew  w h o l l y  i g n o r e s ,  h o w e v e r ,  th e  
f a c t  t h a t  i n  F u r n c o , t h e r e  was s u b s t a n t i a l  

s t a t i s t i c a l  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  th e  e m p l o y e r ' s  work 
f o r c e  was r a c i a l l y  balanced and that t h e re fo re  

t h e r e  was l i t t l e  i f  any a d v e r s e  impact  as a 
r e s u l t  o f  the employer 's  p r a c t i c e s .

P r o o f  t h a t  h i s  work f o r c e  was r a c i a l l y  
balanced or that i t  contained a d i s p r o p o r ­
t i o n a t e l y  h ig h  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  m i n o r i t y  em­
p l o y e e s  i s  not  w h o l l y  i r r e l e v a n t  on the 
i s s u e  o f  i n t e n t  when t h a t  i s s u e  i s  y e t  
t o  be d e c i d e d .  We ca n n ot  say th a t  such 
p r o o f  w ou ld  have a b s o l u t e l y  no p r o b a t i v e  
va lue in determining whether the otherwise  
u n e x p l a i n e d  r e j e c t i o n  o f  t h e  m i n o r i t y  
a p p l i ca n ts  was d i s c r i m i n a t o r i l y  motivated.

Furnco Construct ion  Corp. v .  Waters, supra, 438 

U.S. at 580.
In Vaughn, however,  the s t a t i s t i c s  po inted to  

e x a c t l y  the  o p p o s i t e  c o n c l u s i o n .  Here ,  the  

"p rob a t iv e  va lu e "  o f  such s t a t i s t i c s  was suppor­
t i v e  o f  p l a i n t i f f ' s  c o n ten t ion  that the employer 's  
d e c i s i o n s  were  the  r e s u l t  o f  r a c i a l  animus.

I t  f o l l o w s ,  that  whi le  in Furnco, faced with 

s t a t i s t i c a l  data in d i c a t in g  a r a c i a l l y  balanced 
work f o r c e ,  the Court re fused  to  in v a l id a t e  the 

employer 's  s u b je c t i v e  h i r in g  c r i t e r i a ;  Vaughn,



13

o f f e r s  the contrary  s i t u a t i o n  in  which s u b je c t i v e

c r i t e r i a l  are  c o u p l e d  w i t h  g r o s s  e v i d e n c e  o f
6 /d i s p a r a t e  t r e a t m e n t . — Vaughn v .  W e s t m g h o u s e  

E l e c t r i c  Corp. ,  supra , 471 F. supp. at 825 (Pet.  

App. A at 9 ) .
In Furnco , t h i s  Court r e j e c t e d  the Court o f  

Appeals c r i t i c i s m  o f  the employer 's  e f f o r t  t o  use 
s t a t i s t i c s  in  t h i s  type  o f  case ,  "once  a McDonnell 

Douglas prima f a c i e  showing had been made o u t . "  
Id.  at 579. In ho ld ing  that such p roo f  i s  proba­

t i v e  i n  r e b u t t i n g  th e  prima f a c i e  c a s e ,  the  
Court im p l ied ly  a sse r ts  the n e c e s s i t y  o f  putt ing  

f o r t h  some evidence  in support o f  the le g i t im a te  
reason a sser ted  by the employer.

Contrary to  the a s s e r t i o n s  o f  the defendant,  
the Eighth C i r c u i t  in Vaughn has made no e f f o r t  to  
"add requirements to  the e s ta b l i sh e d  t e s t s  set  out 
by t h i s  C o u r t . "  Pet.  at 12.

Rather,  the Court below merely confirmed that 
in  the fa ce  o f  the s t a t i s t i c a l ,  t e s t im on ia l  and

6/  Moreover as s tated  supra, the Court below did 
n o t  i n v a l i d a t e  the  d e f e n d a n t s  p r a c t i c e s ,  but 
merely held  that the evidence presented by the 
defendant was i n s u f f i c i e n t  to  rebut p l a i n t i f f ' s  
prima f a c i e  c a s e .  620 F .2d  at 6 5 9 -6 6 0  ( P e t .  
App. B at 15-16 ).



