Murphy v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission Appendix to Jurisdictional Statement

    No.

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1984

Joan L. Murphy, Lorraine R. Mason, Edith L. 
McGrody, Marie Pekala, Henrietta Elliott, 
Catherine Beres, Virginia Knowles, Ann 
Jacyszyn, Peggy Felmey, Eleanor Neyer, Doris 
Yocum and Elizabeth McNasby, on behalf of them­

selves and ail others similarly situated,
APPELLANTS

v.

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Human Rela­
tions Commission and Crown Cork and Seal Com­
pany, Inc., and Sheet Metal Production Workers 

Union Local No . 266,
APPELLEES

APPENDIX TO
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 

ON APPEAL FROM THE 
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

OF COUNSEL:
Cohen, Shapiro,

POLISHER, SHIEKMAN
and Cohen 

Stanley M. Schwarz, 
Esquire

1630 Locust Street 
Philadelphia, PA 19103 
(215) 545-1200

Alan M. Lerner, Esquire 
Jeffrey Ivan Pasek, Esquire 
24th Floor, PSFS Building 
12 South 12th Street 
Philadelphia, PA 19107 
(215) 922-1300
Attorneys for Appellants

PACKARD PRESS / LEGAL DIVISION,10th & SPRING GARDEN STREETS, PHILA., PA. 19123 (215) 236-2000





APPENDIX
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Description of Document

1. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission
Recommendation of Hearing Panel, Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Opinion and Fi­
nal Order, dated August 1, 1981.....................  A-l

2. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission 
Recommendation of Hearing Panel and Sup­
plementary Opinion and Order dated May 10,
1982 ......... .................................................. . . . A-57

3. Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania Opin­
ion and Order dated September 28, 1983, af­
firming the Final Order of the Pennsylvania 
Human Relations Commission dated May 10,
1982 .................................................................. A-69

4. Opinion and Judgment of the Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania dated January 9, 1985, affirm­
ing the Final Order of the Commonwealth 
Court of Pennsylvania dated September 28,
1983 .................................................................. A-87

5. Appellants’ Notice of Appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania dated April 9, 1985. . A-103

6. Letter from Mary Martin to Mrs. Henderson of
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commis­
sion .................................................................. A-106

7. February 27, 1970, letter from Virginia T. 
Fichtel, Acting Director of Compliance, Penn­
sylvania Human Relations Commission . . . .  A-109

8. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission
Complaint Docket No. E-3696, Mary Martin v. 
Crown Cork and Seal Company, Inc............A-l 10

l



APPENDIX
TABLE OF CONTENTS— (Continued)

Page
9. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission 

Complaint Docket No. E-3697, Mary Martin v.
Can Workers Union, Local 266 (Sheet Metal 
Worker’s International Assn. AFL-CIO) . . . .  A-112

10. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission 
Memorandum prepared by Ellen L. Wooters,
Field Representative...................................... A-114

11. Letter from Vivienne Haag to Pennsylvania
Human Relations Commission...................... A-120

12. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission
Memorandum from Charles Gratman to Henry 
Saunders.........................................................A-121

13. Case Closing Letter from Mary' Martin to Mr.
Saunders of Pennsylvania Human Relations 
Commission..................................................... A-123

14. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission 
Compliance Division Case Chronology Docket
No. E-3696 ..................................................... A 124

15. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission 
Compliance Division Case Chronology Docket
No. E-3697 ....................................................A-127

16. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission
Initial Case Progress Report Docket No. 
E-3696 ............................................................ A-129

17. December 23, 1970, Notice letter from Charles 
Gratman to Crown Cork and Seal Company,
Inc.................................................................... A-134

18. December 23, 1970, Notice letter from Charles
Gratman to Sheet Metal Workers International 
Association, AFL-CIO, Can Workers Union 
Local 266.........................................................A-135

ii



Page
19. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission

Case Closing Recommendation re: Docket No. 
E-3696 .............................................................A-136

20. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission
Case Closing Recommendation re: Docket No. 
E-3697 ............................................................A-138

21. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission
Complaint Docket No. E-4249 filed by 
Elizabeth C. McNasby....................................A-140

22. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission
Complaint Docket No. E-4027 .........................A-141

APPENDIX
TABLE OF CONTENTS— (Continued)

iii





COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 
GOVERNOR’S OFFICE

PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION

PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN :
RELATIONS COMMISSION,

and :
ELEANOR E. NEYER, et al„

Complainants :
v. : DOCKET NO.

CROWN CORK AND SEAL : E-4027
COMPANY, INC., :

PLANT NO. 1, :
and :

SHEET METAL PRODUCTION :
WORKERS’ UNION, LOCAL 266, :

Respondents :

ELIZABETH McNASBY, :
Complainant :

v. : DOCKET NO,
CROWN CORK AND SEAL : E-4249

COMPANY, INC., :
and :

SHEET METAL WORKERS’ : 
INTERNATIONAL :

ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO, CAN :
WORKERS’ UNION, LOCAL 266 : 

a/k/a SHEET METAL :
PRODUCTION WORKERS :

UNION, LOCAL 266, :
Respondents :

RECOMMENDATION OF HEARING PANEL 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 

OPINION, AND FINAL ORDER

A-l



A-2

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Respondent Crown Cork and Seal Company, 

Inc. (hereinafter “Crown”) is a corporation doing busi­
ness within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania with its 
international corporate headquarters located at 9300 
Ashton Road, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, along with a 
facility designated as Plant No. 1.

2. Respondent Sheet Metal Workers’ Union, Local 
No. 266 (hereinafter “Union” or “Local 266”), affiliated 
with the Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association, 
AFL-CIO, is a labor organization which had and contin­
ues to have offices at 6445 Frankford Avenue, Philadel­
phia, Pennsylvania.

3. The Pennsylvania Human Relations Commis­
sion (hereinafter “PHRC” or “Commission”), by its Ex­
ecutive Director, Homer C. Floyd, hied a complaint 
against Crown and Local 266 at Docket No. E-4027, on 
December 20, 1970, alleging unlawful patterns and 
practices of sex discrimination in recruitment and hir­
ing, initial job assignment, promotions, overtime, layoffs 
and recall from layoffs.

4. Elizabeth McNasby filed a complaint of unlaw­
ful sex discrimination against Crown and Local 266 at 
Docket No. E-4249 on behalf of herself and other simi­
larly situated female employes at Plant No. 1 on or about 
June 11, 1971.

5. On October 27, 1975, the Commission filed an 
amended complaint at Docket No. E-4027 setting forth 
very detailed allegations of unlawful sex discrimination 
against Respondents Crown and Local 266.

6. Eleanor Neyer, Joan Murphy, Sarah Cooper, 
Margaret Felmey, Lorraine Mason, Virginia Knowles, 
Doris Yocum, Edith McGrody, Marie Pekala, Theresa 
Cheplick, Henrietta Hunter, Ann Jacyszyn, and Theresa 
Reed, all incumbent or past employees of Crown, exe­
cuted affidavits in 1975 and became individual named 
complainants in the amended complaint.



A-3

7. The Commission’s original complaint made al­
legations that were general in nature. It consisted of 2 
pages. The amended complaint was 34 pages, included 
very specific charges, was brought on behalf of several 
identified groups of female employes, and included alle­
gations relating to the 13 individually named complain­
ants.

8. The Commission initiated complaint at Docket 
No. E-4027, as amended, and the individual complaint of 
Elizabeth McNasby at Docket No. E-4249, were joined 
for purposes of administrative processing, including in­
vestigation, finding of probable cause, attempted concil­
iation, and public hearing.

9. Complainant Ann Jacyszyn was employed by 
Crown until 1966, when she was laid off and never re­
called.

10. Complainants Eleanor Neyer, Joan Murphy, 
Margaret Felmey, Lorraine Mason, Virginia Knowles, 
Doris Yocum, Edith McGrody, Marie Pekala, Theresa 
Cheplick, and Henrietta Hunter were all laid off from 
employment at Crown for the last time between 1969 
and 1971 and were never employed by Crown thereafter.

11. Complainant Sarah Cooper was employed at 
Crown until February 28, 1974, when she became dis­
abled. From then through the dates of these hearings 
she has received disability retirement payments.

12. Complainants Theresa Reed and Elizabeth 
McNasby were continuously employed by Crown at all 
times from July 9, 1969 to the date of this administrative 
hearing.

13. During the period July 9, 1969 to December 31, 
1975, Crown hired 50 males and no females. In the Phil­
adelphia Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area for this 
time period, females comprised 30.6% of the available 
labor market in the non-durable industry category.

14. Between July 9, 1969 and December 31, 1975, 
590 males or 62.6% of Crown’s production and mainte­



A-4

nance employes at Plant No. 1 were male; 352 or 37.4% 
were female.

15. Between 1971 and 1975 aggregate employ­
ment of females at Plant No. 1 in the production and 
maintenance unit dropped from 26.3% of the work force 
to 20.5% of the work force.

16. Some time in the early 1950’s, Crown adopted 
a system of sex-segregated job classifications.

17. From that time until April, 1967, each collec­
tive bargaining agreement between Local 266 (or its 
predecessor unions) and Crown set forth a group of 
higher rated male jobs and a second group of lower rated 
female jobs.

24. At all times from July 9, 1969 to December 31, 
1975, new employes at Plant No. 1 have been assigned 
to their initial shift and department by Crown’s Person­
nel Office, and to their initial job within their department 
and shift by their department/shift foreman. Men have 
always been initially assigned to home shifts and depart­
ments in which male job openings existed, and to a par­
ticular male job within that home department/shift. No 
new women were hired during this period.

25. At all times from July 9, 1969 to December 31, 
1975, Crown, with the Union’s acquiescence, has effec­
tively maintained a sex-segregated system of plant, de­
partment, and shift seniority for all of its production and 
maintenance unit employes.

26. At all times material to this litigation a sex- 
segregated seniority system has been maintained and 
used for purposes of ascertaining transfer, promotion, 
layoff, and recall rights of employes.

27. A dual roster of plant seniority embodying the 
date of original hire at Plant No. 1 or its predecessor plant 
has been and continues to be maintained in the Person­
nel Office on a sex-segregated basis.

28. Men’s cards are filed chronologically in one 
section of a set of files known collectively as the “plant



A-5

seniority board” and women’s cards are filed in a sepa­
rate section of the same “plant seniority board.”

29. Similar sex-segregated dual rosters of “home 
shift” and “home department” seniority are also main­
tained in the same location and are known as the “de­
partment seniority boards.”

30. As a result of this system, there are dual ladders 
of job progression within all gender integrated depart­
ments. (Some departments are gender segregated, hav­
ing only men’s jobs or only women’s jobs.)

31. At all times since July 9, 1969, the collective 
bargaining agreements in force between Crown and Lo­
cal 266 have provided that employes are to be laid off by 
inverse order of their date of initial hire at Plant No. 1 (or 
its predecessor plant on Erie Avenue). In fact, however, 
the sex-segregated plant seniority board has been and is 
still today the sole system used for purposes of layoff of 
employes at Plant No. 1.

32. At any time when Crown finds it necessary to 
reduce the number of personnel working in men’s jobs, 
it uses this roster to locate the men with lowest plant 
seniority. These men are then ordinarily laid off. When­
ever Crown finds it necessary to reduce the number of 
employes in women’s jobs, the sex-segregated seniority 
board is utilized to select the women with lowest plant 
seniority who are then laid off.

33. In 97.7% or 1311 of the 1342 instances where 
females were laid off between July 9, 1969 and Decem­
ber 31, 1975, less senior males with equal or lower job 
classifications were retained in the employ of Crown 
within the production and maintenance unit at Plant 
No. 1.

34. Females were disproportionately subjected to 
layoffs during the period July 9, 1969 to December 31, 
1975. There occurred 2764 layoffs during this time. Al­
though females constituted 37.4% of all persons em­
ployed during the period, 48.6% of all layoffs were of fe­
male employes.



A-6

35. The mean duration of layoffs involving males 
during the period July 9, 1969 to December 31, 1975 was 
33.5 days; the median was 17.4 days. The mean duration 
of layoffs involving females during the period was 45.9 
days; the median was 23.8 days.

36. Although women constituted 37.4% of the pro­
duction and maintenance unit work force during the pe­
riod July 9, 1969 to December 31, 1975, they incurred 
61.5% of the time spent in layoff status (76,198 days out 
of 123,977 total employe — days on layoff).

37. At all times since July 9, 1969, Crown has fol­
lowed a practice of recalling employes from layoffs, based 
upon the same system of sex-segregated plant seniority 
used for layoffs.

38. When women’s jobs must be filled, Crown re­
calls women from layoff based upon their plant seniority 
as shown on the sex-segregated seniority board.

39. Between July 9, 1969 and December 31, 1975 
there were 975 instances where females remained in lay­
off status when males, with lower job classifications and 
with less seniority, were recalled to employment in the 
production and maintenance unit at Plan No. 1.

40. Between July 9, 1969 and December 31, 1975, 
when there were an insufficient number of men on layoff 
to fill vacancies in male jobs, new men were frequently 
hired in lieu of recalling female employes on layoff 
status.

41. On some occasions, when additional women’s 
job have had to be filled to meet production schedules 
but men have been slated for layoff during the same 
week based on reduced production schedules for those 
departments with a larger number of men’s jobs, Crown 
has assigned these men (who otherwise would have 
been laid off) to fill the women’s jobs “temporarily.” Fe­
male employes who would otherwise have been recalled 
to fill the female vacancies have simply remained on lay­
off.



42. Crown and Local 266 attempted to justify such 
departures from ordinary practice on the theory that 
each case was an emergency — i.e., Crown could not 
afford to wait for women on layoff to respond to telegrams 
ordering them back to work. However, there are appar­
ently no instances of Crown assigning women to do 
men’s jobs in similar “emergency” situations.

43. In some cases, females with many years of 
plant seniority who never would have been laid off ex­
cept for the sex-segregated seniority system, were kept 
out on layoff status so long that their rights to recall, pur­
suant to the terms and provisions of the applicable col­
lective bargaining agreement, expired.

44. During the period from July 9, 1969 through 
December 31, 1975, there were 20 such instances when 
female can workers were terminated from employment 
because they were on layoff in excess of 3 years. In no 
case during this period was a male can worker ever kept 
on layoff for so long that his recall rights expired.

45. In another twenty-two instances, between July 
9, 1969 and December 31, 1975, females with substan­
tial plant seniority felt compelled to accept “early retire­
ment” while on layoff status to avoid expiration of recall 
rights. No male could be identified to elect early retire­
ment during this period.

46. In the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, the effects 
of automation began to substantially impact upon female 
employment at Plant No. 1. Women’s jobs were dispro­
portionately eliminated and the successor jobs, if any, 
were generally higher rated and classified as men’s jobs.

47. This situation resulted in women with substan­
tial seniority being laid off for extended periods, while 
males with far less seniority continued to work and oc­
casionally while new male employes were being hired.

48. As sex-segregated layoffs became more fre­
quent and severe, female employes at Plant No. 1 began 
to complain to Crown and to Local 266.



A-8

49. After women began to complain about sex dis­
crimination at Plant No. 1, officials at Crown, with the 
assistance of Local 266, intentionally and systematically 
attempted to get as many female employes as possible to 
sign ambiguous forms purporting to implement equal 
employment opportunity, but which were in fact an at­
tempt to secure waivers of women employes’ rights to 
equal employment opportunity and to create a “paper 
record” which might shield Crown from potential liabil­
ity for unlawful sex discriminatory practices.

50. Crown and Local 266 attempted to show that 
female can workers had been extended bona fide, good 
faith offers of men’s jobs, but had knowingly and inten­
tionally waived their rights to such jobs by means of writ­
ten “waivers.”

51. The first such allegedly bona fide, good faith 
offers of men’s jobs were made in Spring, 1970 to a group 
of approximately 12 women at a meeting which took 
place at the offices of Local 266. Those women present 
were asked to list or identify on a piece of paper which 
men’s jobs they could do. No clear waiver of rights was 
included.

52. Despite expressions of interest in various 
men’s jobs by women present at this meeting, the actual 
job offers made during or after this meeting were limited 
to a single job in the inspection department, given to 
Elizabeth McNasby.

53. Several other women were allowed to take an 
“inspector’s test” or to work briefly as inspector trainees, 
but were then told they had failed the test or were laidoff 
based upon department seniority or sex-segregated plant 
seniority. (Prior to this time no man was ever adminis­
tered a test when seeking an inspector position).

54. The second occasion when “waivers” were ob­
tained was during the period beginning in or about April, 
1971 and continuing on a sporadic basis, until about 
1974. These “waivers” were preferred to an indetermi­



A-9

nate number of women then on layoff status or about to 
be placed on layoff status.

55. The “waivers” listed titles of jobs traditionally 
available only to men. The women were advised to check 
those in which they were interested and that they would 
thereby be relinquishing their rights to any others.

56. Another set of forms purporting to offer promo­
tional opportunities to men’s jobs was proffered during 
May and June of 1973 to certain women then actively 
employed at Plant No. 1 and neither on layoff status nor 
about to be placed on layoff status. These forms and the 
procedure used for malting the offers and signing the 
forms were substantially identical to that utilized for the 
offers just described in these findings. The forms also 
included purported waivers of rights to positions in 
which no affirmative interest was indicated.

57. None of the forms utilized by Crown with the 
Union’s acquiescence can be considered to be good faith 
offers of equal job or promotional opportunities.

58. The signers of these forms cannot be consid­
ered to have knowingly intended to waive their legal 
rights to be assigned to jobs regardless of sex.

59. Many of the women lacked sufficient formal 
education to fully appreciate the legal significances of 
the proffered “waiver” documents.

60. The offerees were materially misled as to the 
possible legal consequences of the documents by Crown 
and Local 266 officials.

61. The women involved had historically been ex­
cluded from many all male departments and were thus 
unfamiliar with the actual job duties of many of the listed 
jobs.

62. At the time of the offers, job descriptions were 
generally not made available to the women.

63. The women had no meaningful opportunity to 
discuss their decision with a lawyer, spouse or other dis­
interested party as they were expected to sign “on the 
spot” after seeing the documents for the first time.



A-10

64. The women were never offered the opportunity 
to retain copies of the documents which they were to 
sign.

65. No male employe was ever tendered such a 
form or otherwise asked to waive his rights to jobs at 
Plant No. 1.

66. Many women who indicated on their form that 
they were willing to accept assignment to jobs on the 
lists were never assigned to any of the jobs in which they 
indicated an interest.

67. Few of the jobs listed on the forms were actu­
ally available.

68. Not all male job titles in the production and 
maintenance unit were listed on the forms.

69. The forms did not reveal how Crown would 
make use of them and what would be the duration of 
their effectiveness.

70. The forms did not reveal what, if any, steps a 
woman could undertake to revise the preferences she 
had indicated if she subsequently changed her mind.

71. On those occasions when women indicated an 
interest in assignment to a particular men’s job, they 
were frequently discouraged by officials of both Crown 
and Local 266.

72. Crown explained to the women that if a female 
employe decided to enter into a male job in other than 
her home department she would have to relinquish or 
waive her seniority rights in her current home depart­
ment and begin to accrue departmental seniority in a 
new department. (This was the same for any employee at 
Crown, male or female, i.e. when they moved into a new 
department they had to start at the bottom in that de­
partment).

73. As a pre-condition to placement, many of the 
jobs required sxibstantial experience in lower rated de­
partment jobs, but women had always been excluded 
from some of those jobs.



A-ll

74. Crown officials treated women who refused to 
sign the forms exactly the same as those who signed and 
failed to check any of the jobs thereon.

75. Crown frequently relied upon oral representa­
tions of third party lellows employes that particular 
women would refuse assignment to any man’s job, and 
did not inquire further.

76. Despite self-serving claims that all females 
were systematically contacted to ascertain their willing­
ness to accept assignment to men’s jobs, neither Crown 
nor Local 266 kept any record of which women had been 
offered a man’s job or asked to sign a “waiver” form, or 
when such contacts were initiated. In fact, many women 
were never contacted at all, and many others were spo­
ken to only once or twice, rather than be lore every layoff.

77. Crown made only the most limited use of the 
waiver forms in connection with employment decisions 
after they were signed. Originals of the forms were given 
to Crown’s attorneys sometime before 1975 and no cop­
ies were kept in the Personnel Office, nor was the infor­
mation thereon transferred to any other office record.

78. With respect to those women who indicated on 
the forms a willingness to work male jobs, Crown rarely, 
if ever, consulted their forms to determine which partic­
ular jobs they had expressed interest in. Rather they 
were treated as being eligible for any male job to which 
Crown wished to assign them.

79. The process of offering male jobs to incumbent 
and laid off females by use of the “waiver” documents 
and by less formal means resulted in few woman actually 
achieving assignment to male jobs.

80. Elizabeth McNasby, who was successful in 
moving into the Inspection Department as a result of the 
“offer” of men’s jobs to women made at the Spring, 1970 
meeting, was repeatedly laid off from her inspector job 
thereafter because she was lowest in department senior­
ity.



A-12

81. Upon all but the last of several occasions on 
which waivers were proffered to McNasby she failed to 
list any jobs in which she was interested and refused to 
sign the forms because of her distrust of Crown’s motives 
in seeking execution of the forms.

82. Computer analysis, as set forth in Exhibits C- 
43 through C-46 introduced at the hearing, revealed that 
Elizabeth McNasby’s anticipated earnings at Crown 
based upon her seniority and in the absence of sex dis­
crimination, would have exceeded her actual earnings 
by the following amounts:

1971 - $4463.35
1972 - $6510.80
1973 - $6977.59
1975 - $7887.78

83. Women who were reassigned to male jobs after 
July 7, 1969, in accordance with the waiver scheme or by 
any other means, were treated as if they were men for 
seniority purposes so that to the limited extent that 
women appeared on the male seniority list, it was effec­
tively an integrated list.

84. Women who were reassigned to male jobs were 
permitted to opt out of the integrated seniority list and go 
back to the female list if they so chose.

85. At no time during the period July 9, 1969 to 
December 31, 1975 were more than 12 women on the 
integrated seniority list for a particular calendar year.

86. During 1971, while at least 250 females were 
employed or possessed employment rights at Plant No. 1 
in the production and maintenance unit, a total of 5, 2% 
of all female employes, were on the integrated seniority 
list. Only 1 of the 5 was on the integrated list for 12 
months.

87. During calendar year 1972, while at least 221 
females were employed or possessed employment rights 
at Plant No. 1 in the production and maintenance unit, 
a total of 6, less than 3% of all female employes, appeared



A-13

on the integrated seniority list. Only 3 of the 6 were on 
the integrated list for 12 calendar months.

88. During calendar year 1973, while at least 180 
females were employed or possessed employment rights 
at Plant No. 1 in the production and maintenance unit, 
a total of 10, slightly more than 5% of all female 
employes, appeared on the integrated seniority list. Only 
6 of the 10 appeared on the integrated list for the entire 
12 month period.

89. During calendar year 1975, while at least 118 
females were employed or possessed employment rights 
at Plant No. 1 in the production and maintenance unit, 
a total of 12, slightly more than 10% of all female 
employes, appeared on the integrated seniority list, all for 
the entire calendar year.

90. Those female employes who attained inte­
grated seniority status for only part of any calendar year 
were relegated to female seniority status for all periods 
during which they did not appear on the integrated list.

91. All remaining female employes had only seg­
regated female seniority status.

92. From July 9, 1969 to December 31, 1975, no 
more than 18 of the 352 female production and mainte­
nance unit employes have ever been assigned by Crown 
to perform one or more of the men’s jobs.

93. Whenever one of these 18 workers were per­
forming a man’s job, her plant seniority and 
department/shift seniority cards were retained on the fe­
male sections and the department/shift and plant sen­
iority boards with a red tag affixed.

94. A comparison of job titles worked during 1970 
at Crown’s Plant No. 1 in the production and mainte­
nance unit with the job titles worked during 1975 dis­
closes little progress toward ending the pattern of seg­
regation. In 1970, of 104 job titles worked, 61 were all 
male and 33 were all female. Only 10 job titles, or 9.6%, 
were integrated. By 1975, of 76 job titles worked, 43 
were all male, 19 all female, and 14, or 18.4%, integrated.



A-14

95. An examination of employe incumbency data, 
as of December 31, 1975, by Home Department, dis­
closes a pattern of total exclusion of female employes 
from 4 departments encompassing 112 out of 281 pro­
duction and maintenance jobs.

96. Department 29, the Drawn and Iron Depart­
ment (“D&I”) due to its advanced technology, has been 
the fastest growing department at Plant No. 1 since it 
began operation in the early 1970’s. (Because of Crown’s 
use of departmental seniority rapid department growth 
virtually insures an employe rapid promotion within a 
department, especially a new department.)

97. Initially, there was no posting to announce the 
availability of positions in Department 29. Employes 
were transferred into the new department based upon 
subjective appraisals of their experience and ability 
made by Crown’s Personnel Department with advice 
from Local 266.

