Motion For Leave to File Brief and Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners

    IN THE

Supreme Court of tfje UntteD States
October Term 1973

No. 7 3 -4 3 4

WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, et al.,
vs Petitioners,

RONALD G. BRADLEY, et al.,
Respondents.

No. 7 3 -4 3 5

ALLEN PARK PUBLIC SCHOOLS, et al.,
vs. Petitioners,

RONALD G. BRADLEY, et al.,
Respondents.

No. 7 3 -4 3 6

THE GROSSE POINTE PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM, et al.,
V5-, Petitioners,

RONALD G. BRADLEY, et al.,
__________ Respondents.

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE
and

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS 
SUBMITTED BY AMICI CURIAE, METROPOLITAN 

SCHOOL DISTRICTS OF LAWRENCE, WARREN 
AND WAYNE TOWNSHIPS, MARION 

COUNTY, INDIANA

L ewis C. Bose 
William M. Evans

Counsel for Amici Curiae, The Metro­
politan School Districts of Lawrence, 
Warren and Wayne Townships, Marion 
County, Indiana

Bose McKinney & Evans
1100 First Federal Building 
Indianapolis, Indiana 46204 

Of Counsel

Gunthorp-Warren Printing Company, Chicago • 346-1717









IN THE

Supreme Court of tije Mtuteb States
October T erm  1973

No. 73-434

WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, et al., 

vs.
Petitioners,

RONALD G. BRADLEY, et al.,
Respondents.

No. 73-435

ALLEN PARK PUBLIC SCHOOLS, et al.,
Petitioners,

vs.

RONALD G. BRADLEY, et al.,
Respondents.

No. 73-436

THE GROSSE POINTE PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM, et al.,
Petitioners,

vs.

RONALD G. BRADLEY, et al.,
Respondents.

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE 
BY METROPOLITAN SCHOOL DISTRICTS OF 

LAWRENCE, WARREN AND WAYNE TOWN­
SHIPS, MARION COUNTY, INDIANA



2

The Metropolitan School District of Lawrence Township, 
The Metropolitan School District of Warren Township, and 
The Metropolitan School District of Wayne Township, all 
located in Marion County, Indiana (referred to herein as 
“Indiana School Districts” ) respectfully move the Court for 
leave to file the attached “Brief Amicus Curiae” in this case 
under Rule 42 of this Court.

Indiana School Districts requested and obtained consents to 
file a brief amicus curiae from the attorneys for all the 
Petitioners in this case, and from the Respondents, Michigan 
Education Association and Professional Personnel of Van Dyke. 
Indiana School Districts requested consents from the other 
Respondents but received no reply.

The interest of the Indiana School Districts arises from the 
following facts: They are parties defendant to consolidated
appeals now pending in the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit, United States of America and Buckley v. 
Board of School Commissioners of the City of Indianapolis 
(Cause Nos. 73-1968 through 73-1984). These appeals are 
taken from an order of the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of Indiana, ordering relief against school 
districts (including Indiana School Districts) which are con­
tiguous and non-contiguous to the Indianapolis school district 
to remedy de jure segregation previously found to exist solely 
within the Indianapolis school district.

The principal issue now on appeal in the expanded Indi­
anapolis case is substantially similar to a principal issue raised in 
Detroit case now before this Court: whether desegregation of a 
central city in a metropolitan area may be accomplished by 
consolidation, or other forms of metropolitan remedy, involving 
surrounding contiguous and non-contiguous independent school 
corporations, not themselves parties to illegal desegregation. 
A summary of the position taken by the District Court in the 
Indianapolis case is set out in an excerpt from its December 
6, 1973 entry printed in the Appendix to the brief bound with



3

this motion at pages A1 through A10. Accordingly, a 
decision in the cases now before this Court may in effect deter­
mine the Indianapolis case now on appeal in the Circuit Court 
of Appeals.

The Petitioners in the cases before this Court in their 
Petitions for Certiorari have properly presented for review the 
propriety of an interdistrict remedy. They have framed the 
issue in terms of their status as independent municipal corporate 
bodies separate and identifiable from Detroit, of the fact that 
they did not participate in any discriminatory act towards the 
Negro students of Detroit, and of the absence of a finding of 
causal connection between the alleged discriminatory acts of 
the Detroit Board or the State and the racial makeup of the 
non-Detroit defendant school districts.

Indiana School Districts are of the opinion that resolution of 
the case requires analysis of the demographic trends responsible 
for the minority racial concentration in Detroit as in all major 
metropolitan centers, and of the change in the scope and nature 
of the Fourteenth Amendment obligation owed by Michigan 
and virtually every other state to Negro students living in 
metropolitan areas, upon affirmance of the decision of the 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. The proposed remedy would 
place a burden on the Federal Courts to weigh the necessities 
of desegregation or integration against very complex and edu­
cationally sensitive problems incident to how7 school districts in 
metropolitan areas are to be organized, reorganized and operated. 
Indiana School Districts desire to present a brief amicus curiae 
analyzing these problems and analyzing central city desegrega­
tion from this standpoint.

Each of the Indiana School Districts is an independent muni­
cipal corporation with the right to sue and be sued and is a 
political subdivision established by the State of Indiana for the



4

purpose of administering schools within their respective 
boundaries. The person signing this motion is the authorized 
attorney for such Districts.

Respectfully submitted,

Lewis C. Bose 
William M. Evans

Counsel for Amici Curiae, The Metro­
politan School Districts of Lawrence, 
Warren and Wayne Townships, Marion 
County, Indiana

Bose McKinney & Evans

1100 First Federal Building 
Indianapolis, Indiana 46204 

Of Counsel



TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Table of A uthorities................................................................  i

Interest of Amici C u ria e ........................................................ 2

Summary of Argument ...............................   2

A rgum ent..................................................................................  7
A. Population and Population C h an g e ......................  7
B. Scope of the R em edy ............................................  13
C. Reorganization: The Substantive F acto rs..............  17
D. Affirmance Is Inconsistent with Prior Decisions

of This C o u r t .......................................................... 24

C onclusion................................................................................  25

Appendix ..................................................................................  A1

Table of A uthorities 

Federal Cases

Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914 (E. D. Mich. 
1 9 7 2 ) .................................................................................. 15, 16

Bradley v. Milliken (6th Cir., Cause Nos. 72-1809- 
72-1814), Slip Opinion, June 12, 1973 ........................ 13, 23

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954) . . . .  8
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 301 (1955) . . . .  8
Calhoun v. Cook, 332 F. Supp. 804 (N. D. Ga. 1971), 

affd. and rev’d. in part; 451 F. 2d 583 (5th Cir. 1972) 23
Goss v. Bd. of Ed. of Knoxville, 482 F. 2d 1044, (6th

Cir. 1973) ...........................................................................  23
Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 430 (1968) . . .  8



11

Haney v. Co. Bd. of Ed. of Seiver County, 410 F. 2d 920 
(8th Cir. 1969) ................................................................. 24

Kelley v. Metro Bd. of Ed. of Nashville, Tenn., 463 F. 2d 
732, 741 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. den. 409 U. S. 1001 . . 23

Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colo., ........ U. S.
........ , 41 U. S. L. W. 5002 (1 9 7 3 ) ..................................8, 13

Lee v. Macon Co. Bd. of Ed., 448 F. 2d 746 (5th Cir. 
1 9 7 1 ) ..................................................................................... 24

San Antonio Independent Schl. Dist. v. Rodriguez, ........
U. S.......... , 41 U. S. L. W. 4407 (1 9 7 3 ) .......................15, 24

Spencer v. Kugler, 326 F. Supp. 1235 (D. N. J. 1971), 
aff’d. 404 U. S. 1027 (1972) ..........................................  24

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 
U. S. 1 (1971) ..................................................... .............8 ,24

Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U. S. 451 (1972) . . . .  24

State Cases

Co. Dept, of Pub. Welfare v. Potthoff, 220 Ind. 574, 581,
44 N. E. 2d 494 (1942) .......................................... ........  13

Southern Ry. Co. v. Harpe, 223 Ind. 124, 132, 58 N. E.
2d 346 (1944) ................................................................... 13

Woemer v. City of Indpls., 242 Ind. 253, 177 N. E. 2d 
34 (1961) ............................................................................ 13

Government Publications

Bureau of the Census, General Demographic Trends for 
Metropolitan Areas, 1960 to 1970, Rpt. PHC(2)-1, 
page 3 (1971) ........................................................8, 9, 11, 12

Bureau of the Census, Social and Economic Characteristics 
of the Population in Metropolitan and Non-Metropolitan 
Areas: 1970 and 1960, Rpt. P23 No. 3 7 .(1 9 7 1 )___ 7, 8, 9



Ill

Bureau of the Census, Public School Systems in 1971-72 
(herein School Systems 1971-2), Table 2 ....................13,17

Bureau of the Census, The Social and Economic Status of 
the Black. Population in the United States, 1972, Rpt.
P-23 No. 26, p. .1 (1973) ..............................................  9

Bureau of the Census, Birth Expectations of American 
Wives June 1973, Rpt. P-20, No. 254, Table 1 ...........  9

H. E. W., Dept, of Educational Statistics 1971 ...............  17
H. E. W. Education Directory 1972-73 .............................  19
Statistical Abstract of the United States— 1972 ................A -ll

Articles

American Association of School Administrators, School 
District Reorganization (1958), pp. 7 0 -7 1 ....................  15

Bundy Report— See article below: Mayor’s Advisory Panel 
on Decentralization of the New York Schools, Recon­
nection for Learning—A Community School System For 
New York City, McGeorge Bundy, Chairman (Freder­
ick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1969) ........................ 18, 19, 20

Drucker, The Age of Discontinuity (Harper & Row 1968) 10
Hickey, Optimum School District Size (Eric Clearinghouse 

on Educational Administration, University of Oregon 
1969), p. 2 5 .......................................................................  18

Levin, Financing Schools in a Metropolitan Context in 
Metropolitan School Organization: Basic Problems and 
Patterns (McCutcheon Publishing Corporation 1973), 
p. 39 ..................................................................................19, 22

Mayor’s Advisory Panel on Decentralization of the New 
York Schools, Reconnection for Learning—A Com­
munity School System For New York City, McGeorge 
Bundy, Chairman (Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 
1969) ........................................................................18 ,19 ,20



IV

Polley, “Decentralization Within Urban School Systems,” 
in Education in Urban Society, (Dodd, Mead, and Co., 
1962) pp. 122-123, cited in the Bundy Report, p. 8. . . 20

Rebell, New York’s Decentralization Law: Two and a Half 
Years Later, 2 Journal of Law and Education (1973) 
(herein Rebell) ................................................................. 21

Taeuber, Negroes in Cities (Aldine Publishing Company 
1965) (herein Taeuber) ................................................ 10,11

Wall Street Journal, September 7, 1972, p. 1, col. 1 
“Who’s in Charge: Public-Employe Unions Press for 
Policy Role; States and Cities Balk” .............................  15

Zimvet, Decentralization and School Effectiveness— A Case 
Study of the 1969 Decentralization Law in New York 
City (Teachers College Press 1973) ............. . '.............  21



IN THE

Supreme Court of tfje Umteb
October T erm  1973

No. 73-434

WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, et al., 

vs.
Petitioners,

RONALD G. BRADLEY, et al.,
Respondents.

