Fusilier v. Landry Appellees' Record Excerpts

    Mnitrii States Court of Appeals
for the

ififtli Circuit

Case No. 19-30665

VINCENT FUSILIER, SR., Reverend; LIONEL MYERS; 
WENDELL DESMOND SHELBY, JR.; DANIEL TURNER, 

TERREBONNE PARISH BRANCH NAACP,

Plaintiffs-A ppellees,

v.

JEFFREY MARTIN LANDRY, Esq., Attorney General 
for the State of Louisiana, in his official capacity,

Defendant-Appellant.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA, BATON ROUGE

APPELLEES’ RECORD EXCERPTS

L e a h  C. A d e n  
J a n a i S . N e l s o n  
S a m u e l  S p it a l  
NAACP L e g a l  D e f e n s e  

&  E d u c a t io n a l  F u n d , In c .
40 Rector Street, 5th Floor 
New York, New York 10006 
(212)965-2200 
laden@naacpldf.org

-  and -

M ic h a e l e  T u r n a g e  Y o u n g  
NAACP L e g a l  D e f e n s e  

&  E d u c a t io n a l  F u n d , In c .
700 14lh Street N.W., Suite 600 
Washington, DC 20005 
(202)682-1300 
mturnageyoung@naacpldf.org

Attorneys fo r

R o n a l d  L a w r e n c e  W il s o n

701 Poydras Street
One Shell Square
New Orleans, Louisiana 70139
(504)525-4361
cabral2@aol.com

-  and -

M ic h a e l  B. d e  L e e u w  
W il l ia m  A a r o n  L e s s e r  
C o z e n  O ’C o n n o r  
45 Broadway, Suite 1600 
New York, New York 10006 
(212) 509-9400 
mdeleeuw@cozen.com 
wlesser@cozen.com

Plaintiffs-A ppellees

mailto:laden@naacpldf.org
mailto:mturnageyoung@naacpldf.org
mailto:cabral2@aol.com
mailto:mdeleeuw@cozen.com
mailto:wlesser@cozen.com


TABLE OF CONTENTS

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R O A .2 1 548- 
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P la in tif fs ’ S u p p lem en ta l 
M em o ran d u m  in R esp o n se  
to  th is  C o u r t’s O rd e rs  
(D o cs. 138, 165) 
R eg a rd in g  P ro p e r P arties , 
d a ted  N o v e m b e r 1 9 ,2 0 1 5

RE-1 -  R E -1 1 1

R O A .2 1 860-71 R u lin g  on D e fe n d a n ts ’ 
M o tio n s  to  D ism iss , d a ted  
D e ce m b e r 8, 2015

R E - 1 2 - R E - 2 3 2

R O A .3016 1 -6 5 O rd e r C o n d itio n a lly  
A p p o in tin g  S pec ia l M aste r, 
d a ted  M arch  15, 2 0 1 9

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R O A .3 0 5 13-20 P la in tif fs ’ R esp o n se  to  
D e fe n d a n ts ’ R esp ec tiv e  
M em o ran d a  R eg a rd in g  
S pecia l M a s te r’s R ep o rt 
and  R eco m m en d ed  
R em ed y , da ted  
Ju n e  4 , 2019

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V



Case 3:14-cv-00069-SDD Document 169-1 11/23/15 Page 1 of 11

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

TERREBONNE PARISH BRANCH NAACP, et 
al.,

Plaintiffs,
Civil Action. No. 3:14-cv-69-JJB-SCR

PIYUSH (“BOBBY”) JINDAL, the GOVERNOR 
of the STATE OF LOUISIANA, in his official 
capacity, et al.,

Defendants.

PLAINTIFFS’ SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
IN RESPONSE TO THIS COURT’S ORDERS (DOCS. 138,165)

Defendants’ contention that they are improper defendants to this judicial redistricting 

challenge under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 

Amendments to the Constitution is meritless. See Doc. 82-1 at 6-7; Doc. 85-1 at 5; Doc. 94-1 at 

7-8. Countless voting cases in Louisiana and nationwide have properly named governors and/or 

attorneys general as defendants, including: Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 384 (1991),

holding that Section 2 applies to judicial elections; Clark v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 1246, 1246 

(1991), creating numerous majority-minority subdistricts for district courts and courts of appeal 

in Louisiana; Thornburg v. Gingies, 478 U.S. 30, 34 (1986), construing Section 2 following its 

1982 amendment; and Evenwel v. Abbott, 135 S. Ct. 2349 (2015), a constitutional case now 

before the Supreme Court. Further, this Court can afford complete relief among the existing 

parties (/.<?., the Governor and Attorney General)—as in Chisom, which dismissed the Secretary 

of State (“SOS”) before the final remedy was implemented, and other Louisiana redistricting 

cases, which have been adjudicated on the merits without SOS as a defendant—because the SOS 

will implement whatever remedy is adopted, and there is no evidence to the contrary.

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A. The Governor and Attorney General Are Proper Defendants to this Case.

Numerous cases challenging at-large voting for Louisiana courts properly named the 

Governor and/or Attorney General as defendants.

For example, Chisom challenged the use of a multimember district to elect Justices of the 

Louisiana Supreme Court under Section 2 and the Constitution. See Chisom v. Edwards, 659 F. 

Supp. 183, 183-84 (E.D. La. 1987). As here, the Chisom plaintiffs sought a majority-Black 

subdistrict for electing one Louisiana Supreme Court Justice, id., and named the Governor as a 

defendant. See Chisom v. Edwards, 690 F. Supp. 1524, 1530 (E.D. La. 1988). “By [doing so], the 

Chisom Plaintiffs were in effect suing the State.” Chisom v. Jindal, 890 F. Supp. 2d 696, 702 

(E.D. La. 2012). Throughout the litigation, which included multiple appeals to the Fifth Circuit 

and U.S. Supreme Court,1 see Chisom, 501 U.S. at 384, the courts recognized the Governor as a 

proper defendant. For instance, prior to trial, the district court preliminarily enjoined the 

Governor and other defendants from conducting any elections in the judicial district at issue. 

Chisom, 690 F. Supp. at 1536, 1539. The U.S. Supreme Court, in holding that Section 2 applies 

to judicial elections, noted that the case was “against the Governor and other state officials.” 

Chisom, 501 U.S. at 384 (emphasis added).

The Governor and Attorney General also have played a critical role for more than a 

decade in developing: and implementing a remedy in Chisom. In 1992, on remand from the U.S. 

Supreme Court, the Legislature and Governor enacted legislation creating a new Louisiana 

Supreme Court seat elected from a majority-Black subdistrict, and the Governor entered into a 1 2

1 See Chisom v. Edwards, 659 F. Supp. 183 (E.D. La. 1987) (granting motion to dismiss), rev’d, 839 F.2d
1056 (5th Cir. 1988), on remand, 690 F. Supp. 1524 (E.D. La. 1988) (granting preliminary injunction), vacated, 853 
F.2d 1186 (5th Cir. 1988), on remand sub nom., Chisom v. Roemer, No. 86-4075, 1989 WL 106485 (E.D. La. Sept. 
19, 1989) (following trial, finding no liability under Section 2 and the Constitution), remanded b y 9 \ l  F.2d 187 (5th 
Cir. 1990) (remanding for dismissal of Section 2 claims), rev’d, 501 U.S. 380 (1991), on remand sub nom., Chisom 
v. Edwards, 970 F.2d 1408 (5th Cir. 1992) (granting remand to district court), appeals dismissed by 975 F.2d 1092 
(5th Cir. 1992).

2
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consent decree memorializing that legislation. Consent Judgment at 2, Chisom v. Edwards, No. 

86-4075 (E.D. La. Aug. 21, 1992) (referencing Act 512 of 1992) (Ex. I).2 In 1997, to comply 

with the consent decree, the Legislature and Governor enacted legislation reapportioning the 

state Supreme Court districts to include one majority-Black district. Chisom, 890 F. Supp. 2d at 

705-06 (discussing Act 776 of 1997). In 2000, the court granted a request by “the State through 

the Governor and the Attorney General" to incorporate that legislation into the consent decree. 

Id. at 706 & n.22, 714 (emphasis added).3

Similarly, Clark challenged the use of multimember districts for electing court of appeal, 

district court, and family court judges in Louisiana, under Section 2 and the Constitution. See 

Clark v. Edwards, 725 F. Supp. 285, 287 (M.D. La. 1988). As here, the Clark plaintiffs sought a 

majority-Black subdistricts. See Clark v. Roemer, 111 F. Supp. 471,473 (M.D. La. 1991); Clark 

v. Roemer, 111 F. Supp. 445, 467 (M.D. La. 1990). Clark consistently recognized the Governor 

and Attorney General as proper defendants.4 At multiple times, this Court enjoined the Governor 

and Attorney General, along with other defendants, from implementing judicial elections while a 

remedy was being devised. See Clark, 725 F. Supp. at 287 (preliminary injunction as to certain 

judicial offices); id. at 303 (following trial, permanently enjoining any “family court, district 

court, and court of appeal elections”); Clark, 111 F. Supp. at 454-69 (following second trial, 

reinstating permanent injunction as to eleven judicial districts).