98. It was not until October 28, 1974 that Crown 
made any attempt to offer positions in Department 29 to 
female employes working at Plant No. 1 and not until 
October 30, 1974 that Crown informed some female 
employes on layoff status of the availability of openings 
on the D&I lines.

99. Even on those earlier occasions when Crown 
offered traditionally male jobs to certain female 
employes, jobs on the D&I lines were never included in 
the list of jobs allegedly available.

100. At the time of hearing, 44 male and only 2 
female employes were working in Department 29 on the 
first shift. The two females had been temporarily placed 
in the department a few days before the public hearing 
in these cases began. No home department employee in 
Department 29, first shift were female.

101. As of December 31, 1975, the average plant 
seniority for all males employed between July 9, 1969 
and December 31, 1975 was 20.3 years. The average 
plant seniority for females was 28.8 years.



A-15

102. The employment work force profile at Crown 
shows that, despite the higher average seniority of fe­
male employes, females were disproportionately clus­
tered in the lower rated and lower paid job classifica­
tions.

103. Positions in the production and maintenance 
unit at Crown are compensated in accordance with a sys­
tem of job codes as set forth in the applicable collective 
bargaining agreement ranging from the lowest paying 
Code 4 jobs to the highest paying Code 35 jobs.

104. As of December 31, 1975, the mean job Code 
for males was 23.8 and the median was 23.0. For females 
the mean was 13.7 and the median was 11.0.

105. As of December 31, 1975, statistical analysis 
revealed that the mean job code would be 29.0 for fe­
males, 18.9 for males, if attainment were based solely on 
plant seniority. If based solely on department/shift sen­
iority, mean expected job code attainment would be 19.5 
for females, 21.9 for males.

106. From July 9, 1969 through December 31, 
1975, men have been allowed to perform overtime work 
on both men’s job and women’s jobs while women have 
been restricted to a portion of the overtime available on 
women’s jobs.

107. During calendar year 1971, female employes 
earned on the average $3476.00 per employe less than 
similarly situated male employes.

108. During calendar year 1972, female employes 
earned an average of $2954.00 per employe less than 
similarly situated male employes.

109. During calendar year 1973, female employes 
earned an average of $3176.00 per employe less than 
similarly situated male employes.

110. During calendar year 1975, female employes 
earned an average of $3976.00 per employe less than 
similarly situated male employes.

111. After July 9, 1969, responsible officials of 
Crown and Local 266 knew or should have known of the



A-16

prohibitions against sex discrimination in employment 
contained in state and federal law.

112. Some Crown managerial and Local 266 offi­
cials held stereotypic preconceptions and discriminatory 
attitudes toward female employes, particularly with re­
spect to female abilities to perform “strenuous” and 
“dirty” -type jobs. These preconceptions and attitudes af­
fected employment related decisions during the period 
July 9, 1969 to December 31, 1975.

113. At all times material to this litigation, produc­
tion and maintenance employes at Crown’s Plant No. 1 
were represented for purposes of collective bargaining by 
respondent Local 266.

114. At all times material to this litigation, Crown 
and Local 266 were signatories to collective bargaining 
agreements covering production and maintenance de­
partments in Plant No. 1.

115. At all times material to this litigation, all 
employes covered by the collective bargaining agree­
ments between Local 266 and Crown were required, af­
ter an initial 30 day grace period, to join Local 266, pay 
initiation fees and dues, and to maintain union member­
ship as a condition of continued employment at Crown.

116. Officials and agents of Local 266 were at all 
times aware of the sex discriminatory acts and practices 
of Crown.

117. Union officials had access to and examined 
the transfer and layoff lists every week in order to deter­
mine whether employes were being properly transferred 
and laid off. They also had access to the recall list for 
each week.

118. Local 266 has always received notice when 
the recall rights of employes at Plant No. 1 expired.

119. Representatives of Local 266 have always had 
knowledge that weekly “manning” schedules were sub­
mitted by each department foreman on a sex-segregated 
basis.



A-17

120. Subsequent to July 9, 1969, Local 266 nego­
tiated three new collective bargaining agreements with 
Crown covering workers at Plant No. 1, effective respec­
tively in April, 1970, April, 1973, and April, 1976. On 
none of these occasions did Local 266 make any attempt 
whatsoever to obviate through bargaining or to eliminate 
or reduce sex discrimination at Crown or to mitigate its 
effects on female members of Local 266.

121. Local 266 persistently failed to enforce the 
plant seniority provision of the collective bargaining 
agreement despite full knowledge that Crown’s breach 
of that provision, particularly with respect to layoffs and 
recalls, consistently and disproportionately disadvan­
taged female employes.

122. At no time has Local 266 filed any grievance, 
urged any of its members to file a grievance, initiate a 
lawsuit, complained orally or in writing to Crown, or 
taken any other action of any sort whatsoever related to 
enforcement of the non-discrimination provision of the 
collective bargaining agreement despite full knowledge 
of the pattern and practices of sex discriminatory behav­
ior being engaged in by Crown.

123. At all times since July 9, 1969 Local 266 has 
effectively refused to investigate or prosecute the numer­
ous grievances of its female member alleging sex dis­
crimination at Crown.

124. The problem of female members of Local 266 
being improperly laid off was well known to the Union 
and discussed at shop steward’s meetings. However, 
nothing was done about it, even though grievance were 
filed.

125. Approximately 100 female members of Local 
266 signed a written grievance on or about November 1, 
1969 complaining about continuing sex diseriminationin 
employment at Plant No. 1.

126. After the grievance was signed, it was given to 
Pasquale Coia, head shopsteward for delivery to Herman



A-18

Tedeschi, President of Local 266, but Local 266 took no 
further meaningful action regarding the grievance.

127. At all times since July 9, 1969, the final step 
in the applicable grievance procedure has been arbitra­
tion. From that time to the present, Local 266 has never 
taken any case involving any woman to arbitration 
though complaints involving men have been taken to ar­
bitration.

128. Local 266 has been governed by the Consti­
tution and Ritual of the Sheet Metal Workers Interna­
tional Union, AFL-CIO at all times since 1966. The Con­
stitution requires that the employes in layoff status be 
given an opportunity to use withdrawal cards in order to 
avoid reinstatement fees each time they are recalled to 
work. Local 266, contrary to this requirement, has never 
given its members an opportunity to utilize withdrawal 
cards. Instead, at all times material to this litigation, 
whenever employes were in layoff at Crown’s Plant No. 
1, they were required to pay monthly dues or upon recall 
to pay a “reinstatement” fee of between $15 and $30 to 
Local 266.

129. Since female members of Local 266 were laid 
off proportionately with greater frequency than male 
members, the brunt of this particular policy fell most 
heavily on the female members.

130. At all times from July 9, 1969 or earlier up to 
December 31, 1975 officials of Local 266 have actively 
and in concert with Crown worked to maintain sex dis­
criminatory practices in effect at Crown, including the 
sex-segregated system of job classification prevailing at 
Plant No. 1, and have sought to insure that layoff, trans­
fer, promotion and recall were done strictly by sex- 
segregated plant and department seniority.

131. Local 266 oficials have actively assisted 
Crown management in its attempts to get female 
employes at Plant No. 1 to sign documents ostensibly 
waiving their rights to equal employment opportunity. 
They personally reviewed and approved forms calculated



A-19

to obtain uninformed waivers of these rights and they 
participated in meetings on numerous occasions where 
these forms were used.

132. Assertions by officials of Local 266 that they 
had helped to enforce the sex-segregated seniority sys­
tem and sex-segregated job classification system only 
because their female members demanded it were self- 
serving and not credible.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Pennsylvania Human Relations Commis­

sion (hereinafter “Commission” or “PHRC”) has appro­
priately exercised jurisdiction over the parties to and the 
subject matter of the complaints upon which these hear­
ings in Docket Nos. E-4027 and E-4249 were convened.

2. Crown Cork and Seal (hereinafter “Crown”) at 
its Plant No. 1 is an employer within the meaning of 
§4(b) of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (here­
inafter the “PHRA”).

3. Sheet Metal Production Workers’ Union, Local 
266 (hereinafter “Local 266”) is a labor organization 
within the meaning of §4 (d) of the PHRA.

4. All procedural prerequisites to a public hearing 
as set forth at §9 of the PHRA have been satisfied. In­
vestigation, findings of probable cause and attempted 
conciliation of these charges were all completed prior to 
this litigation.

5. The Commission initiated complaint filed on De­
cember 22, 1970 at Docket No. E-4027 did not state al­
leged violations of the PHRA with sufficient particularity 
as required by law and it was therefore a defective com­
plaint and a nullity.

6. The defective complaint filed at Docket No. E- 
4027 on December 22, 1970, being null and void, did not 
toll the running of the PHRA 90 day statute of limita­
tions.



A-20

7. The complaint of Elizabeth McNasby filed on 
June 11, 1971 at Docket No. E-4249 is sufficiently par­
ticular to constitute a valid complaint with respect to the 
allegation related to McNasby individually. It is not suf­
ficiently particular, however, to constitute a valid com­
plaint with respect to the allegations relating to similarly 
situated females. With respect to these latter allegations 
the complaint is accordingly null and void. It is thus not 
valid as a class action complaint and does not toll the 
running of the statute of limitations with respect to any 
allegations other than that relating to McNasby individ­
ually.

8. The amended complaint filed by the Commis­
sion on October 27, 1975 at Docket No. E-4027 is suf­
ficiently particular so as to constitute a valid complaint 
under the PHRA. Being valid in its own right, it is not 
rendered invalid by virtue of the mere technicality that it 
is labelled an “amended” document nor by virtue of the 
fact that it purports to amend a mere nullity; i.e. the orig­
inal Commission initiated complaint of December 22, 
1970.

9. The amended complaint of October 27, 1975, al­
beit a valid complaint in its own right cannot relate back 
to the null and void original complaint of December 22, 
1970. The amended complaint is thus limited by the stat­
ute of limitations to addressing alleged violations of the 
PHRA which occurred within the period commencing 
on July 30, 1975, i.e., 90 days before the October 27, 
1975 filing. All alleged illegalities pre-dating July 30, 
1975 are not redressable by the amended complaint as 
they are barred by the statute of limitations.

10. Allegations concerning all of the 13 individual 
complainants named in the amended complaint at 
Docket No. E-4027, except for Theresa Reed, relate to 
occurrences pre-dating July 30, 1975. None of the 
named complainants other than Theresa Reed (and 
Elizabeth McNasby at Docket No. E-4249) had any em­
ployment relationship with Crown after 1974. Accord­



A-21

ingly, all allegations of the individually named complain­
ants other than Reed and McNasby are barred by the 
statute of limitations.

11. Although violations of the PHRA pre-dating 
July 30, 1975 (except those relating to McNasby), are 
not redressable in this action, evidence of historic pat­
terns and practices of sex discrimination committed by 
Crown and Local 266 is relevant to this case and was 
properly received by the Commission hearing panel. 
Furthermore, nothing in law prohibits the Commission 
from making Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
concerning pre-July 30, 1975 violations so long as those 
violations are not made the subject of any ordered rem­
edy.

12. Delays in the processing of this matter from the 
December 22, 1970 filing of the original complaint to the 
October 27, 1975 filing of the amended complaint, albeit 
attributable primarily to PHRC staff, do not give rise to a 
defense of laches and have not deprived Crown or Local 
266 of due process of law. Neither respondent has shown 
any substantial prejudice to have resulted from the de­
lays and more significantly it has been determined that 
the statute of limitations proscribes any remedy under 
the amended complaint for violations pre-dating July 30, 
1975.

13. Notwithstanding the lengthy delay between 
the filing of her complaint at Docket No. E-4249 on June 
11, 1971 and the commencement of a hearing upon 
these consolidated cases on October 30, 1978, Elizabeth 
McNasby was faultless with respect to that delay, is not 
guilty of laches, and thus redress of her claim is nor 
barred by reason of the delay.

14. The delay between the October 27, 1975 filing 
of the amended complaint and the October 30, 1978 
commencement of the public hearing was not exclu­
sively attributable to the PHRC and accordingly the de­
fense of laches raised by both respondents cannot be sus­
tained.



A-22

15. Section 9 of the PHRA which authorizes the 
Commission to initiate complaints of unlawful discrim­
inatory practices implicitly authorizes complaints on be­
half of classes of aggrieved persons alleging patterns and 
practices of unlawful discriminatory conduct. Commis­
sion initiated complaints are not restricted to allegations 
on behalf of individual discriminatees.

16. At all times from July 9, 1969 to December 31, 
1975, Crown engaged in a pattern and practice of dis­
crimination based upon the sex, female, of applicants 
and employes in hiring, job assignment, job transfer, 
compensation, layoff, and recall from layoff, on a contin­
uing basis.

17. Respondent Crown’s failure to recruit and hire 
females while recruiting and hiring males throughout 
the period from July 9, 1969 to December 31, 1975 con­
stitutes a continuing pattern or practice of discrimina­
tion on the basis of sex in violation of §5(a) of the PHRA, 
43 P.S. §955(a).

18. Respondent Crown’s actions and continuing 
pattern and practice of assigning females to jobs based 
upon their sex, and in establishing and maintaining a 
system of male jobs and female jobs, constitutes discrim­
ination on the basis of sex in violation of §5(a) of the 
PHRA, 42 P.S. §955(a).

19. Respondent Crown’s failure to award overtime 
work to female employes on the same basis as it was 
awarded to male employes constitutes a continuing pat­
tern and practice of discrimination on the basis of sex in 
violation of §5(a) of the PHRA, 43 P.S. §955(a).

20. By establishing and maintaining sex- 
segregated seniority rosters, laying off female employes 
with greater plant seniority than males, recalling laid off 
males with less seniority while females on layoff status 
were not recalled, hiring males while females remained 
in layoff status, Crown has engaged in a continuing pat­
tern and practice of sex-discrimination in violation of 
§5(a) of the PHRA, 43 P.S. 6955 (a).



A-23

21. The seniority system utilized by Crown and Lo­
cal 266 to the extent it employed and continues to em­
ploy sex-segregated plant, department, and shift senior­
ity had and continues to have a disparate pervasive un­
lawful impact upon female employes at Plant No. 1 in the 
production and maintenance unit.

22. The seniority system as administered by Crown 
and Local 266 in the context of layoffs, and recall from 
layoff status had and continues to have a disparate per­
vasive unlawful impact upon female employes at Re­
spondent Crown’s Plant No. 1 in the production and 
maintenance unit.

23. During the period July 9, 1969 to December 31, 
1975, the sex-segregated job classification and seniority 
systems employed by Crown and acquiesced to by Local 
266 disproportionately disadvantaged females employes 
with respect to job assignment, job transfer, compensa­
tion, layoff, and recall from layoff. The present continu­
ing effects of these past practices would be unlawfully 
discriminatory even in the absence of renewed acts of 
discrimination.

24. The sex-segregated job classification and sen­
iority systems historically employed by Crown inhibited 
the movement of Elizabeth McNasby upward through 
the production and maintenance ranks at Crown as oc­
curred with other women. This left her with artificially 
low department seniority in 1971. Thus, continued lay­
offs she suffered in her inspection position were illegal 
consequences of a seniority system which disproportion­
ately disadvantaged women and are therefore remedia­
ble.

25. The sex-segregated job classification and sen­
iority systems employed by Crown and acquiesced to by 
Local 266 were justified by neither any bona fide occu­
pational qualification nor by any business necessity.

26. The seniority system, to the extent that it uti­
lizes seniority measures other than plant seniority and to



A-24

the extent that it perpetuates the effects of past discrim­
inatory practices, is unlawful.

27. Respondent Crown’s current system of 
sex-segregated job classification and plant seniority is 
unlawful per se and must be integrated for all purposes.

28. Respondent Crown’s current system of depart­
ment and shift seniority is unlawful in its effects and may 
not be used as a basis for job advancement, layoffs, or 
recall to employment unless plant seniority among com­
peting employes is equal.

29. While Crown and Local 266 allege, in effect, 
that many female employes knowingly and intentionally 
waived their rights to equal employment opportunity, 
such rights cannot be prospectively waived.

30. The alleged “waivers” preferred as a defense by 
Crown and Local 266, were not informed, knowing waiv­
ers nor were they legally binding.

31. Local 266 has a duty to afford equal represen­
tation to its female members and to accord them full and 
equal membership rights.

32. Local 266 repeatedly discriminated against fe­
male employe members:

(i) by failing to process the grievance of female 
members complaining of the sex discriminatory acts 
and practices of Respondent Crown;

(ii) by improperly encouraging and misleading 
many female members to sign alleged waivers of 
their rights to equal employment opportunity;

(ill) by failing and refusing to enforce the non­
discrimination provision of its applicable collective 
bargaining agreements with Crown;

(iv) by failing to protest against or bargain for an 
end to the illegal practices of Respondent Crown 
which adversely affected female Local 266 mem­
bers; and



A-25

(v) by aiding and abetting Respondent Crown 
in its continued pattern of employment discrimina­
tion.

These acts and policies constitute sex discrimi­
nation in violation of §5(c) and §5(e) of the PHRA, 
43 P.S. §955(c) and (e).
33. Respondent Local 266 violated the PHRA by 

requiring the payment of dues while employes were in 
layoff status and/or by requiring the payment of rein­
statement fees as a condition of obtaining reinstatement 
to employe status from layoff. These requirements, in the 
context of Crown’s sex-segregated layoffs, disproportion­
ately disadvantaged females in violation of §5(c) of the 
PHRA, 43 P.S. §955(c).

34. Local 266 has contended that female employes 
failed to complain or file grievances concerning sex dis­
crimination and generally failed to avail themselves of 
the union’s participatory processes whereby they could 
have made counterdiscrimination suggestions relating to 
future union collective bargaining efforts. Even to the 
extent that these contentions are true, female employes 
have not thereby waived any rights to non- 
discriminatory treatment and are not thereby estopped 
from raising a challenge to Local 266’s discriminatory 
conduct.

35. A proper element of the relief to be awarded is 
back pay for each eligible female discriminatee equal in 
gross amount to the differences between that which she 
actually earned from employment at Crown or elsewhere 
during the period from July 30, 1975 to December 31, 
1975 and that which she would have earned at Crown 
during the same period had she been extended the equal 
employment opportunities to which she was entitled un­
der the PHRA.

36. A similar award is appropriate for Elizabeth 
McNasby dating fr om the filing of her complaint on June 
11, 1971 to December 31, 975.



A-26

37. The inability of the hearing panel to determine 
from the record the precise amount of back pay appro­
priately awardable to Elizabeth McNasby and members 
of the class of discriminatees with redressable claims un­
der the amended complaint at Docket No. El-4027 does 
not preclude the awards of back pay set forth in the at­
tached Final Order as those awards are based upon rea­
sonable calculations supported by the evidence.

38. Females who, should they now be assigned to 
jobs previously classified as male jobs, would otherwise 
be subject to wage reductions because of Crown’s de­
partmental or shift seniority system are legally entitled to 
have their current wage rates “red-circled” or main­
tained at a rate equivalent to the rate a woman could 
attain through the use of her plant seniority until such 
time as she rises within an integrated department to a job 
code level with the appropriate corresponding or higher 
wage rates.

39. A proper element of relief is the required insti­
tution of a bona fide, good faith and effective training 
program to enable female employes to enter jobs and de­
partments from which females have previously been ex­
cluded. Under the circumstances, a step-by-step proce­
dure of learning the necessary skills for advancement 
within departments by on-the-job experience at lower 
level jobs would unfairly delay the discriminatees reach­
ing their rightful place within the hierarchy of jobs at 
Plant No. 1 unless it is demonstrated that experience in 
the lower rated job is a business necessity.

OPINION

I. Background
On December 22, 1970 the Pennsylvania Human 

Relations Commission (hereinafter “PHRC” or “Com­
mission”), by its Executive Director, Homer C. Floyd, 
initiated a complaint at Docket No. E-4027 against Re-



A-27

spondent, Crown, Cork and Seal Company, Inc. (here­
inafter “Crown”), and Respondent Sheet Metal Workers 
Union, Local No. 266 (hereinafter “Local 266”) alleging 
that both respondents had committed acts of unlawful 
sex discrimination in violation of the Pennsylvania Hu­
man Relations Act (hereinafter “PHRA”), Act of October 
27, 1955, P.L. 744, as amended, 43 P.S. §951 et seep 
Another complaint of unlawful sex discrimination was 
lodged against Crown and Local 266 at Docket No. E- 
4249 by Elizabeth McNasby on June 11, 1971.

The PHRC initiated complaint and the McNasby 
complaint were consolidated for purposes of administra­
tive processing and some investigation took place 
through early 1973. Thereafter it appears that there was 
virtually no activity upon the consolidated cases until mid- 
1975 when PHRC staff sought and received affidavits 
from 12 former and 1 incumbent female Crown 
employes relating to the sex discrimination allegations.

In part based upon these affidavits the Commission, 
again by its Executive Director, initiated an amended 
complaint at Docket No. E-4027 on October 27, 1975. 
Investigation then proceeded until a finding of probable 
cause was made by PHRC staff on April 19, 1976. (Tech­
nically this was an amended finding, several findings of 
probable cause having already been made prior to 
amendment of the complaint.)

Conciliation efforts, as required by §9 of the PHRA, 
were undertaken but failed and accordingly a public 
hearing was ordered. Protracted pre-hearing maneuver­
ing and collateral litigation delayed commencement of 
the hearing until October 30, 1978. Thereafter 37 days of 
hearings were held ending on June 17, 1980 and result­
ing in a hearing record of over 6000 pages.

The hearings were conducted before a panel of Com­
missioners consisting of Alvin E. Echols, Junior, Es­
quire, presiding, and Commissioners Doris M. Leader, 
Benjamin S. Lowenstein, Esquire, and Robert Johnson 
Smith. The case on behalf of the complainants was pre­



A-28

sented by PHRC Assistant General Counsel, James J. 
Keeney, Esquire and PHRC General Counsel, Robert S. 
Mirin, Esquire. Respondent Crown was represented by 
Stephen P. Gallagher, Esquire and Respondent Local 
266 was represented by Mark P. Muller, Esquire. Serv­
ing as legal advisors to the hearing panel were PHRC 
Assistant General Counsels James D. Pagliaro, Esquire, 
and Benjamin G. Lipman, Esquire.

Extensive Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
having been submitted in these consolidated cases, this 
Opinion will not attempt to reiterate their essence in nar­
rative form but will undertake only to clarify the under­
lying rationale for aspects of the Commission’s decision 
and Final Order which may not be self-evident.

Additionally, the Commissioners wish to make 
known their view that although procedural deficiencies 
in the processing of this matter have precluded a full 
remedy for all the wrongs found to have been committed, 
these cases nevertheless present one of the most blatant 
patterns of sex discriminatory employment practices that 
has ever been brought to this Commission’s attention. 
Practices concerning hiring, transfer, promotion, com­
pensation, layoff, and recall from layoff were all tainted 
by extremely antiquated and stereotyped perceptions of 
female workers manifest by Crown and Local 266 all op­
erating to the detriment of women employees.

II. Limitations on Action

A. Insufficiency of the original complaint
The December 22, 1970 complaint initiated by the 

PHRC against Respondents Crown and Local 266 was 2 
pages long. The entirety of its substantive allegations 
was as follows:

On or about to wit, December 22, 1970 the com­
plainant alleges that the respondent company en­
gages in unlawful employment practices which are



A-29

discriminatory with respect to female employees, be­
cause of their sex, in hiring, assignment, seniority, 
transfer, salary, overtime, promotion, denial of train­
ing, and layoff. It is further alleged that the respond­
ent Union concurs in and aids and abets the discrim­
inatory practices of the respondent Company.
In the case of PHRC vs. U.S. Steel Cory., 325 A.2d 

910 (1974), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed a 
similarly brief, generalized allegation of classwide dis­
crimination and concluded that by any reasonable stand­
ard the complaint was so deficient in particularly that its 
averments failed to provide the respondent with ade­
quate notice as to the wrongs with which it was charged. 

Unfortunately, the same is the case here. The orig­
inal Commission initiated complaint at Docket No. E- 
4027 is so similar to the complaint found to be defective 
in U.S. Steel that there is no reasonable basis upon which 
we can distinguish it. Accordingly, the complaint must 
be held to be null and void.

B. Sufficiency of the Amended Complaint
On October 27, 1975 the PHRC, by its Executive 

Director, filed a 34 page amended complaint alleging in 
very specific detail a pattern and practice of discrimina­
tion by Respondents Crown and Local 266. The allega­
tions related to several specified classes of females, in­
cluding a group of 13 named individuals, 1 incumbent 
and 12 former Crown employees.

The amended complaint certainly satisfies the par­
ticularity requirements for complaints set forth in U.S. 
Steel and would seem to be sufficient in its own right to 
constitute a complaint under §9 of the PHRA, 43 P.S. 
§959. The mere fact that the label on the document in­
cludes the word “amended” we do not find a basis for 
discrediting it. Furthermore, the fact that the amended 
complaint purports to amend an original complaint 
which we have already held to be a nullity does not con­



A-30

vince us that the amended complaint is any less viable as 
a complaint in its own right. Thus, we have, in effect 
determined to treat the amended complaint as an origi­
nal complaint.

