Memorandum to Visiting Editors

    IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION

RONALD BRADLEY and RICHARD 
BRADLEY, by their Mother and Next 
Friend, VERDA BRADLEY; JEANNE GO­
INGS, by her Mother and Next Friend, 
BLANCHE GOINGS; BEVERLY LOVE, 
JIMMY LOVE and DARRELL LOVE, by 
their Mother and Next Friend, CLARISSA 
LOVE; CAMILLE BURDEN, PIERRE 
BURDEN, AVA BURDEN, MYRA BUR­
DEN, MARC BURDEN and STEVEN 
BURDEN, by th e ir  Father and Next 
F rien d , MARCUS BURDEN; KAREN 
WILLIAMS AND KRISTY WILLIAMS, by 
their Father and Next Friend, C. WIL­
LIAMS; RAY LITT and Mrs. WILBUR 
BLAKE, parents; all parents having chil­
dren attending the public schools of the 
City of Detroit, Michigan, on their own be­
half and on behalf of their minor children, 
all on behalf of any persons similarly situ­
a ted ; and NATIONAL ASSOCIATION 
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLOR­
ED PEOPLE, DETROIT BRANCH,

Plaintiffs,
vs.

WILLIAM J. MILLIKEN, Governor of the 
State of Michigan and ex-officio member of 
M ichigan S ta te  Board o f Education; 
FRANK J. KELLEY, Attorney General of 
the State of Michigan; MICHIGAN STATE 
BOARD OF EDUCATION, a constitutional 
body corporate; JOHN W. PORTER, Act­
ing Superintendent of Public Instruction, 
Department of Education and ex-officio 
Chairman of Michigan State Board of Edu­
cation; BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE 
CITY OF DETROIT, a school district of

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) CIVIL ACTION 
) NO. 35257 
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the first class; PATRICK McDONALD, ) 
JAMES HATHAWAY and CORNELIUS ) 
GOLIGHTLY, members of the Board of ) 
Education of the City of Detroit; and ) 
NORMAN DRACHLER, Superintendent of ) 
the Detroit Public Schools, )

Defendants.

C O M P L A I N T

I.

The jurisdication of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 
Sections 1331(a), 1343(3) and (4), this being a suit in equity 
authorized by 42 U.S.C. Sections 1983, 1988 and 2000d, to re­
dress the deprivation under color of Michigan law, statute, custom 
and/or usage of rights, privileges and immunities guaranteed by the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of 
the United States. This action is also authorized by 42 U.S.C. Sec­
tion 1981 which provides that all persons within the jurisdiction 
of the United States shall have the same rights to the full and 
equal benefits of all laws and proceedings for the security of per­
sons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens. Jurisdiction is 
further invoked under 28 U.S.C. Sections 2201 and 2202, this be­
ing a suit for declaratory judgment declaring certain portions of 
Act No. 48 of the Michigan Public Acts of 1970 (a copy of which 
is attached hereto as Exhibit A) unconstitutional. This is also an 
action for injunctive relief against the enforcement of certain por­
tions of said Act No. 48 and to require the operation of the 
Detroit, Michigan public schools on a unitary basis.

II.

Plaintiffs, Ronald Bradley and Richard Bradley, by their 
Mother and Next Friend, Verda Bradley; Jeanne Goings, by her 
Mother and Next Friend, Blanche Goings; Beverly Love, Jimmy 
Love and Darrell Love, by their Mother and Next Friend, Clarissa 
Love; Camille Burden, Pierre Burden, Ava Burden, Myra Burden, 
Marc Burden and Steven Burden, by their Father and Next Friend,



I a 9

Marcus Burden; Karen Williams and Kristy Williams, by their 
Father and Next Friend, C. Williams; Ray Litt and Mrs. Wilbur 
Blake, parents, are all parents or minor children thereof attending 

‘-schools in the Detroit, Michigan public school system. All of the 
above-named plaintiffs are black except Ray Litt, who is white 

t and who joins with them to bring this action each in their own 
behalf and on behalf of their minor children and all persons simi­
larly situated.

P la in tiff , National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People, Detroit Branch, is an unincorporated association 
with offices at 242 East Warren Avenue, Detroit, Michigan, which 
sues on behalf of its membership who are members of the plaintiff 
class. Plaintiff, N.A.A.C.P., has as one of its purposes the advance­
ment of equal educational opportunities through the provision of 
integrated student bodies, faculty and staff.

III.

Plaintiffs, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, bring this action on their own behalf and on behalf of 
all persons in the City of Detroit similarly situated. There are com­
mon questions of law and fact affecting the rights of plaintiffs and 
the rights of the members of the class. The members of the class 
are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all be­
fore the Court. A common declaratory and injunctive relief is 
sought and plaintiffs adequately represent the interests of the 
members of the class.

IV.

The defendants are:

1. William J. Milliken, Governor of the State of Michigan 
and ex-officio member of the State Board of Education;

2. F rank  J. Kelley. Attorney General of the State of 
Michigan, who is responsible for enforcing the public acts and laws 
of the State of Michigan;



l a  10

3. The Michigan State Board of Education, a constitutional 
body corporate, which is generally charged with the power and re­
sponsibility of administering the public school system in the State 
of Michigan, including the City of Detroit;

4. John W. Porter, Acting Superintendent of Public Instruc­
tion, Department of Education, in the State of Michigan, and ex- 
officio member of the State Board of Education;

5. The Board of Education of the City of Detroit, a school 
district of the first class, organized and existing in Wayne County, 
Michigan, under and pursuant to the laws of the State of Michigan 
and operating the public school system in the City of Detroit 
Michigan;

6. P a trick  M cD onald, James Hathaway and Cornelius 
Golightly, all residents of Wayne County, Michigan, and elected 
members of the Board of Education of the City of Detroit;

7. The remaining board members of the Board of Education 
of the City of Detroit;

8. Norman Drachler, a resident of Wayne County, Michigan, 
and the appointed Superintendent of the Detroit Public Schools.

V.

Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment declaring the last sen­
tence of the first paragraph of Section 2a and the entirety of Sec­
tion 12 of Public Act No. 48 of the Michigan Public Acts of 1970 
unconstitutional.

The challenged portion of Section 2a reads as follows:

Regions shall be as compact, contiguous and nearly equal as
practicable.

Section 1 2 reads as follows:

The implementation of any attendance provisions for the



I a  11
>

1970-71 school year determined by any first class school dis­
trict board shall be delayed pending the date of commence­
ment of functions by the first class school district boards 
established under the provisions of this amendatory act but 
such provision shall not impair the right of any such board to 
determine and implement prior to such date such changes in 
attendance provisions as are mandated by practical necessity. 
In reviewing, confirming, establishing or modifying atten­
dance provisions the first class school district boards esta­
blished under the provisions of this amendatory act shall have 
a policy of open enrollment and shall enable students to 
attend a school of preference but providing priority accep­
tance, insofar as practicable, in cases of insufficient school 
capacity, to those students residing nearest the school and to 
those students desiring to attend the school for participation 
in vocationally oriented courses or other specialized curri­
culum.

Plaintiffs also seek a temporary restraining order and pre­
liminary and permanent injunctions against the enforcement of 
said provisions of Act 48.

VI.

This is also a proceeding for a permanent injunction enjoining 
the defendant, Board of Education of the City of Detroit, its 
members and the Superintendent of Schools from continuing their 
policy, practice, custom and usage of operating the public school 
system in and for the City of Detroit, Michigan in a manner which 
has the purpose and effect of perpetuating a biracial segregated 
public school system, and for other relief, as hereinafter more 
fully appears.

VII.

On August 11, 1969, the Governor of the State of Michigan 
approved Act No. 244 of the Public Acts of 1969 (Mich. Stats. 
Ann. Section 15.2298), said Act being entitled, “AN ACT to re­
quire first class school districts to be divided into regional districts 
and to provide for local district school boards and to define their



9-

powers and duties and the powers and duties of the first class dis­
trict board.” (A copy of Act No. 244 is attached hereto as Exhibit 
B). Act No. 244 applies exclusively to the Board of Education of 
the School District of the City of Detroit, that being the only first 
class school district in the State of Michigan. The essence of Act

a

No. 244 is that it provides the mandate and means for the admini­
strative decentralization of the Detroit school system and the ex­
tent thereof.

On March 2, 1970, the Detroit School Board’s attorney ren­
dered an opinion (attached hereto as Exhibit C) advising the Board 
that in effectuating decentralization under Act No. 244 the law 
imposed three limitations:

1. The Act itself required each district to have not less than 
25,000 nor more than 50,000 pupils;

2. The United States Constitution required each district to 
be in compliance with the “one man, one vote” principle;

3. The United States Constitution, above all, required that 
the districts be established on a racially desegregated basis.

VIII.