14 -

documentary ev idence  on the re c o r d ,  the D i s t r i c t  

Court was c o r r e c t  in  ho ld ing  that the d isputed 
testimony o f  the d e fen d an t ' s  witnesses  was not 

s u f f i c i e n t  to rebut p l a i n t i f f ' s  prima f a c i e  case .  
The primary s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  the lack  o f  o b j e c t i v e  

standards in  Vaughn, was that given the wealth o f  
e v i d e n c e - s t a t i s t i c a l ,  t e s t im o n ia l  and documentary­

support ing  p l a i n t i f f ' s  case ,  the lack  o f  o b j e c t i v e  

s t a n d a r d s  was an a d d i t i o n a l  f a c t o r  s e r v i n g  t o  
co r r o b o r a te  rather  than rebut p l a i n t i f f ' s  prima 

f a c i e  case— which made the d e fen d an t ' s  attempts 

at r e b u t t a l  le s s  c r e d i b l e .
Further support o f  the Eighth C i r c u i t  op in ion  

i s  found in Board o f  Trustees  v.  Sweeney, 439 U.S. 

24 (1978).  There both the m a jo r i ty  and d i s s e n t in g  
op in ions  were in agreement as to  the employer 's  

burden to  "p rod u ce [s ]  ev idence  o f  l e g i t im a te  non- 
d is c r im in a tory  reasons"  f o r  h is  a c t i o n .  I d . at 

26.
In l i t i g a t i o n  the only way a defendant can
' a r t i c u l a t e '  the reason f o r  h is  a c t i o n  i s  by
a d d u c in g  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  e x p l a i n s  what he
had done.

7/  See Brown v .  Gaston County Dyeing Machine Co. , 
supra,  46 /  F .2d at 13b3.



15

Board o f  Trustees v.  Sweeney, supra , 439 U.S.  at 
28 (Stewart ,  J. d i s s e n t i n g ) .

The m a j o r i t y ' s  concern in Sweeney was that ,
rather  than requ ir in g  p r o o f  as to  the le g i t im a te

n o n d i s r i m i n a t o r y  r e a s o n s  f o r  the  e m p l o y e r ' s
a c t i o n s ,  the Court there  may have required  the

d e fe n d a n t  t o  " p r o v e  a b s e n c e  o f  d i s c r i m i n a t o r y
m o t iv e . "  Id .  at 24. In Vaughn, no such r e q u i r e -

8/
ment was made o f  the  d e f e n d a n t . — I t  f o l l o w s  
from Sweeney and Furnco that the i ssue  i s  whether 

t h e r e  has '  been  a " c r e d i b l e "  a r t i c u l a t i o n  o f  a 
l e g i t i m a t e  r e a s o n  f o r  the  e m p l o y e r ' s  a c t i o n s .  

However, i f  as in  Vaughn, the evidence in support 
o f  t h i s  reason i s  not c r e d i b l e ,  then the D i s t r i c t  

Court has the power to  r e j e c t  i t  and ho ld  that the 
d e f e n d a n t  has f a i l e d  to  meet h i s  burden  o f  

a r t i c u l a t i n g  a l e g i t i m a t e  n o n d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  
reason.

S i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  in  Vaughn, the Eighth C ir c u i t  
n o t e s  t h a t  t h e r e  was s i f f i c i e n t  e v i d e n c e  on 

the record  to  ho ld  that even i f  the defendant had

8 /  Vaughn v.  West inghouse E l e c t r i c  Corp. ,  supra , 
F20 F.2d at 6b8-bt>0.



16

been  found  t o  have  a r t i c u l a t e d  a l e g i t i m a t e  

nondiscr iminatory  reason ,  the evidence  adduced at 

t r i a l  was s u f f i c i e n t  t o  e s t a b l i s h  those  reasons as 

p re te x tu a l .
I t  should be noted tha t ,  i f  requ ired ,  

much o f  th e  e v i d e n c e  used  by the  d i s t r i c t  
court  in  f in d in g  a prima f a c i e  case  might go 
to  whether the employer 's  a r t i c u l a t e d  reason 
i s  p r e t e x t u a l .  McDonnell Douglas s ta te s  the 
s t a t i s t i c a l  evidence  submitted by p l a i n t i f f s  
i s  h e l p f u l  in  showing  p r e t e x t .  So would  
testimony o f  Vaughn and others  r e l a t i n g  to  
in d iv id u a l  instances  o f  d i s c r im in a t i o n .  Thus 
th e  d i s t r i c t  c o u r t  i n  the  p r e s e n t  c a s e  
a l t e r n a t i v e l y  cou ld  have found the reasons 
a r t i c u l a t e d  by Westinghouse to  be l e g i t im a t e  
and n o n d i s c r i m i n a t o r y ,  but  based  on the  
s t a t i s t i c a l  e v i d e n c e ,  t e s t i m o n y ,  and l a c k  
o f  o b j e c t i v e  p r o d u c t i o n  s t a n d a r d s ,  th e  
reasons t o  be a pre tex t  f o r  d i s c r im in a t io n .  
As noted by the Third C i r c u i t ,

