Dowell v. Oklahoma City Board of Education Petition for Rehearing with Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc
Public Court Documents
September 24, 1969
Cite this item
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Dowell v. Oklahoma City Board of Education Petition for Rehearing with Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc, 1969. cde01e31-b09a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/391e95e6-4053-43c1-9a99-34cc8f3731ee/dowell-v-oklahoma-city-board-of-education-petition-for-rehearing-with-suggestion-for-rehearing-en-banc. Accessed December 04, 2025.
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OP APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
Nos. 433-69, 434-69
— —..................................- ......... . ............ ............... — ........... — r -
ROBERT L. DOWELL, an infant, who sues by A, L. DOWELL,
his father and next friend, et al..
Plaintiffs-Appelle#s,
: V .
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE OKLAHOMA CITY PUBLIC
SCHOOLS, et al..
Defendants,
and
DAVID WEBSTER VERITY, a minor, by and through GEORGE L.
VERITY, his next friend, and GEORGE L. VERITY and
ELLEN VERITY, on behalf of themselves and other persons
similarly situated.
Intervening Defendants-Appellants,
and
TAEJEMA DANZIE, a minor, by and through MRS. A. J. DANZIE,
her next friend, and MRS. A. J. DANZIE, on behalf of
themselves and other persons similarly situated.
Intervening Defendants-Appellants.
PETITION FOR REHEARING WITH SUGGESTION
FOR REHEARING £N BANC
JACK GREENBERG
JAMES M. NABRIT, III
NORMAN J. CHACHKIN
10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019
JOHN W. WALKER
1820 West 13th Street
Little Rock. Arkansas 72202
ARCHIBALD B. HILL, JR.
407 North Durland
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73104
Attorneys for Appellees Dowell, et al.
CALVIN W. HENDRICKSON
2401 First National Building
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102
Attorney for Appellees Sanger, et al.
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
Nos. 4 3 3 -6 9 , 4 34 -6 9
ROBERT L. DOWELL, an in fa n t , who sues by A. L. DOWELL,
h is fa th e r and next fr ie n d , et a l . ,
P l a i n t i f f s - A p p e l l e e s ,
v.
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE OKLAHOMA CITY PUBLIC
SCHOOLS, e t a l . ,
D efendants,
and
DAVID WEBSTER VERITY, a minor, by and through GEORGE L.
VERITY, h is next fr ie n d , and GEORGE L. VERITY and
ELLEN VERITY, on b e h a lf o f themselves and other persons
s im i la r ly s i tu a te d ,
Intervening D efen dan ts-A ppellan ts
and
TAEJEMA DANZIE, a minor, by and through MRS. A. J. DANZIE,
her next fr ie n d , and MRS. A. J . DANZIE, on b e h a lf o f
themselves and oth er persons s im i la r ly s i tu a te d .
In terven in g -D efen d a n ts-A p p ellan ts
PETITION FOR REHEARING WITH SUGGESTION
FOR REHEARING EN BANC
A p pellees Robert L. Dow ell, e t a l . , r e s p e c t fu l ly request
rehearin g , and suggest the appropriateness o f en banc rehear
ing o f the d e c is io n rendered September 15, 1969, in an order
by C hief Judge Murrah, and C ir c u it Judges B r e ite n ste in and
Hickey. This d e c is io n r e c a lle d the mandate o f th is Court pre
v io u s ly issued fo llo w in g an order o f August 27, 1969, and
vacated orders by the t r i a l court denying in te rv en tio n as
defendants to in terven ors V e r i ty , e t a l . and Danzie, e t a l .
Statement o f the Case
This case in v o lv e s the desegregation o f the p u b lic schoolo
o f Oklahoma C ity , Oklahoma. I t was f i l e d October 9 , 1961, by
ap p ellee Dr. A. L. Dowell, a Negro parent ( la t e r jo in ed by
oth er Negro parents who were allowed to intervene) ag ain st the
e le c te d 5 member Board o f Education o f the Oklahoma C ity Public
Schools and other lo c a l school o f f i c i a l s . The issu e in the
present c o n so lid a ted appeals in volves whether the t r i a l judge
erred in denying in te rv en tio n on August 8 , 1969, to intervenor
V e r i t y , and in denying in terven tio n on August 14, 1969, to
in terven or Danzie. Consideration o f the qu estion s now presented
requ ires a b r i e f resume o f the course o f the l i t i g a t i o n sin ce
1961.
