Detroit Housing Commission v. Lewis Briefs

    f





No. 12,305

■Untteii Ub (£mvt nf Appeals
For the Sixth Circuit

T he Detroit H ousing Commission, a duly authorized 
Department of the City of Detroit,. F inlay C. A i.J-.en , 
President, Mary M. S treit, Vice-President, W alter J. 
Gessell, George A. I sabel and James H. Quello, Mem­
bers; and H arry J. D urbin, Director-Secretary of the 
Detroit Housing Commission,

Defendants and Appellants,

vs.
W alter A rthur L ewis, et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellees.

A ppeal from the D istrict Court of the U nited States 
for the E astern D istrict of M ichigan, Southern D ivision

BRIEF FOR APPELLEES

W illis M. Graves,
62 Mack Avenue,

Detroit, Michigan;
F rancis M. Dent,

4256 Russell,
Detroit 7, Michigan;

T hurgood M arshall,
Constance Baker M otley,

107 West 43rd Street,
New York 36, New York,

Counsel for Appellees.

Supreme Printing Co., Inc , 114 W orth Street, N. Y. 13, BEekman 3 - 2320 
< ^ 3*49





I. Do the policy and practices of the Detroit Housing 
Commission in leasing units in public housing violate 
rights secured to the plaintiffs and members of their class 
by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States and Title 42, United States Code, Section 
1982 (formerly Title 8, United States Code, Section 42) ?

District court answered Yes.
Appellees contend answer should be Yes.

II. Does the final judgment and permanent injunction 
order of the district court require defendants to integrate 
forthwith every public housing unit?

District court did not answer this question directly 
because not raised by appellants below, but the 
record shows that district court’s answer would 
he No.

Appellees contend answer should be No.

III. Is the action of the United States Supreme Court 
in the School Segregation Cases applicable to the instant 
case?

District court answered No.
Appellees contend answer should be No.

Counter Statement of Questions Involved





I ll

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Statement of Questions Involved ..................................  1
Statement of F a c ts ............................................................  1
Argument ............................................................................ 2

I. Do the policy and practices of the Detroit Hous­
ing Commission in leasing units in public hous­
ing violate rights secured to the plaintiffs and 
members of their class by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States and Title 42, United States Code, Sec­
tion 1982, (formerly Title 8, United States 
Code, Section 42) .................................................

II. Does the final judgment and permanent injunc­
tion order of the district court require defend­
ants to integrate forthwith every public hous­
ing unit ..................................................................  8

III. Is the action of the United States Supreme 
Court in the School Segregation Cases ap­
plicable to the instant ca s e ................................... 11

Conclusion..............................................................................  18

Table of Cases

Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249 (1953 ).....................  3
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60 (1917 )...................... 3, 6
City of Birmingham v. Monk, 185 2d 859 (1951) cert.

den., 341 U. S. 940 (1951) ............................................. 3
City of Richmond v. Deans, 281 U. S. 704 (1930) . . . .  3

Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U. S. 668 (1927 )..........................  3
Jones v. City of Hamtramck, 121 F. Supp. 123 (1954) .. 3



IV

PAGE

San Francisco Housing Authority v. Banks, San Fran­
cisco Superior Court No. 420534 (Oct. 1, 1942), 120
A. C. A. 1 (1953), 41 A. C. Minutes 2 (1953) cert, 
den.------U. S .------- 98 L. ed .------- (1954 )...................  4

Seawell v. McWhithey, 2 N. J. Super. 255, 63 Atl. 2d 
542 (1949) rev. on other grds. 2 N. J. 563, 67 Atl. 2d 
309 (1949) ...................................................................... 4

Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948)...........................  3, 7
Taylor v. Leonard, No. C1836-52 Superior Court of 

N. J., Union County, Chancery Division (1954) .. 4
Vann v. Toledo Metropolitan Housing Authority, 113 

F. Supp. 210 (1953) ......................................................  3, 6
Woodbridge v. Housing Authority of Evansville No.

618 U. S. D. C., S. D. Ind. (Findings of Fact and Con­
clusions of Law filed July 6, 1953) .........................  3

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886) .................  6

Statutes Involved

Title 42, United States Code, Section 1982 (formerly 
Title 8, United States Code, Section 42) ..............2, 3, 4, 7

“ All citizens of the United States shall have the 
same right, in every State and Territory, as is en­
joyed by White citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, 
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal prop­
erty”  (R. S. § 1978).



IN THE

Hnttefc States ©curt nf Appeals
For the Sixth Circuit

No. 12,305

T he Detroit H ousing Commission, a duly authorized 
Department of the City of Detroit, F inlay C. A llen, 
President, Mary M. S treit, Vice-President, W alter J. 
Gessell, George A . I sabel and James H. Quello, Mem­
bers; and H arry J. D urbin, Director-Secretary of the 
Detroit Housing Commission,

Defendants and Appellants,

vs.

W alter A rthur L ewis, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellees.

A ppeal prom the D istrict Court of the U nited States 
for the E astern D istrict of M ichigan, S outhern D ivision

BRIEF FOR APPELLEES

Counter Statement of Facts

The facts on which the appellees rely are those stipu­
lated and agreed to by the parties in this cause and appear­
ing on pages 52a to 59a of Appendix to Appellants’ Brief.



2

ARGUM ENT

I. Do the policy and practices of the Detroit Hous­
ing Commission in leasing units in public housing 
violate rights secured to the plaintiffs and members 
of their class by the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States and Title 42, United 
States Code, § 1982.1

District Court answered Yes.
Appellees contend answer should be Yes.

A. Facts stipulated and agreed to by the parties which 
support lower court’s conclusion that “ the regulation, 
policy, custom, usage, conduct and practice of the defend­
ants in refusing to lease to plaintiffs, and other eligible 
Negro applicants similarly situated, certain units of public 
housing under their administration, control and manage­
ment, in accordance with a strict policy of racial segrega­
tion, is a violation of the Constitution and laws of the 
United States particularly the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States and Title 8, Sections 
41 and 42 of the United States Code”  (A. 95a) are as fol­
lows :

“ 29. The defendants presently maintain and 
enforce a policy in public housing which operates 
as follows:

(1) Certain projects were designated prior to 
their erection for white occupancy or for Negro 
occupancy.

(2) No eligible Negro family is admitted to a 
vacancy in a project presently limited to white occu­
pancy and no white family is admitted to a vacancy 
in a project presently limited to Negro occupancy”  
(A. 57a).

1 Formerly Title 8, United States Code, Section 42.



3

List of authorities supporting lower court’s preceding 
conclusion:

Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60 (1917);
Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U. S. 668 (1927);
City of Richmond v. Deans, 281 U. S. 704 (1930);
City of Birmingham v. Monk, 185 F. 2d 859 (1951) 

cert. den. 341 U. S. 940 (1951).

In the preceding cases the legislative arm of the state 
was prohibited from imposing racial restrictions on the 
right to occupy real property—the holding in these cases 
being that such restrictions violated rights secured by the 
due process and equal protection clauses of the 14th Amend­
ment to the Federal Constitution and Title 8, United States 
Code, Section 42 (Title 42, United States Code, Sectiorf 
1982).

Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948);
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249 (1953).

In the preceding cases the judicial arm of the state was 
prohibited from giving effect to privately imposed racial 
restrictions on the right to occupy real property—the hold­
ing being that judicial intervention in such cases was barred 
by the prohibitions of the 14th Amendment to the Federal 
Constitution and Title 8, United States Code, Section 42 
(Title 42, United States Code, Section 1982).

Vann v. Toledo Metropolitan Housing Authority, 
113 F. Supp. 310 (1953);

Woodbridge v. Housing Authority of Evansville, 
No. 618 U. S. D. C. S. D. Ind. (Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law filed July 6, 1953);

Jones v. City of Hamtramck, 121 F. Supp. 123 
(1954).



4

San Francisco Housing Authority v. Banks, San 
Francisco Superior Court No. 420534 (Oct. 1, 
1952), 120 A. C. A. 1 (1953), 41 A. C. Minutes 2
(1953) cert. den.------ U. S . --------98 L. e d .-------
(1954) ;

Seawell v. McWhitley, 2 N. J. Super. 255, 63 Atl. 
2d 542 (1949) rev. on other grds. 2 N. J. 563, 67 
Atl. 2d 309 (1949);

Taylor v. Leonard, No. cl836-52 Superior Court 
of N. J., Union County, Chancery Division 
(1954).

In the preceding cases the administrative arm of the 
state, i.e. local public housing authorities, was enjoined 
from imposing racial restrictions on the right to occupy 
certain public housing units—the holding being that such 
restrictions, resulting from the enforcement of a policy of 
racial segregation in public housing, violated rights secured 
plaintiffs by the due process and equal protection clauses 
of the 14th Amendment and Title 8, United States Code, 
Section 42 (Title 42, United States Code, Section 1982).

B. Facts stipulated and agreed to by the parties which 
support the lower court’s conclusion that “ the resolution 
of the Detroit Housing Commission adopted September 26, 
1952, has not in fact ended the discrimination against the 
plaintiffs and the members of their class, and that such dis­
crimination on the basis of race and color in housing facili­
ties under the auspices of public funds, local or federal, is 
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu­
tion of the United States cmd Title 8, Sections 41 and 42 of 
the United States Code’ ’ (A. 952) are as follows:

“ 24. As of May 31, 1950, just before the orig­
inal complaint in this action was filed, the eligible 
pool of certified applicants for public housing was:

White families 1,838
Negro families 4,942



5

“ As of April 1954 or as of the present, the eligible 
pool of certified applicants for public housing is :

White families 383
Negro families 7,709”  (A. 56a)

“ 25. Since the original complaint in this action 
was filed vacancies have occurred in public housing 
projects limited to white occupancy and vacancies 
have occurred in public housing projects limited to 
Negro occupancy as follows:

White projects 4,417
Negro projects 865”  (A. 56a)

“ 26. Based on the last official report, April-May 
1954, of the Detroit Housing Commission, there are 
the following vacancies:

White propects 51
Negro projects 3 ”  (A. 56a)

“ 29. The defendants presently maintain and en­
force a policy in public housing projects which oper­
ates as follows:

# * #
(3) The application blanks which must be filled 

out by prospective tenants request information con­
cerning the applicant’s race and request the appli­
cant to indicate whether he or she desires to live 
either in the ‘ east’ or ‘west’.

(4) Separate lists of eligible Negro and white 
families are maintained”  (A. 57a)

“ 34. White families with a lesser preferential 
status than some of the plaintiffs, and some of the 
members of the class on behalf of which plaintiffs 
sue, have been admitted to public housing units to 
which, but for race, some of the plaintiffs and some 
of the members of their class would have been ad­
mitted”  (A. 59a)



6

List of authorities supporting lower court’s preceding 
conclusion:

Vann v. Toledo Metropolitan Housing Authority, 
supra;

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886).

In the latter case the city ordinance, as is the resolution 
of September 26, 1952, was fair on its face, but it was ad­
ministered in such a way as to discriminate against Chinese. 
In the instant case, the stipulated facts cited above show 
that the resolution is administered by the Detroit Housing 
Commission and the other defendants in such a way as to 
discriminate against qualified Negro applicants.

C. Facts stipulated and agreed to by the parties which 
support the conclusion of the lower court that “ in public 
housing the doctrine of ‘ separate but equal’ has no place, 
separate housing facilities are inherently unequal. There­
fore, this .court holds that the plaintiffs and others similarly 
situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by 
reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the 
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment”  are the same as those cited above in support 
of the lower court’s second conclusion set out under sub­
division B above.

List of authorities in support of lower court’s preced­
ing conclusion:

Buchanan v. Warley, supra.

In the Buchanan case the United States Supreme Court 
said at page 81:

“ As we have seen, this court has held laws valid 
which separated the races on the basis of equal 
accommodations in public conveyances, and courts of 
high authority have held enactments lawful which



7

provide for separation in the public schools of white 
and colored pupils where equal privileges are given. 
But, in view of the rights secured by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Federal Constitution, such legis­
lation must have its limitations, and cannot be sus­
tained where the exercise of authority exceeds the 
restraints of the Constitution.”

Shelley v. Kraemer, supra.

In the Shelley case the United States Supreme Court 
said at page 22:

“ The rights created by the first section of the 
Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaran­
teed to the individual. The rights established are 
personal rights. It is, therefore, no answer to these 
petitioners to say that the courts may also be induced 
to deny white persons rights of ownership and occu­
pancy on grounds of race or color. Equal protection 
of the laws is not achieved through indiscriminate 
imposition of inequalities.”

The conclusions of the lower court, that the policy and 
practices of the Detroit Housing Commission and the other 
defendants violate rights secured to the plaintiffs and the 
members of their class by the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the Federal Constitution and Title 8 U. S. C. Section 42, 
being supported by the facts in this case and by the authori­
ties, such be affirmed by this court.



8

II. Does the final judgment and permanent injunc­
tion order of the district court require defendants to 
integrate forthwith every public housing unit.

District Court did not answer this question directly 
because not raised by appellants below, but 
record shows district court’s answer would be 
No.

Appellees contend answer should be No.

A. Terms of the Order

The injunction order provides as follows:
#  #  *

“ Now, therefore, it is ordered that the defend­
ants and each of them, their agents, employees, rep­
resentatives and successors be, and they hereby are, 
forever enjoined from:

1. Denying the plaintiffs, and members of the 
class which the plaintiffs represent, the right to lease 
any unit in any public housing project solely because 
of the race and color of the plaintiffs and members 
of the class which plaintiffs represent.

2. Maintaining separate lists of eligible Negro 
and white applicants for public housing.

3. Maintaining racially segregated public hous­
ing projects.”

* # =*

There is no provision of this final judgment and per­
manent injunction order which requires defendants to in­
tegrate every public housing unit forthwith. In other 
words, the order, by its own terms, does not provide for the 
integrating of every unit of public housing forthwith. The 
defendants have, therefore, appealed to this court urging 
as a ground for such appeal a provision of the final judg­
ment order which does not in fact exist.



9

Defendants in their brief do not urge a reversal of the 
decision of the court below on the ground that its ultimate 
conclusion of law that segregation in public housing is un­
constitutional is erroneous. The defendants in this appeal 
claim that since their present policy and practice with 
respect to assignment of eligible families to low rent pub­
lic housing units is in accordance with the constitutional 
mandate, the lower court should have allowed defendants 
time within which to integrate or should have awaited the 
decision of the United States Supreme Court in the School 
Segregation Cases presently pending before it.

I f the order by its terms had provided that the defend­
ants integrate forthwith every unit of public housing, it 
may be that defendants would need time within which to 
devise orderly procedures to meet the terms of such an 
order. But since, by the terms of the order, there is no 
provision for the immediate integration of every public 
housing unit, then clearly the need for time within which 
to devise orderly procedures to effect immediate integra­
tion does not exist.

B. The Effect of the Order

The effect of the district court’s order is not to compel 
defendants to integrate forthwith every public housing 
unit.

The effect of the first provision of the order is to enjoin 
defendants from denying the plaintiffs and members of 
their class the right to lease any unit in any public housing 
project solely because of the race and color of the plaintiffs 
and their class. The effect of this is simply to make avail­
able to the next eligible applicant on the list the next avail­
able unit in any of the public housing projects in the City 
of Detroit. It does not require the defendants to move any 
white families from their present units. It does not require, 
defendants to move any Negro families from their present



10

units in order to effect integration. It simply requires that 
if the plaintiffs, and members of their class, are otherwise 
eligible that vacancies in white projects not be denied them 
solely because they are Negroes.

The second provision of the order enjoins the defend­
ants from maintaining separate lists of eligible Negro and 
white applicants for public housing. This provision of the 
order does not have the effect of requiring the defendants 
to move white families from units in which they presently 
reside, neither does it require defendants to move Negro 
families from units in which they presently reside. It 
simply requires defendants to maintain one list and that is 
a list of applicants eligible for public housing, rather than 
two lists—one of eligible white applicants and one of eli­
gible Negro applicants.

The maintenance of separate lists is obviously the 
method by which racial discrimination is effected with 
respect to the selection of applicants for the next available 
unit in a racially restricted public housing project.

The effect of the third provision of the order is to 
enjoin defendants from continuing to restrict certain 
projects as public housing projects available for occupancy 
by eligible white families only or available for occupancy 
by eligible Negro families only. The effect of this provi­
sion is not to require the defendants to move white families 
presently residing in public housing units or to move Negro 
families presently residing in public housing units. The 
effect of this provision is simply to make available to 
eligible Negro families vacancies which occur in projects 
presently limited to white occupancy and to make available 
to eligible white families vacancies which may occur in 
projects presently limited to Negro occupancy.

The Fourteenth Amendment does not permit the de­
fendants to operate some of their public housing projects



11

on a racially integrated basis and some of their public- 
housing projects on a racially segregated basis. The Four­
teenth Amendment does not permit the defendants to make 
available to the plaintiffs and members of their class units 
in public housing built in the future, but deny to plaintiffs 
and members of their class vacancies which occur in public 
housing projects built in the past.

There were, as of the time of entry of the final judg­
ment and permanent injunction order, 51 vacancies in 
white projects and 3 vacancies in Negro projects. The 51 
vacancies existing in projects limited to white occupancy 
were denied plaintiffs and members of their class solely 
because of race and color. The effect of the third provision 
of the injunction order is to make these 51 vacancies in 
white projects available to plaintiffs and members of their 
class.

III. Is the action of the United States Supreme 
Court in the School Segregation Cases applicable to the 
instant case.

District Court answered No.
Appellees contend answer should be No.

The defendants in their brief, page 11, urged that this 
court modify the final judgment and permanent injunction 
order of the district court so that it be determined that 
the policy and practices of the defendants are not in viola­
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that defendants 
have such additional time within which to complete integra­
tion as appears necessary, with due regard for the public 
safety and welfare. In support of this latter request on 
the part of defendants, defendants urge upon this court 
that the United States Supreme Court in the School Segre­
gation Cases presently pending before it has not yet issued 
final decrees determining how its ruling, that school segre­
gation is unconstitutional, shall be enforced.



12

A. Reasons for Postponement of Decrees in 
School Cases

The United States Supreme Court postponed final 
orders in the School Segregation Cases for the following 
reasons:

(1) Its decision in those cases is of wide applicability, 
i.e., its decision affects mandatory segregation statutes in 
17 southern states and the District of Columbia.

(2) There are a great variety of local conditions in 
those 17 southern states and the District of Columbia which 
must be taken into consideration in formulating decrees.

(3) Formulation of decrees in those cases presents 
“ problems of considerable complexity.”

(4) Upon the reargument of those cases in December 
1953 “  * * * the consideration of appropriate relief was 
necessarily subordinate to the primary question—the con­
stitutionality of segregation in public education.”  The 
court, therefore, did not get the assistance of counsel in 
those cases with respect to formulating its decrees.

For the foregoing reasons, the United States Supreme 
Court postponed the formulation of final decrees in the 
School Segregation Cases.

B. Reasons for Postponement Non-Existent Here

In the instant case, the district court was not faced with 
a decision of wide applicability. There is no state, includ­
ing Michigan, as far as counsel for the appellees have been 
able to determine, in which there are compulsory segrega­
tion laws with respect to public housing. The district court 
was not faced with the problem of declaring a statute of 
statewide applicability in Michigan, and in many other 
states, unconstitutional. It was dealing with the admin­
istrative policy and practices of a single administrative 
agency which affect a single community.



13

C. Simplicity of the Instant Case Drawn by Analogy

Because the decision was not of wide applicability and 
need not comprehend a great variety of local conditions, 
the formulation of a decree in the instant case by the dis­
trict court did not present problems of considerable com­
plexity. As the district court saw it—the problem of the 
instant case was analogous to the problem of colored people 
and white people going up to a ticket window to buy a 
ticket for a train—the train having only so many seats. 
The defendants say, in effect, to the colored people: You 
stand in the background until all tbe seats available on 
that particular train have been sold to white people (A. 
78a). Or, in other words, as the lower court said (A. 79a) 
with respect to a municipal activity which actually exists 
in the City of Detroit: I f they, meaning the defendants or 
the City of Detroit, have two lines lining up for buses on 
the street corner, the effect of the segregation policy is to 
say—let the people standing in the white line get on the 
bus first. The bus becomes filled with white people and 
then drives away leaving the colored people standing there.

The stipulation of facts shows that since this suit was 
filed in June 1950, 4,417 vacancies occurred in white proj­
ects and only 865 occurred in Negro projects. This means 
that white low income families eligible for public housing 
had approximately 3,600 more opportunities to get housing 
than the Negro families. As a result of this the number of 
Negro families eligible for public housing increased from 
4,942 in May 1950 to 7,709 in April 1954. Whereas, the 
number of white families decreased from 1,838 in May 
1950 to 383 in April 1954. From these facts and by refer­
ence to the preceding analogies, the court concluded that 
the Negroes were simply treated unequally “ because they 
are not given their regular turn in getting into these proj­
ects”  (A. 79a).

Therefore, the problem before the district court was 
not a complex one at all. As the district court saw it the



14

problem before it could be resolved by simply giving the 
Negro applicants their regular turn in getting into these 
projects. The court’s conclusion was:

“ The Court: I think that they are entitled to 
have their applications processed and either ap­
proved or disapproved strictly in the order of their 
application”  (A. 81a).

It is, therefore, clear that the district court had no inten­
tion of requiring the defendants to integrate forthwith 
every public housing unit, which as defendants suggest 
would require moving white and Negro families around to 
create some sought of checkerboard pattern. The district 
court simply said: Treat Negroes the same as whites are 
treated and when the Negro’s turn comes give to the Negro 
applicant the next available unit, if he is the next in line 
(A. 81a).

The situation in the instant case is, therefore, unlike 
the complex problem of school desegregation in the cases 
presently pending before the United States Supreme Court.

D. Time Already Allowed

The district court took into consideration the fact that 
there might be some resistence in the City of Detroit on 
the part of some of the people to the admission of Negroes 
to previously all white projects. In view of this, the dis­
trict court permitted four years to elapse between the filing 
of the suit and the entry of its final order. The court said, 
at page 65 of the Appendix to Appellants’ Brief:

“ Now, with reference to the long period of time this 
case has been pending, I appreciate some of the things 
that Mr. Ingalls mentioned. I never anticipated it 
to be such a serious problem in Detroit. I am in­
clined to think that counsel for the defendants are 
under-estimating the progress that we have made in



15

Detroit in good race relationship in recent years. 
Now, going along a little bit further with the matter, 
shortly after one of the preliminary hearings in this 
matter, the defendants rescinded the resolution that 
I have referred to heretofore; shortly thereafter 
they opened a bi-racial occupancy in one of the newer 
developments. Just viewing it from the highway, 
as I do every day, it looks like a pretty good develop­
ment. No trouble (12) has come out of that.

In private housing, colored people have been per­
mitted to move into territories that, as our general 
residential standards go in this community, are rela­
tively high, and no difficulties have arisen there.

I appreciate that adopting the Declaration of In­
dependence did not immediately erase all of the preju­
dice and bigotry that seems to be one of the crosses 
that the American people have to bear.

I agree that we should proceed cautiously. I had 
hoped from the beginning that my home city would 
eliminate segregation, not because some court 
ordered the officials to do so, but because they wanted 
to do it because it was the right thing to do. And, of 
course, I know that all of us would have been happy 
if they had accomplished this result without com­
pulsion by the Federal Government.

I think, however, there comes a time when patience 
ceases to be a virtue. I think that we have reached 
that place right now, so we are going ahead with this 
case.”

The district court, therefore, considered the necessity 
for time in which to bring about a change in the racial poli­
cies of the defendants and in fact allowed them 4 years in 
which to do so. As the district court pointed out and as 
counsel for defendants agreed, the district court had made 
it clear from the very first day in which counsel for plain­



16

tiffs and .defendants appeared in the district court, that 
the district court was of the opinion that the law was with 
the plaintiffs and against the defendants. The record shows 
(A. 82a) the following discussion between the lower court 
and counsel for defendants:

“ The Court: I can understand Mr. Ingall’s posi­
tion. I guess I told you where I stood in this case 
about four years ago.

“ Mr. Ingalls: I beg your pardon?
‘ ‘ The Court: I think you found out where I stood 

in this case about four years ago.
“ Mr. Ingalls: I found that out the first day we 

were in here, your honor.
“ The Court: So that did not come as a shock 

today.
Mr. Ingalls: No.”

In Buchanan v. Warley, supra, justification for the city 
ordinance requiring residential racial segregation was 
sought on several grounds. One ground was that the state 
had the power to pass such an ordinance in the exercise of 
the police power “ to promote the public peace by prevent­
ing racial conflict” .

In response to this argument the Court said, at pages 
74-75:

“ The authority of the state to pass laws in the 
exercise of the police power, having for their object 
the promotion of the public health, safety, and wel­
fare, is very broad, as has been affirmed in numerous 
and recent decisions of this court. * * * But it is 
equally well established that the police power, broad 
as it is, cannot justify the passage of a law or ordi­
nance which runs counter to the limitations of the 
Federal Constitution; * * *



17

“ True it is that dominion over property spring­
ing from ownership is not absolute and unqualified. 
The disposition and use of property may be con­
trolled, in the exercise of the public health, con­
venience, or welfare. * * * Many illustrations might 
be given from the decisions of this court and other 
courts, of this principle, but these cases do not touch 
the one at bar.

‘ ‘ The concrete question here is : May the occu­
pancy, and, necessarily, the purchase and sale of 
property of which occupancy is an incident, be in­
hibited by the states, or by one of its municipalities, 
solely because of the color of the proposed occupant 
of the premises'?”

♦ *  #

“ That there exists a serious difficult problem 
arising from a feeling of race hostility which the law 
is powerless to control, and to which it must give a 
measure of 'consideration, may be freely admitted. 
But the solution cannot be promoted by depriving 
citizens of their constitutional rights”  (at pp. 80-81).

The district court continually urged counsel for the de­
fendants to voluntarily change the racial segregation policy 
and gave them 4 years in which to do so. When it became 
clear to the district court that the defendants were not pro­
ceeding in good faith, it was then, and only then, that the 
district court issued its injunction.



18

CONCLUSON

It is respectfully submitted by counsel for appellees 
that the district court’s final judgment and permanent 
injunction order be affirmed.

W illis M. Graves,
62 Mack Avenue,

Detroit, Michigan;

F rancis M. Dent,
4256 Bussell,

Detroit 7, Michigan;

T hurgood M arshall,
Constance Baker M otley,

107 West 43rd Street,
New York 36, New York,

Counsel for Appellees.









S .< •



No. 12,305

IN THE

United States Court ol Appeals
tor the Sixth Circuit

— ♦ — -

THE DETROIT HOUSING COMMISSION, a duly author­
ized Department of the City of Detroit, FINLAY C. ALLEN, 
President, MARY M. STREIT, Vice-President, W ALTER J. 
GESSEL, GEORGE A. ISABEL and JAMES H. QUELLO, 

Members; and HARRY J. DURBIN, Director-Secretary 
of the Detroit Housing Commission,

Defendants and Appellants, 
vs.

W ALTER ARTHUR LEWIS, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellees

------ ♦------

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN, 

SOUTHERN DIVISION

------ ♦------

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND 
APPELLANT

------ ♦------

PAUL T. DW YER,
Corporation Counsel,

VANCE G. INGALLS,
Assistant Corporation Counsel, 

HELEN W . MILLER,
Assistant Corporation Counsel,

Attorneys for Defendants and 
Appellants,

301 City Hall,
Detroit 26, Michigan.

Interstate Brief 6  Record C o., 642 Beaubien St., Detroit 26, Michigan





STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS INVOLVED

1. Do tlie policy and practices of the Detroit Housing 
Commission in alloting units in Public Housing violate the 
14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States 
and the laws thereof?

Lower Court answers: “ Yes.”
Appellant contends the question should be an­

swered: “ No.”

2. Should the Detroit Housing Commission and its di­
rector-secretary be required to integrate forthwith every 
public housing unit?

Lower Court answers: “ Yes.”
Appellant contends the question should be an­

swered: “ No.”





SUBJECT INDEX OF BRIEF

Page
Statement of Questions Involved.................................  i
Statement of Facts.................................................: .  1-6
Argument ........................................................................  7-11

1. Do the policy and practices of the Detroit 
Housing Commission in allotting units in pub­
lic housing violate the 14th Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States and the
laws thereof? ....................... , ........................... 7-8

2. Should the Detroit Housing Commission and
its Director-Secretary be required to inte­
grate forthwith every public housing un it?.. 9-11

R e lie f............................................................................ ... 12

Supplement “ A ” — Federal Statute: Title 42 U. S.
C. A ............................................................................  13-20

Supplement “ B ” — State Statute................................  20-22
Supplement “ C ” — City of Detroit Ordinance.......... 22-25
Supplement “ D ” —Rules Governing Administration 

of Housing Projects of Detroit Housing Com­
mission ..................................................................... 25-57

Supplement “ E ” —List of “ School Segregation
Cases”  so-called .....................................................  58

CASES REFERRED TO IN BRIEF:

Lonesome v. Maxwell, U. S. Dist. Ct. Md...................  8

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537.................................. 8

Ill



IV

TABLE OF CONTENTS OF APPENDIX

Page
Amended Answer to Amended Complaint............ 23a-30a
Amended Complaint ...............................................  7a-17a
Answer to Amended Complaint.............................  17a-22a
Answer to Complaint of Intervenor-Plaintiffs.. .  45a-50a
Answer to Plaintiffs’ Reply...................................  36a-37a
Appearances ............................................................. 60a
Bond for Costs on Appeal.........................................102a-104a
Docket Entries ......................................................... la-7a
Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction........  91a-92a
Intervenors’ Complaint...........................................  38a-4oa
Notice of Appeal.......................................................  93a
Order Dismissing Amended Complaint as to All 

Defendants Except Detroit Housing Com­
mission, et al......................................................  51a

Order Granting Motion to Intervene as Plaintiffs 37a-38a
Order Staying Proceedings and Suspending In­

junction ...............................................................101a-102a
Petition for Stay of Proceedings or Suspension

of Injunction During Pendency of A ppeal... 94a-101a
Reply to Amended Answer.....................................  31a-36a
Stipulation of Facts.................................................  52a-59a
Transcript of Proceedings.....................................  60a-90a

Preliminary Statement and Motion on Be­
half of City of Detroit.................................  60a-63a

Ruling on Motion and Statement by the Court 63a-66a



V

Page
Statement on Behalf of Plaintiffs.................. 66a-67a
Motion for the Defendants.............................  67a-69a
Statement of the Court and Discussion of 

Stipulation..................................................... 69a-76a
Further Statement on Behalf of Plaintiffs.. 77a-78a
Colloquy between Court and Counsel............ 78a-88a
Statement by the Court...................................  88a-90a
Certificate of Court Reporter.........................  90a





IN THE

United States Court of Appeals 
tor the Sixth Circuit

— ♦ — .

No. 12,305
------ ♦------

THE DETROIT HOUSING COMMISSION, a duly author­
ized Department of the City of Detroit, FINLAY C. ALLEN, 
President, MARY M. STREIT, Vice-President, W ALTER J. 
GESSEL, GEORGE A. ISABEL and JAMES H. QUELLO, 

Members; and HARRY J. DURBIN, Director-Secretary 
of the Detroit Housing Commission,

Defendants and Appellants, 
vs.

WALTER ARTHUR LEWIS, et al„
Plaintiffs and Appellees

------ ♦------

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN, 

SOUTHERN DIVISION

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND 
APPELLANT

------ ♦------

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The City of Detroit owns several units of public housing, 
and operates same through its Detroit Housing Commis­
sion and the Director-Secretary of that Commission, the



2

defendants and appellants in this litigation. The Housing 
Commission was established as a department of city gov­
ernment under an ordinance adopted by the legislative body 
of the City of Detroit in the year 1934, under authority 
found in Act 18 of the Public Acts of Michigan, Extra 
Session 1933, being Sec. 125.651 et seq., C. L. Mich. 1948. 
This act authorized the construction and operation of 
housing projects for persons of low income, and the elimi­
nation of housing conditions which were detrimental to 
the public peace, health, safety, morals, and/or welfare. 
Under other acts, the Detroit Housing Commission was 
authorized to construct and operate war housing and hous­
ing for veterans (Appendix page 54a).

In pursuance of said authority, the City of Detroit con­
structed its present housing units, and was assisted in the 
financing by Federal funds, and is guided in part in its 
operations by contracts with and regulations of the United 
States Government. Pertinent portions of the Federal 
housing act, the state legislation and the City of Detroit 
housing commission ordinance are attached hereto as Sup­
plements A, B and C respectively.

Since the entrance of the final judgment in this case, war 
housing and housing for veterans have been de-program- 
med; and the only projects now accepting applications are 
those known as “ permanent”  housing projects. These may 
be listed by name as follows:

Brewster Homes; Sojourner Truth; Herman Gardens; 
Charles Terrace; Frederick Douglas Homes; Ed­
ward J. Jeffries Homes; Parkside; John W. Smith. 
The Douglas and Jeffries projects have units still 
under construction, and in addition there is pro­
grammed project Mich. 1-11, for which a site is now 
under condemnation (Appendix page 55a). So­



3

journer Truth, formerly war housing, is now classi­
fied permanent.

The Detroit Housing Commission sets up rules and regu­
lations governing public housing and the occupancy thereof, 
and in so doing is guided largely by the authority found 
in the State law and the Federal requirements appearing 
in the contracts described above, and in the rules and regu­
lations set up by the Federal government. A  copy of the 
rules of the housing commission is appended to this brief 
as Supplement No. D.

In prescribing qualifications for applicants, the Detroit 
Housing Commission adopted a resolution on April 29, 
1943, which provided for the maintenance of the racial 
characteristic within a housing project similar to that of 
the residential neighborhood surrounding the housing pro­
ject. This resolution read as follows:

“ The Detroit Housing Commission will in no 
way change the racial characteristics of any neigh­
borhood in Detroit through occupancy standards 
of housing projects under their jurisdiction.”  (Ap­
pendix page 57a.)