See also Chisom, 890 F. Supp. 2d at 703-05 (discussing Act 512 of 1992). Though not named as a 
defendant, the Attorney General signed the consent decree along with the Governor and other defendants. See 
Consent Judgment at 10, Chisom v. Edwards, No. 86-4075 (E.D. La. Aug. 21, 1992). (Contrary to Defendants’ 
suggestion, Doc. 167 at 1, this Court may consider materials outside of the pleadings to adjudicate their 12(b)(1) 
motions. See Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001).)

Since 2000, the court has continued to exercise jurisdiction over the Governor to enforce the consent 
decree. Chisom, 890 F. Supp. 2d at 711 (retaining jurisdiction to interpret the consent decree); id. at 727 (holding 
that the court’s interpretation of the consent decree “is binding on the parties to the agreement, including the State”).
4 Clark also had a convoluted procedural history that included U.S. Supreme Court review. See Clark, 111 F.
Supp. 473-75. As Defendants concede, the 32nd JDC was part of Clark. Doc. 129 at 9; see also Clark, 725 F. Supp. 
at 289. Although the parties stipulated that the then-existing demographics for the 32nd JDC did not render a 
majority-Black subdistrict feasible, there was no question that the Governor and Attorney General were proper 
defendants to the at-large voting challenge for the 32nd JDC—the subject of this lawsuit.

3
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Moreover, consistent with the principle that a federal court should defer to the state in the 

remedial process, Miss. State Chapter, Operation Push v. Mabus, 932 F.2d 400, 405-06 (5th Cir. 

1991) (a state should have the opportunity “in the first instance to remedy the existing 

violations”), in Clark, this Court “called upon the Governor and the Legislature to fashion a 

remedy” upon finding a Section 2 violation. 725 F. Supp. at 306. This Court made clear that 

“[tjhere are many alternatives” and that it had “no preconceived notion as to what changes the 

Governor and the Legislature ought to make.” Id. at 303. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit also 

recognized the Governor’s key role, stating: “We have no reason to doubt that the governor and 

legislature of Louisiana will promptly and properly respond to any violations of constitutional 

rights of the citizens of Louisiana.” Clark, 111 F. Supp. at 474 (quoting Fifth Circuit decision).

Accordingly, the Governor appointed a task force to recommend changes to electoral 

methods, see Exec. Order No. BR 88-41 (1988) (Ex. 2); Exec. Order No. BR 89-1 (Ex. 3); see 

also Doc. 1^17, and the Legislature and Governor adopted a package of reforms conditioned on 

voter approval. Clark, 111 F. Supp. at 474. After voters rejected that package, this Court ordered 

the Governor and Attorney General to confer on the appropriate boundaries of judicial 

subdistricts. See id. at 469, 474. Ultimately, in Clark, the Governor and Attorney General agreed 

to a settlement covering fifteen judicial districts, and the Governor and Legislature enacted 

legislation to effectuate that settlement. See, e.g., Prejean v. Foster, 227 F.3d 504, 507-08 (5th 

Cir. 2000) (discussing settlement and referencing Act 780 of 1993 relating to the 23rd JDC).5

Most recently, in Hall v. Louisiana, the Court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss a 

Section 2 and constitutional challenge to the electoral method for the Baton Rouge City Court on 

the ground that they were not proper defendants. 983 F. Supp. 2d 820, 824-26, 832-33 (M.D. La. * 4

Since then, the Attorney General has advised on the proper application of the Clark remedy. See La. Att’y 
Gen. Op. No. 00-274, 2000 WL 1132731 (2000).

4
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Case 3:14-cv-00069-SDD Document 169-1 11/23/15 Page 5 of 11

2013).* 6 Defendants fail to: (1) acknowledge Hall or any of the aforementioned cases that 

recognized them as proper defendants; and (2) cite a single Louisiana voting case in which the 

court held that they were not proper defendants. See generally Docs. 82-1,85-1, 94-1.7

B. As in Cltisom and Clark, the Governor and Attorney General Will Play a Critical 
Role in the Remedial Process.

Similar to the remedies sought by plaintiffs in Chisom and Clark, Plaintiffs seek: (1) a 

declaration that at-large voting for the 32nd JDC violates Section 2 and the Constitution; (2) a 

permanent injunction enjoining at-large voting for the 32nd JDC; (3) an order setting a deadline 

for Louisiana to adopt an electoral method for the 32nd JDC that complies with the VRA and the 

Constitution; and (4) if the state fails to do so, an order setting forth an electoral method for the 

32nd JDC that complies with the VRA and the Constitution. Doc. 1 at 22. In addition, Plaintiffs 

seek an order, pursuant to Section 3(c) of the VRA, requiring Louisiana to seek preclearance for 

any voting changes impacting the 32nd JDC. /c/.8 Defendants will be instrumental in developing 

and implementing these remedies, as in Chisom and Clark.

Numerous other Louisiana redistricting cases have named the Governor and Attorney General as 
defendants. See, e.g., Prejean, 227 F.3d at 504 (Governor Foster and Attorney General Ieyoub in a challenge to the 
23rd JDC); Hays v. Louisiana, 936 F. Supp. 360, 362 (W.D. La. 1996) (Governor Edwards in a challenge to 
congressional redistricting following 1990 Census); Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325, 325 (E.D. La. 1983) 
(Governor Treen in a challenge to congressional redistricting following 1980 Census); Bussie v. Governor o f La., 
333 F. Supp. 452, 454, 463 (E.D. La. 1971) (Governor McKeithen in a challenge to state legislative redistricting 
following 1970 Census); Bannister v. Davis, 263 F. Supp. 202, 202, 205 (E.D. La. 1966) (Governor Davis in a 
challenge to state legislative apportionment).

The cases cited by Defendants (see, e.g., Doc. 167 at 6-7) do not address redistricting—and thus, shed no 
light on the significant role that the Governor and Attorney General have in fashioning a remedial electoral plan 
after a finding of liability. See Doe v. Jindal, No. 15-1283, slip op. at 5-8 (E.D. La. 2015) (law requiring sex 
offender registration); June Med. Servs v. Caldwell, No. 14-525, 2014 WL 4296679, at *1 (M.D. La. 2014) (law 
requiring doctors who perform abortions to have certain admitting privileges); Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 986 F. Supp. 
2d 749, 752 (E.D. La. 2013) (law precluding recognition of out-of-state same-sex marriage); King v. Loidsiana ex 
rel. Jindal, No. 13-4913, 2013 WL 5673584, at *1 (E.D. La. 2013) (law prohibiting the breach of confidential ethic 
complaints); Doe v. Jindal, No. 11-554, 2011 WL 3664496, at *1 (M.D. La. 2011) (law punishing use of social 
media by registered sex offenders); Harmony Center LLC v. Jindal, No. 10-621, 2010 WL 4955167, at *1 (M.D. La. 
2010) (law regarding licensing of specialized providers); Soc. Aid & Pleasure Club Task Force v. City o f New 
Orleans, No. 06-10057, 2007 WL 763241, at *1 (E.D. La. 2007) (bond requirement for public parades).

There is no dispute that the Attorney General would be responsible for obtaining such preclearance. See 
Doc. 105-1 at 37:16-39:25; see also La. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 13-0124, 2013 WL 5588151 (2013) (acknowledging

5
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Case 3:14-cv-00069-SDD Document 169-1 11/23/15 Page 6 of 11

Defendants assert that they have no role to play in the remedial process because the 

Legislature has “plenary authority” over redistricting, and SOS administers elections. Doc. 85-1 

at 5, 6. This argument is flawed. First, Defendants will be instrumental in the design of an 

appropriate remedial plan for the 32nd JDC—the principal remedy that Plaintiffs seek. Although 

the Legislature, in the first instance, may propose a redistricting plan for the 32nd JDC, as 

discussed above, any such proposal is subject to review and veto by the Governor. La. Const, art. 

Ill, §§ 17, 18.9 Thus, contrary to Defendants’ contention, the Legislature does not enjoy 

“plenary” authority over judicial redistricting. Doc. 85-1 at 5.10 * Accordingly, upon finding a 

violation of federal law, federal courts in redistricting cases have called upon both the 

Legislature and the Governor to propose an appropriate remedy. See, e.g., Clark, 725 F. Supp. at 

306 (“callfing] upon the Governor and the Legislature to fashion a remedy”).11

Defendants concede that the Governor has the power to review (and veto) legislation, but 

nonetheless insist that he has no role until the Legislature approves a bill. See, e.g., Doc. 94-1 at 

7. This argument ignores the multiple other and significant ways in which the Governor can 

act—and has acted—to shape redistricting legislation, including by: (1) reviewing all bills filed

that Section 3(c) coverage would render operable all state laws relating to preclearance under the VRA). The 
Attorney General is a proper defendant on this basis alone. Defendants ignore this reality. See generally Doc. 167.