No. 73-435

ALLEN PARK PUBLIC SCHOOLS, et al.,
Petitioners,

vs.

RONALD G. BRADLEY, et al.,
Respondents.

No. 73-436

THE GROSSE POINTE PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM, et al.,
Petitioners,

vs.

RONALD G. BRADLEY, et al.,
Respondents.

BRIEF AND APPENDIX AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT 
OF PETITIONERS, SUBMITTED BY AMICI CURIAE, 

METROPOLITAN SCHOOL DISTRICTS OF 
LAWRENCE, WARREN AND WAYNE 

TOWNSHIPS, MARION COUNTY,
INDIANA



2

This brief is filed pursuant to Rule 42 of the United States 
Supreme Court. A motion for leave to file a brief amicus 
curiae has been timely filed pursuant to Rule 42(3), and each 
of the amici curiae is a political subdivision for educational 
purposes of the State of Indiana.

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

Amici Curiae are parties defendant to consolidated appeals 
now pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit, United States of America and Buckley v. 
Board of School Commissioners of the City of Indianapolis, 
(Cause Nos. 73-1968 through 73-1984). These appeals are 
taken from an order of the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of Indiana, ordering relief against school 
districts (including Amici Curiae) which are contiguous and 
non-contiguous to the Indianapolis school district, to remedy 
de jure segregation previously found to exist solely within the 
Indianapolis school district.

The principal issue now on appeal in the Indianapolis case 
is substantially similar to a principal issue in the cases now be­
fore this Court: Do state authorities have an obligation to 
Negro and other minority ethnic group children to order a 
reorganization of school governments and school management 
in a metropolitan area to effect a maximum and stable racial 
mix, where by reason of demographic trends common to the 
entire United States, minority race children are now or may 
become a majority in a central city district but are a minority 
in a total metropolitan area.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Appellees now ask this Court for an expansion in kind and 
degree of the obligations owed by state authorities under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to Negro children and to other ethnic



3

groups, where they now are or may become a majority of the 
population or enrollment in a central city school district, but 
a minority in a total metropolitan area. Appellees assert that 
the states have a Fourteenth Amendment obligation to re­
organize local school governments and school management to 
effect a maximum racial mix.

The decisions of this Court to date have dealt principally 
with single school systems— do they retain vestiges of dualism, 
have they maintained a dual school system in the absence of 
statute, how shall they be desegregated? Even when all school 
systems become unitary under these decisions, however, mixing 
of blacks and whites to the degree demanded by Appellees 
cannot be attained, given the structure of existing municipal 
corporations.

Population growth, migration patterns and residential segre­
gation have resulted in the central city of many urban areas 
predominantly or heavily black, surrounded by urban areas 
in the suburbs predominantly white. Where once America’s 
population was predominantly rural it is now predominantly 
urban. According to the 1970 U. S. Census figures, urban 
areas throughout the country, including both central city and 
suburban areas, contain 65% of the total, 64% of the white, 
and 70.7% of the Negro population. Further, population has 
had a natural increase from 131 million in 1940 to 203 million 
in 1970. With limited availability of existing lands in central 
cities, population has expanded substantially in the suburbs, 
where there are now more people than in central cities. Thirty- 
six percent of the total population of the United States (72.8 
million people) live in suburbs, while 29% of the total popula­
tion (58.6 million people) live in central cities. Negroes, how­
ever, have migrated primarily to central cities where they con­
stitute 21% of the population and where 58% of all the 
country’s Negroes live. In the suburbs, by contrast, they con­
tinue to migrate and increase but constitute only 5% of the 
total suburban population. These concentrations are the product



4

of trends in migration and natural increase in population. The 
trends vary from decade to decade, from region to region and 
from city to city, influenced by changes in the birthrate, changes 
in job opportunities, general economic conditions and avail­
ability and condition of housing. The central cities experiencing 
the greatest in-migration and having the highest concentra­
tion of blacks are generally the Nation’s largest, such as New 
York, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco-Oakland and 
Detroit. The continuing concentration has occurred, however, 
to a greater or lesser degree in all others. These migrations 
constitute some of the largest migrations in world history.

Further, substantial research shows that for all regions of 
the country, all types of cities, large or small, central city or 
suburban, substantial residential separation exists between Ne­
groes and whites— a phenomenon that occurs regardless of the 
character of laws and policies, and regardless of the extent of 
other forms of separation or discrimination.

Since desegregation decisions applying to single school systems 
neither touch nor counteract these trends, Appellees and judges 
in the frustration of trying to attain a substantial and stable inte­
gration of blacks and whites in school urge this Court to adopt 
an expanded and deceptively simple version of the states’ Four­
teenth Amendment obligation owed Negro children. If there are 
insufficient whites within a single system so that the system is 
identifiably black in comparison with its neighbors, the system 
must be expanded, or expanded and then reorganized in smaller 
areas, so that each resulting school district in a metropolitan area 
has no greater percentage Negro than any other. After this 
first step the expanded or reorganized districts will then be de­
segregated within the command and guidelines of Brown, Green, 
Swann and Keyes.1

1. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954) 
(Brown I); Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 301 (1955) 
(Brown II); Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 430 (1968); 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1 
(1971); Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colo., . . . .  U. S. 
-----, 41 U. S. L. W. 5002 (1973).



5

The suggested doctrine is, however, highly complex and in­
volves the Court in fundamental questions of local and state 
educational and governmental policy— decisions which this 
Court has never considered appropriate for judicial action. The 
impracticability and undesirability of implicating the judiciary in 
balancing integrative necessities against the educational necessi­
ties of alternate local educational organization— the types, size, 
organization and powers of governmental entities which the 
states create to carry on education— can best be demonstrated 
by the vastness of the area and the scope and detail of the 
problems involved.

As to the size of the problem, 4,896 of the country’s 16,859 
school systems are in metropolitan areas. They enroll 32 million 
of the Nation’s 48 million school children.

Further, each reorganization involves detailed problems in­
fluencing the kind of education that can or will be delivered, 
problems with highly divergent solutions. The following are 
representative: the size of the area to be desegregated in terms 
of numbers and proportions of Negro and white students; the 
size and proportion of Negro and white pupils in each unit; 
whether the area will be administered as a unit or broken down 
into smaller units; whether any unit will have sub-districts and 
the kinds and amount of authority to be given to each sub-district 
over such matters as curriculum, budget, personnel, union nego­
tiations; how many members will be on the governing bodies of 
school boards or sub-boards; how the board members are to be 
selected— by election or appointment; if by appointment by 
whom the appointment is to be made; what relationship, if any, 
is to be retained between local school and civil government; how 
much tax base be assigned to each proposed unit of government; 
what shall be done with existing union contracts; will such con­
tracts be negotiated in the future on a local, metropolitan or 
statewide basis; where, will, or may, teachers be transferred or 
assigned in the area; will curriculum or other educational stand­
ards or tax practices be uniform throughout the area; if so, by



6

whom will they be set. Extreme size itself is currently one of 
the most criticized aspects of school administration.

Finally, the duty to reorganize school districts would apparent­
ly be an on-going duty since its necessity is now urged on the 
basis of the identifiably black nature of central city school stu­
dent bodies and the constitutional authority of the states to re­
organize local units of government, Surely racial patterns are 
not now fixed for all time but will continue to change.

Neither the prior pronouncements of this Court relating to 
constitutionally required equality of treatment nor the in­
ternal logic of these pronouncements, suggest or require that the 
separate school systems be unidentifiable by the race of their 
students. The pronouncement of such a doctrine would consti­
tute a greater change in the body politic than the change from 
“separate but equal” to “separate is inherently unequal” and 
freedom of choice” following Brovin 1 and Brown II, or from 

the latter to the “affirmative duty” of Green, Swann and Keyes. 
Amici urge that thus redefining a duty to involve the Federal 
Courts in weighing a necessity of integration against subjective 
determinations of educational management, throughout the 
country, with unpredictable and possibly counter-productive re­
sults, is unwarranted, and that the decision of the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals should be reversed.



7

ARGUMENT.

A. Population and Population Change.

The theory of Appellees’ case has implications extending far 
beyond the Detroit area with its several million people. It is 
based on changes in the concentrations and racial makeup of 
population and must be evaluated in the light of nationwide 
population trends. For census purposes, the country has been 
broken down into metropolitan areas inside central cities, met­
ropolitan areas outside central cities generally called suburbs, 
and non-metropolitan areas.

The most significant facts about America’s population are 
its continued growth, that it is highly and increasingly urban, 
and that its increased growth is predominantly in the suburbs. 
As of the 1970 census, the distribution of population between 
the major types of population areas was as follows:2

Number
Area (in millions) Percent

Metropolitan Areas: 
Inside Central Cities 58,635 29.0
Suburbs 72,883 36.0

Non-metropolitan Areas 71,015 35.1

Total 202,534 100.0

This represented an increase of 28 million persons in the ten- 
year period beginning in 1960. Of this increase, 20 million 
were in metropolitan areas; and only 4 million in non-metro­
politan areas. Of the 20 million ten-year increase in the met­
ropolitan areas, 16.8 million were in suburban areas. Even

2. Bureau of the Census, Social and Economic Characteristics 
of the Population in Metropolitan and Non-Metropolitan Areas: 
1970 and 1960, Rpt. P23 No. 37 (1971) (herein Pop. Rpt. 23 
No. 37), Table A.