In accordance with this policy, the Housing Director-Secre­
tary and his staff set up separate lists of applicants based 
on race, namely negro and white, and designated each 
project as it came into the planning stage as negro or 
white. This persisted until September 26, 1952, when the 
foregoing resolution of the Detroit Housing Commission 
was rescinded, and in its place the following resolution 
was adopted:

“ In the selection and removal of tenants of hous­
ing projects, the Commission will be guided by the 
best interests of all the people of the City for the 
purpose of protecting their rights and interests



4

and the promotion of harmony amongst them, all 
in accordance with the Constitution and laws of 
the United States and of the State of Michigan.”  
(Appendix page 57a.)

Since September, 1952, two projects previously desig­
nated for white have been integrated, and two projects 
previously designated for negro occupancy have been re­
designed “ integrated.”  One of the former, namely the 
Jeffries Project, will, when completely built, have 2170 
units, and has been admitting families without regard to 
race or color; and as further units within that project 
are completed, the same pattern of integration will be 
used. The Fisher Project housing 500 families, previously 
occupied totally by white, has also been integrated and 
families of both the colored and white races have been ad­
mitted. This, however, is a veterans’ project and is in 
the process of being de-programmed. Of the two negro 
projects, now redesignated “ integrated,”  Douglas Homes 
is not completed but will have a total occupancy of 1006 
units, while Ml-11 is planned for a total of 3874 family 
units. The balance of the above set forth housing projects 
are still designated white and negro, with 3934 for white 
occupancy and 1143 for negro (Appendix page 58a).

This suit was instituted June 5, 1950, hv complaint filed 
in the District Court, wherein it is alleged by the plaintiffs 
that they were applicants for admission to public housing 
in the City of Detroit; that they were of the negro race 
and had not been admitted to housing solely because of 
their race; and that white families with less qualifications 
than the negro applicants had been admitted to said hous­
ing. Plaintiffs brought suit as a class action. Relief in 
the form of a declaratory judgment, an injunction and 
money damages was asked. Just prior to the hearing on 
June 22, 1954, additional persons were permitted to inter­



5

vene as plaintiffs on the ground, among others, that the 
original plaintiffs had been admitted to public housing or 
were no longer eligible for public housing (Appendix pages 
la, 6a, 7a).

The answers of the defendants denied any discrimina­
tion based solely on race, and denied that plaintiffs had 
sustained any deprivation of a constitutional right or any 
civil right granted by Federal law. Various amendments 
to the pleadings were made from time to time, but the basic 
claims and issues were not changed thereby (Appendix 
pages 17a, 23a).

The Common Council of the City of Detroit—being the 
the City’s Legislative Body— and the Mayor of the City 
were original parties defendant; however, by order of the 
court issued July 22, 1954, the case was dismissed without 
prejudice as to these defendants. Earlier, too, the Public 
Housing Administration of the Housing and Home Finance 
Agency of tire United States of America, Raymond M. 
Foley, Administrator of said agency; John T. Egan, Com­
missioner of the Public Housing Administration; and Hugo 
Schwartz, Director of Detroit Field Office of the Public 
Housing Administration, had been parties defendant. 
These, too, were dismissed as defendants by order of the 
District Court primarily under a claim of lack of proper 
jurisdiction ^Appendix pages 7a, 2a).

Trial of this matter took place on June 22, 1954. At the 
opening of same, counsel for the defendants moved for a 
continuance of the hearing pending a decision by the Su­
preme Court of the United States in the school segregation 
cases (list attached hereto as Supplement E), and urged 
that the District Court, prior to the formulating of its 
final judgment or decree, await a pattern to be set by the 
Supreme Court. This motion for continuance was denied



6

(Appendix pages 60a-65a). The Court then, based on a 
written stipulation of facts, stated its opinions and deter­
minations upon the record (Appendix pages 69a-90a), and 
on the same day entered its “ Final Judgment and Per­
manent Injunction” .

It found that the “ regulation, policy, custom, usage, con­
duct, and practice”  of the Detroit Housing Commission 
and its Director-Secretary in refusing to lease to plaintiffs 
and other applicants similarly situated was a violation of 
the Constitution and laws of the United States; further, 
that the resolution of the Housing Commission, adopted 
September 26, 1952, did not end discrimination. It en­
joined the defendants from denying plaintiffs and members 
of their class the right to lease any unit in public housing 
solely because of race and color; enjoined the maintenance 
of separate lists of eligible negro and white applicants to 
public housing; and further enjoined defendants from 
“ maintaining racially segregated public housing projects”  
(Appendix page 91a).

Defendants appealed to this Court, charging the follow­
ing errors in the District Court’s opinion, Final Judgment 
and Permanent Injunction; namely, the finding that the 
present policy and practices of the Detroit Housing Com­
mission violate the 14th Amendment, and the refusal of 
the Court to withhold the formulation of its final decree 
and injunction until the Supreme Court of the United 
States has entered its decree in the school segregation 
cases, and the further refusal of the District Court to grant 
defendants and appellants the time necessary to effect 
a reasonable and practical adjustment. Pending a hearing 
on appeal, the decree and injunction have been stayed by 
order of this court.



7

ARGUMENT
1. DO THE POLICY AND PRACTICES OF THE DETROIT 

HOUSING COMMISSION IN ALLOTTING UNITS IN PUB­
LIC HOUSING VIOLATE THE 14TH AMENDMENT OF 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND 
THE LAWS THEREOF?

Lower Court answers: “Yes.”
Appellant contends the question should be 

answered: “No.”

The Detroit Housing Commission’s policy as to tenant 
placements is contained in its resolution set forth in the 
Statement of Facts, also the Appendix, page 57a. The 
policy so announced requires that the selection of tenants 
be “ guided by the best interests of all the people” ; it aims 
to protect the rights and interests of all by promoting 
“ harmony” —but to act at all times “ in accordance with 
the Constitution and laws of the United States and the 
State of Michigan. ”  The policy thus grants to the adminis­
trative staff of the Housing Commission complete freedom 
to integrate all housing, and makes the accomplishment of 
the objectives stated in the resolution subject to the judg­
ment and discretion of the operating staff.

How much progress has been made1? Following the reso­
lution, one veterans’ housing project of 500 units, pre­
viously for white only, was integrated. No further effort 
was made with the veterans’ or war housing because of 
their temporary nature, and the expected early deprogram­
ming (which has now taken place). Of the permanent 
projects, 7050 new units are now programmed as “ inte­
grated” —while there remains 4077 of the oldest units 
which are not integrated. We hope to report fully on ex­
pected progress in these latter units while this case is be­
fore this Court (Appendix pages 55a, 58a).



8

The defendants’ and appellants’ position is that the 
aforesaid policy and practie does not justify the District 
Court’s finding that defendants are unlawfully discriminat­
ing against the plaintiffs and the members of their class; 
does not justify a finding that the Detroit Housing Com­
mission subscribes to or practices the doctrine of “ separate 
but equal” ; and, more particularly, does not justify a 
finding that defendants are depriving plaintiffs or the 
members of their class of equal protection of the law. It 
is not denied that certain units in public housing continue 
to be segregated according to race; but this is the result of 
a practice instituted under an abandoned policy, and is 
based on the considered judgment of the city of Detroit 
and the staff of the Detroit Housing Commission as to when 
the changeover may take place without seriously disrupt­
ing the peace, welfare, and safety of the entire community.

The defendants and appellants do not urge a reversal of 
the finding of the District Court that “ separate but equal”  
has no place in public housing and constitutes a deprivation 
of constitutional rights, and this even though it is un­
doubtedly true that the United States Supreme Court in its 
segregation eases has not attempted to rule on the ques­
tion of segregation in facilities other than schools. (Lone­
some v. Maxwell, U. S. District Court, Maryland; decision 
rendered July 27, 1954.) These defendants and appellants 
have not, and do not here urge a continuation of the doc­
trine of Plessy v. Ferguson (163 U. S. 537; 16 S. Ct. 1138) 
in connection with public housing; nor will defendants 
and appellants operate their facilities under any such doc­
trine or practice. It is merely urged that the policy and 
practices of the Detroit Housing Commission in the premi­
ses should be recognized as a legitimate functioning of gov­
ernment with the welfare of all the people as its first and 
only consideration; and that the defendants and appellants 
be given, by this Court, sufficient time within which to 
complete orderly and peaceful integration.



9

2. SHOULD THE DETROIT HOUSING COMMISSION AND 
ITS DIRECTOR-SECRETARY BE REQUIRED TO INTE­
GRATE FORTHWITH EVERY PUBLIC HOUSING UNIT?

Lower Court answers: “Yes.”
Appellant contends the question should be 

answered: “No.”

Defendants and appellants here request that the issu­
ance of injunctive relief in this case await the arguments 
and decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in 
the school segregation cases, and that procedures looking 
to enforcement of the law to be therein announced be 
utilized here.

In the school cases, the Chief Justice of the United States 
Supreme Court, at the close of his opinion, said:

“ Because these are class actions, because of the 
wide applicability of this decision, and because of 
the great variety of local conditions, the formula­
tion of decrees in these cases presents problems 
of considerable complexity. On reargument, the 
consideration of appropriate relief was necessarily 
subordinated to the primary question—the con­
stitutionality of segregation in public education. 
We have now announced that such segregation is 
a denial of the equal protection of the laws. In 
order that we may have the full assistance of the 
parties in formulating decrees, the cases will be re­
stored to the docket, and the parties are requested 
to present further argument on Questions 4 and 5 
previously propounded by the Court for the re­
argument this Term. The Attorney General of the 
United States is again invited to participate. The 
Attorneys General of the states requiring or per­
mitting segregation in public education will also be 
permitted to appear as amici curiae upon request 
to do so by September 15, 1954, and submission of 
briefs by October 1, 1954.”



1 0

The questions propounded were:

“ 4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in 
public schools violates the Fourteenth Amend­
ment,

“ (a) would a decree necessarily follow provid­
ing that, within the limits set bv normal geo­
graphic school districting, Negro children should 
forthwith be admitted to schools of their choice, 
or

“ (b) may this Court, in the exercise of its 
equity powers, permit an effective gradual ad­
justment to be brought about from existing 
segregated systems to a system not based on color 
distinctions?
“ 5. On the assumption on which questions 4(a) 

and (b) are based, and assuming further that this 
Court will exercise its equity powers to the end de­
scribed in question 4(b),

“ (a) should this Court formulate detailed de­
crees in these cases;

“ (b) if so, what specific issues should the 
decrees reach;

“ (c) should this Court appoint a special 
master to hear evidence with a view to recom­
mending specific terms for such decrees;

“ (d) should this Court remand to the courts 
of first instance with directions to frame decrees 
in these cases, and if so, what general directions 
should the decrees of this Court include and 
what procedures should the courts of first in­
stance follow in arriving at the specific terms 
o f more detailed decrees?”

The problems in integrating public housing, such as the 
need to condition both the adult occupants of public hous­
ing and the home owners in areas surrounding a public



1 1

housing unit, are difficult and acute, and need as much, if 
not more, careful consideration than the mere readjust­
ment of schools where the integration of children alone is 
involved.

In this case, the District Court, without any argument 
or testimony as to the difficulties which might ensue and the 
need for a continued gradual adjustment, denied a motion 
of the defendants and appellants for a continuance to 
await the decision of the United States Supreme Court; and 
refused to be hound in any way by the pattern expected to 
be announced this fall by that Court relative to the decree 
and the terms of enforcement in the school cases. Defend­
ants and appellants in this appeal only ask that the final 
judgment and injunction of the District Court, which calls 
for forthwith compliance, be modified to follow the an­
nouncements expected from the United States Supreme 
Court insofar as they may apply to the circumstances of 
this case; and that these defendants and appellants be 
accorded an opportunity to present proper testimony to a 
master appointed by this Court, or otherwise to present 
a picture of the status of our progress in integration and 
the problems and difficulties yet to be overcome.

RELIEF

Defendants and appellants respectfully urge that the 
“ Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction” , as issued 
by the District Court, be modified so that it be determined 
that the policy and practices of the defendants and ap­
pellants are not a violation of the 14th Amendment; and 
that defendants and appellants may have such additional 
time within which to complete integration as appears



1 2

necessary with due regard for the public safety and wel­
fare.

Respectfully submitted,

PAUL T. DWYER,
Corporation Counsel,

VANCE G. INGALLS,
HELEN W. MILLER,

Assistants Corporation Counsel, 
Attorneys for Defendants and 

Appellants,
301 City Hall,
Detroit 26, Michigan.



13

SUPPLEMENT “A”

Federal Statute: Title 42 U. S. C. A.

§1401. Declaration of policy
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to 

promote the general welfare of the Nation by employing 
its funds and credit, as provided in this chapter, to assist 
the several states and their political subdivisions to al­
leviate present and recurring unemployment and to remedy 
the unsafe and insanitary housing conditions and the acute 
shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for 
families of low income, in urban and rural nonfarm areas, 
that are injurious to the health, safety, and morals of the 
citizens of the Nation. Sept. 1, 1937, c. 896 §1, 50 Stat. 
888; July 15, 1949, c. 338, Title III, §307(a), 63 Stat. 429.

§1402. Definitions
When used in this chapter—

LOW-RENT HOUSING

(1) The term “ low-rent housing”  means decent, safe, 
and sanitary dwellings within the financial reach of fami­
lies of low income, and developed and administered to 
promote seviceability, efficiency, economy, and stability, 
and embraces all necessary appurtenances thereto. The 
dwellings in low-rent housing as defined in this chapter 
shall be available solely for families whose net annual in­
come at the time of admission, less an exemption of $100 
for each minor member of the family other than the head 
of the family and his spouse, does not exceed five times 
the annual rental (including the value or cost to them 
of water, electricity, gas, other heating and cooking fuels, 
and other utilities) of the dwellings to be furnished such 
families. For the sole purpose of determining eligibility 
for continued occupancy, a public housing agency may 
allow, from the net income of any family, an exemption



14

for each minor member of the family (other than the head 
of the family and his spouse) of either (a) $100, or (b) 
all or any part of the annual income of such minor. For 
the purposes of this subsection, a minor shall mean a per­
son less than 21 years of age.

ADMINISTRATION

(6) The term “ administration”  means any or all 
undertakings necessary for management, operation, main­
tenance, or financing, in connection with a low-rent-housing 
or slum-clearance project, subsequent to physical com­
pletion.

PUBLIC HOUSING AGENCY

(11) The term “ public housing agency”  means any 
State, county, municipality, or other governmental entity 
or public body (excluding the Administration), which is 
authorized to engage in the development or administra­
tion of low-rent-housing or slum-clearance. The Adminis­
tration shall enter into contracts for financial assistance 
with a State or State agency where such State or State 
agency makes application for such assistance for an 
eligible project which, under the applicable laws of the 
State, is to be developed and administered by such State 
or State agency.

§1409. Loans for low-rent housing and 
slum-clearance projects

The Administration may make loans to public-housing 
agencies to assist the development, acquisition, or adminis­
tration of low-rent-housing or slum-clearance projects 
by such agencies. Where capital grants are made pur­
suant to section 1411 of this title the total amount of 
such loans outstanding on any one project and in which the 
Administration participates shall not exceed the develop­
ment or acquisition cost of such project less all such 
capital grants, but in no event shall said loans exceed 
90 per centum of such cost. In the case of annual con­



15

tributions in assistance of low rentals as provided in sec­
tion 1410 of this title the total of such loans outstanding 
on any one project and in which the Administration par­
ticipates shall not exceed 90 per centum of the develop­
ment or acquisition cost of such project. Such loans shall 
bear interest at such rate not less than the applicable 
going Federal rate, plus one-half of one per centum, shall 
be secured in such manner, and shall be repaid within 
such period not exceeding sixty years, as may be deemed 
advisable by the Administration: Provided, That in the 
case of projects initiated after March 1, 1949, with re­
spect to which annual contributions are contracted for 
pursuant to this chapter, loans shall not be made for a 
period exceeding forty years from the date of the bonds 
evidencing the loan: And provided further, That, in the 
case of such projects or any other projects with respect 
to which the contracts (including contracts which amend 
or supersede contracts previously made) provide for loans 
for a period not exceeding forty years from the date of 
the bonds evidencing the loan and for annual contributions 
for a period not exceeding forty years from the date the 
first annual contribution for the project is paid, such loans 
shall bear interest at a rate not less than the applicable 
going Federal rate. Sept. 1, 1937, c. 896, §9, 50 Stat. 
891; 1947 Reorg. Plan No. 3, §§1, 4(a), 9 eff. July 27, 
1947, 12 F. R, 4981, 61 Stat. 954; July 15, 1949, c. 338, 
Title III, §304(c), (d), 63 Stat. 425.

§1410. Annual contributions in assistance of 
low rentals—Authorization

(a) The Administration may make annual contributions 
to public housing agencies to assist in achieving and main­
taining the low-rent character of their housing projects. 
The annual contributions for any such project shall be 
fixed in uniform amounts, and shall be paid in such 
amounts over a fixed period of years. The Administra­
tion shall embody the provisions for such annual con­
tributions in a contract guaranteeing their payment over 
such fixed period. The Administration shall not make



16

any contract for loans (other than preliminary loans) or 
for annual contributions or for capital grants pursuant 
to this chapter with respect to any low-rent housing pro­
ject initiated after March 1, 1949, unless the governing 
body of the locality involved has entered into an agree­
ment with the public housing agency providing that, sub­
sequent to the initiation of the low-rent housing project 
and within five years after the completion thereof, there 
has been or will be elimination, by demolition, condemna­
tion, effective closing, or compulsory repair or improve­
ment, of unsafe or insanitary dwelling units situated in 
the locality or metropolitan area subtantially equal in 
number to the number of newly constructed dwelling units 
provided by such project; Provided, however, that where 
more than one family is living in an unsafe or insanitary 
dwelling unit the elimination of such unit shall count as 
the elimination of units equal to the number of families 
accommodated therein: Provided, further, that such
elimination may, in the discretion of the Administration 
be deferred in any locality or metropolitan area where 
there is an acute shortage of decent, safe, or sanitary hous­
ing available to families of low income: And, provided 
further, That this requirement shall not apply in the case 
of any low-rent housing project located in a rural non­
farm area, or to any loAv-rent housing project developed 
on the site of a slum cleared subsequent to July 15, 1949, 
and that the dwelling units which had been eliminated by 
the clearance of the site of such project shall not be 
counted as elimination for any other low-rent project.

LIMITATION ON PARTICULAR CONTRIBUTION 
AND PERIODS

(b) Annual contributions shall be strictly limited to 
the amounts and periods necessary, in the determination 
of the Administration, to assure the low-rent character of 
the housing projects involved. Toward this end the Ad­
ministration may prescribe regulations fixing the maximum 
contributions available under different circumstances, giv­
ing consideration to cost, location, size, rent-paying ability,



17

of prospective tenants, or other factors bearing upon the 
amounts and periods of assistance needed to achieve and 
maintain low rentals. Such regulations may provide for 
rates of contribution based upon development, acquisition 
or administration cost, number of dwelling units, number 
of persons housed, or other appropriate factors: Pro­
vided, That the fixed contribution payable annually under 
any contract shall in no case exceed a sum equal to the 
annual yield, at the applicable going Federal rate plus 
1 per centum, upon the development or acquisition cost 
of the low-rent housing or slum-clearance project in­
volved.

VETERANS’ PREFERENCE

(g) Every contract made pursuant to this chapter for 
annual contributions for any low-rent housing project 
shall require that the public housing agency, as among 
low-income families which are eligible applicants for oc­
cupancy in dwellings of given sizes and at specified rents, 
shall extend the following preferences in the selection of 
tenants:

First, to families which are to be displaced by any low- 
rent housing project or by any public slum-clearance or 
redevelopment project initiated after January 1, 1947, 
or which were so displaced within three years prior to 
making application to such public housing agency for 
admission to any low-rent housing; and as among such 
families first preference shall be given to families of 
disabled veterans whose disability has been determined 
by the Veterans’ Administration to be service-connected, 
and second preference shall be given to families of de­
ceased veterans and servicemen whose death has been de­
termined by the Veterans’ Administration to be service- 
connected, and third preference shall be given to families 
of other veterans and servicemen;

Second, to families of other veterans and servicemen 
and as among such families first preference shall be given 
to families of disabled veterans whose disability has been 
determined by the Veterans’ Administration to be service-



18

connected, and second preference shall be given to families 
of deceased veterans and servicemen whose death has been 
determined by the Veterans’ Administration to be service- 
connected.

§1415. Preservation of low rents
In order to insure that the low-rent character of housing 

projects will be preserved, and that the other purposes 
of this chapter will be achieved, it is provided that—

LOW-RENT HOUSING PROJECTS

(1) When a loan is made pursuant to section 1409 of 
this title for a low-rent-housing project the Administration 
may retain the right, in the event of a substantial breach 
of the condition (which shall be embodied in the loan 
agreement) providing for the maintenance of the low-rent 
character of the housing project involved or in the event 
of the acquisition of such project by a third party in any 
manner including a bona-fide foreclosure under a mort­
gage or other lien held by a third party, to increase the 
interest payable thereafter on the balance of said loan 
then held by the Administration to a rate not in excess 
of the going Federal rate (at the time of such breach or 
acquisition) plus 2 per centum per annum or to declare 
the unpaid principal on said loan due forthwith.

TENANCY ONLY BY LOW INCOME FAMILIES

(8) Every contract made pursuant to this chapter for 
annual contributions for any low-rent housing project 
initiated after March 1, 1949, shall provide that—

(a) the public housing agency shall fix maximum 
income limits for the admission and for the continued 
occupancy of families in such housing, that such 
maximum income limits and all revisions thereof 
shall be subject to the prior approval of the Adminis­
tration, and that the Administration may require the 
public housing agency to review and to revise such



19

maximum income limits if the Administration deter­
mines that changed conditions in the locality make 
such revisions necessary in achieving the purposes of 
this chapter;

(b) a duly authorized official of the public housing 
agency involved shall make periodic written state­
ments to the Administration that an investigation has 
been made of each family admitted to the low-rent 
housing project involved during the period covered 
thereby, and that, on the basis of the report of said 
investigation, he has found that each such family at 
the time of its admission (i) had a net family income 
not exceeding the. maximum income limits theretofore 
fixed by the public housing agency (and approved by 
the Administration) for admission of families of low 
income to such housing; and (ii) lived in an unsafe, 
insanitary, or overcrowded dwelling, or was to be 
displaced by another low-rent housing project or by 
a public slum-clearance or redevelopment project, or 
actually was without housing, or was about to be with­
out housing as a result of a court order of eviction, 
due to causes other than the fault of the tenant: Pro­
vided, that the requirement in (ii) shall not be ap­
plicable in the case of the family of any veteran or 
serviceman (or of any deceased veteran or service­
man) where application for admission to such housing 
is made not later than five years after March 1, 
1949;

(c) in the selection of tenants (i) the public hous­
ing agency shall not discriminate against families, 
otherwise eligible for admission to such housing, be­
cause their income are derived in whole or in part from 
public assistance and (ii) in initially selecting fami­
lies for admission to dwellings of given sizes and at 
specified rents the public housing agency shall (sub­
ject to the preferences prescribed in section 1410 
(g) of this title) give preference to families having



2 0

the most urgent housing needs, and thereafter, in se­
lecting families for admission to such dwellings, shall 
give due consideration to the urgency of the families’ 
housing needs; and

(d) the public housing agency shall make periodic 
reexaminations of the net incomes of tenant families 
living in the low-rent housing project involved; and 
if it is found, upon such reexamination, that the net 
incomes of any such families have increased beyond 
the maximum income limits fixed by the public hous­
ing agency (and approved by the Administration) 
for continued occupancy in such housing, such fami­
lies shall be required to move from the project.

SUPPLEMENT “B”

State Statute:

Act No. 18, Public Acts of Extra Session of 1933, as 
amended by Act No. 80, Public Acts of 1935; and 
further amended by Act No. 265, Public Acts of 
1937, and by Act No. 5, Public Acts of Extra Session 
of 1938.

HOUSING COMMISSION LAW

Sec. 2. Any city or incorporated village of the state of 
Michigan is hereby authorized to purchase, acquire, con­
struct, maintain, operate, improve, extend and/or repair 
housing facilities and to eliminate housing conditions which 
are detrimental to the public peace, health, safety, morals, 
and/or welfare.

Sec. 7. Such commission shall have the following enu­
merated powers and duties:

(a) To determine in what areas of the city or vil­
lage it is necessary to provide proper sanitary housing 
facilities for families of low income and for the elimi­
nation of housing conditions which are detrimental to 
the public peace, health, safety, morals, and/or wel­
fare ;



2 1

(b) To purchase, lease, sell, exchange, transfer, 
assign and mortgage any property, real or personal, 
or any interest therein, or accpiire the same by gift, 
bequest or under the power of eminent domain; to own 
hold, clear and improve property; to engage in or 
to contract for the design and construction, reconstruc­
tion, alteration, improvement, extension, and/or re­
pair of any housing project or projects or parts there­
of; to lease, and/or operate any housing project or 
projects;

(c) To control and supervise all parks and play­
grounds forming ,a part of such housing development 
but may contract with existing departments of the city 
or village for operation or maintenance of either or 
both;

(d) To establish and revise rents of any housing 
project or projects, but shall rent all property for such 
sums as will make them self-supporting, including all 
charges for maintenance and operation, for principal 
and interest on loans and bonds, and for taxes;

(e) To rent only to such tenants as are unable to 
pay for more expensive housing accommodations;

(f) To call upon other departments for assistance 
in the performance of its duties, but said departments 
shall be reimbursed for any added expense incurred 
therefor;

(g) It shall have such other powers relating to said 
housing facilities project as may be prescribed by 
ordinance or resolution of the governing body of the 
city or village or as may be necessary to carry out the 
the purposes of this act.

Sec. 44. In the operation or management of housing 
projects a commission shall at all times observe the fol­
lowing duties with respect to rentals and tenant selection:
(a) it may rent or lease the dwelling accommodations 
therein only to persons of low income; (b) it may rent or 
lease the dwelling accommodations therein only at rentals



22

within the financial reach of such persons of low income;
(c) it may rent or lease to a tenant dwelling accommoda­
tions consisting of the number of rooms, hut no greater 
number, which it deems necessary to provide safe and sani­
tary accommodations to the proposed occupants thereof, 
without overcrowding; (d) it shall not accept any person 
as a tenant in any housing project if the person or persons 
who would occupy the dwelling accommodations have an 
aggregate annual net income in excess of five times the an­
nual rental of the quarters to be furnished such person 
or persons, except that in the case of families with three or 
more minor dependents such ratio shall not exceed six to 
one; in computing the rental for this purpose of selecting 
tenants, there shall be included in the rental the average 
annual cost, as determined hv the commission, to the occu­
pants, of heat, water, electricity, gas, cooking range and 
other necessary services or facilities, whether or not the 
charge for such services and facilities is in fact included
in the rental; (e) it shall prohibit subletting by tenants. # # #

SUPPLEMENT “C”

City of Detroit Ordinance

(Being Chapter 23, Compiled Ordinances of 1945)

DETROIT HOUSING COMMISSION
(Approved Januarv 15, 1934. Effective January 16, 1934.

Ord. 262-C.)
Section 1. A  commission is hereby created to be known 

as the Detroit Housing Commission.
Sec. 2. Said Housing Commission shall consist of five 

members to be appointed by the Mayor. The term of office 
of members of the housing commission shall be five years. 
Members of the first housing commission existing here­
under shall be appointed for the terms of one year, two 
years, three years, four years and five years, respectively, 
and annually thereafter one member shall be appointed for



23

the term of five years. Members of the housing commission 
shall serve without compensation and may be removed 
from office by the Mayor. Any vacancy in office shall be 
filled by the Mayor for the remainder of the unexpired 
term. (Effective Jan. 13, 1938, Ord. 46-D.)

Sec. 5. Such housing commission shall have the follow­
ing enumerated powers and duties:

(a) To determine in what areas of the city it is 
necessary to provide proper sanitary housing facili­
ties for families of low income and for the elimination 
of housing conditions which are detrimental to the 
public peace, health, safety, morals and/or welfare.

(b) To purchase, lease, sell, exchange, transfer, 
assign and mortgage any property, real or personal, 
or any interest therein, or acquire the same by gift, 
bequest or under the power of eminent domain; to own, 
hold, clear and improve property; to engage in or to 
contract for the design and construction, reconstruc­
tion, alteration, improvement, extension, and/or repair 
o f any housing project or part thereof; to lease and/or 
operate any housing project.

(c) To control and supervise all parks and play­
grounds forming a part of such housing development 
but may contract with existing departments of the city 
for operation or maintenance of either or both.

(d) To establish and revise rents of any housing 
project, but shall rent all property for such sums as 
will make them self-supporting, include all charges for 
maintenance and operation, for principal and interest 
on loans and bonds, and for taxes. .

(e) To rent only to such tenants as are unable to 
pay for more expensive housing accommodations.

(f) To call upon other departments for assistance 
in the performance of its duties, but said departments 
shall be reimbursed for any added expense incurred 
therefor.



24

(g) It shall have such other powers relating to said 
housing facilities project as may be prescribed by ordi­
nance or resolution of the Common Council or as may 
be necessary to carry out the purposes of this act.

Sec. 10. The housing commission shall have complete 
control of the entire housing project, including the con­
struction, maintenance and operation as fully and com­
pletely as if said housing commission represented private 
owners. Contracts for construction or purchase of ma­
terials entered into by the housing commission shall not be 
required to be made through the city purchasing depart­
ment.

Sec. 15. The commission shall manage and operate its 
housing projects in an efficient manner so as to enable it 
to fix the rental for dwelling accommodations at the lowest 
possible rates consistent with its providing decent, safe 
and sanitary dwelling accommodations, and no commis­
sion shall construct or operate any such project for profit. 
To this end the commission shall fix the rentals for dwell­
ings in projects at no higher rates than it shall find to be 
necessary in order to produce revenues which, together 
with all other moneys, revenues, income and receipts from 
whatever sources derived available for such purposes, will 
be sufficient (a) to pay, as the same become due, the prin­
cipal and interest on the bonds issued for such projects,
(b) to meet the cost of, and to provide for, administration, 
operation and maintenance of the projects, including the 
cost of any insurance on the projects or on bonds issued 
therefor; (c) to create, during not less than the six years 
immediately succeeding its issuance of any bonds, a reserve 
sufficient to meet the largest principal and interest pay­
ments which will be due on such bonds in any one year 
thereafter and to maintain such reserve; and (d) (1) By 
setting up a reserve for taxation purposes of five per cent 
of the gross rentals of the project for any one year, which 
sum shall be paid to the municipality and other taxing 
units in proportion to the amount of taxes received for such 
unit in the year previous to the acquiring of the site for any 
housing project or (2) to pay to the municipality and other



25

taxing units a sum annually in taxes equal to the amount 
of taxes received, prior to the acquiring of any such pro­
ject site, from the assessment previously levied against such 
site. (Effective Jan. 13, 1938, Ord. 46-1).)

Sec. 22. In the operation or management of housing 
projects a commission shall at all times observe the fol­
lowing duties with respect to rentals and tenant selection: 
(a) it may rent or lease the dwelling accommodations 
therein only to persons of low income; (b) it may rent or 
lease the dwelling accommodations therein only at rentals 
within the financial reach of such persons of low income;
(c) it may rent or lease to a tenant dwelling accommoda­
tions consisting of the number of rooms but no greater 
number, which it deems necessary to provide safe and sani­
tary accommodations to the proposed occupants thereof, 
without overcrowding; (d) it shall not accept any person 
as a tenant in any housing project if the person or persons 
who would occupy the dwelling accommodations have an 
aggregate annual income in excess of five times the annual 
rental of the quarters to be furnished such person or per­
sons; in computing the rents for this purpose of selecting 
tenants, there shall be included in the rental the average 
annual cost, as determined by the commission to the occu­
pants, of heat, water, electricity, gas cooking range and 
other necessary services or facilities, whether or not the 
charge for such services and facilities is in fact included in 
the rental; (e) it shall prohibit subletting by tenants. 
(Effective Jan. 13, 1938. Ord. No. 46-D.)

SUPPLEMENT “D”

Rules Governing Administration of Housing Projects 
of Detroit Housing Commission

BE IT RESOLVED by the Detroit Housing Commission 
as follows:

Section I. This resolution, together with other resolutions 
provided for below, shall, together with the contract be­
tween this Commission and the Public Housing Adminis­



2 6

tration, constitute the Management Program of this Com­
mission with respect to Brewster Homes, Mich. 1-13, and 
Parkside Homes, Mich. 1-14.

(The following regulations govern all housing projects, 
but have been made applicable to the several projects by 
separate resolutions.)

Section II. Conditions Governing E ligibility:

A. Eligibility for Admission
There are to be eligible for admission to low-rent hous­
ing projects operated by this Commission only those ap­
plicants :

1. who qualify as a family (see Section X I A ) ; and
2. whose net income at the time of admission, less

a. an exemption of $100 for each minor member 
of the family other than the head of the fam­
ily and his spouse; and

b. the amounts paid by the U. S. Government 
for disability or death occurring in connec­
tion with military service;

does not exceed the appropriate income limits for 
admission set forth in Exhibit #1.

3. whose net liquid assets do not exceed $1,200 unless 
exception is made by the Detroit Housing Com­
mission in specific cases.

4. who, except for the family of a veteran or service­
man, or of any deceased veteran or serviceman 
(see Section X I E) applying for admission prior 
to March 1, 1954, are at the time of admission:

a. living in dwellings determined to be unsafe, 
unsanitary or overcrowded as defined in Sec­
tion IV  A.

b. to be displaced by another low-rent housing 
project or by a public slum-clearance or re-



27

development project in the area of operation 
of this Commission; or

c. actually without housing of any kind due to 
causes other than the fault of the tenant (see 
Section IV B ) ;

d. about to be without housing as a result of a 
court order of eviction due to causes other 
than the fault of the tenant (see Section IV 
B and C ) ; and

5. who qualify as the family of a citizen of the United 
States (see Section IV D) except that this re­
quirement shall not be applicable for the family of 
any serviceman or any veteran who has been dis­
charged (other than dishonorably) from, or the 
family of any serviceman who died in the Armed 
Services of the United States within four years 
prior to the date of application for admission;

6. who conforms to the occupancy standards for ad­
mission set forth in Section VII.