See also, e.g., Fireside Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Martin, 66 So. 2d 511, 513 (La. 1953) (“The Governor has his 
part in legislation through his power of veto.”); Doc. 106-2 at 54:1-55:2, 57:7-14.
10 Thus, the Legislature’s authority is sharply circumscribed by that of the Governor. See, e.g., Major, 574 F. 
Supp. at 333, 352 (the Governor’s veto threat played a “decisive role in the defeat o f’ a redistricting proposal; “[t]he 
Louisiana Legislature’s policy, which would have maintained New Orleans’ black community within one district. . . 
[was] abruptly discarded in the face of the Governor’s veto threat.”); see also id. at 333 (“Louisiana’s chief 
executive has considerable power and influence, both de jure and de facto,” because of his veto power); Louisiana 
Legislature, Veto Flistory -  Since Constitution of 1974 Went Into Effect (July 2015), 
http://house.louisiana.gov/H_PDFdocs/VetoHistoryl974.pdf (since 1974, the Legislature has overridden the 
Governor’s veto only twice) (Ex. 4). And the Governor has exercised his veto power to address district court 
judgeships. See Doc. 106-1 (Governor’s veto message regarding Senate Bill (“S.B.”) 429 of 2008, relating to the 
24th JDC); Ex. 5 (Governor’s veto message regarding S.B. 908 of 1997, relating to the 15th JDC).

See also, e.g., Major, 574 F. Supp. 355-56 (“invit[ingj” the defendants, including the Governor, to “present 
to this court . . .  a duly-enacted legislative plan”; “[sjhould the Legislature, or the Governor, choose not to act, we 
shall . . . develop and implement a remedial plan”). That the Legislature may be involved in devising a remedy does 
not render the Governor an improper party, contrary to any suggestion by Defendants. Doc. 167 at 9-10.

6

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Case 3:14-cv-00069-SDD Document 169-1 11/23/15 Page 7 of 11

in the Legislature, Doc. 106-2 at 86:19-24; (2) drafting legislation upon request, see id. at 34:25- 

35:13; (3) formally recording his position on any pending legislation, id. at 59:2-18; (4) 

testifying or otherwise participating in proceedings before the Legislature, id. at 29:10-24; (5) 

appointing a task force on redistricting,12 id. at 106:2-111:25; and (6) calling an extraordinary 

session of the Legislature to force it to address redistricting,13 La. Const, art. Ill, § 2(B). The 

Attorney General similarly will have an important role in the design of an appropriate remedy.14

Second, Defendants will be instrumental in the proper implementation of the remedial 

plan. In particular, under Louisiana’s Election Code, the Governor issues commissions to the 

winners of elections for the 32nd JDC, which are necessary for such individuals to take office. 

See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 18:513(A)(5), 42:141, 49:211; see also Ex. 11 at 38:9-19 (SOS 

30(b)(6) Dep.). Because of this specific statutory responsibility, which Defendants ignore (see 

generally Doc. 167), the Governor is a proper party that this Court can enjoin to block at-large 

voting for the 32nd JDC, see Chisom, 690 F. Supp. at 1536, 1539 (enjoining the Governor); 

Major, 574 F. Supp. at 355 (same), and ensure the proper implementation of the remedial plan.15

See, e.g., Bannister, 263 F. Supp. at 209 (“Shortly [after the court found a constitutional violation] the 
Honorable John J. McKeithen, Governor of Louisiana, appointed a committee to study reapportionment . . . and to 
make appropriate recommendations.”); Exec. Order No. BR 88-41 (1988) (Ex. 2) (Governor Roemer appointing a 
task force to study method of election forjudges following finding of Section 2 violation in Clark).
13 See, e.g., Proclamation No. 12 KBB 2006, Item Nos. 8, 13 (Feb. 3, 2006) (extraordinary session to address 
the creation of a single district court for Orleans Parish and the abolition of the Municipal Court of New Orleans) 
(Ex. 6); Proclamation No. 11 MJF 2002, Item Nos. 57, 99 (Mar. 19, 2002) (extraordinary session to address 
additional judgeships for the 22nd JDC and 26th JDC) (Ex. 7); Proclamation No. 50 MJF 2001, Item Nos. 1-3 (Oct. 2, 
2001) (extraordinary session to address state legislative and congressional redistricting) (Ex. 8); Proclamation No. 8 
MJF 98, Item Nos. 127, 166 (Mar. 17, 1998) (extraordinary session to change the election dates of, and the terms 
for, certain court of appeal judges and to address additional judgeship for the 3rd JDC) (Ex. 9); Proclamation, Item 
Nos. 58, 123 (Mar. 18, 1996) (extraordinary session to address additional judgeship for the 36th JDC and to adopt 
the court-drawn congressional redistricting plan in Hays v. Louisiana) (Ex. 10).
14 As chief legal officer of the state, La. Const, art. V, § 8, and consistent with his statutory duties, see La. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 49:253 (“The Attorney General shall attend the legislature during its session, and shall give his aid 
and advice in the arrangement and preparation of legislative acts and documents, when required by either the senate 
or the house.”), the Attorney General reviews all bills filed, Doc. 105-1 at 64:12-65:9, 66:10-15; attends committee 
hearings, id. at 57:2-16; and offers advice on pending legislation, including by formal opinion, id. at 55:20-56:17 
(“We do field questions from legislators. That’s our duty regarding legislation”); see also id. at 41:15-43:25.

The Governor also would call special elections for the 32nd JDC, see La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18:621; see also 
Doc. 106-2 at 70:22-71:2, which this Court may order, see Taylor v. Monroe Cty. Bd. o f  Supervisors, 421 F.2d 1038,

7
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C. This Court May Afford Complete Relief Among the Existing Parties.

As in Chisom and numerous other Louisiana voting cases, this Court can afford complete 

relief among the existing parties even though SOS is no longer a defendant. See 890 F. Supp. 2d 

at 711, 728-29 (granting now-Chief Justice Johnson’s request to dismiss SOS even though the 

final remedy “ha[d] not yet been implemented”).16 As SOS stated, his duty in administering 

elections is “purely ministerial,”17 and he “exercises election responsibilities without regard to 

how election districts are fonned or election methods are established.”18 Doc. 18-1 at 13. 

Accordingly, SOS will implement whatever remedial plan is adopted in this case. There is 

simply no basis in the record—and Defendants point to none, see generally Doc. 167—upon 

which to conclude that SOS would administer at-large voting for the 32nd JDC even if it were

1039-43 (5th Cir. 1970); Williams v. City o f Dallas, 734 F. Supp. 1317, 1411-13, 1415 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (ordering a 
special election because “[t]he current Council, which [was elected during the pendency of the litigation and] will 
serve an extended . . . term absent relief by this Court, continues the effect of the discriminatory election system”).

The Attorney General also would: (1) advise SOS and local officials on compliance with election law, 
including the remedial plan, see Doc. 105-1 at 59:9-16 (“[W]e do have attorneys that try to assist locals in 
complying with the Election Code.”); see also, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 49:251; La. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 00-274, 
2000 WL 1132731 (2000); and (2) defend the remedial plan if subsequently challenged, see Doc. 105-1 at 110:22- 
111:5; see also supra n.8 (discussing Attorney General’s role in obtaining preclearance, if ordered by this Court).

Defendants fail to recognize (see, e.g., Doc. 167 at 7-8, 10) that other Louisiana voting cases have been 
adjudicated on the merits without SOS as a defendant. See, e.g., Citizens for a Better Gretna v. City o f Gretna, La., 
636 F. Supp. 1113, 1114, 1135 (E.D. La. 1986) (finding Section 2 violation without SOS as a defendant), affd, 834 
F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1987), cert, denied, 492 U.S. 905 (1989); St. Bernard Citizens for Better Gov’t v. St. Bernard 
Parish Sch. Bd„ No. 02-2209, 2002 WL 32943863 (E.D. La. July 19, 2002), 2002 WL 2022589, at *10 (E.D. La. 
Aug. 28, 2002) (same); Theriot v. Parish o f Jefferson, 966 F. Supp. 1435, 1437-38, 1449-50 (E.D. La. 1997) 
(adjudicating equal protection challenge to a majority-minority district without SOS as a defendant), a ff  d, 185 F.3d 
477 (5th Cir. 1999), cert, denied, 529 U.S. 1129 (2000).
17 Contrary to Defendants’ suggestion, Doc. 167 at 2, though Plaintiffs opposed SOS’s motion to dismiss for 
lack of Article 111 standing, Plaintiffs did not dispute SOS’s assertion that his duties are ministerial, but noted, 
notwithstanding, that the exercise of those duties caused injury sufficient to satisfy Article 111 standing. See Doc. 22 
at 8-12. In denying SOS’s motion to dismiss, the Court did not reject SOS’s observation that his duties are 
ministerial. See generally Doc. 32. Contrary to Defendants’ suggestion, Doc. 167 at 2-4, while SOS was a proper 
defendant under Article III, he is not a necessary party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 19. See, 
e.g., Temple v. Synthes Corp., 498 U.S. 5, 7-8 (1990) (district court erred in dismissing case on the ground that 
plaintiffs did not join all “potential joint tortfeasors”; joint tortfeasors are “merely permissive parties” and not 
necessary parties under FRCP 19(a)).
18 See also Doc. 18-1 at 13 (“If lawmakers reconfigure the district . . .  or if the court ultimately orders a 
different system for electing judges in the district, [SOS] will go about its business . . .  in accordance with the terms 
set by lawmakers or the court.”); id. at 3, 18; Doc. 24 at 4 (“[T]he Secretary is bound to follow the election laws 
enacted by other branches of government, and his failure or refusal to do so could well amount to malfeasance.”); id. 
at 5, 11-12; Ex. 11 at 141:10-17 (Q: “So whether by Court order or legislative act, if a change in the method of 
election for a Louisiana court is ordered or legislatively prescribed, the [SOS] would conduct the elections according 
to that?” A: “We follow the law. We follow the court order.”); id. at 52:1-53:5.