1. Proceedings During 1961-62 b e fo re Statu tory
Three-Judge D i s t r i c t Court.
On October 11, 1961, Chief Judge A. P. Murrah designated
a th ree -ju d g e d i s t r i c t cou rt to hear and decide th is c a se .
C h ief Judge Murrah and D i s t r i c t Judges Bohanon and Daugherty
were d esign ated . A p r e - t r i a l order o f January 26, 1962, framed
the i s s u e s ; i t i s se t out in i t s e n t ir e t y in the appendix h ere to .^
B r i e f ly summarized, i t in dicated that the case involved whether
2
the school board was u n c o n s t i tu t io n a lly continuing r a c ia l segre
gation or had adopted a good f a i t h desegregation plan and was
already in compliance w ith Brown v . Board o f Education, 347
U .S . 483 (1 9 5 4 ) , 349 U .S . 294 (1 9 5 5 ) . The i n v a l i d i t y o f
Oklahoma s ta tu te s requ irin g se g reg a tio n , sought to be en join ed ,
was conceded by the defendants. The th ree-ju d g e court held a
f u l l e v id en tia ry hearing on the m erits on A p r il 3, 1962. On
July 10, 1962, the th ree-ju d g e court entered i t s order, which
is a lso attached as an appendix h e re to . The court ruled that
the th ree-ju d ge court should be d is s o lv e d , but n ev erth e le ss
expressed a view on the m erits f in d in g that the defendants had
not u n c o n s t itu t io n a lly applied the school laws.
2. The Case in 1 9 6 3 -6 4 .
A fte r remand to the re s id e n t judge, and fu rth er pleadings
and h ea rin g s , p l a i n t i f f s f i n a l l y obtained an in ju n ctio n again st
segregation and an order requ irin g a desegregation p lan . The
d e c is io n i s reported at 219 F. Supp. 427 (W.D. O k la . , July 11,
1 9 6 3 ) . In January 1964, the board f i l e d a p o lic y statement
regarding in te g r a t io n . A fte r a hearing the t r i a l court d irected
the board to employ a team o f experts independent o f lo c a l s e n t i
ment to survey the problem o f d eseg rega tion . When the board
d eclin ed to do t h i s , p l a i n t i f f s responded to the c o u r t 's in v i t a
tion and a team o f three w e ll q u a l i f ie d experts were appointed
by the court to study and make a re p o rt . (See d e c is io n at 244
F. Supp. 972 recounting the above events in d e t a i l . )
3
3. The Case in 1 9 6 5 -6 8 .
The expert report was f i l e d and a f t e r an ev id en tia ry hearing
approved by the t r i a l c o u rt . The major fe a tu re s o f the e xp erts '
recommendations (a m a jo rity to m in ority r a c ia l tr a n s fe r o p tio n ,
the p a ir in g o f severa l sc h o o ls , and fa c u lty in te g ra tio n ) were
adopted by the c o u rt . 244 F. Supp. 971 . The d i s t r i c t judge
stayed h is own order pending the b o a rd 's appeal. This Court
affirm ed by a d ivided vote o f 2 -1 on January 23, 1967. 375 F.2d
158. The b o a rd 's p e t i t i o n fo r c e r t i o r a r i was a lso denied, 387
U .S . 931 (May 29, 1 9 6 7 ) . A fte r the appeal the board prepared
a plan embodying the main fea tu res o f the e x p e rts ' plan and the
d i s t r i c t judge perm itted major implementation to be in the
1968-69 school y ear . The t r i a l judge d ire c te d the board to con
tinue fu rth er study and in v e s t ig a t io n and to improve the p lan .
4 . The case in 1969.
On June 12, 1969, the board f i l e d a new plan for desegrega
t io n . A fte r a three day hearing in July 1969, the b o a r d 's new
plan was r e je c te d . The t r i a l judge found that two o f the schools
p re v io u s ly paired were developing a r a c ia l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n as
Negro sch ools and that the s i tu a t io n was d e te r io r a t in g . The
cou rt required the school board to d e v ise a new plan s im ila r to
the s o -c a l l e d Wheat Plan which had been presented during the
t r i a l . The board responded by p resen tin g a plan to enlarge the-
attendance boundaries o f c e r ta in sch ools during the 1969-70 term.
The t r i a l judge then approved th is plan on August 1 , 1969. His
4
order a ls o required a fu rth er long—range plan to be f i l e d by
November 1 , 1969.