C. Statute of Limitations
The PHRA, at §9, 43 P.S. §959, requires that “Any 

complaint filed pursuant to this section must be so filed 
within ninety days after the alleged act of discrimina­
tion.” The amended complaint filed at Docket No. 
E-4027 purports to apply to discriminatory acts during 
the period July 9, 1969 (when the PHRA was amended 
to prohibit sex discrimination) through and continuing 
beyond the date the amended complaint was filed, Oc­
tober 27, 1975.

We believe that §9’s statute of limitations confines 
the amended complaint to redressing grievances within 
a much more narrowly circumscribed time frame; par­
ticularly, to allegations of discriminatory acts which oc­
curred no more than 90 days prior to the filing of a com­
plaint. The question thus arises:

Is the amended complaint restricted to acts occur­
ring within 90 days of its filing or does it relate back 
to the filing of the original complaint thus allowing it 
to redress allegations of discriminatory acts which 
occurred within 90 days of the December 22, 1970 
filing of the original complaint?
As previously indicated, the amended complaint vir­

tually ignores the statute of limitations and purports to 
apply to conduct dating back to July 9, 1969. We find, 
however, that this is impermissible and that the 
amended complaint, filed October 27, 1975, cannot re­
dress discriminatory conduct occurring more than 90 
days prior to its filing.

We have made this determination because of the 
well-established doctrine, adhered to in Pennsylvania



A-31

and elsewhere, that an amendment to a complaint can­
not revive a time barred claim and cannot introduce a 
new cause of action after a statute of limitations has ex­
pired. Thus, here, where the original complaint is a nul­
lity, fails to state a viable cause of action, and fails to toll 
the running of the statute of limitations, the amended 
complaint, in effect stating a new cause of action, cannot 
relate back to the original date of filing. Instead, it is re­
stricted to redressing allegations of discriminator}' acts 
occurring on or after July 30, 1975 (90 days before the 
October 27, 1975 filing of the amended complaint).

(The amended complaint characterizes most of Re­
spondents’ discriminatory acts as being of a continuing 
nature. And while the evidence suggested the correct­
ness of this contention, little in the record affords us a 
sufficient basis upon which to formulate specific mone­
tary relief beyond the date of December 31, 1975. Thus, 
notwithstanding an evidentiary picture manifesting bla­
tant sex discrimination dating back to the July 9, 1969 
enactment of the sex discrimination prohibitions in the 
PHRA and continuing up through the dates of these 
hearings in 1978-1980, the statute of limitations and the 
state of the record restrict much of the remedy we have 
ordered to the period July 30, 1975 to December 31, 
1975.)

D. The 13 individually named complainants
During the recommencing of investigation of this 

matter by PHRC staff in mid-1975, affidavits of 13 
women were sought and received. The 13 included 1 in­
cumbent and 12 former Crown employees. Their affida­
vits were attached to the October 27, 1975 amended 
complaint and they were thereafter treated as individu­
ally named complainants.

Unfortunately, all but one of the women, Theresa 
Reed, had no employment relationship with Crown nor 
any membership relationship with Local 266 after 1974.



A-32

As none except Reed can allege victimization by discrim­
inatory practices on or after July 30, 1975 the statute of 
limitations thus bars their claims.

E. The complaint of Elizabeth McNasby
On June 11, 1971 Elizabeth McNasby filed an indi­

vidual complaint against Crown and Local 266 alleging 
in relevant part “that the respondents consorted in the 
lay-off of the complainant because of her sex, female, 
and have prevented her, as well as all other females, from 
enjoying equal job opportunities at Crown Cork and Seal 
Company.”

Notwithstanding its brevity, we have no doubt but 
that the specific references in the complaint to a partic­
ular act of layoff is sufficient to withstand the particularly 
requirement for complaints set forth in the U.S. Steel 
case. Accordingly, we hold that the McNasby complaint 
is viable for purposes of redressing her individual griev­
ance against the respondents. With respect to her alle­
gation on behalf of all other females, however, we are of 
a different view.

In the case of PHRC v. Freeport Area School Dis­
trict, 359 A.2d 727 (1976), the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court reviewed a sex discrimination complaint brought 
by an individual female on behalf of herself and all sim­
ilarly situated females. The court held that:

. . . PHRC may order affirmative relief for persons 
other than the named complaint (sic) when (1) the 
complainant alleges that such other persons have 
been affected by the alleged discriminatory practices 
and (2) such other persons entitled to relief may be 
described with specificity. 359 A.2d at 728.
We do not find McNasby’s allegations on behalf of 

“all other females” sufficient to constitute a redressable 
complaint as measured by the standards of either U.S. 
Steel or Freeport. Nothing in her allegations facilitates 
specific identification of “such other persons entitled to



A-33

relief’ as required by Freeport. Furthermore, the allega­
tion that . . all other females (have been prevented) 
from enjoying equal job opportunities at Crown Cork and 
Seal Company” is totally lacking in the degree of partic­
ularly required by U.S. Steel to give respondents notice of 
the charges against them.

Accordingly we find the McNasby complaint suffi­
cient to toll the running of the statute of limitations with 
respect to her individual allegations of discrimination; 
but failing to state a cause of action on behalf of the class 
of other female employes at Crown it does not toll the 
running of the statute as to the classwide allegation.

F. Initiation o f a pattern and practice complaint 
by the PHRC

In its post-hearing brief Crown challenges the au­
thority of the Commission to initiate a complaint based 
upon an alleged pattern and practice of discrimination. 
Nothing in logic or law supports this view.

The PHRA at §9, 43 P.S. §959 states in relevant part:
Any individual claiming to be aggrieved by an al­
leged unlawful discriminatory practice may make, 
sign and file with the Commission a verified com­
plaint, in writing, which shall state the name and 
address of the person, employer, labor organization 
or employment agency to have committed the un­
lawful discriminatory practice complained of, and 
which shall set forth the particulars thereof and con­
tain such other information as may be required by 
the Commission. The Commission upon its own in­
itiative or the Attorney General may, in like manner, 
make sign and file such complaint.
No reasonable inference can be drawn from this lan­

guage that there exists a limitation on the type of Com­
mission initiated complaint permitted under §9 of 
PHRA.



A-34

The apparent intention of this legislative invention,
i.e. the Commission initiated complaint, is to attack the 
type of broad based discriminatory conduct that is not 
njanifest by single isolated incidents (which are more 
likely to result in individual complaints). The 
Commonwealth’s interest in eradicating unlawful dis­
crimination, above and beyond the interest of individual 
victims, is vindicated through Commission initiated 
charges. This interest, of necessity will at times be di­
rected at patterns and practices of discriminatory con­
duct.

Finally, although the issue raised by Crown has ap­
parently never before been addressed by the state’s ap­
pellate courts, the continued approval of PHRC Final Or­
ders arising out of Commission initiated pattern and 
practice complaints suggests that the courts do not agree 
with Crown’s view. See, for example, PHRC vs. Chester 
School District, 233 A. 2d 290 (Pa. Sup. 1967) and PHRC 
vs. Chester Housing Authority, 327 A. 2d 335 (Pa. Sup. 
1974).

G. The laches defense

Both respondents assert the doctrine of laches as a 
defense to their conduct in these cases. The doctrine pro­
hibits a party guilty of inexcusable delay from maintain­
ing an action against an opponent who has been sub­
stantially prejudiced by the delay. We find the doctrine 
applicable here.

It is certainly correct that PHRC staff had sole con­
trol of the pace at which this matter moved toward res­
olution from the time the original complaint was filed in 
1970 until pre-hearing preparation began in earnest in 
1976. It is equally true that the Commission had the stat­
utory obligation to proceed expeditiously with the case 
and did not. Nonetheless, neither respondent has been 
significantly prejudiced by the Commission’s slowness.



A-35

Most important in this regard is the fact that all 
charges against respondents pre-dating July 30, 1975 
(except those relating to Elizabeth McNasby individu­
ally) have been dismissed due to statute of limitations 
problems. And while the Commission has relied in large 
part in reaching its holding upon evidence of discrimi­
natory acts which pre-dated July 30, 1975, neither re­
spondent was prejudiced by reliance upon such evi­
dence.

From the initiation of the original complaint to the 
time of the hearing neither respondents’ conduct was in 
any way affected by the pendency of this litigation. In 
fact, their discriminatory practices, based upon anti­
quated and blatant stereotypes, were maintained in pre­
cisely the same manner as they always had been.

Respondents encountered no meaningful difficulty 
in producing their evidence because of the delay. Certain 
Crown payroll records from 1974 were lost and unavail­
able but this was obviously due to Crown’s own neglect 
as records concerning 1971-1973 were readily available.

The principal element in the defense offered by both 
respondents concerned securing and use of “waivers” 
from female employes. Although Crown was unable to 
produce all the waivers it claimed to have secured over 
the years this could not affect our decision, as, for rea­
sons set forth later in this Opinion, we have rejected the 
legitimacy of the entire waiver process.

Local 266 officials and other witnesses frequently 
claimed lapse of memory when testifying and under­
standably so. Nevertheless, the crucial elements of these 
eases and the primary bases for our decision, namely sta­
tistics and the waiver process, were well presented by all 
parties. We can think of no place in the record where 
there is an indication of lapse of memory, unavailability 
of witnesses, or loss of documents which could have 
meaningfully altered our view with respect to these two 
subjects.



A-36

As to delays attending the processing of these mat­
ters after filing of the amended complaint in 1975 we 
view those as due at least as much to respondents’ con­
duct, including Crown’s initiation of collateral litigation, 
as to PHRC staffs. And with respect to Elizabeth 
McNasby, she, of course, can in no sense be deemed 
guilty of laches as she had no control whatsoever over the 
pace at which this litigation unfolded.

III. Evidence of Discriminatory Practices

A. Theories of discrimination
Employment discrimination litigation, particularly 

that arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq. (hereinafter “Title VII”), 
has resulted in judicial formulation of 2 basic discrimi­
nation models. The first, disparate treatment, is the more 
self-evident form of discriminatory conduct. It is the sim­
ple situation where an individual is less favorably treated 
than others due, at least in part, to consideration of some 
prohibited characteristic such as race, age, religion, na­
tional origin, etc. It is plainly unlawful under 
anti-discrimination laws. McDonnell Douglas Corp. vs. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

The second discrimination model, and the some­
what more complicated one, is that of disparate impact. 
This involves practices which are fair in form but dis­
criminatory in their operation, i.e., which appear to be 
neutral but which adversely affect one protected group 
more than another. Disparate impact discrimination has 
been expressly declared to be unlawful under both Title 
VII, Griggs vs. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and 
under the PHRA, General Electric Corp. vs. PHRC, 365 
A. 2d 649 (Pa. Sup. 1976).

In these cases we find both forms of discrimination 
to have occurred. The detailed Findings of Fact and Con­
clusions of Law which accompany this Opinion make



A-37

unnecessary a lengthy discussion of our reasoning. 
However, it is clear that Crown’s failure to hire women 
during the period 1969-1975 and its sex-segregated sys­
tem of job classification constitute different, disadvanta­
geous treatment on the basis of sex, i.e., unlawful dis­
parate treatment. And statistical and other evidence 
demonstrate that the sex-segregated seniority system at 
Crown had an unlawfully disparate impact upon females 
with respect to earnings, layoff, and recall from layoff.

B. Statistics
The courts of this Commonwealth and those of the 

nation have consistently relied upon statistical proof as a 
means of assessing compliance with anti-discrimination 
laws. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. U.S., 
431 U.S. 324(1977), Hazlewood School District vs. U.S., 
433 U.S. 299 (1977), PHRC vs. Chester Housing Author­
ity, 327 A. 2d 335 (Pa. Sup. 1974), PHRC vs. Chester 
School District, 233 A. 2d 290 (Pa. Sup. 1967). This ap­
proach is predicated upon a recognition that discrimina­
tion is frequently a systemic condition related to wide 
spread practices rather than a series of isolated events.

Substantial statistical disparities between existing 
population distributions and the distribution that might 
be expected in the absence of discrimination (e.g., per­
centage of women in a work force compared to percent­
age of qualified women in available labor pool) will gen­
erally be regarded as prima facie evidence of discrimi­
nation. Castaneda vs. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977), 
Hazlewood, supra, Chester Housing Authority, supra. 
Unrebutted statistical evidence demonstrating an unu­
sually skewed distribution will cause a court to conclude 
that chance alone cannot account for the disparities and 
that discrimination has occurred.

Much statistical evidence was introduced in support 
of the complaintants’ cases at hearing. The disparities 
reflected by these statistics were substantial and indi­



A-38

cated a profound disadvantage experienced by females at 
Crown with respect to hiring, compensation, promotion, 
layoff, and recall from layoff. We find this statistical ev­
idence alone to be sufficient to establish a prima facie 
case of discrimination.

C. Evidence of historic practices
Much of the evidence introduced at hearing and re­

lied upon by the Commission in formulating this deci­
sion concerned historic discriminatory practices which 
had their origins prior to July 30, 1975. Crown’s sex- 
segregated systems of job classification and seniority 
were the subject of much of the evidence introduced and 
the statistical reflections of the consequences of these 
systems, in terms of layoff, earnings, etc., related often to 
the entire period July 9, 1969 to December 31, 1975. The 
evidence thus failed to distinguish acts and conse­
quences that were within and that were not within the 
statute of limitations. A question arises as to the appro­
priateness of the Commission’s consideration of, reliance 
upon, and making findings concerning events outside 
the statute of limitations.

In the case of General Electric Corp. vs. PHRC, 365
A.2d 649 (1976), the Pennsylvania Supreme court re­
viewed the admissibility of evidence of discrimination 
concerning conduct not merely outside the statute of 
limitations, but even predating the enactment of the 
PHRA’s prohibition against sex discrimination. The 
court ruled that such historic evidence, although it can­
not give rise to a finding of redressable illegalities, may 
still be admissible under some circumstances. And those 
circumstances are clearly present in this case.

The General Electric court observed that employ­
ment practices which are apparently neutral can some­
times operate to “freeze” the effect of past discriminatory 
conduct, thus perpetuating into the present the impact 
of the past discrimination. Even if the prior discrimina­



A-3 9

tory practice has been abandoned, the court found that 
this perpetuation of discriminatory effects can cause the 
present neutral practices to be deemed discriminatory in 
their own right. Accordingly evidence of the past practice 
might be admissible.

In the cases at bar, Crown’s sex-segregated job clas­
sification and seniority systems remained in place even 
at the time of the hearing. (They were gradually being 
removed by virtue of non-applicability to new female 
employes and the “option” of integrated seniority offered 
to more senior female employes, discussed infra. But for 
the overwhelming majority of women, sex-segregation at 
Crown was the rule.)

Nevertheless, Crown’s sex segregation policies can 
be analogized to the abandoned discriminatory practices 
discussed in General Electric, because even to the extent 
that sex segregation was breaking down, its historic 
place in employment decision making at Crown contin­
ued to have effects.

Thus, for example, women who had long been lim­
ited in advancement due to sex-segregated departments 
could not afford to give up department seniority and 
transfer to integrated departments when that option be­
came available. By virtue of the dual seniority system, 
segregation, and employer-fostered psychological barri­
ers, women were “locked” into their low-paying, layoff- 
prone positions even when Crown began the slow proc­
ess of dismantling overt segregation.

As the court said in General Electric, 365 A. 2d 
659-660:
In sum, we hold that if an employer has in fact en­
gaged in past discriminatory actions, and if the im­
pact of these actions is perpetuated by the 
employer’s otherwise neutral present employment 
policy, then that employer’s present policy may be 
held to be in violation of Section 5(a) of the PHRA.

The same is applicable here.



A-40

IV. Defenses

As indicated in the preceding section of this Opinion, 
complaintants have clearly succeeded in establishing in 
this matter a prima facie case of employment discrimi­
nation. With statistical evidence they have demonstrated 
disparate treatment of females in hiring. (Respondents 
have effectively offered no defense to this change.) They 
have shown by testimonial and other evidence that dis­
parate treatment occurred with respect to job assign­
ment in that women were inevitably initially assigned to 
lower paying “women’s job.” And by testimonial, docu­
mentary, and statistical evidence they have demon­
strated the disparate impact that women suffered in 
terms of promotions, earnings, layoffs and recall from 
layoffs resulting from application of the sex-segregated 
seniority system.

A. The business necessity doctrine
There is a defense, of course, to a prima facie case of 

employment discrimination. It is what is known as the 
“business necessity doctrine. ”It holds that “(T)he unin­
tended discriminatory impact of an employment policy 
may be justified. . . .  if that policy is necessary for the 
safe and efficient operation of the enterprise.” General 
Electric Cory. vs. PHRC, 365 A.2d 649, 655 (Pa. Sup. 
1976). Thus, once a complaintant establishes a prima 
facie case of employment discrimination, “(T)he burden 
then shifts to the employer to justify his employee se­
lections on the basis of job-related criteria which are nec­
essary for the safety and efficiency of the enterprise (ci­
tation omitted)”. General Electric, 365 A. 2d at 656. Re­
spondents have failed to do that in these cases.

In defense to the charges the respondents have 
raised several interrelated contentions. They assert that 
when changes in the law began to prohibit sex discrim­
ination they undertook efforts to remove any vestiges of 
such discrimination from their employment practices



A-41

but at the same time wished to preserve the option of 
“loyal” female employes to remain in female jobs if they 
so chose. This was accomplished, according to respond­
ents, primarily through the tendering of certain docu­
ments to female employes during the early 1970s which 
ostensibly facilitated their choosing male jobs in accord­
ance with their seniority if they wished or waiving their 
rights to these jobs if they preferred.

As a result of this process respondents argue that the 
previously sex-segregated seniority lists evolved into a fe­
male last for those incumbent women who only wished 
to be considered for female jobs and an integrated list for 
all other employes.

In light of the obvious simplicity of using integrated 
plant seniority for all purposes and permitting women to 
opt out of promotions to men’s jobs if they wished (thus 
protecting the desires of the “loyal” employes) we are 
hard pressed to accept any assertion that the employ­
ment practices here in question are justified by business 
necessity.

B. Ostensible employe desires
We reject based upon the evidence and common 

sense the respondents’ position that female employes 
generally did not wish to be promoted to male jobs. Such 
a view was characterized in General Electric, 365 A.2d at 
661, as “an assumption based upon an undifferentiated 
stereotypic appraisal of the women as a class; as such it 
was plainly discriminatory.” Similarly in Ostapowicz vs. 
Johnson Bronze Co., 369 F. Supp. (W.D. Pa. 1973) the 
court observed at 537 that:

It is true that certain females testified they did not 
want the responsibility which went with the job of 
machine operator first class even though this meant 
more money, and the same, of course, might be true 
of many men. In the view of the court, however, this 
appears to be a type of warrantless assumption based



A-42

on generalizations or stereotyped characterizations 
of the sexes. It is the opinion of the court that to 
justify failure to advance women because they did 
not want to be advanced is a type of stereotyped char­
acterization which will not stand.

Respondents’ view that most female employes were 
not interested in promotion to male jobs was one of many 
sexist stereotypes that seems to have guided employ­
ment practices at Crown. It is also noteworthy, that even 
to the extent that these ostensible desires of female 
employes were accurately perceived by respondents 
those desires must be attributed in part to psychological 
conditioning by virtue of the historic imposition of sex- 
segregated job classification at Crown.

C. The Waivers
From approximately 1970 to 1974, primarily 

through a series of meetings and by use of an assortment 
of documents (hereinafter referred to as “waivers”), 
Crown and Local 266 purported to be making good faith 
offers of non-discriminatory job placement to females 
while actually seeking to build a “paper record” which 
they believed would exculpate them from any future 
charge of sex discrimination. We view these waivers as 
unlawful per se, unlawful as used, and void as waivers of 
rights to equal employment opportunity.

Nothing about the waivers suggest that they were 
truly intended as good faith job offers. They required 
women to state affirmatively, in advance, how they 
wished to exercise their seniority to secure rights guar­
anteed by equal employment opportunity laws including 
the PHRA. But, of course, these rights being guaranteed 
by statute, should not require any affirmative exercise. 
More significantly, no male was ever shown, offered, or 
asked to sign one of these forms. Males’ seniority rights 
were exercised automatically not as an option available 
only upon an affirmative effort.



A-43

Although there was some variance in the different 
waiver forms utilized over the years and although the 
scenarious in which respondents sought the waivers 
similarly varied, basically what most often occurred was 
that women were offered forms and were told to list ox- 
check off those males jobs on the forms for which they 
wished to be considered. The forms generally stated a 
waiver of rights to jobs not affirmatively indicated. Such 
a practice appears to be illegal per se because of the view 
in the courts that prospective waivers of equal employ­
ment opportunity rights are prohibited. Alexander vs. 
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974).

Furthermore, Waivers of statutory rights, such as 
those guaranteed by the PHRA, are frowned upon gen- 
ei’ally by the law and will be looked at with askance. Par­
ticularly, before giving credit to a waiver of this charac­
ter, a court would have to be well-satisfied that it was a 
knowing and voluntary waiver. That cannot be said in 
this case.

The attached Findings of Fact detail the problems 
surrounding execution of the forms and the defects in 
the forms themselves. All of these attendant circum­
stances, reviewed in light of a strong public policy 
against giving credit to waivers such as these, compel 
our finding that female employes at Crown, when sign­
ing these waivers, did not intend to waive their rights to 
equal job opportunities.

Finally, the use to which respondents put the foi'ms 
belies any assertion that the forms had anything what­
soever to do with implementation of equal employment 
opportunity rights. Crown never demonstrated any sig­
nificant business use of the forms. There appears to be 
little if any connection between what a female employe 
might have placed on the forms and her actual move­
ment to a male job.

The forms obviously had only the most limited affect 
in dismantling the sex-segregated seniority system as, in 
all, only 18 females appeared on the integrated seniority



A-44

list over the years 1971-1975, and no more than 12 ever 
appeared on that list in a given year.

The general rule against prospective waivers of 
equal employment rights, the public policy discouraging 
waivers of statutory rights, the discriminatory, coercive 
circumstances surrounding execution of the forms, and 
the lack of any meaningful business use of the forms all 
operate to require rejection of respondents’ defenses 
based upon the waivers.

D. Challenges to statistical evidence

Crown offered a rather obtuse challenge to the sta­
tistical case presented by complainants. In effect 
Crown’s evidence appeared to acknowledge the accuracy 
of most of complainants’ statistical presentation, but 
Crown concluded that any disparate impact suffered by 
any identifiable group was due, not to sex, but to whether 
the group was on the female or the integrated seniority 
list.

This may well be a nice and technically correct sta­
tistical distinction. However, for purposes of enforcing 
an anti-discrimination law such as the PHRA, we refuse, 
contrary to the suggestion implicit in Crown’s evidence, 
to ignore the basic facts that the integrated senority list 
was virtually all male and that with some limited excep­
tions the seniority systems at Crown remained effec­
tively segregated at all times material to this litigation. 
Furthermore, segregation of the seniority systems was 
attributable totally to the respondents, not to the 
discriminatees, and was patently illegal. (Ironically, 
Crown’s expert admitted that in 2 of the 4 analyzed years 
even women on the integrated list had earnings that 
were less, by statistically significant amounts, than sim­
ilarly situated men.)



A-45

YL Remedy
The remedical authority of the Commission is set 

forth as part of §9 of the PHRA, 43 P.S. §959:
If, upon all the evidence at the hearing, the Com­
mission shall find that a respondent has engaged in 
or is engaging in any lawful discriminatory practice 
as defined in this act, the Commission shall state its 
findings of fact, and shall issue and cause to be 
served on such respondent an order such respond­
ent to cease and desist from such unlawful discrim­
inatory practice and to take such affirmative action 
including but not limited to hiring, reinstatement or 
upgrading of employes, with or without back pay, 
admission or restoration to membership in any re­
spondent labor organization......... as, in the judge­
ment of the Commission, will effectuate the pur­
poses of this act, and including a requirement for 
report of the manner of compliance.

Reviewing this medical authority in PHRC vs. Alto- 
Reste Park Cemetary Association, 306 A. 2d 881 (1973), 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court observed that “the 
Legislature vested in the Commission, quite properly, 
maximum flexibility to remedy and hopefully eradicate 
the ‘evils’ of discrimination.” 306 A. 2d at 887. We believe 
that the attached Final Order, read in light of our Find­
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, is a responsible 
exercise of that judicially sanctioned flexibility.

Our primary concern in formulating a remedy is 
manifest in the injunctive type relief we have ordered. 
This is intended to dismantle and root out as expedi­
tiously as possible the sex-segregated senority system 
which has continuously disadvantaged female workers. 
(Although most of the evidence in this case concerned 
the period from July 9, 1969 to December 31, 1975, dis­
criminatory practices having been clearly demonstrated 
for that period and there being no evidence suggesting



A-46

their cessation, we may and do reasonably conclude that 
the practices remain prevalent, PHRC vs. St. Joe Min­
erals Corp., 382 A 2d 731, 735 (Pa. Sup. 1978), and we 
issue a remedy accordingly.)