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declared invalid by this Court. Further, as noted supra and contrary to Defendants’ argument, 

Doc. 167 at 5, 9, an injunction against the Governor would effectively halt at-large voting for the 

32nd JDC. Thus, SOS is not a necessary party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(A).

Even assuming that SOS is a necessary party, dismissal would not be warranted. FRCP 

19 does not mandate automatic dismissal if a necessary party is absent, but instead, requires a 

court to determine whether the case may be dismissed “in equity and good conscience.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 19(b); Lone Star Indus., Inc. v. Redwine, 757 F.2d 1544, 1552 (5th Cir. 1985) 

(“Pragmatic and equitable considerations control the Rule 19(b) analysis.”). None of the four 

factors relevant in this inquiry19 support dismissal. First, a judgment entered in SOS’s absence 

will not prejudice SOS or the existing parties. SOS has conceded that he is bound to implement 

whatever remedial plan is adopted here, and Defendants will not be prejudiced because they will 

be given the chance to design a remedy. Second, as there will be no prejudice to either SOS or 

Defendants, the extent to which prejudice might be alleviated also does not support dismissal. 

Dernick, 639 F.2d at 199 (“We need not consider how relief may be fashioned to avoid 

prejudice. There will be no prejudice.”). The lack of prejudice to SOS alone demonstrates that 

dismissal is inappropriate. See Fernandes, 663 F.2d at 636 (“Where, as here, it is possible to 

resolve the dispute without adversely affecting the interests of the absent parties, the district 

court should not dismiss the case.”). Third, there is no “threat of piecemeal, inconsistent

FRCP 19 identifies four relevant factors: (1) the extent to which ajudgment rendered in the party’s absence 
might prejudice that party or the existing parties, (2) the extent to which the prejudice might be alleviated; (3) 
whether a judgment in the absence of the party would be adequate; and (4) whether the plaintiffs would have an 
adequate remedy if the action were dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b). The first two factors focus on prejudice, while 
the third and fourth factors focus on judicial economy. See Dernick v. Bralorne Res., Ltd., 639 F.2d 196, 199 (5th 
Cir. 1981) (“The third and fourth elements . . . involve questions of judicial efficiency.”); see also Republic o f 
Philippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851, 870 (2008) (noting that the third factor “refers to the public stake in settling 
disputes by wholes”). The most important factor is the prejudice that would result to the absent party. See Fernandes 
v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 636 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Shelton v. Exxon Corp., 843 F.2d 212, 216 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(the first factor is the “most critical factor”). The third and fourth factors alone are not sufficient to compel 
dismissal. Boone v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 682 F.2d 552, 554 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that “judicial 
economy and convenience do not in themselves provide grounds for dismissal”).

9
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litigation.” Brown v. Pac. Life Ins. Co., 462 F.3d 384, 394 (5th Cir. 2006). With the Governor

and Attorney General as defendants, this case will conclusively resolve the validity of at-large

voting for the 32nd JDC under Section 2 and the Constitution.20 Fourth, Plaintiffs will have no

remedy to the vote dilution caused by at-large voting for the 32nd JDC, and thus will be unable to

protect their “fundamental” right to vote, Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1,10 (2009), if this case

is dismissed. Because Louisiana officials have refused to provide a remedy—despite 30 years of

advocacy—Plaintiffs have had no choice but to turn to this Court for relief. See Doc. 91-1 at 46-

49. The equities here do not support dismissal.21

This the 19th day of November, 2015.

/s/ Ronald L. Wilson 
Ronald L. Wilson (LSBN 13575)
701 Poydras Street, Suite 4100 
New Orleans, LA 70139 
Telephone: (504) 525-4361 
Facsimile: (504) 525-4380 
cabral2@aol.com

A/Leah C. Aden 
Leah C. Aden* **
Victorien Wu*
Natasha M. Korgaonkar*
Deuel Ross*
NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & 

EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC. 
40 Rector Street, 5th Floor 
New York, NY 10006 
Telephone: (212) 965-2200 
Facsimile: (212)226-7592 
laden@naacpldf.org 
♦ADMITTED PRO HAC VICE 
**TRIAL ATTORNEY

Counsel for Plaintiffs

The Governor and Attorney General have been sued in their official capacities. Doc. 1 at I. As such, this 
lawsuit is functionally against the state of Louisiana. See Chisom, 890 F. Supp. 2d at 702; Doc. 78 at 2.
21 Pimentel does not compel dismissal here. “[WJhether a particular lawsuit must be dismissed [under FRCP
19] can only be determined in the context of particular litigation.” Provident Tradesmen Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 118 (1968). In Pimentel, dismissal was warranted because the absent parties would have 
been prejudiced by a judgment in their absence. See 553 U.S. at 864-69, 872. Here, SOS will not be prejudiced 
because his duties are ministerial, see supra n.17, and he will implement any and all remedies adopted in this case. 
See Dernick, 639 F.2d at 199-200 (reversing dismissal because “[t]here will be no prejudice” to the absent party).

10

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mailto:cabral2@aol.com
mailto:laden@naacpldf.org


Case 3:14-cv-00069-SDD Document 169-1 11/23/15 Page 11 of 11

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing Plaintiffs’ Supplemental 

Memorandum in Response to this Court's Orders (Docs. 138, 165) with this Court using the 

CM/ECF system, which provides notice of filing to all counsel of record.

A/ Leah C. Aden____
LEAH C. ADEN 
NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE 

AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC. 
40 Rector Street, 5th Floor 
New York, NY 10006 
(212) 965-2200 
(212) 229-7592 (fax)

Attorney for Plaintiffs

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

TERREBONNE PARISH NAACP, ET AL. 

VERSUS

PIYUSH (“BOBBY”) JINDAL the GOVERNOR 
of the STATE OF LOUISIANA, in his official 
capacity, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION 

NO. 14-069-JJB-SCR

RULING

This matter is before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)( 1) (Doc. 82) 

brought by Defendant James D. “Buddy” Caldwell, in his official capacity as Attorney General of 

the State of Louisiana (“Caldwell”), a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to 12(b)(1) (Doc. 94) brought 

by Defendant Bobby Jindal, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Louisiana, and a 

Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(c) (Doc. 85) brought jointly by the defendants. Plaintiffs, 

the Terrebonne Parish Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 

Reverend Vincent Fusilier, Sr., Lionel Myers, Wendell Desmond Shelby, Jr., and Daniel Turner 

have filed oppositions to the respective motions (Docs. 105, 106, 104). For the reasons stated 

herein, Caldwell’s and Jindal’s Motions to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) (Docs. 82 & 94), 

and the jointly filed Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(c) (Doc. 85) are DENIED.

I. Background

This case is a challenge to the use of at-large voting for the 32nd Judicial District Court 

(“32nd JDC”) to dilute Black voting strength, in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act 

of 1965, 52 U.S.C. § 10301, and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the United States 

Constitution. Compl. 1, Doc. 1. The plaintiffs pray for, inter alia, the following declaratory and 

injunctive relief: (1) a declaration that defendants’ at-large method of electing members to the 1

1

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32nd JDC was adopted and/or maintained with a discriminatory purpose in violation of Section 2 

and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution; (2) a declaration that 

Defendants’ at-large method of electing members to the 32nd JDC has the result of denying or 

abridging the right to vote on account of race or color in violation of Section 2 and the Fourteenth 

and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution; and (3) an injunction precluding the defendants, 

their successors, and agents from enforcing, administering, implementing, or conducting any 

future elections to the 32nd JDC under the current at-large method of election.

The plaintiffs originally brought this action against three defendants: Piyush “Bobby” 

Jindal as Governor of the State of Louisiana in his official capacity; James “Buddy” Caldwell as 

Attorney General of the State of Louisiana in his official capacity; and Tom Schedler as Secretary 

of State of Louisiana in his official capacity. The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed Schedler with 

prejudice as a defendant in this action (Doc. 69).

The specific allegations against the Governor are as follows:

Defendant Piyush (“Bobby”) Jindal is the Governor of Louisiana and is being sued 
in his official capacity. Under the Louisiana Constitution, he is “the chief executive 
officer of the state,” and must “faithfully support the constitution and laws of the 
state and of the United States,” as well as ensure that “the laws are faithfully 
executed.” La.Const. art. IV, § 5(A). Like other executive officers of the State, 
Defendant Jindal is required to uphold the U.S. Constitution, including the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to it, as part of the execution of his 
gubernatorial duties and responsibilities. 4 U.S.C. § 101. In his capacity as “chief 
executive officer of the state,” Defendant Jindal also is empowered to sign 
legislation into law that would change the electoral method for the 32nd Judicial 
District. La. Const, art. IV, § 5(A). Defendant Jindal’s role in fashioning a remedy 
to the instant action is similar to and consistent with former governor Buddy 
Roemer’s appointment of a legislative task-force on judicial elections to devise a 
remedy in the Clark v. Edwards, Section 2 litigation discussed infra. 725 F.Supp.
285 (M.D. La. 1988)....

Compl. f  17, Doc. 1.