7. who have resided in the City of Detroit for one 
continuous year with their entire family imme­
diately prior to admission (or who, having lived 
in the City of Detroit for one continuous year, 
have not since been away more than one year).

8. who include no person who is a member of an or­
ganization designated as subversive by the Attor­
ney General of the United States. All applicants 
shall be required to execute a “ Certification of 
Non-Membership in Subversive Organizations”  
which form is attached hereto as Exhibit No. 6.

9. who are reasonable rent risks;
10. who have been determined to have the ability to 

pay the rent to be charged without the additional 
sacrifice of other budgetary essentials.



2 8

B. Eligibility for Continued Occupancy:
There are to be eligible for continued occupancy in the 
Federally-aided low-rent projects operated by this Com­
mission only those occupants:

1. who qualify as a family (see Section X I A) except 
that a person or persons remaining as the re­
siduum of a family may be permitted to remain in 
occupancy in units of appropriate size; and

2. whose net income at time of re-examination, less
a. an exemption of either $100 for each minor 

member of the family other than the head 
of the family and his spouse, or all the in­
come of such minor, whichever is the greater, 
less any deductions in connection therewith 
which were taken into account in determining 
the net income of the family; and

b. the amounts paid by the U. S. Government 
for disability or death occurring in connec­
tion with military service.

does not exceed the appropriate income limits for 
continued occupancy as set forth in Exhibit No. 1.

3. who qualify as the family of a citizen (see para­
graph D of Section IV ) except for the waiver for 
families of veterans and servicemen set forth in 
paragraph A 5, of this section.

4. who conform to the occupancy limits for con­
tinued occupancy established in Section VII.

5. who include no person who is a member of an 
organization designated as subversive by the At­
torney General of the United States. Occupants 
shall be required to execute a “ Certification of 
Non-Membership in Subversive Organizations”  
once a year. This form is attached hereto as Ex­
hibit No. 6.



29

Section III. I ncome L im its :

Maximum income limits for admission and continued occu­
pancy, and special admission limits for families displaced 
by Slum Clearance and Urban Redevelopment projects, are 
set forth in Exhibit No. 1. No minimum income limits are 
established.

Section IV . H ousing Conditions P rior to A dmission :

A. Unsafe, Unsanitary or Overcrowded Dwellings
Unsafe, unsanitary or overcrowded dwellings are those 
in which one or more of the following conditions are 
found to exist:

1. Location
The location of the unit is such as to create a 
health, fire or safety hazard for the occupants 
of such dwelling units;

2. Condition of Structure
The condition of the structure is such to create 
serious safety hazards by reason of the need of 
major repairs to roof, walls, ceilings, floors, or 
stairs, or to create serious health hazards by rea­
son of continuous dampness or exposure brought 
about by neglect or dilapidation;

3. Water Supply
Lack of potable running water within the dwelling 
unit;

4. Toilet Facilities
No flush toilet in the dwelling unit; or, if present, 
unfit for use.



30

5. Bath Facilities
No bathtub or shower in the dwelling unit; or, if 
present, unfit for use.

6. Kitchen Facilities
Lack of permanent, safe, and reasonably efficient 
kitchen facilities within a dwelling unit, including 
sink with running water and provisions for a 
cooking stove.

7. Lighting Facilities
Dwelling not wired or inadequately wired for 
electricity.

8. Heating Facilities
Heating facilities inadequate or unsafe.

9. Overcrowding
The number of persons occupying a dwelling unit 
exceeds the maximum limits established for con­
tinued occupancy in its projects, or when two or 
more families are occupying a dwelling unit de­
signed for single-family occupancy.

10. Living room, bedroom, or kitchen with no win­
dows, or with windows opening on an airshaft; 
or toilet or bath with inadequate ventilation.

11. No connection between plumbing fixtures and ade­
quate sewage disposal system.

B. Causes Other Than the Fault of the Tenant
Being without housing for willful or deliberate failure 
to pay rent or to carry out other normal obligations of 
tenancy is not to be interpreted as due to causes other



31

than the fault of the tenant and therefore does not 
qualify an applicant under this provision. However, a 
substantial reduction in the family’s income, an increase 
in rent beyond its reasonable ability to pay, or compel­
ling or calamitous circumstances of any nature result­
ing in loss of accommodations, will be considered as 
causes other than the fault of the tenant.

C. Eviction Ordered
The mere prospect of eviction is not sufficient to qualify 
a family for admission on the basis that it is about to be 
without housing. A court judgment must actually have 
been issued, and it must have been issued for causes not 
construed to he the fault of the tenant.

D. Family of a Citizen
A family is considered to be the family of a citizen of 
the United States when the family member who is named 
as the lessee in and as such signs the lease agreement 
for the dwelling unit which he and his family are to 
occupy is a citizen of the United States.

E. The substandard conditions and other factors used to 
determine need for housing shall be rated in accordance 
with the Priority Score System which is attached hereto 
as Exhibit No. 2.

Section V. Selection of T enants :

A. Order of Preference
As among eligible applicants of appropriate size and 
composition for the available dwelling units, the follow­
ing order of preference is to be applied in selecting 
tenants for each range of specified rent established by 
Exhibit No. 3 titled “ Ranges of Specified Rent” . Speci­
fied rent means the amount of rent which must be 
charged for a unit in order to serve a cross-section of 
the low-rent market and maintain a rental revenue no



32

lower than the lowest possible average rent required 
for project solvency.
First, to families which are to be displaced by any low- 
rent housing project or by any public Slum Clearance or 
Kedevelopment project initiated after January 1, 1947, 
or which were so displaced within three years prior to 
making application to such public housing agency for 
admission to any low-rent housing; and as among such 
families, first preference shall be given to families of 
disabled veterans whose disability has been determined 
by the Veterans’ Administration to be service-con­
nected, and second preference shall be given to families 
of deceased veterans and servicemen whose death has 
been determined by the Veterans’ Administration to be 
service-connected, and third preference shall be given 
to families of other veterans and servicemen.
Second, to families of other veterans and servicemen 
not qualifying as displaced families as above. As among 
such families, first preference shall be given to families 
of disabled veterans whose disability has been deter­
mined by the Veterans’ Administration to be service- 
connected, and second preference shall be given to fami­
lies of deceased veterans and servicemen whose death 
has been determined by the Veterans’ Administration 
to be service-connected.
The selection of families for assignment to ranges is to 
be administered so as to maintain, as nearly as possible, 
the designated distribution of families to ranges. As 
ranges become underpopulated, new admissions are 
to be so selected as to maintain the same relative dis­
tribution as indicated above.

B. ATo Discrimination Against Relief Families
In the selection of tenants, there is to be no discrimina­
tion against families (otherwise eligible for admission) 
because their incomes are derived in whole or part from 
public assistance. No quotas or other devices are to be 
established to limit the number of relief families.



33

C. Transfer of Tenants
Transfer of a family within a low-rent project aided by 
the Public Housing Administration, or transfer to such 
a project from any other low-rent project operated by 
this Commission, when such family is eligible for con­
tinued occupancy in the dwelling to which it is trans­
ferred, is not for any purpose deemed to be an admis­
sion to the project and is not to be subject to the prefer­
ences enumerated in V-A, above.

D. Determination of Urgency of Housing Need
Criteria used in determining the relative urgency of 
housing need within preference groups shall take into 
account: (1) the absence of housing or prospect thereof, 
overcrowding, or the characteristics of the dwelling oc­
cupied by the family; (2) physical and health conditions 
of the family; (3) lowness of net income.

E. The priority Score System attached hereto as Exhibit 
# 2  shall be used to rate and grade preferences set forth 
in this section.

Section VI. R ents :

A. Ratio of Rent to Income
In all permanent low-rent projects operated by this 
Commission, the same gross rent is to apply to all fami­
lies of like composition and of like net income insofar 
as permitted by maximum rents. The gross rent is to 
be based on a percentage (as set forth in the Schedule 
of Rents) of the annual net income of the family less 
an exemption of $100 for each minor member of the 
family other than the head of the family and his spouse, 
except as restricted in Section X-C.
However, where such an exemption would result in a 
violation of the minimum rent-income ratios for ad­
mission in the State Law (5-to-l for families with less



34

than 3 minors, and 6-to-l for families with 3 or more 
minors), the exemption will he made only for snch an 
amount as will not result in violation.

B. Rents for Families Eligible Because of Exemption of 
Income and for Ineligible Families Pending Removal
All families in these categories, regardless of the 
amount of their income, are to be charged the same pro­
portion of their net income for rent as established in 
“ A ”  above, insofar as permitted by maximum rents.

C. Minimum Rent
The minimum gross rent to be charged any tenant, re­
gardless of how low its income may be, is to be the 
minimum rent shown in the Schedule of Bents.

D. Welfare Rents
The amount of rent charged any Welfare family shall 
not be less than the rent which would be charged if the 
same amount of income were received entirely from 
non-relief sources.

E. Schedule of Dwelling Rents
There is attached as Exhibit # 4  a Schedule of Dwelling 
Bents for the projects.

F. Schedule of Utilities Allowances
The schedule contains statements relative to the fol­
lowing: 1

1. Project-Supplied Utilities
The utilities arid quantities of such utilities to be 
supplied by each project and included in the con­
tract rent.



35

2. Tenant-Swpplied Utilities
Utilities not supplied by a project as a part of 
contract rent, the estimated average per-unit 
cost or value to the tenant for reasonable quanti­
ties of each such utility.

G. Charges To Tenants Other Than Rent
Charges in addition to those for contract rent as fol­
lows :

1. Excess-Utility Charges
Where gas or electricity is supplied for use in 
the dwelling, tenants shall be charged for quanti­
ties used in excess of the amounts included in 
the contract rent. Such charges shall be made 
only if the utilities are individually metered for 
each dwelling.

2. Miscellaneous Charges
Tenants shall be charged for: (1) damages to 
equipment or property due to tenants’ negligence; 
and (2) supplies provided or services rendered 
not included in the contract rent.
Tenants shall be charged the cost of caring for 
lawns, yards, walks, stairwells and hall spaces 
assigned to the tenant as his responsibility should 
he, in the opinion of the Management fail to 
care for them properly.
Other miscellaneous charges shall be made in ac­
cordance with the terms of the lease and the 
tenants’ handbook.

Section VII. Occupancy Standards :

To avoid overcrowding and prevent waste of space, dwel­
lings are to be leased in accordance with the occupancy 
standards set forth below. Where it is found at the time of



36

periodic re-examination that the size of the dwelling is no 
longer suitable for the family in accordance with these 
standards, the family is to be required to move as soon as a 
dwelling of appropriate size becomes available. Every 
member of the family, regardless of age, shall be considered 
a “ person” .

Number of Persons
Number of --------------------------------------
Bedrooms Minimum Maximum

0*  2 2
1 2  3
2 3 5
3 4 7
4 6 10

*One person—the residuum of a tenant family—is to be 
permitted to continue to occupy the smallest-size unit.

A. Units shall be assigned so that persons of opposite 
sex (other than husband and wife) need not occupy the 
same bedroom except that at admission children of op­
posite sex under 8 years of age may occupy the same 
bedroom; for continued occupancy, children up to 10 
years of age may occupy the same bedroom.

B. In addition to the standards specified above, for ad­
mission a child less than 2 years old may occupy the 
parents’ bedroom; for continued occupancy a child 
less than 4 years old may occupy the parents’ bed­
room.

C. Living rooms may be used for sleeping quarters for 
not more than one person and then only in cases of 
emergency and where this room has been designed with 
reasonable privacy, that is, where it is not necessary 
to pass through this room to get to the bathroom or 
other bedrooms. Under no circumstances shall the 
living room be considered satisfactory sleeping quarters 
for a child of school age, an elderly person, or persons 
in poor health.



37

Section VIII. R eceipt of A pplications and

Determination of E ligibility:

This section sets forth the basic steps which are to be 
taken in obtaining and verifying data for purposes of 
(a) determining whether applications meet the conditions 
of eligibility for admission set forth in Section II; (b) 
applying the preference requirements covered in Section 
V ; (c) determining the rent to be charged families ad­
mitted in accordance with Section VI, and the size of 
dwelling required in accordance with Section VII.

A. Application for Admission
The application for admission constitutes the basic 
form of the permanent record to be established for 
each family from which an application for admission 
is accepted. 1

1. Families From Whom Applications Are to be 
Accepted
To assure compliance with the preference re­
quirements of the Housing Act of 1949 and the 
Commission’s Contract with the Public Housing 
Administration, as outlined in Section V, ap­
plications from all persons seeking admission to 
a project are, until the end of the initial operat­
ing period, to be accepted regardless of the 
number of eligible applications on file; except 
that, if the flow and volume of applications re­
ceived is such as to indicate that tenants will be 
selected only from those groups having a prefer­
ence priority (i.e., displaced families and fami­
lies of Veterans and Servicemen), applications 
from families without such preference-priority 
are to be discontinued and registrations taken in 
their place.
If, after the end of the initial operating period, 
there are sufficient applications on file from fami-



38

lies with a preference priority, or from non­
preference families having a substantial housing 
need, to fill vacancies as they occur, additional 
applications from families without a preference- 
priority need not be taken. However, registra­
tions shall be taken in their place.

B. Procedures Governing Receipt of Applications
Each person from whom an application for admission 
is accepted is to be required to submit and sign an 
application on Form No. C-of-D 30-AP-A, Application 
For A Family Dwelling, as now used and as may be 
revised in the future.
If, during the application interview, ineligibility is 
definitely established, the applicant is to be informed 
and the application signed by the applicant classified 
as ineligible. In such instances, sufficient information 
is to be entered on the application form to show def- 
nitely the cause of ineligibility.
All entries are to be made in ink, indelible pencil, or 
typed in. Corrections or changes are to be made by 
lining through the original entry and substituting there­
for the correcting data. Also, such changes are to be 
dated and initialed by the person recording the changed 
data and the reason and authority for such change 
incorporated in the record.

C. Verification and Documentation of Admission Data
To substantiate determinations with respect to eligi­
bility, preference rating, dwelling size, and rent to be 
paid, and to establish the validity of the Authority’s 
certification of a family’s eligibility for admission, 
the representations made by the applicant-family in its 
application for admission are to be verified and all



39

verified findings relating thereto are to be documented. 
Documentation of verified findings is to consist o f :

1. Photostatic or carbon copies of documents in the 
applicant’s possession which substantiates his 
claims; or a brief summary of the pertinent con­
tents signed and dated by the staff member who 
viewed the documents.

2. Letters from employers and other pertinent 
sources giving authoritative information concern­
ing all items and amounts of income and deduc­
tions, other eligibility and preference determina­
tions.

3. Notarized statements from persons whose earn­
ings are irregular, such as salesmen, taxi-drivers, 
etc., setting forth gross receipts, itemized ex­
penses, and any other pertinent data deemed to 
be necessary in order to properly determine net 
income.

4. Memoranda of verification data obtained by per­
sonal interview, telephone conversation, or other 
means setting forth the source or informant, the 
date received, and signed by the staff member 
receiving the information; and

5. A record of a physical inspection of the housing 
conditions of all applicants except:

a. Those who can submit proof that at the 
time of admission they are actually with­
out housing, or are about to be without 
housing as a result of a court order due to 
no fault of their own, or are to be displaced 
by a low-rent housing project or by a public 
slum-clearance or redevelopment project; 
and

b. Those with Veteran or Serviceman status 
who apply prior to March 1, 1954, and who 
fall into preference categories in which the 
number of applications on file from eligible 
applicants is less than the number of units



40

available, which would result in the admis­
sion of all such families without the neces­
sity of determining the urgency of the 
family’s needs.

D. Analysis of Verified Findings
As verifying data are assembled, they are to be re­
viewed and evaluated in the light of established eligi­
bility criteria set forth in Section II and the findings 
summarized. If, during the process of verifying an 
applicant’s eligibility for admission, it is ascertained 
that for one or more reasons he does not meet the es­
tablished conditions governing eligibility for admission, 
the investigation is to be discontinued and the applicant 
advised of his ineligibility.

E. Certification
As a part of the application record of each aplicant 
determined to be eligible for admission, the Supervisor 
of Tenant Selection is to certify that an investigation 
has been made of such family, and that on the basis 
of said investigation it has been determined that the 
applicant and his family meet all the conditions gov­
erning eligibility.

F. Re-checking Verified Findings Prior to Admission
I f there is a time lag of more than thirty days be­
tween the date income determinations were made and 
the time of admission, a re-check is to be made to ascer­
tain that the income of the family is as it was previ­
ously determined, and that other eligibility factors are 
unchanged. Changed conditions are to be verified be­
fore the family is admitted.



41

Section IX. L easing of Dwelling U n it s :

A lease Agreement (see Exhibit No. 7) is to be entered 
into between this Commision and all of its tenants. The 
Lease Agreement is to be kept current at all times and is 
to reflect the rent being charged and the conditions gov­
erning occupancy.
Each lease is to require the tenant to deposit $1.00 for the 
keys to the dwelling plus $20.00 as a security deposit to 
cover loss of removable articles, damage to property, rea­
sonable wear and tear excepted, or non-payment of rent 
and other charges.

A. Execution of Lease Agreement
1. A responsible member of each family accepted 

as a tenant is to be required to execute a Lease 
Agreement prior to actual admission. One copy 
of the Lease is to be given to the tenant and one 
executed copy is to be retained in the tenant’s 
file.

2. The member of the family signing the lease is to 
be a citizen of the United States, except that the 
condition of citizenship is to be waived for the 
family of any serviceman or of any veteran who 
has been discharged (under conditions other 
than dishonorable) from, or the family of any 
serviceman who dies in, the armed forces of the 
United States within four years prior to the 
date of application for admission.

3. If, through any cause, the signer of the lease 
ceases to be a member of the tenant-family, the 
lease is to be voided and a new agreement exe­
cuted and signed by a remaining member of the 
family who can qualify as a lessee, provided such 
person meets the requirements set forth in Sec­
tion II, and provided the family is otherwise 
eligible for continued occupancy. If no member 
is qualified to sign a new lease, the existing lease 
is to be voided and the family required to vacate.



42

4. If a tenant-family transfers to a different dwel­
ling in the same or another low-rent project op­
erated by this Commission, the existing lease is 
to be cancelled and a new lease executed for the 
dwelling into which the family is to move by a 
member of the family who meets the requirements 
set forth above.

B. Cancellation of the Lease Agreement
Cancellation of a tenant’s lease is to be in accordance 
with the provisions of the tenant lease form attached 
hereto as Exhibit No. 7.

Section X. P eriodic B e-examination and 

B ent A djustments :

A. Redetermination of Eligibility and Rent Adjustments
The eligibility of all tenants is to be re-examined once 
every twelve months, and, upon determination of the 
anticipated income for the ensuing year, the tenant’s 
rent is to be adjusted in accordance therewith. If the 
net income, less authorized exemptions, exceeds the 
applicable income limit for continued occupancy, or if 
the tenant is otherwise ineligibile, the tenant is to be 
required to move from the project within six months 
from the date of the redetermination of eligibility. The 
length of time between the admission of a tenant and 
his first re-examination is not to exceed eighteen 
months.
In addition to the regular annual re-examination of in­
come to determine rent and eligibility status, the ten­
ant shall be required to report changes of income and 
family composition within not more than 30 days after 
that occurs. Upon receipt of such report, the tenant’s 
anticipated income for the ensuing year will be rede­
termined. When such redetermination has been made, 
the rent will be adjusted in accordance therewith. The



43

income of the tenant may be re-examined at the request 
of the Management or the tenant and a rent adjust­
ment made at any time during the year.
Increases in rent resulting from an increase in family 
income or a change in family composition shall be 
put into effect as of the first of the month following 
that in which the change of status actually occurred. 
A  decrease in rent shall be made when it is ascertained 
that the family’s circumstances have changed suf­
ficiently to warrant a lower rent. The effective date 
shall be the first of the month in which the basis for 
the determination of rent has been verified.

B. Method of Computation
In computing tenant incomes upon admission or re­
examination, the Management shall use whatever 
method of computation or projection most accurately 
anticipates the net annual income of the family.

C. Restrictions on Reduction of Rent
1. Whereas the Detroit Housing Commission’s pur­

pose in establishing rent grades below the aver­
age operating cost per unit is to provide decent 
housing for families with constant incomes of a 
very low level, it is not the Commission’s policy 
to supply dwellings at a level lower than our 
Grade B ($25.00) rent either to indigents or to 
employable persons temporarily out of work. 
Therefore, the Detroit Housing Commission will 
compute income under the herein-outlined policy, 
but where the computation indicates a rent 
grade lower than Grade B ($25.00) and the tenant 
is an employable person temporarily out of work, 
or an indigent, the rent shall be established at 
the Grade B ($25.00) level.

2. Any able-bodied tenant voluntarily engaged in 
business shall be charged the maximum rent ir­
respective of the income reported at the time 
of re-examination.



44

3. In all instances where the circumstances and in­
come computation indicate that a rent reduction 
is in order, a sworn statement of the families’ 
liquid assets must be taken. The circumstances 
of the case should be outlined in a memo to the 
Supt. of Housing Operations and a decision will 
be rendered.

D. Definition of a “ Relief Client”
A tenant shall be considered a “ relief client”  and the 
minimum agency rent (under the “ indigent”  provi­
sion of restriction # 1 )  of $25.00 shall be charged 
wherever the tenant receives direct relief, even though 
only of a supplementary character. “ Direct relief” 
constitutes cash or relief orders for food, shelter, fuel, 
etc., received regularly because of an income deficiency. 
A  tenant who receives only sporadic assistance, such 
as clothing, medical care, burial assistance, etc., shall 
not be considered a “ relief client”  and the rent should 
be graded to the net annual income in accord with our 
established schedules.

E. Re-Excmiination Procedures
Data assembled at the time of re-examination are to be 
filed in the folder set up for the family at the time of 
its application for admission (see Section VIII A ).

1. Receipt of Applications for Continued Occu­
pancy
Each tenant is to be required, at the time of re­
examination, to submit and sign an application 
for continued occupancy on form No. C-of-D-101- 
AP as now used and as may be revised in the 
future.
All entries on the form are to be made in ink, 
indelible pencil, or typed in. Corrections or 
changes are to be made by lining through the orig-



45

inal entry and substituting therefor the correcting 
data. Also, such changes are to be dated and 
initialed by the person recording the changed 
data, and the reasons and authority for such 
changes incorporated in the record.

2. Verification and, Documentation of Re-examina- 
tion Data
To substantiate determinations with respect to 
eligibility for continued occupancy, size of unit 
required, and appropriateness of rental charges, 
and also to establish the validity for the certi­
fication of a tenant’s eligibility for continued 
occupancy, the representation made by the ten­
ant-family in its application for continued occu­
pancy which differ from those previously veri­
fied are to be verified. Re-verification of citizen­
ship and Veteran or Service status is not re­
quired for those members of the family concera- 
ing whom these facts have previously been veri­
fied and recorded. However, employment and 
income data are to be verified in every instance. 
All verified findings are to be documented and 
placed in the tenant’s folder.

3. Verification Required
Any income shall be supported by verification. 
A wage earner’s income shall be verified by the 
submission of pay stubs, the employer’s written 
statement, or other similar documentary evi­
dence.
If a tenant is engaged in business, the burden of 
proof of income shall rest with the tenant; and 
the company books, income tax statement, or 
other evidence shall be submitted for examina­
tion.



46

4. Analysis of Verified Findings
As verifying data are assembled, they, together 
with pertinent data on file, are to be reviewed 
and evaluated in light of established eligibility 
criteria for continued occupancy. In instances 
of marked variance between existing records and 
newly verified material, the reason for discrep­
ancies are to be ascertained and action taken in 
accordance with the provisions of paragraph 
“ F ”  below.

F. Action Required Following Re-examination
Immediately following re-examination, each tenant re­
examined is to be informed in writing concerning:

1. Eligibility status, and if ineligible, the date by 
which the family must vacate;

2. Any change to be made in the rent or size of unit 
occupied; and

3. Any instances of misrepresentation or non-com­
pliance with the terms of the lease revealed 
through re-examination, and any corrective action 
which is to be taken.

The notices to ineligible tenants to vacate are to allow 
the tenant six months from the date of such determination 
to move from the project. Court action will be started 
against ineligible tenants who do not move voluntarily by 
the expiration date of their notices unless an extension 
in residence is allowed in accordance with policy estab­
lished by this. Commission.
Families found to contain any person who is a member of 
an organization designated as subversive by the Attorney 
General of the United States shall be prompty evicted 
without any waiting period.
I f at the time of re-examination it is found that the 
tenant’s misrepresentations have resulted in his paying a 
lower rent than he should have paid, he is to be required



47

to pay the difference between the rent he has paid and 
what he should have paid, and, at the discretion of the 
Commission, he may be required to vacate the project.
All tenants are to be required to report promptly all sub­
stantial changes in income or family composition, and if 
it is found that the tenant has failed to report such 
changes as they occurred, and such changes would have 
required him to pay a higher rent, the increased rent is 
to be made retroactive to the date on which the change 
of income occurred, and at the discretion of the Commis­
sion he may be required to vacate the project immediately.

Section XI. Definition of T erms :

A. Family
“ Family” means a group of persons regularly living 
together, which consists of two or more persons re­
lated by blood, marriage, or adoption. In addition, 
there may be considered as part of a family other per­
sons who will live regularly as an inherent part of the 
family group whose earnings and resources are avail­
able for use in meeting the living expenses of the 
group. Persons otherwise eligible for inclusion in a 
family group need not be excluded because of tempor­
ary absence. A group of unrelated persons living to­
gether, or a person living alone, does not constitute 
a family, nor may lodgers be included in a family.

R  Head of a Family
The “ head of a family” is that member of the group 
who is legally or morally responsible for the group.

C. Veteran
“ Veteran”  means a person (man or woman) who has 
served in the active military or naval service of the 
United States at any time (1) on or after September 
16, 1940, and prior to July 26, 1947, (2) on or after 
April 6, 1917, and prior to November 11, 1918, or (3) 
on or after June 27, 1950 and prior to such date there­



48

after as shall be determined by the President, and who 
shall have been discharged or released therefrom under 
conditions other than dishonorable.

D. Serviceman
“ Serviceman”  means a person (man or woman) in the 
active military or naval service of the United States 
who has served therein at any time (1) on or after 
September 16, 1940, and prior to July 26, 1947, (2) 
on or after April 6, 1917, and prior to November 11, 
1918, or (3) on or after June 27, 1950, and prior to 
such date thereafter as shall be determined by the 
President.

E. Family of a Veteran or Serviceman
A family is a “ family of a veteran or serviceman”  
when:

1. The veteran or serviceman is either the head of 
the family or related to the head of the family 
by blood, marriage or adoption, and is living with 
the family or is temporarily absent from home 
by reason of hospitalization, a duty assignment, 
employment, or school attendance in another lo­
cality; or

2. The veteran or serviceman, formerly the head of 
the family, is deceased or absent from the family 
by reason of permanent hospitalization, separa­
tion or desertion.
Divorce terminates the status of the family as 
that of veteran or serviceman unless there re­
mains one or more members of the family for 
whose support the veteran or serviceman is still 
legally or morally responsible. Re-marriage of 
the spouse of such veteran or serviceman, term­
inates the family’s status as that of such veteran 
or serviceman, even though dependents of the 
veteran or serviceman constitute a part of the 
newly-formed family group.



49

3. The veteran or serviceman, not the head of the 
family, is (a) deceased or absent from the family 
by reason of permanent hospitalization, (b) was 
a member of the family at the time of his death 
or hospitalization, and (c) was related to the 
head of the family by blood, marriage, or adop­
tion ; provided that in order to qualify under this 
provision the family must contain two or more 
persons related to such veteran or serviceman 
by blood, marriage, or adoption.

F. Military or Naval Service of the United States
“ Military or naval service of the United States”  mean 
only the Army, Navy Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast 
Guard, and since July 29, 1945, the commissioned 
corps of the U. S. Public Health Service.

G. Minor
“ Minor”  means a person less than twenty-one years 
of age other than the head of the family or his spouse. 
An unborn child may not be counted as a minor.

H. Utilities
“ Utilities”  means water, electricity, gas, and other 
heating, refrigeration and cooking fuels. I.

I. Contract Rent
“ Contract rent”  means the rent charged a tenant for 
use of the dwelling accommodation, equipment, services, 
and utilities supplied by the project. Contract rent does 
not include charges for utilities which may be pur­
chased by the project and sold to the tenant as a trans­
action separate from the payment of such rent, excess 
utility charges, or miscellaneous charges.



50

J. Gross Ren\t
“ Gross rent”  means contract rent plus the Commis­
sion’s estimate of value or cost to the tenant for rea­
sonable amounts of utilities not included in the contract 
rent.

K. Aggregate Family Income
1- “ Aggregate family income”  means all the income 

from any source whatsoever, before deductions or 
exemptions, anticipated to be received during the 
twelve months following admission or re-examination 
(as the case may be) by all persons, including minors, 
actually occupying, or who are actually to occupy, 
the dwelling, and by a family head temporarily sep­
arated from the group. In determining aggregate 
family income, due regard shall be given to both the 
current and prospective rate of income.

2. Aggregate family income is to include but need not 
be limited t o :

a. The full amount, before any payroll deductions, 
of wages and salaries, including compensation 
for overtime and all other compensation for per­
sonal services (such as commissions, fees, tips, 
and bonuses) including the cash value of any 
compensation in kind (such as meals).

b. Net income from the operation of a business or 
profession as determined by current income tax 
methods.

c. Interest, dividends, and net income of any kind 
through real or personal property.

d. -The full amount received from annuities, peri­
odic payments derived from insurance policies, 
retirement income, pensions, periodic benefits 
for disability or death and other similar types 
of periodic receipts including monthly payments 
received by beneficiaries of either National 
Service Life Insurance or U. S. Government 
War Risk Insurance.



51

e. Payments in lieu of earnings such as unemploy­
ment and disability compensation, Social Se­
curity benefits, Workmen’s Compensation, bene­
fits in lieu of earnings, and dismissal wages, ex­
cluding, however, lump-sum payments under 
health and accident insurance and under Work­
men’s Compensation.

f. Cash relief receipts and the value of determin­
able relief allowances in kind, including rental 
allowances.

g. Periodic and determinable allowances such as 
alimony and regular contributions or gifts, in­
cluding amounts received from any persons not 
residing in the dwelling.

h. The full amount received for the case of foster 
children.

i. All regular pay, special payments and allow­
ances (such as longevity, overseas duty, rental 
allowances, allowances for dependents, etc.) re­
ceived by a member of the armed forces who is 
the head of the family, whether or not he is liv­
ing in the dwelling, or by any other member of 
the armed forces who is living in the dwelling.

j. Subsistence allowances or receipts in connection 
with education or training received by a former 
member of the armed forces who is the head of 
the family, whether or not he is living in the 
dwelling, or any other former member of the 
armed forces who is living in the dwelling.

3. The following are not to be considered as income 
and are not, therefore, to be included in aggregate 
family income:

a. Amounts which are specifically received for, 
or are a reimbursement of, the costs of ill­
ness or medical care.



52

b. Casual and irregular gifts.
c. Casual and sporadic earnings of minor chil­

dren.
d. Lump-sum additions to family assets such as 

inheritances, insurance payments, capital 
gains, and settlements for personal or prop­
erty losses.

L. Net Family Income
“ Net Family Income”  means “ aggregate income”  less 
deductions specified below and anticipated during the 
twelve-month period for which aggregate family income 
is estimated. Such deductions are to be applied uni­
formly to all families:

1. The occupational expenses listed below, when the 
employee receives no specific reimbursement for 
them, and others of similar nature which, in the 
opinion of the Management, are justified, but only 
to the extent by Avhich such expenses exceed nor­
mal and usual expenses incident to employment.

a. Union dues and assesments.
b. Amounts paid by an employee into a group 

insurance fund or plan to which he is re­
quired to belong as a condition of his employ­
ment.

c. Uniforms, special clothing, tools and laun­
dry, when consistent with the nature of the 
tenant’s employment and working conditions 
but not in excess of the following limits:

1. Uniforms (e.g., D. S. R., letter carriers, 
nurses, policemen, firemen, etc.)—not 
more than $50 per year.

2. Special clothing required by industrial 
workers (e.g., overalls, aprons, heavy 
gloves, shoes, etc.,)—not more than $50 
per year.



53

3. Tools supplied by industrial or con­
struction workers—not more than $50 
per year.

4. Commercial laundry or cleaning—not 
more than $25 per year.

d. Transportation expense, incidental to em­
ployment (via the lowest-cost public trans­
portation available), in excess of 35$ per 
working day for each worker.

e. Traveling expenses incidental to employment 
and not reimbursed.

f. The cost of maintaining an automobile or 
other motor vehicle required by the nature 
of the tenant’s employment and not reim­
bursed. This allowance shall be computed at 
a flat rate of 8$ for each mile the vehicle is 
used by the tenant in the course of his work.

2. Deductions from wages if required by law or re­
quired by the employer as a condition of employ­
ment, such as deductions for Social Security, pen­
sions, retirement funds or death benefits, or for 
health, accident or medical benefit plans.

3. Amounts paid, if reasonable and necessary, for 
the support of a person or persons not residing 
with the family but for whose support one or more 
members of the family are legally or morally re­
sponsible; but not including expenses incured for 
the support of children away from home for pur­
poses of normal and voluntary education.

4. Amounts paid, if reasonable, for the care of chil­
dren or aged or incapacitated family members in 
order to permit the primary wage earner to work, 
provided that no other member of the family is 
available to provide the necessary care.