In the 1969-70 school year, the Detroit Board of Education 
operated 21 high school constellations providing a public educa­
tion for 281,101 school children (excluding 12,758 students not 
listed in high school constellations and in adult programs). 61.9% 
of these students were Negro, 36.4% were white, and 1.7% were of 
other racial-ethnic minorities. Of the 21 high school constellations 
operated by the Detroit School Board in 1969-70, 14 were racially 
identifiable as “ white” or “Negro” constellations. The high school 
constellations contain within them 208 elementary schools, 53 
junior high schools, and 21 senior high schools. Of the 208 ele­
mentary schools (enrolling 166,258 pupils), 114 (enrolling 92,225 
pupils) are identifiable as “Negro” schools and 71 (enrolling 
46,448 pupils) are identifiable as “ white” schools. Of the 53 
junior high schools (enrolling 63,476 pupils), 24 (enrolling 31,201 
pupils) are identifiable as “ Negro” schools and 18 (enrolling

la  12



I a 13

21,507 pupils) are identifiable as “white” schools. Of the 21 
senior high schools (enrolling 54,394 pupils, 11 (enrolling 25,351 
pupils) are identifiable as “Negro” schools and 6 (enrolling 19,183 
pupils) are identifiable as “white” schools.

IX.

On April 7, 1970, the Detroit Board of Education adopted a 
limited plan of desegregation (Exhibit D, attached hereto) for the 
senior high school level, which plan was to take effect on a stair­
step basis over a period of four years so that by 1972, there 
would be substantially increased racial integration. This plan for 
high school desegregation comtemplated a change in high school 
boundary lines, thereby changing the junior high feeder patterns in 
twelve of Detroit’s 21 senior high schools.. The plan was designed 
so that by the year 1972. only three (as compared to the present 
17) of Detroit’s senior high schools would be racially identifiable 
as “ Negro” or “ white” high schools. The plan also provided that a 
student presently enrolled in a junior high school and who has a 
brother or sister presently enrolled in a senior high school would 
continue in senior high school at the school his brother or sister 
was presently attending. All those presently enrolled in senior high 
school would not, due to the stair-step feature of the plan, be 
affected and they would continue through graduation at the segre­
gated senior high school they were presently attending. The April 
7 plan did not involve, nor did it affect, the existing racially segre­
gated pattern of pupil assignments in the elementary and junior 
high schools.

X.

On April 7, 1970, the Detroit Board of Education by a four- 
to-two vote (the seventh member, now deceased, expressing his 
approval by letter from his hospital bed) adopted a regional 
boundary plan (attached hereto as Exhibit D) for administrative 
decentralization consisting of --men regions. The seven regions as 
established by the Board on April 7.1970 contained an average of 
38,802 pupils per region with the smallest region containing 
33,043 pupils and the largest region containing 46,592 pupils, or a 
range of deviation of 13.549 pupils with an average deviation of



I a i 4♦

2,892 pupils per region. The racial complexion of the pupil enroll­
ment in the seven regions averaged 61.7% Negro with the lowest 
percent Negro region being 34.4% and the largest percent Negro 

. region being 76.7%, or a range of deviation of 42.3% Negro with 
an average regional deviation of 10.5% Negro.

XI.

The actions of the Detroit School Board on April 7, 1970 
approv ing  a desegregation plan resulted in expressions of 
“ community hostility” . A movement to recall the four members 
of the Detroit School Board who voted in favor of the April 7, 
1970 action was initiated by white citizens. The recall movement 
was resolved by the Detroit voters (of which a majority are white) 
at the August 4, 1970 election, which resulted in the removal of 
the four board members who had voted in favor of the April 7, 
1970 plan. The April 7th plan created a similar reaction in the 
Michigan State Legislature which culminated in the passage of 
Public Act 48, interposing the State and voiding the partial dese­
g regation  plan, which Act was approved by the defendant, 
Governor Milliken, on July 7, 1970.

XII.

On July 28, 1970, the attorney for the Detroit Board of 
Education rendered an opinion (attached hereto as Exhibit E) that 
Act 48 has both the design and the effect of completely elimi­
nating the provisions of the April 7th plan adopted by the Board. 
Section 2a of the Act provides that “ [rjegions shall be as com­
pact, contiguous and nearly equal in population as practicable.” 
This provision was intended to and does eliminate the efforts of 
the Board on April 7, 1970 to create racially integrated regions. 
Section 1 2 of Act 48 eliminates all provisions of the Board’s April 
7th plan aimed at desegregation of the Detroit public schools by, 
first, delaying the implementation of the attendance provisions 
until January 1, 1971 and, second, by mandating an open enroll­
ment (“ freedom of choice” ) policy qualified only by a provision 
providing students residing nearest a school with an attendance 
priority over those residing farther away. Section 1 2 has the fur­
ther effect of eliminating two policies of the Detroit Board of



I a 15

Education: (1) prior to the adoption of Act 48, a student could 
transfer to a school other than the one to which he was initially 
assigned only if his transfer would have the effect of increasing 
desegregation in the Detroit school system; (2) prior to the adop­
tion of Act 48, whenever pupils had to be bused to relieve over­
crowding, they were transported to the first and nearest school 
where their entry would increase desegregation.

XIII.

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 2a of Act 48, the defen­
dant, Governor William G. Milliken, on July 22, 1970 appointed a 
three-member commission known hereafter as the Detroit Boun­
dary Line Commission to draw the boundary lines for the eight 
public school election regions mandated by Act 48. On August 4, 
1970 the Detroit Boundary Line Commission adopted its plan and 
presented its boundary lines for the eight election regions as called 
for in Act 48. The Boundary Line Commission’s August 4th plan 
(a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit F) is a complete 
negation of the Board’s April 7th region plan. The August 4th plan 
creates eight regions with an average of 33,582 pupils in each 
region with a range of deviation of 19,942 (the largest region con­
tains 43,025 pupils while the smallest region contains 23,083) and 
an average deviation for each region of 22.9%. Under the plan 
adopted by the Detroit Boundary Line Commission on August 4, 
3 970, there will be new racially segregated school regions estab­
lished in the defendant school system.

XIV.

Section 12 of the Act was enacted with the express intent of 
preventing the desegregation of the defendant system. It applies to 
but one school district in the State and reestablishes a policy 
found by the United States Supreme Court to be an inadequate 
method for elimination of segregated school attendance patterns. 
It seeks to reverse a finding of the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Michigan in Sherrill School Parents Com­
mittee v. The Board o f  Ed. o f  the School District o f  the City o f  
Detroit, Michigan, No. 22092, E.D. Mich. Sept. 18, 1964, that the 
“Open School” program does not appear to be achieving substan-



I a 16

tial student integration in the Detroit School System presently or 
within the foreseeable future.

XV.

Plaintiffs allege that in the premises Public Act 48 on its face 
and as applied violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the Consti­
tution of the United States; the Act pertains solely to the Detroit 
Board of Education and thereby deliberately prohibits the Detroit 
Board of Education from making pupil assignments and estab­
lishing pupil attendance zones in a manner which all other school 
districts in the State of Michigan are free to do. Public Act 48 
thereby creates an irrational, unreasonable and arbitrary classifi­
cation which contravenes the equal protection and due process 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The distinction made by 
Public Act 48 is further unconstitutional by the fact that it applies 
solely to the Detroit school district where the bulk of Negro 
school children in the State of Michigan are concentrated.

XVI.

Public Act 48 further violates the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution in that the Act impedes the legally 
mandated integration of the public schools; the effect of the Act is 
to perpetuate the segregation and racial isolation of the past and 
give it the stamp of legislative approval. The Act, building upon 
the preexisting public and private housing segregation, has the pur­
pose, intent and effect of intensifying the present segregation and 
racial isolation in the Detroit public schools. The Act further vio­
lates the Fourteenth Amendment in that it constitutes a reversal 
by the State of Michigan of action taken by the Detroit School 
Board which action was consistent with and mandated by the Con­
stitution of the United States. In addition, Public Act 48 infringes 
upon the Thirteenth Amendment in that its effect is to relegate 
Negro school children in the City of Detroit to a position of 
inferiority and to assert the inferiority of Negroes generally, there­
by creating and perpetuating badges and incidents of slavery; and, 
also, in that it denies to black persons in Detroit the same rights to 
the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings as white 
citizens enjoy.



l a  17

XVII.

The defendants, Board of Education of the City of Detroit 
and Michigan State Board of Education, are charged under 
Michigan law and the Constitution and laws of the United States 
with the responsibility of operating a unitary public school system 
in the City of Detroit, Michigan.

XVIII.

Plaintiffs allege that they are being denied equal educational 
opportunities by the defendants because of the segregated pattern 
of pupil assignments and the racial identifiability of the schools in 
the Detroit public school system. Plaintiffs further allege that said 
denials of equal educational opportunities contravene and abridge 
their rights as secured by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amend­
ments to the Constitution of the United States.

XIX.