An additional purpose in the exercise of our remedial 
authority is, of course, to restore discriminatees to their 
“rightful place,” i.e. to vitiate the effects of any discrim­
ination they have endured over time. Albermarle Paper 
Co. vs. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). Unfortunately, stat­
ute of limitations problems have restricted the class of 
discriminatees to whom a remedy can be extended and 
the absence of sufficient evidence relating to the period 
following December 31, 1975, the burden of production 
of which belonged to complainants, precludes any mon­
etary relief for the period after the date.

In calculating monetary relief for the class of entitled 
discrminatees we have been guided by the principles of 
flexibility enunciated in English vs. Seaboard Coastline 
R.R. Co., 12 EPD Para. 11,237 (S.D. Ga. 1975) at 5729:

(i) Difficulty of ascertainment of amounts due will 
not be confused with right of recovery.

(ii) Unreasonable exactitude, in light of available in­
formation, will not be required.

(iii) Uncertainties will be resolved in favor of the vic­
tims of unlawful discrimination and against the 
wrongdoers.

We have also considered in calcuating monetary re­
lief the court’s declaration United States vs. United 
States Steel Corp., 520 F. 2d 1043, (5th Cir. 1975); cert, 
denied, 429 U.S. 817, (1976) at 1050:

Once a court has determined that a defendant’s con­
duct caused some damages to the class, or to a rep­
resentative sample of its members, then the burden



A-47

falls upon the wrongdoers to explain away or dis­
prove the damages which each claimant’s evidence 
arguably supports.
With respect to those females who had employment 

rights with Crown between July 30 and December 31, 
1975, no evidentiary showing was made which would 
disqualify any of them.

The specific amounts awarded to eligible 
discriminatees were arrived at by considering 
Complainant’s Exhibit 46 introduced at the hearing. The 
exhibit represents a statistical study by complainants’ 
expert purporting to demonstrate how much additional 
earnings each female would have enjoyed during 1975 
in the absence of discrimination. Respondent’s expert 
had no significant dispute with the figures on the exhibit. 
We then awarded to each discriminatee 42% of the 
amount on the exhibit representing a pro-rata share of 
the amount covering the period July 30 to December 31, 
1975.

We awarded Elizabeth McNasby a pro-rata portion 
of the amount on Exhibit C-43 for 1971 from the date of 
her complaint. She was awarded the amounts reflected 
on C-44 for 1972, C-45 for 1973, and C-46 for 1975. Be­
cause there was no data available from respondents for 
1974 we awarded McNasby an amount for that year rep­
resenting her average amount for the other years.

Finally, because we regard Crown principally re­
sponsible for the diminished earnings of the 
discriminatees we have not made Local 266 jointly liable 
for back pay.

FINAL ORDER
AND NOW, this 29th day of September, 1981, the 

Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (hereinaf­
ter “PHRC” or “Commission”) orders:

1. That Respondent Crown, Cork and Seal (herein­
after “Crown”) shall conduct all of its hiring and em­



A-48

ployment practices in a non-discriminatory manner and 
in accordance with the Pennsylvania Human Relations 
Act (hereinafter “PHRA”), Act of October 27, 1955, P.L. 
744, as amended, 43 P.S. Section 951, et seq.

2. That Respondent Sheet Metal Workers Union, 
Local No. 266 (hereinafter “Local 266”) shall conduct all 
of its activities, including but not limited to, initiation 
and reinstatement of members, setting and collection of 
dues and fees, processing of grievances filed by 
employes, representation of employes, and advocacy of 
the interests of employes in a non-discriminatory man­
ner and in accordance with the PHRA.

3. That Respondent Crown shall:

(a) recruit female employes on the same basis as 
male employes;

(b) hire female employes on the same basis as male 
employees;

(c) make initial assignments to shift, department, 
and/or job regardless of the sex of the employe;

(d) promote and transfer employes to any depart­
ment and/or job regardless of sex;

(e) assign overtime work to employes regardless of 
their sex;

(f) layoff employes without regard to sex and based 
solely upon plant seniority, in the absence of a bona 
fide, necessitous business reason for using a meas­
ure or consideration other than plant seniority; and,

(g) recall employe from layoff without regard to sex 
and based solely upon their seniority in the absence 
of a bona fide, necessitous business reason for using 
a measure or consideration other than plant senior­
ity.



A-49

4. That Respondent Crown shall pay back wages to 
members of the class of females who were employed or 
who possessed employment rights at Crown’s Plant No. 
1, production and maintenance unit, during the period 
July 30, 1975 to December 31, 1975. The amount of back 
pay shall be equal to 42% of the amount listed by the 
name of each female on the document introduced in ev­
idence at the hearing as Complainant’s Exhibit 46. 
Added to this total shall be 6% interest, compounded on 
a quarterly basis from the end of calendar year 1975. The 
total may be reduced by such appropriate deductions as 
are allowable under federal, state, and local income tax 
laws or any other appropriate and normal deductions pro­
vided that Crown shall file within 60 days after the ef­
fective date of this Order an appropriate affidavit item­
izing any such tax or other deductions and indicating, 
with respect to each, the precise reason therefore (e.g. 
federal income tax, state income tax, local wage tax, so­
cial security and/or any period of unavailability for em­
ployment). Such filing (and all filings and reports re­
quired pursuant to this Order) shall be directed to the 
Director, Systemic Enforcement Division (hereinafter 
“SED”) at the PHRC’s Headquarters office. Commission 
staff shall have 30 days to object to any of the proposed 
deductions. In the event of any objections by Commis­
sion staff, the net amount minus deductions proposed by 
Crown shall immediately be paid and Crown shall have 
an opportunity to demonstrate by clear and convincing 
evidence presented to the Hearing Panel that each of the 
contested deductions is proper. The Hearing Panel’s rec­
ommendations upon the objections shall be ruled upon 
by the Commission. Post-judgment interest shall be pay­
able at the rate of 6% per annum compounded quarterly.

5. That the preceding paragraph of this Order shall 
apply in full to the back wage award of Elizabeth 
McNasby except that in lieu of 42% of the amount listed 
by her name on Complainant’s Exhibit 46, her award 
shall be based upon the following yearly amounts plus



A-50

6% interest compounded on a quarterly basis from the
end of calendar year 1971:

1971 - $2499.28
1972 - $6510.80
1973 - $6977.59
1974 - $6306.62
1975 - $7887.78

6. That to the extent that openings are or subse­
quently become available. Crown shall make good faith 
offers of reinstatement to each female employe who is 
presently laid off if she was laid off while a less plant 
senior male continued to be employed. Such offers shall 
be made based upon employment availability and rela­
tive plant seniority within the production and mainte­
nance unit.

7. That within 180 days after the effective date of 
this Order, Crown shall integrate its shift, department, 
and plant seniority systems in the following manner:

a) All employes, regardless of sex, shall be given an 
opportunity to bid on the shift of their choice, based 
solely upon their plant seniority. Such bids shall be 
honored by management strictly on the basis of plant
seniority.
b) All employes shall be informed of the results of 
the shift bidding and, thereafter, each female 
employe shall have the opportunity to bid on the de­
partment of her choice. The bid shall be honored by 
management strictly on the basis of plant seniority, 
and if upon that basis any female’s bid cannot be 
accommodated she shall be given successive oppor­
tunities to bid into the department of her choice until 
such time as her plant seniority results in her bid 
being honored.
c) Within any department to which she is assigned, 
regardless of whether by bidding or otherwise, each 
female shall be allowed to bid on the particular job of



A-51

her choice, provided that she has greater plant sen­
iority than the existing incumbent thereof at the 
time of the bid.

d) In each case where a female employe takes ad­
vantage of these bidding opportunities, she shall be 
granted not less than 30 days of bona fide, good faith 
training on the selected job, in recognition of the cu­
mulative effect of historical denial of equal employ­
ment opportunities at Crown.

e) In the event that any voluntary or involuntary 
transfer directly or indirectly resulting from the bid­
ding procedures set forth in this paragraph causes 
reassignment of any employe to a lower-paying po­
sition than that which s/he regularly holds, his/her 
wages shall be “red-circled” and maintained for the 
duration of employment with Crown at not less than 
the “red-circled” amount, plus any raises generally 
granted to other employes of the same job class.

f) Variances from the requirements of this para­
graph shall be available to accommodate individual 
employe hardships or for other good cause shown 
with the consent of the SED Director.

8. That in order to facilitate the intelligent exercise 
of bidding rights set forth in subparagraphs 6(a) - 6(c) of 
this Order, Crown and Local 266 shall take all necessary 
steps to advise and inform female employes as to the na­
ture and duties of all production and maintenance jobs 
within Plant No. 1.

9. That within 30 days of the effective date of this 
Order, all management and supervisory personnel 
within Plant No. 1, and all officials and shopstewards of 
Local 266 shall be provided by Crown and Local 266 with 
complete copies of the Order, and the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Opinion upon which it is based.



A-52

Copies shall also be posted on all bulletin boards 
throughout Plant No. 1 and shall remain clearly and 
prominently displayed for a period of 3 years.

. 10. That Crown shall institute a bona fide affirma­
tive action program directed towards recruiting, hiring, 
promoting, transferring, and recalling females and to­
ward remedying the continuing effects of its past dis­
criminatory practices. The affirmative action program 
shall include an appropriate training program for fe­
males and an educational program to acquaint all super­
visory and non-supervisory employes at Plant No. 1 with 
the requirements of the PHRA and the particular rem­
edies being ordered in these cases. The affirmative ac­
tion program shall be in writing and a copy shall be sent 
to the SED Director within 180 days of the effective date 
of this Order.

11. That Respondent Crown and Respondent Local 
266 shall take all reasonable steps necessary to insure 
that none of the named complainants, females who tes­
tified at the hearing of this matter, or other female or 
male employes of Crown or members of Local 266 who 
assisted with the investigation of this case or, who at any 
time prior or subsequent to the effective date of this Or­
der, advocated the rights of the female employes within 
Plant No. 1 under the Pennsylvania Human Relations 
Act, or who opposed unlawful employment practices are 
subjected to any harassment or discrimination.

12. That a copy of this adjudication shall be for­
warded to the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, the 
National Labor Relations Board, Pennsylvania Depart­
ment of Labor, Federal Department of Labor and Local 
266’s parent International Union, recommending that 
appropriate action be taken with respect to Local 266, its 
officials and agents.

13. That Local 266 shall cease requiring the pay­
ment of dues while an employe is on layoff status.

14. That Local 266 shall cease requiring the pay­
ment of any reinstatement fees associated, or in any way



A-53

connected with any employe’s return from an involun­
tary layoff.

15. That within 60 days of the effective date of this 
Order, Local 266 shall reimburse all females for any dues 
paid while on layoff and for any fees paid upon reinstate­
ment from layoff between July 30, 1975 and the effective 
date of this Order. Local 266 shall submit a complete 
report to the SED Director indicating with respect to 
each female who receives a reimbursement pursuant to 
this paragraph the name of the female and the amount 
reimbursed. With respect to any female who does not 
receive a full reimbursement pursuant to this paragraph, 
Local 266 shall report to the SED Director the name of 
the female and why she received less than full reim­
bursement.

16. That for 3 years from the effective date of this 
Order, the Commission expressly retains jurisdiction 
over this matter to insure implementation of the provi­
sions of this Order, or to modify or amend the Order to 
effectuate the purposes of the PHRA.

17. That the SED Director shall oversee the imple­
mentation of the provisions of this Order for a period of 
3 years after its effective date and upon notice, shall have 
access to the confidential personnel records of Crown 
employes and to other records of Crown and Local 266 to 
the extent necessary to fulfill PHRC duties under the 
Order, provided that appropriate confidentiality shall be 
maintained for such records.

18. That for 3 years from the effective date of this 
Order, any party may petition the Chairperson of the 
Commission to reopen the record for or in connection 
with implementation, modification, or amendment of the 
Order.

19. That for 3 years from the effective date of this 
Order where Commission staff believes that any of 
Crown or Local 266’s actions reflect a continuation of the 
practices found unlawful by the PHRC, or constitute an 
effort to avoid the effect of this adjudication, Commission



A-54

staff may either petition to reopen this record for the pur­
pose of adducing evidence and proposing an appropriate 
course of action or may recommend that an appropriate 
Commission charge be filed.

20. That for 3 years from the effective date of this 
Order, Respondent Crown shall, on a quarterly basis, re­
port to the SED Director:

a) all hiring within the production and maintenance 
unit at Plant No. 1.
b) all reassignment, promotions transfers, layoffs, 
recall from layoffs, and expiration of recall rights, in­
volving the production and maintenance unit at 
Plant No. 1.

These reports shall indicate the name, address, sex, 
plant seniority date, initial job class and title, subsequent 
job class and title, layoff date, job class and title occupied 
as of layoff date, recall job class and title, and the dura­
tion of the layoff.

21. That for 3 years from the effective date of this 
Order, Respondent Crown shall promptly inform the 
SED Director, in writing, when any female is laid off if 
any other employee with less plant seniority remains em­
ployed or if any employe with less plant seniority is re­
called prior to a female employe with greater plant sen­
iority. Crown shall supply the following information for 
each employe involved in any such employment action 
(i.e., the female employee and each less senior employe 
working or being recalled): Name, address, plant sen­
iority date, job class and title before and after layoff or 
recall, and a narrative statement explaining the reason 
for the retention or recall of the less senior employe.

22. That for 3 years from the effecive date of this 
Order, Crown and Local 266 shall, within 10 days of re­
ceipt inform the SED Director, in writing, of any griev­
ance or complaint (written or oral) involving:



A-55

(a) plant seniority
(b) layoffs
(c) recall from layoffs
(d) expiration of recall rights
(e) assignment of overtime
(f) sex discrimination
(g) job classifications
(h) promotions
(i) vesting of pension rights

at Plant No. 1, and involving the production and main­
tenance unit. This report shall include all relevant 
employment data and the position of each respondent 
concerning the merits of the grievance/complaint. Final 
disposition of the grievance/complaint shall also be 
promptly reported to the SED Director.

Pennsylvania Human 
Relations Commission

By : ________ _____________
Joseph X. Yaffe, 

Chairperson

Attest-.

Elizabeth M. Scott, 
Secretary



A-56

RECOMMENDATION OF HEARING PANEL

AND NOW, this 28th day of August, 1981, in con­
sideration of the entire record in this matter the Hearing 
Panel hereby adopts the attached as their- proposed Find­
ings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Opinion and Final Or­
der, and recommends that the same be finally adopted 
and issued by the Pennsylvania Human Relations Com­
mission.

Pennsylvania Human 
Relations Commission

Alvin E. Echols, Jr., Esquire 
Chairperson of the Hearing Panel

Doris M. Leader 
Hearing Commissioner

Benjamin S. Lowenstein, Esquire 
Hearing Commissioner

Robert Johnson Smith
Hearing Commissioner



A-57

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 
GOVERNOR’S OFFICE

PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION

PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN :
RELATIONS COMMISSION, : 

and :
ELEANOR E. NEYER, et al., :

Complainants
V.

CROWN CORK AND SEAL 
COMPANY, INC.,

PLANT NO. 1, 
and

SHEET METAL PRODUCTION 
WORKERS’ UNION, LOCAL 266,

Respondents

DOCKET NO. 
E-4027

ELIZABETH McNASBY,
Complainant

V.

CROWN CORK AND SEAL 
COMPANY, INC., 

and
SHEET METAL WORKERS’ 

INTERNATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO, CAN 

WORKERS’ UNION, LOCAL 266 
a/k/a SHEET METAL 

PRODUCTION WORKERS 
UNION, LOCAL 266,

Respondents

DOCKET NO. 
E-4249

RECOMMENDATION OF HEARING PANEL 
AND SUPPLEMENTARY OPINION AND ORDER



A-58

RECOMMENDATION OF HEARING PANEL

AND NOW, this 26th day of April, 1982, the Hearing 
Panel hereby adopts the attached as their proposed Sup­
plementary Opinion and Order, and recommends that 
the same be finally adopted and issued by the Pennsyl­
vania Human Relations Commission.

Pennsylvania Human 
Relations Commission

Alvin E. Echols, Jr., Esquire 
Chairperson of the Hearing Panel

DORIS M. LEADER 
Hearing Commissioner

Benjamin S. Lowenstein, Esquire 
Hearing Commissioner

Robert Johnson Smith
Hearing Commissioner



A-59

SUPPLEMENTARY OPINION AND ORDER

Having carefully reconsidered our Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, Opinion, and Final Order in these 
cases in light of the Request for Reconsideration filed by 
Complainants, we have determined that all supplemen­
tary relief sought by Complainants must be denied.

Our Final Order was entered on September 29, 
1981. Subsequently, on October 9, 1981, a Request for 
Reconsideration was filed on behalf of the Complainants. 
Certain collateral proceedings were thereafter initiated 
before the Commonwealth Court, but none of them are 
now pending.

We view the Request for Reconsideration as being 
divisible into five issues, the first three inter-related and 
the last two clearly distinct. They are:

1) Was the PHRC initiated complaint, filed Decem­
ber 22, 1970, sufficient to serve as a viable complaint 
under the standards set forth by the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court in the case of PHRC v. U.S. Steel, 
325 A.2d 910 (1974)?

2) Regardless of the sufficiency of the December 
22, 1970 PHRC initiated complaint, as judged by 
U.S. Steel standards, is there any other basis for al­
lowing the complaint to toll the running of the stat­
ute of limitations?

3) Was the complaint filed by Elizabeth McNasby, 
at E-4247, sufficient to state a class action allega­
tion?

4) In light of the fact that our Final Order awarded 
back pay to only those women who had an employ­
ment relationship with Respondent, Crown Cork 
and Seal on or after July 30, 1975, should the 
amount of back pay have been calculated from a date 
preceding July 30, 1975?



A-60

5) Should Respondent, Local 266, have been made
jointly liable with Crown for the back pay awarded?

We have answered each of these questions in the neg­
ative and will explain our answers sequentially.

I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
In our original ruling we held that the PHRC initi­

ated complaint, filed December 22, 1970, was fatally de­
ficient because it did not set forth with particularity those 
violations of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act with 
which Respondents were charged. The requirement of 
particularity is compelled by §9 of the Act and by our 
state Supreme Court’s decision in the U.S. Steel case.

Of course, U.S. Steel was decided more than three 
years after filing of the December 22, 1970 PHRC initi­
ated complaint. And PHRC staff, which originally 
drafted the complaint, had no way of anticipating the 
U.S. Steel decision. Nonetheless, when the court of last 
resort in this Commonwealth issues an interpretation of 
the Human Relations Act, we are bound. That court hav­
ing concluded that complaints must be particular in their 
allegations and that lacking such particularity the com­
plaint will be dismissed, we have no choice but to follow 
that ruling.

The result in this case, requiring dismissal of the De­
cember 22, 1970 PHRC initiated complaint to many may 
be disappointing and may even seem unfair. But to do 
otherwise we would necessarily have to overrule or ig­
nore the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. We are neither 
competent nor willing to do either of those things.

The Request for Reconsideration suggest that U.S. 
Steel can be distinguished and that the December 22, 
1970 PHRC initiated complaint is not so lacking in par­
ticularity as the complaint in U.S. Steel. We categorically 
reject this suggestion.

The two complaints suffer from identical defects. 
Both catalogue virtually all the practices of the respective



A-61

Respondents as to which a violation of the Act might ex­
ist and they then assert that such violations do in fact 
exist. Thus, they accomplish little beyond advising the 
respective Respondents that an unlawfully discrimina­
tory employment practice is charged. The original 
Crown complaint, like that in U.S. Steel, fails in any 
meaningful way to set forth required particulars and the 
Request for Reconsideration has done nothing to con­
vince us otherwise.

The Request also attempts to distinguish this case 
from U.S. Steel in light of the respective procedural pos­
tures of the cases. It asserts that the Court in U.S. Steel 
only found the unduly generalized complaint to be in­
sufficiently particular to support the enforcement of a 
subpoena and since the Crown case proceeded well be­
yond the discovery stage the particularity requirement 
should not be imposed.

We find nothing in U.S. Steel to support this distinc­
tion. We need not be apologetic in reiterating that it is 
plainly within the authority of our Supreme Court to con­
strue the Human Relations Act and to determine proce­
dural matters such as the requirements for a viable com­
plaint. And we are, of course, constrained by such de­
terminations. The U.S. Steel mandate of particularity in 
complaints purports to apply generally without regard to 
the procedural posture of the case. We must enforce that 
mandate in the matter before us.

The Request for Reconsideration also argues that 
protests relating to sufficiency of the complaint had been 
previously rejected by both the hearing panel and the 
courts. This, is not quite correct, however. In fact, on the 
several occasions when Respondents raised the insuffi­
ciency of the complaint in advance of or during the hear­
ing, the panel repeatedly deferred consideration of the 
issue without making a final ruling. With the luxury of 
hindsight available this might not have been the best



A-62

course. Nevertheless, there is no place in the record 
where the panel expressly ruled that the original com­
plaint was adequate.

Similarly, in all the collateral litigation that occurred 
in the courts, most relating to discovery issues, Respond­
ents frequently raised the defense of insufficiency of the 
original complaint. The Request for Reconsideration is 
incorrect, however, in asserting that any court ever ad­
judicated this question. Rather, the rulings generally 
treated Respondents’ appeals as impermissibly interloc­
utory and thus the question was never addressed.

II. TOLLING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
In our Final Order, we held that because of its failure 

to satisfy the particularity standards of U.S. Steel, the 
original complaint was null and void and thus could not 
toll the running of the statute of limitations. The most 
significant consequence of this was to prohibit any rem­
edy for any women who did not have an employment 
relationship with Crown on or after July 30, 1975 (90 
days prior to the filing of the October 27, 1975 amended 
complaint which we expressly held to be viable).

The Request for Reconsideration urges that even if 
the original complaint was defective under U.S. Steel 
standards, still the statute of limitations should be tolled 
for a variety of reasons and the class of women with re- 
dressable grievances should not be restricted as in our 
Final Order. The Request asserts that, notwithstanding 
the lack of particularity in the original complaint, Re­
spondents had actual notice as to the allegations charged 
and did not rely upon the deficient pleadings.

The factual premises underlying the argument are 
correct. It is clear that events made Crown and Local 266 
aware of the scope of the charges against them before 
they raised the issue of deficiencies in the complaint. 
Nonetheless, as set forth in the preceding section, we do 
not understand the rule in U.S. Steel to be situationally



A-63

relevant. The Court appears in that case to have fixed a 
firm standard that is consistent with well-established 
Pennsylvania law; i.e., that the initial pleading, the com­
plaint, must give adequate notice to the defending party 
as to the charges against it. The fact that subsequent 
events may have informally provided Respondents with 
notice of the charges and the fact that Respondents ap­
parently did not rely to their detriment upon the ambi­
guities of the broad, general December 22, 1970 PHRC 
initiated complaint, do not permit us to treat the U.S. 
Steel rule as eroded or inapplicable.

The Request for Reconsideration also argues that 
Crown and Local 266 participated in this case for years 
before raising the defense of the complaint’s lack of par­
ticularity and that accordingly the defense is waived for 
not being timely. Several cases are cited in support of this 
position and without reviewing them individually in this 
opinion, we find each of them readily distinguishable as 
involving objections which were not raised until after 
trial began or which were not raised in accordance with 
a specifically governing procedural rule.

In this case, Respondents’ objection is in no sense 
untimely. It was raised approximately two years before 
the public hearing and was not outside any controlling 
rule of PHRC or general administrative procedure. The 
delay in raising the objection, in fact, should be viewed 
as attributable, in part, to the essential differences be­
tween administrative and judicial processes. Unlike 
court proceedings, when one is before an administrative 
agency like the PHRC, with a mixed investigative, 
prosecutorial, and adjudicative function, there is no rea­
son, no incentive compelling the raising of procedural 
objections before litigation is threatened. Indeed, con­
trary to the rules governing proceedings in court, §9 of 
the Human Relations Act makes clear that an answer to 
the complaint is not even required of a Respondent. 
There was thus, no rfeason for Respondents in this mat­
ter to raise their objections before they did.



A-64

Furthermore, the lengthy delay in processing this 
matter, at least up to the October 27, 1975 filing of the 
amended complaint appears primarily attributable to 
PHRC staff. The U.S. Steel case was decided in late 1974 
and for approximately a year before and a year after 
PHRC staff had almost no contact with Respondents. 
Several months after the amended complaint was filed, 
the particularity defense was raised. The defense there­
fore does not appear to be untimely or waived.

III. CLASS ACTION STATUS OF THE McNASBY COM­
PLAINT

The amended PHRC initiated complaint, at Docket 
Number E-4027, filed October 27, 1975 is and was 
treated in our Final Order as a class action. In the Re­
quest for Reconsideration, however, it is urged that the 
complaint filed by Elizabeth McNasby at E-4249 in May, 
1971, is also a proper class action.

McNasby’s complaint alleged that “(T)he respond­
ents consorted in the layoff of the complainant because 
of her sex, female, and have prevented her, as well as 
other females, from enjoying equal job opportunities at 
Crown, Cork and Seal Company.”