Promptly the McWilliams in te rv en o rs , a white fam ily opposed
to the p lan , appealed to th is Court and applied fo r a sta y pend
ing appeal. On August 5, 1969, a panel o f th is Court vacated
the order o f August 1, and remanded the case fo r the t r i a l judge
to con sider the a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f se c t io n 4 0 7 (a ) ( 2 ) o f the C i v i l
Rights Act o f 1964. The d i s t r i c t judge wrote an opinion dated
August 8 , re a ffirm in g h is p r io r a c tio n .
On th is same d a te , August 8 , the V e r ity in te rv en tio n request
was f i l e d , and denied . Judge Bohanon denied in terven tio n as
"Too L a t e . " On August 13, Judge Bohanon again entered h is order
approving the new desegregation p lan . On August 14, the Danzie
in terven tio n v/as requested and Judge Bohanon denied that in te r
vention request the same day.
The Danzie and V e r ity in tervenors then f i l e d n o t ic e s o f
appeal, and sought sta ys pending appeal in th is Court. A panel
o f the court entered an order on August 27 a ffirm in g the den ia l
o f in te rv e n tio n . At the same time the court again vacated the
t r i a l ju d g e 's order.
On September 3, 1969, Mr. J u st ic e Brennan re in sta te d the
d i s t r i c t court order o f August 13 pending d is p o s i t io n o f a p e t i
tion fo r c e r t i o r a r i . The c e r t i o r a r i p e t i t i o n was f i l e d w ithin
the 15 days allowed by J u stic e Brennan and the case is now pend
ing in the Supreme Court as No. 603 , October Term, 1969.
5
On September 2, 1969, the V e r ity and Danzie in tervenors
asked th is Court to recon sider the m atter . A p p e lle e s , regarding
the m atter as governed by Rule 4 0 , F .R .A .P . which fo rb id s answers
to a rehearing p e t i t i o n un less requested , f i l e d no response. On
September 15, 1969, the court entered an order vacatin g the t r i a l
ju d g e 's d e c is io n denying rehearing and d ir e c t in g the t r i a l court
to permit the Danzie and V e r ity in tervenors to be heard on a
motion to modify the August 13 order which, as we have noted,
i s re in sta te d pending the United S ta te s Supreme C o u r t 's co n sid er
ation o f a p e t i t io n fo r c e r t i o r a r i .
On September 11, 1969, the t r i a l judge extended the time
fo r the board to f i l e i t s desegregation plan to March 1970 fo r
elementary sc h o o ls , but denied an exten sion o f the November 1,
1969, d eadlin e fo r secondary sc h o o ls . On September 12, 1969, the
board o f education f i l e d n o t ic e o f appeal from the order o f
August 13, 1969, and the order o f September 12, 1969.
Argument
I . The Court Apparently Overlooked Important Questions in
the In te r p r e ta t io n o f Rule 24, Federal Rules o f C i v i l
Procedure.
Because o f the unusual course o f th is l i t i g a t i o n , th is p e t i
tion fo r rehearing is a p p e l le e s 1 f i r s t opportunity to b r i e f the
m erits o f the appeal. The c o u r t 's August 27 ru lin g follow ed an
emergency hearing on a stay a p p lic a t io n and ap p e llee s had no
opportunity to prepare a b r i e f b e fo re that r u lin g . A pp ellees had
no opportunity to respond to a p p e lla n ts ' request for reco n sid eratio n
6
ill view o f Rule 40(a) , Federal Rules o f A p p e lla te Procedure. We
b e l ie v e that the court overlooked important q u estion s presented
by the a p p e a l.
F i r s t , i t is submitted that the d e c is io n below should be
su stain ed on the ground that the attempted in terven tio n was not
t im ely . This was the ground r e l ie d upon by Judge Bohanon in h is
order o f August 8 , 1969, denying the V e r ity in te r v e n tio n . I t is
not d iscu ssed in e ith e r opinion by th is Court. Where the in t e r
vention comes n early 8 years a f t e r s u i t was f i l e d , i t seems
p la in that a question o f t im e lin e ss is presented . The in terven
tion was sought a f t e r the proceedings in 1969 had progressed
through a p r e - t r i a l h earing , a three day t r i a l , appeal, and remand.
We b e l ie v e that there i s an apparent c o n f l i c t w ith th is Court s
p rio r d e c is io n s ru lin g that a d e c is io n on the t im e lin e ss o f in t e r
vention is w ith in the d is c r e t io n o f the d i s t r i c t court and w i l l
not be d istu rbed absent an abuse o f d is c r e t io n . See Simms v .