The plaintiffs allege that the defendants herein, acting under 
color of the laws of the State of Michigan, have pursued and are 
presently pursuing a policy, custom, practice and usage of oper­
ating, managing and controlling the said public school system in a 
manner that has the purpose and effect of perpetuating a segre­
gated public school system. This segregated public school system is 
based predominantly upon the race and color of the students 
attending said school system: attendance at the various schools is 
based upon race and color; and the assignment of personnel has in 
the past and remains to an extent based upon the race and color of 
the children attending the paiticular school and the race and color 
of the personnel to be assigned.

XX.

The plaintiffs allege that the racially discriminatory policy, 
custom, practice and usage described in paragraph XIX has in­
cluded assigning students, designing attendance zones for elemen­
tary junior and senior high schools, establishing feeder patterns to 
secondary schools, planning future public educational facilities.



l a  18

constructing new schools, and utilizing or building upon the 
existing racially discriminatory patterns in both public and private 
housing on the basis of the race and color of the children who are 
‘eligible to attend said schools. The said discriminatory policy, cus­
tom, practice, and usage has resulted in a public school system 

> composed of schools which are either attended solely or pre­
dominantly by black students or attended solely or predominantly 
by white students.

XXI.

The plaintiffs allege that the racially discriminatory' policy, 
custom, practice and usage described in paragraph XIX has also 
included assigning faculty and staff members employed by defen­
dants to the various schools in the Detroit school system on the 
basis of the race and color of the personnel to be assigned. Conse­
quently, a general practice has developed whereby white faculty 
and staff members have been assigned on the basis of their race 
and color to schools attended solely or predominantly by white 
students and Negro faculty and staff members have been assigned 
on the basis of their race and color to schools attended solely or 
predominantly by black students.

xxn.

The defendants have failed and refused to take all necessary 
steps to correct the effects of their policy, practice, custom and 
usage of racial discrimination in the operation of said school 
system and to insure that such policy, custom, practice and usage 
for the 1970-71 school year, and thereafter, will conform to the 
requirements of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.

XXIII.

Plaintiffs and those similarly situated and affected on whose 
behalf this action is brought are suffering irreparable injury and 
will continue to suffer irreparable injury by reason of the pro­
visions of the Act complained of herein and by reason of the 
failure or refusal of defendants to operate a unitary school system 
in the City of Detroit. Plaintiffs have no plain, adequate or com-



l a  19

plete remedy to redress the wrongs complained of herein other 
than this action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. 
Any other remedy to which plaintiffs could be remitted would be 
'attended by such uncertainties and delays as to deny substantial 
relief, would involve a multiplicity of suits and would cause fur­
ther irreparable injury. The aid of this Court is necessary in 

* assuring the citizens of Detroit and particularly the black public 
school children of the City of Detroit that this is truly a nation of 
laws, not of men, and that the promises made by the Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth Amendments are and will be kept.

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs respectfully pray that upon the 
Filing of this complaint the Court:

1. Issue, pendente life, a temporary restraining order and a 
preliminary injunction:

a. Requiring defendants, their agents and other persons 
acting in concert with them to put into effect the partial plan 
of senior high school desegregation adopted by the defendant, 
Detroit Board of Education, on April 7, 1970, which plan 
called for its implementation at the start of the 1970-71 
school term, provided, however: (1) that the plan shall not be 
e ffec ted  on a stair-step basis, but shall, in accord with 
Alexander v. Holmes County Board, 396 U.S. 19 (1969), be­
come completely and fully effective at the beginning of the 
coming (1970-71) school year; and (2) that those provisions 
which exclude a pupil who has a brother or sister presently 
enrolled in a senior high school from being affected by the 
plan shall be deleted in accord with Ross v. Dyer, 312 F.2d 
191 (5th Cir. 1963);

b. Restraining defendants, their agents and other per­
sons acting in concert with them from giving any force or 
effect to Sec. 1 2 of Act No. 48 of the Michigan Public Acts of 
1970 insofar as its application would impair or delay the dese­
gregation of the defendant system;

c. Restraining defendants from taking any steps to 
implement the August 4, 1970 plan, or any other plan, for



I a 20

new district or regional boundaries pursuant to Act 48, or 
from taking any action which would prevent or impair the 

, im p le m e n ta tio n  o f the regions established under the 
defendant Board’s earlier plan which provided for non-racially 
identifiable regions;

d. Restraining defendants from all further school con­
s t r uc t i on  until such t ime as a constitutional plan for 
operation of the Detroit public schools has been approved and 
new construction reevaluated as a part thereof;

e. Requiring defendants to assign by the beginning of 
the 1970-71 school year principals, faculty, and other school 
personnel to each school in the system in accordance with the 
ratio of white and black principals, faculty and other school 
personnel throughout the system.

2. Advance this cause on the docket and order a speedy 
hearing of this action according to law and upon such hearing:

a. Enter a judgment declaring the provisions of Act No. 
48 complained of herein unconstitutional on their face and as 
applied as violative of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amend­
ments to the United States Constitution;

b. Enter preliminary and permanent decrees perpetu­
ating the orders previously entered;

c. Enter a decree enjoining defendants, their agen 
employees and successors from continuing to employ policies, 
customs, practices and usages which, as described herein­
above, have the purpose and effect of leaving intact racially 
identifiable schools;

d. Enter a decree enjoining defendants, their agents, 
employees and successors from assigning students and/or 
operating the Detroit school system in a manner which re­
sults in students attending racially identifiable public schools;

e. Enter a decree requiring defendants, their agents.



I a 213?

employees and successors to assign teachers, principals and 
other school personnel to schools to eliminate the racial 
identity of schools by assigning such personnel to each school 
in accordance with the ratio of white and black personnel 
throughout the system.

f. Enter a decree enjoining defendants, their agents, 
employees and successors from approving budgets, making 
available funds, approving employment and construction con­
tracts, locating schools or school additions geographically, and 
approving policies, curriculum and programs, which are de­
signed to or have the effect of maintaining, perpetuating or 
supporting racial segregation in the Detroit school system.

g. Enter a decree directing defendants to present a com­
plete plan to be effective for the 1970-71 school year for the 
elimination of the racial identity of every school in the system 
and to maintain now and hereafter a unitary, nonracial school 
system. Such a plan should include the utilization of all 
methods of integration of schools including rezoning, pairing, 
grouping, school consolidation, use of satellite zones, and 
transportation.

h. Plaintiffs pray that the Court enjoin all further con­
struction until such time as a constitutional plan has been 
approved and new construction reevaluated as a part thereof.

i. Plaintiffs pray that this Court will award reasonable 
counsel fees to their attorneys for services rendered and to be 
rendered them in this cause and allow them all out-of-pocket 
expenses of this action and such other and additional relief as 
may appear to the Court to be equitable and just.

Respectfully submitted,

Nathaniel Jones, General Counsel 
N.A.A.C.P.
1790 Broadway 
New York, New York



Louis R. Lucas 
Ratner, Sugarmon & Lucas 
525 Commerce Title Building 
Memphis, Tennessee

Bruce Miller and 
Lucille Watts, Attorneys for 
Legal Redress Committee 
N.A.A.C.P., Detroit Branch 
3426 Cadillac Towers 
Detroit, Michigan, and 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs



*

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION

I a 497

RONALD BRADLEY, et al., j
Plaintiffs j

)
WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, et al., j

Defendants ) 
and |
DETROIT FEDERATION OF TEACHERS,)* ^ ^ * * * V 1 ,  p t v t i  A P T  JO N  ISin
LOCAL 231, AMERICAN FEDERA- )
TION OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO, j 35257

Defendant- )
Intervenor )

and . )
DENISE MAGDOWSKI, et al., )

)Defendants- )
Intervenor )

et al. !

r -  v  RjS.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
IN SUPPORT OF RULING

ON DESEGREGATION AREA AND DEVELOPMENT OF PLANS

On the basis of the entire record in this action, including 
particularly the evidence heard by the court from March 28 
through April 14. 1972. the court now makes the following 
Supplementary Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. It



' should be noted that the court has taken no proofs with respect 
to  the establishment o f the boundaries o f the 86 public school 
districts in the counties o f Wayne, Oakland and Macomb, nor 
on the issue o f  whether, with the exclusion o f the cHgr o f  
Detroit school district, such school districts have commitci; acts 
o f  de jure segregation.

INTRODUCTION

1. On September 27, 1971, this court issued its Rulsugon 
Issue of Segregation. On October 4, 1971, this court ismed 
from the bench guidelines to bind the parties in the submission 
of plans to remedy the constitutional violation found, ie ., 
school segregation; and in particular this court noted that the 
primary objective before us was to deveop and implement a 
plan which attempts to “achieve the greatest possible degree of 
actual desegregation, taking into account the practicalities of 
the situation.” The same day this court reiterated these require­
ments by orders “that the Detroit Board of Education submit a 
plan for the desegregation of its schools within 60 days** and 
“that the State defendants submit a metropolitan plan o f  de­
segregation within 120 days.” In response to these orders hear­
ings were held, and thereafter rulings issued, on Detroit-only 
plans (see Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Detroit- 
Only Plans of Desegregation) and on the propriety of con­
sidering remedies which extend beyond the corporate 
geographic limits of the City of Detroit. (See Ruling on Pro­
priety of Considering a Metropolitan Remedy to Accomplish 
Desegregation of the Public Schools of the City of Detroit.) 
Between March 28, 1972 and April 14, 1972, hearings were 
held on metropolitan proposals for desegregation of the Detroit 
public schools.