Subject to close analysis, the complaint neatly di­
vides into two specific allegations. The first concerns 
only McNasby’s layoff. The second is about preventing 
“females from enjoying equal job opportunities.” How 
such prevention orrurs, and more importantly, what job 
opportunities are involved, is nowhere disclosed.

In our Final Order we upheld the sufficiency of 
McNasby’s individual claim and unlike all the other fe­
males at Crown, whose only protection came under the 
umbrella of E-4027, McNasby was awarded back wages 
going back to the 1971 filing of her ccomplaint. How­
ever, we also held that the second part of McNasby’s 
complaint, the class action allegation, was insufficiently 
particular and must fall.



A-65

Class actions under the PHRC have been expressly 
made the subject of liberal rules by our state Supreme 
Court in PHRC v. Freeport Area School District, 359 
A.2d 724 (1976).

It appears that the McNashy complaint satisfies the 
Feeeport test for class actions and to the extent that any­
thing on page 42 of our original opinion suggests the 
contrary we stand corrected and modify our opinion ac- 
ccordingly. But nothing in Freeport dispenses with the 
complaint — particularity rule of U. S. Steel. The rule 
was not addressed in Freeport because the complaint in 
that case clearly satisfied the standard by adequately de­
scribing the discriminatory act to which Complainants 
were allegedly being subjected. This is unlike the 
McNasby complaint which, with respect to the class, 
merely says that females are prevented “from enjoying 
equal job opportunities.” Failing to satisfy the adequacy 
of complaint requirement, we never reach the point in 
McNasby of addressing the question whether it satisfies 
the Freeport requirements for class actions.

IV. PERIOD DURING WHICH BACK PAY ACCRUES

Having determined that complaint and statute of 
limitations problems restrict the class of women with re- 
dressable grievances to those who had an employment 
relationship with Crown on or after July 30, 1975, our 
Final Order included an award of back pay for the period 
July 30 to December 31, 1975.

The Request for Reconsideration raises a very seri­
ous challenge to our disallowance of back wages for any 
time predating July 30, 1975.

We adhere to the view manifest in our prior cases 
that where a complaint is timely filed, we have authority 
to award back pay for a period pre-dating the filing of the 
complaint by more than 90 days. We have purposefully 
chosen in this case, however, to exercise our discretion, 
and circumscribe our award of back pay within the same



A-66

time frame as governed our statute of limitations deci­
sion.

As we stated at page 55 of our original opinion in this 
matter, “Our primary concern in formulating a remedy 
(has been) . . .  to dismantle and root out as expeditiously 
as possible the sex-segregated seniority system which 
has continuously disadvantaged female workers.”

In this regard it should be recalled that this is and 
always has been a PHRC initiated action. The December 
22, 1970 filing named only the PHRC as a Complainant. 
Subsequently, when the amended complaint of October 
27, 1975 was filed, the affidavits of thirteen individual 
women were attached. Until that time no individual, 
other than Elizabeth McNasby in her separate com­
plaint, had come forward as a Complainant.

The interests of the PHRC in litigating discrimina­
tion claims are frequently identical to the interests of in­
dividual discriminatees. But the primary goal of the 
agency must be to vindicate the public interest. This is 
especially so in PHRC initiated complaints. We feel our 
Final Order in this case, with its forceful injunctive-type 
relief, accomplishes the vindication of the public interest 
while fairly balancing the relevant private interests.

Elizabeth McNasby, who filed her individual com­
plaint in 1971 and who has been totally faultless with 
respect to subsequent delays in this matter has been 
granted relief going back to the date of her filing. 
Theresa Reed, who did not become a party to this litiga­
tion until solicited by PHRC staff to excute an affidavit in 
1975, and all other class members who are protected by 
the 1975 amended complaint, received some back pay. 
Respondents Crown and Local 266 are ordered to alter 
radically their existing practices and to pay some com­
pensation for past wrongs. However, they are not held 
financially accountable for the several years pre-dating 
the amended complaint when delays in processing this 
matter were attributable primarily to PHRC staff.



A-67

Unfortunately, we can award nothing to the twelve 
affiants (other than Theresa Reed) who ceased employ­
ment with Crown at various times between 1966 and 
1974 and who annexed their affidavits to the 1975 
amended complaint. We have no doubt that these twelve 
were victimized by the pattern of unlawful sex discrim­
ination that we have found to have been practiced by 
Respondents throughout all periods relevant to this liti­
gation. Nonetheless, for reasons set forth in our original 
opinion and earlier in this supplementary opinion, the 
failure of the original December 22, 1970 PHRC initiated 
complaint coupled with the 90 day statute of limitations 
compels us to dismiss their grievances.

V. JOINT LIABILITY OF LOCAL 266
At page 57 of our original opinion, it says: “Finally, 

because we regard Crown principally responsible for the 
diminished earnings of the discriminatees, we have not 
made Local 266 jointly liable for back pay.” The Request 
for Reconsideration, argues that the union can and 
should be made jointly and severally liable or, at least, 
that the liability should be apportioned.

The Request is no doubt correct that this can be 
done. The case of PHRC v. Transit Casualty, 387 A.2d 
58 (1978), clearly allows back pay orders against Re­
spondents other than employers and numerous Title VII 
cases, where discrimination has occurred pursuant to 
collective bargaining, have made unions jointly and sev­
erally liable with employers.

Nonetheless, in this case we feel that we have fairly 
distributed the financial burdens of our order commen­
surate with the nature of the wrongs done. Respondent 
Crown was both the principal beneficiary and the prin­
cipal perpetrator of the misdeeds. Furthermore, Re­
spondent, Local 266, has not escaped monetary conse­
quences for its discriminatory behavior. Paragraphs 
13-15 of our Final Order, page 65, restricts monies to be



A-68

collected by the union in the future and require reim­
bursements to “all females for any dues paid while on 
layoff and for any fees paid upon reinstatement from lay­
off between July 30, 1975 and the effective date of this 
Order.”

VI. CHANGES IN THE FINAL ORDER
We take this opportunity to correct two significant 

typographical errors in our original Final Order:
(1) the word “plant should be added to page 59, par­
agraph 3(g) so that it reads — “recall employes from 
layoff without regard to sex and based solely upon 
their plant seniority;”
(2) the reference at page 63, paragraph 8, to 
“Subparagraphs 6(a)-6(c)” should be changed to 
“subparagraphs 7(a)-7(c)”.
AND NOW, this 10th day of May, 1982, in consid­

eration of the record in this matter, our Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, Opinion, and Final Order entered 
September 29, 1981, and the Request for Reconsidera­
tion filed by Complainants on October 9, 1981, we adopt 
this Supplementary Opinion and Order and deny all re­
lief sought in the Request for Reconsideration.

Pennsylvania Human 
Relations Commission

ATTEST:

Doris M. Leader, 
Vice-Chairperson

Elizabeth M. Scott, 
Secretary



A-69

JOAN L. MURPHY et al., In the
Commonwealth 

Court of 
Pennsylvania

Petitioners

v.

COMMONWEALTH OF 
PENNSYLVANIA, 

PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN 
RELATIONS COMMISSION, No. 1348 

C.D. 1982Respondent

BEFORE:
HONORABLE ROBERT W. WILLIAMS, JR., Judge 
HONORABLE JOSEPH T. DOYLE, Judge 
HONORABLE ALEXANDER F. BARBIERI, Judge

ARGUED: April 6, 1983
OPINION BY
JUDGE BARBIERI FILED: September 28, 1983

Fourteen former and current employees (Petition­
ers) of Crown Cork and Seal Company (Crown) appeal 
here from an order of the Pennsylvania Human Relations 
Commission (Commission) disposing of two complaints 
filed against Crown and Local 266, Sheet Metal Workers’ 
International Association, AFL-CIO (Union). We affirm.

On December 22, 1970, the Commission instituted a 
complaint, on its own motion, against Crown and the 
Union making the following allegation of improper con­
duct:

3. On or about to wit, December 22, 1970 the com­
plainant alleges that the respondent Company en­
gages in unlawful employment practices which are 
discriminatory with respect to female employes, be­
cause of their sex, in hiring, assignment, seniority, 
transfer, salary, overtime, promotion, denial of train­



A-70

ing, and layoff. It is further alleged that the respond­
ent Union concurs in and aids and abets the discrim­
inatory practices of the respondent company.

On June 11, 1971, a former employee of Crown, 
Elizabeth C. McNasby, also filed a complaint with the 
Commission in which she alleged that Crown and the 
Union “consorted in the lay-off of the complainant be­
cause of her sex, FEMALE, and have prevented her, as 
well as other females, from enjoying equal job opportu­
nities at Crown Cork and Seal Company.” Following the 
procedures specified in Section 8 of the Pennsylvania 
Human Relations Act (Act), Act of October 27, 1955, 
P.L. 744, as amended, 43 P.S. §959, the Commission in­
stituted investigations into each of these complaints, and 
found probable cause to credit the allegations of its com­
plaint and the McNasby complaint on April 6, 1972 and 
June 20, 1972, respectively. The Commission then com­
menced conciliation efforts, and on October 26, 1972 is­
sued Investigative Findings detailing the evidence it had 
compiled of the alleged discriminatory conduct-, of 
Crown. This evidence tended to show that Crown dis­
criminated against women with respect to hiring, train­
ing, job assignments, layoffs, transfers, promotions, sal­
ary levels, and the availability of overtime. The Union 
then filed a written response to the Investigative Find­
ings alleging, inter alia, that it had no control over the 
policies of Crown.

Although the Commission’s conciliation efforts sub­
sequently proved unsuccessful, the Commission took no 
further action on either the McNasby or its own com­
plaint until the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued its 
decision in Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission 
v. United States Steel Corp., 458 Pa. 559, 325 A.2d 910 
(1974). In United States Steel, the Commission had filed 
a complaint against the United States Steel Corporation 
(U.S. Steel) which contained an allegation of discrimi­
natory conduct nearly identical to that found in the



A-71

Commission’s December 22, 1970 complaint against 
Crown and the Union. Interrogatories were then sent to 
U.S. Steel, U.S. Steel refused to answer them, and the 
Commission responded by filing an equity action ad­
dressed to this Court’s original jurisdiction seeking an 
order directing U.S. Steel to respond. Preliminary objec­
tions were filed, and in Pennsylvania Human Relations 
Commission v. United States Steel Corporation, 10 Pa. 
Commonwealth Ct. 408, 311 A.2d 170 (1973), we dis­
missed the Commission’s action because (1) we lacked 
equity jurisdiction over the matter and (2) the 
Commission’s complaint failed to meet the particularity 
requirement of Section 9 of the Act, the relevant portion 
of which reads as follows:

Any individual claiming to be aggrieved by an 
alleged unlawful discriminatory practice may make, 
sign and file with the Commission a verified com­
plaint, in writing, which shall state the name and 
address of the . . . employer . . . alleged to have com­
mitted the unlawful discriminatory practice com­
plained of, and which shall set forth the particulars 
thereof. . . .  The Commission upon its own initiative 
• . . may, in like manner, make, sign and file such 
complaint. . . . (Emphasis added.)

On appeal, our Supreme Court affirmed solely on the ba­
sis that the Commission’s complaint failed to meet the 
particularity requirements of Section 9. In response to 
this decision, the Commission filed an Amended Com­
plaint against Crown and the Union on October 27, 
1975, naming itself and thirteen former and current em­
ployees of Crown as the complainants, in which it de­
scribed in great detail the alleged discriminatory conduct 
of Crown and the Union. This complaint, in addition to 
seeking specific forms of relief for each of the individu­
ally named complainants, also sought relief “in the form 
of status adjustments, back wages and/or restoration of 
lost benefits” for the following classes of individuals:



A-72

(a) All female employees placed on layoff status 
since July 9, 1969 for any period of time, 
whether or not they were ever recalled and 
whether or not their recall rights have since ex­
pired;

(b) All female employees who were on layoff sta­
tus, on July 9, 1969 who were not recalled or 
did not accept recall subsequent to July 9, 1969 
whether or not their recall rights have since ex­
pired;

(c) All female employees who since July 9, 1969 
have for any period of time been employed in 
jobs classified at Code 19 or below;

(d) All females who since July 9, 1969 have been 
rejected for employment by the Respondent 
Company.

Crown subsequently filed an answer to this amended 
complaint denying each of the allegations of discrimina­
tory conduct, and in “New Matter” asserted, inter alia, 
(1) that the Commission’s amended complaint was 
barred by the doctrine of laches; (2) that the Commission 
was not authorized to seek class-wide relief, and (3) that 
certain of the individually named complainants lacked 
standing to file a complaint since they were no longer 
employed by Crown. The Union, for its part, simply sub­
mitted a letter informing the Commission that it would 
not file an answer. The Commission subsequently con­
ducted a new investigation, made a new probable cause 
determination, reinstituted conciliation efforts, and is­
sued amended findings summarizing the results of its 
investigation, even though the Commission’s Amended 
Complaint, by its very terms, purported to be an 
amended version of the Commission’s December 22, 
1970 Complaint, and not a new cause of action. There­
after, the Commission’s conciliation efforts once again 
proved to be unsuccessful, and on February 22, 1977,



A-73

Crown filed a motion to dismiss alleging, inter alia, that 
the Amended Complaint had not been filed within the 
ninety day time period specified in Section 9 of the Act. 
Thirty-seven days of hearings followed between the 
dates of October 30, 1978, and June 17, 1980, and after 
evaluating, for over a year, the voluminous record cre­
ated during these hearings, the Commission issued, on 
September 29, 1981, a sixty-eight page adjudication and 
order. In this adjudication the Commission found as 
facts, inter alia, (1) that Crown, with a few minor ex­
ceptions, maintained a system of sex-segregated job 
classifications, (2) that men were assigned to job classi­
fications with higher ratings than those offered women 
employees, (3) that Crown, with the Union’s acquies- 
ence, maintained separate seniority lists for male and fe­
male job classifications, (4) that these separate seniority 
lists were used for the purpose of ascertaining transfer, 
promotion, layoff, and recall rights, (4) that in 97.7% of 
the cases where females had been laid off of their jobs on 
the basis of their position on the female seniority list, 
men with less seniority had been retained in male jobs, 
(5) that in the period between July 9, 1969, and Decem­
ber 31, 1975, female employees at Crown had been laid 
off more often and for greater lengths of time than men 
even though females, as a group, had more seniority 
than males, (6) that the average rate of pay for female 
employees during this period was less than that for male 
employees, (7) that Crown hired fifty new male employ­
ees, but no new female employees, between the dates of 
July 9, 1969 and December 31, 1975, (8) that male em­
ployees occasionally filled temporary vacancies in female 
job classifications, but that females were never asked to 
fill temporary vacancies in male job classifications, (9) 
that the Union refused to file grievances or to institute 
litigation on behalf of female employees even though the 
female employees complained to the Union about 
Crown’s sexually discriminatory practices, and (10) that 
the Union, in violation of the provisions of its own con­



A-74

stitution, did not submit withdrawal cards to laid off em­
ployees, who were frequently women, so that the laid off 
employees would be excused from paying union dues 
during the period of their layoffs, or reinstatement fees 
upon being recalled to work. The Commission then con­
cluded, as a matter of law, inter alia, (1) that its Decem­
ber 22, 1970 complaint failed to satisfy the particularity 
requirements of Section 9 of the Act, and was hence a 
“defective complaint and a nullity[,]” (2) that its October 
27, 1975 complaint, although purporting to be an 
amendment of its December 22, 1970 complaint, was in 
fact a new cause of action, and hence did not toll the 
ninety day time limitation specified in Section 9, (3) that 
all of the allegations of discriminatory conduct advanced 
by the individually named complainants in the Com­
mission’s October 27, 1975 complaint, except those ad­
vanced by Theresa Reed, involved discriminatory con­
duct occurring more than ninety days prior to the filing 
of the Commission’s Amended Complaint, and hence 
were time barred, (4) that “ [djelays in the processing of 
this matter . . . albeit attributable primarily to PHRC 
staff, do not give rise to a defense of laches and have not 
deprived Crown or Local 266 of due process of law[,]” (5) 
that the Commission is authorized by the provisions of 
Section 9 of the Act to initiate complaints on behalf of 
classes of aggrieved persons, (6) that Crown’s treatment 
of female employees between the dates of July 9, 1969 
and December 31, 1975 with respect to “hiring, job as­
signment, job transfer, compensation, layoff, and recall 
from layoff’ constituted a continuing pattern and prac­
tice of discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of 
the provisions of Section 5(a) of the Act, 43 P.S. § 955(a), 
(7) that the Union violated the provisions of Sections 
5(c) and 5(e) of the Act, 43 P.S. §§955(c) and 955(e), by 
failing to process grievances filed by female employees, 
by encouraging certain female employees to sign waivers 
of their equal employment opportunity rights, by failing 
to seek enforcement of provisions of collective bargain­



A-75

ing agreements it negotiated prohibiting discriminatory 
conduct, and by “requiring the payment of dues while 
employees were in layoff status and/or by requiring the 
payment of reinstatement fees as a condition of obtaining 
reinstatement to employe status from layoff!,]” a require­
ment which the Commission concluded disproportion­
ately affected female employees “in the context of 
Crown’s sex-segregated layoffs. . . . ” The Commission 
further concluded that the portion of Elizabeth 
McNasby’s June 11, 1971 complaint pertaining to her 
individual claim for relief satisfied the particularity re­
quirements of Section 9 of the Act, but that her com­
plaint was not sufficiently specific with respect to claims 
for similarly situated female employees, thereby making 
that portion of the complaint “null and void.” Finally, as 
for the merit of McNasby’s individual claim, the Com­
mission reached the following conclusion:

The sex-segregated job classification and senior­
ity systems historically employed by Crown inhibited 
the movement of Elizabeth McNasby upward 
through the production and maintenance ranks at 
Crown as occurred with other women. This left her 
with artificially low department seniority in 1971. 
Thus, continued layoffs she suffered in her inspec­
tion position were illegal consequences of a seniority 
system which disproportionately disadvantaged 
women and are therefore remediable.

In a ten page order accompanying its adjudication, the 
Commission ordered, inter alia, monetary relief for both 
Elizabeth McNasby and “the class of females who were 
employed or who possessed employment rights at 
Crown’s Plant No. 1, production and maintenance unit, 
during the period July 30, 1975 to December 31, 1975.” 
These amounts represented the difference between the 
pay the women would have received if there had not 
been a sex-based seniority system at Crown, and the 
amount of pay they actually received, during the periods



A-76

of time the Commission awarded relief, as shown in a 
statistical analysis which was offered into evidence at 
one of the Commission hearings. In the case of Elizabeth 
McNasby, the Commission awarded relief from the date 
she filed her complaint, through December 31, 1975. 
The rest of the female employees, however, were only 
awarded relief for the five month period running from 
July 30, 1975, a date three months prior to the filing of 
the Commission’s Amended Complaint, through Decem­
ber 31, 1975. The Commission concluded that it could 
not award monetary relief to female employees, other 
than McNasby, for periods of time prior to July 30, 1975. 
The Commission also concluded that “the absence of 
sufficient evidence relating to the period following De­
cember 31, 1975, the burden of production of which be­
longed to complainants, precludes any monetary relief 
for the period after that date.” The Commission next or­
dered Crown to make good faith offers of reinstatement, 
as jobs became available, and in the relative order of 
plant seniority “within the production and maintenance 
unit[,]” to each female employee who was laid off while 
a male of lesser seniority was retained, and additionally 
issued a number of directives designed to integrate 
Crown’s shift, department, and plant seniority systems. 
Crown was also directed to implement an affirmative ac­
tion program, and the Union, for its part, was ordered (1) 
to conduct its activities, and to advocate the interests of 
its members, in a nondiscriminatory manner, (2) to 
cease the practice of either collecting union dues while 
its members were laid off, or requiring the payment of 
reinstatement fees when members returned from invol­
untary layoffs, and (3) to reimburse all union dues and 
reinstatement fees paid by female employees at Crown 
who were on layoff status or who were reinstated at any 
time between July 30, 1975 and the effective date of the 
Commission’s order. The Commission expressly ab­
solved the Union of any liability for the award of mone­
tary relief that was made to the females who had suffered



A-77

diminished earnings, however, stating that it felt that 
Crown was primarily responsible for this diminution in 
earnings.

Following the issuance of this adjudication and or­
der, a request for reconsideration was filed by the 
Commission’s staff which the Commission granted on 
November 27, 1981. After the submission of further legal 
memoranda to a Commission hearing panel, a further 
supplementary opinion and order was issued, which af­
firmed the initial results reached in the Commission’s 
first adjudication and order. In this supplementary opin­
ion, the Commission noted that while it had the power to 
afford relief to the female employees of Crown, employed 
as of July 30, 1975, for periods of time prior to that date, 
it had elected not to do so in this case concluding that

(t)he interests of the PHRC in litigating discrimina­
tion claims are frequently identical to the interests of 
individual discriminatees. But the primary goal of 
the agency must be to vindicate the public interest. 
This is especially so in PHRC initiated complaints. 
We feel our Final Order in this case, with its forceful 
injunctive-type relief, accomplishes the vindication 
of the public interest while fairly balancing the rel­
evant private interests.

The Commission similarly concluded that while it could 
have held the Union jointly liable for all of the monetary 
damages awarded, it had elected not to do so. The 
present appeal, filed by McNasby and the thirteen indi­
vidually named complainants in the Commission’s 
Amended Complaint, followed.

Before this Court, Petitioners initially advance a 
number of legal theories in support of the proposition 
that the Commission erred as a matter of law, or abused 
its discretion, by not affording complete monetary relief 
to all female employees employed at Crown ninety days 
prior to the filing of the Commission’s original complaint 
and thereafter. We shall address these issues seriatim.



A-78

Petitioners first contend, as we understand it, that 
the Commission’s initial complaint was sufficiently spe­
cific, given the factual context of the present case, to 
meet the specificity requirements of Section 9 of the Act, 
and that its technical defects, if any, were minor, and 
could be cured by amendment, as opposed to the filing of 
a new cause of action. We disagree.

To support their assertion that the Commission’s 
original complaint complied with the specificity require­
ments of Section 9 of the Act, Petitioners note that an 
employee of Crown, Mary Martin, filed a formal com­
plaint against Crown on April 15, 1970, and the Union on 
April 20, 1970, in which she complained about specific 
discriminatory practices, and that the Commission 
made, after an investigation, a probable cause determi­
nation on the Crown complaint prior to October 15, 
1970, when Ms. Martin withdrew the complaints. Peti­
tioners also make reference to a report found in the 
record before us, written by a Commission field repre­
sentative, which indicates that eleven female employees 
of Crown, including Ms. Martin, visited the 
Commission’s Philadelphia office on February 27, 1970 
to complain about specific discriminatory practices at 
Crown, but refused to file a formal complaint at that time 
when they were informed they would have to file such a 
complaint under their own names. By making reference 
to these facts, Petitioners apparently seek to establish 
that Crown and the Union were engaging in discrimi­
natory practices, and that they were made aware of this 
fact through the investigative process initiated by the 
Martin complaint. Petitioners then conclude that since 
Crown and the Union had such knowledge, the Com­
mission was excused from alleging the discriminatory 
practices complained of with particularity when it filed 
its original complaint. Such a conclusion, however, 
misperceives the function of a complaint filed pursuant 
to the procedures specified in Section 9.



A-79

In addressing the problem of discrimination, which 
may take myriad forms defying statutory description, the 
General Assembly has provided a procedure in Section 9 
whereby an alleged discriminator is put on notice, 
through the filing of a complaint, of the specific conduct 
which is alleged to be discriminatory. Subsequent to the 
receipt of this notice, and prior to the holding of a formal 
hearing on the charge, the alleged discriminator is in­
formed, following a Commission investigation, as to 
whether or not the Commission finds probable cause to 
credit the allegations of the complaint, and if such a 
probable cause determination is made, conciliation ef­
forts are initiated in an attempt to resolve the matter. 
Only after the alleged discriminator is informed of the 
specific conduct complained of, has been informed that 
the Commission has found probable cause to credit the 
allegations of the complaint, and has refused, after con­
ciliation efforts, to modify its behavior, does the matter 
proceed through the sometimes lengthy and expensive 
process of a formal hearing, a process, the resort to 
which, ,the General Assembly intended to minimize 
through the procedures specified in Section 9. It is clear, 
therefore, as our Supreme Court held in United States 
Steel, that the purpose of the filing of a complaint under 
the procedures specified in Section 9 is not simply to in­
form an alleged discriminator that it will be made the 
subject of an investigation, as Petitioners allege in their 
brief to this Court, but instead is designed to inform the 
alleged discriminator of the specific conduct complained 
of, so that it will know, after a probable cause determi­
nation is made, and conciliation efforts are initiated, 
what specific meritorious charges are being brought 
against it, and more importantly, what voluntary 
changes it can make to avoid litigation. Here, we believe 
that the Commission correctly concluded that the 
Commission’s original complaint failed to perform this 
function. As the above quoted portion of the Com­
mission’s original complaint shows, neither Crown nor



A-80

the Union were informed as to what specific acts of mis­
conduct they were being charged with, but instead were 
simply informed, in essence, that they were being 
charged with a violation of the Act and that an investi­
gation would commence. Such a complaint does not 
comply with the requirements of the Act. United States 
Steel. Moreover, it is clear, in our view, that specific al­
legations of misconduct presented in withdrawn causes 
of action, or in investigative reports, is not a substitute for 
the filing of specific charges against an alleged discrim­
inator under the mandatory procedure outlined above.