8

though extensive, these changes represent a slowing of the rate 
of increase for both central city and suburban population in­
crease, which were twice as high in the preceding 10 years 
beginning in 1950.3

These trends are different for whites and blacks. Whites in 
the ten-year period between 1960 and 1970 decreased in num­
ber and percent in central cities, increased slightly in non­
metropolitan areas, and increased substantially in suburban 
areas. Blacks, on the other hand, decreased in non-metropoli­
tan areas, increased substantially in suburban areas, but in­
creased in an even greater amount both in numbers and percent 
in central cities,4 as shown by the following chart:5

1970 I960 Change 1960-1970
Percent Percent

Race and Distri- Distri-
Residence___________Number* bution Number* bution Number* Percent

WHITE 
Metropolitan:

Inside Central Cities 45,088 25.4 47,638 30.0 —2,550 —5.4
Suburban 68,539 38.6 51,793 32.6 16,746 32.3

Non-metropolitan 63,802 36.0 59,267 37.3 4,535 7.7

Total—United States 177,429 100.0 158,698 100.0 18,731 11.8

NEGRO
Metropolitan:

Inside Central Cities 12,587 55.2 9,480 51.5 3,107 32.8
Suburban 3,536 15.5 2,430 13.2 1,106 45.5

Non-metropolitan 6,685 29.3 6,481 35.2 204 3.1

Total—United States 22,807 100.0 18,391 100.0 4,416 24.0
* In Millions

Within metropolitan areas of every region, including the 
south, whites are found in the largest numbers in the suburbs 
while blacks are concentrated in central cities; and in each

3. Bureau of the Census, General Demographic Trends for 
Metropolitan Areas, 1960 to 1970, Rpt. PHC(2)-1, page 3 (1971) 
(herein Demo. Rpt. PHC(2)-1).

4. Id. at pp. 4-6.
5. Pop. Rpt. 23 No. 37, supra n. 2, Table A-



9

region of the country, blacks now comprise a higher percentage 
of the central city population than they did a decade ago.6

A significant factor in attempting a nationwide policy on 
restructuring local government, if it be done, is some under­
standing of the underlying causes of population change. One 
of these is the birthrate. For whites, the birthrate has fallen 
in the last decade and continues to fall moderately. For Negroes 
the birthrate has fallen later but since 1967 more precipitately, 
but is still above the level of white births.7 This has been re­
flected in falling elementary school enrollments which in future 
years will mean reductions in both elementary and upper grade 
enrollments.8

An additional factor is the relative ages of white and black 
women of childbearing age. For the country as a whole a 
greater percentage of the Negro population than of the white 
is of childbearing age. This, however, varies from region to 
region. The north central region has a relatively lower white 
age group than the northeast region, while the white popula­
tion of the south and west are more youthful than either.9

Further, aside from the factors of natural increase, popula­
tion distribution depends on the factors influencing in-migration 
to one area and out-migration from another. Migration de­
pends among other things on the relative lack of employment 
opportunities in the place people live compared with the greater

6. Id. at p. 2; Demo. Rpt. PHC(2)-1 at pp. 4-5; Bureau of the 
Census, The Social and Economic Status of the Black Population 
in the United States, 1972, Rpt. P-23 No. 26, p. 1 (1973) (herein 
Bl. Pop. Rpt. P-23, No. 26). A chart further evidence this fact 
assembled from data in Statistical Abstract of the United States— 
1972 is set out in the Appendix to this brief (herein the Br. App.) 
at p. A ll.

7. Bl. Pop. Rpt. P-23 No. 26, supra n. 6, Table 59 reproduced 
in Br. App. p. A12; Bureau of the Census, Birth Expectations of 
American Wives June 1973, Rpt. P-20, No. 254, Table 1, repro­
duced in part in Br. App. at p. A13.

8. Bl. Pop. Rpt., supra n. 6, Table 46, reproduced in Br, App. 
at p. A14.

9. Demo. Rpt. PHC(2)-1, supra n. 3, pp. 7, 9, 10, 12.



10

opportunities in the areas into which they move, and the avail­
ability of housing in other areas, either public or private. The 
change for employment reasons is illustrated by the northward 
movement of blacks from cotton producing jobs during World 
War I due to the destruction of the cotton crop by the boll 
weevil and the improvement in farm machinery, coupled with 
the increase in wartime employment opportunities in the north. 
Further illustrative, is the slowing of this movement during the 
depression of the thirties, and its increase again during and 
after World War II.10 The availability of housing, in turn, is 
affected by major economic factors. Negroes did not move 
from the inner part of the central city during World War II 
because new housing was non-existent. The flow of Negroes to 
the outer areas of central cities and to the suburbs, and of 
the whites to the suburbs, was due in large part to the destruc­
tion of central city housing by public works or private develop­
ment, its deterioration in older areas, and to the vast expansion 
of housing in the suburbs commencing in the fifties. The con­
tinued migration of both whites and blacks to particular met­
ropolitan areas in the sixties and beyond is a product of 
continuing better job opportunities.11

In recent years, migration has not been characterized entirely 
by migrations from rural to metropolitan, but also by migrations 
from one metropolitan area to another, migrations which “flow 
in complex and interlocking channels.”12

The only certainties in the area of demographics are the 
variations within a general theme, the multiple factors which 
govern change, and the unpredictability of percentages, ratios 
and numbers of population and school enrollment within any 
particular area.

10. Drucker, The Age of Discontinuity (Harper & Row 1968), 
p. 227. “No city in history has ever been able to absorb an influx 
of such magnitude as the American cities have had to absorb since 
the end of World War II.”

11. Taeuber, Negroes in Cities (Aldine Publishing Company 
1965) (herein Taeuber) pp. 12-3, 125, 152-3, 162-165.

12. Taeuber, at pp. 127-8.



11

The variations are at least as significant as the overall pattern 
For example, in the decade of the sixties: in the northeast, popu­
lation growth was due to natural increase, the substantial white 
out-migration being balanced in part by in-migration of other 
races, there being an increase in white non-metropolitan popu­
lation ;lrt in the north central region, there was heavier out­
migration of whites from non-metropolitan areas, with roughly 
balancing out-migration of whites from, and Negroes into, 
metropolitan areas;13 14 in the south there was, by contrast, heavy 
in-migration of whites to metropolitan areas, lighter in-migration 
of other races, moderate out-migration of whites and heavy out­
migration of Negroes from non-metropolitan areas;15 in the west, 
net in-migration to metropolitan areas was highest in percent in 
the Nation, consisting of 2.4 million whites and 650,000 of 
other races, with California the greatest attractor of migrants 
in the Nation, gaining 2,000,000 by in-migration.16

Cities reveal the same variation. For example, blacks ex­
panded in all suburban areas but without, however, an over­
all percentage increase. Virtually all the increase resulted 
from in-migration in the suburbs and not from any natural 
increase. The suburban areas of Washington, D. C. and St. 
Louis had large Negro percentage gains; Detroit and Pittsburgh 
virtually none, and Baltimore suburbs experienced a Negro per­
centage loss.17

Central cities which showed the greatest percentage loss in 
white population were among the 12 largest in the country, but 
even here there was variation. New York, Chicago and Detroit 
alone accounted for more than half of the loss in numbers. 
Washington, D. C., St. Louis, Detroit and Cleveland had the 
highest rates of loss, with Chicago and New York showing rel-

13. Demo. Rpt. PHC(2)-1, supra n. 3, p. 7.
14. Id at p. 9.
15. Id. at p. 10.
16. Id. at p. 11.
17. Id. at p. 14.



12

atively moderate rates of loss, and Los Angeles experiencing a 
white gain in population. Cities between 2 million and 500,000 
had a small aggregate gain in numbers of whites, but about one- 
half of these cities lost white population while the other half 
gained, with great variations between them.18 The same varia­
tion can be applied to Negro gains in numbers as well as white 
losses. The figures can be further broken down to show whether 
the gains or losses were occasioned by net in-migration, net 
out-migration, or natural population increase.

Finally, one researcher has found that residential separation 
between blacks and whites is a condition existing in all cities in 
all regions of the country regardless of the character of local 
laws and policies, and regardless of the extent of other forms of 
segregation and discrimination.19

There are no reliable studies suggesting that central city 
school segregation was a causal factor in these vast demographic 
changes or that the present trends are consistent throughout 
the country or can be accurate predictors of what will occur 
in the future in any particular metropolitan area or city.

If demographic changes in school enrollments make a case 
for judically supervised school reorganization, the change will 
be national in scope and can reasonably be expected to affect 
many of the 4,896 school corporations in metropolitan areas

18. Id. at p. 13.
19. Taeuber, supra n. 10, pp. 35-6.

“No further analysis is necessary to reach some broad 
generalizations concerning racial segregation: In the urban
United States, there is a very high degree of segregation of the 
residences of whites and Negroes. This is true for cities in all 
regions of the country and for all types of cities—large and 
small, industrial and commercial, metropolitan and suburban. 
It is true whether there are hundreds of thousands of Negro 
residents, or only a few thousand. Residential segregation pre­
vails regardless of the relative economic status of the white and 
Negro residents. It occurs regardless of the character of local 
laws and policies, and regardless of the extent of other forms 
of segregation or discrimination.”



13

which educate 32 million of the Nation’s 48 million school 
children.20

B. Scope of the Remedy.

Appelles’ justification for a judical order to the State of 
Michigan to reorganize its school corporations is based on the 
segregation in the Detroit schools, its predominant (68.6% ) 
Negro enrollment coupled with the predominantly white enroll­
ment of surrounding school corporations,21 the technical nature 
of local school officials as “state officials” charged with local re­
sponsibilities, and the constitutional right of the State to create, 
dissolve, regulate and grant powers to, local school corporations.