2. From the initial ruling on September 27, 1971, to  this 
day, the basis of the proceedings has been and remains the 
violation: de jure school segregation. Since Brown v. Board of 
Education the Supreme Court has consistently held that the 
remedy for such illegal segregation is desegregation. The racial 
history of this country is writ large by constitutional adjudica­
tion from Bred Scott v. Sanford to Plessy v. Fergusmt to

1*498



I a 499

Brown. The message in Brown was simple: The Fourteenth 
Amendment was to be applied full force in public schooling. 
The Court held that “state-imposed” school segregation 
immeasurably taints the education received by all children in 
the public schools; perpetuates racial discrimination and a his­
tory of public action attaching a badge of inferiority to the 
black raoe in a public forum which importantly shapes the 
minds and hearts of succeeding generations of our young 
people; and amounts to an invidious racial classification. Since 
Brown the Supreme Court has consistently, and with increasing 
force, held that the remedy upon finding de jure segregation is 
prompt and maximum actual desegregation of the public 
schools by all reasonable, feasible, and practicable means avail­
able. This court finds that there is nothing in the law, wisdom, 
or facts, and the particular circumstances and arguments, 
presented in this case which suggest anything except the affir­
mance of these principles in both fact and law.

3. The task before this court, therefore, is now, and, since 
September 27, 1971, has always been, how to desegregate the 
Detroit public schools. The issue, despite efforts of the inter- 
venors to suggest a new rationale for a return to the discredited 
“separate but equal” policy, * is not whether to desegregate. 
That question has been foreclosed by the prior and settled com­
mands of the Supreme Court and the. Sixth Circuit. Our duty 
now is to “grapple with the flinty, intractable realities” 2 Qf 
implementing the constitutional commands.

4. In the most recent set of hearings, several issues were 
addressed generally, including appropriate methods of pupils 
reassignment to desegregate schools; quality and capacity of 
school facilities; transportation needs incident to school de­
segregation; the effects of new school construction, and 
judicially established controls thereon, on any plan of de­
segregation; the reassignment of faculty and restructuring of 
facilities incident to pupil reassignment to accomplish school 
desegregation: appropriate and necessary interim and final 
administrative and financial arrangements; appropriate com­
munity, parental, staff, and pupil involvement in the deseg­
regation process; and attention to individual, cultural, and



l a  500

ethnic values, respect, dignity and identity. But the primary 
question addressed by these hearings, in the absence of submis­

sion of a complete desegregation plan by the state, remains the 
determination of the area necessary and practicable effectively 
to eliminate “ root and branch” the effects of state-imposed and 

* supported segregation and to desegregate the Detroit public 
schools.

SUPPLEMENTARY FINDINGS OF FACT

A. The Desegregation Area

5. The State Board of Education filed six (6) “plans” 
without recommendation or preference; intervening defendants 
Magdowski, et al., filed a proposal for metropolitan desegrega­
tion which included most of the tri-county area; the defendant 
Detroit Board of Education filed a proposal for metropolitan 
desegregation which included the entire tri-county area. 3 At 
the hearing plaintiffs presented a modification of the three pro­
posals which actually described areas within which pupil deseg­
regation was to be accomplished.

6. In the consideration of metropolitan plans of deseg­
regation of the Detroit public schools, the State defendants 
stand as the primary defendants. They bear the initial burden of 
coming forward with a proposal that promises to work. In the 
context of this case, they represent the “school authorities ” 4 
to whom equity courts traditionally have shown deference in 
these matters.  ̂ Yet in its submission without recommendation 
of six (6) “plans” the State Board of Education has failed to 
meet, or even attempt to meet, that burden and none of the 
other State defendants has filled the void.

7. The State Board refused to make any recommenda­
tions to the court about the appropriate area for desegregation. 
In State Defendant Porter’s words, the State Board “didn’t 
make a decision, period.” Defendants Milliken and Kelley 
merely filed objections to all six (6) plans.

8. Three of the State “plans” merely proposed concepts 
alternative to maximum actual desegregation. The Racial 
Proportion Plan described a statistical method of determining the



I a 501

number of transfers involved in achieving a particular racial 
'ratio in each school once an area of desegregation had been 
chosen. The Equal Educational Opportunity and Quality 
Integration Plan was admitted to be a non-plan and described 
criteria for education which, in whole or part, might, or might 
not, be applicable to any school system.

9. Only one State “plan,” the Metropolitan District Re­
organization Plan, attempted to describe an area within which 
desegregation should occur, called the “initial operating zone” 
(sometimes referred to hereafter as the “ State Proposal”). That 
“plan,” however, was primarily concerned with discussing a new 
governance structure for the desegregation area. Pupil reassign­
ment was mentioned only in passing and no foundation was laid 
by State defendants for the particular area of desegregation 
described. Further, it suffered from the default of the State 
defendants by their stubborn insistence that under their self- 
serving, and therefore self-limiting, view of their powers they 
were free to ignore the clear order of this court and abdicate 
their responsibility vested in them by both the Michigan and 
Federal Constitution for supervision of public education and 
equal protection for all citizens.

10. From the very limited evidence in the record in sup­
port of the area in that state proposal, the primary foundation 
appears to be the particular racial ratio attained in that plan, 
approximately 65% black, 35% white, with the provision that 
the area could be expanded if “white flight” ensued. In the 
absence of any other persuasive foundation, such area is not 
based on any definable or legally sustainable criteria for either 
inclusion or exclusion of particular areas; and the concept of an 
“initial operating zone” raises serious practical questions, which 
should be avoided if a more permanent solution is now possible. 
In short, the area described by the “ initial operating zone” does 
not appear to be based primarily on relevant factors, like elim­
inating racially identifiable schools; accomplishing maximum 
actual desegregation of the Detroit public schools; or avoiding, 
where possible, maintaining a pattern of schools substantially 
disproportionate to the relevant school community’s racial com­
position by force of deliberate action by public authority. Nor.



I a 502

on the evidence in this record, is the “initial operating zone” 
based on any practical limitation of reasonable times and dis­
tances for transportation of pupils. These factors seem to have 
played little part in the creation of the “ initial operating zone” 
and are reflected less in its result.

11. At the hearings, moreover, the State defendants did 
not purport to present evidence in support, or even in opposi­
tion, to the State Proposal. The State, despite prodding by the 
court, presented only one witness, who merely explained what 
appeared on the face of the various State “Plans” submitted. 
The State’s cross examination of witnesses was of no assistance 
to the court in ascertaining any preference, legal or educational. 
Put bluntly, State defendants in this hearing deliberately chose 
not to assist the court in choosing an appropriate area for effec­
tive desegregation of the Detroit public schools. Their resistance 
and abdication of responsibility throughout has been consistent 
with the other failures to meet their obligations noted in the 
court’s earlier rulings. Indeed, some of the submissions spoke as 
clearly in opposition to desegregation as did the legislature in 
Sec. 12 of Act 48 ruled unconstitutional by the Sixth Circuit.

12. In such circumstances little weight or deference can be 
given to the unsupported submission of the State Board of 
Education. In light of the available alternatives and the facts 
produced at the hearing bearing on the issue, the court finds 
that State defendants offered no basis for ruling that the “initial 
operating zone” is the appropriate area within which to effec­
tively desegregate the Detroit public schools.

13. Similarly, the newly intervening, defendant school dis­
tricts did not attempt at the hearing to assist the court in 
determining which area was appropriate to accomplish effective 
desegregation. They were given the opportunity, by express 
written order and several admonitions during the course of the 
hearings, to assist the court in the task at hand but chose in 
their best judgment instead, in the main, to suggest their view 
that separate schools were preferable. The failure of the group 
of 40 districts to even comment that the court should exclude 
certain districts under any number of available rationales may in



part be explained by the awkward position chosen by them and 
their counsel of having single representation for districts on 
different sides of the various suggested perimeters.

14. The plans of intervening defendants Magdowski, et al., 
and the defendant Detroit Board of Education are similar. With 
slight variations they include the entire tri-county, metropolitan 
Detroit area, with that area divided into several regions or 
clusters to make the planning for accomplishing desegregation 
more manageable. Although both have as their main objective 
desegregation, their larger area arises primarily from a heavy 
emphasis on such factors as white flight and an appropriate 
socio-economic balance in each cluster and school. 6

15. The authors of the Detroit Board and Magdowski 
plans readily admit that the regions or clusters for pupil reas­
signment which involve Mt. Clemens and Pontiac are not direct­
ly related to desegregation of the Detroit public schools and 
may be disregarded without any substantial adverse effect on 
accomplishing our objective. No other party has expressed any 
disagreement with that view. And the court finds that these two 
regions or clusters, for purposes of pupil reassignment, need not 
be included at this time in the desegregation area.