Andrews, 118 F.2d 803 (10th C ir . 1 9 4 1 ) ; K e lle y v . Summers, 210
F.2d 665 , 674 (10th C ir . 1 9 5 4 ) ; Miami County Nat. Bank v. B a n c ro ft ,
121 F .2d 921 (10th C ir . 1 9 4 1 ) . See a ls o , 3B M oore's Federal Prac
t i c e , pp. 24-521 e t se q . "In te rv e n tio n a f t e r judgment i s unusual
and not o fte n g r a n te d ." (Moore, supra, at p. 24—5 2 6 .) The ques
tion o f t im e lin e ss should be f u l l y b r ie fe d and argued b efo re the
c o u rt . In view o f the apparent c o n f l i c t with p r io r ru lin g s by
oth er panels o f the Tenth C ir c u it on banc rehearing may be j u s t i f i e d .
Second, Rule 2 4 ( a ) ( 2 ) , upon which in tervenors r e ly for th e ir
claim o f in terven tio n o f r ig h t requ ires that the ap p lica n t claim
7
,r an in teres t r e la t in g to the property or tra n saction which is the
su b ject o f the a c t i o n . " This requirement i s not d iscu ssed by
e ith e r opinion o f th is Court. However, th is C o u rt 's action has
created a c o n f l i c t w ith d e c is io n s o f the F if th C ir c u it in
S t . Helena Parish School Board v . H a l l , 287 F.2d 376, 379 (5th
C ir . 1 9 6 1 ) , c e r t , den. 368 U .S . 830 (1 9 6 1 ) , and S t e l l v . Savannah-
Chatham County Board o f Education, 333 F .2d 55, 60 (5th C ir .
1 9 6 4 ) . In S t . Helena, supra, the F i f t h C ir c u it ruled that white
parents had no r ig h t to intervene in school d esegregation cases
brought ag ain st a lo c a l board. In S t e l l , supra, the court refused
to overturn a t r i a l d e c is io n to permit in te rv e n tio n , ru lin g again
that i t was a d is c r e t io n a r y q u e stio n . For a s im ila r ru lin g see
a lso Blocker v . Board o f Education o f Manhasset, 229 F. Supp.
714 (E.D. N .Y . 1 9 6 4 ) .
We b e l ie v e that the contrary r e s u lt in a case in volvin g the
D i s t r i c t o f Columbia should not be follow ed in that the circum
stances o f the case are d is t in g u is h a b le . See Ilobsen v . Hansen,
44 F .R .D . 18 (D.C. 1 9 6 8 ) , remanded on appeal sub nom. Smuck v .
Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. C ir . 1 9 6 9 ) . The Smuck case i s d i s
tin gu ish ab le on se v era l grounds. There, in te rv en tio n on appeal
was perm itted because the school board decided not to appeal. In.
Oklahoma C ity the school board has appealed the disputed August 13
ord er . This s i g n i f i c a n t fa c t may not have come to the a tte n tio n
o f th is Court sin ce the n o tic e o f appeal was f i l e d only three days
b efo re th is C o u rt 's September 15, 1969, d e c i s i o n . In any event,
the le g a l standing o f the Smuck intervenors involved a lim ite d
8
intervenfcion to a sso r t a s p e c i f i c kind, o f le g a l r i g h t : the pro
te c tio n o f the freedom o f action o f the school board. Here, the
V e r ity and Danzie in terven ors a s s e r t a c o n s t i tu t io n a l claim not
to be assigned to sch ools on the b a s is o f race to promote r a c ia l
b ala n ce . We b e l ie v e that th is argument i s w ithout m e rit , and is
indeed so devoid o f substance that the complaint in in te rv en tio n
f a i l s to s t a t e a claim upon which r e l i e f may be granted. In
any event, the same arguments are involved in the phase o f th is
case which is now pending on p e t i t io n fo r c e r t i o r a r i in the
Supreme Court o f the United S t a t e s .
The t r i a l judge has had no opportunity to ru le on whether
the V e r ity and Danzie com plaints in in terven tio n can su rvive a
motion to d ism iss . This C o u rt 's order o f September 15 might be
read as deciding those qu estion s sub s i l e n t i o by assuming the
n e c e s s ity fo r the t r i a l court e n te rta in in g a motion to amend the
August 13, 1969, ord er.