The allegations contained in the complaint against the Attorney General are as follows:

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Defendant James Caldwell is Louisiana’s Attorney General and is being sued in his 
official capacity. As Attorney General, Defendant Caldwell is the “chief legal 
officer of the state,” charged with asserting or protecting the rights or interests of 
Louisiana. La. Const, art. IV, §8. Like other executive officers of the State, 
Defendant Caldwell is required to support the U.S. Constitution, including the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to it, before executing his duties as Attorney 
General. 4 U.S.C. § 101.

Id. at H 18.

II. Discussion

Caldwell and Jindal bring these Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 82 & 94) pursuant to Rule 

12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The defendants argue that this Court lacks 

subject matter jurisdiction over the claims asserted against them because the Eleventh 

Amendment bars such claims. Additionally, the defendants raise numerous arguments for 

dismissal in a joint Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(c) (Doc. 85).

A. Motions to Dismiss Pursuant to 12(b)(1) (Docs 82 & 94)

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(1), a party may challenge a court’s 

subject matter jurisdiction at any time. Giles v. NYLCare Health Plans, Inc., 172 F.3d 332, 336 

(5th Cir. 1999). The party asserting that the court has jurisdiction bears the burden of proving 

that the court may adjudicate the case. Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 

2001). In determining whether it has subject matter jurisdiction, the court may look at the 

complaint alone, the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts in the record, or the complaint 

supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts. Id. A motion 

under 12(b)(1) should be granted only if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set 

of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. Home Builders Ass'n o f Miss., Inc.

3

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v. City o f Madison, Miss., 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998); see also Ramming, 281 F.3d at 

161.

In their Motions to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) (Docs. 82 & 94), both Jindal and 

Caldwell argue that they are entitled to sovereign immunity pursuant to the Eleventh 

Amendment, and therefore this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs’ 

claims under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as well as their constitutional claims under the 

Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.

The Eleventh Amendment bars suits by private citizens against a non-consenting state in 

federal court. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890). Eleventh Amendment immunity applies 

not only to the state itself, but precludes actions against state officers sued in their official 

capacity. Bd. ofTrs. o f the Univ. o f Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001); Edelman v.

Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,663-69 (1974). However, state sovereign immunity is not absolute; in this 

case there are two relevant exceptions—Congressional abrogation, and the exception established 

in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).

1. Congressional Abrogation

First, Congress may abrogate sovereign immunity “if it makes its intention to abrogate 

unmistakably clear in the language of the statute and acts pursuant to a valid exercise of its 

power” under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Nev. Dep't o f Human Res. v. Hibbs, 

538 U.S. 721,726 (2003); CityofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997) (citing South 

Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,308 (1966)). As this Court recognized in Hall v. 

Louisiana, Congress has abrogated state sovereign immunity for claims arising under the Voting 

Rights Act. 983 F. Supp. 2d 820, 830 (M.D. La. 2013), reconsideration denied (Apr. 7, 2014) 

(citing Mixon v. State o f Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 398-99 (6th Cir. 1999) and Reaves v. United States

4

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Case 3:14-cv-00069-SDD Document 171 12/08/15 Page 5 of 12

DOJ, 355 F. Supp. 2d 510, 515 (D.D.C.2005) (“Congress, in passing the Voting Rights Act, 

effected a valid abrogation of state sovereign immunity.”)). Therefore, the Court concludes that 

the plaintiffs’ claims arising under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act against both Jindal and 

Caldwell are not proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.

2. Ex parte Young

Second, in Ex parte Young the Supreme Court carved out an exception to Eleventh 

Amendment immunity. According to Ex parte Young, in certain circumstances state officers may 

be sued in their official capacity and a federal court “may enjoin state officials to conform their 

future conduct to the requirements of federal law.” Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 337 (1979). 

To determine whether the doctrine o f Ex parte Young avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit 

“a court need only conduct a straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an 

ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.” Virginia 

Office for Prot. A Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 255 (2011). However, for the exception to 

apply a plaintiff “must demonstrate that the state officer has ‘some connection’ with the 

enforcement of the disputed act.” K.P. v. LeBlanc, 627 F.3d at 124 (citing Ex parte Young, 209 

U.S. at 157).

The Court finds that the complaint satisfies the “straightforward inquiry” because the 

complaint alleges a violation of federal law (i.e., Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the 

Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution), and the plaintiffs seek 

prospective relief (i.e., seeking a declaration that the current at-large method of election violates 

federal law, and an injunction prohibiting any further elections under the at-large method).

5

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Despite satisfying this straightforward inquiry, the defendants argue that neither Jindal 

nor Caldwell have the requisite “connection'’ with the enforcement of the at-large method of 

election in the 32nd JDC.

Meanwhile, the plaintiffs argue that both Jindal and Caldwell have “some connection” 

with the enforcement of the allegedly unlawful election method due to their duties and 

responsibilities as the Chief Executive Officer and the Chief Legal Officer of the state. Jindal, as 

the Chief Executive Officer of the state, is “empowered to sign legislation into law that would 

change the electoral method” for the 32nd JDC. Compl. ^ 17, Doc. 1. Caldwell, as the Chief 

Legal Officer of the state, is “charged with asserting or protecting the rights or interests of 

Louisiana.” Id. at 18. According to the complaint, both Jindal and Caldwell are “charged with 

ensuring Terrebonne’s compliance with applicable state and federal voting laws,” and they are 

the “enforcement officials maintaining, executing, and enforcing the 32nd [JDC’s] 

discriminatory at-large electoral method.” Id. at *[*[ 17, 21. Moreover, the plaintiffs allege that the 

defendants have “maintained at-large voting to elect judges for the 32nd [JDC] to dilute, 

minimize and cancel out the voting strength of Black voters in Terrebonne.” Id. at ^ 68. The 

complaint further alleges that, absent redress by this Court, the defendants “will continue to 

maintain and enforce” the discriminatory electoral system in violation of Section 2 and the 

Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Id. f  21. The Court finds that these allegations are 

sufficient to demonstrate that both Jindal and Caldwell have “some connection” with the 

enforcement of the current at-large electoral method in the 32nd JDC. Therefore, the plaintiffs 

have satisfied the requirements of the Ex parte Young exception, and the plaintiffs’ claims 

arising under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments are not barred by the Eleventh 

Amendment.

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In sum, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the plaintiffs’ Voting Rights Act claims 

because of Congressional abrogation, and the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the plaintiffs’ 

constitutional claims under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments because the plaintiffs have 

met the Ex parte Young exception. Therefore, both Caldwell’s and Jindal’s Motions to Dismiss 

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) (Docs. 82 & 94) are DENIED.

B. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to 12(c) (Doc. 85)

In the Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(c), the defendants make four arguments:

(1) Jindal and Caldwell cannot be sued in their official capacities under § 1983; (2) Jindal and 

Caldwell are entitled to qualified immunity; (3) the plaintiffs have failed to allege with 

specificity the actions they challenge as unconstitutional; and (4) neither defendant is the proper 

party to provide the plaintiffs the relief they seek.

Rule 12(c) provides that “[ajfter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay 

trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). “A motion 

brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) is designed to dispose of cases where the material facts 

are not in dispute and a judgment on the merits can be rendered by looking to the substance of 

the pleadings and any judicially noticed facts.” Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean 

Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312-13 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Hebert Abstract Co. v. Touchstone 

Props., Ltd., 914 F.2d 74, 76 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam)). “Pleadings should be construed 

liberally, and judgment on the pleadings is appropriate only if there are no disputed issues of fact 

and only questions of law remain.” Id. (citing Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Bank o f 

China, 142 F.3d 887, 891 (5th Cir. 1998)). The claims may be dismissed “when it is clear that the 

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.” Great 

Plains Trust Co., 313 F.3d at 312-13. A judgment on the pleadings is properly granted when,

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taking all the allegations in the pleadings as true, [a] party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law. Lyon v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 656 F.3d 877, 883 (9th Cir. 2011). In analyzing the 

complaint, the Court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff. Id.

1. Official Capacity Claim Under § 1983

First, Jindal and Caldwell argue that the plaintiffs’ claim under § 1983 fails because they 

have been sued in their official capacity, and officials sued in their official capacity are not 

“persons” under § 1983. Id. at 3-4. The law is clear, however, that in a suit for injunctive relief, 

state officials sued in their official capacity are “persons” under § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep't o f 

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10 (1989). Here, the plaintiffs seek injunctive relief under § 1983 

against state officials sued in their official capacity. Compl. 12-16, Doc. 1 (requesting an 

injunction precluding the defendants from enforcing, administering, implementing, or conducting 

any future elections in the 32nd JDC under the current at-large method of election). Accordingly, 

the defendants are “persons” under § 1983 and the defendants are not entitled to judgment on the 

pleadings.

2. Qualified Immunity Under § 1983

Second, the defendants argue that they cannot be liable under § 1983 because they are 

entitled to qualified immunity. Similar to above, the defense of qualified immunity does not 

extend to suits for injunctive or declaratory relief under § 1983. Chrissy F. by Medley v. Miss. 