16. With the elimination of these two clusters there are, 
then, three basic proposals to be considered for the desegrega­
tion area: the State Proposal; the Detroit Board Proposal, and 
the proposal of defendant-intervenors Magdowski, et al. In 
addition, as noted, plaintiffs filed a modification of these three 
proposals.

17. Each of these proposals starts from the same two 
premises: (1) the tri-county area 7 constitutes the relevant 
school community which can serve as an initial benchmark in 
beginning the evaluation of how to effectively eliminate the 
racial segregation of Detroit schools; (2) but in some instances 
reasonable time and distance limitations for pupil transporta­
tion, and in other instances the actual area required to eliminate 
the pattern of racially identifable schools, limit the area within 
which pupil reassignment should occur. In terms of proof, put­
ting aside arguments of impotence by the State defendants,

I a 503



I a 504

there was absolutely no contradictory evidence on these two 
criteria. The entire tri-county area includes areas, pupils, and 
schools in 86 school districts; it includes approximately one 
million students, of whom approximately 20% are black. Based 
on the evidence concerning school and non-school factors, 8 
and reasonable time and distance limitations for pupil transpor­
tation, the court finds that both premises are accurate.9

18. The State Proposal includes the areas, pupils and 
school in 36 school districts, approximately 550,000 students 
are included of whom 36% are black. The Detroit Board Pro­
posal (excluding clusters 8 and 12) includes the areas, pupils, 
and schools in 69 school districts; approximately 850,000 stu­
dents are included, of whom 25% are minority. ^  The CCBE 
Proposal includes the areas, pupils, and schools in some 62 
school districts; approximately 777,000 students are included 
of whom 197,000 (25.4%) are black. Plaintiffs’ Proposal 
includes the areas, pupils, and schools in 54 school districts; 
approxim ately 780,000 students are included, of whom 
197,000(25.3%) are black.

19. The State Proposal approaches what may be con­
sidered a substantial disproportion in the context of this case. It 
is to be remembered that within any desegregation area, the 
racial composition of desegregated schools will vary from the 
area’s racial mix. Given the variations in school plant, demo­
graphic and geographic factors, limiting the desegregation area 
to the State Proposal would result in some schools being sub­
stantially disproportionate in their racial composition to the 
tri-county area, and other schools racially identifable, all with­
out any justification in law or fact. This finding is supported by 
the lack of any apparent justification for the desegregation area 
described by the State Proposal except a desire to achieve an 
arbitrary racial ratio.

20. Transportation of children by school bus is a common 
practice throughout the nation, in the state of Michigan, and in 
the tri-county area. Within appropriate time limits it is a con­
siderably safer, more reliable, healthful and efficient means of 
getting children to school than either car pools or walking, and 
this is especially true for younger children.



I a 505

21. In Michigan and the tri-county area, pupils often 
spend upwards of one hour, and up to one and one half hours, 
one-way on the bus ride to school each day. Consistent with its 
interest in the health, welfare and safety of children and in 
avoiding impingement on the educational process, state educa­
tional authorities routinely fund such transportation for school 
children. Such transportation of school children is a long­
standing, sound practice in elementary and secondary education 
in this state and throughout the country. And the court finds 
such transportation times, used by the state and recommended 
here, are reasonable in the circumstances here presented and 
will not endanger the health or safety of the child nor impinge 
on the educational process. For school authorities or private 
citizens to now object to such transportation practices raises the 
inference not of hostility to pupil transportation but rather 
racially motivated hostility to the desegregated school at the 
end of the ride.

22. The Plaintiffs’ Proposal made reference to P.M.8, 
based on the TALUS regional transportation and travel times 
study. Although there was dispute over the meaning of the 
study, such studies are deemed sufficiently reliable that major 
governmental agencies customarily rely on their projection for a 
variety of planning functions. When used by the plaintiffs, P.M. 
8, in conjunction with the Detroit Board’s survey of maximum 
school to school travel times, served as a rough guideline within 
which the plaintiffs’ modification of other proposals attempted 
to stay in an effort to provide maximum desegregation without 
any more transportation time than is required to desegregate. 
This court finds that the utilization of these two factors, and 
the lower travel time estimates which should result, is a reason­
able basis for the modification in the circumstances of this case. 
The court’s duty and objective is not to maximize transporta­
tion but to maximize desegregation and within that standard it 
will always be reasonable to minimize transportation. To that 
end the court has accepted the more conservative perimeter for 
the desegregation area suggested as a modification by plaintiffs 
because it provides no less effective desegregation.

23. Based on these criteria, the State Proposal is too nar­
rowly drawn.



I a 506

24. Based on these criteria, parts of the Detroit Board 
Proposal are too sweeping.

25. Based on these criteria, the CCBE Proposal and the 
Plaintiffs’ Proposal, roughly approximate the area so de-

* scribed * *.

26. There is general agreement among the parties, and the 
court so finds, that on the west the areas, schools, and pupils in 
the Huron, Van Buren, Northville, Plymouth and Novi districts 
12 (1) are beyond the rough 40-minute travel time line; (2) are 
not necessary to effectively desegregate schools involved in the 
regions and clusters abutting those schools; and, (3) at this 
writing, are not otherwise necessary, insofar as pupil assignment 
is concerned, to provide an effective remedy now and hereafter. 
(See Findings 63-69 below.)

27. In the southwest the school districts of Woodhaven, 
Gibralter, Flat Rock, Grosse lie and Trenton are within reason­
able time and distance criteria set forth above. These virtually 
all-white districts are included in the Detroit Board Proposal but 
excluded from the plaintiffs’ modification. The areas, schools 
and pupils in such school districts are similarly not necessary to 
effectively desegregate. (Clusters 13, 14, and 15 in Plaintiffs’ 
Proposal are 20.5%, 24.4% and 22.7% black respectively.) There 
is nothing in the record which suggests that these districts need 
be included in the desegregation area in order to disestablish the 
racial identifiability of the Detroit public schools. From the 
evidence, the primary reason for the Detroit School Board’s 
interest in the inclusion of these school districts is not racial 
desegregation but to increase the average socio-economic 
balance of all the schools in the abutting regions and clusters. In 
terms of what this court views as the primary obligation estab­
lished by the Constitution — racial desegregation — the court 
deems the proper approach is to be more conservative: the 
court finds it appropriate to confine the desegregation area to 
its smallest effective limits. This court weighs more heavily the 
judicially recognized concern for limiting the time and distance 
of pupil transportation as much as possible, consistent with the 
constitutional requirement to eliminate racially identifiable 
schools, than a concern for expanding the desegregation area to



I a 507

raise somewhat the average socio-economic balance of a rela­
tively few clusters of schools. * 3

28. To the north and northeast, the only major disagree­
ment  among the Detroit Board Proposal and plaintiffs’ 
modification relates to the areas, schools, and pupils in the 
Utica School District. This district is a virtually all-white, long, 
relatively narrow area extending several miles in a north-south . 
direction away from the city of Detroit. Only the southern part 
of the district is within the rough, TALUS 40-minute travel 
time line.

29. The Detroit Board argues that Utica should be includ­
ed in order to raise the average socio-economic balance of the 
abutting clusters and schools. In this instance, however, the 
overall racial composition of the cluster, 27.0% black, may tend 
toward disproportionate black relative to the tri-county starting 
point.

30. Mr. Henrickson, the planner for the Board, also sug­
gested that Cluster 3 of Plaintiffs’ Proposal, because of its 
omission of Utica, might present some problems, which he 
admitted could be solved, in designing a plan of pupil reassign­
ment for the desegregation of schools. (See Findings 34-39 
below.)

31. In light of these relevant, and competing, considera­
tions the question presented by the Utica situation is close; 
however, at this writing, the court determines that the areas, 
schools, and pupils in the Utica School District need not be 
included, and therefore, should not be included in the deseg­
regation area.  ̂4

32. The court Finds that the appropriate desegregation 
area is described by plaintiffs’ modification of the three primary 
proposals. Within that area the racial identifiability of schools 
may be disestablished by implementation of an appropriate 
pupil desegregation plan. The area as a whole is substantially 
proportionate to the tri-county starting point. Within the area it 
is practicable, feasible, and sound to effectively desegregate all 
schools without imposing any undue transportation burden on 
the children or on the state’s system of public schooling. The



I a 508

time or distance children need be transported to desegregate 
schools in the area will impose no risk to the children’s health 
and will not significantly impinge on the educational process.