Also, of course, we find no merit in Petitioners’ as­
sertion that the lack of specificity in the Commission’s 
original complaint could be cured by amendment. Al­
though Section 9 provides in part that “the complainant 
shall have the power reasonably and fairly to amend any 
complaint[,]” it would clearly be unreasonable and unfair 
to allow a complainant to toll the ninety day time limi­
tation specified in Section 9, perhaps as in the present 
case by a number of years, through the filing of an action 
which does not comply with the mandatory require­
ments of Section 9, and which does not accurately in­
form the alleged discriminator of the specific charges be­
ing advanced against it, and which would later be 
amended to enumerate specific charges after an inves­
tigation and conciliation efforts had been completed. Ac­
cordingly, we believe that the Commission, having con­
cluded that the Commission’s original complaint lacked 
specificity, properly concluded that it could not be cured 
by amendment. See Junk v. East End Fire Department, 
262 Pa. Superior Ct. 473, 396 A.2d 1269 (1978). We also 
believe, contrary to Petitioners’ assertion in their brief, 
that this conclusion is not contrary to our Supreme 
Court’s decision in Pennsylvania Human Relations 
Commission v. St. Joe Minerals Corp., 476 Pa. 302, 382 
A.2d 731 (1978). In St. Joe Minerals, the Supreme Court 
simply concluded that an amended complaint, which 
added specific allegations of discriminatory conduct to



A-81

an earlier complaint, complied with the specificity re­
quirement of Section 9. The court did not have before it, 
however, and did not decide, the question of whether the 
amended complaint was a new cause of action, or 
whether it was simply an amendment of the earlier com­
plaint.

Petitioners additionally allege that the Commission 
erred as a matter of law by concluding that Elizabeth 
McNasby failed to satisfy the specificity requirement of 
Section 9 in that portion of her complaint brought on 
behalf of other female employees at Crown. As we noted 
above, however, that portion of the McNasby complaint 
simply stated that respondents have prevented her, “as 
well as all other females, from enjoying equal job oppor­
tunities. . . .’’ This statement clearly failed to notify ei­
ther Crown or the Union of the specific practices being 
complained of.

Petitioners next allege that Crown and the Union 
waived their right to challenge the specificity of the 
Commission’s original complaint, since they did not raise 
an objection to the specificity of that complaint until 
February 22, 1977, well after the filing of the amended 
complaint and Crown’s answer thereto. Although we 
note that 1 Pa. Code §35.54 provides that a respondent 
may file a motion to dismiss “with his answer!,]” and that 
1 Pa. Code §35.35 provides that answers, unless other­
wise ordered, shall be filed within twenty days of the date 
of service of a complaint, since this issue was not raised 
below, and since there has been no reason shown why it 
could not have been raised below, it will not be addressed 
here. See Section 703(a) of the Administrative Agency 
Law, 2 Pa. C.S. § 703(a).

The next allegation of error advanced by Petitioners 
is their assertion that their due process and equal pro­
tection rights were violated by the Commission’s failure 
to permit the correction of the Commission’s original 
complaint. In support of this contention, Petitioners rely 
on the recent decision of the United States Supreme



A-82

Court in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 
(1982). We believe that this case is clearly distinguish­
able.

In Logan, a complainant filed a timely complaint 
with the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission 
(Commission) alleging that he had been discriminated 
against on the basis of a physical handicap unrelated to 
ability. The applicable Illinois statutory law provided that 
once such a complaint was filed, the Commission was to 
convene a factfinding conference within 120 days. Ap­
parently through inadvertence, this conference was not 
held until 138 days after the filing of the complaint, and 
the respondent subsequently moved to dismiss the ac­
tion on this basis. When the Commission refused, the 
respondent petitioned the Illinois Supreme Court for a 
writ of prohibition, and that court subsequently held that 
the complainant’s petition had to be dismissed. Upon a 
further appeal, however, the United States Supreme 
Court reversed. In its majority opinion, the Supreme 
Court concluded that the right to pursue a discrimina­
tion complaint under the applicable Illinois statutory law 
was a species of property right protected by the due proc­
ess clause of the fourteenth amendment, and that the 
complainant’s due process rights had been deprived by 
the dismissal of his complaint since the complainant’s 
interest in pursuing his complaint was paramount to any 
interest the state might have in conducting conferences 
within 120 days. In a separate concurring opinion 
authored by Justice Blackmun and joined in by three 
other justices, Justice Blackmun additionally concluded 
that the Illinois statute’s 120 day hearing provision vio­
lated the equal protection clause of the United States 
Constitution, since there was no rational basis for dis­
tinguishing those complaints processed by the commis­
sion within 120 days, and those which were processed 
later. Here, even if we were to assume that the right to 
file a discrimination complaint under the provisions of 
the Act is a species of protected property right which may



A-83

not be deprived by an arbitrary procedural rule not ra­
tionally related to any compelling state interest, the fact 
remains that the original complaint in this case was filed 
by the Commission, and not the Petitioners here, and did 
not purport to be brought on behalf of any specific indi­
viduals or class of individuals. Hence, we do not believe 
that Petitioners have any constitutionally protected in­
terest in the Commission’s original complaint. Further­
more, even if Petitioners had such an interest, we believe 
that the Act’s specificity requirement is rationally related 
to the state’s interest in having respondents adequately 
informed of the specific charges being brought against 
them prior to the initiation of investigations and concil­
iation efforts. We reject, therefore, Petitioners’ due proc­
ess and equal protection arguments.

Petitioners finally make two allegations of abuse of 
discretion by the Commission: (1) its failure to award 
monetary damages to female employes for periods of 
time prior to July 30, 1975; and (2) in relieving the Union 
of joint liability for the monetary damages awarded, since 
it specifically found that the Union aided and abetted the 
discriminatory job classification and seniority scheme 
which led to those damages. We disagree with both con­
tentions.

First of all, as to both allegations, we must note that 
the Commission’s power to fashion remedies is virtually 
plenary and exclusive. Section 9 of the Act provides, in 
relevant part that

[i]f, upon all the evidence at the hearing, the Com­
mission shall find that a respondent has engaged in 
or is engaging in any unlawful discriminatory prac­
tice as defined in this act, the Commission shall state 
its findings of fact, and issue and cause to be served 
. . .  an order requiring such respondent to cease and 
desist from such unlawful discriminatory practice 
and to take such affirmative action including but not 
limited to hiring, reinstatement or upgrading of



A-84

employes, with or without back pay . . . as, in the 
judgment of the Commission, will effectuate the 
purposes of this act. . . .

As our Supreme Court noted in the case of Pennsylvania 
Human Relations Commission v. Alto-Reste Park Cem­
etery Association, 453 Pa. 124, 306 A.2d 881 (1973), our 
scope of review of a Commission decision to order a par­
ticular remedy or not is limited. There the court noted 
“that the expertise of the Commission in fashioning rem­
edies is not to be lightly regarded[,]” id. at 134, 306 A.2d 
at 887, and concluded that Commission orders pertain­
ing to remedies should not be disturbed on appeal “ ‘un­
less it can be shown that the order is a patent attempt to 
achieve ends other than those which can fairly be said to 
effectuate the policies of the Act.’ ” Id. at 134, 306 A.2d 
at 887 (emphasis in original) (quoting Fireboard Paper 
Products Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 379 U.S. 203, 216 (1964)). 
Hence, the question that is before us is whether the 
Commission’s refusal to award monetary damages for a 
period of more than five months is a patent attempt to 
achieve an end other than one which can fairly be said to 
effectuate the policies of the Act.

Bearing in mind that the Commission’s discretion to 
prescribe remedies, because of the Commission’s, and 
not our, expertise in such matters, is broad enough to 
accomplish whatever overall relief will effectuate the 
purposes of the Act, we cannot say that the extent of 
relief granted here was an abuse of discretion. Thus, we 
cannot substitute our view for the discretionary judg­
ments of the Commission in limiting monetary damages 
to the period July 30, 1975 to December 31, 1975, in light 
of its extensive grants of injunctive relief. Also, we can 
find no abuse of discretion cognizable by us in the 
Commission’s judgment in not making the Union jointly 
liable for the monetary damages awarded, since we be­
lieve that the Commission could have reasonably con­
cluded that it was unfair to make the dues paying mem­



A-85

bers of that Union ultimately responsible for the mone­
tary award, and since there is no indication of record that 
Crown, a substantial company, will not be able to pay the 
monetary award.

Alexander F. Barbieri, Judge



A-86

JOAN L. MURPHY et al„
Petitioners

v.

In the
Commonwealth 

Court of 
Pennsylvania

COMMONWEALTH OF : 
PENNSYLVANIA, :

PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN : 
RELATIONS COMMISSION, :

Respondent :
No. 1348 
C.D. 1982

ORDER
NOW, September 28, 1983, the order of the Penn­

sylvania Human Relations Commission in the above cap­
tioned matter dated May 10, 1982, is affirmed.

Alexander F. Barbieri, Judge



A-87

SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
Eastern District

JOAN L. MURPHY, et al., :
Appellants : No. 2 E.D.

vs. : APPEAL
COMMONWEALTH : DOCKET, 1984

OF PENNSYLVANIA, : 
PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN :

RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al. :
Appellees :

JUDGMENT

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, It is now here 
ordered and adjudged by this Court that the ORDER of 
the COMMONWEALTH COURT, be, and the same is 
hereby AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

Marlene F. Lachman, Esq. 
Prothonotary

Dated: JANUARY 9, 1985



A-88

[J-115-84]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

EASTERN DISTRICT

JOAN L. MURPHY, LORRAINE 
R. MASON, EDITH L. McGRODY, 

MARIE PEKALA, HENRIETTA 
ELLIOTT, CATHERINE BERES, 

VIRGINIA KNOWLES, ANN 
JACYSZYN, PEGGY FELMEY, 

ELEANOR NEYER, DORIS 
YOCUM & ELIZABETH 

McNASBY, on behalf of themselves 
and all others similarly situated,

Appellants

vs

COMMONWEALTH OF 
PENNSYLVANIA, 

PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN 
RELATIONS COMMISSION, and 

CROWN CORK AND SEAL 
COMPANY, INC., and 

SHEET METAL PRODUCTION 
WORKERS’ UNION, LOCAL 266,

Appellees

No. 2 E.D. Appeal 
Dkt. 1984

Appeal from the 
Order of the 

Commonwealth 
Court at No. 1348 

C.D. 1982, 
affirming the 
Order of the 
Pennsylvania 

Human Relations 
Commission at 

Docket Nos. 
E-4027 and 

E-4249

77 Pa. Cmwlth. 
291, 456 A. 2d 740 

(1983).

ARGUED; 
JUNE 19, 1984

OPINION

m r . justice  McDerm o tt  file d : January  9,1985
Appellants have brought this appeal to challenge an 

order of the Commonwealth Court which affirmed a de­
cision of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commis­
sion.



A-89

In February of 1970, eleven female employees of 
Crown Cork and Seal, Inc. (Company) went to the of­
fices of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission 
to complain that the Company, with the assistance and 
acquiesence of their union, the Sheet Metal Production 
Workers Union-Local 266 (Union), was discriminating 
against them and all other female production employees, 
on the basis of sex. At this time these women voiced their 
displeasure over the Company’s and Union’s actions, but 
no one among them filed an individual complaint.

In April, 1970, one of the eleven women, Mary Mar­
tin, filed an individual complaint. However, this com­
plaint was withdrawn in October of that same year.

In December 1970, based in part on the information 
brought to its attention by the above parties, the Com­
mission, on its own motion, filed a “Commissioner’s 
Complaint” against the Company and the Union. This 
complaint consisted of two pages and made general al­
legations concerning “unlawful employment practices.”1 
There was no mentioned in this complaint of any of the 
individual complainants.

On June 11, 1971, appellant Elizabeth McNasby 
filed an individual complaint, in which she alleged that 
she was “laid off without regard to her seniority from her 
position of inspector, because of  her sex.”2 This com-

1. The relevant allegations as contained in paragraph 3 were: 
On or about to wit (sic), December 22, 1970 the complainant 
alleges that the respondent Company engages in unlawful em­
ployment practices which are discriminatory with respect to fe­
male employees, because of their sex, in hiring, assignment, 
seniority, transfer, salary, overtime, promotion, denial of train­
ing and layoff. It is further alleged that the respondent Union 
concurs in and aids and abets the discriminatory practices of the 
respondent Company.
2. She further alleged that;
. . .  the respondents consorted in the lay-off of the complainant 
because of her sex, FEMALE, and have prevented her, as well 
as all other females, from enjoying equal job opportunities at 
Crown Cork and Seal Company.



A-90

plaint was eventually joined with the 1970 
Commissioner’s complaint for purposes of administrative 
processing.

In April, 1972, the Commission, acting in accord­
ance with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (Act),3 
issued a finding of probable cause and initiated concili­
ation efforts. See 43 P.S. §959. By mid 1972, counsel for 
both the Union and the Company had entered appear­
ances.

On October 16, 1974, this Court handed down a de­
cision in Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. 
U.S. Steel Cory., 458 Pa. 559, 325 A.2d 910 (1974). 
Therein we held that a Commissioner’s complaint that 
merely stated general allegations of discriminatory prac­
tices was invalid, in that such a complaint failed to satisfy 
the “particularity” requirement of Section 9 of the Act, 
43 P.S. §959. This decision was relevant in the present 
context since the Commissioner’s complaint which in­
stituted this action was substantially the same as the one 
dismissed in U.S. Steel.

On October 27, 1975, the Commission filed a second 
complaint against the Company and the Union. This sec­
ond complaint designated as an “Amended Complaint,” 
set forth detailed allegations of unlawful sex discrimina­
tion, and listed the following women as individual com­
plainants: Eleanor Neyer, Joan Murphy, Sarah Cooper, 
Margaret Felmey, Lorraine Mason, Virginia Knowles, 
Doris Yocum, Edith McGrody, Marie Pekala, Theresa 
Cheplick, Henrietta Hunter, Ann Jacyzyn and Theresa 
Reed. Despite having had no contact with the Commis­
sion for almost five years, these women had been con­
tacted by investigators of the Commission for the pur­
pose of filing this “Amended Complaint,” and were re­
quested to file affidavits in support of the discriminatory 
charges. However, at the time this second complaint was

3. Act of October 27, 1955, P.L. 744, §9, as amended.



A-91

filed only Theresa Reed was employed by the Company.4
This “Amended Complaint” was also joined with the 

original complaint (and the McNasby complaint) for pur­
poses of administrative processing. Thereafter, on April 
19, 1976, a finding of probable cause was made by the 
Commission staff.

Responding to this “Amended Complaint” the Com­
pany filed an answer and new matter. The Union de­
clined to file an answer, but submitted a letter indicating 
that they did not believe that an answer was required.

Pursuant to statute the Commission undertook con­
ciliation efforts, which failed; and a public hearing was 
directed to be held before a panel of Commissioners. Due 
to extensive prehearing litigation no hearing was held 
until October 30, 1978. Once begun, however, the hear­
ings required 37 days.

Prior to these hearings, in February 1977, the Com­
pany had filed a motion to dismiss the “Amended Com­
plaint.” In the memorandum of law accompanying this 
motion, the Company argued that the original 1970 com­
plaint lacked sufficient particularity, and therefore both 
complaints should be dismissed. The Commission re­
served its ruling on this motion pending completion of 
the public hearing.

On September 29, 1981, the Commissioners issued 
their “Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Opinion 
and Final Order.” Their ultimate conclusion was that the 
Company had engaged in practices which constituted 
“one of the most blatant patterns of sex discriminatory 
practices that has ever been brought to (the) Commis­
sioners’ attention. ” 5 Commissioners’ Opinion, Dkt. Nos. 
E-4027; E-4249, p. 38.____________________ _________

4. Ms. Jacyzyn was laid off in 1966, while complainants Neyer, 
Murphy, Felmey, Mason, Knowles, Yocum, McGrody, Pekala, 
Cheplick and Hunter were laid off for the final time between 1969 
and 1971. Ms. Cooper retired on disability in February, 1974.

5. This conclusion was not appealed by the Company and its 
validity is not an issue in this action.



A-92

The Commissioners also concluded that: (1) the 
original complaint was insufficiently pleaded and was a 
“nullity” ; (2) the McNasby complaint was sufficiently 
particular but applicable only to her as an individual 
complainant; and (3) the “Amended Complaint” was ef­
fectively an original complaint unto itself. They further 
concluded that, as for the remaining complainants, the 
90 day statute of limitation set out in Section 9 of the Act, 
43 P.S. §959, barred all but Theresa Reed from recov­
ering any tangible relief.

The Commission ordered monetary relief for 
Elizabeth McNasby, to be computed from the date she 
filed her complaint through December 31, 1975; and 
also ordered monetary relief for “the class of females who 
were employed or who possessed employment rights at 
Crown’s Plant No. 1, production and maintenance unit, 
during the period July 30, 1975 to December 31, 1975.” 
Id. at 59.

The Commission also directed the company to im­
plement an affirmative action program; to make good 
faith offers of reinstatement to each female employee 
who was laid off while a male of lesser seniority was re­
tained; and to integrate their shift, department, and plant 
seniority systems.

Though the Commission absolved the Union of any 
liability for the award of monetary relief,6 the Union was 
ordered to: conduct its activities in a non-discriminatory 
manner; cease collecting union dues while its members 
were laid off; and reimburse all union dues and reinstate­
ment fees paid by female employees who were on layoff 
status or who were reinstated at any time between July 
30, 1975 and the effective date of the Commissioner’s 
order.

6. The Commissioners based this decision on their conclusion 
that it was the Company that was primarily responsible for the 
women’s diminution in earnings.



A-93

Following this opinion and order a request for re­
consideration was filed by the Commission’s staff. This 
request was granted on November 27, 1981, and counsel 
was permitted to submit further legal arguments: one of 
which was the purported waiver by the Company and the 
Union of raising the issue of the defective original com­
plaint. Thereafter a supplementary opinion and order 
were issued, affirming the original order, with slight 
modifications. Complainants appealed this order to the 
Commonwealth Court, which affirmed.7 Upon petition 
we granted allocatur. We also affirm.

In pursuing this appeal the complainants have 
raised the following issues: whether the 1970
Commissioner’s complaint tolled the statute of limita­
tions; whether the “Amended Complaint” dated back to 
the original complaint and effectively cured the defective 
pleading; whether the failure of appellants to raise, prior 
to their petition for reconsideration, the timeliness of the 
Company’s objection to the defective pleading, was in 
itself a waiver; whether the Commissioners should have 
found that all the violations w'ere of a continuing nature; 
whether the order of the Commissioners, which denied 
eleven women of any relief, constituted a violation of 
their due process rights and/or the equal protection 
clause; whether the relief granted by the Commissioners 
was too limited in scope; and whether the Commission­
ers abused their discretion in failing to declare the Union 
to be jointly liable for monetary damages.

Basically these issues focus on the Commissioners’ 
decision regarding the defective original complaint and 
the scope of the remedy.

Firstly, it is clear that the original complaint, being 
substantially similar to the one of which we disapproved 
in U.S. Steel, supra, was defective; and appellants do not 
seriously contend otherwise. Secondly, it is equally clear

7. This Opinion appears at 77 Pa. Cmwlth. 291, 456 A. 2d 740 
(1983).



A-94

that the power of the Human Relations Commission re­
sults from the legislature’s delegation of such power. As 
such the limits of that power must be strictly construed. 
See Pa. Human Relations Commission v. St. Joe Miner­
als Corp., 476 Pa. 302, 382 A.2d 731 (1978). See also, Pa. 
Human Relations Commission v. Zamantakis, 478 Pa. 
454, 387 A.2d 70 (1978),

By statute the jurisdiction of the Human Relations 
Commission may be invoked by filing a verified com­
plaint “which shall set forth the particulars” of the dis­
criminatory practice complained of. 43 P.S. §959. See 
U.S. Steel, supra. A filing which does not comply with 
these strictures improperly invokes the Commission’s ju­
risdiction, and is in fact a nullity.

Appellants have argued that the original pleading 
sufficiently put the Company and Union on notice, and 
like a praecipe for a writ of summons, should be suffi­
cient to toll the statute of limitation. We find no merit in 
this argument. As stated above, proceedings before the 
Human Relations Commission are strictly governed by 
the statute devised by our legislature. They are wholly 
distinct from proceedings pursuant to the Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and decisions thereunder are not dispositive 
of proceedings before the Commission.

Since the 1970 complaint was defective, the Com­
mission was without jurisdiction to rule on the merits of 
this case until the properly pleaded “Amended Com­
plaint,” and thus we find no merit in appellant’s tolling 
argument. Similarly we dismiss their contention that the 
second pleading corrected the first, since the “Amended 
Complaint” could not properly be construed to convey ex 
post facto jurisdiction for a period beyond the statutory 
limit.

We also find meritless appellants’ waiver issue. 
Since the Commission’s jurisdiction exists solely by 
grant of statue, objections to complaints which fail to 
properly invoke that jurisdiction are in the nature of ob­
jections to subject matter jurisdiction, which may be



A-95

raised at any time. See Pa. Human Relations Commis­
sion v. Alto Reste Cemetary Association., 453 Pa. 124, 
128 n.4, 306 A.2d 881, 884 n.4 (1973). Additionally, the 
objections which were filed by the respondents were not 
untimely according to the accepted standards of practice 
before the Human Relations Commission. See Commis­
sioners’ Supplementary Opinion and Order, Dkt. Nos. E- 
4027; E-4249 p.8 .

Complainants have also challenged the 
Commission’s dismissal of the 1970 complaint on con­
stitutional grounds, relying on the recent United States 
Supreme Court case of Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 
455 U.S. 422 (1982). In Logan the complainant had filed 
an individual complaint with the Illinois Fair Employ­
ment Practices Commission. Thereafter, through an ad­
ministrative oversight, the Commission failed to sched­
ule a hearing on the complaint until five days after the 
statutory period for convening such a hearing had run. 
The Illinois Supreme Court had held that Logan’s com­
plaint must be dismissed due to the failure of the Com­
mission to schedule the hearing properly. The United 
States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the dis­
missal of Logan’s claim under these circumstances con­
stituted a violation of his due process rights.8

We have no quarrel with the wisdom of the Logan 
decision. However, it is inapplicable to the present situ­
ation. Unlike Logan the complainants here, with the ex­
ception of Ms. McNasby, never filed complaints in 1970. 
In this regard the observation of the majority, per the 
opinion of Mr. Justice Blackmun, is instructive:

The State may erect reasonable procedural require­
ments for triggering the right to an adjudication, be 
they statutes of limitations (citation omitted) or, in 
an appropriate case, filing fees (citation omitted). 
And the State certainly accords due process when it

8. Four members of the court concluded that Logan’s equal 
protection rights were also violated.



A-96

terminates a claim for failure to comply with a rea­
sonable procedural or evidentiary rule. (Citations 
omitted.) (Emphasis in original.)

Id. at 437.
Complainants have sought to circumvent the fact 

that they did not file individual complaints by arguing 
that their claim was preserved because the 
Commissioner’s complaint represented their interests. 
This argument misperceives the nature of a complaint 
filed by the Commission on its own motion. Such a com­
plaint, while often benefiting individual claimants, is 
filed on behalf of the Commonwealth, as opposed to in­
dividual claimants, with the intent of vindicating the 
public interest by eliminating discriminatory practices. 
Thus, the complainants here were not the real parties in 
interest in the 1970 complaint and have no foundation 
for their constitutional arguments. See generally Smiler 
v. Toll, 373 Pa. ,127, 137, 94 A.2d 764 (1953); see also, 
Spires v. Hanover Fire Insurance Co., 364 Pa. 52, 70 
A. 2d 828 (1950).

Appellant’s final arguments go to the adequacy of 
the Commission’s award. We have consistently held that 
the Commissioners, when fashioning an award, have 
broad discretion and their actions are entitled to defer­
ence by a reviewing court. Pa. Human Relations Com­
mission v. Zamatakis, supra. In Pa. Human Relations 
Commission v. Alto Reste Park, supra, we adopted the 
following standard of review. “The (Commission’s) order 
will not be disturbed ‘unless it can be shown that the 
order is a patent attempt to achieve ends other than can 
fairly be said to effectuate the policies of the Act’ . . . ” 
(citation omitted). Id. at 134, 306 A.2d at 887.

The decision of the Commissioners to limit the 
award of monetary damages to 90 days prior to the filing 
of the “Amended Complaint” represented an exercise of 
the discretion which they hve been expressly delegated. 
That decision was obviously influenced by the fact that,



A-97

other than Elizabeth McNasby, no individual claimant 
pressed her claim until prodded by the Commission. In 
these circumstances the Commissioner’s limitation of 
benefits does not appear to be an abuse of discretion.