Dep’t o f Pub. Welfare, 925 F.2d 844, 849 (5th Cir. 1991). As discussed above, the plaintiffs seek 

injunctive relief under § 1983. The defendants have failed to demonstrate that they are entitled to

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Case 3:14-cv-00069-SDD Document 171 12/08/15 Page 9 of 12

qualified immunity as a matter of law, and therefore are not entitled to judgment on the 

pleadings.1

3. Specificity of the Complaint

Third, the defendants argue that the case should be dismissed because the complaint 

“contains merely conclusory allegations” because the plaintiffs did not “specify which Louisiana 

statutes are being challenged as unconstitutional and what statutes should be modified.” Dfs. ’ 

Supp. Mem. 5, Doc. 85-1. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain 

a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint “need only be a short and plain statement that gives the defendant 

notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Colle v. Brazos County, 981 

F.2d 237,243 (5th Cir. 1993).

The defendants correctly point out that the plaintiffs did not specify the statute or statutes 

that they challenge as unconstitutional. Flowever, the plaintiffs were not required to specify the 

statute being challenged. The Court has reviewed the complaint and finds that it contains 

sufficiently detailed factual allegations to make the plaintiffs’ claims against Jindal and Caldwell 

plausible. Moreover, as discussed more fully in a prior ruling in this case, the complaint 

sufficiently alleges the elements of the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment claims. 

See Ruling 9-11, Doc. 32. Therefore, the defendants are not entitled to judgment on the 

pleadings on this ground.

1 The Court is doubtful that, after a reasonable inquiry, these two defenses are warranted by existing law or good 
faith argument for extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.

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4. Proper Parties

Lastly, the defendants argue that the case should be dismissed against them because they 

are not the proper defendants. The defendants argue that they are not the parties that can give the 

plaintiffs the remedy they seek because the Louisiana legislature has the plenary authority to 

modify the election method in the 32nd JDC. Dfs. ’ Supp. Mem. 2-6, Doc. 85-1. Instead, 

according to the defendants, it is the Secretary of State that is charged with enforcing the at-large 

method of election in the 32nd JDC. Accordingly, by voluntarily dismissing the Secretary of 

State, the plaintiffs have created an issue for the Court to consider whether the Secretary of State 

was necessary and indispensable pursuant to Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs respond by arguing that Jindal and Caldwell are the proper defendants 

because a suit against the Governor and Attorney General in their official capacity is, in effect, a 

suit against the State. Thus, an injunction against the Governor and Attorney General would 

effectively halt the at-large voting for the 32nd JDC. The plaintiffs also argue that, similar to 

other voting rights cases in Louisiana, the Governor and Attorney General will be instrumental in 

devising and implementing a remedy to the at-large voting schemes. Therefore, the plaintiffs 

argue the Court may afford complete relief among the existing parties even though the Secretary 

of State is no longer a defendant.

The Governor and Attorney General, both sued in their official capacity, are important to 

any remedial process this Court may order. See Pis. ’ Suppl. Mem. 5-8, Doc. 168. As the Chief 

Executive Officer of the state, the Governor’s powers and duties include: reviewing and vetoing 

legislation, reviewing bills in the Legislature, drafting legislation upon request, formally 

recording his position on pending legislation, testifying in proceedings before the legislature, 

appointing a task force to address redistricting, and having the power to call an extraordinary

10

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session of the Legislature to force it to address redistricting. Id. Similarly, as the Chief Legal 

Officer of the State, the Attorney General’s powers and duties include: obtaining preclearance 

under Section 3(c) of the Voting Rights Act for any voting changes impacting the 32nd JDC, 

attending the legislature during its session, advising other government entities on compliance 

with election law, and defending any remedial plan this Court may grant in a subsequent 

challenge. Id. Based on their powers and duties, the Court agrees that Jindal and Caldwell will be 

instrumental in devising and enforcing a remedy that this Court may potentially order.

Additionally, both the Governor and Attorney General were named as defendants in 

several other voting rights cases. See. e.g., Carr v. Edwards, No. 94-1280, 1994 WL 419856, at 1 

(M.D. La. August 8, 1994); Clark v. Roemer, 111 F. Supp. 471 (M.D. La. 1991). Most recently, 

in Hall v. Louisiana, this Court denied Jindal and Caldwell’s motion to dismiss a Section 2 and 

constitutional challenge to the electoral method for the Baton Rouge City Court on the ground 

that they were not proper defendants. 983 F. Supp. 2d 820, 824—26, 832-33 (M.D. La. 2013). 

Considering the powers and duties of the defendants sued in their official capacity, as well as the 

numerous other voting rights cases finding that the Governor and Attorney General were proper 

defendants, the Court is not persuaded by the defendants’ arguments that Jindal and Caldwell are 

not the proper defendants in this matter. Accordingly, the defendants have not demonstrated that 

they are entitled to judgment on the pleadings.

Finally, the Court agrees with the plaintiffs that complete relief may be afforded amongst 

the existing parties. The Secretary of State’s duties with regard to election laws are established 

by the legislature, and he carries out election laws without regard to how election districts are 

formed or election methods are established. The defendants point to no evidence to suggest 

otherwise. Therefore, at this time the Court proceeds on the assumption that the Secretary of 11

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State will carry out his ministerial duties and conduct elections pursuant to any remedial plan 

adopted by the Louisiana legislature or by this Court. Accordingly, the Court concludes that 

Rule 19 does not provide a basis for dismissal in this case.

In sum, accepting all well-pleaded facts as true, and viewing them in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff, the Court finds that the defendants have failed to establish they are 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law on any of the defenses raised. Therefore, the defendants’ 

Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(c) is DENIED.

III. Conclusion

Having concluded that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the plaintiffs’ claims under 

the Voting Rights Act nor their constitutional claims under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 

Amendments, both Caldwell’s and Jindal’s Motions to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) (Docs. 

82 & 94) are DENIED. Additionally, having reviewed the complaint the Court finds that the 

defendants have not shown that a judgment on the merits can be rendered in their favor, and 

therefore their Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(c) (Doc. 85) is DENIED.

Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on December 8, 2015.

JUD F
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

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Case 3:14-cv-00069-SDD Document 385 03/15/19 Page 1 of 5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

TERREBONNE PARISH BRANCH NAACP,
ET AL CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS 14-69-SDD-EWD

PIYUSH ('‘BOBBY") JINDAL, the GOVERNOR 
of the STATE OF LOUISIANA, in his official 
capacity, ET AL.

ORDER CONDITIONALLY APPOINTING SPECIAL MASTER

This matter was submitted to the Court upon the Parties’ submissions of 

candidates for appointment as Special Master, as ordered by the Court on December 17, 

2018.1 Given the nature of this matter and the Court’s previous findings, the Court has 

concluded that the appointment of a Special Master is appropriate under Rule 53(a)(1) of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to assist the Court in the remedy phase of this case.

All Parties submitted briefs setting forth arguments and credentials for potential 

candidates for Special Master.1 2 The Court has carefully reviewed the Parties’ 

submissions, the candidates’ credentials and experience, and the arguments offered both 

in favor of, and against, certain candidates. Based on the information before the Court, 

the Court finds that David R. Ely is best qualified to serve as Special Master in this case. 

Mr. Ely has extensive experience addressing issues like those presented herein, and

1 Rec. Doc. No. 371.
2 Rec. Doc. Nos. 373, 374, 376, & 377. The Parties were permitted to submit Replies to these briefs at 
Rec. Doc. Nos. 383 & 384.
Document Number: 50612

Page 1 o f 5
Certified Mail to David R. Ely
Return Receipt Requested - 7004 1160 0003 2648 6413

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there is no suggestion that Mr. Ely would investigate the appropriate remedy in this matter 

in a partisan manner. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that David R. Ely, President and Founder of Compass 

Demographics, Inc. in San Gabriel, California, is conditionally appointed Special Master 

for the purpose of submitting a Report and Recommendation proposing a legally sound 

remedy that conforms to this Court's previous Ruling of August 17, 20171 and complies 

with the Federal and State Constitutions and the Voting Rights Act.

The Report and Recommendation must include color maps showing both of the 

proposed remedial plan maps submitted by Plaintiffs. As these maps were considered 

and formed part of the Court's reasoning on liability, no new maps may be presented by 

the Parties. Flowever, while the evidence of proposed maps will be limited to the maps 

in the record, the Special Master’s Report and Recommendation need not be confined to 

these maps. The Special Master may consider all the evidence in making his 

recommendation to the Court and is free to develop his own plan if necessary.

The Special Master shall have the authority granted by Rule 53(c) to perform his 

duties fairly and efficiently, including: reviewing evidence on the record; setting a date, 

time, and place for hearings; presiding over hearings; conducting telephone conferences; 

reviewing/drafting remedial plans; and making recommendations.

The Court expects the Special Master to perform his duties based on the extensive 

evidence currently on the record; however, the Special Master also has authority to take 

evidence and conduct evidentiary hearings if he deems it necessary. The Special Master

1 Rec. Doc. No. 289.
Document Number: 50612

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is authorized to retain appropriate assistants, experts, and staff as may be reasonably 

necessary to accomplish this task within the time constraints imposed by this Order,

All pleadings shall be filed with the Court via the Court’s CM/ECF filing system. 

The Special Master's reports, orders, and decisions shall be filed in the record and served 

pursuant to Rule 53(d).

The Parties shall comply with all reasonable requests of the Special Master, and 

the Parties shall make their experts available to the Special Master, and the Parties and 

their experts are expected to fully and reasonably cooperate with the Special Master in 

the process of formulating an appropriate remedial plan.