[T jhere are no hard and fa s t  ru les  as to 
what e v i d e n c e  must be  c o n s i d e r e d  as 
c o n s t i t u t i n g  a prima f a c i e  case and what 
ev idece  i s  needed in order  to  e s t a b l i s h  
a p r e t e x t .  M o s t  i m p o r t a n t l y ,  t h e  
u l t i m a t e  b u r d e n  o f  p e r s u a d i n g  t h e  
f a c t f i n d e r  that there  has been i l l e g a l  
d i s c r im in a t io n  re s id e s  always with the 
p l a i n t i f f .  We w i l l  thus r e v i e w  the  
judgment o f  the d i s t r i c t  court  not with 
an eye to  s t r i c t  adherence to  form, but 
i n  o r d e r  t o  d e t e r m i n e  w h e t h e r  t h e



17

d e c i s i o n  on the merits o f  p l a i n t i f f ' s  
case is  c l e a r l y  erroneous  on the f a c t s ,  
o r  u n c o n g e n i a l  t o  p r e v i o u s l y  enun­
c ia t e d  l e g a l  standards.  Whack v.  Pea- 
body & Wind Engineering C o . ,  595 F.2d 
T90^ 193 (3d  C i r . 19 79) ( f o o t n o t e s
o m i t t e d ) .

Vaughn v.  Westinghouse E l e c t r i c  Corp. , supra , 620 

F. 2d at 660 n . 4.
In Vaughn, the Court below merely appl ied  the 

standard a r t i c u l a t e d  by t h i s  Court in McDonnell 

Douglas v.  Green, supra ; Furnco Construct ion  Corp. 
v.  Waters,- supra, and Board o f  Trustees v.  Sweeney, 

supra,  and determined that the defendant f a i l e d  
to  o f f e r  s u f f i c i e n t  e v i d e n c e  th a t  th e  s t a t e d  

l e g i t im a t e  reason f o r  i t s  a c t i o n  e x i s t e d  fa c t u ­
a l l y .  See Turner v .  Texas I n s t r u m e n t s ,  I n c . ,  

555 F . 2d 1251, 1255-56 (5th Cir.  1977);  S i l b e r -
h orn  v .  G e n e ra l  I r o n  Works Co_. , 584 F . 2d 970

(10th C ir .  1978).

I I I .  THE HOLDING OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUT IS CONSIS­
TENT WITH THE DECISIONS OF OTHER CIRCUITS

The Court in Vaughn did not requ ire  that the 
defendant e s t a b l i s h  o b j e c t i v e  c r i t e r i a ;  nor did 

the Court ho ld  that absent such o b j e c t i v e  c r i t e r i a



18

that the defendant cou ld  never,  under any circum­
stan ces ,  rebut a prima f a c i e  case based on d i s ­

q u a l i f i c a t i o n .  Rather the Court simply he ld  that 
on the b a s i s  o f  t h i s  r e c o r d ,  g iven  the strength 

o f  p l a i n t i f f ' s  prima f a c i e  c a s e ,  s u p p o r t e d  by 

s t a t i s t i c a l ,  t e s t im o n ia l  and documentary p r o o f ,  

th e  a b s e n c e  o f  such o b j e c t i v e  c r i t e r i a  was a 
" f a c t o r  t o  be co n s id e r e d "  Vaughn v ,  Westinghouse 

E l e c . Corp. , supra , 471 F. Supp. 285.
I t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  th e  d e c i s i o n  o f  th e  Court  

below i s  f u l l y  consonant with each o f  the a s s e r -  
t e d ly  c o n f l i c t i n g  d e c i s i o n s  c i t e d  by the p e t i t i o n e r  

See Loeb v . Textron,  I n c . ,  600 F.2d 1003 (1st  C ir .  
1979) ;  Whiting v.  Jackson State  U n i v e r s i t y , 616 

F.2d 116 (5th Cir .  1980);  Burdine v.  Texas Dept.
° f  Community A f f a i r s , 608 F . 2d 563 ( 5 t h  C i r .  