B. Ousters

33. The Detroit Board Proposal makes use of 16 regions 
or clusters. These clusters range from 36,000 to 105,000 pupils 
and from 17.5% to 29.7% “minority.” The clusters are arranged 
along major surface arteries and utilize the “skip,” or non­
contiguous zoning, technique to minimize the time and distance 
any child need spend in transit. The use of these clusters basical­
ly subdivides the planning for pupil reassignment within the 
desegregation area into a series of smaller, manageable and 
basically independent plans. Thus, although as the new inter- 
venors suggest devising a desegregation plan for a system with 
some 800,000 pupils has never been attempted, the practical 
'and manageable reality is that desegregation plans for systems 
with from 36,000 to 100,000 pupils has been done and such 
plans have been implemented.

34. Plaintiffs’ Proposal uses the same cluster technique 
and the same clusters, modified to fit the desegregation area. 
The 15 clusters range from 27,000 to 93,000 pupils and from 
20.5% to 30.8% black. Only three relevant objections were 
raised by Mr. Henrickson, to the clusters as modified.

35. First, Cluster 4 was challenged as “concealing” a 
“problem,” namely effective desegregation of other schools 
resulting from the omission of Utica from plaintiffs’ modifica­
tion. On cross-examination Mr. Henrickson admitted that the 
“problem” of actual pupil desegregation for these other schools 
could be “solved,” that all schools within Cluster 4 could be 
affectively desegregated, and that Cluster 4 was smaller than the 
Detroit Board Cluster 6. The objection was thus narrowed to 
the possibility that a suburban high school constellation feeder 
pattern might have to be split between two Detroit high school 
constellation feeder patterns in order to desergregate. Several of 
the Detroit Board’s clusters, however, also contain two Detroit 
high school feeder patterns.



I a 509

36. This objection, splitting an existing feeder pattern, 
was raised directly in reference to Cluster 12. In neither 
instance, however, did Mr. Henrickson suggest that the time or 
distance of transportation involved was too long or that it would 
present administrative difficulty in devising a pupil assignment 
plan for either cluster. The objection relates solely to a matter 
of administrative convenience, namely the use of existing feeder 
patterns in preparing pupil assignments. For example, Mr. 
Henrickson previously admitted that in drawing a pupil assign­
ment plan, an alternative to use of existing feeder patterns 
would be to “wipe the slate clean,” and disregard existing 
feeder patterns. In fact one of the State plans suggested use of 
census tracts as an alternative. 1  ̂On numerous occasions in the 
past Mr. Henrickson himself has reassigned parts of one feeder 
pattern to another school in order to relieve overcrowding 
and/or accomplish desegregation. The objection to such 
practice, therefore, is admittedly insubstantial.

37. The third objection relates to the exchange of Detroit 
Northern for Detroit Murray in Clusters 6 and 15 requiring that 
the students transported, if they proceed on their entire journey 
by way of the expressway, encounter an interchange which 
tends to be rather slow-moving. Such transportation time and 
distance, however, is well within the rough criteria for reason­
ableness and is shorter than or comparable to the maximum 
trips required in the Detroit Board’s clusters. In other instances, 
Mr. Henrickson admitted that pupils in the Detroit proposal 
might also have to travel through similar interchanges. More­
over, the objection to this particular increase in travel time must 
be weighed against the apparent general decrease in time which 
would be required in plaintiffs’ modified clusters as compared 
with the Detroit Board’s clusters. In any event the desegregation 
panel, based on its investigation of all aspects of pupil assign­
ment, remains free to suggest a modification of these clusters in 
order to reduce the time and number of children requiring 
transportation.

38. With that caveat, the court finds that plaintiffs’ 
modification of the Detroit Board’s clusters provides a 
workable, practicable, and sound framework for the design of a 
plan to desegregate the Detroit public schools.



C. PupH Assignment and Transportation.

39. Example o f various methods of pupil assignment to 
accomplish desegregation have been brought to the attention of 
the court by the parties: pairing, grouping, and clustering of 
schools; various strip, skip, island, and non-contiguous zoning; 
various lotteries based on combinations of present school assign­
ment, geographic location, name, or birthday. Judicious use of 
these techniques — coupled with reasonable staggering of school 
hours and maximizing use of existing transportation facilities — 
can lead to maximum actual desegregation with a minimum of 
additional transportation.

40. Quite apart from desegregation, under any circum­
stances, transportation for secondary pupils living more than \Vz 
miles, and elementary pupils, living more than 1 mile from 
school, is often demanded by parents and should be provided. 
Moreoever, it is essential to the effectiveness of any desegrega­
tion plan that transportation be provided free to all students 
requiring it under that criteria. (Brewer v. Norfolk Board of 
Education,____F. 2d_____ (April 1972) (4th Cir.)

41. In the recent past more than 300,000 pupils in the 
tri-county area regularly rode to school on some type of bus;, 
this figure excludes the countless children who arrive at school 
in car pools, which are many, many times more dangerous than 
riding on the school bus.

42. Throughout the state approximately 35-40% of all stu­
dents arrive at school on a bus. In school districts eligible for 
state reimbursement of transportation costs in the three 
affected counties, the percent of pupils transported in 1969-70 
ranged from 42 to 52%.

43. In comparison approximately 40%, or 310,000, of the 
780,000 children within the desegregation area will require 
transportation iii order to accomplish maximum actual deseg­
regation.

44. Hence, any increase in the numbers of pupils to be 
transported upon implementation of a complete desegregation 
plan over the number presently transported, relative to the state

I a 510



I a 511

and the tri-county area, should be minimal. Indeed, any increase 
may only reflect the greater numbers of pupils who would be 
transported in any event but for the state practice, which af­
fected the segregation found in this case, and which denies state 

Reimbursement to students and districts wholly within city 
limits regardless of the distance of the child from the school to 
which assigned. ^ (R u lin g  on Issue of Segregation at 14.) The 
greatest change is the direction of the buses.

45. There is uncontradicted evidence that the actual 
cost of transportation for a two-way plan of desegregation 
should be no greater than 50 to 60 dollars per pupil trans­
ported, comparable to the present costs per pupil through 
the state. Increases in the total costs of pupil transportation in 
the desegregation area, therefore, will result primarily from pro­
viding all children requiring transportation a free ride instead of 
imposing the costs of transportation for many on the families in 
districts which are ineligible for state reimbursement and which 
fail to provide transportation.

46. By multiple use of buses, careful routing, and econo­
mies of scale resulting from a comprehensive system of pupil 
transportation, it may be possible to achieve savings in per pupil 
costs. For example in 1969-1970 many school districts in the 
tri-county area which used the same bus for even two loads per 
day lowered their per pupil costs to $40 or less. In a co­
ordinated, urban pupil transportation system it may be possible 
to raise the bus use factor to three of more. (See “First Report” 
State Survey and Evaluation.)

47. In the tri-county area in the recent past there were 
approximely 1,800 buses (and another 100 smaller vans) used 
for the transportation of pupils. Assuming a rough average of 50 
pupils per bus carrying three loads of students per day, this 
transportation fleet may prove sufficient to carry some 270,000 
pupils.

48. Various public transit authorities now transport an 
additional 60,000 pupils on their regular public runs.

49. The degree to which these plausible bus-use factors



I a S12

can be realized to  their maximum, and whether these public 
transit facilities may be fully utilized in a plan o f desegregation, 
must be answered upon careful investigation by a panel o f ex­
perts.

50. There is no disagreement among the parties, and the 
court so finds, that additional transportation facilities, at least 
to the number o f 3 SO buses, will have to  be purchased to  meet 
the increase in the number o f students who should be provided 
transportation for either an interim or final plan o f desegrega­
tion.

51. For all the reasons stated heretofore — including time, 
distance, and transportation factors — desegregation within the 
area described in physically easier and more practicable and 
feasible, than desegregation efforts limited to the corporate 
geographic limits of the city of Detroit.

52. The issue of transportation of kindergarten children, 
and their inclusion in part or in full in the desegregation plan, 
may require further study. There was general agreement among 
the experts who testified that kindergarten, but for “political” 
considerations, should be included, if practicable, in the deseg­
regation plan. Kindergarten, however, is generally a half-day 
program. Transportation of kindergarten children for upwards 
of 45 minutes, one-way, does not appear unreasonable, harmful, 
or unsafe in any way. In the absence of some compelling justifi­
cation, which does not yet appear, kindergarten children should 
be included in the final plan of desegregation.

53. Every effort should be made to insure that transporta­
tion and reassignment of students to accomplish desegregation 
is “two-way” and falls as fairly as possible on both races. 
Although the number of black and white children transported 
and reassigned at the outset will be roughly equal, it is 
inevitable that a larger proportion of black children will be 
transported for a greater proportion of their school years than 
white children, if transportation overall is to be minimized. To 
mitigate this disproportion, every effort should be made at the 
outset to randomize the location of particular grade centers. In 
the short term, full utilization of vastly under-capacity inner-



I a 513

city schools may also help to mitigate the disproportion for 
some black children; and in the long term, new school capacity, 
consistent with other constitutional commands and the overall 
needs of the desegregation area and the surrounding area, should 
be added in Detroit, in relative proximity to concentrations of 
black student residence.