Pursuant to Rule 53(b)(2)(B), the Special Master is permitted to communicate ex 

parte with the Court at any time, and the Court advises the Parties that these 

communications will remain primarily procedural. However, considering the time 

constraints before the Special Master, the Court may need to have substantive ex parte 

communications with the Special Master. To the extent such communications are 

necessary, this Order authorizes those communications.

The Special Master is not permitted to communicate ex parte with any Party or 

counsel for any Party in this matter. Further, the Special Master may not have ex parte 

communications regarding his duties pursuant to this Order outside of the Court and any 

assistants or experts retained to assist him.

Pursuant to Rule 53(b)(2)(C), the Special Master shall maintain orderly files

consisting of all documents submitted to him by the Parties and any written orders,

findings, and recommendations. All other materials should be preserved until relieved of

this obligation by the Court. The Special Master shall preserve all datasets used in the 

Document Number: 50612

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formulation of redistricting plans, and any drafts considered but not recommended to the 

Court, in their native format.

Pursuant to Rules 53(f)(3)-(5), the Court shall review all factual findings made or 

recommended by the Special Master for clear error, all legal conclusions made or 

recommended by the Special Master de novo, and review procedural matters for abuse 

of discretion. The Parties will be afforded an opportunity to submit responses and/or 

objections to the Report and Recommendation, which the Court will consider prior to 

rendering a final decision and order.

The Parties have moved to have this matter resolved prior to the June 6, 2019 

session of the Louisiana Legislature; hence, to the extent reasonably practical, the 

Special Master shall submit his Report and Recommendation to the Court on or before 

April 22, 2019. The Parties shall file any response and/or objection to the Report and 

Recommendation on or before May 20, 2019. The Court will issue a ruling approving or 

rejecting the Special Master's recommendation by June 3, 2019, or as soon as thereafter 

practicable. Leave to extend the deadlines set forth herein shall be freely given upon 

motion setting forth the grounds for the relief requested.

All reasonable costs and expenses of the Special Master, including reasonable 

compensation to the Special Master and any assistants, experts, or staff, shall be subject 

to approval by this Court and shall be borne equally by the Parties and paid in full within 

forty-five days after Court approval. The Special Master’s rate shall be $250 per hour.

The Special Master shall preserve all records of time and expenses incurred.

Finally, this Order appointing David R. Ely as Special Master in this matter is

contingent upon Mr. Ely submitting an affidavit pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Document Number: 50612

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Procedure 53(b). Thus, IT IS ORDERED that David R. Ely shall file an affidavit disclosing 

whether there is any ground for disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455 no later than 

March 21. 2019,

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Baton Rouge, Louisiana this /t>  day of March, 2019.

C. c /C , 
SHELLY D.JJfCK 
CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE 
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

Document Number: 50612

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Case 3:14-cv-00069-SDD Document 415 06/10/19 Page 1 of 8

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

TERREBONNE PARISH BRANCH NAACP, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

Civil Action. No. 3:14-cv-69-SSD-EWD

JOHN BEL EDWARDS, the GOVERNOR of the 
STATE OF LOUISIANA, in his official capacity, et 
al.,

Defendants.

PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ RESPECTIVE MEMORANDA 
REGARDING SPECIAL MASTER’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDED REMEDY

This Court, Plaintiffs, the Special Master, (previously) the Louisiana Legislature, and now, 

critically, the Defendant Governor of the State of Louisiana all agree that it is feasible to draw a 

majority-Black single-member district (“SMD”) to remedy the Voting Rights Act and 

Constitutional violations that this Court held exist.1 In his two-page Response to Special Master’s 

Report and Recommended Remedy, Defendant Governor urges a remedy of a majority-Black 

SMD; but the Governor also asks that the remainder of the four seats on the five-member 32nd 

JDC continue to be elected at-large. See generally Doc. 399. The U.S. Supreme Court and Fifth 

Circuit, however, have expressed a preference for single-member remedial districts and held that 

maintaining remnants of the illegal at-large system in a remedial plan requires justification. Doc.

1 This Court accepted Plaintiffs’ Illustrative Plan for liability purposes, further found that it could be an
effective remedy, and Plaintiffs offered it for a proposed remedy. That plan contained a majority-Black SMD 
for the 32nd JD, as did Plaintiffs’ Alternative Plan, which they also offered as a proposed remedy. The Special 
Master proposed two remedial plans, both of which included a majority-Black SMD for the 32nd JDC. And, as 
this Court recognized, following the 2010 Census, a bill passed out of committee in the Louisiana Legislature 
that included a majority-Black SMD (House Bill 582 of 2011). See 410 at 5 (citing Doc. 289 at 87). Moreover, 
after the 1990 and 2000 Censuses, pending before the Louisiana Legislature were other bills (e.g., Senate Bill 
1052 of 1999, SB 958 of 2001, and HB 1723 of 2001), that included a majority-Black SMD for the 32nd JDC 
that this Court also recognized. Id. (citing Doc. 289 at 81-83).

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410 at 9-10 (plaintiffs providing a mountain of cites to earlier pleadings calling the Court and the 

parties’ attention to this precedent). Defendant Governor has provided no such justification and 

this Court is required to justify such a proposed hybrid remedy.* 2

Defendant Attorney General is the only actor in this lawsuit who continues to claim that it 

is “impossible” to draw a majority-Black SMD without violating traditional redistricting principles 

and without race being the predominant consideration driving the development of such a district. 

See, e.g., Doc. 409 at 1. This directly conflicts with this Court’s findings, the Governor of 

Louisiana, the Special Master’s analysis,3 Plaintiffs’ experts, and the Louisiana Legislature, which, 

as noted, developed a majority-Black SMD for the 32nd JDC on multiple occasions. To be clear, 

the Special Master Plan 2 is not a so-called racial gerrymander; but, importantly, even if it were. 

Defendant Attorney General concedes, as he must, that even a purported racial gerrymander can 

survive constitutional scrutiny if it was drawn to comply with Section 2, which can be a compelling 

state interest. Id. at 3.

Defendant Attorney General also continues to rely upon his expert, Mr. Hefner—whose 

opinions this Court rejected after trial—to support the contention that it is “impossible” to draw a 

legal majority-Black SMD. But Mr. Hefner continues to make a number of baseless claims that 

must be rejected during this remedial phase including that:

• “citizenship voting age population (“CVAP”) data should not be used as a criteria for 

a remedy plan or its evaluation,” Doc. 409-3 at 3;

• “the multi-decade trend of decentralization of the minority population in Terrebonne

For similar reasons, the opinion of Dr. Weber, an expert for Defendant Attorney General, who contends 
that Special Master Plan 2 “baffles” him and is not “narrowly tailored” because it contains five SMDs should be 
rejected in light of Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit precedent. Doc. 409-1 at 5-6.

Under any standard of review of the Special Master’s findings of fact, it is clear that Special Master Plan 2 
complies with this Court’s Ruling, the VRA, and the U.S. Constitution. C f  Doc. 409 at 2 with Doc. 385 at 4.

2

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... requires the drawing of a bizarre and awkward district to connect the scattered 

remaining neighborhoods of majority Black residents across the Parish,” id. at 3; see 

also id. at 4-9;

• the proposed five SMDs under Special Master Plan 2 will become misaligned with the 

precincts for the Terrebonne Parish Council and School Board over time because those 

bodies will “create[e] new precincts, changje] boundaries, and chang[e] precinct 

designations” after 2020 with the next decennial redistricting and Louisiana is not 

required to redistrict judicial bodies, id. at 9;

• the Special Master (like Plaintiffs) should not rely on the Parish Council and School 

Board districts as benchmark plans upon which to consider and develop remedial (or 

liability) plans in this case, including because of the “significant difficulties 

maintaining the two majority Black districts” within each of those nine-SMD plans, id. 

at 10; see also id. at 13-26;

• the Special Master’s plans “carve[] up” communities of interest, or related to the above 

point, erroneously rely upon the communities already combined under the Parish 

Council and School Board Plans, id.; and,

• “[ijmplementation of a single-member district plan will do little to broaden the area 

within the Parish from which a judge is elected,” id. at 28.

Mr. Hefner's opinions should be rejected because this Court has already rejected most, if 

not all of these contentions. See, e.g., Doc. 289 at 17, 21-26 (specifically addressing the “parties’ 

disagreements about whether the black population [in Terrebonne] is compact” and finding that it 

is; id. at 26 (this Court specifically rejecting testimony from “Defendants’ experts ... that 

Terrebonne’s population is diversifying and that black residents are too spread out to create a 3

3

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majority-black [SMD]”); id. at 30 (this Court disagreeing with defense experts on their issues with 

split precincts and recognizing that Terrebonne’s precinct “boundaries, while they should be 

adhered to if possible, are not set in stone”); see also id. at 30-31 n. 171; id. at 29 (this Court 

specifically rejecting Mr. Hefner’s opinion on communities of interest and finding that “there are 

numerous districts” in “[cjurrent electoral districts (Parish Council District 2, School Board 

District 2, House District 51. Senate District 21)” that “combine” the same areas included in every 

proposed plan before this Court).