This chain of logic disregards the fact that while Michigan, in 
common with other states, has plenary power over the entities 
by which education is carried out, it has chosen to carry out edu­
cation through local independent municipal corporations pri­
marily responsible to a local constituency.22

The question is not whether the State has the right to control 
these matters, but whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires 
a judicial supervision over the character of the entities by which 
educational matters be carried out for the purpose of achieving 
a greater mix of Negroes and whites and a balancing of integra­
tive necessities against the multitudinous educational considera­
tions involved in a reorganization of school corporations. An

20. Bureau of the Census, Public School Systems in 1971-72 
(herein School Systems 1971-2), Table 2.

21. Bradley v. Milliken (6th Cir., Cause Nos. 72-1809-72- 
1814) Slip Opinion, June 12, 1973, pp. 53, 63-4.

22. Parenthetically most states also have plenary authority over 
all local governmental subdivisions. In Indiana this is true for 
counties (Co. Dept, of Pub. Welfare v. Potthoff, 220 Ind. 574, 581, 
44 N. E. 2d 494 (1942) and for civil cities and towns (Woerner v. 
City of Ind pis., 242 Ind. 253, 266, 177 N. E. 2d 34 (1961)), 
which may be abolished, consolidated or combined or eliminated by 
statute, and which have only those powers delegated by statute 
(Southern Ry. Co. v. Harpe, 223 Ind. 124, 132, 58 N. E. 2d 346 
(1944)).



14

answer requires some understanding of the broad range of edu­
cational matters now determined locally.

The framework for the performance of educational services 
throughout the country is described by this Court in San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriquez in substantial detail, 
but also in general terms as follows:23

“Although policy-decision making and supervision in cer­
tain areas are reserved to the State, the day-to-day authority 
over the ‘management and control’ of all public elementary 
schools is squarely placed on the local school boards.”

This is typically and particularly true throughout the country 
in broad areas of educational policy, including among other 
things, curriculum and school programs, hiring, firing and pro­
motion of personnel, fixing the terms of employment, pupil 
assignments, school construction and budget. With respect to 
curriculum, while a multiple choice of textbooks and minimum 
graduation requirements are generally certified by the state, local 
school districts have tremendous latitude. They determine the 
subjects taught, the methods by which they are taught, the 
amount of time spent per day in different study areas, pupil 
assignment, grade structure of particular schools, the use of 
supplemental material, summer school programs, the type and 
extent of extracurricular activities, whether to provide schools 
for specialized instruction, whether to adopt such innovations as 
undifferentiated grade schools, “hands on” vocational programs, 
and learning disability programs, and where, how and whether, 
to build facilities for those activities.

With respect to personnel, while the states enforce minimum 
certification requirements, the great bulk of personnel decisions 
— who is hired, where they are to be assigned, internal adminis­
tration, orgainization of departments, the conditions of employ­
ment, the right of promotion and transfer— are controlled local­
ly, particularly in the larger districts, the latter matters are 
governed by highly sophisticated union contracts negotiated be-

23............U. S........... , 41 U. S. L. W. 4422, n. 108.



15

tween local districts and unions, where the scope of negotiations 
becomes a confrontation between board and union over general 
school policy.24 With respect to pupil policies, typically, a local 
school district will control where and to what schools pupils are 
assigned, whether they will be transferred, the prerequisites to 
participation in given programs and the control and discipline of 
students. Budget, another local function, determines how much 
of the available funds a district will expend in what areas. As 
has been frequently noted, control of fiscal policy is control of 
educational policy.25

The extent to which Appellees would inject the judiciary into 
this local process is evidenced by the District Courts by the 
“Ruling on Desegregation Area and Order for Development of 
a Plan of Desegregation” in this case.26 While this order was 
vacated by the Sixth Circuit order pending state legislative 
response, it was not reversed; and the scope of this order in­
dicates the necessary scope of the response. It is to be 
measured by the interplay of only two factors, “maximum 
feasible desegregation” and the “elimination of racially identifi­
able schools”.27 With respect to the area of desegregation to

24. See, Wall Street Journal, September 7, 1972, p. 1, col. 1 
“Who’s in Charge: Public-Employe Unions Press for Policy Role; 
States and Cities Balk”:

“The UFT’s president, Albert Sb anker, freely concedes that 
some of the demands had policy implications. But, he insists, 
‘what we’re primarily interested in is improving the teachers’ 
working conditions.’ It just so happens, he adds, that ‘there is 
hardly anything which cannot simultaneously be viewed as a 
working condition and a matter of educational policy.’

The issue of class size is one of Mr. Shanker’s favorite 
examples. ‘You can approach it from the point of view of 
what’s best for the children or as a question of allocating 
resources,’ he says. ‘But, obviously, handling a lot of kids is 
more difficult than handling just a few. And in that way, it’s 
most certainly a working condition.’ ”

25. American Association of School Administrators, School 
District Reorganization (1958), pp. 70-71.

26. 345 F. Supp. 914 (E. D. Mich. 1972).
27. Id. at p. 925, n. 9.



16

which the order applied, the Court had before it the following 
proposals:28

Proposal Number of 
Districts

Number of 
Pupils

% Black

Total Metropolitan 
Area 86 1,000,000 20%

Detroit Board 69 850,000 25%
CCBE 62 770,000 25.4%
Plaintiffs 54 780,000 25.3%
State 36 555,000 36%

The Court chose a modified form of Plaintiff’s proposal.
With respect to the organization of local governmental entities 

necessary to effect the order, the following parts are significant:29
J. Pending further orders of the court, existing school 

district and regional boundaries and school governance 
arrangements will be maintained and continued, except 
to the extent necessary to effect pupil and faculty desegrega­
tion as set forth herein; provided, however, that existing 
administrative, financial, contractual, property and govern­
ance arrangements shall be examined, and recommenda­
tions for their temporary and permanent retention or 
modification shall be made, in light of the need to operate 
an effectively desegregated system of schools (345 F. 
Supp. at p. 919.)

 ̂ * * * *
70. The plans submitted by the State Board, the 

Detroit Board, and the intervening defendants Magdowski, 
et al., discuss generally possible governance, finance, and 
administrative arrangements which may be appropriate for 
operation of an interim or final plan of desegregation. 
Without parsing in detail the interesting, and sometimes 
sensible, concepts introduced by each plan, it is sufficient to 
note that each contemplates overlaying some broad educa-

28. Id. / 'Tj
29. The District Court Order in the Indianapolis case was com­

parable in scope, although ameliorated in detail. See Br. App., 
pages Al through A10.



17

tional authority over the area, creating or using some 
regional arrangement (with continued use or eventual re­
drawing of existing districts), and considerable input at the 
individual school level. The court has made no decision in 
this regard and will consider the matter at a subsequent 
hearing. (345 F. Supp. at p. 933.)

C. Reorganization: The Substantive Factors.

A local school district’s organization is a major determinate 
of whether it can deliver good education. The most crucial 
aspect is its size: too small, it lacks the pupils and resources 
for a broad range of offerings and services; too large, it be­
comes unresponsive to its constituents, inflexible, inefficient and 
unable to innovate on a broad scale. Since the early 1940’s, 
extremely small size has been increasingly corrected by con­
solidation.30 No good remedy has been found for bigness (as 
will be shown below); but there has been no tendency to aggre­
gate schools further into extremely large units. Distribution of 
schools in the United States by enrollment as of 1969 was as 
follows:31

School Districts with pupil

Number Percent 
of Total

Enrollments of 25,000 & over 180 1.001%
10,000 to 24,000 538 2.992

5,000 to 9,999 1,096 6.095
2,500 to 4,999 2,026 11.268

300 to 2,499 7,911 43.998
under 300 6,229 34.644

The classic examination of large school system failure is the 
study conducted by the Mayor’s Advisory Panel on Decentraliza­
tion of New York Schools, better known as the “Bundy Report”. 
This report chronicled and studied the continuing decline in

30. School Systems 1971-72, supra n. 20, pp. 1-2.
31. H. E. W., Dept, of Educational Statistics 1971.



18

student performance and increasing cost of the New York 
City system. It pinpointed the major cause as too large a size.32

No school system is free of shortcomings, but in New 
York the malaise of parents is heightened by their in­
creasing inability to obtain redress or response to their 
concerns. Teachers and administrators, too, are caught in 
a system that has grown so complex and stiff as to over­
whelm its human and social purpose.

Whether the reaction is quiet frustration or vocal pro­
test, the result throughout the city is disillusionment with 
an institution that should be offering hope and promise. 
No parent, no teacher, no school administrator, no citizen, 
no business or industry should rest easy while this erosion 
continues.

The causes of the decline are as diverse and complex as 
the school system itself and the city that created it. But 
one critical fact is that the bulk and complexity of the 
system have gravely weakened the ability to act of all 
concerned— teachers, parents, supervisors, the Board of 
Education, and local school boards.

The system had become one in which many interest groups 
could assert a negative and self-serving power but in which 
none could effectively innovate.33

Neglect of this principle (i.e., the instrumental value of 
power as opposed to its value as a final goal) in our 
judgment, is responsible for much of what is wrong in 
the New York City Schools today. We find that the school 
system is heavily encumbered with constraints and limita­
tions which are the result of efforts by one group to assert 
a negative and self-serving power against someone else. 
Historically these efforts have had ample justification, each

32. Mayors Advisory Panel on Decentralization of the New 
York Schools, Reconnection for Learning—A Community School 
System for New York City, McGeorge Bundy, Chairman (Fred­
erick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1969) (herein the “Bundy Report) 
pp. 5-6.

33. Reprinted in Hickey, Optimum School District Size (Eric 
Clearinghouse on Educational Administration, University of Oregon 
1969), p. 25.



19

in its time. To fend off the spoils system, to protect 
teachers from autocratic superiors, to ensure professional 
standards, or for dozens of other reasons, interest groups 
have naturally fought for protective rules. But as they 
operate today these constraints bid fair to strangle the 
system in its own checks and balances, so that New 
Yorkers will find themselves, in the next decade as in the 
last, paying more and more for less and less effective 
public education (p. 1).