5. In the case of a former member of the armed serv­
ices who is the family head, who is absent from



54

home and who is receiving allowances in connec­
tion with education or training, an amount equal 
to the allowance received by a former member of 
the armed forces without dependents who is re­
ceiving the same education, or training.

6. In the case of a member of the armed services who 
is the family head and who is stationed away from 
home, $50 per month to cover special occupational 
expenses, plus any other deductions regularly 
allowed for all families if actually incurred. Spe­
cial occupational expenses in excess of $50 may be 
allowed only when specifically approved by the 
Commission.

7. Any deduction claimed for child care expense or 
for support of family members not in the home 
must be supported by documentary evidence.

In no event are the following items to be allowed as de­
ductions :

1. Payments of income tax, including payroll deduc­
tions therefor.

2. Payments for savings bonds, or the acquisition of 
other assets, including payroll deductions there­
for.

3. Payroll deductions of any kind not required by 
law or by the employer as a condition of employ­
ment for pensions or other benefits.

4. Payments on, or garnishment for, installment 
purchases, repayment of loans, or interest and 
finance charges on such items.

5. Any other items not specifically enumerated in 
Items # 1  through # 6 .



55

M. Public Slum-Clearance and Redevelopment Project
“ Public Slum-Clearance and Redevelopment Project”  
means any project undertaken by a public body for the 
primary purpose of slum clearance; or a redevelopment 
project undertaken by a public body pursuant to State 
or Local legislation and which qualifies or is of a physi­
cal character which could qualify for financial assistance 
under Title I of the Housing Act of 1949.

N. Initiated
The term “ initiated”  as used herein applies solely to 
slum-clearance or redevelopment projects as defined in 
paragraph “ M ”  above, and is the effective date of the 
assistance contract between the assisting agency and 
the local public body.

Section XII. A ccounting and R eporting Procedures :

A. The accounting procedure shall be in accordance with 
the Public Housing Administration’s Manual relating 
thereto.

B. Management records and reports other than those of a 
financial nature shall be prepared and filed in accord­
ance with the Public Housing Administration’s Manual 
relating thereto.

Section X III . Operating B udgets :

Operating budgets shall be prepared and submitted in ac­
cordance with the terms of the contract and other regula­
tions that may be provided for by the Public Housing Ad­
ministration.

Section XIV. Operating Reserve :

For each five-year period, the Operating Reserve shall be 
one-half of the “ Annual Operating Expense”  of each de­



56

velopment (as used herein, “ Annual Operating Expense”  
includes the expenses of Management; Operating Services; 
Dwelling and Commercial Utilities; Repairs, Maintenance 
and Replacements; Collection Losses; and Miscellaneous 
Operating Expenses. It excludes Payments in Lieu of 
Taxes; Debt Service; Provisions for Reserves; and Mis­
cellaneous Non-Operating Expense).
Such Operating Reserve shall be established and main­
tained in the manner provided for in the regulations of the 
Public Housing Administration.

Section XV. Procurement P olicy :

Purchases and contracts for materials, supplies, or serv­
ices, except for personal services, shall be made in accord­
ance with City of Detroit ordinances and regulations.

Section XVI. I nsurance :

Insurance shall be obtained in the amounts and in the man­
ner prescribed by the Public Housing Administration’s 
Manual relating thereto.

Section XVII. Personnel P olicy :

The management and operating staffs for the administra­
tion of the projects shall be appointed in accordance with 
the requirements of the City of Detroit Civil Service Com­
mission, and the salaries and wages established by that 
Commission are to be considered prevailing under the ap­
plicable local law.
Hours of work, annual leave, and sick leave shall be in 
conformance with City of Detroit ordinances and regula­
tions relating thereto.



57

Section XVIII. A dministrative R egulations:

The Director-Secretary appointed by the Commission shall, 
subject to the supervision and direction of the Commis­
sion, have general charge and supervision of the manage­
ment, tenant relations, operation, and maintenance of the 
project. He or his designees may make such purchases and 
employ such personnel as may be authorized by the Com­
mission. He shall see that all orders and resolutions of 
the Commission relating to the management and operation 
of the projects are carried out.
The Director-Secretary shall also advise and make recom­
mendations to the Commission on all matters and policies 
affecting the management and operation of the projects as 
low-rent projects, and on any other matters as may from 
time to time be assigned to him by the Commission.

Section XIX. Community R elations P rogram :

It shall be the responsibility of this Commission to pro­
vide guidance and initiate programs covering health, sani­
tation, recreation, tenant maintenance, and community ac­
tivities for tenants. This program is to be accomplished 
through arrangements with public and private agencies who 
will provide leadership, maintenance and technical aid.



58

SUPPLEMENT “E”

List of “School Segregation Cases”, so-called:

( 1 )

Oliver Brown, et al.,
Appellants,

v.
Board of Education of To­

peka, Shawnee County, 
Kansas, et al.

( 2 )

Harry Briggs, Jr., et al.,' 
Appellants, 

v.
R. W. Elliott, et al.
(3)
Dorothy E. Davis, et al., 

Appellants, 
v.

County School Board of 
Prince Edward County, 
Virginia, et al.

(4)
Francis B. Gebhart, et al.,' 

Petitioners, 
v.

Louise Belton, et al.

(5)
Spottswood Thomas B ol-' 

ling, et al.,
Petitioners, • 

v.
C. Melvin Sharpe, et al.

347 U. S. 483; 74 S. Ct. 686 
On Appeal from the United 

States District Court for 
the District of Kansas.

On Appeal from the United 
States District Court for 
the Eastern District of 
South Carolina.

On Appeal from the United 
States District Court for 
the Eastern District of 
Virginia.

On Writ of Certiorari to the 
Supreme Court of Dela­
ware.

347 U. S. 497; 74 S. Ct. 693 
On Writ of Certiorari to the 

United States Court of 
Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit.







No. 12,305

In the

United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit

— ♦ —

THE DETROIT HOUSING COMMISSION, a duly author­
ized Department of the City of Detroit, FINLAY C. ALLEN, 
President, MARY M. STREIT, Vice-President, W ALTER J. 
GESSEL, GEORGE A. ISABEL and JAMES H. QUELLO, 

Members; and HARRY J. DURBIN, Director-Secretary 
of the Detroit Housing Commission,

Defendants and Appellants, 
vs.

WALTER ARTHUR LEWIS, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellees

-------♦-------

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN, 

SOUTHERN DIVISION

------ ♦------

APPENDIX TO APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
------ ♦------

PAUL T. DW YER,
Corporation Counsel,

VANCE G. INGALLS,
Assistant Corporation Counsel, 

HELEN W . MILLER,
Assistant Corporation Counsel,

Attorneys for Defendants and 
Appellants,

301 City Hall,
Detroit 26, Michigan.

Interstate Brief 6  Record Co., 642 Beaubien St., Detroit 26, Michigan





In the

United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit

— ♦ —

No. 12,305
------ ♦------

THE DETROIT HOUSING COMMISSION, a duly author­
ized Department of the City of Detroit, FINLAY C. ALLEN, 
President, MARY M. STREIT, Vice-President, WALTER J. 
GESSEL, GEORGE A. ISABEL and JAMES H. QUELLO, 

Members; and HARRY J. DURBIN, Director-Secretary 
of the Detroit Housing Commission,

Defendants and Appellants, 
vs.

WALTER ARTHUR LEWIS, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellees

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN, 

SOUTHERN DIVISION

------ ♦------

APPENDIX TO APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
------ ♦------

PAUL T. DWYER,
Corporation Counsel,

VANCE G. INGALLS,
Assistant Corporation Counsel, 

HELEN W . MILLER,
Assistant Corporation Counsel,

Attorneys for Defendants and 
Appellants,

301 City Hall,
Detroit 26, Michigan.





TABLE OF CONTENTS OF APPENDIX
Page

Amended Answer to Amended Complaint............ 23a-30a
Amended Complaint ............................................... 7a-17a
Answer to Amended Complaint.............................  17a-22a
Answer to Complaint of Intervenor-Plaintiffs... 45a-50a
Answer to Plaintiffs’ Reply...................................  36a-37a
Appearances ....................... . ...................................
Bond for Costs on Appeal.........................................102a-104a
Docket Entries ......................................................... la-7a
Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction........ 91a-92a
Intervenors ’ Complaint..........................    38a-45a
Notice of Appeal....................................................... 93a
Order Dismissing Amended Complaint as to All 

Defendants Except Detroit Housing Com­
mission, et al......................................................

Order Granting Motion to Intervene as Plaintiffs 37a-38a
Order Staying Proceedings and Suspending In­

junction ............................................................. 101a-102a
Petition for Stay of Proceedings or Suspension

of Injunction During Pendency of Appeal. .. 94a-101a
Reply to Amended Answer.....................................  31a-36a
Stipulation of Facts.................................................  52a-59a
Transcript of Proceedings.....................................  60a-90a

Preliminary Statement and Motion on Be­
half of City of Detroit.................................  60a-63a

Ruling on Motion and Statement by the Court 63a-66a
Statement on Behalf of Plaintiffs.................. 66a-67a
Motion for the Defendants.............................. 67a-69a



Page
Statement of the Court and Discussion of 

Stipulation ..................................................... 69a-76a
Further Statement on Behalf of Plaintiffs.. 77a-78a
Colloquy between Court and Counsel............ 78a-88a
Statement by the Court...................................  88a-90a
Certificate of Court Reporter........ .................  90a

11



In the

United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit

— +—

No. 12,305
------ ♦------

THE DETROIT HOUSING COMMISSION, a duly author­
ized Department of the City of Detroit, FINLAY C. ALLEN, 
President, MARY M. STREIT, Vice-President, W ALTER J. 
GESSEL, GEORGE A. ISABEL and JAMES H. QUELLO, 

Members; and HARRY J. DURBIN, Director-Secretary 
of the Detroit Housing Commission,

Defendants and Appellants, 
vs.

W ALTER ARTHUR LEWIS, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellees

-------+-------

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN, 

SOUTHERN DIVISION

-------1-------

APPENDIX TO APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
-------+-------

DOCKET ENTRIES
1950

June 5. Complaint filed; $15.00.
June 5. Summons issued.
June 21. Summons returned and filed.
June 22. Summons returned and filed.



2 a D ocket Entries

June 30.

July 3. 
Tuly 10.

Aug. 4.

Aug. 22. 
Aug. 22. 
Sept. 1.

Sept. 1. 
Sept. 18.

Oct. 4. 
Oct. 9.

Oct. 10. 
Oct. 17.

Oct. 23.

Oct. 23.

Nov. 6. 
Nov. 6.

Nov. 16.

Nov. 16. 
Nov. 17.

Nov. 28. 

Dec. 4.

Motion of Raymond M. Foley, et al., to quash 
filed; hearing July 10/50; Lederle, J.

Answer of City of Detroit, et al., filed.
Order overruling motion to quash filed and en­

tered ; Lederle, J.
Motion and order extending time for defendant 

to answer, etc., filed; Levin, J.
Subpoena returned and filed.
Subpoena returned and filed.
Motion by the Housing and Home Finance 

Agency, et al., to quash summons, dismiss and 
for summary judgment filed; hearing Septem­
ber 18/50; Lederle, J.

Proof of service filed.
Motion to dismiss, etc., adjourned to October 9, 

1950; Lederle, J.
Summons returned and filed.
Motion to dismiss, etc., adjourned to October 23, 

1950 by request; Lederle, J.
Deposition of Finlay C. Allan et al. filed.
Motion to file amended complaint filed; hearing 

October 23,1950; Lederle, J.
Order dismissing complaint as to certain defend­

ants filed and entered; Lederle, J.
Order granting motion to amend complaint filed 

and entered; Lederle, J.
Proof of service filed.
Order allowing amended complaint filed and en­

tered; Lederle, J.
Motion by the Housing and Home Finance 

Agency, et al., to dismiss filed; hearing De­
cember 4, 1950; Lederle, J.

Proof of service filed.
Stipulation and order extending time to plead to 

December 4,1950 filed; order entered; Lederle, 
J.

Order dismissing amended complaint as to Hous­
ing and Home Finance Agency, et al., filed.

Answer of City of Detroit, et al., filed.



D ocket Entries 3a

Dec. 6.

Dec. 23. 

1951
Jan. 9.

Jan. 22. 
Jan. 22.

Jan. 22.

Feb. 14.

Feb. 21.

Feb. 26.

Mar. 1. 
Mar. 8. 
Mar. 15. 
Mar. 19.

Mar. 26.

Apr. 23. 
May 15. 
May 21.

June 20.

June 25.

June 27. 
July 2.

July 9.

Order overruling Schwartz’s motion to dismiss 
and proof of mailing tiled; order entered; 
Lederle, J.

Answer of Hugo C. Schwartz, tiled.

Order for hearing February 5, 1951 tiled and 
entered; Lederle, J.

Motion for adjournment tiled.
Order adjourning pre-trial to February 26, 1951 

tiled and entered; Lederle, J.
Interrogatories to Detroit Housing Commission, 

et al., tiled.
Answer to interrogatories of Detroit Housing 

Commission tiled.
Interrogatories to Walter Arthur Lewis, et al., 

tiled.
Pre-trial adjourned to March 26, 1951; Lederle,

J.
Plaintiffs’ answer to interrogatories tiled.
Plaintiffs’ interrogatories tiled.
Return of service on interrogatories filed.
Stipulation adjourning pre-trial to April 23,1951 

filed.
Pre-trial adjourned to April 23, 1951 for an­

swers to interrogatories; Lederle, J.
Pre-trial adjourned to May 21, 1951; Lederle, J.
Affidavit of service of interrogatories filed.
Pre-trial adjourned to June 25, 1951 by request; 

Lederle, J.
Motion for order to answer interrogatories filed; 

hearing July 2,1951; Lederle, J.
Pre-trial adjourned to July 2, 1951, request of 

government; Lederle, J.
Proof of service of motion tiled.
Pre-trial and motion continued to July 16, 1951; 

Lederle, J.
Motion of plaintiff for summary judgment filed; 

hearing July 16, 1951; Lederle, J.



4a D ocket E ntries

July 12.

July 13. 
July 16.

July 16.

July 23. 
July 23.

July 23. 

Aug. 6.

Aug. 13. 

Aug. 13.

Aug. 20.

Sept. 10.

Oct. 8. 
Oct. 8. 
Oct. 8.

Oct. 8.

Dec. 31.

Dec. 31.

Dec. 31.

Motion of plaintiff for summary judgment filed; 
hearing July 23, 1951; Lederle, J.

Affidavit of Vance G. Ingalls filed.
Motion of Hugo C. Schwartz for summary judg­

ment filed; hearing July 23, 1951; Lederle, J.
Pre-trial and motion adjourned to July 23, 1951 

request of plaintiff’s counsel; Lederle, J.
Answer of Schwartz to interrogatories filed.
Hearing on motion of Schwartz for summary 

judgment heard in part and continued to Aug­
ust 6,1951; Lederle, J.

Pre-trial held in part and continued to October 8, 
1951; Lederle, J.

Hearing on motion for summary judgment ad­
journed to August 13, 1951 by consent; Led­
erle, J.

Motion to substitute successor to federal office, 
filed; hearing September 10, 1951

Hearing on motion of Hugo C. Schwartz for 
summary judgment adjourned to August 20, 
1951; Lederle, J.

Hearing on motion of Hugo C. Schwartz for 
summary judgment adjourned to September 
10, 1951 by consent; Lederle, J.

Special appearance and objection of William E. 
Bergeron filed.

Pre-trial adjourned without date; Lederle, J.
Amendment to answer filed.
Affidavit of service of motion for summary judg­

ment filed.
Affidavit in opposition to motion for summary 

judgment filed.
Order overruling motion for substitution of suc­

cessor to Federal Office filed and entered; 
Lederle, J.

Order overruling motion for summary judgment 
on behalf of plaintiffs filed July 9 and 12, 1951 
filed and entered; Lederle, J.

Order granting defendant Schwartz’s motion for 
summary judgment and proof of mailing filed 
and entered; Lederle, J.



D ocket E ntries

Dec. 31.

1952 
Feb. 13.

Feb. 29.

June 16. 
June 26. 
July 9. 
Oct. 14. 
Oct. 15. 
Oct. 22.

1953 
Apr. 16.

Apr. 27.

Sept. 29.

Oct. 5. 

Oct. 19. 

Oct. 19. 

Nov. 4. 

Dec. 1. 

Dec. 21.

Order for hearing February 18, 1952 filed and 
entered; Lederle, J.

Hearing had and pre-trial adjourned to Febru­
ary 29,1952; Lederle, J.

Pre-trial held; trial to be set for A pril; Lederle, 
J.

Amended answer of City of Detroit et al. filed. 
Reply to answer filed.
Answer to reply filed.
Request for admission filed.
Proof of service filed.
Objections to request filed.

5a

Notice of hearing on objections for April 27,1953 
filed; Lederle, J.

Order requiring defendants to answer request 
for admission filed and entered; Lederle, J.

Motion by plaintiff to review and grant motion 
for summary judgment noticed October 5, 
1953; Lederle, J.

Motion by plaintiff to review and grant motion 
for summary judgment noticed to October 19, 
1953; Lederle, J.

Affidavit in opposition to motion to review and 
grant motion for summary judgment by In­
galls filed.

Motion to review and grant motion for summary 
judgment adjourned to November 4 at 9:30 
a. m., request defendants, filed.

Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment heard 
in part and continued to December 1, 1953; 
Lederle, J.

Motion for summary judgment adjourned to De­
cember 21, 1953 at 9 :30 a. m. request defend­
ant’s attorney; Lederle, J.

Motion for summary judgment adjourned to 
January 18, 1954; Lederle, J.



6a D ocket E ntries

1954
Jan. 18. Motion for summary judgment heard further 

and continued to May 3, 1954 at 2; Lederle, J.
Mar. 22. Order for special hearing on April 19, 1954 at 

11:00 a. m .; Lederle, J.
Apr. 6. Interrogatories to defendants by plaintiff.
Apr. 6. Motion for summary judgment for plaintiffs on 

plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment or 
in the alternative an early trial date; noticed 
April 19,1954 at 11.

Apr. 16. Answer to motion for summary judgment.
Apr. 16. Answer to interrogatories.
Apr. 16. Motion for summary judgment of dismissal of 

amended complaint; noticed April 19, 1954 at 
2 .

Apr. 16. Admission of facts requested filed by defendant.
Apr. 19. Proof of service filed.
Apr. 19. Motion to intervene by plaintiffs, noticed May 

11,1954.
Apr. 19. Special hearing held; all motions continued to 

May 11, 1954 and trial set for June 22, 1954; 
Lederle, J.

May 10. Defendant’s withdrawal of motion for summary 
judgment of dismissal.

May 10. Motion to intervene as plaintiffs noticed for May 
11,1954; Lederle, J.

May 11. Order overruling plaintiffs’ motion for summary 
judgment; Lederle, J.

May 11. Order granting motion to intervene as plaintiffs; 
Lederle, J.

May 14. Proof of mailing.
June 21. Subpoena to Mary Y. Beck et al. filed.
June 22. Answer to complaint of intervenor-plaintiffs.
June 22. Motion to add defendants.
June 22. Order adding defendants.
June 22. Stipulations of facts.
June 22. Final judgment and permanent injunction; Led­

erle, J.
July 2. Notice of appeal of defendants filed; $5.00.



Am ended Complaint 7a

July 6. Proof of mailing filed.
July 12. Certified copy of order of Court of Appeals stay­

ing proceedings and suspending injunction 
filed and entered; Simons, C. J.

July 22. Order dismissing amended complaint as to all de­
fendants except the Detroit Housing Commis­
sion, etc.; Lederle, J.

July 23. Proof of service.
July 28. Bond for costs in $250.00 filed; U. S. Fidelity and 

Guaranty.
July 30. Motion for extension of time to file record on 

appeal.
July 30. Motion heard in part and continued to August 

9,1954 at 2; Lederle, J.
Aug. 5. Proposed bill of costs filed.
Aug. 6. Transcript filed.

AMENDED COMPLAINT

(Filed November 6,1950)
1. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant 

to Title 28, United States Code, section 1343 (3) this being 
a suit in equity authorized by law to be brought to re­
dress the deprivation under color of state law, statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of a right, privilege 
or immunity secured by the Constitution and Laws of the 
United States or by any Act of Congress providing for 
equal rights of citizens, namely, the right to acquire and 
lease real property without discrimination because of race 
or color as secured by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend­
ments to the Constitution of the United States and Title 
8, sections 41, 42 and 43 of the United States Code. The 
jurisdiction of this Court is also invoked pursuant to 
Title 28, United States Code, section 1331, this being a 
suit arising under the Constitution and laws of the United 
States wherein the matter in controversy as to each plain­
tiff exceeds the sum of three thousand dollars ($3,000) 
exclusive of interest and costs.



8a Am ended Complaint

2. This is a proceeding for an injunction, and a dec­
laratory judgment pursuant to Title 28, United States 
Code, section 2201 for the purpose of determining a ques­
tion in actual controversy between the parties, that is, 
whether the regulation, policy, custom, usage, conduct and 
practice of defendants in refusing to lease to plaintiffs 
and other qualified Negro applicants similarly situated 
solely because of their race and color and in accord­
ance with a strict policy of racial segregation, certain 
units of housing under the administration, control and 
management of the defendants, is a violation of the Con­
stitution and Laws of the United States, particularly the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and Title 8, sections 41, 42 and 43 of the 
United States Code.

3. This is a class action pursuant to Rule 23 (a) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure brought by the 
plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and on behalf of others 
similarly situated, namely, honorably discharged Negro 
veterans of World War II, and non-veterans, residents 
of the City of Detroit, County of Wayne, State of Michi­
gan, and citizens of the State of Michigan and of the 
United States who are in need of housing and who are 
eligible for permanent low-rent housing, war housing and 
veterans’ housing, as contemplated by the LTnited States 
Housing Acts of 1937 and 1949, as amended, and other 
applicable laws, and who are similarly denied admission, 
solely because of their race and color and in accordance 
with a strict policy of racial segregation to some of the 
housing projects maintained, operated and controlled by 
the defendants and reserved exclusively by defendants 
for non-Negro tenants. Said persons constitute a class 
too numerous to be brought individually before the Court, 
but there are common questions of law and fact involved 
herein, common grievances arising out of common wrongs, 
and common relief sought for the entire class as well as 
special relief for the plaintiffs. The interests of said 
class are fairly and adequately represented by plaintiffs 
herein.



Am ended Complaint 9a

4. Plaintiffs are Negroes, citizens of the United States 
and of the State of Michigan, residents of the City of 
Detroit, County of Wayne and State of Michigan. Each 
is the head of a family in serious need of a home, with 
income, less an exemption of $100.00 for each minor, which 
does not exceed five times the annual rental of any dwell­
ing unit to which they may be lawfully admitted in ac­
cordance with the provisions of Title 42, U. S. C., section 
1402, as amended July 15, 1949. Walter Arthur Lewis 
is a veteran of World War II, honorably discharged from 
the armed forces of the United States, married and has 
three children. Jasper Irvin is a veteran of World War 
II, honorably discharged from the armed forces of the 
United States, married and has eight children. Jerome 
Gray is a veteran of World War II, honorably discharged 
from the armed forces of the United States, married and 
has four children. Amanda Snead is now on the eligible 
list for public housing and has three children. Eddie L. 
Hall is a veteran of World War II, honorably discharged 
from the armed forces of the United States and married. 
Jessie Love is now on the eligible list and has children. 
Cornelius Britt is a veteran of World War II, honorably 
discharged from the armed forces of the United States, 
married, and has two children. Bobert Dixon is on the 
eligible list, married and has four children. Ozie Linder 
is on the eligible list, married and has five children and 
Willard Tipton is a veteran of World War II, honorably 
discharged from the armed forces of the United States 
and is married. Each has duly made application for ad­
mission to the permanent low-rent housing, war housing 
and veterans’ housing projects under the control, opera­
tion and management of defendants. Each of the applica­
tions has been on file for a long period of time and some 
as long as six years. Pursuant to the application of each 
duly made, defendants placed the plaintiffs’ name on an 
eligible list separate and distinct from the list on which 
all other eligible white applicants’ names have been placed 
solely because of their race and color and in accordance 
with a strict policy of racial segregation and have re­
fused to consider plaintiffs eligible for permanent low-



10a Am ended Complaint

rent housing, war housing and veterans’ housing projects 
set aside for white applicants solely because of their race 
and color.

5. Defendant, City of Detroit, Michigan, is a Muni- 
cial Corporation duly incorporated under the laws and 
constitution of the State of Michigan. Defendant, Albert 
E. Cobo, is the duly-elected Mayor of the City of Detroit, 
Michigan, and is chief executive officer of said city and 
head of the administrative branch of the government of 
the City of Detroit, Michigan. Defendants, Mary V. 
Beck, Edward D. Connor, James H. Garlick, John A. 
Kronk, Louis C. Mariani, Charles G. Oakman, William 
Rogell and Del A. Smith are all duly-elected members of 
the Common Council of the City of Detroit, the chief legis­
lative body of said city. Defendant, The Detroit Housing 
Commission, hereinafter referred to as the Commission, 
is a duly-authorized department of the City of Detroit, 
established January 16, 1934, by the City of Detroit, 
Michigan, Ordinance 262-C, and pursuant to the laws of 
the State of Michigan, Michigan Compiled Laws (1948) 
125.651 to 125.698, for the purpose of administering a 
program for the purchase, acquisition, construction, main­
tenance, operation, improvement, extension, repair and 
mortgaging of housing facilities in the City of Detroit, 
Michigan and for the elimination of housing conditions 
which are detrimental to public peace, health, safety, 
morals and/or welfare of the City of Detroit, Michigan. 
Defendants, Finlay C. Allen, Mary M. Streit, Robert L. 
Berry, Walter J. Gessel and George A. Isabel are all 
duly-appointed and acting officers and members of the 
Commission. Defendant, Harry J. Durbin, is Director- 
Secretary of the Commission. Defendant Public Housing 
Administration is a constituent unit of the Housing and 
Home Finance Agency of the LTnited States of America. 
Defendant Raymond M. Foley is the duly-appointed and 
acting administrator of the said Housing and Home Fi­
nance Agency. Defendant John T. Egan is the duly-au­
thorized and acting Commissioner of the said Public



Am ended Complaint 11a

Housing Administration, and defendant Hugo C. 
Schwartz is the duly-authorized Detroit Field Office Di­
rector of the said Public Housing Administration of the 
Housing and Home Finance Agency. All individual de­
fendants are sued in their official capacities.

6. The defendant Commission was established by the 
City of Detroit in response to the requirements of the 
National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, Title 40, United 
States Code, section 401 et seq. as amended, and laws 
amendatory thereof and supplemental thereto which pro­
vided for the organization and operation of local public 
housing commissions. As contemplated by the United 
States Housing Act of 1937 and 1949, Title 42, United 
States Code, section 1401 et seq. and other applicable 
laws, the Commission enables the City of Detroit to secure 
grants and loans from the United States government for 
the purpose of providing permanent low-rent housing, war 
housing and veterans’ housing for families of low income.

7. The Housing and Home Finance Agency was es­
tablished pursuant to the provisions of Reorganization 
Plan No. 3, July 27, 1947 (Title 5, United States Code, 
section 133y-16). The Housing and Home Finance 
Agency succeeds the National Housing Agency, in which 
latter organization, all federal housing and related op­
erations were temporarily consolidated during the war, 
and consists of three constituent units of which defend­
ant, Public Housing Administration, is one. The defend­
ant, Public Housing Administration, administers the low- 
rent housing program of the United States government 
provided for by the United States Housing Acts of 
1937 and 1949, Title 42, United States Code, section 1401 
et seq. whereby federal funds are provided for housing, 
owned, operated and administered by local housing au­
thorities or commissions for low-rent housing use. Pur­
suant to the provisions of Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 
1947, the Commissioner of the Public Housing Adminis­
tration succeeds to the functions of the Administrator of 
the United States Housing Authority who previously ad-



1 2 a Am ended Complaint

ministered the United States Housing Act of 1937, and 
succeeds to the functions of the National Housing Agency 
with respect to non-farm housing properties under section 
2(a) (3) of the Farmers’ Home Administration Act of 
1946, and with respect to the liquidation and dissolution 
of the Defense Homes Corporation, which agencies pur­
suant to laws applicable entered into several contracts 
with the defendant City of Detroit through its Housing 
Commission.

8. These contracts resulted in the construction, maint­
enance and operation of three general types of housing, 
permanent low-rent housing, war housing and veterans’ 
housing. The permanent low-rent housing consists of the 
following projects, namely, Brewster Homes, Charles Ter­
race, Herman Gardens, Parkside and John W. Smith, 
Brewster Addition and Parkside Addition. The war 
housing consists of the following projects, namely So­
journer Truth, McKeever Homes, Carle Homes, Charles 
Annex, Temp. Douglass, Emerson Homes, Valentine, 
Adams, Fisher, Catallo, Brooks Homes, and Moseley 
Homes. The veterans’ housing consists of the following 
projects, namely, Algonquin, Croxon, Stone Homes, Brooks 
Annex and McKeever Annex.

9. The Housing and Home Finance Agency succeeded, 
among others, to the functions of (1) the War and Navy 
Departments with respect to national defense and war 
housing (except that located on military or naval posts, 
reservations or bases) Act of September 9, 1940 (54 Stat. 
872), as amended, and (2) the functions of all agencies 
designated to provide temporary shelter in defense areas 
under the Act of March 1, 1941 (c. 9), May 24, 1941 
(34:498c-4 and note) and December 17, 1941 (c. 591) (55 
Stat. 14, 197 and 810), insofar as such functions related 
to such temporary shelter.

10. All of these said defendants, their aides, agents 
and representatives are under an obligation to discharge 
their duties in conformity with the Laws and Constitution 
of the United States of America.



Am ended Complaint 13a

11. Under color of their authority, defendants and 
each of them in administering the entire public housing 
program of the City of Detroit, and the United States 
Housing Act of 1937 and 1949 and Title 42 U. S. C. sec­
tion 1501 et seq. with respect to Detroit, have adopted a 
strict policy of racial segregation based solely upon the 
race and color of prospective tenants. This regulation, 
policy, custom, usage, conduct and practice in resolution 
form as adopted by defendant Commission and approved 
and enforced by the other defendants provides that the 
defendant Commission in selecting tenants “ will in no 
way change the racial characteristics of any neighbor­
hood in Detroit through occupancy standards of housing 
projects under their jurisdiction.” This resolution is in 
practice the policy, custom and usage of segregating Negro 
and white applicants and tenants, and as a matter of fact 
has resulted in changes in the racial characteristics of 
neighborhoods from mixed neighborhoods to segregated 
neighborhoods. It was formally adopted by the defendant 
Commission on April 29, 1943 and has been approved and 
acquiesced in by each of the other defendants.

12. As a result of said resolution, regulation, policy, 
custom and usage, Negro and white applicants are listed 
separately upon being declared eligible, are required to 
state their race upon applying and are assigned units in 
separate projects on the basis of race and color; no eligible 
Negro families are considered for admission to vacancies 
which occur in projects designated for white families and 
no eligible white applicants are considered for projects 
designated for Negro families. Negro applicants have been 
denied admission to projects for which they would have 
otherwise been eligible and for which they were more 
eligible than white applicants who have been admitted 
to the projects reserved for whites, by reason of priority 
of application and veteran of World War II status; Negro 
applicants have been considered for admission only to the 
permanent low-rent housing projects known as Brewster 
Homes, with a total of 943 units and the war housing pro­
jects known as Brooks, Moseley, Douglass and Sojourner



14a Am ended Complaint

Truth with a total of 1,827 units, and to veterans’ housing 
projects known as Brooks Annex and Angonquin with a 
total of 325 units; while white applicants have been con­
sidered for permanent low-rent projects known as Charles 
Terrace, Herman Gardens, Parkside, Parkside Addition 
and John W. Smith with a total of 3,934 units, and war 
projects known as Adams, Carle, Catallo, Charles Annex, 
Emerson Homes, Fisher, McKeever Homes and Valentine 
with a total of 3,454 units, and veterans’ projects known 
as Croxon, McKeever Annex and Stone Avith a total of 
830 units.

13. Defendants are presently engaged in the con­
struction of additional low-rent housing projects pursu­
ant to the provisions of the U. S. Housing Act of 1937 
and the U. S. Housing Act of 1949.

14. Of the 2,456 Negroes Avho Avere certified as eligible 
in 1949, only 247 or 10 percent Avere granted leases in 
public housing units, Avhile of the 4,020 whites who Avere 
certified eligible the same year, 1,586 or 39 percent were 
granted leases in loAv-rent housing units. The defendant 
Commission published in its Monthly Eeport for May- 
June 1950, page 7, the folloAAnng data: “ As of May 31, 
1950, the eligible pool of certified applicants for housing 
Avas:

White Families 1,836
Negro Families 4,942

Total 6,778”

This policy, custom and usage has therefore resulted in 
Negro applicants being denied equality of opportunity by 
defendants to obtain housing and in being discriminated 
against solely because of their race and color by defend­
ants and each of them in Adolation of the due process 
clause of the Fifth Amendment and the due process and 
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the Federal Constitution and Title 8, sections 41 and 42 
of the United States Code.



Am ended Complaint 15a

15. The plaintiffs and others on behalf of the plaintiffs 
have continually requested that they be assigned to va­
cant units in any of the low-rent housing projects named 
above whether permanent, war, or veterans’ housing. 
Plaintiffs and others on behalf of plaintiffs have peti­
tioned all of the defendants to change this regulation, 
policy, custom and usage, but each of the said defendants 
has failed and refused to do so although each defendant 
has the inherent power to do so.