The basis for the Commissioner’s refusal to conclude 
that an award should be entered for that period after 
1975, was simply that there was insufficient evidence to 
uphold such a finding. Our review of the record supports 
that conclusion.

Complainants also dispute the Commissioner’s de­
cision to absolve the Union of responsibility for monetary 
damages. As stated above their action in this regard was 
based on the conclusion that it was the Company’s ac­
tions which were primarily responsible for the employ­
ees’ lost wages and opportunities. Given the above cited 
standard of review we find no abuse in the Commission’s 
award, especially since the Commissioners ordered af­
firmative injunctive relief to correct the existing prob­
lems.

We affirm the Order of the Commonwealth Court.
Mr. Chief Justice Nix files a dissenting opinion.



A-98

[J-115-1984]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

EASTERN DISTRICT

JOAN L. MURPHY, LORRAINE 
R. MASON, EDITH L. McGRODY, 

MARIE PEKALA, HENRIETT A 
ELLIOTT, CATHERINE BERES, 

VIRGINIA KNOWLES, ANN 
JACYSZYN, PEGGY FELMEY, 

ELEANOR NEYER, DORIS 
YOCUM & ELIZABETH 

McNASBY, on behalf of themselves 
and all others similarly situated,

Appellants

vs

COMMONWEALTH OF 
PENNSYLVANIA, 

PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN 
RELATIONS COMMISSION, and 

CROWN CORK AND SEAL 
COMPANY, INC., and 

SHEET METAL PRODUCTION 
WORKERS’ UNION, LOCAL 266,

Appellees

No. 2 E.D. Appeal 
Dkt. 1984

Appeal from the 
Order of the 

Commonwealth 
Court at No. 1348 

C.D. 1982, 
affirming the 
Order of the 
Pennsylvania 

Human Relations 
Commission at 

Docket Nos. 
E-4Q27 and 

E-4249

77 Pa. Cmwlth. 
291,456 A.2d 740 

(1983).

ARGUED: 
JUNE 19, 1984

DISSENTING OPINION

NIX, C. J. FILED: JANUARY 9, 1985
I dissent. Once again the majority of this Court seeks 

to strangle the spirit of modem administrative law with 
the trappings of the more technical and formalistic style 
of pleadings associated with early common law. As stated 
by Mr. Justice Roberts in his dissent to Pennsylvania



A-99

Human Relations Commission v. U.S. Steel Corp., 458 
Pa. 559, 325 A.2d 910 (1974), “ [t]his sterile and unre­
alistic approach results in a restrictive construction of 
the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act which may crip­
ple the Commonwealth’s efforts to correct the more sub­
tle forms of discrimination.” Id. at 567, 325 A.2d at 914 
(Roberts, J., dissenting, joined by Nix, J.).

In the instant case the 1970 complaint filed by the 
Commission alleged:

On or about to wit, December 22, 1970 the com­
plainant alleges that the respondent Company en­
gages in unlawful employment practices which are 
discriminatory with respect to female employes, be­
cause of their sex, in hiring, assignment, seniority, 
transfer, salary, overtime, promotion, denial of train­
ing, and layoff. It is further alleged that the respond­
ent Union concurs in and aids and abets the discrim­
inatory practices of the respondent Company.

Unlike the general allegation of discrimination held 
insufficient by all members of this Court in U.S. Steel 
Corp.,1 supra at 563, 570, 325 A.2d at 912, 916, the com­
plaint filed in this case adequately put the defendant on 
notice that the Commission intended to conduct an in­
vestigation and hearing regarding sex discrimination 
against its female employees. The term “set forth the

1. The comparable section of the complaint held insufficient in 
Pa. Human Relations Commission v. U.S. Steel Corp., 458 Pa. 559, 
325 A.2d 910 (1974), read:

The Respondent has in the past and continues until the 
present time to maintain a discriminatory system of recruit­
ment, hiring, training, employment, compensation, promotion, 
demotion, job assignment or placement, transfer, layoff, reten­
tion, referral, dismissal, rehire, retirement, and pensions, and 
has otherwise discriminated in the past and continues until the 
present time to discriminate regarding terms, conditions and 
privileges of employment because of sex, race and national or­
igin.
Id. at 562-63, 325 A.2d at 912.



A-100

particulars” as used in Section 9 of the Act, Act of Oc­
tober 27, 1955, P.L. 744 §9, as amended, 43 P.S. §959, 
should not be read to mean that a statistical report is re­
quired in the original complaint.

The complaint in this case sufficiently alleged that 
the employer had engaged in across-the-board discrim­
ination against female employees. When, as the record 
amply reflects,2 an employer engages in such wide­
spread sex discrimination as was the case here, it is dif­
ficult to imagine how much more “particularized” the 
pleadings need be to provide the employer with notice of 
intent to investigate. Under the reasoning employed by 
the majority the complaint would resemble a detailed re­
port. Such specificity is absurd in light of the fact that 
oftentimes in these cases the necessary “particularized” 
information will not be disclosed until the investigation is 
completed.

I would rule, therefore, that initial complaints in dis­
crimination cases brought by the Pennsylvania Human 
Relations Board need only give notice to: ( 1 ) enable a 
resondent to lighten the burden of the investigation and 
hearing process itself, and (2 ) encourage voluntary com­
pliance with the Act. See U.S, Steel Corp., supra at 569, 
325 A.2d at 915 (Roberts, J., dissenting, joined by Nix
JO-

I further disagree with the majority’s conclusion that 
the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission does 
not represent the individual claimants’ interests when it

2. Indeed the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission 
found as a conclusion of law that:

At all times from July 9, 1969 to December 31, 1975, Crown 
engaged in a pattern and practice of discrimination based upon 
the sex, female, of applicants and employes in hiring, job as­
signment, job transfer, compensation, layoff, and recall from 
layoff, on a continuing basis.
Pennsylania Human Relations Commission v. Crown Cork and 
Seal Co., P.H.R.C. Nos. E-4027, E-4249 (Aug. 28, 1981) at 29.



A-101

files a complaint alleging discrimination.3 If such is the 
case, then a complaint by the Commission is nothing 
more that a mere formality which can impose no mon­
etary penalty upon the discriminating employer. Such a 
conclusion also is contrary to the holding of the United 
States Supreme Court in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush 
Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982). Logan held that an individual’s 
right to redress grievances through the adjudicatory pro­
cedures of a state agency charged with providing relief to 
citizens who have been unjustly injured by discrimina­
tion in employment is a species of property protected by 
the Due Process Clause. Id. at 431.

The Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission 
has the power and the duty “ [t]o initiate, receive, inves­
tigate and pass upon complaints charging unlawful dis­
criminatory practices.” 43 P.S. §957(f). The eleven fe­
male employees who went to the Commission in Febru­
ary of 1970 thus had reason to believe that their rights 
were being vindicated by the Commission. Certainly 
claimants such as those before this Court have an inter­
est in freedom from discrimination in employment, in 
back pay or other monetary relief, and in public vindi­
cation of their rights. They also have an interest in re­

3. The majority supported this proposition by citing Smiler v. 
Toll, 373 Pa. 127, 137, 94 A.2d 764 (1953) and Spires v. Hanover 
Fire Insurance Co., 364 Pa. 52, 70 A. 2d 828(1950). Neither of these 
cases, however, involved the situation where a public agency was 
charged with the duty to safeguard against constitutional violations. 
Sm iler involved the issue of a real party in interest under a sealed 
contract and H a n over  F ire In su ra n ce  Co. merely held that a third 
party beneficiary under a fire insurance policy must be named or 
referred to in the contract. We are not dealing with theories of con­
tract in the instant case. Here we have the situation where a public 
agency has been established to safeguard the public against unlaw­
ful discriminatory practices. Since this Commission benefits the en­
tire Commonwealth, it does not follow that individual complainants 
are not represented by the Commission. Rigid principles of contract 
law should not obstruct the legislative intent behind the establish­
ment of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission.



A-102

dressing their grievances through the administrative 
agency that was established for that purpose by the leg­
islature as an expert in the field of discrimination, and in 
the full benefits of an investigation and hearing as pro­
vided by the Act. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., supra 
at 431.

For the above reasons I would hold that the original 
complaint filed by the Commission sufficiently satisfied 
the “particularity” requirement of Section 9 and that the 
rights of the individual complainants were preserved by 
the Commission. I would thus remand the action to the 
Commission for the award of back pay or other monetary 
relief for the individual complainants not inconsistent 
with the finding that the original complaint was valid.



A-103

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOAN L. MURPHY, LORRAINE :
R. MASON, EDITH L, McGRODY,
MARIE PEKALA, HENRIETTA :
ELLIOTT, CATHERINE BERES,
VIRGINIA KNOWLES, :
ANN JACYSZYN, :
PEGGY FELMEY, ELEANOR :
NEYER, DORIS YOCUM AND 
ELIZABETH McNASBY, :
on behalf of themselves and all ;
others similarly situated, :

Appellants
v.

COMMONWEALTH OF 
PENNSYLVANIA 
PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN 
RELATIONS 
COMMISSION,

Appellees

and

CROWN CORK AND SEAL 
COMPANY. INC. AND 
SHEET METAL PRODUCTION 
WORKERS' UNION, LOCAL 266 641 E.D. Allocatur

Interoenors Docket 1983



A-104

NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

NOTICE is hereby given that Joan L. Murphy, Lor­
raine R. Mason, Edith L. McGrody, Marie Pekala, Henri­
etta Elliott, Catherine Beres, Virginia Knowles, Ann 
Jacyszyn, Peggy Felmey, Eleanor Neyer, Doris Yocum 
and Elizabeth McNasby hereby appeal to the Supreme 
Court of the United States from the Final Judgment of 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirming the final 
judgment of the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania 
(77 Pa. Commw. Ct. 291 (1983) and the final judgment 
of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission. The 
said judgment of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
was entered on January 9, 1985.

This appeal is taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2).

Dated: April 4, 1985

OF COUNSEL:
COHEN, SHAPIRO, 

POLISHER, 
SHIEKMAN 
and COHEN 

22nd Floor 
Philadelphia Savings 

Fund Building 
12 South 12th Street 
Philadelphia, PA 19107 
(215) 922-1300

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Alan M. Lerner_______
Alan M. Lerner 
Jeffrey Ivan Pasek 
22nd Floor
Philadelphia Savings Fund 

Building
12 South 12th Street 
Philadelphia, PA 19107 
(215) 922-1300
Attorneys for Appellants



A-105

and
Stanley M. Schwarz, Esquire 
1630 Locust Street 
Philadelphia, PA 19103 
(215) 545-1200

cc: Ellen K. Barry, Esquire
Jerome A. Hoffman, Esquire 
Stephen P. Gallagher, Esquire 
Mark P. Muller, Esquire



A-106

February 7. 1970 
Phila.. Pa.

Dear Mrs. Henderson:
. I am writing this letter in regards of discrimination of 

sex at Crown Cork and Seal.
Around three months ago November 1 . 1969. 95 per­

cent ol the girls filed a grievance complaint and gave it 
to the president of our union which he completely ig­
nored until the girls asked him when he was going to 
give us a meeting. At first he told the girls it was too near 
the holidays and he couldn't get a hall. Later he told 
them when we have a meeting regarding our contract he 
would make arrangements. When he posted the notice, 
he had on the notice “Proposals for New Contract." A 
special meeting will be held for this purpose and this 
purpose onlv. No other orders of business will be taken 
up at this time.

Our contract is coming up this April 5th and we girls 
are worried that he will have things in the contract that 
will do away with the women. He will onlv tell us what 
he wants us to know and when we get our book about a 
year later things will be in there we don't know anything 
about.

Girls with 19 and 20 years get laid off and they were 
hiring new men. At the present time girls with 17 and 18 
years are laid off now and men with onlv 2  months are 
working.

There are a lot of jobs the girls can do but they w ill 
not give us a chance.

In 40 Dept, the girls packed cans in cartons from a 
machine also hand packed into bulk cartons bag. Then 
they changed to bulk pallets which is a double rake with 
about forty cans on a rake. So the men took that over. 
Now they put it on palletizers which consist of pushing 
buttons and they refuse to give us a chance on it. Which 
rightfully belongs to the girls in the first place.



A-107

Also when there is overtime the head shop steward 
trys and bring men on women's jobs instead of asking us 
first.

At one time we had applied. They did away with that 
job but gave it to the clerks which consist of all men. 
Now they make tickets for the jobs which anv girl can do 
that job.

There is a girl inspector which has 17 vears with the 
company she is laid off but they put a new man on her 
job which worked in 40 Dept, with onlv 1 1/2 vears w ith 
the company.

Mrs. Henderson our main concern right now is that 
they are doing away with women and placing men on our 
jobs. When some of the girls went to the head shop stew ­
ards they laughed right in their faces. And the companv 
is going right along with them.

One of the girls went to the personnel manager and 
asked him about going on the palletizers and he said. 1 
don’t see why not and asked her if she talked to the union 
about it and she told him what we did As of now she 
hasn t received an answer from the companv or union.

The vice president holds two jobs in the union. He 
also is head shop steward on day work. We don't think it 
is right.

I nr sending you this week’s lay off slip to prove to 
vou what I am saying is the truth.

There are so many other things but the people on 
day. second and third shifts can tell you themselves.

We would appreciate any help vou can give us as 
things have gone too far.

Mrs. Henderson the trouble is we are afraid to sign 
any one girl's name against the union because thev will 
find one wav or another to get us fired or make it rough 
for us. fhev already know that we are asking for help and 
they don't like it at all.

Thanking you for any help you can give us.



A-108

Crown Cork & Seal 
9300 Ashton Road 
Philadelphia. PA 19114
2/7/70

I remain.
Mary Martin
9301 Ashton Road. Apt. 10 
Philadelphia. PA 19114
Phone OR-6-2515



A-109

February 27, 1970

Miss Mary Martin
9303 Ashton Road — Apt. 10
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19114

Dear Miss Martin:
This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter of Feb­

ruary 7, 1970 relative to your situation at Crown Cork 
and Seal, which has been forwarded to me for reply.

The information you have submitted has been for­
warded to our Philadelphia Regional Office. A Field Rep­
resentative from that office will contact you in the near 
future in order to secure more detailed information and 
to determine this Commission’s jurisdiction in this mat­
ter.

We are returning the original copy of your Lay Off 
Notice and Grievance Slip for your records. Any addi­
tional written material pertinent to your complaint which 
you may have would be helpful to our Field Represent­
ative.

Thank you for bringing this situation to our atten­
tion.

Sincerely yours,

Virginia T. Fichtel 
Acting Director of Compliance



A-110

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 
PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION

Marv Martin :
( Complainant)

C O M P L A 1 N T

1 DOCKET NO. L-3696

Crown Cork and Seal Company. Inc.
(Respondent) :

C O M P L A I N T

1. The complainant herein is Mary Martin. 9309 
Ashton Road. Philadelphia. Pa.

2. The respondent herein is Crown Cork and Seal 
Company. Inc.. 9300 Ashton Road. Philadelphia. Pa.

3. On or about to wit. April 13. 1970. the respondent 
refused to give the complainant, overtime work while 
giving it to men although she has senioritv over male 
employees in her job classification; and has generally 
treated the complainant, as well as other women, differ­
ently from men because of her sex, female.

4. Such action by the respondent constitutes an un­
lawful discriminatory practice and is in violation of: 
(check below according to complaint).

(x) Section 5. Sub-Section(s) (a) of the Act of 
October 27. 1955. P.L. 744. as amended by 
the Act of February 28. 1961. P.L. 47. 
known as the Pennsylvania Human Rela­
tions Act.

( ) Section 4. Sub-Section) s ) ____of the Act of
July 17. 1961. P .L .____ known as the



A- 111

Pennsylvania Fair Educational Opportuni­
ties Act.

5. No other action based on the allegations set forth 
in this complaint has been instituted by the complainant 
in any court or before any other commission within this 
Commonwealth, except as follows:

“None
(Insert “none”, if applicable.)

6 . The unlawful discriminatory practice referred to 
in this complaint is of a continuing nature which has 
persisted up to and including the present time. (To be 
crossed out if not applicable.)

Sworn to and subscribed :
before me this 15 dav :
of April, 1970. :

/§/___ /s/ Marv Martin___________
(Signature of Complainant)Notary Public 

My Commission Expires:



A-112

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 
PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION

Mary Martin :
(Complainant)

C O M P L A 1 N T

DOCKET NO. E-3697

Can Workers Union. Local 266 
(Sheet Metal Worker's Inti. 

Assn.. AFL-CIO)
(Respondent)

C O M P L A I N T

1- The complainant herein is Mary Martin. 9309 
Ashton Road. Philadelphia. Pa.

2. The respondent herein is Can Workers Union. 
Local 266. (Sheet Metal Worker's Inti. Assn.. AFL-CIO) 
6445 Frankford Avenue. Philadelphia. Pa. 19135.

3. On or about to wit. (April 13, 1970 the complain­
ant alleges the Union failed to represent her because the 
Union President. Herman Tedeschi, seized her griev­
ance slip from Pat Cioa. Chief Steward 1st Shift, threw it 
at John Librizzi. Head Steward. 3rd Shift, and cursed her 
as he walked away; and that this refusal to accept griev­
ances is of a continuing nature against herself and other 
women because of their sex. female.

4. Such action by the respondent constitutes an un­
lawful discriminatory practice and is in violation of:
(check below according to complaint).

(x) Section 5. Sub-Section(s) (c) of the Act or 
October 27. 1955. P.L. 744. as amended by



A-113

the Act of February 28, 1961. P.L. 47. 
known as the Pennsylvania Human Rela­
tions Act.

( ) Section 4. Sub-Section(s) _ _ _  of the Act of
July 17. 1961. P.L. ____, known as the
Pennsylvania Fair Educational Opportuni­
ties Act.

5. No other action based on the allegations set forth 
in this Complaint has been instituted by the complainant 
in anv court or before any other commission within this 
Commonwealth, except as follows:

"None”
(Insert “none”, if applicable.)

6 . The unlawful discriminatory practice referred to 
in this Complaint is of a continuing nature which has 
persisted up to and including the present time. (To be 
crossed out if not applicable.)

Sworn to and subscribed 
before me this 15 day :
of April, 1970.

/s/___________________  /s/ Mary Martin___________
Notary Public (Signature of Complainant)
My Commission Expires:



A-114

Feb. 27, 1970

Inquiry
Eleven ( 1 1 ) women came to the RO to file a com­

plaint against their Company and Union. Names follow:
Mary Martin — 930 Ashton Rd., Philadelphia, Pa. 

OR 6-2515 — 21 years seniority
Virginia Knowles — 3130 Custer Street, Philadel­

phia, Pa. NE 4-6871 — 16 years 
seniority

Marie Pekala — 6370 Marsden Street, Philadel­
phia, Pa., no phone — 171/2 years sen­
iority

Anna Beldick — 817 N. Taylor Street, Philadel­
phia, Pa., PO 8-2083 — 20 years sen­
iority

Dorothea Gribbin — 4904 Penn Street, Philadel­
phia, Pa., PI 3-7879 — 18 years 
seniority

Helen Dawson — 187 Gehrig Avenue, Gloucester, 
New Jersey, CL 6-1298 — 16 years 
seniority

Dolores Harrison — 6318 Algard Street, Philadel­
phia, Pa., DE 3-3710 — 18 years 
seniority

Veronika Miczan — 6833 Oakley Street, Philadel­
phia, Pa., no phone — 171/2 years 
seniority

Joan L. Murphy — 2610 Almond Street, Philadel­
phia, Pa., NE 4-2725 — 17 years 
seniority

Constance Pacini — 933 Tree Street, Philadelphia, 
Pa., DE 6-3675 — 16 years sen­
iority

Helen Steenson — 1220 E. Sedgley Avenue, Phil­
adelphia, Pa. JE 5-1246 — 16’A 
years seniority



A-l lo

They work for: Crown Cork and Seal Company Inc. 
9300 Ashton Road 
Philadelphia, Pa.

Their Union is: Can Workers Union, Local 266
Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Assn., 

AFL-CIO
6445 Frankford Avenue 
Philadelphia, PA 
DE 1-3220

The women allege they are being discriminated 
against because of their sex. They complained to the Un­
ion six years ago but were ignored. They also came to the 
State Building in Philadelphia to complain but received 
no help. It was not ascertained to which department they 
came in the State Building.

The FR gave each person present a book of PPIRC 
Laws with the sex amendment insert and explained the 
law and where the sex amendment is now applicable.

The incidents of discrimination are the following: 
The Company has become highly automated. Most op­
erations are push button. As the new machines are 
brought in the women who operated the older ones are 
replaced by men. New machines are simpler and easier, 
less strenuous, to operate. When women ask supervision 
to be allowed to learn the new operations (specifically, 
the “palletizer” ) they are told, “That’s a man’s job.” This 
denial of training and replacement by men is happening 
in many other departments.

The women stated the object of this policy is to re­
place women with men.

After denying them the opportunity to learn new op­
erations and replacing the women with men the Com­
pany began to lay them off on a Lack-of-Work basis. Men 
were hired in the place of women who had been laid-off.

Women are not allowed to work overtime. Men are 
given all overtime work.



A-116

Men are started at a higher rate of pay than women 
who are doing the same work.

Some told their personal experiences: Mary Martin, 
Lead Girl in 20 Dept., and Virginia Knowles, Packer in 40 
Dept., said they were laid-off for lack-of-work but they 
observed that the only men laid-off on this basis were 
those with one (1) or two (2) weeks seniority. Martin has 
twenty-one (2 1 ) years seniority, Knowles sixteen (16).

Helen Steenson, with sixteen and one-half (T6 V2) 
years seniority, was laid off for lack-of-work. She had 
been trained as an Inspector. This job receives a higher 
pay rate than that of Seamer Operator, for instance. She 
returned to work on a callback, as a Seamer Operator. 
When she asked to be allowed to work as an Inspector 
(openings for) she was told she could not because she 
had been laid-off too much.

Marie Picala (IW 2 years sen.) was not allowed to 
work overtime. She spoke to Eddie Lavin, Shop Steward. 
He told her there was no overtime work in her depart­
ment although she observed there was and that men 
were brought in to do it.

The women had brought a Union Booklet (at­
tached), a Grievance Slip dated November 1, 1969 with 
signatures (See Attachment 1), and a letter from the Un­
ion dated January 20, 1970 (See Attachment 2). Page 25 
of the Union Contract has Article IX which is titled “Dis­
crimination” and states there will be none on the basis of 
race, color, national origin, religion or sex. The Griev­
ance was presented to the Union representative (name 
unknown) on November 1 , 1970. Nothing was done to 
process or recognize this grievance, despite the number 
of women who signed, almost every women in the plant 
alleged those present. Later, after the grievance was ig­
nored, several women went to the office of the Union 
President, Herman Tedeschi. They were made to wait for 
hours, and eventually left without seeing him about their 
grievances. The letter from the Union was sent to all em­
ployees and requests all Union members to attend a



A-117

meeting about the new contract. It states that no other 
order of business will be taken up at the meeting. The 
assembled women called this letter “a slap in the face." 
They want to file a complaint against the Union for fail­
ure to represent (them).

The FR asked about Union Leadership. There are 
about fifty (50) top people, including shop stewards. Two 
(2) shop stewards are female. There are twelve (12) on 
the Executive Board, of whom three (3) are women. One 
(1) of these women is the Recording Secretary. The FR 
asked the titles of the remaining two (2) women. These 
are not known. The FR asked if these women had. or 
were known to have, any real power, and influence in the 
decision-making process, or if they helped to make pol­
icy. The women present insisted (alleged) they do not. 
To sum up: Five (5) females are in positions of some 
authority. Five (5) out of fifty (50). One (1) is the Re­
cording Secretary. Two (2) are Shop Stewards.

The women commented about the change in Union 
membership over the years. Out of approximately 1100 
members about 1/4 are female. Once the Union was pre­
dominantly female. But three (3) or four (4) years ago 
women with more than fifteen (15) years seniority lost it 
because they had been laid-off more than one ( 1 ) year. 
Because women are being foi'ced to leave the Company 
and being laid-off the Union membership reflects this 
change.

The FR asked if there are any women in supervision, 
either on the floor (plant) or in the office. None, it was 
stated. The highest position for a woman is as Lead Girl.

CS King was called in and questioned those present 
about privileges and draining. There are thirty (30) days 
training for all new employees. Fie then asked about sick 
leave and benefits. These are the same for all workers, 
male or female. It appeared that the substance of the 
complaint against the Company deals with denial of 
training and layoff. With the Union it is failure to rep­
resent.



A-118

CS King explained the method of filing a complaint. 
When it was learned their names would appear on a com­
plaint those present expressed great fear of reprisal. Al­
though the CS and the FR explained that the law pro­
tects the complainant, that it is illegal to take revenge on 
a complaint or complainants, the women insisted “They 
would find some way to punish us.” Thev came to PHRC 
believing they could make an anonymous complaint. 
The CS said it might be possible to file a PHRC com­
plaint, and left the room to call Harrisburg for instruc­
tions.