Third, the court did ru le that the in tervenors were not
adequately represented by the McWilliams in te rv en o rs . This f a i l s
to address whether th e ir in te r e s t s are adequately represented by
the school board which has appealed the same order. Representa
tion by the governmental a u th o r it ie s i s considered adequate in
the absence o f gross n eg ligen ce or bad fa i t h on th e ir p a r t . "
3B Moore's Federal P r a c t ic e , pp. 2 4 -1 9 4 . Blocker v . Board o f
Education o f Manhasset, supra; S t . Helena Parish School Board v .
H a l l , supra.
9
II. A Judge o f the Panel Which Decided the Case Was D isqu al
i f i e d under the P rovisions o f 28 U .S .C . §47 Because He
P reviou sly Heard and Decided Issu e s Involved in the
Cause as a Member o f a S ta tu to ry Three-Judge D i s t r i c t
C o u rt.
I t i s r e s p e c t f u l ly submitted that the p re sid in g judge o f the
panel which decided th is case , Chief Judge A. P. Murrah, was
d is q u a l i f i e d to p a r t ic ip a t e by 28 U .S .C . §47 which p ro v id e s :
No judge s h a l l hear or determine an appeal
from the d e c is io n o f a case or issu e tr ie d
by him.
Judge Murrah1s p a r t ic ip a t io n in the 1961-1962 th ree-ju dge
cou rt proceedings i s described in the Statement, supra. The r e l e
vant orders in d ic a t in g the issu es framed fo r t r i a l and the issu es
a c tu a l ly decided are appended h e re to . See p r e t r i a l order o f
January 26, 1962, and order o f July 10, 1962. Quite p la in ly the
f u l l range o f i s s u e s - - t h e case as a whole— was tr ie d b efo re the
three—judge co u rt . Although that court was d ou btfu l o f i t s
ju r i s d ic t io n and u lt im a te ly decided i t had no j u r i s d i c t i o n , i t
expressed a view on the b a s ic m erits o f the case s ta t in g that the
school board was not g u i l t y o f m aintaining an u n c o n s t itu t io n a lly
segregated school system.
A judge who has once heard the cause on the m erits in the
t r i a l court i s d i s q u a l i f i e d from hearing an appeal in the same
cause, which in volves in any degree matters upon which he had
occasion to pass in the lower c o u r t . " (Emphasis added.)
v . D illin gh a m , 174 U .S . 153, 157 (1 8 9 9 ) ; Rexford v . Brunswick-
Balke-C o1lender Co. , 228 U .S . 339 (1 9 1 3 ) ; Wm. Cramp & Sons S. &
E. B. Co. v . In te r n a tio n a l C u rtis Marine Turbine C o ., 228 U .S .
10
645 (1 9 1 3 ) ; American Construction Co. v. J a c k so n v ille T. & K. W.
Railway Co. , 148 U .S . 372, 387 (1 8 9 3 ) ; c f . United S ta te s v .
Emholt, 105 U .S . 414 (1 8 8 2 ) . The t e s t under se c t io n 47 is a
s t r i c t one. Section 47 is "not r e s t r i c t e d to the case o f a
ju d g e 's s i t t i n g on a d ir e c t appeal from h is own d ecree , or upon
a s in g le q u e s t io n ." (Moran, supra, 174 U .S . at 1 5 7 .) "A Judge
who has sa t at the hearing below o f a whole cause at any stage
th ereof i s undoubtedly d i s q u a l i f ie d to s i t in the c i r c u i t court
o f appeals at the hearing o f the whole cause at the same or at
any l a t e r s ta g e " ( i b i d . ) .
The Supreme Court has twice held that even a consent o f the
p a r t ie s cannot make a d i f fe r e n c e and j u s t i f y f a i l u r e to comply
w ith s e c t io n 4 7 . Thus, i t cannot m atter that the o b je c t io n was
not h e re to fo re ra ise d in th is Court. Rexford v . Brunswick-
B alke-C ollen der Co. , 228 U .S . at 344; Wm, Cramp & Sons S. & E.
B. Co. v. In te rn a tio n a l C u rtis Marine Turbine Co. , 228 U .S . a t
650 . In any event, a p p e lle e s ' f a i lu r e to o b je c t i s p e r fe c t ly
understandable in that none o f a p p ellee^ present counsel p a r t i c i
pated in the 1961—62 proceedin gs. One o f a p p e llee s counsel in
that proceeding, John Green, E sq ., became an A s s is ta n t United
S ta te s Attorney (see 219 F. Supp. at 4 2 8 ) , and the other
(Mr. U. S. Tate) i s deceased.