16. Under the provisions of the United States Housing 
Act of 1937, the United States Housing Authority, which 
has been succeeded by the defendant Public Housing Ad­
ministration, was empowered under section 1409, Title 
42 United States Code “ to make loans to public-housing 
agencies to assist the development, acquisition or admin­
istration of low-rent housing or slum clearance projects 
by such agency” , and was empowered by section 1410 
“ to make annual contributions to public housing agencies 
to assist in achieving and maintaining the low-rent char­
acter of their housing projects.”  As an alternative to 
the next preceding method of assistance, the U. S. Housing 
Authority was authorized to make capital grants to such 
local public housing agencies upon the request of such 
local public housing agencies. In addition, the authority 
was empowered under section 1415 to “ insert in any con­
tract for loans, annual contributions, capital, grants, sale, 
lease, mortgage or any other agreement or instrument 
made pursuant to this act * * * such other covenants, 
conditions or provisions as it may deem necessary in 
order to ensure the low-rent character of the housing 
project involved.”  The U. S. Housing Act of 1949 amends 
the U. S. Housing Act of 1937 in certain respects not here 
material and in addition provides for further grants and 
loans and strengthens these controls and supervisory 
poAvers of the defendant Public Housing Administration 
over local agency projects. The war housing in the City 
of Detroit described above, which was originally con­
structed pursuant to Title 42, Section 1501 et seq, has



16a Am ended Complaint

recently been turned over by the defendant, Public Hous­
ing Administration, to the defendant, Detroit Housing 
Commission, to be operated by said Commission for low- 
rent housing use. The veterans’ housing in the City of 
Detroit, which was constructed pursuant to the provisions 
of Title 42, Section 1501 et seq. is under the management 
and jurisdiction of the defendant Commission.

17. The defendants Public Housing Administration of 
the Housing and Home Finance Agency, Raymond M. 
Foley, John T. Egan and Hugo C. Schwartz have ac­
quiesced in and have approved said policy, custom and 
usage of segregation and have continually refused to re­
quire the other defendants to change said policy, custom 
and usage despite their inherent power to do so and have 
continued to give financial aid and other assistance to the 
other defendants herein despite said segregation policy, 
custom, and usage in violation of the prohibitions to the 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Wherefore plaintiffs respectfully pray this Court that 
upon the filing of this complaint as may appear proper 
and convenient to the Court, the Court advance this cause 
on the docket and order a speedy hearing of this action 
according to law, and that upon said hearing:

1. This Court adjudge, decree and declare the rights 
and legal relations of the parties to the subject matter 
here in controversy in order that said declaration shall 
have the force and effect of a final judgment.

2. That this Court enter a judgment or decree declar­
ing that the policy, custom and usage of the defendants 
and each of them and their successors in office in refusing 
to lease to qualified Negro applicants certain units of any 
public low-rent or other housing projects under the juris­
diction, management and control of the defendants, solely 
because of the race and color of such applicants, and of 
segregating tenants into projects on the basis of race or 
color is in violation of the Constitution and Laws of the 
United States and particularly the Fifth and Fourteenth



A nsw er to Am ended Complaint 17a

Amendments to the United States Constitution and sec­
tions 41 and 42 of Title 8 of the United States Code.

3. That this Court issue a permanent injunction for­
ever restraining and enjoining the defendants, and each 
of them, their agents and representatives and successors 
in office from denying to qualified Negro applicants the 
right to lease any unit in any of the public housing pro­
jects under their control, management and supervision 
because of the race or color of said applicants, and from 
segregating tenants into projects on the basis of race or 
color, and from making any distinction whatsoever be­
cause of race or color in the leasing of units in any public 
housing projects under their control, management and 
jurisdiction.

' 4. Plaintiffs further pray that this Court give each of 
them judgment for Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) 
and allow them their costs herein and grant such other 
and further relief as may appear to the Court to be 
equitable and just.

ANSW ER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT

(Filed December 4, 1950)
Now comes the City of Detroit, a municipal corporation, 

Albert E. Cobo, Mayor, Mary V. Beck, Edward D. Connor, 
James H. Garlick, John A. Kronk, Louis C. Miriani, 
Charles G. Oakman, William Rogell and Del A. Smith, 
members of the Common Council of the City of Detroit; 
the Detroit Housing Commission, a duly authorized de­
partment of the City of Detroit, Finley C. Allan, Presi­
dent, Mary M. Streit, Vice-President, Robert L. Berry, 
Walter J. Gessel and George A. Isabel, members, and 
Harry J. Durbin, Director-Secretary of the Detroit Hous­
ing Commission, defendants herein, by Paul T. Dwyer, 
Acting Corporation Counsel, Vance G. Ingalls and Helen



1 8 a A nsw er to Am ended Complaint

W. Miller, Assistants Corporation Counsel, its attorneys, 
and for answer thereto say:

1. Answering paragraph one, these defendants admit 
that Title 28 U. S. C. A., Section 1343(3), gives District 
Courts of the United States jurisdiction “ to redress the 
deprivation under color of state law, statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom or usage of a right, privilege or im­
munity secured by the Constitution and laws of the 
United States or by any Act of Congress providing for 
equal rights of citizens” , but these defendants deny that 
plaintiffs have suffered any such deprivation or any de­
privation as alleged in said complaint. Further answer­
ing these defendants deny that the matter in controversy 
exceeds the sum of $3,000 exclusive of interest and costs.

2. Answering paragraph two, these defendants admit 
that Title 28 U. S. C. A., Section 2201, authorizes a Dis­
trict Court of the United States, when there exists an 
actual controversy to declare the rights and other legal 
relations of interested parties seeking such declaration, 
but deny that there exists between plaintiffs and these de­
fendants any such controversy or any controversy cogniz­
able in the Federal Court of the United States and further 
deny that there has been any violation by these defendants 
of the Constitution and Laws of the United States, par­
ticularly the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution, and Title 8, Sections 41 and 
42 and 43 of the United States Code.

3. Answering paragraph three, these defendants deny 
the allegations therein contained.

4. Answering paragraph four, these defendants neither 
admit nor deny the allegations contained therein for want 
of knowledge.

5. Answering paragraph five, these defendants admit 
that the defendant City of Detroit is a municipal corpora­
tion, duly incorporated under the laws and Constitution 
of the State of Michigan; that defendant Albert E. Cobo 
is the duly elected Mayor of the City of Detroit, Michigan



Answ er to Am ended Complaint 19a

and is the Chief Executive Officer of said City and the 
head of the administrative branch of the Government of 
the City of Detroit, Michigan; that defendants Mary V. 
Beck, Edward D. Connor, James H. Garlick, John A. 
Kronk, Louis C. Miriani, Charles G. Oakman, William 
Rogell and Del A. Smith are all duly elected members of 
the Common Council of the City of Detroit, the chief 
legislative body of said City. These defendants further 
admit that the Detroit Housing Commission was estab­
lished pursuant to Ordinance 262-C of the City of Detroit, 
which became effective January 16, 1934, and for the pur­
poses, duties and powers of said Commission these de­
fendants refer to the said ordinance establishing the Com­
mission and to the Statutes of the State of Michigan as 
made and provided. These defendants further admit that 
Finley C. Allen, Mary M. Streit, Robert L. Berry, Walter 
J. Gessel and George A. Isabel are all duly appointed and 
acting officers and members of the Detroit Housing Com­
mission and that the defendant Harry J. Durbin is Di­
rector and Secretary of said Commission. All further 
allegations in said paragraph contained are neither ad­
mitted nor denied by these defendants for want of knowl­
edge.

6. These defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 
six, but do admit that certain Federal Acts, including the 
Housing Acts of 1937 and 1949 enabled the Commission to 
secure grants and loans from the United States govern­
ment for the purpose of providing permanent low-rent 
housing and for assistance in the construction and op­
eration of war and veterans housing.

7. These defendants neither admit nor deny the allega­
tions of paragraph seven for want of knowledge, except 
the allegation that certain contracts were entered into be­
tween the Commission and the Federal Agencies men­
tioned, which allegation is admitted.

8. These defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 
eight.



20a A nsw er to Am ended Complaint

9. These defendants neither admit nor deny the allega­
tions of paragraph nine for want of knowledge.

10. These defendants admit the allegations of para­
graph ten.

11. Answering paragraph eleven, these defendants ad­
mit that on April 29, 1943, defendant Housing Commis­
sion, as then constituted, by resolution duly adopted, de­
clared it to be the policy of the City of Detroit that no 
change in the racial characteristics of any neighborhood 
in Detroit would be made through occupancy standards 
of housing projects under their jurisdiction and for 
greater certainty reference is made to the Minutes of the 
defendant Detroit Housing Commission. These defend­
ants further admit that Negro and white applicants are 
listed separately upon being declared eligible and that no 
eligible Negro family is admitted to projects designated 
for white residents and no eligible white family is ad­
mitted to projects designated for Negro residents. The 
remaining allegations in said paragraph are denied. These 
defendants further deny specifically that any of these de­
fendants either participated in the fixing of the above 
policy or have they taken any action whatsoever regarding 
same.

12. Answering paragraph 12 these defendants admit 
that negro and white applicants are listed separately upon 
being declared eligible, are required to state their race 
upon applying and are assigned units at separate projects 
on the basis of race and color, and that no eligible negro 
families are considered for admission to vacancies which 
occur in projects for white families and no eligible white 
applicants are considered for projects designated for 
negro families. As to the number of units in each of 
the projects as listed in paragraph 12, these defendants 
admit that the same are substantially correct and deny all 
other allegations of paragraph twelve.

13. These defendants admit the allegations of para­
graph thirteen.



14. These defendants admit the certification of eligible 
tenants as listed in paragraph fourteen for 1949, and the 
eligible pool of certified applicants for May, June 1950 
as therein listed is substantially correct. The remaining 
allegations are denied.

15. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph fif­
teen, except as to the allegation that petitions were filed 
requesting the change of the foregoing regulation or 
policy, which allegation is admitted.

16. These defendants neither admit nor deny the al­
legations of paragraph sixteen for want of knowledge, 
except as to the allegation in paragraph sixteen that cer­
tain war housing units in the City of Detroit have been 
turned over to the Commission to be operated for vet­
erans, in low rent housing, which allegation is admitted. 
Defendants further admit that veterans’ housing is under 
the management and jurisdiction of the defendant com­
mission subject to certain regulations and controls of 
federal agencies.

17. These defendants neither admit nor deny the al­
legations of paragraph seventeen for want of knowledge.

In further answer to the amended complaint defend­
ant Housing Commission avers that the Commission is 
negotiating contracts under the Federal Housing Act of 
1949 heretofore referred to for the construction and op­
eration of approximately 10,000 units of public low rent 
housing, and approximately all of which units will be 
designated for negro occupancy, in accordance with the 
policy established by the resolution adopted in 1943 re­
ferred to in paragraph eleven heretofore.

Wherefore these defendants pray that the amended 
complaint be dismissed for the reasons that this court 
lacks jurisdiction over the persons of these individuals 
or collective defendants, that the court lacks jurisdiction 
over the subject matter involved, that the plaintiffs have 
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 
and that the amended bill of complaint fails to state a

A nsw er to Am ended Complaint 21a



22a A nsw er to Am ended Complaint

cause of action and these defendants further pray that 
judgment be awarded to these defendants and that the 
court allow them such costs as may appear to be equitable 
and just.

City of Detroit,
A Municipal Corporation,

Albert E. Cobo, Mayor 
Mary V. Beck,
Edward D. Connor,
James H. Garlick,
John A. Kronk,
Louis C. Miriani,

, Charles G. Oakman,
William Rogell and 
Del A, Smith,

Members of the Common Council of 
the City of Detroit,

Detroit Housing Commission,
Finlay C. Allen,
Mary M. Streit,
Robert L. Berry,
Walter J. Gessel and 
George A. Isabel,

Members thereof
Harry J. Durbin,

Director-Secretary of the Detroit 
Housing Commission,

Defendants.
By Paul T. Dwyer,

Acting Corporation Counsel,
By Vance G. Ingalls,

Assistant Corporation Counsel,
By Helen W. Miller,

Assistant Corporation Counsel,
Attorneys for said Defendants, 
301 City Hall,
Detroit 26, Michigan.

jbated at Detroit, Michigan, 
this 1st day of December, 1950.



Am ended A nsw er to Am ended Complaint 23a

AMENDED ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT

(Filed June 16,1932)
In amended answer to plaintiffs’ amended complaint, 

these defendants say:
1. Answering paragraph one, these defendants admit 

that Title 28 U. S. C. A. Section 1343 (3), gives District 
Courts of the United States jurisdiction “ to redress the de­
privation under color of state law, statute, ordinance, regu­
lation, custom or usage of a right, privilege or immunity 
secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States 
or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of 
citizens” , but these defendants deny that plaintiffs have 
suffered any such deprivation or any deprivation as alleged 
in said complaint. Further answering these defendants 
deny that the matter in controversy exceeds the sum of 
$3,000 exclusive of interests and costs.

2. Answering paragraph two, these defendants admit 
that Title 28 U. S. C. A., Section 2201, authorizes a District 
Court of the United States, when there exists an actual con­
troversy to declare the rights and other legal relations of 
interested parties seeking such declaration but deny that 
there exists between plaintiffs and these defendants any 
such controversy or any controversy cognizable in the Fed­
eral Court of the United States and further deny that there 
has been any violation by these defendants of the Constitu­
tion and Laws of the United States, particularly the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Consti­
tution, and Title 8, Sections 41, 42 and 43 of the United 
States Code. Defendants deny that they or any of them 
have or have had any regulation, policy, custom, usage, con­
duct or practice of refusing to lease units of housing to 
plaintiffs and other qualified negro applicants similarly 
situated solely because of their race and color or in accord­
ance with any strict policy of racial segregation as in this 
paragraph alleged.



3. Defendants neither admit nor deny that plaintiffs and 
others similarly situated are in need of permanent low rent 
housing, veteran housing, or war housing, not having suffi­
cient information upon which to base an answer. Defend­
ants, deny, however, that any of them are denied admission 
to any of the City’s housing projects solely because of their 
race and color or in accordance with any strict policy of 
racial segregation.

Defendants deny the other allegations of this paragraph 
of the amended complaint.

4. Defendants neither admit nor deny the allegations of 
paragraph four as to the so-called eligibility of plaintiffs 
for city housing, not having sufficient information upon 
which to base an answer.

Defendants admit that each plaintiff has made applica­
tion for housing and that some of the applications have 
been on file for a considerable time, but aver that that is be­
cause of the cessation of the construction of public housing 
in Detroit during the last war and the shortage of material 
and increased costs after the war.

Defendants deny that they or any of them placed plain­
tiffs’ names on an eligible list separate and distinct from 
the list on which all other eligible white applicants’ names 
have been placed solely because of their race and color and 
in accordance with any strict policy of racial segregation 
nor have these defendants or any of them refused to con­
sider plaintiffs eligible for permanent low rent housing, 
war housing and veterans housing projects set aside for 
white applicants, solely because of their race and color.

5. Answering paragraph five, these defendants admit 
that the defendant City of Detroit is a municipal corpora­
tion, duly incorporated under the laws and Constitution of 
the State of Michigan; that defendant Albert E. Cobo is the 
duly elected Mayor of the City of Detroit, Michigan, and is 
the Chief Executive Officer of said City and the head of the 
administrative branch of the Government of the City of 
Detroit, Michigan; that defendants Mary V. Beck, Edward

24a Am ended Answ er to Am ended Complaint



D. Connor, James H. Garlick, John A. Kronk, Louis C. 
Miriani, Charles G. Oakman, William Rogell, Del A. Smith 
and Eugene I. Van Antwerp are all duly elected members 
of the Common Council of the City of Detroit, the chief 
legislative body of said City. These defendants further 
admit that the Detroit Housing Commission was established 
pursuant to Ordinance 262-C of the City of Detroit, which 
became effective January 16, 1934, and for the purposes, 
duties and powers of said Commission these defendants 
refer to the said ordinance establishing the Commission and 
to the Statutes of the State of Michigan as made and pro­
vided. These defendants further admit that Finlay C. 
Allen, Mary M. Streit, Robert L. Berry (now deceased), 
Walter J. Gessell and George A. Isabel are all duly ap­
pointed and acting officers and members of the Detroit 
Housing Commission (except Robert L. Berry, deceased) 
and that the defendant Harry J. Durbin is Director and 
Secretary of said Commission. All further allegations in 
said paragraph contained are neither admitted nor denied 
by these defendants for want of knowledge.

6. Defendants admit allegations o f paragraph six.
7. These defendants neither admit nor deny the allega­

tions of paragraph seven for want of knowledge, except the 
allegation that certain contracts were entered into between 
the Commission and the Federal Agencies mentioned, which 
allegation is admitted.

8. These defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 
eight.

9. These defendants neither admit nor deny the allega­
tions of paragraph nine for want of knowledge.

10. These defendants admit the allegations of para­
graph ten. 11

11. Defendants deny that in administering the public 
housing program they or any of them have adopted any 
strict policy of racial segregation based solely upon the 
race or color of any prospective tenants.

Am ended A nsw er to Am ended Complaint 25a



Defendants deny that the resolution adopted by the De­
troit Housing Commission referred to in this paragraph of 
the Amended Complaint was a strict policy of racial segre­
gation based solely upon the race or color of the prospec­
tive tenants.

Defendants further aver that said resolution was re­
scinded by the Detroit Housing Commission on the 10th 
day of April, 1952.

Defendants deny the other allegations of this paragraph 
of the Amended Comijlaint.

12. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 
twelve that white and negro applicants are listed separately 
and that some projects are designated for white and some 
for negro families, and some are mixed, but deny that that 
is the result of any resolution, regulation, policy, custom 
or usage of racial segregation based solely upon the race 
and color of the prospective tenants and further deny that 
no eligible negro families and no eligible white applicants 
are considered for projects designated for negro families 
as a result of any resolution, regulation, policy, custom or 
usage as alleged in the ximended Complaint.

These defendants further declare affirmatively that, in 
the selection and removal of tenants of public housing pro­
jects, the Commission has been guided by the principles of 
the best interests of all the people of the City, the protec­
tion of their rights and interests, the promotion of har­
mony, and the preservation of public peace, health and 
safety, and further, that under its inherent police power, 
the City of Detroit and its departments, including the Hous­
ing Commission, have the right to make and have made and 
followed policies to promote the foregoing purposes, and in 
doing so, it has been necessary from time to time to provide 
for the separation of races in certain housing projects.

In further answer to paragraph twelve of the Amended 
Complaint defendants aver that the housing projects now

26a Am ended A nsw er to Am ended Complaint



operated and under construction by the City of Detroit will 
provide housing for approximately 7878 white families and 
for approximately 8682 negro families and that the new 
program of public housing now in progress will add some 
6640 units of housing for negro families, so that Detroit 
will then have approximately 7878 units of public housing 
for white families, and approximately 13,322 units of public 
housing for negro families or almost twice the number of 
units for negro families as for white as against a popula­
tion ratio in Detroit shown by the 1950 census of 1,543,962 
white people in Detroit and 300,496 negro people or 86.3% 
white and 16.2% negro of the total population.

According to the United States Census of 1950, there 
were in the City of Detroit, at the time of the census,.17,450 
white families in substandard housing and 13,884 non-white 
families in substandard housing, and of these families, ap­
proximately 9440 of the white families and approximately 
8150 of the non-white families were families of low income 
by the standards established pursuant to the Housing Act 
of 1937, as amended.

In further answer defendants aver that when the projects 
now under construction, the so-called Jeffries and Douglas 
projects are completed, all presently eligible families for 
public housing will be housed by the City.

Defendants deny the other allegations of paragraph 
twelve.

13. These defendants admit the allegations of para­
graph thirteen.

14. These defendants admit the certification of eligible 
tenants as listed in paragraph fourteen for 1949, and the 
eligible pool of certified applicants for May, June 1950 as 
therein listed is substantially correct.

Defendants, however, deny the existence of any policy, 
usage, custom that has resulted in negro applicants being

Am ended Answ er to Am ended Complaint 27 a



denied equality of opportunity to obtain public housing, or 
in being discriminated against solely because of their race 
and color in violation of the due process clause of the Fifth 
Amendment and the due process and equal protection 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Con­
stitution and Title 8 sections 41 and 42 of the U. S. Code.

15. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph fif­
teen.

16. These defendants neither admit nor deny the alle­
gations of paragraph sixteen for want of knowledge, except 
as to the allegation in paragraph sixteen that certain war 
housing units in the City of Detroit have been turned over 
to the Commission to be operated for veterans, and one 
project for low income housing, which allegation is ad­
mitted. Defendants further admit that veterans’ housing 
is under the management and jurisdiction of the defendant 
commission subject to certain regulations and controls of 
federal agencies. The Acts referred to speak for them­
selves.

17. These defendants neither admit nor deny the alle­
gations of paragraph seventeen for want of knowledge. 
Defendants do deny, however, that they have or have had 
any policy, custom or usage of regulation as alleged in the 
Amended Complaint and previously specifically denied in 
this Amended Answer.

Wherefore, these defendants pray that the Amended 
Complaint and this complaint be dismissed and the relief 
requested therein be denied for the reasons that this court 
lacks jurisdiction over the persons of these individual or 
collective defendants, that the court lacks jurisdiction over 
the subject matter involved, that the plaintiffs have failed 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and that 
the amended complaint and this complaint fail to state a 
cause of action and these defendants further pray that 
judgment be awarded to these defendants and that the

28a Am ended A nsw er to Am ended Complaint



Am ended Answ er to Am ended Complaint 29a

court allow them such costs as may appear to be equitable 
and just.

City of Detroit, 
a Municipal Corporation,

Albert E. Cobo, Mayor,
Mary V. Beck,
Edward D. Connor,
James H. Garlick,
John A. Kronk,
Louis C. Miriani,
Charles G. Oakrnan,
William Rogell,
Del A. Smith, and 
Eugene I. Van Antwerp,

Members of the Common Council;
Detroit Housing Commission,
Finlay C. Allen, President,
Mary M. Streit, Vice-President, 
Robert L. Berry (deceased),
Walter J. Gessel, and 
George A. Isabel,

Members,
Harry J. Durbin,

Director-Secretary,
By / s /  Paul T. Dwyer,

Acting Corporation Counsel, 
/ s /  Vance G. Ingalls,

Asst. Corporation Counsel, 
Attorneys for said defend­

ants.

Dated at Detroit, Michigan, 
16th day of June, 1952.



30a Am ended A nsw er to Am ended Complaint

State of Michigan,
County of Wayne—ss.

Vance G. Ingalls, of the City of Detroit, Wayne County, 
Michigan, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is an 
Assistant Corporation Counsel of the City of Detroit, and 
as such is one of the attorneys for the defendants herein; 
that he is authorized to sign the names of the defendants to 
the foregoing Amended Answer and that he did so sign 
same; that he knows the contents thereof and that the same 
is true to the best of his knowledge, except as to those mat­
ters therein stated to be upon information and belief, and 
as to those matters he believes the same to be true.

/ s /  Vance G. Ingalls.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16th day of June, 
A. D. 1952.

/ s /  Mildred Lepler,
Notary Public, Wayne County, Michigan. 
My commission expires October 16, 1955.



R ep ly  to Am ended Answ er 31a

REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER

(Filed June 26,1952)
Plaintiffs, replying to defendants’ second amended an­

swer in accordance with the order of this court, reply as 
follows as to new matter raised in said answer:

1. In reply to paragraph 2, plaintiffs allege that there 
exists between the plaintiffs and the defendants an actual 
controversy cognizable in the federal district court of the 
United States involving the violation of rights secured to 
the plaintiffs and each of them, by the Constitution and 
laws of the United States, particularly the Fifth and Four­
teenth Amendments thereto, and Title 8, United States 
Code, Sections 41, 42 and 43.

In further reply to paragraph 2, plaintiffs allege that the 
defendants and each of them have and have had a regula­
tion, policy, custom, usage, conduct and practice of refus­
ing to lease units of public housing to the plaintiffs and 
other qualified Negro applicants similarly situated solely 
because of their race and color in accordance with a strict 
policy of racial segregation in public housing projects un­
der the control, management and jurisdiction of the said 
defendants.

2. In reply to paragraph 3, plaintiffs allege that the 
plaintiffs are in need of permanent low-rent rousing, vet­
erans housing, or war housing, and meet all of the require­
ments established b.y law and by these defendants for ad­
mission to said public housing projects.

Plaintiffs further allege, in replying to paragraph 3, that 
the defendants and each of them have denied admission to 
public housing projects under the jurisdiction and manage­
ment of the defendants to the plaintiffs and other Negroes 
similarly situated solely because of their race and color in 
accordance with a strict policy of racial segregation.

Plaintiffs further allege, in reply to paragraph 3, that 
this is a class action brought by the plaintiffs on behalf of 
themselves and on behalf of other qualified Negroes simi-



32a R eply to Am ended Answ er

larly situated pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23(a) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The class on behalf 
of which plaintiffs bring this suit is composed of honorably 
discharged Negro veterans of World War II and non-vet­
erans who are residents of the City of Detroit, County of 
Wayne, and citizens of the State of Michigan of the United 
States, who are in need of housing and who are eligible for 
permanent low-rent housing, war housing, or veterans hous­
ing as contemplated by the United States Housing Act of 
1937, as amended by the United States Housing Act of 
1949, and other applicable laws and who have been denied 
admission solely because of their race and color in accord­
ance with a strict policy of racial segregation to housing 
projects maintained, operated, and controlled by the de­
fendants and each of them. Said persons constitute a class 
too numerous to be brought individually before the court, 
but there are common questions of law and fact herein, com­
mon grievances arising out of common wrongs, and common 
relief sought for the common class as well as special relief 
for the plaintiffs. The interests of said class are fairly and 
adequately represented by the plaintiffs herein.

3. In reply to paragraph 4, plaintiffs allege that the 
plaintiffs are Negroes, citizens of the United States and of 
the State of Michigan, residents of the City of Detroit, 
County of Wayne. Each of the plaintiffs is the head of a 
family in serious need of a home. Each of the plaintiffs 
meets all of the requirements for admission to permanent 
low-rent housing, war housing, or veterans housing as es­
tablished by law. Each of the plaintiffs has duly made 
application for admission to permanent low-rent housing, 
war housing, or veterans housing projects under the con­
trol, operation, and management of the defendants. Each 
application has been on file for a long period of time and 
some as long as eight years. Pursuant to the application of 
each duly made, defendants placed the plaintiffs ’ names on 
an eligible list separate and distinct from the list on which 
all eligible white applicants have been placed solely be­
cause of their race, and color in accordance with a strict 
policy of racial segregation and have refused to consider 
plaintiffs’ eligibility for permanent low-rent housing, war



R eply to Am ended Answ er 33a

housing and veterans housing projects set aside by the de­
fendants for the exclusive use of white applicants.

In further reply to paragraph 4, plaintiffs deny that their 
names have been on the eligible list for a considerable time 
because of the cessation of the construction of public hous­
ing in Detroit during the last war and a shortage of mate­
rial and increased costs after the war and affirmatively 
allege that their names have been on the eligible list for a 
long period of time solely because they are Negroes and be­
cause the defendants and each of them refused to admit 
them to housing projects in the City of Detroit solely be­
cause of their race and color in accordance with a strict 
policy of racial segregation in public housing projects in 
the City of Detroit.

4. In reply to paragraph 11, plaintiffs allege that in ad­
ministering the public housing program of the City of De­
troit, the defendants and each of them have adopted a strict 
policy of racial segregation based solely on the race and 
color of prospective tenants. This regulation, policy, cus­
tom, usage, conduct and practice, in resolution form, was 
first adopted by the Detroit Housing Commission April 29, 
1943, and provided that the Detroit Housing Commission, 
in selecting tenants “ will in no way change the racial char­
acteristics of any neighborhood in Detroit through occu­
pancy standards of housing projects under their jurisdic­
tion.”  This resolution was, and is, in practice the policy, 
custom, and usage of segregating Negro and white appli­
cants and tenants in public housing projects in the City of 
Detroit under the control, management and jurisdiction of 
these defendants and, as a matter of fact, has and presently 
does result in changing the racial characteristic of neigh­
borhoods in Detroit from mixed neighborhoods to segre­
gated neighborhoods. This said resolution was, in fact, a 
strict policy of racial segregation based solely upon the 
race and color of prospective tenants.

In further reply to paragraph 11, the plaintiffs allege 
that the resolution adopted by the defendant Detroit Hous­
ing Commission on the tenth day of April, 1952, is, in fact, 
a re-statement of the resolution of the Detroit Housing



34a R eply  to Am ended Answ er

Commission adopted on April 29, 1943, and is based upon 
and is, in fact, a policy of separating Negro and white ten­
ants in public housing projects in the City of Detroit under 
the control, management, and jurisdiction of these defend­
ants. Plaintiffs further allege that pursuant to the said 
resolution adopted by the defendant Detroit Housing Com­
mission on the tenth day of April, 1952, the defendants and 
each of them has continued and is presently enforcing a 
strict policy of racial segregation in all public housing pro­
jects in the City of Detroit.

5. In reply to paragraph 12, plaintiffs deny that some 
of the projects in the City of Detroit under the control, 
management, and jurisdiction of the defendants are ra­
cially-mixed projects. Plaintiffs allege that all of the pub­
lic housing projects in the City of Detroit are still operated 
and maintained by these defendants in accordance with a 
strict policy of racial segregation based solely upon the 
race and color of prospective tenants and that such policy 
is a result of the resolution adopted by the Detroit Housing 
Commission on April 29, 1943, and by the Detroit Housing 
Commission and these defendants on April 10, 1952, and is 
in accordance with the regulations, customs, and usage of 
the Detroit Housing Commission and these defendants. 
Plaintiffs further allege that no eligible Negro families are 
considered for admission to projects designated for white 
families and no eligible white applicants are considered for 
projects designated for Negro families and that such policy 
is the result of the resolution adopted by the Detroit Hous­
ing Commission on April 29, 1943, and by the Detroit Hous­
ing Commission and these defendants on April 10, 1952.

In further reply to paragraph 12, plaintiffs allege that 
the defendants, in allegedly selecting and removing tenants 
of public housing projects in accordance with “ the best in­
terest of all the people of the City of Detroit, the protection 
of their rights and interests, the promotion of harmony, 
and the preservation of public peace, health, and safety,”  
are, in fact, continuing the policy of segregating Negro and 
white tenants in public housing projects in the City of De­
troit.



R eply  to Am ended Answ er 35a

In further reply to paragraph 12, plaintiffs deny that the 
City of Detroit and its departments, including the Detroit 
Housing Commission, have the inherent police power 
and/or the right to segregate the races in public housing 
projects in the City of Detroit. In further reply to para­
graph 12, plaintiffs allege that as a result of resolutions 
adopted by the Detroit Housing Commission and these de­
fendants and as a result of a regulation, policy, custom, and 
usage of the defendants and each of them, Negro and white 
applicants are listed separately upon being declared eligible 
for public housing in the City of Detroit and required to 
state their race upon applying and are assigned units in 
separate projects on the basis of race and color. The plain­
tiffs and other Negro applicants have been denied admis­
sion to projects for which they are otherwise eligible and 
for which they are more eligible than white applicants who 
have been admitted to projects reserved for white occu­
pancy by reason of priority of application and veteran of 
World War II status.

6. In reply to paragraph 14, plaintiffs allege that the 
defendants and each of them have a policy, usage, and cus­
tom that has resulted in qualified Negro applicants being 
denied equality of opportunity to obtain public housing in 
the City of Detroit and which lias resulted in the plaintiffs 
and other qualified Negroes being discriminated against 
solely because of their race and color in violation of the due 
process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Con­
stitution and the due process and equal protection clauses 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, 
and Title 8, Sections 41 and 42, of the United States Code.

7. In reply to paragraph 17, plaintiffs allege that the 
defendants have, and have had, a policy, custom, usage, and 
regulation of segregating Negro and white tenants in public 
housing projects in the City of Detroit, which projects have 
been aided by the Public Housing Administration of the 
Housing and Home Finance Agency pursuant to applicable 
federal laws.



36a A nsw er to P la in tiffs ’ R ep ly

Wherefore, plaintiffs demand judgment as prayed for in 
their Amended Complaint.

Willis M. Graves,
62 Mack Avenue,
Detroit 1, Michigan.

Francis M. Dent,
4256 Russell Street,
Detroit 1, Michigan.

Edward N. Turner,
606 East Vernor Highway, 
Detroit 1, Michigan.

Thurgood Marshall,
Constance Baker Motley,

20 West 40th Street,
New York 18, N. Y.,

Attorneys for Plaintiffs.

ANSW ER TO PLAINTIFFS' REPLY

(Filed July 9, 1952)
Defendants, answering the reply of plaintiffs to the 

amended answer heretofore filed, say:
That the allegations and denials of defendants in the 

amended answer are hereby re-asserted in answer to the 
reply of plaintiffs, and all affirmative allegations con­
tained therein not heretofore answered or denied are here­
by denied.

Wherefore, defendants request dismissal of the amended 
complaint.

/ s /  Paul T. Dwyer,
Acting Corporation Counsel,

/ s /  Yance G. Ingalls,
Assistant Corporation Counsel, 

Attorneys for Defendants,
301 City Hall,
Detroit 26, Michigan.

Dated: July 7, 1952.



Order Granting M otion to In tervene 37a

State of Michigan,
County of Wayne— ss.

Vance Gr. Ingalls, being duly sworn, deposes and says 
that he is an Assistant Corporation Counsel of the City 
of Detroit, a municipal corporation, defendants herein; 
that as such he is authorized to sign the foregoing answer 
to plaintiff’s reply and that he did so sign same; that he 
knows the contents thereof and that the same is true of 
his own knowledge except as to those matters therein 
stated to be upon information and belief, and as to those 
matters he believes it to be true.

/ s /  Vance Gr. Ingalls,
Assistant Corporation Counsel.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 7th day of 
July, 1952.