During the absence of the CS the women asked the 
FR if the Company could be made to guarantee thirty 
(30) days of work from a call-back after layoff. Everyone 
present had experienced long periods of lay-off, and 
some were presently laid-off. The FR told them this was 
something to demand as part of an adjustment by the 
Company, after an investigation had shown cause.

The CS returned saying he had talked to Elizabeth 
Henderson, Deputy Director about the complaint, the 
layoffs, etc. He was told not to file a PHRC complaint 
because, for one thing PHRC has had problems with 
group complaints. All that would be necessarv is one 
name on a complaint against the Union, however, with 
the other women used as witnesses. This person could 
be someone with a specific grievance. All the women 
present said they have a grievance but none wanted her 
name on a complaint. CS King asked if someone who had 
been laid-off and replaced by a man would be willing to 
file a complaint. Again the answer was no because of fear 
of reprisal. Although these women have not got much of 
a job or jobs they are afraid of losing them by causing 
trouble to the Company, and particularv to the Union.

All present (complainants) were surprised and dis­
mayed by this turn of events. They could not understand 
why their names and their jobs could not be protected by 
the filing of an anonymous complaint. CS King was 
asked by those present what they could do about their



A-119

grievance, now that PHRC would not accept an anony­
mous complaint and would not initiate its own. He sug­
gested they write to Mrs. Henderson requesting her to 
have PHRC initiate their complaint, and to have as many 
aggrieved females as possible sign the letter. Also, to 
send a similar letter to the Governor. The women left the 
RO with plans to follow the advice of CS King.

Ellen L. Wooters
Field Representative



A-120

Attachment #24 E 
E 3696
June 18, 1970

Dear Sir:
I feel there is discrimination in our plant regarding 

female employees. There are quite a few jobs in this 
plant that could be covered by females if given the op­
portunity. The women in 40 dept, have asked manv 
times for a chance on the pallitizers. But have never been 
allowed to try them. They were given, and do run. the 
depalletizer which is almost the same operation. But this 
job rarely runs.

Our women have seniority over most of the men in 
our dept, but have very few jobs because almost every­
thing runs in pallets. The women are put in our repair 
area, while men with a year or even six months are on a 
line. There are also sweeping and cleaning jobs that are 
all given to men.

On overtime in our dept, there are very few women 
who work. Say a girl is on a line all week in bulk and then 
when Saturday comes they go into pallets and that 
means all men. So after the women worked on the line all 
week she is out of luck for overtime.

We also have women with 16 years laid off and men 
with a month or two seniority working on dav work.

There are many other jobs that could be discussed 
for women. I feel there should be some way the women 
in our plant could have a little better deal.

I have 28 years in this plant but if things keep going 
the way they are I could be the next one out of a job.

Vivienne Elaag



A-121

Evaluation of Case Docket Nov. 17. 1970
No. E-3696
Henry Saunders, Field Representative 
Charles H. Gratman. Compliance Specialist

It is my opinion that the investigational process, 
which has been conducted in great detail, has been pre­
sented in such a manner that reasonable cause can be 
immediately determined by reviewing the record.

The complainants allegations refers to the following 
areas:

1) refusal to grant overtime
2) refusal to assign to palletizer
3) generally treated the complainant and other 

women employees differently
4) and that this was done because of her sex
The complainant supported the above by presenting 

documents which indicated sex discrimination in the ar­
eas of:

1) job assignments
2 ) job training
3) lay-offs and recall policy
4) denial of overtime to females
5) higher status salary for men
6) denial of promotional opportunities to women
7) recruitment policy which denies women job op­

portunities
8) and the respondent’s policy of causing women to 

lose their seniority by prolonged layoffs.
The respondent’s records which were reviewed and 

in most cases secured tend to substantiate these claims. 
The pattern of sex discrimination becomes apparent onlv 
after each form (attachment) is reviewed.

It is my contention that because of the importance of 
this case and the possibility of Commission action in the 
form of a Public Hearing that every effort should be made 
on the part of the Field Representative to evaluate the 
case in such a manner that the facts can be easilv re­



A-122

viewed and understood. Therefore, I suggest that in each 
area of the complainant’s allegation and concern the FR 
prepare a separate and detailed comparative chart or doc­
ument that will substantiate or refute the allegation.

' The nature of this comparison should not be limited 
to a narrow evaluation of the allegation but should en­
compass the overall policy of the respondent as it relates 
to its female employees. This would mean going beyond 
the allegation when patterns suggest that discriminatory 
practices exist. A finding of Reasonable Cause can only 
be made after all the facts are secured, reviewed, eval­
uated and interpreted by the Field Representative. This 
presentation should be as clear as possible and not make 
it necessary to review the record to piece together the 
facts.



November 1 e. 1970
Dear Mr. Saunders:

I am dropping the charge against the union. "Can 
Workers Union" Local 266. Also the company Crown 
Cork and Seal. 1 want to thank vou lor all the trouble you 
went thru. You are a good honest man. If more were like 
you this world would be a better place to live.

Thanking you again. 
I remain

/s/ Marv Martin



A-124

December 22. 1970

PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION

Compliance Division 
CASE CHRONOLOGY

Docket No. E-3696

4-22-70 CS assigned Case to FR
4-24-70 CS handed initial statement to FR
Later FR reviewed initial statement
4-25-70 FR telephoned complainant
4-27-70 FR checked Corporation Information
Later FR telephoned complainant
Later FR met complainant
Later FR visited respondent companv
Later FR met Industrial Relations Manager
Later FR reviewed records and received copies
4-28-70 FR conferred with CS
4-29-70 FR visited complainant
Later FR visited respondent
Later FR toured plant
5-6-70 FR receiv ed correspondence from complainant
Later FR telephoned ADC Fichel
5-15-70 FR conferred with CS
Later CS conferred with FR
5-18-70 FR telephoned complainant
5-26-70 Complainant telephoned RO
5-29-70 FR conferred with complainant
6-1-70 FR telephoned complainant
6-5-70 FR conferred with complainant
6-7-70 FR telephoned company employees
6-8-70 FR conferred with CS—specific charge should be 

amended



A-125

Later
Later
Later
Later
6-12-70

Later

7-1-70
Later
7-2-70
7-10-70
7-16-70

Later
7-17-70
7-21-70
Later
7-22-70
Later
Later
7-24-70
7-25-70
7-27-70
7-28-70
Later
Later
Later
7-29-70
7-30-70
7- 31-70 
Later
8- 7-70 
8-14-70

FR telephoned a company employee
FR telephoned Mr. Walter
Plant Manager telephoned CS and FR
FR telephoned company employees
FR visited respondent company and conferred
with Plant Manager and Industrial Relations
Manager
FR visited the complainant—received letter from 
Mrs. Hall
FR reviewed case with CS 
FR received correspondence (attachment #27) 
FR telephoned Mr. Walter 
FR telephoned Mr. Walter 
FR’s visited respondent company—check Per­
sonnel Files
Union President conferred with FR’s 
FR visited complainant 
FR conferred with CS 
FR telephoned complainant 
FR conferred with CS
Complainant in RO-original complaint amended
FR visited respondent company
FR phoned complainant
FR visited complainant
FR received letter from respondent
Reasonable Cause established
Case progress submitted to CS
Complainant phoned FR
FR phoned witness — no contact
FR reviewed case
CS conferred with FR
Case progress submitted to CS
FR commented on the case at staff meeting
CS Handed memo to FR
Complainant phoned FR

s



A-126

Later
8-21-70
Later
8-26-70
Later
8-27-70
8- 31-70
9- 3-70 
Later 
9-8-70 
9-9-70 
9-16-70 
9-17-70 
9-25-70 
9-28-70 
Later

9- 30-70 
Later 
Later
10- 2-70 
Later 
10-14-70 
10-15-70

Later
12-1-70

CS requested RS to review case
FR received note from CS
CS requested RS to review case
FR received memo from CS
FR reviewed case
RS, CS. FR reviewed case
FR reviewed case
CS Handed memo to FR
FR reviewed memo
FR reviewed case
FR answered memo of 8-7-70
Case progress submitted to CS
CS conferred with FR
CS conferred with FR
Case progress submitted to CS
Case conference with RS. CS. Commissioner
Heide, Neil Thomas at request of RS
FR received phone call from ACLU
FR phoned complainant
FR received memo from CS
FR reviewed case
FR determined reasonable cause questionable 
Complainant phoned FR
Complainant's letter of withdrawal received in 
RO
Case progress and closing submitted to CS 
Case closing submitted CS



A-127

December 22, 1970 

PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION

4-22-70

Compliance Division 
CASE CHRONOLOGY

Docket No. E-3697

CS assigned case to FR
4-24-70 CS handed initial statement to FR
Later FR reviewed initial statement
4-25-70 FR telephoned complainant
4-27-70 FR checked Corporation Information
Later FR telephoned complainant
Later FR met complainant
4-28-70 FR conferred with CS
4-29-70 FR visited complainant
Later FR visited respondent union
Later FR met union president
5-1-70 FR telephoned respondent union
5-4-70 FR visited respondent & interviewed witnesses
Later FR telephoned complainant
5-6-70 FR received correspondence from complainant
5-12-70 Complainant telephoned FR
5-14-70 FR visited complainant
5-15-70 FR conferred with CS
Later FR telephoned respondent union
Later CS conferred with FR
Later FR telephoned complainant
Later FR checked with telephone operator
Later FR telephoned Moses Librizzi
Later FR telephoned Moses Librizzi — left message
Later FR telephoned John Librizzi
5-18-70 FR telephoned Crown Cork and Seal Co.



A-128

Later FR telephoned Pat Coia
Later FR telephoned complainant
5-26-70 Complainant telephoned RO
5-29-70 FR telephoned complainant
6-1-70 FR telephoned complainant
Later CS conferred with FR
6-5-70 FR conferred with complainant
6-8-70 Union President telephoned FR
7-13-70 FR telephoned respondent union
7-16-70 Mr. Tedeschi conferred with FR's
7-17-70 FR visited complainant
Later FR submitted attachments to Hbg.
7-27-70 FR phoned respondent union — left message
7-28-70 Mr. Tedeschi phoned FR
7-29-70 FR conferred with CS and was instructed to con­

centrate on E-3696
10-7-70 FR reviewed case
Later Case closing submitted CS
10-15-70 Letter of withdrawal sent FR



A-129

Docket No. E-3696
Initial Case Progi'ess 
Complainant
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission 
100 North Cameron Street 
Harrisburg. Pa.
Respondent
Crown Cork and Seal Company Inc.
9300 Ashton Road 
Philadelphia, Pa.

and
Sheet Metal Workers International Association 
Can Workers Union Local No. 266 
6445 Frankford Avenue 
Philadelphia, Pa.

As a result of the investigational process in the dock­
eted cases E-3696 and E-3697 sufficient information 
was secured to credit the allegation of the complainant. 
However, she has withdrawn her complaint alleging sex 
discrimination.

The following is a partial list of the general allega­
tions made by Mary Martin.
( 1 )  Sex Discrimination

a) Company is becoming automated and the female 
employees are being denied the opportunity to 
operate them. (Machinery)

b) The female employees are also being replaced by 
male employees (new hires?) on the older ma­
chines which are harder to operate.

c) Their refusal stems from the expression “its a 
man’s job”?

d) Because they have not had the opportunity to 
learn the new jobs they are laid off. When work 
is available men are hired rather than recalling 
the women.



A-130

e) Men work overtime whereas women do not.
f) Men receive a higher rate of pay — for doing the 

same work.
g) There are no female supervisors — Highest po­

sition is that of “Lead Girl”.
h) Separate seniority lists — one for male one for 

female.
i) Union officials complete pre-employment appli­

cations for males who are unable to do so because 
of language barrier.

j) Only men are allowed to operate the palletizer in 
department 23 and 28.

k) Women are laid off for prolonged periods to elim­
inate their seniority rights and privileges.

l) Racial segregation of departments (#40 #23). 
The following is a list of specific complaints made by

her fellow employees:

Specific Complaints
1. Mary Martin — lead man gets $.10 more per

hours for doing the same work 
— even the sweeper gets more 
than I do.

2. Eleanor Meredith — A general statement that
women are being laid off 
because of their sex.

3. Vargenca Haag — Is fearful that she will lose
her job and seniority be­
cause of sex discrimination.

4. Florence Brumaster — Men with less seniority
work days while women 
are required to work 
nights.

5. Dorothy Gribbins — Denied job opportunities.
6. Mary Martin — No longer allowed to work over­

time as are some of the other 
women who came to PHRC to 
file a complaint.



A-131

Also on 4-13-70 she was taken 
off overtime and it was given to 
a man — also affected are 
Eleanor Meredith and Vivian 
Haag.

7. Emily Feigel — She lost her job to a man who
has less seniority (hearsay).

8. Doris Yocum — 16 years of seniority was laid
off (6-6-70) she also says man 
with less seniority are re­
tained.

The respondent has made the following reply to 
some of the allegations.

Respondents Reply of Explanation
1. Overtime — Department 40

a) (M) (M) (M) (M) (M) (M) (M) (M) (M) (Mi (M)
4-11-40 6287 7607 7558 6628 7261 5986 7547 6672 2965
4-12-70 6287 7607 7261 5986 2965
4-25-70 6287 7607 7558 5986 7547 2965 7364 2829

Those Transferred to other Department

Name Sex Department
Martin (F) to dept. 22
Hartman (F) 5 ? ??

Rassion (F) >> Anglina Rassino seniority 
1-4-51

Loniti (F) Josephine Moniti seniority 
4-16-51

Fyfer (F)
Johnson CM)

The above indicates that all overtime granted on 
4-11-70 and 4-12-70 were to male employees — female



A-132

employees were transferred to department 12. The larger 
employee number also reflects that seniority is being ig­
nored.

Respondent says person working on job gets first 
preference for overtime — than seniority (if women can’t 
get the job how can they get overtime?)

2. Lay Off — Recall Policy
Union contract provides that plant seniority shall 

govern in all cases of layoffs and recalls provided the in­
dividual has the ability to do the work — last hired first 
laid off — last laid off first recalled.

Union is notified 2 days prior to lay off.
From the attached material it it apparent that the 

respondent keeps two (2) separate lists and is not fol­
lowing procedure as the female employees have greater 
seniority to the male employees. Greater is an under­
statement.

The following lists reflect that two separate lists are 
kept for male and female employees and seniority rights 
are violated.

Recall 12-29-69

(1) 15 W — average seniority 14 years
5 M — average seniority 2 months

6-29-70

(2) 5 W — average seniority 18 years
9 M — average seniority 1V2 months

3-2-70

(3) 0 W
14 M — average seniority 2Vz months

3-2-70
(4) 0 W

4 M — average seniority 2 months



A-133

Layoff
(1) 16 W 

0 M

(2) 0 W 
7 M

(3) 19 W 
30 M

(4) 8 VV 
0 M

(5) 21 W
0 M

(6) 5 W 
15 M

average seniority 15 years 

6-12-70

average seniority 1 month 
6-12-70

average seniority 17 years 
average seniority 1 month 

6-19-70
— average seniority 17 years

2-27-70
— average seniority 17 years

4-10-70
average seniority 17 years 
average senioritv 2 months 

2-6-70
3. Salary Scale

Respondent claims no difference in salary. All em­
ployees start at $2.95 per hour. However the average sal­
ary of the female employees is lower than the male em­
ployees even though they have greater seniority — A dif­
ferent wage scale and payroll code number may also in­
dicate a difference in salary and potential promotion pos­
sibilities.
4. Denial o f Job Opportunities and Training

Respondent states “certain jobs men must do”. 
Based on this information I believe that a PHRC is 

justified and that all the female employees are victims of 
discrimination either through their loss of employment 
and/or conditions of employment.



A-134

December 23. 1970
Mr. Adam P. Walter 
Industrial Relations Manager 
Crown Cork and Seal Company Inc.
9300 Ashton Road 
Philadelphia, PA 19136

Re: Docket No. E-4027
Pennsylvania Human Relations Com­
mission

v.
Crown Cork and Seal Company, Inc., Sheet 
Metal Workers International Association, 
AFL-CIO Can Workers’ Union Local 266

Dear Mr. Walter:
The Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission 

has initiated a complaint alleging sex discrimination. 
The respondents are as indicated above.

In order to resolve this complaint it will be necessary 
to meet with you in order to present you with complaint 
forms and to make you aware of the information needed 
to resolve this allegation.

If you would kindly contact me within the next 
seven (7) days an appointment can be arranged.

Sincerely yours.

Charles Gratman 
Compliance Specialist

CG/kk
Certified Mail
Return Receipt Requested



A-135

December 23. 1970
Mr. Herman Tedeschi
President & Business Agent
Sheet Metal Workers International Association
AFL-CIO Can Workers Union Local 266
6445 Frankford Avenue
Philadelphia, PA 19135

Re: Docket No. E-4027
Pennsylvania Human Relations Com­
mission

v.
Crown Cork and Seal Company, Inc., Sheet 
Metal Workers International Association, 
AFL-CIO, Can Workers’ Union Local 266

Dear Mr. Tedeschi:
The Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission 

has initiated a complaint alleging sex discrimination. 
The respondents are as indicated above.

In order to x'esolve this complaint it will be necessarv 
to meet with you in order to present you with complaint 
form and to make you aware of the information needed 
to resolve this allegation.

If you would kindly contact me within the next 
seven (7) days an appointment can be arranged.

Sincerely yours,

Charles Gratman 
Compliance Specialist

CG/kk
Certified Mail
Return Receipt Requested



A-136

PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION 
CASE CLOSING RECOMMENDATION

January 29, 1971

Docket No. E-3696
Complaint Received: 4-15-70
Date Docketed: 4-20-70
Initial Contact with Complainant: 4-25-70

Complainant Respondent
(Mrs.) Mary Martin Crown Cork & Seal
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Company, Inc.

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Charge: Sex
The complainant, a female, alleges the respondent 

refuses to give her overtime work while giving it to male 
employees, and refuses to assign her to the Palletizer 
Machine, despite the fact that she has seniority over 
male employees. The complainant further alleges that 
the respondent generally treats the complainant and 
other female employees differently than male employees, 
because of sex.
Summary of Facts:

Before the investigation of this case was completed, 
the complainant requested withdrawal of this complaint. 
The withdrawal was confirmed in a letter received from 
the complainant on 10-15-70. No reason was given for 
the withdrawal.

Note: Because the information secured during
this investigation indicated a pattern of 
discrimination in all phases of the 
respondent’s employment practices, a 
PHRC complaint, Docket No. E-4027, 
was initiated on 12-22-70 against this re­



A-137

spondent and the Sheet Metal Workers' 
International Association. AFL-CIO. Can 
Workers’ Union, Local 266.

Staff Findings:
Staff found the complaint was withdrawn by the 

complainant.
Recommendation:

It is recommended that the Commission dismiss this 
case on the grounds that the complaint was withdrawn 
bv the complainant.

Henry S. Saunders Howard L. Tucker. Jr.
Docket No. E-3696 
Page 2

Commission Action: To close as recommended. 1/29/71.

/s/ Homer C. Floyd 
Homer C. Floyd 
Executive Director



A-138

PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION 
CASE CLOSING RECOMMENDATION

January 29. 1971
Docket No. E-3697
Complaint Received: 4-15-70
Date Docketed: 4-20-70
Initial Contact with Complainant: 4-27-70
Complainant 
(Mrs.) Mary Martin 
Philadelphia. 

Pennsylvania

Respondent 
Sheet Metal Workers' 
International Association. 
AFL-CIO Can Workers’ 

Union 
Local 266
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Charge: Sex
The complainant, a female, alleges the respondent 

refuses to represent her in her efforts to secure overtime 
work and assignment to the Palletizer Machine at Crown 
Cork & Seal Company, Inc. The complainant further al­
leges that the respondent refuses to represent the com­
plainant and other female employees in their efforts to 
secure the same treatment by the Company as that ac­
corded male employees, because of sex.
Summary o f Facts:

Before the investigation of this case was completed, 
the complainant requested withdrawal of this complaint. 
The withdrawal was confirmed in a letter received from 
the complainant on 10-15-70. No reason was given for 
the withdrawal.

Note: Because the information secured during
this investigation indicated a pattern of 
discrimination in all phases of the 
Company's employment practices, with 

^ervention bv the Union in behalf of



A-139

the female employees, a PHRC complaint. 
Docket No. E-4027. was initiated on 
12-22-70 against this respondent and 
Crown Cork and Seal Company. Inc.

Staff Findings:
Staff found the complaint was withdrawn by the 

complainant.
Recommendation:

It is recommended that the Commission dismiss this 
case on the grounds that the complaint was withdrawn 
by the complainant.

Commission Action: To close as recommended. 1-29-71.

/s/ Homer C. Floyd 
Homer C. Floyd 
Executive Director



A-140

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 
GOVERNOR’S OFFICE

PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION

Elizabeth C. McNasby :
(Complainant)

v. :
DOCKET NO. E-4249

Crown Cork and Seal Company 
Sheet Metal Workers :

International Association,
AFL-CIO, Local 266

(Respondent) :

C O M P L A I N T

(x) Employment ( ) Housing ( ) Public Accommodations 
( ) Education . . . Because of the ( ) Race, ( ) Color, 
( ) Religious Creed ( ) National Origin ( ) Ancestry 
( ) Age or (x) Sex, of the complainant.

1. The Complainant herein is Elizabeth C. 
McNasby, 43 Haverford Road, Runnemede, New Jersey

2. The Respondent herein are Crown Cork and Seal 
Company, 9300 Ashton Road, Philadelphia, Pennsylva­
nia and Sheetmetal Workers International Association, 
AFL-CIO, Local 266, 6445 Frankford Avenue, Philadel­
phia, Pa.

3. The Complainant alleges that the respondents 
consorted in the lay-off of the complainant because of 
her sex, FEMALE, and have prevented her, as well as all 
other females, from enjoying equal job opportunities at 
Crown Cork and Seal Company.



A-141

4. The Complainant alleges that the alleged unlaw ­
ful discriminatory practice:

(x) took place on or about May 14. 1971 
( ) is of a continuing nature which has persisted up 

to and including the present time.
5. No other action based on these allegations has 

been instituted by the Complainant in any Court or be­
fore any other Commission within the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania except as follows:

(x) None
( )__________________________________________________
6. Such action complained of is a violation of:
(x) Section 5 (a) (e) of the Pennsylvania Human Re­

lations Act. Act of October 27, 1955. P.L. 744. as 
amended by the Act of February 28, 1961. P.L. 47 and as 
further amended by the act of July 9, 1969. P.L. 133.

( ) Section__________ of the Pennsylvania Fair Ed­
ucational Opportunities Act (Act of July 17. 1961. P.L. 
776).

/s/ Elizabeth C. McNasby 
(Signature of Complainant) 
Date: 6/11/71

Sworn to and subscribed 
before me this 11 th day 
of June, 1971

/s/
Notary Public 
My Commission Expires:



A-142

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 
PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION

Pennsylvania :
Human Relations Commission :

(Complainant) :
: C O M P L A I N T

v. :
DOCKET NO. E-4027

Crown Cork and Seal Company 
Sheet Metal Workers’ :

International Association,
AFL-CIO, Can Workers’

Union, Local 266 
(Respondents) :

C O M P L A I N T

1. The complainant herein is Pennsylvania Human 
Relations Commission, 100 North Cameron Street, Har­
risburg, Pennsylvania 17101.

2. The respondents herein are Crown Cork & Seal 
Company, Inc., 9300 Ashton Road, Philadelphia, Penn­
sylvania 19114; and Sheet Metal Workers’ International 
Association, AFL-CIO, Can Workers’ Union, Local 266, 
6445 Frankford Avenue, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 
19135.

3. On or about to wit, December 22, 1970 the com­
plainant alleges that the respondent Company engages 
in unlawful employment practices which are discrimi­
natory with respect to female employes, because of their 
sex, in hiring, assignment, seniority, transfer, salary, 
overtime, promotion, denial of training, and layoff. It is 
further alleged that the respondent Union concurs in 
and aids and abets the discriminatory practices of the 
respondent Company.



4. Such action by the respondent constitutes an un­
lawful discriminatory practice and is in violation of Sec­
tion 5, Sub-Section(s) (a) and (e) of the Act of October
27, 1955, P.L. 744, as amended by the Act of February
28, 1961, P.L. 47, and as further amended by the Act of
July 9, 1969, P.L.______(Act #56), known as the Penn­
sylvania Human Relations Act.

5. No other action based on the allegations set forth 
in this Complaint has been instituted by the complainant 
in any court or before any other commission within the 
Commonwealth.

6. The unlawful discriminatory practice referred to 
in this Complaint is of a continuing nature which has 
persisted up to and including the present time.

Sworn to and subscribed 
before me this 22nd day 
of December, 1970

Notary Public 
My Commission Expires:

Homer C. Floyd 
Executive Director