D. Restructuring of Facilities and 
Reassignment of Teachers

54. In the reassignment of pupils to accomplish deseg­
regation the court finds that facilities must be substantially 
reallocated and faculty substantially reassigned by reason of the 
clustering, pairing and grouping of schools.

55. In order to make the pupil desegregation process fully 
effective the court finds that it is essential to integrate faculty 
and staff and to insure that black faculty and staff representa­
tion at every school is more than token. The court has pre­
viously found and reaffirms that “a quota or racial balance in 
each school which is equivalent to the system-wide ratio and 
without more” is educationally unsound, and that the desid­
eratum is the balance of staff by qualifications for subject and 
grade level, and then by race, experience and sex. It is obvious, 
given the racial composition of the faculty and staff in the 
schools in the metropolitan plan area, and the adjusted racial 
composition of the students, that vacancies and increases and 
reductions in faculty and staff cannot effectively achieve the 
needed racial balance in this area of the school operation. 
Active steps must be taken to even out the distribution of black 
teachers and staff throughout the system.

56. In the desegration area approximately 16% of the 
faculty and 12% of the principals and assistant principals are 
black. In this context “token” means roughly less than 10% 
black. Moreover, where there is more than one building adminis­
trator in any school, a bi-racial administrative team is required 
wherever possible.

57. Every effort should be made to hire and promote, and 
to increase such on-going efforts as there may be to hire and



I a 514

promote, additional black faculty and staff. Because of the 
system atic and substantial under-employment of black 
administrators and teachers in the tri-county area, an affirma­
tive program for black employment should be developed and 
implemented.

58. The rated capacity of classrooms in the Detroit public 
schools is 32; in some of the suburban districts the average rated 
capacity is as low as 24 or 25. Utilization should be redeter­
mined on a uniform basis.

59. In respect to faculty and staff, school facilities, and 
the utilization of existing school capacity, normal administra­
tive practice in handling the substantial reallocation and reas­
signment incident to pupil desegregation should produce 
schools substantially alike.

60. In the circumstances of this case, the pairing, grouping 
and clustering of schools to accomplish desegregation with 
minimum transportation often requires use of grade arrange­
ments such as K-4, K-5, or even K-6. In so planning pupil reas­
signments, it is sometimes necessary, and often administratively 
practicable, to include grades K-8 or even K-9 to achieve the 
maximum actual desegregation with the minimum trans­
portation. Grade structures in most elementary schools in the 
desegregation area is a basic K-6; however, almost all other 
combinations are found. They differ within and among various 
districts.

61. In the reassignments of pupils and teachers and the 
reallocation of equipment and facilities required to accomplish 
desegregation, the elementary grades and schools present rela­
tively few administrative difficulties, while the high school 
grades and facilities present the greater difficulties, particularly 
with respect to scheduling and curriculum.

62. For these reasons, if it develops that interim choices 
must be made because of the impossibility of immediate deseg­
regation of all grades, schools, and clusters in the desegregation 
area, the weight of the evidence is, and the court so finds, that 
desegregation should begin first at the earliest grades for entire



I a 515

elementary school groupings throughout as many clusters as 
, possible.

E. School Construction

63. Relative to suburban districts the Detroit public 
schools, as a whole, are considerably over-capacity. (See also 
Finding 58, supra.) To alleviate this overcrowding equalize rated 
capacity and minimize and equalize transportation burdens 
borne by black pupils in the city, needed new school capacity, 
consistent with other requirements of a desegregation plan, 
should be added on a priority basis in the city of Detroit.

64. Relevant to the court’s choice of a desegregation area 
more limited than the Detroit Board Proposal is the testimony, 
elecited on cross-examination from two of the primary authors 
of that proposal, related to the effects of controlling new school 
construction. The broader area in the Detroit proposal was 
chosen without any real consideration of the impact of control­
ling school construction in an area larger than the desegregation 
area. Upon reflection, both Dr. Flynn and Mr. Henrickson 
admitted that closely scrutinizing and limiting the addition of 
capacity to areas outside the desegregation area might lead them 
to re-evaluate the need, in the context of maintaining now and 
hereafter a unitary system, to include an area as sweeping as 
recommended by the Detroit Board Proposal.

65. In our Ruling on Issue of Segregation, pp. 8-10, this 
court found that the “residential segregation throughout the 
larger metropolitan area is substantial, pervasive and of long 
standing” and that “governmental actions and inaction at all 
levels, Federal, State and local, have combined with those of 
private organizations, such as loaning institutions and real estate 
associations and brokerage Firms, to establish and to maintain 
the pattern of associations and brokerage firms, to establish and 
to maintain the pattern of residential segregation through the 
Detroit metropolitan area.” We also noted that this deliberate 
setting of residential patterns had an important effect not only 
on the racial composition of inner-city schools but the entire 
School District of the City of Detroit. (Ruling on Issue of Seg­
regation at 3-10.) Just as evident is the fact that suburban



I a 516

school districts in the main contain virtually all-white schools. 
The white population of the city declined and in the suburbs 
grew; the black population in the city grew, and largely was 

’contained therein by force of public and private racial discrim­
ination at all levels.

66. We also noted the important interaction of school and 
residential segregation: “Just as there is an interaction between 
residential patterns and the racial composition of the schools, so 
there is a corresponding effect on the residential pattern by the 
racial composition of schools.” Ruling on Issue of Segregation 
at 10. Cf. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg, 402 U.S. 1, 20-21 
(1971); “People gravitate toward school facilities, just as 
schools as located in response to the needs of people. The loca­
tion of schools may thus influence the patterns of residential 
development of a metropolitan area and have important impact 
on composition of inner city neighborhoods.”

67. Within the context of the segregatory housing market, 
it is obvious that the white families who left the city schools 
would not be as likely to leave in the absence of schools, not to 
mention white schools, to attract, or at least serve, their chil­
dren. 18 Immigrating families were affected in their school and 
housing choices in a similar manner. Between 1950 and 1969 in 
the tri-county area, approximately 13,900 “regular classrooms,” 
capable of serving and attracting over 400,000 pupils, ^  were 
added in school districts which were less than 2% black in their 
pupil racial composition in the 1970-71 school year. (P.M. 14; 
P.M. 15).

68. The precise effect of this massive school construction 
on the racial composition of Detroit area public schools cannot 
be measured. It is clear, however, that the effect has been sub­
stantial. 20 Unfortunately, the State, despite its awareness of 
the important impact of school construction and announced 
policy to control it, acted “in keeping generally, with the 
discriminatory practices which advanced or perpetuated racial 
segregation in these schools.” Ruling on Issue of Segregation at 
15; see also id., at 13.

69. In addition to the interim re-evaluation of new school



I a 517

construction required in the order, pursuant to the State 
Board’s own requirements, the final plan will consider other 

•appropriate provisions for future construction throughout the 
metropolitan area.

» F. Governance, Finance and Administrative Arrangements

70. The plans submitted by the State Board, the Detroit 
Board, and the intervening defendants Magdowski, et al., discuss 
generally possible governance, finance and administrative ar­
rangements 21 which may be appropriate for operation of an 
interim or final plan of desegregation. Without parsing in detail 
the interesting, and sometimes sensible, concepts introduced by 
each plan, it is sufficient to note that each contemplates over­
laying some broad educational authority over the area, creating 
or using some regional arrangement (with continued use or 
eventual redrawing of existing districts), and considerable input 
at the individual school level. The court has made no decision in 
this regard and will consider the matter at a subsequent hearing.

71. Each concept needs to be “fleshed-out” in the hard 
prospect of implementation of a final plan of desegregation and 
what is necessary and essential, and only that, for the successful 
operation of that plan of school desegregation now on an 
interim basis and hereafter on a permanent footing.

72. There are now some 86 school districts in the tri­
county area of varying size, numbers of pupils, shapes, and 
wealth.

73. In another context, the State Board of Education 
found each related to a “metropolitan core city” (Detroit) as 
“city,” “town,” or “urban fringe” districts.

74. The boundaries of these school districts in general 
bear no relationship to other municipal, county, or special dis­
trict governments, needs or services. 2 2

75. Some educational services are already provided to stu­
dents on an interdistrict, county, intercounty, or metropolitan 
basis: and many support services are provided by the inter­
m ediate school districts and the State Department of



Education. For various reasons many pupils already cross school 
district lines to attend school or receive educational services. 23

76. In many respects -  patterns of economic life, work, 
play, population, planning, transportation, health services — the 
tri-county area constitutes a rough series of interrelated com­
munities constituting, in the view of the United States Census 
Bureau, a single standard metropolitan statistical area.