Mildred Lepler,
Notary Public, Wayne County, Michigan.
My commission expires October 16, 1955.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO INTERVENE 
AS PLAINTIFFS

(Filed May 11,1954)
At a session of said court held in the Federal Building, 

Detroit, Michigan, on May 11, 1954.
Present: Honorable Arthur F. Lederle, Chief Judge.
This case having come on for hearing on motion of John 

Williams, Ann Landers, Charlei Bell Rollins, Nathan 
Watkins, Eddie McDuffie, Dorothy Vinson, Linda Robert­
son, Barbara Owens, May Williams, David Barnes, Willie 
Sturgess, Jessie Washington, Ruby Brinson, John F. 
Powell, Floyd Harris, Ethel M. Myles, Jesse Jennings, 
Marion Crossland, Mary L. Brown, Hillard Scott, and Ed­
ward Foster to intervene as plaintiffs.



38a In terven ors ’ Complaint

Now, therefore, it is ordered that motion to intervene 
as plaintiffs be, and the same hereby is, granted.

Arthur F. Lederle,
Chief Judge.

INTERVENORS’ COMPLAINT

(Filed May 11, 1954)
1. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 

Title 28, United States Code, section 1343 (3) this being a 
suit in equity authorized by law to be brought to redress the 
deprivation under color of state law, statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom or usage of a right, privilege or im­
munity secured by the Constitution and Laws of the United 
States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal 
rights of citizens, namely, the right to lease real property 
without discrimination because of race or color as se­
cured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States and Title 8, section 42 of the United 
States Code.

2. This is a proceeding for a declaratory judgment 
pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, section 2201 
for the purpose of determining a question in actual contro­
versy between the parties, that is, whether the regulation, 
policy, custom, usage, conduct and practice of defendants 
in refusing to lease to plaintiffs and other qualified Negro 
applicants similarly situated solely because of their race 
and color and in accordance with a policy of racial segre­
gation, certain units of housing under the administration, 
control and management of the defendants, is a violation 
of the Constitution and Laws of the United States, par­
ticularly the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Title 8, section 42 of the United States 
Code.

3. This is a proceeding for a permanent injunction 
forever enjoining the defendants, and each of them, their



In terven ors ’ Complaint 39a

agents, employees, representatives and successors in office 
from denying to the Intervenor-plaintiffs, and all other 
qualified Negro applicants for public housing similarly 
situated, the right to lease a public housing unit in cer­
tain public housing projects in the City of Detroit under 
the control, management and jurisdiction of defendants, 
and from segregating tenants in separate projects or with­
in the same project on the basis of race and color, and 
from making any distinction whatsoever because of race 
or color in leasing units in any public housing project.

4. This is an action for damages against the defend­
ants and each of them for wilfully refusing and for un­
lawfully refusing to admit the intervenor-plaintiffs, and 
others similarly situated, to certain units in certain public 
housing projects, solely because of their race and color 
in violation of rights secured to the intervenor-plaintiffs, 
individually and others similarly situated, individually, by 
the Constitution and laws of the United States.

5. This is a class action pursuant to Rule 23 (a) (3) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure brought by the 
intervenor-plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and on be­
half of others similarly situated, namely, honorably dis­
charged Negro veterans of World War II, and non­
veterans, residents of the City of Detroit, County of 
Wayne, State of Michigan, and citizens of the State of 
Michigan and of the United States who are in need of 
housing, who have applied for, and who are eligible for 
permanent low-rent housing, war housing and veterans’ 
housing, as contemplated by the United States Housing 
Act of 1937 and 1949, as amended, Title 42 U. S. Code, 
sections 1401-1433, as amended, and other applicable laws, 
and who are denied solely because of their race and color 
and in accordance with a policy of racial segregation, ad­
mission to some of the housing projects maintained, op­
erated and controlled by the defendants, solely because the 
intervenor-plaintiffs are Negroes. Said persons con­
stitute a class too numerous to be brought individually 
before the Court, but there are common questions of law 
and fact involved herein, common grievances arising out



40a In terven ors ’ Complaint

of common wrongs, and common relief sought for the en­
tire class as well as special relief for the plaintiffs. The 
interests of said class are fairly and adequately repre­
sented by intervenor-plaintiffs herein.

6. Intervenor-plaintiffs are Negroes, citizens of the 
United States and of the State of Michigan, residents of 
the City of Detroit, County of Wayne, each is the head 
of a family in serious need of a home, with income, less 
an exemption of $100 for each minor, which does not ex­
ceed five times the annual rental of any dwelling unit to 
which they may be lawfully admitted in accordance with 
the provisions of Title 42, U. S. C. section 1402, as 
amended July 15, 1945. Each has duly made application 
for admission to the permanent low-rent housing, war 
housing or veterans’ housing projects under the control, 
operation and management of defendants. Each appli­
cation has been on file for a long period of time. Pur­
suant to the application of each duly made, defendants 
placed the intervenor-plaintiffs’ names on an eligible list 
separate and distinct from the list on which all other 
eligible white applicants’ names have been placed, solely 
because of race and color and in accordance with a policy 
of racial segregation presently enforced by defendants 
and have refused to consider intervenor-plaintiffs eligible 
for permanent low-rent housing, war housing and vet­
erans’ housing projects limited to white occupancy, solely 
because of race and color.

7. Defendant, City of Detroit, Michigan is a Muni­
cipal Corporation duly incorporated under the laws and 
constitution of the State of Michigan. Defendant, Albert 
E. Cobo, is the duly-elected and acting Mayor of the City 
of Detroit, Michigan and is chief executive officer of said 
city and head of the administrative branch of the govern­
ment of the City of Detroit, Michigan. Defendants, Mary 
Y. Beck, Edward D. Connor, Eugene Van Antwerp, John 
A. Kronk, Louis C. Mariani, Blanche Parent Wise, W il­
liam Rogell, Charles N. Youngblood and Del A. Smith are 
all duly-elected and acting members of the Common Coun­
cil of the City of Detroit, the chief legislative body of said



In terven ors ’ Complaint 41a

city. Defendant, The Detroit Housing Commission, here­
inafter referred to as the Commission, is a duly author­
ized department of the City of Detroit, established Janu­
ary 16, 1934, by the City of Detroit, Michigan, Ordinance 
262-C, and pursuant to the laws of the State of Michigan, 
Michigan Compiled Laws (1948) 125.651 to 125.698, for 
the purpose of administering a program for the purchase, 
acquisition, construction, maintenance, operation, improve­
ment, extension, repair and mortgaging of housing fa­
cilities in the City of Detroit, Michigan and for the elimina­
tion of housing conditions which are detrimental to public 
peace, health, safety, morals and/or welfare of the City of 
Detroit, Michigan. Defendants Finlay C. Allen, Mary M. 
Streit, Walter J. Gessel, James H. Quello and George A. 
Isabel are all duly-appointed and acting officers and mem­
bers of the Commission. Defendant, Harry J. Durbin, is 
Director-Secretary of the Commission.

8. The permanent low-rent housing under the control, 
jurisdiction and management of defendants consists of the 
following projects, namely, Brewster Homes, Charles 
Terrace, Herman Gardens, Parkside and John W. Smith, 
Brewster Addition and Parkside Addition, and Jeffries 
and Douglass Homes, presently under construction. The 
war housing consists of the following projects, namely So­
journer Truth, McKeever Homes, Carle Homes, Charles 
Annex, Temp. Douglass, Emerson Homes, Valentine, 
Adams, Fisher, Catallo, Brooks Homes, and Moseley 
Homes. The veterans’ housing consists of the following 
projects, namely, Algonquin, Croxon, Stone Homes, 
Brooks Annex and McKeever Annex.

9. All of these said defendants, their aides, agents and 
representatives are under an obligation to discharge their 
duties in conformity with the Laws and Constitution of 
the United States of America.

10. Under color of their authority, defendants, and 
each of them, in administering the entire public housing 
program of the City of Detroit, have adopted and pres­
ently enforce a policy of racial segregation based solely



42a In terven ors ’ Complaint

upon the race and color of prospective tenants. This 
policy in resolution form as adopted by defendant Com­
mission and approved and enforced by the other defend­
ants provides that the defendant Commission in selecting 
tenants ‘ ‘ will in no way change the racial characteristics 
of any neighborhood in Detroit through occupancy stand­
ards of housing projects under their jurisdiction.”  This 
resolution is in practice the policy of segregating Negro 
and white applicants and tenants in separate public hous­
ing projects and, as a matter of fact, has resulted in 
changes in the racial characteristics of neighborhoods 
from mixed neighborhoods to segregated neighborhoods. 
It was formally adopted by the defendant Commission on 
April 29, 1943 and has been approved and acquiesced in 
by each of the other defendants.

11. As a result of said policy, Negro and white ap­
plicants are listed separately upon being declared eligible, 
are required to state their race upon applying and are 
assigned units in separate projects on the basis of race 
and color; no eligible Negro family is considered for ad­
mission to vacancies which occur in projects designated 
for white families and no eligible white family is con­
sidered for projects designated for Negro families; Negro 
applicants have been denied admission to projects for 
which they are otherwise eligible and for which they are 
more eligible than white applicants who have been ad­
mitted to the projects reserved for white occupancy by 
reason of priority of application and veterans of World 
War II status; displaced family status; and urgency 
of need status; Negro applicants have been considered 
for admission only to the permanent low-rent housing 
projects known as Brewster and Jeffries Homes, and the 
war housing projects known as Brooks, Moseley, Doug­
lass and Sojourner Truth, and to veterans’ housing pro­
jects known as Brooks Annex and Algonquin; while white 
applicants have been considered for permanent low-rent 
projects known as Charles Terrace, Herman Gardens, Park- 
side, Parkside Addition and John W. Smith, and war pro­
jects known as Adams, Carle, Catallo, Charles Annex,



In terven ors ’ Complaint 43a

Emerson Homes, Fisher, McKeever Homes and Valentine, 
and veterans’ projects known as Croxon, McKeever Annex 
and Stone.

12. Defendants are presently engaged in the construc­
tion of additional low-rent housing projects pursuant to 
the provisions of the U. S. Housing Act of 1937 as 
amended.

13. There are presently 7,709 Negro applicant families 
who have been declared eligible by defendants who are 
presently awaiting admission to public housing. There 
are 383 white applicant families who have been declared 
eligible and who are presently awaiting admission to pub­
lic housing. Since this action and proceeding was orig­
inally tiled by the original plaintiffs herein on June 5, 
1950 there have been more than 4,000 vacancies in pro­
jects limited to white occupancy for admission to which 
intervenor-plaintiffs and members of the class which they 
represent were eligible and to which they would have been 
admitted but for the racial segregation policy complained 
of here.

14. This segregation policy has therefore resulted in 
Negro applicants being denied equality of opportunity by 
defendants to obtain housing and in being discriminated 
against solely because of their race and color by defend­
ants and each of them in violation of the due process and 
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the Federal Constitution and Title 8, section 42 of the 
United States Code.

15. The intervenor-plaintiffs and others on behalf of 
the original plaintiffs have continually requested that they 
be assigned to vacant units in any of the low-rent housing 
projects named above whether permanent, war, or vet­
eran’s housing. The original plaintiffs and others on be­
half of intervenor-plaintiffs have petitioned all of the de­
fendants to change this policy but each of the said de­
fendants has failed and refused to do so although each 
defendant has the inherent power so to do.



44a In terven ors ’ Complaint

16. Intervenor-plaintiffs have suffered and shall con­
tinue to suffer irreparable injury for which there is no 
clear, adequate or speedy remedy at law unless this Court 
grants the injunctive relief prayed for the intervenor- 
plaintiffs and the members of the class which they repre­
sent.

Wherefore, intervenor-plaintiffs respectfully pray this 
Court that upon the filing of this complaint, as may appear 
proper and convenient to the Court, the Court advance this 
cause on the docket and order a speedy hearing of this 
action according to law, and that upon said hearing:

1. This Court adjudge, decree and declare the rights 
and legal relations of the parties to the subject matter 
here in controversy in order that said declaration shall have 
the force and effect of a final judgment.

2. That this Court enter a judgment or decree de­
claring that the policy of the defendants, and each of 
them, and their successors in office in refusing to lease 
to qualified Negro applicants certain units in certain public 
low-rent or other housing projects under the jurisdiction, 
management and control of such applicants, and of segre­
gating tenants into separate projects or within the same 
project on the basis of race or color, is in violation of the 
Constitution and Laws of the United States and par­
ticularly the due process and equal protection clauses of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Con­
stitution and Section 42 of Title 8 of the United States 
Code.

3. That this Court issue a permanent injunction for­
ever restraining and enjoining the defendants, and each 
of them, their agents and representatives and successors 
in office from denying to qualified Negro applicants the 
right to lease any unit in any of the public housing pro­
jects under the control, management and supervision of 
the defendants, solely because of the race or color of 
said applicant, and from segregating tenants into sepa­
rate projects or within the same project on the basis of 
race or color, and from making any distinction whatso-



ever because of race or color in the leasing of units in 
any public housing projects under the control, manage­
ment and jurisdiction of defendants.

4. Plaintiffs further pray that this Court give each of 
them judgment for Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) 
against the defendants and each of them and allow them 
their costs herein and grant such other and further relief 
as may appear to the Court to be equitable and just.

Willis M. Graves,
62 Mack Avenue,
Detroit, Michigan;

Francis Dent,
4256 Russell Street,
Detroit, Michigan;

/ s /  Constance Baker Motley,
Thurgood Marshall,

107 West 43 Street,
New York, New York,

Attorneys for Intervenor-Plaintiffs.

A nsw er to C om p rin t o f  Intervenor-Plaintiffs 45a

ANSW ER TO COMPLAINT OF INTERVENOR- 
PLAINTIFFS

(Filed June 22,1954)
Answering the complaint of intervenor-plaintiffs, the 

defendants say:
1. The defendants admit the provisions of the Con­

stitution and laws of the United States referred to but 
dehy their application to the subject matter or the parties 
in this proceeding and specifically deny that intervenor- 
plaintiffs have suffered any such deprivation or any de­
privation as alleged in the complaint and deny that in­
tervenor-plaintiffs have any right to lease public housing 
units under any laws or the Constitution of the United 
States and further deny that they have or are discriminat­
ing against intervenor-plaintiffs under any such laws or



Constitution of the United States because of race or 
color.

2. The defendants admit the provisions of law and 
the Constitution of the United States referred to but deny 
their application to the parties or subject matter here 
involved and deny there exists between intervenor-plain- 
tiffs and defendants any controversy cognizable in the 
Federal Court of the United States and further deny that 
there has been any violation of the Constitution and Laws 
of the United States by these defendants.

3. Defendants deny that intervenor-plaintiffs or others 
have any right to lease public housing units in certain 
projects and deny that any segregation or distinction is 
made between tenants solely on the basis of race or color.

4. Defendants deny that they have wilfully or unlaw­
fully refused to admit intervenor-plaintiffs or others to 
housing projects solely because of their race or color 
in violation of any of their rights under the Constitution 
or laws of the United States.

5. Defendants admit that intervenor-plaintiffs have 
applied for public housing under the laws, rules and regu­
lations pertaining thereto and deny that they have been 
denied admission solely because of their race or color 
or in accordance with any policy of racial segregation. 
Defendants further deny that this is a proper class action 
or that intervenor-plaintiffs have any right to represent 
any others of their class herein or to seek any remedy for 
others than themselves.

6. Defendants admit intervenor-plaintiffs made appli­
cation and were placed on so-called eligible lists but deny 
that the applications were placed on any separate lists 
solely because of race or color or in accordance with any 
policy or racial segregation presently enforced by de­
fendants and deny that they have refused to consider 
intervenor-plaintiffs eligible for any housing limited to 
white occupancy solely because of race or color.

7. Defendants admit the allegations therein.

46a A nsw er to Complaint o f In tervenor-Plaintiffs



8. Defendants admit the allegations therein, except 
that some of the temporary projects have been depro­
grammed and tenants are no longer being taken for them.

9. Defendants admit and aver that defendants, their 
aides, agents and representatives have at all times dis­
charged their duties in conformity with the laws and Con­
stitution of the United States.

10. Defendants deny the allegations therein and aver 
that the resolution to has been rescinded on September 
26, 1952.

11. Defendants admit the allegations therein, except 
as to allegation the Negro applicants have been denied 
admission to the project for which they are otherwise 
eligible and for which they are more eligible than white 
applicants who have been admitted to the projects re­
served for white occupancy by reason of priority of ap­
plication and veteran of World War II status, displaced 
family status and urgency of need status, which is neither 
admitted or denied, but it is possible that in certain in­
stances that may have occurred.

12. Defendants admit the allegations therein.
13. Defendants admit the allegations therein, except 

the allegation that intervenor-plaintiffs and members of 
class were eligible, which as to plaintiff-intervenors is de­
nied, and as to others in class is neither admitted or de­
nied, and except allegation that plaintiff-intervenors would 
have been admitted except for racial segregation policy 
complained of, which allegation is denied. Defendants 
aver on the contrary that plaintiff-intervenors as well as 
the original plaintiffs in this proceedings, except for the 
original plaintiffs who were admitted to projects, are not 
qualified for admission to any project regardless of race 
or color, and defendants further deny any of them would 
or could have been admitted regardless of race or color, 
and further deny that there is any policy of racial segre­
gation in connection with housing projects operated by the 
Housing Commission.

Defendants further aver that the only policy of the 
Commission on tenant selection, aside from income, vet-

A nsw er to Complaint o f  Intervenor-P laintiffs  47a



eran and other qualifications, under the rules and regu­
lations, is the one adopted on September 26, 1952, which 
reads:

“ In the selection and removal of tenants of hous­
ing projects, the Commission will be guided by the 
best interests of all the people of the City for the 
purpose of protecting their rights and interests and 
the promotion of harmony amongst them, all in ac­
cordance with the Constitution and laws of the United 
States and of the State of Michigan.”

Defendants deny that that is a racial segregation policy, 
but aver that it is a policy of preservation of peace, health, 
safety and welfare of all the people, including prospective 
and present tenants of the projects intended for the pur­
pose of preventing trouble, disorder and conflict.

Further, defendants say that under that policy, the 
Jeffries and Fisher projects have been integrated and that 
both white and colored families admitted without regard 
to race or color and that as and when it becomes possible 
under conditions preserving the public peace, and safety, 
and without promoting breaches of the same, so that the 
rights and interests of all the people are protected and 
harmony preserved, integration of other projects will be 
accomplished.

14. Defendants deny the allegations therein.
15. Defendants deny the allegations therein.
16. Defendants deny the allegations therein.

Defendants further - say that all allegations of the in- 
tervenor-plaintiffs’ complaint, not heretofore admitted or 
denied are hereby denied and that the affirmative allega­
tions herein and answers to allegations herein are also 
adopted as further answer to the original plaintiffs’ 
amended complaint.

Wherefore, these defendants pray that the Amended 
Complaint and this Complaint be dismissed and the relief

48a Answ er to Complaint o f Intervenor-Plaintiffs



requested therein be denied for the reasons that this Court 
lacks jurisdiction over the persons of these individual or 
collective defendants, that the court lacks jurisdiction over 
the subject matter involved, that the plaintiffs have failed 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and that 
the amended complaint and this complaint fail to state 
a cause of action and these defendants further pray that 
judgment be awarded to these defendants and that the 
court allow them such costs as may appear to be equitable 
and just.

City of Detroit, a municipal corpora­
tion,

Albert E. Cobo, Mayor,
Mary V. Beck,
Edward D. Connor,
James H. Garlick,
John A. Kronk,
Louis C. Miriani,
Charles Gf. Oakman,
William Rogell and 
Del A. Smith,

Members of the Common Council 
of the City of Detroit,

Detroit Housing Commission,
Finlay C. Allen,
Mary M. Streit,
Robert L. Berry,
Walter L. Gessel and 
George A. Isabel,

Members thereof,
Harry J. Durbin,

Director-Secretary of the Detroit 
Housing Commission, Defendants, 

By / s /  Paul T. Dwyer,
Corporation Counsel,

By / s /  Yance G. Ingalls,
Assistant Corporation Counsel, 

Attorneys for said Defendants, 
301 City Hall,
Detroit 26, Michigan.

A nsw er to Complaint o f  In tervenor-P laintiffs  49a



50a A nsw er to Complaint o f Internenor-Plaintiffs

State of Michigan,
County of Wayne— ss.

On this 21st day of June, A. D. 1954, before me a Notary 
Public in and for the County of Wayne, appeared Paul 
T. Dwyer and Vance G. Ingalls, to me personally known 
to be the persons who executed the foregoing answer to 
complaint of intervenor-plaintiffs, and acknowledged to 
me that they are the C oloration  Counsel and Assistant 
Corporation Counsel of the City of Detroit, and as such 
are attorneys for the foregoing defendants; that they are 
authorized to sign the foregoing answer to complaint of 
intervenor-plaintiff for and on behalf of the foregoing de­
fendants and that they did so sign same; that they know 
the contents thereof and that the same is true of their own 
knowledge and belief, except as to such matters herein 
stated to be upon information and belief, and as to those 
matters, they believe it to be true.

/ s /  Helene Povlitz,
Notary Public, Wayne County, Michigan.
My commission expires December 20, 1957.

t



Order Dismissing Amended Complaint 
as to Certain Defendants

51a

ORDER DISMISSING AMENDED COMPLAINT AS TO  
ALL DEFENDANTS EXCEPT THE DETROIT HOUS­
ING COMMISSION, FINLAY C. ALLEN, MARY M. 
STREIT, WALTER J. GESSEL, GEORGE A. ISABEL, 
JAMES H. QUELLO AND HARRY J. DURBIN.

(Filed July 22,1954)
At a session of said court held in the Federal Building, 

Detroit, Michigan, on July 22,1954.
Present: Honorable Arthur F. Lederle, Chief Judge.
It having been moved by defendants’ attorney Vance G. 

Ingalls, that the Amended Complaint be dismissed as to all 
defendants except the Detroit Housing Commission, Finlay
C. Allen, Mary M. Streit, Walter J. Gessel, George A. 
Isabel, James H. Quello and Harry J. Durbin, and the 
Court having found that said motion should be granted.

It is ordered, that the Amended Complaint be and it is 
hereby dismissed without prejudice as to all defendants ex­
cept the Detroit Housing Commission, a duly authorized 
department of the City of Detroit, Finlay C. Allen, Presi­
dent, Mary M. Streit, Vice-President, Walter J. Gessel, 
George A. Isabel and James H. Quello, Members, and 
Harry J. Durbin, Director-Secretary of the Detroit Hous­
ing Commission.

Arthur F. Lederle,
Chief Judge.



52a Stipulation o f Facts

STIPULATION OF FACTS

(Filed June 22,1954)
It is hereby stipulated and agreed by the parties in this 

cause by and through their respective counsel that for the 
determination of this cause the following is an agreed state­
ment of facts:

1. This is an action for a declaratory judgment that 
the policy, custom and usage of the defendants in refusing 
to lease to qualified Negro applicants certain units of pub­
lic housing, solely because of the race and color of such 
applicants, and of segregating tenants into projects on the 
basis of race or color is in violation of the Constitution and 
laws of the United States.

2. This is an action for a permanent injunction forever 
restraining and enjoining the defendants from denying to 
qualified Negro applicants the right to lease any unit in 
any of the public housing projects under the control, man­
agement and supervision of defendants because of the race 
or color of said applicants, and from segregating tenants 
into projects on the basis of race or color, and from making 
any distinction whatsoever because of race or color in the 
leasing of units in any public housing project.

3. The complaint in this action prays judgment for each 
of the plaintiffs for ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) and 
costs.

4. Each of the original plaintiffs at the time of filing 
the original complaint in this action was an adult Negro 
citizen of the United States and of the State of Michigan 
residing in the City of Detroit.

5. Each of the original plaintiffs in this action has made 
application for admission to a public housing unit in a 
public housing project in the City of Detroit.

6. After making the required application, each of the 
original plaintiffs was placed on the eligible list of eligible 
Negro families maintained by the defendants.



Stipulation o f  Facts 53a

7. The original complaint in this action was filed on the 
5th day of June, 1950.

8. Since the filing of the original complaint, the follow­
ing original plaintiffs have been admitted to public hous­
ing projects by the defendants: Robert Dixon, Eddie L. 
Hall, Ozzie Linder, Jessie Love and Amanda Sneed.

9. Since the filing of the original complain, the follow­
ing original plaintiffs have become ineligible for public 
housing: Walter Arthur Lewis, Casper Irvin, Jerome 
Gray, Cornelius Britt and Willard Tipton.

10. On May 11,1954, the following persons were allowed 
by the court to intervene in this action as plaintiffs: John 
Williams, Ann Landers, Charloi Bell Rollins, Nathan Wat­
kins, Eddie McDuffie, Dorothy Vinson, Linda Robertson, 
Barbara Owens, May Williams, David Barnes, Willie Stur- 
gess, Jessie Washington, Ruby Brinson, John F. Powell, 
Floyd Harris, Ethel M. Myles, Jesse Jennings, Marion 
Crossland, Mary L. Brown, Hillard Scott, and Edward 
Foster. Each of these persons are on the eligible list of 
eligible Negro families maintained by defendants. It shall 
be subject to further stipulation as to the admissibility of 
these persons to public housing projects.

11. The defendant, City of Detroit, Michigan, is a mu­
nicipal corporation duly incorporated under the laws and 
Constitution of the State of Michigan.

12. Defendant Albert E. Cobo is the duly elected and 
acting Mayor of the City of Detroit, Michigan, and is the 
chief executive officer of said City, head of the administra­
tive branch of government of said City and appoints the 
members of the defendant Detroit Housing Commission. 
He was the Mayor of the City of Detroit at the time the 
original complaint was filed in this cause and is the Mayor 
at the present time.

13. Defendants Mary V. Beck, Edward D. Conner, 
James H. Garlick, John A. Kronk, Louis C. Miriani, Charles
G. Oakman, William Rogell and Del A. Smith at the time 
the original complaint in this action was filed were each



54a Stipulation o f Facts

duly elected and acting members of the Common Council 
of the City of Detroit, the chief legislative body of said 
City. Since that time Eugene Van Antwerp, Charles N. 
Youngblood and Blanche Parent Wise have been duly 
elected and have become acting members of the Common 
Council and by order of the court have been substituted as 
defendants in place of James H. Garlick and Charles G. 
Oakman who are no longer members of the Common 
Council.

14. Defendant Detroit Housing Commission is a duly 
authorized department of the City of Detroit established 
January 16, 1934, by the City of Detroit, Michigan, Ordi­
nance 262-C, and pursuant to the laws of the State of Michi­
gan, Michigan Compiled Laws (1948) 125.651 to 125.698 
for the purpose of administering a program for the pur­
chase, acquisition, construction, maintenance, operation, 
improvement, extension, repair of housing facilities in the 
City of Detroit and for the elimination of housing condi­
tions which are detrimental to public peace, health, safety, 
morals and/or welfare of the City of Detroit.

15. Defendants Finlay C. Allen, Mary M. Streit, Robert 
L. Berry, Walter J. Gessel and George A. Isabel were all 
duly appointed and acting officers and members of the De­
troit Housing Commission at the time of the filing of the 
original complaint in this action. Since that time Robert L. 
Berry has been succeeded to office by James H. Quello. 
James H. Quello by order of the court has been substituted 
as a defendant in this action in place of Robert L. Berry.

16. Defendant Harry J. Durbin is and was at the time 
of filing of the original complaint the duly appointed and 
acting Secretary-Director of the Detroit Housing Commis­
sion.

17. The defendant Detroit Housing Commission is pres­
ently maintaining and operating a number of public hous- 
ing projects in the City of Detroit, Michigan. At the time 
of the filing of the original complaint in this cause, the de­
fendant Commission maintained and operated one perma­
nent low rent housing project, known as Brewster Homes,



Stipulation o f  Facts 55a

with a total of 943 units to which only qualified Negro appli­
cant families were admitted. At that time, it also main­
tained and operated four public housing projects, known 
as war housing projects, with a total of 1,827 units to which 
only eligible Negro families were admitted. These projects 
are called Brooks, Mosley, Douglas and Sojourner Truth. 
At the same time, it maintained and operated projects 
known as veterans’ public housing projects, with a total of 
325 units to which only qualified Negro veteran families are 
admitted. These projects are known as Brooks Annex and 
Algonquin. At that time it also maintained and operated 
five permanent low rent projects to which only qualified 
white families are admitted. These projects, known as 
Charles Terrace, Herman Gardens, Parkside and John W. 
Smith, contain a total of 3,934 units. War housing projects 
maintained by the Commission at the time of the filing of 
the original complaint to which only qualified white families 
were admitted are known as Adams, Carle, Catallo, Charles 
Annex, Emerson Homes, Fisher, McKeever Homes and 
Valentine, with a total of 3,454 units. Veterans’ projects 
maintained by the Commission at the time of the filing of 
the original complaint and to which only qualified white 
veteran families are admitted are known as Croxton, 
McKeever Annex and Stone Homes, with a total of 830 
units.

18. At the time of the filing of the original complaint in 
this action the defendants were engaged in the construction 
of additional permanent low rent housing projects pursuant 
to the provisions of the United States Housing Act of 1937 
as amended by the United States Housing Act of 1949 (title 
42, U. S. C., Secs. 1401-1433) as amended.

19. Since the filing of the original complaint in this 
action portions of two projects have been completed. These 
projects are Edward J. Jeffries Homes with a total of 714 
units completed, and Frederick Douglas Homes with a total 
of 334 units completed. Each of these projects is presently 
under construction and when completed, Jeffries Homes 
will have a total of 2170 units and Douglas Homes a total of 
1006 units.



56a Stipulation o f  Facts

20. One of these projects, Jeffries Homes, is presently a 
racially integrated project as respects its racial occupancy 
pattern.

21. The other project, Douglas Homes, was designated 
in the application for federal assistance for Negro occu­
pancy.

22. One of the war housing projects, Fisher Homes, 
formerly limited to occupancy by white families is pres­
ently racially integrated.

23. All of the public housing projects in the City of 
Detroit, permanent low rent, war housing both temporary 
and permanent, and veterans’ housing were and are all 
constructed pursuant to federal housing statutes whereby 
federal financial assistance is provided.

24. As of May 31, 1950, just before the original com­
plaint in this action was filed, the eligible pool of certified
applicants for public housing was:

White families ........................ 1,838
Negro families ........................ 4,942

As of April 1954 or as of the present, the eligible pool of 
certified applicants for public housing is :

White families ........................ 383
Negro families ........................ 7,709

25. Since the original complaint in this action was filed 
vacancies have occurred in public housing projects limited 
to white occupancy and vacancies have occurred in pub­
lic housing projects limited to Negro occupancy as follows:

White p ro je cts ........................ 4,417
Negro p ro je cts ........................ 865

26. Based on the last official report, April-May 1954, of 
the Detroit Housing Commission, there are the following
vacancies:

White p ro jects .............................. 51
Negro project .............................. 3



Stipulation o f  Facts 57a

Of the 51 vacancies in white projects, 50 are in Herman 
Gardens and 1 is in Smith Homes. The vacancies in Her­
man Gardens have been converted as follows: 22 zero-bed­
room units and 22 two bedroom units were converted to 22 
four bedroom units; 12 units to be converted are not avail­
able for renting.

27. The only written statement of tenant selection policy 
of the Detroit Housing Commission aside from the rules 
and regulations dealing with the qualifications of the appli­
cants, such as income, veteran status, residence, etc., is ex­
pressed by the resolution adopted by the Commission on 
September 26, 1952, which reads:

“ In the selection and removal of tenants of housing 
projects, the Commission will be guided by the best 
interests of all the people of the City for the purpose 
of protecting their rights and interests and the promo­
tion of harmony amongst them, all in accordance with 
the Constitution and laws of the United States and of 
the State of Michigan.”

28. The former written statement of tenant selection 
policy of the Commission of maintaining the racial charac­
teristics of neighborhoods, was rescinded on September 26, 
1952, prior to the adoption of the above resolution and 
reads as follows:

“ The Detroit Housing Commission will in no way 
change the racial characteristics of any neighborhood 
in Detroit through occupancy standards of housing 
projects under their jurisdiction.”

29. The defendants presently maintain and enforce a 
policy in public housing projects which operates as follows:

(1) Certain projects were designated prior to their 
erection for white occupancy or for Negro occupancy.

(2) No eligible Negro family is admitted to a va­
cancy in a project presently limited to white occupancy 
and no white family is admitted to a vacancy in a pro­
ject presently limited to Negro occupancy.



58a Stipulation o f Facts

(3) The application blanks which must be filled out 
by prospective tenants request information concerning 
the applicant’s race and requests the applicant to indi­
cate whether he or she desires to live either in the 
“ east”  or “ west” .

(4) Separate lists of eligible Negro and white fami­
lies are maintained.

(5) In certain other projects presently not desig­
nated either as white or Negro, white and Negro fami­
lies are and have been admitted without regard to race 
or color.

The Jeffries Project, which was opened for occu­
pancy and which will have 2150 units, has been com­
pletely integrated and applicants certified without re­
gard to race or color; also, since adoption of the fore­
going resolution, Fisher Temporary Project of 500 
units, formerly designated as a white project, was inte­
grated, and applicants certified without regard to race 
or color; also, since adoption of the resolution of Sep­
tember 26, 1952, appearing at paragraph 27 above, the 
new Douglas Project with occupancy of 1006 units and 
the programmed project designated as Mich. 1-11, the 
site for which is now under condemnation, with a 
planned occupancy of some 3,874 units, formerly desig­
nated for Negro occupancy, are integrated projects.

30. In permanent projects presently under operation 
there are approximately 4,000 white families and approxi­
mately 2,127 Negro families.

31. The pleadings at this time raise no question as to 
the physical equality of the separate housing facilities pro­
vided for Negro and white tenants.

32. Eecords of the Housing Commission currently show 
that there are a total of 7,709 Negro applicants and 383 
white applicants for public housing listed as eligible based 
on the application as made. Eligibility is subject to final 
determination at time of admission.



Stipulation o f Facts 59a

33. Each family admitted to a public housing unit is 
required to sign a lease granted by the Detroit Housing 
Commission.