Size, itself, has been recognized in many studies as responsible 
for many of the failures of large city schools, such studies 
making it increasingly clear that good educational decisions 
are made at a level that is close to the individual child.34

At the same time, it is peculiar that, just as the dis­
advantages of large school districts are being recognized, 
the metropolitan approach would increase the size of the 
overall administrative unit. The cumbersome and highly 
bureaucratized behavior of the large-city school districts is 
responsible for many of the failures of the city schools. 
Increasingly, it appears that good educational decisions 
are made at a level that is close to the individual child 
(see, for example, Fantini [1970], pp. 40-75). Despite 
this recognition, the movement to metropolitan school dis­
tricts would centralize further the level of decision making 
and buttress that centralization with an even greater op­
portunity for bureaucratic mindlessness.

There have been many studies on the optimum size of a 
school district. Generally recommended optimum sizes vary 
with the purpose for which the size is picked. Studies do not, 
however, suggest a school district size even approaching Detroit’s 
size.35

34. Henry M. Levin, Financing Schools in a Metropolitan Con­
text in Metropolitan School Organization: Basic Problems and
Patterns (McCutcheon Publishing Corporation 1973), p. 39.

35. Detroit is the sixth largest school district in the United 
States with an enrollment of 266,193 in the 1971-1972 school year. 
H. E. W. Education Directory 1972-73, p. 255. For a table sum­
marizing optimum for varying purposes, see Br. App. A15.



2 0

The remedy proposed by the Bundy Report was based on 
the following premise:36

The concept of local control of education is at the heart 
of the American public school system. Laymen deter­
mine the goals of public education and the policies calcu­
lated to achieve them.

The report recommended decentralizing the system into 
component units with substantial and real control over educa­
tional policy. It proposed local community school districts of 
from 12 to 40 thousand pupils with some policy established 
on a city-wide basis but with each district primarily governed 
by community school boards. These would establish procedures 
and channels for the closest possible consultation with parents, 
community residents and teachers, preserving all existing tenure 
rights of teachers but thereafter awarding tenure selection to 
the community district.37

This type of decentralization is of a different character from 
decentralization of administrative functions where all ultimate 
control is retained by central authorities. The results of the 
latter have been characterized as follows:38

When authority is decentralized, the person granted local 
power remains responsible to the same group of officials 
that delegated the authority. . . . Because local officials 
are responsible to higher authority, rather than to those 
they serve, their clients have no direct means of influencing 
policy or action; even more important, perhaps, the official 
loses the freedom of action which true responsibility would 
confer on him. . . . What now exists . . .  in most large 
cities is authority without responsibility.

The decentralization recommended by the Bundy Report has 
been a failure since it did not reckon with the unwillingness

36. Bundy Report, p. 6.
37. Id. at pp. XIII and XIV.
38. John W. Polley, “Decentralization Within Urban School 

Systems,” in Education in Urban Society (Dodd, Mead, and Co., 
1962), pp. 122-123, cited in the Bundy Report, p. 8.



21

of those who had power within the system— teachers, administra­
tors and central board— to relinquish it. The range of failure, 
from the compromise enabling legislation through its subsequent 
implementation, has been well chronicled.39 Curriculum reform 
could not be effected because of central board control of 
policies and since central board budgetary restraints prevented 
local boards from hiring curriculum specialists.40 Budget sub­
missions by local boards were for informational purposes only, 
and local funds were allocated by fairly rigid formulas.41 With 
respect to personnel, the relatively large grants of power were 
frustrated by the power retained in the Board of Examiners to 
appoint, assign and discharge teachers. Teachers retained the 
right to transfer from one district in the system to another and 
were unresponsive to the needs of the constituency they served.42 
Finally, the process of collective bargaining remained with the 
central board. Local boards had three representatives who could 
meet with the negotiating committee but who were not part of 
the “management team”.43 The quantitative results in student 
performance continued downward after decentralization, as it 
had before.44

39. Rebell, New York’s Decentralization Law: Two and a
Half Years Later, 2 Journal of Law and Education (1973) (herein 
Rebell); Zimvet, Decentralization and School Effectiveness—A Case 
Study of the 1969 Decentralization Law in New York City 
(Teachers College Press 1973) (herein Zimvet).

40. Rebell, pp. 7-12; Zimvet, p. 5.
41. Rebell, pp. 13-14.
42. Zimvet, pp. 5-6, 127-128.

“Much of the conflict between the professional staff and 
the community can be traced to these two sets of criteria. In 
terms of what a teacher should be, the professional staff and 
the unions representing them insist that he must pass certain 
tests, possess particular credentials, and perform his assigned 
duties in accordance with accepted procedures and practices. 
Community groups, on the other hand, especially those con­
cerned with the appointment of more black and Puerto Rican 
teachers and supervisors, insist that traditional credentials are 
not as important as is the ability of the teacher or supervisor to 
relate to children, to parents, and to the community.”

43. Rebell, pp. 21-30.
44. Zimvet, p. 147.



22

The “metropolitan solution” has been termed an educational 
myth attributable to the desire for simple answers to complex 
questions and one which fails to make the distinction between 
educational problems which exist in a metropolitan area as 
contrasted with problems which can only be solved by a met­
ropolitan solution.45

Even if a metropolitan solution is necessary for purposes of 
achieving maximum integration, however, the only structural 
remedy to the educational problem of size-—decentralization— 
will by definition conflict with integration in many situations. 
The concentration of Negroes and whites in different areas is 
the heart of the problem, and this occurs by the decentraliza­
tion of the present local educational governments.

In any case, and even if experts are found who revere large 
school size, this is the caulderon of educational policy into 
which Appellees would thrust the judiciary in decreeing maxi­
mum integration by interdistrict remedy.
In addition to the problem of establishing a new framework of 
educational government, Appellees’ position raises the equally 
difficult problem of how each reorganized unit shall be gov­
erned. With hundreds of thousands of people in very large 
areas, elections have proved unsatisfactory. They are expensive, 
often lack effective supporting political organization, and are 
subject to manipulation by narrowly based interest groups. If 
the governing body is to be picked by appointment, the appoint­
ing authority must be chosen. What civil political officer or 
officers will be chosen, answerable to whom. Appointment re­
moves the board member one further step from the people he 
serves— a crucial problem in a large district whose boundaries 
are not, and in a reorganization will not be, coterminous with 
any other political entity.

Other problems, while less fundamental, will prove equally 
troublesome. What will be done with the collective bargaining 
contract of the largest unit? Will this contract be imposed

45. Metro. Schl. Org., supra n. 35, pp. 35, 41-2.



23

over the entire area on the various units and sub-units? May 
teachers be transferred from one area to another? Do the 
residents of the area through their boards have power to hire, 
fire, transfer and promote? Are the teachers responsive to the 
constituents of that district— a factor more important than 
formal educational qualifications? Who controls finance?

Necessarily the judiciary, under Appellees’ theory, must in 
the last analysis determine a myriad of educational problems in 
the reorganized districts which affect the day-to-day operation 
of the system. Further, since the reorganization process even 
without desegregation problems lasts over several school years, 
and since desegregation cases historically are marked by long 
court sojourns with annual petitions for additional relief as 
conditions or doctrine change, judicial intervention will be both 
pervasive and long.46 Additionally, the implication of the Sixth 
Circuit Court opinion would logically require further judicial 
reorganization occurring with demographic change. Its deci­
sion is buttressed on the racial identifiability of Detroit “as a 
black school system” and a Detroit school district predominantly 
black surrounded by a ring of suburbs and school systems pre­
dominantly white and historical boundary lines which are con­
sidered artificial and must be disregarded.47 As applied to the 
country as a whole, this condition will occur in many other 
areas, and will reoccur in some areas once an area is desegre­
gated given the varying pattern of demographic change.

46. For a poignant history of one desegregation suit, see Cal­
houn v. Cook, 332 F. Supp. 804, 805-6 (N. D. Ga. 1971), aff’d. 
and rev’d. in part; 451 F. 2d 583 (5th Cir. 1972). In view of the 
subjective educational and governmental judgments required under 
the doctrine here urged by Appellees consistency of lower court 
decision would be even less expected than it is in practice under the 
present relatively clear single district doctrines. Compare, Kelley v. 
Metro Bd. of Ed. of Nashville, Tenn., 463 F. 2d 732, 741 (6th Cir. 
1972), cert. den. 409 U. S. 1001, with Goss v. Bd. of Ed. of Knox­
ville, 482 F. 2d 1044, 1046-7 (6th Cir. 1973).

47. See, n. 21 supra.



24

D. Affirmance Is Inconsistent with Prior Decision of This 
Court.

The internal logic of prior decisions of this Court does not 
require or permit the redefinition of the constitutional duty urged 
by the Appellees or reached by the Sixth Circuit. There is no 
showing that the acts of school authorities in Detroit created the 
concentration of black population and black students in Detroit. 
Rather, this concentration was a major demographic change 
occurring to a greater or lesser extent throughout the country as 
a whole. This Court has previously held that the constitution 
does not require a particular racial balance in a given school or 
stability in racial balance in a school or school district.48 Further, 
the Detroit area suburban schools are not part of the Detroit 
school system in which segregation was found by the District 
Court, but are separate identifiable and unrelated school sys­
tems.49 This is not a case where the Detroit area districts are 
being created with the effect of hindering a desegregation 
order.50 Finally, Appellees have attacked, as has been shown 
above, the basic governmental framework and methods of edu­
cational management which Michigan has chosen for furnishing 
education to its children. This framework and these methods 
are matters in which courts lack expertise and familiarity, where 
educators cannot agree on the solutions to the many problems 
and where it would be difficult to imagine a constitutional re­
quirement having a greater impact on the federal system.51

48. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 
U. S. 1, 24, 31-2; Spencer v. Kugler, 326 F. Supp. 1235 (D. N. J. 
1971), aff’d. 404 U. S. 1027 (1972).

49. Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colo., . . . .  U. S.
. . . ., 41 U. S. L. W. 5002, 5006, 5009 (1973).

50. Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U. S. 451 (1972). 
Neither is this a case such as Haney v. Co. Bd. of Ed. of Seiver 
County, 410 F. 2d 920 (8th Cir. 1969), where small all negro 
districts were set up as an integral part of a dual system, or Lee v. 
Macon Co. Bd. of Ed., 448 F. 2d 746 (5th Cir. 1971), where the 
State had acted to prevent desegregation within a single district.

51. San Antonio Independent Schl. Dist. v. Rodriguez, . . . .
U. S......... , 41 U. S. L. W. 4407, 4419-20 (1973).



25

CONCLUSION

As a matter of educational policy, it may be sound in specific 
instances for states to reorganize their school districts or to 
cause the transfer of students across district lines for the purpose 
of creating greater mixing of the races in settings which promise 
to further the education of all children. An absolute constitu­
tional requirement, however, that states must reorganize any dis­
trict in a metropolitan area where its student body is more 
heavily black than its neighbors to counteract existing and future 
demographic trends would thrust the federal judiciary into 
balancing a necessity of integration against and ultimately de­
termining the most sensitive areas of school management. Such 
a requirement is unwarranted. Amici urge that the decision of 
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in this case be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

Lewis C. Bose,
William M. Evans,

1100 First Federal Building, 
Indianapolis, Indiana 46204

Bose, McKinney & Evans 
Of Counsel.





A ppendix





TABLE OF CONTENTS TO APPENDIX

PAGE

Excerpts from Supplemental Memorandum of Decision, 
December 6, 1973, United States of America, et al. v.
The Board of School Commissioners of Indianapolis, 
et al. (S D Ind. No. IP-68-C-225) ...........................A1-A10

Growth of Non-White Population in Major Central Cities, 
1960-1970 ........................................................................... A l l

Bureau of Census— Table on birth expectations for report­
ing wives, 18 to 39 years old, 1967 and 1972 ................A12

Bureau of Census— Births to date per 1,000 wives to 18 to 
39 years old, 1967 to 1973 .................................................A13

Bureau of Census— School Enrollment, 3 to 34 years old 
by level, 1967 and 1972 .....................................................A14

Chart of optimum school district size recommendations . . A15





A1

APPENDIX

U nited States D istrict Court

Southern District of Indiana 

Indianapolis Division

United States of A merican, et a l . ,"
Plaintiffs,

vs.
r*Cause No. IP-68-C-225

The Board of School Commission­
ers of Indianapolis, et al

Defendants. __

EXCERPTS FROM
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OF DECISION 

(December 6, 1973)

I. Introduction

Heretofore, on August 18, 1971, the Court filed herein its 
Memorandum of Decision, incorporating its findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, and making certain interim orders, with 
respect to the issues presented by the complaint of the original 
plantiff, United States of America, and the answer of the 
original defendants, The Board of School Commissioners of the 
City of Indianapolis, the individual members of such Board, and 
the Board’s appointed Superintendent of schools. Such decision, 
which will be referred to hereafter as “Indianapolis I ” is re­
ported in 332 F. Supp. 655, aff’d 474 F. 2d 81 (7 Cir. 1973), 
cert. den. 37 L. Ed. 2d 1041 (1973).

Thereafter, on July 20, 1973, the Court filed herein a second 
Memorandum of Decision, incorporating its findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, and making certain interim orders, with re­
spect to certain issues presented by the complaint of the original



A2

and added plaintiffs, Donny Brurell Buckley, et al, and the 
answers of the original and added defendants. Such decision 
will be referred to hereafter as “Indianapolis II,” is reported
i n ........ F. Supp............ , 37 Ind. Dec. 524, and is now’ on appeal
to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Nos. 73-1968 
to 73-1984, inch

The key decision made in Indianapolis I was that the India­
napolis public school system (hereafter “IPS”) was being oper­
ated by the original defendants, and had been operated by their 
predecessors in office, as a system practicing de jure segregation 
of students of the Negro race. It was therefore held that the 
Negro students were being denied the equal protection of the 
laws, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Brown v. 
Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954). Certain interim 
measures tending to prevent further segregation were ordered, 
pending consideration of the questions to be presented and later 
decided in Indianapolis II, it being understood that the law re­
quired the defendants to take affirmative action to desegregate 
IPS Green v. Country School Board, 391 U. S. 430 (1968).

The key decisions made in Indianapolis II were that (1) as a 
practical matter, desegregation promising a reasonable degree of 
permanence could not be accomplished within the present boun­
daries of IPS, and (2) added defendant officials of the State of 
Indiana, their predecessors in office, the added defendant The 
Indiana State Board of Education, and the State itself have, by 
various acts and omissions, promoted segregation and inhibited 
desegregation within IPS, so that the State, as the agency ulti- 
matedy charged under Indiana law with the operation of the 
public schools, has an affirmative duty to desegregate IPS.

The Court also held in Indianapolis II that IPS could be effec­
tively desegregated either by combining its territory with that 
of all or part of the territory served by certain added defendant 
school corporations, into a metropolitan system or systems, and 
then reassigning pupils within the expanded system or systems 
thus created, or by transferring Negro students from IPS to



A3

added defendant school corporations, either on a one-way or an 
exchange basis. It further held that the State, through its Gen­
eral Assembly, should be first afforded the opportunity to select 
its own plan, but that if it failed to do so within a reasonable 
time, the Court would have the power and the duty to promul­
gate its own plan, and place it in effect. Bradley, et al, v. Milli-
ken, et a l , ........ F. 2 d .......... (6 Cir. 1973). See Baker v. Carr,
369 U. S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964).

By way of affirmative relief pending action by the General 
Assembly, the Court ordered IPS to effect pupil reassignments 
for the 1973-74 school year sufficient to bring the number of 
Negro pupils in each of its elementary schools to approximately 
15%, which has been accomplished. The Court also directed 
IPS to transfer to certain added defendant school corporations, 
and for such corporations to receive and enroll, a number of 
Negro students equal to 5% of the 1972-73 enrollment of each 
transferee school, with certain exceptions. This order was, on 
August 8, 1973, stayed by the Court until the 1973-74 school 
year by an order made in open court but not previously reduced 
to writing.

At this time, certain matters have been presented to the 
Court, both formally and informally, which require further rul­
ings in the premises. Such rulings are now made, as hereafter 
set out, as supplementary to or, in some instances, in lieu of 
rulings heretofore entered in Indianapolis II, as heretofore 
modified.

*  *  *  He $

IV. Guidelines of this Court— General

It is, of course, recognized by the Court that it cannot 
issue a positive order to the General Assembly to enact specific 
legislation. It is for such reason that the Court has suggested 
several different methods by which the General Assembly 
could approach the problem of effectively desegregating IPS,



A4

and it does not imply that there may not be other equally 
effective methods which may occur to that body.

Within the context of what has been suggested as possible 
alternatives, however, the Court offers further observations, as 
follows:

(1) With respect to the concept of one metropolitan school 
district, embracing the area designated in Figure 1, attached 
to the Court’s opinion in Indianapolis II, it is apparent that 
some advantages would be obtained from such a system. To 
name a few, a uniform tax base would be provided for the 
education of the more than 200,000 pupils, in the combined 
system, and economy in operation could be achieved through 
central purchasing and reduction of administrative overhead. 
Complete desegregation would be simplified. On the other 
hand, it may be that such a system would be too large in terms 
of difficulty of administration and remoteness of the central 
office from school patrons.

(2) With respect to the concept of creating various new 
metropolitan districts— for example, six or eight to replace the 
present twenty-four pictured on Figure 1, it is apparent that 
some of the advantages above noted would be reduced, and 
some of the disadvantages improved. Another alternate of 
course, would be to create one metropolitan system for taxing 
purposes, which in turn would be subdivided into several semi- 
autonomous local districts. So long as IPS and the local districts 
are each effectively desegregated, the method used would be 
constitutionally immaterial.

(3) With respect to the concept of permitting the present 
school corporations shown on said Figure 1 to remain as is, 
insofar as geography and control is concerned, such a solution 
would of course preserve local autonomy, and this Court would 
have no reason to disapprove such a solution, so long as each such 
corporation is required to participate in the desegregation of 
IPS. Put in other terms, local autonomy for such corporations, 
is, under the law of Indiana, a privilege—-not a right—-all



A5

as discussed in detail in Indianapolis II. The consideration 
for permitting the various corporations to continue their separate 
existences might therefore be stated to be their participation in 
a meaningful plan to desegregate IPS. Some of the pertinent 
facts which the General Assembly may wish to consider in 
this regard are set out in the next two sections hereof.

V. Transfer of Pupils

When speaking of the transfer of pupils, the first logical 
question is as to the numbers involved. In this connection, the 
focus must be on the elementary schools within IPS which 
were not affected by the interim plan adopted by the Court for 
the present school year, and which have an enrollment of 
Negro pupils exceeding 80%. There are nineteen such schools, 
fourteen of which have Negro enrollments in excess of 97%. 
Two additional schools have enrollments exceeding 60%, and 
should also be considered. The total enrollment of black 
students in these 21 schools, excluding kindergarten and special 
education students, is approximately 11,500.

The General Assembly might order the exchange of all 
or a substantial part of these 11,500 students with students 
from the suburban school corporations. For purposes of illustra­
tion, if it were determined to desegregate such schools on the 
basis of approximately 85% white— 15% black, then about 
9,775 black children would need to be transferred to suburban 
schools, and about the same number of non-black children 
would need to be transferred to IPS.

There is case law to the effect that transfers of students 
must be made on an approximately equal basis insofar as the 
races are concerned, unless there is good reason why this 
should not be done. In such cases it has been held that to 
impose the “burden” of being transported wholly or largely 
upon students of one race is yet another from of racial dis­
crimination and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
rights of the group transported. United States v. Texas Educa-



A6

tion Agency, 467 F. 2d 848 (5 Cir. 1972); Lee v. Macon 
County Board of Education, 448 F. 2d 746 (5 Cir. 1971); 
Haney v. County Board of Education of Sevier County, 429 
F. 2d 364 (8 Cir. 1970). Such cases, if followed, would 
seem to mandate so-called “two-way” busing, absent compelling 
reasons to the contrary.