1979) c e r t .  granted;  Siberhorn v.  General Iron 

Works C o . , 584 F.2d 970 (10th C ir .  1978);  Kentrot i  
v.  F ront ier  A i r l i n e s ,  I n c . ,  585 F.2d 967 (10th

Cir .  1978);  James v .  Newspaper Agency Corp. , 591

F.2d 579 (10th Cir .  1979) ;  Patterson  v.  American 
T o b a c c o  C o . ,  586 F .2 d  300 ( 4 t h  C i r .  1 9 7 8 ) ;  

T a y l o r  v .  P h i l i p s  I n d u s t r i e s ,  I n c . ,  593 F .2d

783 (7 th  C i r .  1 9 7 9 ) ;  Whack v .  Peabody  & Wind



19

Engineering Co. , 595 F.2d 190 (3rd C ir .  1979);
Coleman v .  M i s s o u r i  P ac .  R. C o . ,  622 F .2 d  408 

(8 t h  C i r .  1 9 8 0 ) ;  M i d d l e t o n  v .  Remington Arms 

Co . ,  I n c . ,  594 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir .  1979).

For example, there  i s  nothing in  Loeb 
v.  Textron ,  I n c . , supra, which c o n t r a d i c t s  the 

Eighth C i r c u i t ' s  ho ld ing  that :
The em p loyer  b e a r s  t h e  burden  o f  showing 
by a p r e p o n d e r a n c e  o f  the  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  
the  l e g i t i m a t e  r e a s o n  e x i s t s  f a c t u a l l y .

Vaughn v.- W e s t in g h o u s e  E l e c t r i c  C o r p . , s u p r a , 
620 F .2d  at 659.  Ind eed  the  F i r s t  C i r c u i t  in  

L oeb ,  p a i n s t a k i n g l y  p o i n t s  out  t h a t  the em­

p l o y e r  has a "b u r d e n  o f  p r o d u c t i o n "  w hich  i s  
met by a d e f e n s e  d e s i g n e d  t o  meet the  prima 

f a c i e  case  and which,
must be s u f f i c i e n t , on i t s  fa ce ,  to  ' r e b u t '  
or ' d i s p e l '  the in fe r e n ce  o f  d i s c r im in a t io n  
t h a t  a r i s e s  from p r o o f  o f  th e  prima f a c i e  
case .  (emphasis added)

Loeb v.  Textron,  I n c . , supra, 600 F.2d at 1011 — 

1012, n . 5.
The reasonableness  o f  the employer 's  reasons 
may o f  course  be probat ive  o f  whether they 
are p r e t e x t s .  The more i d o s y n c r a t i c  or 
q u e s t i o n a b l e  th e  e m p l o y e r ' s  r e a s o n ,  the  
e a s ie r  i t  w i l l  be to  expose i t  as a p re te x t ,  
i f  indeed i t  i s  one.



- 20

I d . at 1012, n .6 .

In each o f  the cases c i t e d  by p e t i t i o n e r s  in
w hich  the  e m p l o y e r ' s  bu rden  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  i s  

9 /d i s c u s s e d — th e  Court  i n v a r i a b l y  d i s c u s s e d  the  
p r o o f  o r  lack o f  p r o o f  presented  by the employer 

t o  s u p p o r t  th e  s t a t e d  r e a s o n  f o r  i t s  a c t i o n .
Thus, t o  frame the q uest ion  in terms o f  the 

r e q u i r e m e n t  f o r  " o b j e c t i v e  c r i t e r i a "  as p e t i ­
t i o n e r  attempts h ere ,  p l a i n l y  misses the po int  o f  

the d e c i s i o n s  o f  t h i s  Court and the C i r c u i t s  which 
have cons idered  the i s su e .  A l l  that is  required ,  

and i t  i s  requ ired  by each o f  these  d e c i s i o n s ,  i s  
t h a t  t h e r e  be come e v i d e n c e  t h a t  the  a s s e r t e d  