34. White families with a lesser preferential status than 
some of the plaintiffs, and some of the members of the class 
on behalf of which plaintiffs sue, have been admitted to 
public housing units to which, but for race, some of the 
plaintiffs and some of the members of their class would 
have been admitted.

Signed: "Willis M. Graves,
62 Mack Avenue,
Detroit 1, Michigan.

Francis M. Dent,
4256 Russell,
Detroit 7, Michigan.

Constance Baker Motley,
Thurgood Marshall,

101 W. 43rd Street,
New York 36, New York, 

Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
Signed: Paul T. Dwyer,

301 City Hall,
Detroit 26, Michigan;

Yance G. Ingalls,
301 City Hall,
Detroit 26, Michigan;

Helen W. Miller,
301 City Hall,
Detroit 26, Michigan,

Attorneys for Defendants.

(We print the following transcript in its entirety to com­
ply with the requirements of Rule 21(e) relevant to the 
printing of the opinion of the court. We  find the opinion 
of the District Judge interspersed throughout the entire 
proceeding.)



Transcript of Proceedings—Preliminary Statement 60a 
and Motion on Behalf of City of Detroit

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

(1) Proceedings had in the above-entitled cause before 
Hon. Arthur F. Lederle, Chief District Judge, at Detroit, 
Michigan, on Tuesday, June 22, 1954, commencing at nine- 
thirty o ’clock in the morning.

Appearances: Willis M. Graves, Esq., 62 Mack Avenue, 
Detroit 1, Michigan, and Mrs. Constance B. Motley, 20 
West 40th Street, New York, N. Y., attorneys for the 
Plaintiffs; Vance G. Ingalls, Esq., Assistant Corporation 
Counsel, City Hall, Detroit 26, Michigan, attorney for the 
Defendants.

*  #  *  #  *

(3) Detroit, Michigan.
Tuesday, June 22, 1954.
Nine thirty o ’clock A. M.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT AND MOTION ON BEHALF 
OF THE CITY OF DETROIT

The Court: All right, Mr. Ingalls.
Mr. Ingalls: May it please the Court, at this time I 

move the Court to hold in abeyance any further considera­
tion of this case until after the United States Supreme 
Court has heard and considered arguments on the two 
questions that it left open in the Public School Segrega­
tion cases, which will be heard in September, and, pre­
sumably, a decision will follow after that.

I make that motion for this reason, if the Court please, 
that the United States Supreme Court in the School case 
decisions, as the Court Avell knows, outlawed the separate 
but equal doctrine so far as it applies to public schools, 
but the Court in the last paragraph of the opinion in the 
main case, to my mind recognized and took judicial notice
(4) of the fact that the school officials throughout the parts 
of the country where schools are presently segregated, 
would have a problem of enforcement of any decree that 
the Court might hand down in connection with their opin­
ions.



Recognizing that problem, and, in my opinion, trying 
to avoid another Dred Scott decision, for the first time 
in history, I believe, they postponed writing a decree, be­
cause they did recognize the problem of enforcement.

The language of the Court in the last paragraph was 
this (reading):

“ Because these are class actions, because of the 
wide applicability of this decision, and because of the 
great variety of local conditions, the formulation of 
decrees in these cases presents problems of consid­
erable complexity. On re-argument, the consideration 
of appropriate relief was necessarily subordinated to 
the primary question—the constitutionality of segre­
gation in public education. We have now announced 
that such segregation is a denial of the equal protec­
tion of the laws. In order that we may have the full 
assistance of the parties in formulating decrees, the 
cases will be restored to the docket, and the parties 
are requested to present further argument on Ques­
tions (5) 4 and 5 previously propounded by the Court 
for the re-argument this Term.”

Now, the 4 and 5 questions which they left for re­
argument were the 4 and 5 questions of the questions pro­
pounded for argument at the last time those cases were 
argued, and these are the questions that they have now 
left open again for reargument.

(Reading):
“ (4). Assuming that it is decided that segregation 

in public schools violates the Fourteenth Amend­
ment,

“ (a) Would a decree necessarily follow pro­
viding that with the limits set by normal geo­
graphic school distincting any more children will 
forthwith be admitted to schools of their choice; 
or

“ (b) May this Court in the exercise of its 
equity powers permit an effective gradual adjust-

Prelim inary Statem ent and M otion on B ehalf 61a
o f the C ity o f  D etroit



ment to be brought about from existing segregated 
systems to a system not based on color distinction?

“ (5) On the assumption on which questions 4 
a and I) are based, and assuming further that this 
Court will exercise its equity powers to the end de­
scribed in question 4 b.

(6) “ (a) Should this Court formulate detailed de­
crees in these cases?

“ (b) If so, what specific issue should the de­
crees reach?

“ (c) Should this Court appoint a special master 
to hear evidence with a vieAv to recommending 
specific terms for such decrees?

“ (d) Should this Court remand to the Courts 
of first instance with directions to frame decrees 
in these cases, and, if so, what general directions 
should the decrees of this Court include, and what 
procedures should the Courts of first instance fol­
low in arriving at the specific terms of more de­
tailed decrees?”

Now, over the week end, if the Court please, attorneys 
for the plaintiffs and attorneys for the defendants have 
considered and discussed and put on paper a stipulation 
of facts in this case.

It Avas not until ten o’clock last night that I Avas able 
to call Mr. DAvyer, the Corporation Counsel, and read that 
stipulation to him. Both he and I Avanted more time to 
consider that, but in vieAv of the fact that counsel for the 
plaintiffs insisted that either Ave stipulate the facts im­
mediately, or go to trial today, AAre executed the stipula­
tion.

(7) Now, we AAmuld like, if the Court please, more time 
to take up that stipulation with our defendants, the Com­
mon Council and the Housing Commission. That would 
not take too long.

I think, if the Court please, that the Court Avould be 
well advised to put over any further argument in this

62a Prelim inary Statem ent and M otion on Behalf
o f the C ity o f  D etroit



case, and, of course, any decision in the case until the 
Supreme Court has acted upon the proposed decrees in 
the Public School cases, particularly with reference to 
what those decrees should contain, and how their opinion 
and decrees should be enforced.

It is indicated by the questions, if the Court please, to 
my mind, that the United States Supreme Court was con­
cerned, so concerned about the enforcement of their opin­
ion in those cases, that they considered seriously provid­
ing in their decrees that the enforcement would take 
a period of time necessary to adjust the differences, neces­
sary to lessen the possibility of conflict, the time neces­
sary to lessen the possibility of harm and possible blood­
shed.

Now, all of those things I believe the Court seriously 
had in mind, and wanted to alleviate as much as possible, 
and that is why they took that action, and I believe this 
Court could advisedly follow that procedure, (8) and then 
if this Court is inclined to give the plaintiffs a decree in 
this case, the Court would then have the benefit of the 
judgment of the United States Supreme Court on the 
matter.

Ruling on M otion and, Statement by the Court 63a

RULING ON MOTION AND STATEMENT BY THE COURT

The Court: Well, Mr. Ingalls, your motion is over­
ruled.

I think maybe at this time it is quite appropriate for 
me to say that I think plaintiffs’ counsel have exercised 
excellent judgment in being as patient as they have been 
in pressing the claims of the parties they represent, and 
I do not want to impose upon their graciousness and their 
apparent desire to solve this problem amicably any further.

I call your attention to stipulations Nos. 20 and 22. 
Perhaps it might be well at this time to review a little bit 
of the history of this case, and I am doing it from mem­
ory. I will appreciate it if you all follow very closely, 
and if you do not agree with me we can see if we can 
reach an agreement.



At the time this case was started, the defendants had 
a resolution on their records or minutes declaring it to be 
the policy of defendants not only to restrict the (9) oc­
cupancy in the various housing projects, hut also to deter­
mine the racial characteristics of that housing project, not 
on the basis of the project itself, but upon what they de­
clared to be the racial characteristics of the area, the 
community—I do not quite remember what expression they 
used there. Do you, Mrs. Motley?

Mrs. Motley: The neighborhood.
Mr. Ingalls: The neighborhood, your Honor.
The Court: The neighborhood, without any definition

of what they considered to he a neighborhood. So that, 
at that stage of the proceedings they went beyond mere 
segregation in a public building.

I think that you will recall that very early in these pro­
ceedings I expressed doubt that you could prove, as a 
matter of fact, that you could have segregation according 
to race without having inequality.

My recollection is that at that time I suggested that 
there were a variety of publicly-owned facilities available 
for occupants of various public housing projects. My 
recollection is that I referred to the type of schools, that 
in the older neighborhood they had old schools, and in 
the newer neighborhoods they had new schools. That in 
some of the neighborhoods they had parks, public parks 
immediately available in the immediate locality of the 
(10) public housing project, and in other areas they did 
not have facilities equal to those.

Now, if I recall, I mentioned the matter of transporta­
tion; that an individual employed in a factory on one side 
of the city could not be said to be treated equally if he 
was required to accept housing facilities on the other side 
of the city, when housing facilities within the immediate 
neighborhood of his place of employment were available.

What I was talking about then was not law at all; it 
was facts.

Generally speaking, our law remains fairly constant, 
but because of additional information, and perhaps a little

64a Ruling on M otion and Statem ent by the Court



better understanding on the part of the courts, we have 
come to view facts in a different light.

Now, the Supreme Court has settled one thing, and 
that is that mere segregation as segregation is unequal 
treatment.

Now, if it applies to the child in the school, it seems 
to me that it would apply with equal force and effect to the 
child in the home, or the child in the playground, or the 
child in the park.

Necessarily, the child spends more time in his home 
than he does in the schoolroom, and if he has to be (11) 
segregated in his home surroundings, the psychological 
effect on him, referred to in the Supreme Court cases, 
would be just as damaging as the psychological effect 
upon him for the shorter period of time that he is in the 
schoolroom.

Well, so much for the children.
Now, of course to a lesser degree perhaps, and perhaps 

not, it would have the same effect upon the parents. We 
all need all of the build-up that we can get from time to 
time to keep our chins up, and any discrimination or un­
justice is bound to have a bad effect on the adult as well 
as the child.

Now, with reference to the long period of time this 
case has been pending, I appreciate some of the things 
that Mr. Ingalls mentioned. I never anticipated it to be 
such a serious problem in Detroit. I am inclined to think 
that counsel for the defendants are under-estimating the 
progress that we have made in Detroit in good race re­
lationship in recent years. Now, going along a little bit 
further with the matter, shortly afer one of the prelimin­
ary hearings in this matter, the defendants rescinded the 
resolution that I have referred to heretofore; shortly 
thereafter they opened a bi-racial occupany in one of the 
newer developments. Just viewing it from the highway, 
as I do every day, it looks like a pretty good development. 
No trouble (12) has come out of that.

In private housing, colored people have been permitted 
to move into territories that, as our general residential

Ruling on M otion and Statem ent by the Court 65a



standards go in this community, are relatively high, and 
no difficulties have arisen there.

I appreciate that adopting the Declaration of Inde­
pendence did not immediately erase all of the prejudice 
and bigotry that seems to be one of the crosses that the 
American people have to bear.

I agree that we should proceed cautiously. I had hoped 
from the beginning that my home city would eliminate 
segregation, not because some court ordered the officials 
to do so, but because they wanted to do it because it was 
the right thing to do. And, of course, I know that all 
of us would have been happy if they had accomplished this 
result without compulsion by the Federal Government.

I think, however, there comes a time when patience 
ceases to be a virtue. I think that we have reached that 
place right now, so we are going ahead with this case.

Mrs. Motley, did you have something to say?

STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFFS

(13) Mrs. Motley: I would just like to say one word, 
if the Court please, in view of the remarks made by Mr. 
Ingalls.

Yesterday we spent many hours trying to reach an 
agreement in this case, and it was the understanding of 
Mr. Ingalls and Miss Miller that we were ready to enter 
into the stipulation for the purpose of avoiding the neces­
sity of a long and costly trial in this matter, that we were 
entering into the stipulation, and insisted upon its being 
signed last night in order that we might proceed this 
morning to an argument on the law in this case.

Of course, if I had realized that Mr. Ingalls was going 
to go back on his word, we probably would have had that 
agreement in writing also; but we did not, and we, there­
fore, did not anticipate that he was going to ask the Court 
to again postpone this matter.

The Court: Well, Mrs. Motley, haven’t I taken care
of that?

Mrs. Motley: Yes.

66a Statem ent on B ehalf o f  Plaintiffs



M otion fo r  the Defendants 67a

The Court: Then you would agree that the remarks
that you just made may be stricken?

Mrs. Motley: Yes, I will consent to them being 
stricken.
(14) The Court: Let us see if we can proceed without 
that.

Mrs. Motley: Yes.
The Court: In other words, I am not too much in­

terested in what happened yesterday. I am more interested 
in what is going to happen tomorrow.

Mrs. Motley: In view of our understanding, we pre­
pared a final order which we would like to request the 
Court to consider.

The Court: All right. Let me see it.
Mrs. Motley: Yes, your Honor.
(Documents were then handed up to the Court.)
The Court: Did you give me all of the copies?
Mrs. Motley: Yes, your Honor.
The Court: All right.
Mrs. Motley: We have one other matter, and that is

the addition of defendants, the members of the Common 
Council.

(Handing a document up to the Court.)
The Court: Is there any objection to this order sub­

stituting defendants, Mr. Ingalls?
Mr. Ingalls: I did not consent to it, and I could not 

stipulate it.
The Court: I think you—
Mr. Ingalls (interposing): I would like to make a fur­

ther motion on that particular point.
(15) The Court: All right.

MOTION FOR THE DEFENDANTS

Mr. Ingalls: We have raised the question all the way 
through in our answers that the Court had no jurisdiction 
over the parties, and, without mentioning them, at the time 
we had particular reference to the members of the Com­
mon Council.



68a M otion fo r  the Defendants

I, therefore, at this time move that all of the members of 
the Common Council be removed from this proceeding, for 
the following reason:

As the Court well knows, having been a municipal lawyer 
for a good many years the legislative body is the Common 
Council of the City of Detroit, and so far as administration, 
so far as administrative matters of the city are concerned, 
it cannot interfere with them under the charter.

The Housing Act of the State of Michigan, and also the 
city ordinance adopted under it, has the following provi­
sion (reading):

“ The Commission shall have complete control of the 
entire housing project or projects, including construc­
tion, maintenance and operation, as fully and com­
pletely as if said Commission represented private
(16) owners. Contracts for the construction and pur­
chase of material entered into by the Commission shall 
not be required to be made through any city or village 
purchase department.”

It further provides that the only things that the Common 
Council approves are deeds, contracts and leases or pur­
chases, but not leases with tenants.

In other words, the Common Council under the State law, 
and under the ordinance adopted under this State law, has 
no jurisdiction over the tenant selection by the Housing 
Commission, and has never exercised by any record of the 
Common Council any such jurisdiction.

For instance, the policies of tenant selection, such as the 
incomes of the tenants for admission, their status, so far 
as their housing conditions are concerned, and so on, are 
all fixed by the Housing Commission. No rules or regula­
tions propounded by the Federal Housing Administration 
or the Commission were ever submitted to the Common 
Council for approval or disapproval.

So that in this connection, the Common Council, particu­
larly the individual members who are here being sued, had 
no jurisdiction over this matter, and could have no jurisdic­
tion under the law.



Furthermore, if the Court enters a decree or (17) injunc­
tion in this case against the Housing Commission, it would 
he as fully effective, of course, as if it were directed against 
the members of the Common Council also.

For that reason, your Honor, I move that the members 
of the Common Council be stricken from this proceedings.

Statem ent o f  the Court and Discussion  69a
o f Stipulation

STATEMENT OF THE COURT AND DISCUSSION 
OF STIPULATION

The Court: I think you may be right on that, Mr. In­
galls, and I will just withhold action on your motion until 
we get to the end of this.

This case being submitted on stipulation, there is only one 
thing that I am particularly concerned with on the matter 
of facts at this stage of the proceedings, and that is to be 
perfectly certain that we have all of the facts in the record 
that should be here.

Suppose we go over the stipulation now paragraph by 
paragraph.

Paragraph 1 merely relates to the pleadings, the state 
of the record here, so we do not need to spend any time 
on that. I assumed that you have covered that.

The same thing applies to 2 and to 3.
Number 4 describes the plaintiffs.
Number 5 indicates the action that they took in seeking 

the right to occupy the premises.
Number 6 indicates what the Housing Commission, (18) 

or its authorized representatives did with the application.
Number 7 gives the date that the proceedings were 

started.
Number 8. I think that it might add something to this 

Number 8 if you indicate that they were not admitted on a 
bi-racial basis, but were admitted to housing that was 
limited to a colored housing project.

Mr. Ingalls: No, your Honor.
The Court: That is not true?
Mr. Ingalls: Some of them were admitted to Jeffries.
Mrs. Motley: In one or two instances, according to the 

answers made to the interrogatories which are on file, one



or two of the original plaintiffs were admitted to the Jef­
fries homes.

The Court: Well, I am back to my question again; 
wouldn’t the picture he clearer if that was specifically set 
forth in the findings?

Mrs. Motley: 1 think it would be.
The Court: I cannot think of anything to add to 9.
Number 10 just brings the matter up to date, so far as 

the plaintiffs are concerned.
Mr. Ingalls: On 10, may I say a word there?
(19) The Court: Oh, yes.
Mr. Ingalls: Your Honor remembers that at the last 

meeting we had here, plaintiffs offered six intervenor plain­
tiffs, whose names did not appear in this last at all. Those 
six I had checked by the Housing Commission, and have 
full reports on, but now it appears that they are not in here 
at all, and these are names with which I am not familiar, 
although they were in the intervenor complaint. I only 
considered the original six that were offered here.

So, in view of that, we would like the opportunity, and 
we provided for it in the last sentence in that paragraph, of 
checking on the admissibility of those—

The Court: All right.
Mr. Ingalls: •—of those new plaintiffs, and submitting 

them to the Court by a stipulation.
The Court: All right.
Mr. Ingalls: Yes, your Honor.
The Court: Now, when we come to Number 12, it may be 

that we do not need the Mayor here.
The same observation applies to the members of the 

Council in Number 13.
Number 14 is merely a recital of the law.
In Number 15, the names of the Commissioners.
Number 16, their administrative officer.
(20) Number 17, the description of the various housing 

projects that the defendants were operating.
Number 18 refers to the continued activity of the defend­

ant in this field.
Number 19, the same.
Numbers 20, 21 and 22 are the same.

70a Statem ent o f the C ourt and Discussion
o f Stipulation



Number 23 discloses that they were built partially with 
Federal funds.

Number 24 discloses the ratio between the white families 
seeking occupancy of these public housing projects in 1950, 
and again in 1954. That seems to me to be rather signifi­
cant.

Likewise Number 25 is significant, and Number 26.
Where are the Smith homes located!
Mr. Ingalls: I will say just between Rosedale Park and 

Brightmoor, on Evergreen, just south of Fenkell.
The Court: All right.
The resolution referred to in Number 27 is rather a laud­

able objective. Your criticism is withdrawn, living up to 
the resolution, isn’t it, Mrs. Motley!

Mrs. Motley: That is right.
The Court: And, of course, Number 28 refers to the reso­

lution that I referred to in my preliminary remarks in over­
ruling Mr. Ingalls’ motion for a continuance.

(21) Now, going over Number 29, paragraph by para­
graph, I have nothing to suggest until we get to 3.

What do you understand to be the effect of that west or 
east, Mrs. Motley!

Mrs. Motley: Well, I understand—
The Court: Is that merely a statement of preference, or 

was that interpreted to mean that the applicant would not 
accept an apartment on the west side if they had applied 
for an apartment on the east side!

Mrs. Motley: I understand that to mean that that refers 
to certain racial neighborhood characteristics; that is, some 
projects located in the east are in a colored residential area, 
and perhaps some in the west are in some of the white 
areas, and this may be used as a device for getting a pros­
pective applicant to agree to live in an area which he would 
not otherwise want to live in, by asking him to choose the 
area which he would want to live in.

And then we feel that in public housing of this kind, the 
applicant, the next eligible applicant on the list should be 
assigned the next vacancy. If preferences are allowed, it 
may be that segregated projects will result by that means.

Statem ent o f the Court and Discussion  71a
o f Stipulation



That is why in the order we ask that that be eliminated 
from the application blank.

Mr. Ingalls: May I say something on that, (22) yonr 
Honor?

The Court: Yes, I am thinking about the same thing you 
are.

Mr. Ingalls: Mrs. Motley is making it unduly compli­
cated. All it means is to express the wish of whether they 
want to live east of Woodward, or west of Woodward. 
That is all it is.

The Court: I think we should very early keep in mind 
that within very restricted limitations, the Court has no 
right to interfere with the discretion of legislative or ad­
ministrative bodies. Perhaps we should be a little more 
cautious in dealing with State agencies, as contrasted with 
Federal agencies.

Well, let us give that some more thought.
I understand 4.
I understand Number 30.
I understand Number 31, 32, 33 and 34.
Now, follow this:
The classification of applicants for occupancy of public 

housing units, according to race, results in an unequal treat­
ment of the applicant.

Mr. Connelly (the court reporter), will you read that? 
(The court reporter then read the last statement (23) of 

the Court as follows:

“ The classification of applicants for occupancy of 
public housing units, according to race, results in an 
unequal treatment of the applicant.” )

The Court: Assuming that you are entitled to that kind 
of a finding, based upon the agreed facts, is that a finding 
of fact, or a conclusion of law, Mrs. Motley?

Mrs. Motley: I would then think it is a conclusion of law. 
The Court: Is it?
Mrs. Motley: Pardon me ?
The Court: I wonder. You think about it a minute, and 

I will think about it a minute, and we will take a short 
recess.

72a Statem ent o f  the Court and Discussion
o f Stipulation



(Thereupon a short recess was taken.)
The Court: What I had in mind with reference to this, 

what looks to me like an ultimate finding of fact at this time 
is this, and I can illustrate it by the quotation from the 
Kansas case, that is, in the Brown case, if you will just 
take a look at that, and I assume you both have it, I am 
looking at Law Week, and my paging will not be the same 
as yours. It reads (reading):
(24) “ Segregation of white and colored children in public 

schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored chil­
dren.”

There is not any question in my mind but what that sen­
tence is a finding of fact.

Mrs. Motley: Yes, that is true. The District Court in 
Kansas found that in its finding of fact.

The Court: It is my present impression that in that 
respect the stipulation of facts is incomplete. I do not 
assume that—well, I will back up a bit—I think perhaps the 
Supreme Court having found that as a fact, it may thereby 
come to be a question of law as we thought about it, but 
our problem here is a little broader. We are in a different 
field.

So, I am presently thinking about what we now have in 
the record. I assume that the Court can take judicial 
notice of the map of the City of Detroit; if not, I assume 
that Mr. Ingalls will stipulate that a map may be added to 
the record.

Will you do that, Mr. Ingalls?
Mr. Ingalls: Certainly.
The Court: So, we will get the map in.
Having been fairly active in this community for a good 

many years, I have a very good picture of the community. 
As Mr. Ingalls pointed out, I formerly was connected with 
the (25) Corporation Counsel’s office, and conducted con­
demnation proceedings in very nearly every school section 
or district of the City. But, the knowledge that I gained in 
that manner is not a part of the record in this case.

I have the impression that, generally speaking, the hous­
ing projects that have been allocated for colored occupa-

Statem ent o f  the Court and Dismission 73a
o f Stipulation



tion generally have been in the central part of the city, 
which in recent times have been generally referred to as 
the “ slum district” , whereas, the two housing projects that 
I presently have in mind, in contrast to that, which were 
exclusively allocated to white occupancy were in outlying 
districts, in other words, in rural parts of the town.

I am thinking presently of the Chandler Park project, 
which, if I am not mistaken, is located immediately adjacent 
to a rather nice city park; the Herman Gardens project, 
which is out in a community that recently developed new 
schools, new streets, comparatively close with relation to 
the other housing projects, to the Rouge Park, and perhaps 
other public facilities. I do not think I ought to trust my 
memory even if I could do it.

I recall when we condemned the site for a pole yard for 
the D. P. W., out on Southfield Road, I guess it was, that 
was way out in the country. We went out there because 
the land was cheap, and it was more economical to store 
these (26) poles way outside of the built-up area than it 
was to buy more expensive land, to keep the poles in the 
vicinity of where they were going to be used.

Mr. Ingalls: If the Court wants it, we will spot those on 
a map and bring it in.

The Court: That might be a good thing to get into the 
record.

Assuming for the sake of the argument that in view of 
the fact that the Supreme Court adopted this Kansas find­
ing, that I can thereby follow it as a settled question, that 
would take care of the children involved. Perhaps all that 
judge was referring to was the public schools. I assume I 
can take judicial notice of the fact that if not the primary 
reason, at least one of the major reasons for having people 
in family groups is for the purpose of rearing and educat­
ing children.

I think that that would require some serious thought on 
our parts.

Now, referring to the Delaware case, the quotation that 
is in here reads as follows (reading):

“ I conclude from the testimony that in our Delaware 
society state imposed segregation and education itself

74a Statem ent o f  the Court and Discussion
o f Stipulation



results in the negro children as a class receiving 
(27) educational opportunities which are substantially 
inferior to those available to white children otherwise 
similarly situated. ’ ’

You will note that the judge there started out by saying, 
“ I conclude from the testimony.”

Now, I am asking myself is there sufficient in this record 
at the present time to make a similar finding?

What do you think about it, Mr. Ingalls, or do you want 
to concede that the same reasoning that was used in Kan­
sas and Delaware would result in the same kind of a finding 
of fact?

Mr. Ingalls: Of course, there is nothing in the stipula­
tion to that effect, though.

The Court: I understand there is not.
Mr. Ingalls: There is no direct claim of that kind made 

in any of the pleadings, or in any of the complaints. The 
plaintiffs’ claims, of course, are general on that line, that 
they are being deprived of their rights under the Four­
teenth Amendment, and so on, because of the practice of 
the Housing Commission in separating these projects.

Now, of course, the Court in its determination of a mat­
ter of this kind certainly can take judicial notice of many 
things, and perhaps that might be one. The Court has in­
formation and knowledge on that subject.

However, the Court also will take judicial notice (28) of, 
shall we say, the possibility, as the United States Supreme 
Court has, of trouble or conflict ensuing from any further 
change at this time. I would not go so far as to say that 
the Court would say that that is a fact, or the conclusion 
that was made in the Delaware case, or in the other case 
that the Court referred to, but it might be, in the Court’s 
mind, a conclusion of law.

However, there are no facts in the case on that, as I 
understand it.

The Court: Maybe this is a good time to review the judi­
cial process or method by which we determine disputes.

First, we must find the facts.
Secondly, we must find the law.

Statem ent o f  the Court and Discussion  75a
o f Stipulation



Third, enter the judgment that the law compels.
A judge has no right to make findings of fact based upon 

his, or, perhaps I should say, what he thinks his knowledge 
of the situation is. That has to be done on the basis of the 
record.

There are two ways that a judge can be wrong in finding 
facts.

First, he can find what he thinks is a fact, but which is 
not supported by substantial evidence.

Second, he can fail to find a fact which is material to 
decision, where there is a substantial evidence (29) to sup­
port that finding.

What I am concerned about right now, Mrs. Motley, is 
what do we have in this record that would support a finding 
that segregation of children in a public housing project is 
detrimental to children ?

Secondly, what evidence do we have in the record that 
Avould indicate that segregation of adults on the basis of 
race is detrimental to adults ?

I deem it to be the duty of the trial court always to be 
especially careful about the preparation of findings of fact.

I f our findings are incomplete, or, if we make findings 
that are not supported by the evidence, that makes it im­
possible for the appellate courts to perform the functions 
assigned to the appellate courts.

I always start out on the assumption that every case I 
try is going to be appealed; in fact, I wish they all would be 
appealed.

Do you have some suggestion, Mrs. Motley?
Mrs. Motley: Yes, I would like to say this, if the Court 

please.

76a Statem ent o f  the Court and Discussion
o f Stipulation



Further Statement on Behalf of Plaintiffs 77 a

(30) FURTHER STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF
THE PLAINTIFFS

Mrs. Motley: Your Honor, we do not have in this record 
any psychological testimony, such as they had in the Kansas 
ease, upon which that finding was based. But in Louisiana, 
we had a right involved, which is not involved in the school 
cases, and that is a property right, and we think that the 
detriment here to the negro adult, and consequently to their 
children, is that they are deprived of a property right, the 
right to acquire housing to which they are otherwise quali­
fied solely because of race and color.

Now, several of these stipulations clearly indicate that. 
That is, stipulation 24, which shows the number of eligible 
negro applicants presently waiting admission, and then 
specifically the very last stipulation, Number 34, in which 
it is stipulated that some of the plaintiffs have been denied 
housing. The stipulation is that white families with a less 
preferential status have been admitted to projects to which 
some of the plaintiffs would have been admitted but for 
race.

So, your Honor, the detriment to them was the depriva­
tion of valuable property rights, the right to lease real 
property free from state imposed restrictions.

The Court: You think it is more nearly like a negative 
restriction case?
(31.) Mrs. Motley: Yes, your Honor.

Now, I wanted to say, your Honor, that we have a 
final memorandum of law which I have just handed to 
your secretary, in which we argue that if there is psycho­
logical injury to the children in the school situation as a 
result of segregation, it follows that there will be similar 
psychological injury in a segregated housing situation 
where that segregation is compelled by the state.

Then, your Honor, we also refer to the deprivation of 
property rights, which is the right involved in a housing 
situation, that we do not have in the school situation.

One other thing that the memorandum contains is a 
detailing of the involvement of the Common Council in a



public housing situation, enumerating all of the things 
which the Federal and State statutes require the Council 
to do with respect to this housing situation, indicating 
their control involved in the entire picture.

Mr. Ingalls: Of course, the opposite to that is merely
this, certainly the residents of the Brewster project I 
do not think feel hurt at all because they are living in 
there rather than Parkside, except for maybe some in­
convenience in getting to work.

The Court: All I will say, Mrs. Motley, is that I want 
to offer all of the suggestions I think of as I go (32) along; 
but if you think you do not need a finding similar to the 
Kansas and Delaware findings, that really is primarily 
.your responsibility. I have a feeling that every lawyer 
should have the right to try his own lawsuit the way he 
wants to.

Mrs. Motley: I think I am making such a finding 
based on the stipulations that I indicated here, Number 
25 and so on.

The Court: That is, you think you would be entitled
to such an ultimate finding by the Court on the basis of 
the stipulation!

Mrs. Motley: Yes.
The Court: Well, that may be the answer.
Which particular paragraphs did you have in mind?
Mrs. Motley: Paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 29, 32 and 34.
The Court: Let me see if I can think of an analogy

like this:
You say in effect that what the city is doing is telling 

the colored people, “ You step aside; we are going to 
wait on these white people first.”  In other words, if you 
were going up to a ticket window to buy a ticket for a 
train and they had only so many seats on the train, they 
could keep the colored people standing in the background 
until they sold all the seats they had available on that 
particular train to white people?

(33) Mrs. Motley: Yes, that is the analogy, and the negro 
families are thus deprived of decent, sanitary housing 
that they would otherwise have had.

78a Colloquy between Court and Counsel



The Court: Maybe I had better put it into a municipal 
activity: If they have two lines lining up for the buses 
on the corner here, and I guess they still have to line 
up to get on the buses, do they not, Mr. Ingalls?

Mr. Ingalls: Only at the peak periods.
The Court: If they establish two lines there, and then 

they let the white people get on the first bus, and the bus 
is loaded and it drives away and leaves the colored peo­
ple standing there, it would be obviously unequal treat­
ment.

Well, it seems to me that is as far as I can go on this 
stipulation, that they are treated unequally because they 
are not given their regular turn in getting into these pro­
jects.

Well, I do not think that I can make any finding on 
the basis of this record here that would be similar to the 
findings in the Brown case.

Mrs. Motley: As to the psychological effect as to the 
property right element?

The Court: Yes. Perhaps that is the better way to
present the case.

Let us see if I can state the findings that I think 
(34) you might be entitled to on this basis:

On the basis of the stipulation of facts, it is obvious 
that the plaintiffs and those they represent as a class are 
not receiving equal treatment for the reason that they 
are not admitted to vacancies in the public housing pro­
jects, in accordance with the order in which the applica­
tions are filed.

Mr. Connolly (the Court reporter), will you please read 
that back?

(The statement just made by the Court was read back 
by the Court reporter as follows:

“ On the basis of the stipulation of facts, it is 
obvious that the plaintiffs and those they represent 
as a class are not receiving equal treatment for the 
reason that they are not admitted to vacancies in the 
public housing projects, in accordance with the order 
in which the applications are filed.” )

Colloquy between Court and Counsel 79a



The Court: Can you think of a better way to say
that ?

Mrs. Motley: I would add something to that.
The Court: All right.
Mrs. Motley: And that is that they are consequently 

denied their property rights not to be—that they are con­
sequently denied a valuable property right in being denied 
housing to which they are otherwise eligible, solely (35) 
because of race and color.

The Court: I think we probably should disagree some­
where, hut that in my book is a conclusion of law.

Mrs. Motley: Maybe.
The Court: Well, Mr. Ingalls, don’t you think that

plaintiffs are entitled to a finding substantially as I 
dictated it ?

Mr. Ingalls: I feel at this point, your Honor, that any 
further argument on my part will be entirely pointless, 
in vieAv of the fact that your Honor has completely decided 
this case.

The Court: No, I have not decided it. As a prac­
tical matter, the judge does not decide a case; the facts 
decide the case. All the judge does is to objectively look 
at the facts, and facts are about the most stubborn things 
I know of. It is very difficult to argue with the facts. 
I do not blame you at all for not arguing with that fact.

Mr. Ingalls: Your Honor, I might say that we feel 
that in view of that resolution, the latest resolution of 
the Housing Commission, that the former racial segrega­
tion policy has been abandoned officially by the Housing 
Commission, and that it is now a matter of gradual ac­
complishment with complete integration which may take 
time in view of the difficulties and problems involved, 
which were recognized (36) certainly by the United States 
Supreme Court.