The Supreme Court has not specifically addressed itself to 
this question. However, it is worthy of note that in McDaniel 
v. Barresi, 402 U. S. 39 (1971), that Court approved a de­
segregation plan adopted by the Clarke County (Ga.) Board 
of Education which reassigned pupils in five heavily Negro 
“ ‘pockets’ ” to other attendance zones, busing many of them, 
without any corresponding busing of whites. Other “one-way” 
busing plans have likewise been approved, depending on the 
factual setting. Hart v. County School Board, 459 F. 2d 981 
(4 Cir. 1972); Norwalk Core v. Norwalk Board of Education, 
423 F. 2d 121 (2 Cir. 1970). Indeed, the Fourth Circuit has 
flatly held that a pattern of assigning Negro students to formerly 
all-white schools, without requiring similar travel on the part 
of whites, does not violate the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Allen v. Asheville City Board of 
Education, 434 F. 2d 902 (4 Cir. 1970). Moreover, analysis 
of the cases cited in the preceding paragraph indicates that 
they have been decided on their particular facts, even though 
some of the language is in terms of absolute requirements.

The Court does not find it necessary to attempt to resolve 
this question in terms of constitutional absolutes, nor could it 
appropriately do so on the present record, since the question 
has not been squarely presented. However, the record does 
contain undisputed evidence that virtually all of the twenty-one 
IPS elementary schools above referred to (located as shown in 
Figure 13, attached) are substantially out of line with the re­
quirements of present Indiana law and regulations establishing 
minimum acreage requirements for elementary schools. The 
regulations require seven acres for schools with 200 or less



A7

pupils, plus an additional acre for each additional 100 pupils 
or major fraction thereof. Bums Indiana Rules & Regs., § (28- 
415)-3. As reflected in Figure 14, attached, only one of these 
schools meets acreage requirements. Most schools are grossly 
deficient in the space required—for example, the pupil density 
at School 66 is 544.21 pupils per acre, and is 493.57 per acre 
at School 42 and 481.33 per acre at School 73. By way of 
comparison, the pupil density at School 42, taking into con­
sideration its enrollment and the State formula, should be 57.58 
pupils per acre. It is thus overcrowded by 857.18%!

The evidence further shows that, with a few exceptions, the 
twenty-one schools in question are among the older schools in 
the IPS system— some dating back 100 years, more or less. 
Although there is no evidence that the Board of School Com­
missioners has not maintained such schools as well as could be 
expected under the circumstances, it is a fair inference, subject 
to further proof, that the type of construction, use of flammable 
materials, etc., would fail by a wide margin to meet safety 
standards for newly constructed schools. On the other hand, 
the evidence discloses that the school plants maintained by 
added defendant school corporations are, for the most part, 
relatively new and in compliance with acreage and safety 
standards.

On the basis of the foregoing facts, therefore, this Court 
would not feel justified in condemning out of hand a “one­
way” suburban busing plan involving pupils from such of the 
twenty-one schools as may seem to the Board, on analysis, to 
afford inadequate educational plant facilities, viewed in the 
light of current standards. Additionally, such a plan would 
involve transportation of substantially fewer pupils, and there­
fore be less expensive.

Finally, unless convinced to the contrary by additional evi­
dence in an appropriate hearing, this Court is not prepared 
to characterize busing as an unmitigated “burden.” Although 
it might appear to a child to be “burdensome” to be deprived



A8

of walking to school in the warm days of May and September 
(which presupposes that children do not like to ride in motor 
vehicles with their neighborhood friends— a somewhat novel 
concept to the Court), the Court doubts that it would seem 
such a burden to be transported in a heated bus through the 
rain, sleet, and snow so familiar in this latitude during other 
months of the school term. As pointed out in Indianapolis II, 
nearly 80% of suburban pupils (more than 80% since the 
elimination of Greenfield) are bused to school at the present 
time, without complaint.

The Court is not of the opinion that it" would be wise to 
require transportation of kindergarten pupils, primarily because 
of their age, nor to transport special education pupils because 
of the various special problems which would inevitably arise 
in this regard. Further, the Court recognizes that special prob­
lems arise with respect to high school pupils, which might 
render their transfer counter-productive once their high school 
training has begun. As to pupils in grades 1-8, however, the 
Court knows of no reason why transfer of pupils, in whatever 
fashion the General Assembly may elect, would not be reason­
able and practical to accomplish the constitutional duty imposed 
by the Supreme Court, with the understanding, of course, that 
a transferred elementary pupil would thereafter routinely con­
tinue to be transferred to the same transferee school corpora­
tion for continued education through high school.

If, for example, transfer were made of Negro pupils from 
those of the twenty-one schools failing to meet modern stand­
ards to the schools of added defendants situate within the 
geographical area depicted in said Figure 1, all of those trans­
ferred would be afforded education in a desegregated setting. 
It should be no great task to desegregate the remaining school 
or schools within IPS. The Court estimates, based on the 
statistics and projections in the record, that it would be neces­
sary for the suburban schools within such Figure 1 area, ex­
cluding the Washington Township and Pike Township schools,



A9

to accept transfer of IPS elementary pupils in grades 1-8 in 
number equivalent to approximately 15% of their 1973-74 
enrollments in the same grades in order to accomplish this 
result.

After such transfers were accomplished, the racial percentages 
in each school to which transfers were made would be approxi­
mately 87% white and 13% Negro— a ratio which, by coin­
cidence, would approximate that of the nation as a whole. As 
regards Washington Township, its minority percentage as pro­
jected for the present school year is already this high, so that 
general 1-8 transfers to this defendant would not appear to be 
indicated; however, the acceptance of pupil initiated transfers 
from IPS to its Everett J. Light Industrial Center, to the extent 
that vacancies exist, might well be required. Pike Township 
likewise has a substantial minority percentage at this time; how­
ever, a number of transfers sufficient to increase such percent­
age to a figure approximating that of the other suburban schools 
should be considered.

VI. Costs and Mechanics of Transfers

One advantage of the dual transfer system would be that if 
approximately equal numbers of pupils were transferred to and 
from suburban schools, tuition, transportation, and other costs 
would balance out as between IPS and the various other cor­
porations, and no additions to school plants would be necessary. 
On the other hand, more pupils would be transported, thus in­
creasing this total cost, and such a system would continue the 
use of the IPS antique buildings and grounds.

A one-way transfer plan would involve substantial tuition 
payments from IPS to the transferee schools. To the extent that 
such tuition applied only to the actual per capita cost of instruc­
tion, utilities, maintenance service, etc., no hardship would be 
imposed upon IPS, because it is apparant that IPS expense for 
such services would be correspondingly reduced. However, the



A10

present transfer law, I.C. 1971, 20-8.1-6-1 through 20-8.1-6-15, 
as amended, Burns §§ 28-5001 through 28-5015, also contem­
plate charges related to the fair value of the transferee school 
plant, tax levies for building purposes, and other items related 
to capital outlay of the transferee school. Considering that the 
State of Indiana is itself at fault in this matter, as previously 
found, the General Assembly should consider whether the State 
should be required to contribute the necessary amount to com­
pensate the transferee corporations for the use of their respective 
plants. Such a provision, with an appropriate formula, could be 
adopted as an amendment to the existing transfer law.

It is possible that the General Assembly could discharge its 
duty in this matter simply by amending the existing transfer 
law. The purpose of such law, as the Court understands it, is 
to permit the better accommodation of school children. As 
pointed out in Section III hereof, the Supreme Court of the 
United States has held that for a minority child to be compelled 
to attend a segregated school denies the Fourteenth Amendment 
rights of such child: in effect, the child is not properly accom­
modated. Therefore, if the transfer law were amended to recog­
nize transfers to accomplish desegregation of a school system 
which has been finally adjudged to have been segregated de jure 
(as is true in the case of IPS), a basis would be established for 
other necessary changes regarding time of payment of tuition, 
the share to be borne by the State, the matter of responsibility 
for and payment of the cost of transportation, and similar details. 
Since the actual number or percentage of pupils to be trans­
ferred is more of an administrative detail than a legislative func­
tion, this matter could be left to the discreation of the local 
school board or boards, subject to the approval of the court 
having jurisdiction of the case.



GROWTH OF NON-W1IITE POPULATION IN 
MAJOR CENTRAL CITIES - 1960-1970

A 11

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Rank 
of SMSA 
in Terras 
ot Total 
1970 
Popula­
tion

Name of SMSA Total 
SMSA 

Popula­
tion % Net 
Change 

1960-1970

Total 
Central 
City 
White 
Popula­
tion % 

Change 
1960-1970

Total 
Central 
City Non- 
White 
Popula­
tion % 
Change 
1960-1970

Total
Central
City
Popula-
ulation
%. Change
1960-1970

Total 
Central 
City 
White 
Popula­
tion Net 
Migration

Total 
Central 
City Non- 
White 
Popula­
tion Net 
Migration

Excess of 
Non-White Growth 
Rate Over White 
Growth Rate in 
Central City 
(Col. 3 less 
Col. 2)

1 New York, N.Y. 7.8 - 9.3 61.6 1.1 -955,500 435,800 70.9
2 Los Angeles-Long

Beach, Cal. 16.4 4.7 55.6 12.5 - 67,200 127,700 50.9
3 Chicago, 111. 12.2 -18.6 38.4 - 5.2 -645,600 113,200 57.0
4 Philadelphia, Pa.-N. J. 10.9 12.9 25.2 - 2.7 -246,400 39,600 12.3
5 Detroit, Mich. 11.6 -29.1 38.1 - 9.5 -386,800 97,500 67.2
6 San Francisco, Oak-

land. Cal. 17.4 -17.2 51.3 - 2.8 -154,500 66,900 68.5
7 Washington, D.C.