r e a s o n  e x i s t s  f a c t u a l l y .  Thus i f  the  a s e r t e d  
reason  f o r  a d ischarge  i s  that the employee abused 

the s i ck  leave p o l i c y ,  Taylor v .  P h i l ip s  Indus- 
r i e s ,  I n c . , supra , the Court may proper ly  expect 

to r e c e iv e  ev idence  as to  whether o ther  employees 
were s im i la r ly  t rea ted  f o r  s im i la r  abuses. See 

id .  at 786. And i f  the employee was not allowed

9/  Kentrot i  v.  Front ier  A i r l i n e s ,  I n c . , supra ; 
and P a t t e r s o n  v .  American T o b a c c o  Co . , s u p r a , 
o f f e r  no d i s c u s s i o n  o f  th i s  i s sue .



21

to  f i l l  a c e r t a i n  v a c a n c y ,  James v .  Newspaper 
Agency Corp. , supra , the Court may proper ly  expect 

to r e c e iv e  ev idence  that the p o s i t i o n  was never 
a v a i l a b l e .  See i d .  a t  583.  S i m i l a r l y ,  i f  the  

employee was d i s q u a l i f i e d  Coleman v.  Missouri  Pac . 
R. Co. , supra, the Court may proper ly  expect to  

r e c e iv e  ev idence  regarding the comparative q u a l i ­
f i c a t i o n s  o f  those  employees not d i s q u a l i f i e d .  

See id .  at 409.
The c l e a r  import o f  these  d e c i s i o n s  i s  that

n e i th er  the Eighth C i r c u i t ' s  op in ion  in Vaughn,
nor the op in ions  o f  t h i s  Court requ ire  a s p e c i f i c

type o f  p roo f  in order  to  rebut the prima f a c i e
‘ 1 0 /

case.-—  Rather,  given the p a r t i c u l a r  f a c t s  o f  a
p a r t i c u l a r  case a d i f f e r e n t  type o f  p roo f  may be

. 11/a p p r o p r ia te .—

The E ig h th  C i r c u i t  c a r e f u l l y  r e v i e w e d  the  
r e c o r d  in  t h i s  c a s e  and d e te r m in e d  th a t  t h i s

10 /  In F u r n c o , f o r  example the  c o m p a r a t iv e  
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  o f  the employees not h i red  was not 
an issue  as the defendant conceded that they were 
q u a l i f i e d .

11/ See g e n e r a l l y ,  McDonnell Douglas v.  Green, 
supra, 411 U.S at 802, n .1 3 ;  Whack v.  Peabody & 
Wind Engineering Co. , supra, 595 F.2d at 193 and 
nT 8.



22

C o u r t ' s  p r e s c r i p t i o n s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  the  em­

p l o y e r ’ s burden o f  producing  evidence  once a prima 
f a c i e  case  o f  employer d i s c r im in a t io n  has been 

e s ta b l i s h e d  were fo l l ow ed  by the D i s t r i c t  Court.  
Thus,  the  E ig h th  C i r c u i t  found th a t  t h e r e  was 

s u f f i c i e n t  ev idence  in  the record  to  support the 
D i s t r i c t  C ou r t 's  view that the de fendant ,  West ing-  

house,  f a i l e d  to  a r t i c u l a t e  a l e g i t im a t e  reason 
f o r  Vaughn's d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n ,  and, even i f  such 

a reason  were found to  have been a r t i c u l a t e d ,  the 
ev idence ,  taken as a whole,  was s u f f i c i e n t  to  hold  

the reasons to  be p r e te x tu a l .



23

CONCLUSION

For the fo r e g o in g  reasons ,  the p e t i t i o n  f o r  

a w r i t  o f  c e r t i o r a r i  should be denied.

R e s p e c t f u l l y  submitted,

JACK GREENBERG *
0. PETER SHERWOOD 
CLYDE E. MURPHY 

Suite  2030 
10 Columbus C i r c l e  
New York,  New York 10019 
(212) 586-8397

JOHN WALKER
1191 F i r s t  National  Bldg.  
L i t t l e  Rock, Arkansas 72201

ZIMMERY CHUTCHER, JR.
Mays, Crutcher & Brown 
One Union National Plaza 
Suite 836
L i t t l e  Rock, Arkansas 72201 

ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENTS
*

Counsel  o f  Record



MEUEN PRESS !NC. —  H. Y. C. *f*gg*» 219