The Court: Well, I will make the finding as I dictated 
it, and if, Mrs. Motley, you think that is all you need, we 
will stop there.

Do you have some more ideas?
Mrs. Motley: No, I don’t think so, your Honor.

80a Colloquy betw een Court and Counsel



The Court: Maybe I had better look at the Plessy
v. Ferguson ease again.

Mrs. Motley: May it please the Court, we have de­
cided that there may be something that could be added 
to your last finding.

We think on reading just the very last part of it, that 
they, referring to the plaintiffs, are not admitted to the 
vacancies in public housing projects in accordance with 
the order in which the applications are filed, we feel that 
there should be added to that, and in accordance with the 
statutory preferences for admission.

There are certain statutory preferences for admission 
which probably take precedence over the mere priority of 
applications in a particular case. For example—

The Court: I understand what you mean. I gave a
little thought to adding something to that, but 1 rather 
came to the conclusion that we had better point up very 
clearly that they are not taken in the order that they apply 
because of the processing that follows after that, that 
that (37) would open up a lot of loopholes here if we get 
into that.

Mrs. Motley: Yes.
The Court: I think that they are entitled to have their 

applications processed and either approved or disap­
proved strictly in the order of their application.

Mrs. Motley: I see.
The Court: If you get beyond that, then you run into 

complications.
Mrs. Motley: Yes.
The Court: That is, in other words, Joe Doakes came 

up first, and we have either got to take care of Joe 
Doakes in the order of the number one place, or else show 
that Sam Smith, who came second because of a statutory 
preference that he may have is thereby entitled to get 
ahead of Joe Doakes.

Mrs. Motley: Yes; with that understanding it is clear.
The Court: So I think you had probably better leave

it just the way it is.
Mrs. Motley: Yes.

Colloquy between Court and Counsel 81a



The Court: They are entitled to a yes or no answer
on the applications as they appear.

I can understand Mr. Ingalls’ position. I guess I told 
you where I stood in this case about four years ago.

Mr. Ingalls: I beg your pardon?
The Court: I think you found out where I stood in

this case about four years ago.
Mr. Ingalls: I found that out the first day we were

in here, your honor.
The Court: So that did not come as a shock today.
Mr. Ingalls: No.
The Court: Of course, I am glad to have the help of

the Supreme Court of the United States.
Mr. Ingalls: Yes.
The Court: Is there anything in the Plessy v. Fergu­

son case except a finding that any discrimination against 
a person because of his race violated his constitutional 
rights? Then the Court went further in that case and 
decided on the record that it had before it, that if you 
had equal physical facilities you had equality of treat­
ment.

Looking at this Brown case again, the Chief Justice 
wrote as follows (reading):

“ In each of the cases other than the Delaware case, 
a three-judge Federal District Court denied relief 
to the plaintiffs on the so-called ‘ separate but equal’ 
doctrine announced in Plessy v. Ferguson. Under 
that doctrine equality of treatment is accorded when 
the (39) races are provided substantially equal facili­
ties, even though these facilities be separate.”

There is no point in getting ino an argument about it, 
but it seems to me that was a finding of fact on the part 
of the Supreme Court at that time.

Do you think of any findings that you want to add to 
the stipulation, Mr. Ingalls?

Mr. Ingalls: Will your Honor excuse me a minute while 
I have a conference ?

The Court: Yes.

82a Colloquy between Court and Counsel



(Mr. Ingalls conferred with Miss Miller.)
Mr. Ingalls: Of course your Honor, I think based upon 

these stipulations,—on the statements already made that 
it has not been determined whether or not the plaintiffs, 
the intervenor plaintiffs are even eligible under the rules 
and regulations of the Commission, regardless of race, 
and that has been left open for amendment to the stipula­
tion. I would suggest in that connection that the Court 
make a finding that it is possible that none of the plain­
tiffs, under the rales and regulations of the Commission, 
may be eligible for housing even though they are on the 
eligible list. They are placed on the eligible list, as yopr 
Honor knows, on their own statements, and those are not 
checked at the time, and are not checked and investigated 
until the time of admission to a vacancy, and at that time
(40) they find there may be misstatements and so on, 
and they are not actually eligible, based on income and 
other factors rather than race.

Secondly, going back to my original statement of what 
the United States Supreme Court did in withholding a 
decree until later, in effect taking judicial notice of the 
problems involved of immediately doing away with segre­
gation of public schools in certain communities, that this 
Court could also take judicial notice of those possibili­
ties.

The Court: I do not think that I could take judicial
notice of it, but if I could, it would be just the opposite 
to your conclusion.

Mr. Ingalls: I recognize, yrour Honor, as already said,
has no fear of the result, but there is always the possi­
bility even in the Court’s mind, I imagine, of—

The Court: I do not think there is the remotest chance 
of any difficulty in it.

I assume that this judgment you have prepared, Mrs. 
Motley, in effect, is your request for conclusions of law.

I think we can solve that whole problem by just para­
phrasing the next to the last paragraph in the Brown 
case. It will then read as follows:
(41) I conclude that in the field of public housing the 
doctrine of separate but equal has no place. Separate

Colloquy betw een Court and Counsel 83a



housing facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, I 
hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated 
for whom the actions have been brought are by reason 
of the segregation complained of deprived of the equal 
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.

I am going to excuse you now until one o ’clock. I may 
be a little late, but I will give you this period to think 
those over, and maybe we can get it all finished today. 
In the meantime, leave your brief with me.

(Thereupon, at eleven thirty-five o ’clock in the morning, 
a recess was taken until one o’clock in the afternoon, same 
day, same place.)

(42) Detroit, Michigan.
Tuesday, June 22, 1954.
One fifteen o ’clock P. M.

(The hearing of this cause was resumed pursuant to the 
recess.)

The Court: I have read your memorandum, Mrs. Mot­
ley, and I think it is very good.

Probably you are right, that the best basis for your 
claim comes under the property rights. I, however, like 
to approach the problem on the broader basis of what 
we sometimes mistakenly call human rights, because, after 
all, I guess property rights are one of the most valuable 
rights we have, and, to that extent, it is a human right.

Mrs. Motley: I would like to say, your Honor, that
we have redrawn it to incorporate your conclusion of law.

(Mrs. Motley then handed documents to the Court and 
and to Mr. Ingalls.)

The Court: Number 1, of course, is all right.
Mr. Ingalls: On Number 1, your Honor, do you want

to consider that motion of mine as to the Council1?
The Court: Number 2 is all right.
Number 3 is all right.
I am not going to ask you to agree to any of these, Mr. 

Ingalls, but if you see something that you want to call 
my attention to, do not hesitate to do it.

84a Colloquy between Court and Counsel



Number 3 is all right, including the added paragraph.
Paragraph 1 of the order is all right.
I wonder if you need Number 2. I think in the long run 

we might be better off without it,—that you might be bet­
ter off without it.

The same thing with Number 3.
I think the obvious answer to Number 3 is that if I 

were filling out one of those blanks,—I think we should 
carefully avoid interfering with the details of administra­
tion, except for the overall objective to prevent discrimina­
tion.

I think Number 4 is all right.
Number 5 is all right.
I wonder whether Number 6 is before the Court.
Mrs. Motley: I think that it is, for the reason that

if no white families are admitted to certain projects—
The Court: What I meant to say was, assuming that 

that is true, are there any white families objecting to 
that?

Mrs. Motley: Are there any white people objecting to
not being admitted to— ?

The Court: To what they call colored housing?
(44) Mrs. Motley: I don’t know whether there are, or 

not.
The Court: Well, that is the answer.
Mrs. Motley: But I think this is the other side of the

point in the case.
The Court: Well, that may be, and it may be that some 

day we will have to pass on it, but I do not want to pass on 
anv more than I have to, so Ave will leave out Number 
6 . '

N oav, do we need number 7?
It strikes me that we ought to keep this order as 

simple as we can. The Court will always be open to your 
complaint of violations.

I am inclined to think that we should eliminate Num­
bers 7 and 8. I think that takes care of it.

Noaâ , on Mr. Ingalls’ motion to dismiss the Mayor and 
members of the Common Council, I am going to amend 
that, without prejudice, for two reasons:

Colloquy betw een Court and Counsel 85a



Any time I enter an order like this, I want to look for­
ward to the time when we come to enforce it; and if any 
individual, not only public officials, but people who are 
not public officials, aid and abet the parties enjoined, they, 
of course, can be brought in on the same citation as the 
particular individual enjoined.

(45) I am not unmindful of the fact that we do have a 
social problem here, and it may be that strictly you are 
entitled to that relief, but I do not want to extend the 
order beyond what I feel at this time is necessary.

So that, I will grant the motion dismissing the Mayor 
and the members of the Common Council, without preju­
dice to reopening the case and bringing them back into 
the case if it becomes necessary.

My present thought is that it will not be necessary. I 
am inclined to think that if they do not hear about this 
injunction, in my opinion some of them may read about 
it in the newspapers. In addition to that( I know that 
they are law abiding citizens, and I do not think we will 
have any problem there at all.

I will redraft the order in the form which I have sug­
gested here, and enter it immediately.

I think the record should probably show that on the 
basis of the facts as I have found them and dictated in 
the record, plus the stipulation of facts, I find, as a con­
clusion of law, that the policy adopted and followed by 
the defendant Housing Commission and Harry J. Durbin, 
Director-Secretary of the Housing Commission, has been 
in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United 
States, particularly the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution, and, therefore, (46) it follows that a judg­
ment must be entered granting the relief prayed for as 
to the members of the Housing Commission and Harry 
J. Durbin, its Director-Secretary.

An order may be entered dismissing without prejudice 
the Mayor and the members of the Common Council 
named in the pleadings.

I do not assume, Mrs. Motley, that you are interested 
in costs, are you?

Mrs. Motley: We have an order prepared for that.

86a Colloquy between Court and Counsel



The Court: You see, that raises a difficult problem be­
cause of the change of the various defendants.

Mr. Ingalls: The Supreme Court says, a public matter­
being involved, no costs.

The Court: That is easy to say when you are ruling 
in favor of a public agency, but what about these poor 
people that have been investing their own money?

Mrs. Motley: We have prepared a motion for costs.
The Court: Now, if you will tell me who the costs

should be taxed against, and the proportion against each 
one, that will solve the problem for today, and it may 
be after consideration you will think differently of it.

Mrs. Motley: We thought it would be taxed against 
the Housing Commission.

The Court: As a corporate body?
Mrs. Motley: Yes.
(47) Mr. Ingalls: If there are any costs allowed, I think 

that is the way it should be done; it would lie against the 
Housing Commission.

The Court: All right. I will have the order read with 
costs to be taxed, and we will cross that bridge when we 
come to it.

Do you have some provision in the order and in the in­
junction providing for service, or will you take care of 
that, Mrs. Motley? You will advise the Housing Commis­
sion—

Mrs. Motley: Well—
The Court: Maybe I should not ask that question. I do 

remember some provision for service of the order on the 
specific party.

Well, suppose you work it out, and, of course, Mrs. Her­
rington, if you will just take over from where I leave off 
here.

(Then followed a short discussion off the record.)
The Court: I think I have left two things hanging in the 

air.
Number 3 will be left out, though I can see that there can 

be a perfectly innocent reason for asking that question.
Eliminate Number 2.

Colloquy between Court and Counsel 87a



88a Statem ent by the Court

As I said, the Law Clerk will work with you, and (48) as 
soon as it is ready, it can be typed up.

Mr. Ingalls: Before you close, your Honor, in order to 
complete the record, you will recall at our last meeting here 
you gave me an opportunity to file an answer to the inter- 
venors ’ complaint. I have not yet filed that, because of the 
circumstances surrounding it, b.ut to complete the record, I 
would like to file it.

STATEMENT BY THE COURT

The Court: The record will show that Mr. Ingalls has an 
opportunity at this time to file an answer to the application 
to intervene, and if as to these latest parties named after 
investigation lie wants to file another amended answer, he 
may do so.

At the outset here, I said something about the fine co­
operation I have received from the plaintiffs’ lawyers, and 
I could repeat the same thing about Mr. Ingalls. I am glad 
to see that Miss Miller is here today.

Mr. Ingalls, I have tried to arrange this record so that 
this final order can be enforced, and, of course, it will be 
enforced. But, as an American, I do not like that expres­
sion “ enforce”  or “ force.”

I hope I am right that no difficulties will arise out of this 
order that I am entering. I have every reason (49) to be­
lieve that they will not arise.

In the first place, the people living in this community are 
either American citizens, or, if they be aliens, practically 
all of them hope to become American citizens and, there­
fore, they believe in the principles of our government.

Now, the elementary principle is that all men are created 
equal; they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
rights. Government was not instituted to give them these 
rights; it was instituted to protect them. All the Court is 
doing on this occasion is making a declaration again of the 
fundamental human rights that were enumerated in the 
Declaration of Independence, and repeated from time to 
time.



Statem ent by the Court 89a

We just celebrated Flag Day. A flag is not a piece of 
colored cloth; it is a symbol of what we inwardly believe, 
and that is the reason why we should cherish it. I certainly 
will be terribly disappointed if my fellow citizens who have 
just celebrated Flag Day should forget that that means that 
everyone has equal rights in our country.

Now, further than that, I can say that I think you will 
find that the vast majority of people in Detroit, regardless 
of their specific religious convictions, at heart approve of 
the teachings of Christianity.

(50) As I said earlier, the purpose of Government’s pro­
tecting families and family life is primarily so that the 
little children will have an opportunity to grow up and 
become useful citizens.

Now, as I see it, housing is just as important as school­
ing, and I am inclined to think that if I had this problem 
to solve, I would remind the people who objected to the 
little children coming into my community because of the 
color of their skin, that when it was written “ Suffer thee 
little children to come unto me,”  the expression was not 
limited to suffer the little white children to come unto me, 
but it included all of them.

It is a little bit difficult for me to understand why any­
body would want to deprive a little child of a decent home 
merely because he happened to have a colored skin.

So I think that if I had the problems which the City au­
thorities seem to think they have, I would not adopt force 
as the first approach.

Now, having started on this, I am thinking that if worst 
came to worst and hydrogen bombs started to drop on this 
country, they might destroy our buildings, they might de­
stroy our factories, they might kill off a great many human 
beings and maim a great many others, but they cannot 
destroy America as long as our concept of human rights 
and (51) spiritual values are retained, and as long as we 
retain those spiritual values, we can build again.

So, I say, those things which tend to destroy our con­
cepts as American citizens, and our concept of the dignity 
of man, and what we sometimes refer to as spiritual values, 
are more dangerous than the most potent weapons, which 
can only destroy physical things.



90a Statem ent by the Court

I know that you did not ask me for this talk, but as you 
get toward the end of your career, like Mr. Graves and I 
am, sometimes you preempt the opportunity of saying some 
things that we think might be helpful to the younger people 
that are coming along our way.

Mr. Ingalls: I would like to ask for the usual time for 
appeal, but that does not mean that I am going to appeal, 
but I will have to take it up with my clients.

The Court: Yes, whatever the rule says. I will not grant 
a stay, however.

(Thereupon an adjournment was taken.)

(52) United States of America,
Eastern District of Michigan,
Southern Division— ss.

I, Bertrand D. Connolly, Official Reporter of the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, 
Southern Division, do hereby certify that on Tuesday, June 
22, 1954, I reported stenographically the proceedings had 
in the cause of Walter Arthur Lewis, et al., plaintiffs, v. 
The City of Detroit, et al., defendants, No. 9505, before 
Hon. Arthur F. Lederle, Chief District Judge, and that the 
foregoing fifty-one (51) pages comprise a true and accurate 
transcription of my shorthand notes made on said day and 
date.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this 
30tli day of June, A. D. 1954.

Official Reporter.



Final Judgment and Perm anent Injunction  91a

FINAL JUDGMENT AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION

(Filed June 22,1954)
At a session of said court held in the Federal Building, 

Detroit, Michigan, on June 22,1954.
Present: Honorable Arthur F. Lederle, Chief Judge.
This suit having been filed on behalf of the plaintiffs as a 

class action on behalf of themselves and on behalf of others 
similarly situated, and the Court having found from the 
agreed facts:

1. That the Court has jurisdiction of the parties and 
subject matter.

2. That the regulation, policy, custom, usage, conduct 
and practice of the defendants in refusing to lease to plain­
tiffs, and other eligible Negro applicants similarly situated, 
certain units of public housing under their administration, 
control and management in accordance with a strict policy 
of racial segregation, is a violation of the Constitution and 
laws of the United States, particularly the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and 
Title 8, Sections 41 and 42 of the United States Code.

3. That the resolution of the Detroit Housing Commis­
sion adopted September 26, 1952, has not in fact ended the 
discrimination against the plaintiffs and members of their 
class, and that such discrimination on the basis of race and 
color in housing facilities under the auspices of public 
funds, local or federal, is in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and 
Title 8, Sections 41 and 42 of the United States Code.

The Court concludes that in public housing the doctrine 
of “ separate but equal”  has no place. Separate housing 
facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, this Court 
holds that the plaintiffs and other similarly situated for 
whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the 
segration complained of, deprived of the equal protection 
of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.



92a Final Judgment and Perm anent Injunction

Now, therefore, it is ordered that the defendants and each 
of them, their agents, employees, representatives and suc­
cessors be, and they hereby are, forever enjoined from :

1. Denying the plaintiffs, and members of the class 
which the plaintiffs represent, the right to lease any unit in 
any public housing project solely because of the race and 
color of the plaintiffs and members of the class which plain­
tiffs represent.

2. Maintaining separate lists of eligible Negro and 
white applicants for public housing.

3. Maintaining racially segregated public housing pro­
jects.

It is further ordered that true copies of this Final Judg­
ment and Permanent Injunction be served upon the Detroit 
Housing Commission, a duly authorized department of the 
City of Detroit, Finlay C. Allen, President, Walter J. Ges- 
sel, George A. Isabel, Mary M. Streit, and James II. Quello, 
Members; and Harry J. Durbin, Director-Secretary of the 
Detroit Housing Commission.

And it is further ordered that costs in this action be taxed 
for the plaintiffs.

Arthur F. Lederle,
Chief Judge.



N otice o f  A ppeal 93a

NOTICE OF APPEAL

(Filed July 2,1954)
Notice is hereby given that the Detroit Housing Com­

mission, Finlay C. Allen, Walter J. Gessel, Mary M. Streit, 
James H. Quello, and Harry J. Durbin, defendants above 
named, hereby appeal to the United States Court of Ap­
peals for the Sixth Circuit from the final order enjoining 
them from:

1. Denying the plaintiffs, and members of the class 
which the plaintiffs represent, the right to lease any unit 
in any public housing project solely because of the race 
and color of the plaintiffs and members of the class which 
plaintiffs represent.

2. Maintaining separate lists of eligible Negro and 
white applicants for public housing.

3. Maintaining racially segregated public housing pro­
jects.

Entered in this action on the 22nd day of June, A. D. 
1954.

Paul T. Dwyer,
Corporation Counsel, City of 

Detroit,
Vance Gf. Ingalls,
Helen W. Miller,

Assistants Corporation Counsel, 
301 City Hall,
Detroit 26, Michigan, 
Attorneys for Appellants.

Dated: July 2, 1954.



94a Petition  fo r  Stay o f Proceedings

PETITION FOR STAY OF PROCEEDINGS OR 
SUSPENSION OF INJUNCTION DURING 

PENDENCY OF APPEAL

To the United States Circuit Court 
of Appeal, Sixth Circuit:

Your petitioners, The Detroit Housing Commission, a 
duly authorized department of the City of Detroit, Finlay 
C. Allen, President, Mary M. Streit, Vice-President, 
Walter J. Gessel, George A. Isabel and James H. Quello, 
Members, and Harry J. Durbin, Director-Secretary of the 
Detroit Housing Commission, respectfully represent as 
follows:

1. The nature of the cause and the relief granted plain­
tiffs therein is stated in the order entered by Chief Dis­
trict Judge Arthur F. Lederle, on June 22, 1954, which 
reads as follows:

“ UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION

Walter Arthur Lewis, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

v.
The Detroit Housing 

et al.,
Commission,

Defendants.

No. 9505.

FINAL JUDGMENT AND 
PERMANENT INJUNCTION

At a session of said court held in the Federal 
Building, Detroit, Michigan, on June 22, 1954.

Present: Honorable Arthur P. Lederle, Chief Judge.
This suit having been filed on behalf of the plain­

tiffs as a class action on behalf of themselves and on



behalf of others similarly situated, and tlie Court 
having found from the agreed facts:

1. That the Court has jurisdiction of the parties 
and subject matter.

2. That the regulation, policy, custom, usage, con­
duct and practice of the defendants in refusing to 
lease to plaintiffs, and other eligible Negro applicants 
similarly situated, certain units of public housing 
under their administration, control and management 
in accordance with a strict policy of racial segrega­
tion, is a violation of the Constitution and laws of the 
United States, particularly the Fourteenth Amend­
ment to the Constitution of the United States and 
Title 8, Sections 41 and 42 of the United States Code.

3. That the resolution of the Detroit Housing 
Commission adopted September 26, 1952, has not 
in fact ended the discrimination against the plaintiffs 
and members of their class, and that such discrimina­
tion on the basis of race and color in housing fa­
cilities under the auspices of public funds, local or 
federal, is in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States and Title 8, 
Sections 41 and 42 of the United States Code.

This Court concludes that in public housing the 
doctrine of ‘ separate but equal’ has no place, sepa­
rate housing facilities are inherently unequal. There­
fore, this Court holds that the plaintiffs and others 
similarly situated for whom the actions have been 
brought are, by reason of the segregation complained 
of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Now, therefore, it is ordered that the defendants 
and each of them, their agents, employees, representa­
tives and successors be, and they hereby are, forever 
enjoined from:

1. Denying the plaintiffs, and members of the 
class which the plaintiffs represent, the right to lease

P etition  fo r  Stay o f Proceedings 95a



96a P etition  fo r  Stay o f Proceedings

any unit in any public housing project solely because 
of the race and color of the plaintiffs and members 
of the class which plaintiffs represent.

2. Maintaining separate lists of eligible Negro 
and white applicants for public housing.

3. Maintaining racially segregated public housing 
projects.

It is further ordered that true copies of this Final 
Judgment and Permanent Injunction be served upon 
the Detroit Housing Commission, a duly authorized 
Department of the City of Detroit, Finlay C. Allen, 
President, Walter J. Gessel, George A. Isabel, Mary 
M. Streit, and James H. Quello, Members; and Harry 
J. Durbin, Director-Secretary of the Detroit Housing 
Commission.

And it is further ordered that costs in this action 
be taxed for the plaintiffs.

Arthur F. Lederle,
Chief Judge.”

2. Because of the nature of the case, counsel for de­
fendants requested the District Judge to postpone further 
proceedings therein until the United States Supreme Court 
formulates decrees in the public school segregation cases, 
which request was refused.

The public school cases referred to are:
(1) Oliver Brown, et al.,

Appellants,
v.

Board of Education of Topeka,
Shawnee County, Kansas, et al.

On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Kansas.



Petition  fo r  S tay o f  Proceedings 97a

(2) Harry Briggs, Jr., et al,
Appellants,

y.
R. W. Elliott, et al.,

On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of South Carolina

(3) Dorothy E. Davis, et al.,
Appellants,

y.
County School Board of Prince Edward 

County, Virginia, et al.
On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Virginia.

(4) Francis B. Gebhart, et al.,
Petitions,

v.
Louise Belton, et al.

On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court 
of Delaware.

(5) Spottswood Thomas Bolling,
et al., Petitioners,

Y.
C. Melvin Sharpe, et al.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of 

Columbia Circuit.

In those cases, the Chief Justice of the United Supreme 
Court, at the close of his opinion, said:

“ Because these are class actions, because of the 
wide applicability of this decision, and because of the 
great variety of local conditions, the formulation of



decrees in these cases presents problems of consid­
erable complexity. On reargument, the consideration 
of appropriate relief was necessarily subordinated 
to the primary question—the constitutionality of 
segregation in public education. We have now an­
nounced that such segregation is a denial of the equal 
protection of the laws. In order that we may have 
the full assistance of the parties in formulating de­
crees, the cases will be restored to the docket, and 
the parties are requested to present further argu­
ment on Questions 4 and 5 previously propounded 
by the Court for the reargument this Term. The 
Attorney General of the United States is again in­
vited to participate. The Attorneys General of the 
states requiring or permitting segregation in public 
education will also he permitted to appear as amici 
curiae upon request to do so by September 15, 1954, 
and submission of briefs by October 1, 1954.”

The questions propounded were:
“ 4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in 

public schools violates the Fourteenth Amendment,
“ (a) would a decree necessarily follow pro­

viding that, within the limits set by normal geo­
graphic school districting, Negro children should 
forthwith be admitted to schools of their choice, or

“ (b) may this Court, in the exercise of its 
equity powers, permit an effective gradual adjust­
ment to be brought about from existing segregated 
systems to a system not based on color distinc­
tions?

“ 5. On the assumption on which questions 4 (a) 
and (b) are based, and assuming further that this 
Court will exercise its equity powers to the end de­
scribed in question 4 (b),

“ (a) should this Court formulate detailed de­
crees in these cases;

98a Petition  fo r  S tay o f Proceedings



P etition  fo r  Stay o f Proceedings 99a

‘ (b) if so, what specific issues should the de­
crees reach;

“ (c) should this Court appoint a special master 
to hear evidence with a view to recommending 
specific terms for such decrees;

“ (d) should this Court remand to the courts 
of first instance with directions to frame decrees 
in these cases, and if so, what general directions 
should the decrees of this Court include and what 
procedure should the courts of first instance follow 
in arriving at the specific terms of more detailed 
decrees?”

In a case of this nature, which presents problems, par­
ticularly of enforcement, similar to the school cases, the 
solutions to such problems to be found by the United 
States Supreme Court, after rearguments, would be of 
immense assistance to the local officials and Court and 
the order of the District Judge herein should be sus­
pended until such decisions are made.

3. Defendants have this day filed with the District 
Court their notice of appeal of this case to the United 
States Circuit Court of Appeals, 6th Circuit.

4. Counsel for defendants were informed in open 
court that no stay of proceedings would be granted by the 
trial judge.

5. The injunction granted by the District Court is 
mandatory and immediately effective upon service.

6. The defendants would sustain irreparable injury by 
the failure to stay the proceedings or suspend the injunc­
tion issued by the District Court, and maintain the status 
quo during the pendency of the appeal.

Wherefore, your petitioners pray that an order may be 
granted by this Court, staying the proceedings and sus-



100a P etition  fo r  Stay o f  Proceedings

pending the injunction issued by the District Judge here­
in, during the pendency of the appeal therefrom.

Detroit Housing Commission, a duly au­
thorized Department of the City of 
Detroit,

Finlay C. Allen, President,
Mary M. Streit, Vice-President,
Walter J. Gessel,
George A. Isabel,
James H. Quello, Members,
Harry J. Durbin, Director-Secretary,

Defendants.
By Paul T. Dwyer,

Corporation Counsel,
By Vance G. Ingalls and 
Helen W. Miller,

Assistants Corporation Counsel,
301 City Hall,
Detroit 26, Michigan,
Attorneys for said Defendants.

Dated: June .. ,  1954.

State of Michigan,
County of Wayne— ss.

On this ..  day of June, A. D. 1954, before me, a Notary 
Public, in and for said County, personally appeared Paul 
T. Dwyer and Vance G. Ingalls and Helen W. Miller, to 
me known to be the persons who signed the foregoing Peti­
tion, who being first duly sworn, did depose and say, that 
they are, respectively, Corporation Counsel and Assist­
ants Corporation Counsel for the City of Detroit, that as 
such they are attorneys for the defendants in the fore­
going cause and are authorized to sign the foregoing 
Petition for Stay of Proceedings or Suspension of In­
junction During Pendency of Appeal, and that they did 
so sign same; that they know the contents thereof and 
that the same is true of their own knowledge, except as to



Order Staying Proceedings and Suspending 101a 
Injunction

such matters therein stated to be upon information and 
belief, and as to such matters, they believe it to be true.

Helene Povlitz,
Notary Public, Wayne County, Michigan. 
My commission expires: December 20, 1957.

(Seal)

ORDER STAYING PROCEEDINGS AND 
SUSPENDING INJUNCTION

(Filed July 12,1954)
At a session of the United States Circuit Court of 

Appeal, held at the Federal Building in the City of De­
troit, on the 8th day of July, A. D. 1954.

Present: Honorable Charles C. Simons, Chief United 
States Circuit Judge, and with written concurrence of 
Honorable Thomas F. McAllister and Honorable Potter 
Stewart, Circuit Judges.

In this cause, the defendants, Detroit Housing Commis­
sion, and the members thereof, having filed a notice of 
appeal, and simultaneously therewith having filed a peti­
tion requesting a stay of proceedings and suspension of 
the injunction issued June 22, 1954, and it appearing that 
the final judgment entered in this cause orders a perman­
ent injunction commanding defendants forthwith to in­
tegrate all public housing by eliminating any practice of 
racial segregation, and it appearing to this Court that 
the United States Supreme Court in the so-called school 
segregation cases, has ordered further argument with re­
lation to formulating decrees for the enforcement of the 
Court’s opinion prohibiting segregation in public educa­
tion, and it further appearing to this Court that a stay 
of proceedings is likewise appropriate in order that ord­
erly procedures may be developed for the purposes of im­
plementing the decision of the District Court prohibiting 
segregation in public housing, and it appearing to this 
Court, that in fairness to all the parties concerned, it is 
wise to await the action of the Supreme Court and the



102a Bond fo r  Costs on Appeal

framing of its final decrees, so that its constitutional views 
may be given effect without undue hardship, now, there­
fore,

It is ordered that all proceedings in said cause be 
stayed and the injunction issued be suspended as prayed 
for in the petition, during the pendency of the appeal filed 
herein.

Approved for Entry,
Charles C. Simons (signed),

Chief United States Circuit Judge.
(Seal)
A true copy:
Attest:

Carl W. Reuss, Clerk,
By Grace Keller (signed),

Deputy Clerk.

BOND FOR COSTS ON APPEAL

Know all men by these presents that we, The Detroit 
Housing Commission, a duly authorized department of the 
City of Detroit, Finlay C. Allen, President, Mary M. Streit, 
Vice-President, Walter J. Gessel and James H. Quello, 
Members, and Harry J. Durbin, Director-Secretary of the 
Detroit Housing Commission, as principal, and United 
States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, as surety, are held 
and firmly bound unto Walter Arthur Lewis, Jasper Irvin, 
Jerome Gray, Amanda Snead, Eddie L. Hall, Jessie Love, 
Cornelius Britt, Robert Dixon, Ozie Linder and Willard 
Tipton; and John Williams, Ann Landers, Charlei Bell 
Rollins, Nathan Watkins, Eddie McDuffie, Dorothy Vinson, 
Linda Robertson, Barbara Owens, May Williams, David 
Barnes, Willie Sturgess, Jessie Washington, Ruby Brin­
son, John F. Powell, Floyd Harris, Ethel M. Myles, Jesse 
Jennings, Marion Crossland, Mary L. Brown, Hillard Scott



Bond fo r  Costs on Appeal 103a

and Edward Foster, in the sum of Two Hundred and Fifty 
and 00/100 ($250.00) Dollars to be paid to the said Walter 
Arthur Lewis, Jasper Irvin, Jerome Gray, Amanda Snead, 
Eddie L. Hall, Jessie Love, Cornelius Britt, Robert Dixon, 
Ozie Linder and Willard Tipton; and John Williams, Ann 
Landers, Charlei Bell Rollins, Nathan Watkins, Eddie Mc­
Duffie, Dorothy Vinson, Linda Robertson, Barbara Owens, 
May Williams, David Barnes, Willie Sturgess, Jessie Wash­
ington, Ruby Brinson, John F. Powell, Floyd Harris, Ethel 
M. Myles, Jesse Jennings, Marion Crossland, Mary L. 
Brown, Hillard Scott and Edward Foster, their successors, 
executors, administrators or assigns, to which payment to 
be well and truly made we bind ourselves, our heirs, execu­
tors, administrators, successors and assigns, jointly and 
severally by these presents.

Sealed with our seals and dated this 23rd day of July, 
A. D. 1954.

Whereas, on June 22, 1954, a final judgment was ren­
dered and a permanent injunction granted in the above en­
titled action, in favor of the above named obligees, and the 
said Detroit Housing Commission, a duly authorized de­
partment of the City of Detroit, Finlay C. Allen, President, 
Mary M. Streit, Vice-President, AValter J. Gessel and 
James H. Quello, Members, and Harry J. Durbin, Director- 
Secretary of the Detroit Housing Commission, have duly 
filed a notice of appeal from said judgment to the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit;

Now, therefore, the condition of this bond is such that if 
the said Detroit Housing Commission, a duly authorized 
department of the City of Detroit, Finlay C. Allen, Presi­
dent, Mary M. Streit, Vice-President, Walter J. Gessel and 
James H. Quello, Members ,and Harry J. Durbin, Director- 
Secretary of the Detroit Housing Commission, as appel­
lants, shall pay all costs if said appeal is dismissed or if 
the judgment is affirmed, or such costs as may be awarded 
by the Court of Appeals if the judgment is modified, then



this obligation to he void, otherwise to remain in full force 
and effect.

The Detroit Housing Commission, a 
duly authorized Department of the 
City of Detroit,

Finlay C. Allen, President,
Mary M. Streit, Vice-President, 
Walter J. Gessel,
James H. Quello,

Members,
Harry J. Durbin,

Director-Secretary,
Detroit Housing Commission, 

Principal.
United States Fidelity and Guaranty 

Company, Surety.

104a Bond fo r  C osts on Appeal

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public, this 
23rd day of July, A. D. 1954.

Frank Kunnert,
Notary Public, Wayne County, Michigan. 
My commission expires May 13, 1955.

(Seal)