Md.-Va. 38.6 -39.4 30.7 -  1 . 0 -133,300 38,300 70.1
S Boston, Mass. SMSA 6.1 -16.5 69.9 - 3.1 -130,600 26,500 86.4
9 Pittsburgh, Pa. - 0.2 -18.0 6.0 -13.9 - 99,100 - 6,400 24.0

10 St. Louis, Mo.-111. 12.3 -31.6 19.1 -17.0 -181,800 900 50.7
11 Baltimore, Md. 14.8 -21.4 29.7 - 3.5 -149,700 31,700 51.1
12 Cleveland, Ohio 8.1 -26.5 15.7 -14.3 -206,400 - 2,800 42.2

Houston, Texa3 40.0 -25.5 50.9 31.4 67,200 55,600 25.4
14 Newark, N.J. 9.9 -36.7 53.6 - 5.6 -106,600 31,500 90.3
15 Minneapolis-St. Paul• t

Minn. 22.4 - 7.9 49.8 - 6.1 - 94,400 7,200 57.7
16 Dallas, Tex. 39.0 14.2 66.3 24.2 7,500 46,900 52.1
17 Seattle-Everett, Wash. 28.4 - 8.5 43.5 - 4.4 - 72,600 9,800 52.0
18 Anaheim-Santa-Ana-

Garden Grove, Cal. 101.8 50.8 301.6 54.4 (NA) (NA) 250.8
19 Milwaukee, Wise. 9.8 -10.4 69.9 - 3.3 -128,400 23,000 80.3
20 Atlanta, Ga. 36.7 -20.0 37.3 2.0 - 82,500 32,700 57.3
21 Cincinnati, Ohio,

Ky-Ind. 9.2 -17.2 15.9 -10.0 -106,100 - 2,500 33.122 Paterson - Clifton- t

Passaic, N.J. 14.5 - 9.1 98.1 1 . 0 - 25,500 9,800 107.2
23 San Diego, Cal. 31.4 17.2 72.8 21.6 27,600 17,300 55.624 Buffalo, N.Y. 3.2 -20.7 ’ 34.1 -13.1 -111,100 9,000 54.3
25 Miami, Fla. 35.6 13.5 19.3 14.8 29,400 - 5,700 . 5.S26 Kansas Citv, Mo.-Kans. 14.8 0 37.3 6.6 - 28,800 13,000 37.327 Denver, Colo. 32.1 -  0 . 1 60.2 4.2 - - 41,100 -j 12,200 60.3
26 San Bernardino,

Riverside, Ontario,
Cal. 41.2 33.7 1 1 1 . 1 38.4 (NA) (NA) 77.4

29 Indpls., Ind. 17.5 9.8 36.0 13.6 - 17,400 15,400 24.230 San Jose, Cal. 65.8 111.4 318.6 118.3 (NA) (NA) 207.2
31 New Orleans, La. 15.3 -17.6 14.9 - 5.4 - 91,600 -10,500 32.5
32 Tampa, St. Peters-

burg, Fla. 31.1 5.2 24.8 8.3 24,900 24,800 19.6
33 Portland, Ore.-Wash. 22.8 0.2 43.3 2.7 - 7,600 4,700 43.134 Phoenix, Ariz. 45.8 31.2 52.2 32.4 71,500 5,600 21.0
35 Columbus, Ohio 21.4 11.3 30.8 14.5 - 10,600 9,400 19.5
36 Providence, Paw-

tucket, Warwick,
R. I.-Mass., SMSA 10.9 - 6.8 48.8 - 4.8 - 40,000 2,600 55.6

37 Rochester, N.Y. 20.5 -17.1 115.1 - 7.0 - 68,500 16,600 132.238 San Antonio, Texas 20.6 9.8 30.6 11.3 - 52,300 5,300 20.8
39 Dayton, Ohio 16.9 -17.8 30.7 - 7.1 - 60,300 6,100 48.5

5ourea: U. S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract
.V

of the United States - 1972, Section 33, page S37, et seq.





BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
STATUS OF THE BLACK POPULATION IN THE UNITED 
__STATES, 1972, RPT. P--23 NO. 26 , (1973)_____

TABLE 59. SELECTED DATA ON BIRTH EXPECTATIONS FOR REPORTING 
WIVES, 18 TO 39 YEARS OLD: 1967 AND 1972

Subject Total,
Age of Wife

18 to 39
years

18 to 24 25 to 29 30 to 34 35 to 39

1967
Total number of reporting 
wives:
Negro----------thousands - 1,280 342 307 309 321
White----------thousands- 14,440 3,798 3,420 3,390 3,831

Average number of births 
to date:
Negro-------------------- 3.2 1.8 3.0 3.9 4.2
White,-- ----------------- 2.4 1.1 2.3 3.0 3.1

Average number of total 
births expected:
Negro-------------------- 3.7 2.8 3.4 4.3 4.2
White-------------------- 3.1 2.9 3.0 3.2 3.2

Percent of expected children 
already born:
Negro-------------------- 87 64 88 92 98
White-------------------- 77 39 75 93 97

1972
Total number of reporting 
wives:
Negro— -------thousands-- 1,449 400 3 53 347 348
White---------thousands-- 16,681 4,670 4,392 3,909 3,711

Average number of births 
to date:
Negro-------------------- 2.7 1.3 2.1 3.5 3.9
White-------------------- 2.0 0.9 1.8 2.7 3.1

Average number of total 
births expected:
Negro----- --------------- 3.2 2.4 2.8 3.7 4.0
White-------------------- 2.6 2.2 2.4 2.8 3.2

Percent of expected children 
already born:
Negro-- ------------------ - 84 55 76 95 99
White-------------------- 77 40 74 94 99

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Social and Economic Statistics
Administration Bureau of the Census.



- -

■



EXCERPTS FROM BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, BIRTH 
EXPECTATIONS OF AMERICAN WIVES JUNE 1973, 
______RPT. P-20, NO. 254 , TABLE 1________

Table 1. Births to Date, Additional Births Expected, and Total Births Expected Per 1,000 Wives 18 to 39 Years Old 
Reporting on Expectations, by age, and by race and Spanish Origin for selected years: 1967 to 1973

(Civilian noninstitutional population)

Subject and age 
of wife

All Races White Negro Spanish
origin
19731973 1972 1971 1967 1973 1972 1967 1973 1972 1967

Births To Date Per 1,000 Wives
18 to 39 years-------------

18 to 24 years-----------
18 and 19 years--------
20 and 21 years--------
22 to 24 years---------

25 to 29 years-----------
30 to 34 years-----------
35 to 39 years------------

2,044
895
588
743

1,049
1,755
2,623
3,189

2,090
928
608
721

1,098
1,807
2,749
3,173

2,146
952
571
771

1,124
1,949
2,802
3,210

2,427
1,173

731
970

1,366
2,312
3,050
3,214

2,008
848
540
697

1,004
1,723
2,589
3,149

2,039
893
565
661

1,073
1,781
2,681
3,109

2,357
1,116

654
893

1,317
2,255
2,974
3,130

2,540
1,372
(B)

1,218
1,502
2,210
3,089
3,857

2,688 
1,325 
(B)

1,258
1,435
2,147
3,548
3,945

3,193
1,787
(B)

1,657
2,015
2,996
3,929
4,157

2,447
1,109
(B)
(B)

1,282
2,217
3,316
3,641

>
C4>





BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
STATUS OF THE BLACK POPULATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 1972, RPT. P-23 NO. 26, (1973)_______

A 14

TABLE 46. SCHOOL ENROLLMENT OF PERSONS 3 TO 34 YEARS OLD, 
BY LEVEL: 1967 AND 1972
(Numbers in thousands. Minus sign (-) 

denotes decrease)

Level of school and race
1967 1972

Percent
change

BLACK

Total— *-------------------- 6,826 7,959 16.6
Nursery— :----------------------- 140 185 32.1
Kindergarten---- ---------------- 418 448 7.2
Elementary school--------------- 4,618 4,573 -1.0
High school---------------- ----- 1,651 2,025 22.7.
College------------------------- 370 727 96.5

WHITE
Total---------------------- 43,816 51,314 17.1

Nursery------------------------- 564 1,079 91.3
Kindergarten-------------------- 2,840 2,633 -7.3
Elementary school--------------- 28,415 27,185 -4.3
High school---------------------- 11,997 12,959 8.0
College------------------------- 5,905 7,458 26.3

Source: U. S. Department of Commerce, Social and Economic Statistics
Administration, Bureau of the Census.

T .





OPTIMUM SCHOOL DISTRICT SIZE 
by Michael E . Hickey 

December 1969

A 15

Table V.
Summary of Optimum Size Recommendations

Criterion Optimum Size Source
Community control 
Community control 
General quality 
General quality 
General quality 
General quality 
General quality 
General quality
Quality/economy 

< Quality/economy 
Quality/economy 
Quali ty/economy 
Effectiveness

Cost/pupil
Tax effort required
Special staffing
Net current expenditure
Elementary school unit
Secondary school unit
Administrative de­
centralization 

Administrative de­
centralization 

Administrative de­
centralization 

Administrative district
Administrative district 
Administrative district

50.000 total population 
7,000-8,000 pupils
10.000 pupils (min.)
28.000 pupils
50.000 pupils 
1,500 pupils (min.)
10.000 pupils
25.000 pupils

50.000 pupils
12.000 pupils
25.000 pupils
50.000 pupils 
500 pupils (max.) 
700-1,000 pupils
300,000-500,000 
total pop.

20.000 pupils

Havighurst (1968) 
Havighurst (1968) 
State of California 
Swanson (1962) 
Benson (1965)
Conant (1969) 
Packard (1963)
Comm, for Economic 
Development (1960) 
Faber (1966) 
Fitzwater (1958) 
McClure 
Dawson (1948)
Nat. Comm, on 
School District 
Reorg. (1948) 

Hanson (1962) 
Vincent (1966) 
Vincent (1966) 
Vincent (1966)
NEA DEP (1954)
White House Conf. 
on Education

Havighurst (1968)
Passow (1967) *

10.000- 20,000 pupils
5.000 pupils (min.)
5.000- 6,000 pupils (min.)
12.000 pupils
10.000 pupils

12.000- 40,000 pupils
20.000- 50,000 pupils
15.000- 20,000 pupils
10.000- 12,000 pupils

Bundy (1967)
IAR, Columbia 
Univ. (1961)

Peabody Coll. (1965) 
AASA (1959)

Special Services:
Adult education 
Business administration 
Electronic Data Pro­
cessing
Special Education

20.000 (min.) 
35,000-50,000 pupils
100.000 pupils
20.000 pupils

Great Plains 
School District 
Organization 
Project (1968)