77. Local units of government in the metropolitan area 
have in many instances joined together for the purpose of pro­
viding better solutions to problems confronting them. In such 
instances various units of government have either disregarded 
local boundaries or have concluded that the problems were such 
as to call for a metropolitan solution. In some cases they have 
created overlay organizations. SEMCOG, recreational autho­
rities, a metropolitan sewage system, SEMTA, and the Detroit 
Water System are examples of these metropolitan approaches.

78. Indeed, the State defendants at this very moment are 
attempting in state court to strike down one irrationality, and 
the discriminatory effect, of the existing school district arrange­
ment, i.e., finance, apparently in the hope of moving to a virtual 
state-wide assumption of costs.

79. In such circumstances there has been no showing that 
the existing school district boundaries are rationally related to 
any legitimate purpose; and the court finds that the particular 
welter of existing boundaries for 86 school districts is not 
necessary to the promotion of any compelling state interest.

80. On the basis of the present record, the court is of the 
view that the shifts in faculty, staff, resources and equipment 
and the exchanges of pupils necessary to accomplish maximum 
actual desegregation may be made, at least on an interim basis, 
by contractual agreements or otherwise among and between the 
existing school districts. The court has serious reservations, 
however, whether such procedures will inevitably threaten the 
continuing effectiveness of a plan of desegregation over the 
long-term. On these issues more evidence and further hearings 
will be necessary before reaching a final decision.

I a 518



81. The State defendants, and in particular the State 
Board o f  Education which is charged with the primary respon-

• ab ility  for public education in Michigan, are the primary parties 
to  be charged with responsibility to  undertake that vital inquiry 
and return with recommendations about those governance, 
financial, and administrative arrangements which are necessary 
and essential to the successful implem entation o f a plan o f de­
segregation on an interim and continuing basis.

G. Involvement o f Affected Persons and Communities 
and Protection Against Racial Discrimination 

in the Desegregation Process

82. The court has received uncontroverted evidence in the 
plans filed by every party and in testimony, and advice in 
several briefs amicus uriae, and the court finds, that the follow­
ing additional factors are essential to implementation and 
operation of an effective plan of desegregation in the circum­
stances of this case:

(a) Bi-racial councils made up of the parents and staff, 
and, where appropriate, pupils, should be set up at 
each school; the persons most affected must be 
encouraged and given every opportunity to parti­
cipate in the implementation of desegregation.

(b) Curriculum content, and all curriculum materials and 
student codes, must be re-evaluated and reflect the 
diversity of ethnic and cultural backgrounds of the 
children now in the schools. As far as possible, those 
immediately affected by these decisions at the indi­
vidual school level should participate in that process.

(c) In-service training for faculty and staff for multi­
ethn ic studies and human relations should be 
required; we must, after all, rely primarily on our 
teachers and children to respect, nurture, and deal 
with the diversity of students present in the deseg­
regated school.

(d) The entire grading, reporting, counselling, and testing 
program should be reviewed in light of desegregated

I a 519



I a 520

schools compared to traditional schools and to avoid 
imposing the effects of past discrimination on the 
children. Tracking, whether so labeled or by any test,

* which has racial effects should not be utilized; within
schools a pattern of classes which are substantially 
disproportionate in their racial composition from the 
relevant school or grade mix should be closely 
scrutinized and maintained only if necessary to pro­
mote a compelling educational objective.

83. In making the finding above, we remind the parties 
that this court’s task is to enforce constitutional rights not to 
act as a schoolmaster; the court’s task is to protect the con­
stitutional rights here found violated with as little intrusion into 
the education process as possible. The court’s objective is to 
establish the minimum constitutional framework within which 
the system of public schools may operate now and hereafter in 
a racially unified, non-discriminatory fashion. Within that 
framework the body politic, educators, parents, and most par­
ticularly the children must be given the maximum opportunity 
to experiment and secure a high quality, and equal, educational 
opportunity. However, experience has proven that specific 
goals, deadlines and methods of reporting and review must be 
required in all desegregation cases to insure compliance.

H. Timing

84. The burden remains with State defendants to show 
why desegregation for all schools, grades, classrooms, and pupils 
in the desegregation area should not proceed now, i.e., in the 
context of this litigation, for the 1972 fall term. The design and 
implementation of desegregation plans for all grades in 15 
clusters — including pupil assignments, necessary reassignment 
of faculty and restructuring of facilities, planning and acquiring 
the needed transportation facilities — is conceded by all parties 
to be a major undertaking. Yet next fall will already be a full 
year, not just four or six or even eight weeks, Cf. Carter v. West 
Feliciano Parish School Bd., 396 U.S. 290 (1970), after the 
initial ruling by this court of the need for maximum feasible 
desegregation “now.” In such circumstances the burden to 
prove the infeasibility of implementation of complete relief is 
high.



I a 521

85. The desegregation panel, therefore, must make every 
effort to plan to implement as much actual desegregation, for as 
many clusters, schools, grades, classrooms, and students as pos­
sible.

86. At a minimum, there is agreement among, and 
evidence from, the experts that desegregating several grades, and 
more particularly entire elementary schools, within many, if not 
all, clusters may be accomplished in the fall.

87. In view of Findings 60 to 62, supra, if hard choices 
must be made for the fall, any interim plan should attempt to 
desegregate grades K-6, K-8, or K-9 in as many entire clusters as 
possible; and, in the absence of some other showing, there 
appears no reason why a complete plan may not be imple­
mented by fall 1973. 24

88. A heavy burden rests with those who seek delay in 
any way, shape, kind, degree or extent to convince the court 
that maximum actual desegregation cannot proceed effectively 
forthwith.

89. In view of the time constraints, the need to discharge 
this burden forthwith, the State defendants’ default in assisting 
this court to determine the appropriate desegregation area, and 
the State defendants’ asserted and evident lack of available plan­
ning capacity suited to the task, the court finds that some addi­
tional entity must be charged with the task of preparing a pupil 
assignment plan to accomplish maximum actual desegregation 
and a transportation plan within the framework this day 
established. To that end a panel of skilled experts, broadly re­
presentative of the parties and their interests, appointed by the 
court and assigned that task, is required to discharge effectively 
and promptly these two tasks.

90. State defendants remain charged with the duty, how­
ever, of coming forward with other necessary reports and plans 
concerning those governance, administrative, and financial ar­
rangements necessary and essential to the implementation of an 
effective plan of desegregation on an interim and on-going basis.

4



I a 522

I. The Plan

91. Based on the entire evidence amassed in this case, the 
court finds that an educationally sound, administratively fea­
sible, constitutionally adequate, practicable and effective plan 
of desegregation may be developed, implemented, and operated 
hereafter for the desegregation area as set forth in findings 1-90 
above.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The court has continuing jurisdiction of this action for 
all purposes, including the granting of effective relief. Bradley v. 
Milliken, Ruling on Issue of Segregation, September 27, 1971; 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Detroit-Only Plans 
of Desegregation, March 28, 1972.

2. A de jure segregation violation having been found, the 
minimum remedy is maximum actual desegregation, taking into 
account the practicalities of the situation. ^5 B ra d le y  v. M il-  
lik en , Oral Order, October 4, 1971; Findings of Fact and Con­
clusions of Law on Detroit-Only Plans of Desegregation, March 
28, 1972; B ro w n  v. B o a rd  o f  E d u c a tio n , 347 U.S. 383 (1954), 
349 U.S. 294 (1954); G reen  v. C o u n ty  S c h o o l B d ., 391 U.S. 
430 (1968); A le x a n d e r  v. H o lm e s  C o u n ty  B d . o f  E d ., 396 U.S. 
19 (1969); C a rte r  v. W est F e lic ia n o  S c h o o l  B d ., 3 9 6  U.S. 290
(1970) ; S w a n n  v. C h a r lo tte  M e c k le n b e rg  B d . o f  E d ., 402 U.S. 1
(1971) ; D a v is  v. B o a rd  o f  S c h o o l C o m m iss io n e rs  o f  M o b ile , 402 
U.S. 33 (1971); D a v is  v. S c h o o l D is tr ic t  o f  C ity  o f  P o n tia c , 443
F. 2d 573, cert, d e n ie d , 925 U.S. 233 (1971).

3. The remedial obligation rests with school authorities, 
but where in any way they fail, or are unable because of the 
circumstances of the case, to fulfill any part of the obligation 
promptly and fully, the court has broad equity power, and the 
duty, to insure that demonstrable progress be made now; that a 
schedule for planning be adopted forthwith; and that necessary 
planning be specifically ordered and immediately undertaken in 
order that a constitutionally adequate plan may be fashioned 
and Finally ordered implemented as soon as possible. S w a n n  v. 
C h a r lo tte -M e c k le n b e rg  B o a rd  o f  E d u c a tio n , 311 F. Supp. 265 
(W.D.N.C. 1970), a f f ’d , 402 U.S. 1 (1971); C a rte r  v. W est