Moreover, Mr. Hefner’s arguments also are baseless for the following reasons:

• CVAP is commonly used in remedial redistricting to assess effectiveness, see, e.g., 

Patino v. City o f Pasadena, 230 F. Supp. 3d 667, 708, 729 (S.D. Tex. 2017); Montes 

v. City o f Yakima. 40 F. Supp. 3d 1377, 1391, 1405, 1412 (E.D. Wash. 2014);

• To be sufficiently numerous and geographically compact, Section 2 does not require 

Black people to live in the most hyper racially-segregated areas of a jurisdiction; that 

is, even if Black people may have achieved some residential integration, that does not 

change, as this Court recognized, that a sufficiently large and geographically compact 

Black community resides in concentrated areas of the Parish, areas of which are 

included in the Special Master’s Plan 2—indeed, as noted above, these are similar areas 

included in every map before this Court (i.e., state legislative districts like House 

District 51 under Louisiana’s 2011 plan, Parish Council and School Board districts 1 

and 2, the Illustrative Plan, the Alternative Plan, and the Special Master’s Plan 1);

• Plaintiffs should not be denied relief because Louisiana fails to engage in decennial 

judicial redistricting and, thus, precincts for judicial bodies become misaligned with 

precincts for other Louisiana bodies. As Plaintiffs’ expert, Bill Cooper, whose 4

4

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testimony this Court accepted after trial, has repeatedly made clear, Louisiana can 

correct this misalignment after 2020 redistricting. See, e.g.. Doc. 284 at^50-53;4

• Plaintiffs also should not be denied relief because of Mr. Hefner’s unsubstantiated 

issues with the plans for the Parish Council and School Board. These plans have never 

been adjudicated to be illegal. Moreover, if there is any problem with them, that is for 

Louisiana officials to correct. Moreover, this Court heard Mr. Cooper’s testimony at 

trial and Defendants had the opportunity then to contest that Mr. Cooper has been able 

to draw apportioned, majority-minority SMDs for both the Parish Council and School 

Board. See Day 2, Trial Tr. at 152:20-153:9 (Mr. Cooper testifying that more compact 

districts that comply with one person one vote can be drawn for the Parish Council and 

School Board); see also Day 8, Trial Tr. at 279:18-280:7 (Mr. Cooper testifying that 

“there was no reason to under populate [the majority-minority districts in the Parish 

Council and School Board districts post-2010]. Two districts could have been drawn 

that were more compact with deviations that were just under .... [0]ne was like minus 

2 percent and the other was minus 4 percent”);

• Relatedly, it is commonplace for demographers to rely upon maps already in use as 

benchmarks for developing new maps. Here, thus, it is appropriate for the Special 

Master (and before then Mr. Cooper) to look to the Parish Council and School Board 4 5

4 Indeed, Plaintiffs primarily offered the Alternative Plan that includes whole precincts, like the Special
Master’s Plan 2, because of Defendants repeated complaints about the number of split precincts included in the 
Illustrative Plan, complaints that this Court ultimately rejected after trial. Doc. 289 at 30-31.

Moreover, assuming Louisiana fails to resolve any alignment issues post-2020, there would be only one 
election during the next decade— in 2026. Louisiana, therefore, would have another opportunity to align 
precincts post-2030 before the next election in 2032. Ultimately, however, as the trial records make clear, 
Louisiana, generally, and Terrebonne, specifically, are accustomed to administering judicial and other elections 
under plans with split precincts. Id. at 30-31; Doc. 284 at 48-50 (citing an Attorney General Opinion on a 
mechanism used to address split precincts and including testimony from Terrebonne's former Voter Registrar 
for 25 1/2 years that Terrebonne has administered elections for taxing districts, justice of the peace, constables, 
and some school board offices under split precincts).

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districts—which contain nine SMDs and two majority-Black SMDs within them—to 

ascertain the communities that already have been brought together by Louisiana 

officials in election after election since the 1970s to provide Black voters with electoral 

opportunity, and to develop a new majority-Black SMD for the five-member 32nd 

JDC.5

• By Mr. Hefner’s own admissions, at present, the current judges all live in close 

proximity to each other in Houma and thus fail to bring geographical diversity to the 

32nd JDC, because they do not all live in diverse areas of the Parish, . Special Master 

Plan 2, however, provides Black voters with their statutory right to elect their 

candidates of choice to the 32nd JDC in election after election from proposed District 

1. Nothing about the Special Master’s Plan 2 stops any lawyer from any part of the 

Parish from running for any of the seats (A-E), including the soon-to-be vacant seats A 

and B. Thus, the recommended plan’s implementation has the opportunity to bring not 

just racial diversity to the 32nd JDC, but also geographic diversity—and, perhaps, 

gender diversity—to a state court that was all white and all male from 1968 to 2014, 

and which remains all male through the present.6

As this Court recognized, SMDs for the Parish Council and School Board were developed in response 
to Section 2 litigation, similar to the present case, in the late 1970s. Doc. 289 at 16. Similar areas are brought 
together in House District 51, as also recognized by this Court and noted previously by Plaintiffs.

Further, even though Plaintiffs continue to disagree with the Special Master’s finding, in contravention 
of this Court’s findings, that District 3 in the Illustrative Plan is not a community of interest, Plaintiffs remind 
this Court that it is only one district out o f five where the Special Master has made this finding; he did not, 
however, find that the entire Illustrative map fails to respect communities o f interest including in proposed 
District 1, the majority-Black SMD.

For similar reasons, the opinion of Dr. Weber should be rejected. See generally Doc. 398-3. This Court 
rejected his testimony after trial. Moreover, aspects of Dr. Weber’s opinion continue to illuminate what this 
Court recognized after trial: Black voters in Terrebonne continue to encounter disparities in registration and 
turnout as compared to the white population, which Plaintiffs contend is a continuing legacy of discrimination 
in voting, education, and other areas of life in Terrebonne, specifically, and Louisiana, generally. Cf. Doc. 409- 
1 at 3-4 with Doc. 289 at 59-60. However, this Court considered those turnout disparities and still found that an 
effective remedy was possible and that a remedy also may prompt participation in Terrebonne elections. Doc.

6

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Case 3:14-cv-00069-SDD Document 415 06/10/19 Page 7 of 8

This Court has broad, equitable powers to remedy the violations of Plaintiffs’ voting rights. 

See, e.g., Doc. 319 at 2-3, 6-8. For these reasons, and those explained in Plaintiffs’ Corrected 

Memorandum Regarding the Special Master’s Report and Recommended Remedy, we urge this 

Court to accept the Special Master’s recommended Plan 2.

Respectfully submitted this 4th day of June, 2019.

/s/ Ronald L. Wilson
Ronald L. Wilson (LSBN 13575)
701 Poydras Street, Ste. 4100 
New Orleans, LA 70139 
T: (504) 525-4361 / F: (504) 525-4380 
cabral2@aol.com

Michael de Leeuw*, Cozen O’Connor 
William Lesser*
45 Broadway, 16th Floor
New York, NY 10006
T: (212) 908-1131 / F: (646) 461-2042
MdeLeeuw@cozen.com

/s/Leah C. Aden
Leah C. Aden* - **, NAACP LDF
40 Rector Street, 5th Floor
New York, NY 10006
T: (212) 965-2200 / F: (212) 226-7592
laden@naacpldf.org

Michaele N. Tumage Young*, NAACP LDF 
700 14th Street NW, Suite 600 
Washington, D.C. 20005 
T: (202) 216-5567/F: (202)682-1312 
mtumageyoung@naacpldf.org

*PRO HAC VICE / **TRIAL ATTORNEY Counsel for Plaintiffs

289 at 33-34 & n.187; see also Doc. 410 at 4 n.2.

7

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mailto:cabral2@aol.com
mailto:MdeLeeuw@cozen.com
mailto:laden@naacpldf.org
mailto:mtumageyoung@naacpldf.org


Case 3:14-cv-00069-SDD Document 415 06/10/19 Page 8 of 8

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing Plaintiffs ’ Response to Defendants ’ 

Respective Memoranda Regarding Special Master's Report and Recommended Remedy with this 

Court using the CM/ECF system, which provides notice of filing to all counsel of record.

Dated: June 4, 2019

/s/ Leah C. Aden
LEAH C. ADEN
NAACPLEGAL DEFENSE
AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC.
40 Rector Street, 5th Floor
New York, NY 10006
(212) 965-2200
(212) 229-7592 (fax)

8

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I c e rtify  th a t on N o v e m b e r 12, 2 0 1 9 ,1 e lec tro n ica lly  filed  th e  fo reg o in g  w ith  

th e  C le rk  o f  th e  C o u rt fo r th e  U n ited  S ta te s  C o u rt o f  A p p ea ls  fo r the  F ifth  C irc u it by  

u s in g  the  ap p e lla te  C M /E C F  sy stem , w h ic h  w ill au to m a tica lly  send  em ail 

n o tif ica tio n  to  all co u n se l o f  reco rd .

D ated : N o v e m b e r 1 2 ,2 0 1 9

/s/Leah C. Aden 
L eah  C. A d en
N A A C P  L egal D efen se  and 

E d u ca tio n a l F und , Inc. 
4 0  R ec to r S tree t, 5 th  F loo r 
N e w  Y o rk , N Y  10006 
T : (2 1 2 )9 6 5 -2 2 0 0  
F: (2 1 2 ) 2 2 6 -7 5 9 2

Attorney for Appellees