The ru le o f se c t io n 47 is q u ite s t r i c t . But as Mr. J u stic e
Black observed in a d i f f e r e n t , but not unrelated c o n te x t , in
Re Murchison, 349 U .S . 133, 136 (1 9 5 5 ) , such a ru le "may sometimes
]^ar t r i a l by judges who have no actu al b i a s , but the rule helps
11
In any event, the in te n tio ns a t i s f y "th e appearance o f j u s t i c e . "
o f Congress i s to require that the court o f appeals "be c o n s t i
tuted o f judges uncommitted and uninfluenced by having expressed
or formed an opinion in the court o f f i r s t in s t a n c e ." Moran v .
D illin gh a m , 174 U .S . 153, 156 -157 (1 8 9 9 ) . Judge Murrah expressed
a view on the m erits in the July 10, 1962, ord er. Ihe Supreme
Court precedents require a rehearing b efo re a court o f appeals
c o n stitu te d in compliance with se c t io n 47 .
This same qu estion in volv in g se c t io n 47 i s now pending in
the United S ta te s Supreme Court in the p e t i t io n fo r c e r t i o r a r i
seeking review o f th is C o u rt 's d e c is io n o f August 27, 1969,
vacatin g the t r i a l court order o f August 13, 1969.
R e sp e c tfu lly submitted,
JACK GREENBERG
JAMES M. NABRIT, I I I
NO RMAN J . CHACHKIN
10 Columbus C ir c le
New York, New York 10019
JOHN W. WALKER
1820 West 13th S tre e t
L i t t l e Rock, Arkansas 72202
ARCHIBALD B. HILL, JR.
407 North Durland
Oklahoma C ity , Oklahoma 73104
Attorneys fo r A pp ellees Dowell, et a l .
CALVIN W. HENDRICKSON
2401 F ir s t N ational Building
Oklahoma C ity , Oklahoma 73102
Attorney for Appellees Sanger, e t a l .
12
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby c e r t i f y that on the 24th day o f September, 1969,
I served a copy o f the foregoin g P e t it io n fo r Rehearing with
Suggestion fo r Rehearing en banc on attorneys fo r in tervening
d e fe n d a n ts -a p p ella n ts and on
o f same in the United S ta tes
addressed to the fo l lo w in g :
V. P. Crowe, Esq.
George S. Guysi, Esq.
5th F lo o r , 100 Park A ve . Bldg.
Oklahoma C ity , Okla. 73102
George F. Short, Esq.
2401 F ir s t N ational Bldg.
Oklahoma C ity , Okla. 73102
Norman E. Reynolds, Esq.
2808 F ir s t N ational Bldg.
Oklahoma C ity , O kla. 73102
Attorneys fo r McWilliams
Intervenors
J. Harry Johnson, Esq.
2105 F ir s t N ational Bldg.
Oklahoma C ity , Okla. 73102
Attorney for the Board o f
Education o f Oklahoma C ity
Public Schools
defendants by d e p o sitin g a copy
a i r m ail, postage prepaid ,
George L. V e r i ty , Esq.
Brown, V e r ity & Brown
2220 F ir s t N ational Bldg.
Oklahoma C ity , Okla. 73102
Attorney for V e r ity , e t
a l and D anzie, e t a l .
W illiam G. Smith, Esq.
405 In v e sto rs C a p ita l Bldg.
Oklahoma C ity , Okla. 73102
Robert H. Warren, Esq.
325 Robert S. Kerr Ave.
Oklahoma C ity , Okla. 73102
___
James M. N abrit, I I I
Attorney fo r Plain t i f f s - A p p e l le e s
45a
(Filed July 10, 1962)
Obder D issolving T hree-Judge Court
[Title Omitted]
This action was brought by Robert L. Dowell, a minor
child of the negro race by and through his father as next
friend, and as a class action in boliall of all others similarly
situated, against the Board of Education of the Oklahoma
City Public Schools, Independent District No. 89, and the
indi\ iduals; in their capacities as set forth in the caption.
The original and amended complaint of plaintiff, insofar
as this order is concerned, may be considered as setting
forth the same complaints and asking for the same relief.
The amended complaint seeks to strike down all Consti
tutional and statutory provisions of the State of Oklahoma
relating to segregation of the races in the public schools.
Defendants admit, in their answer, that all of these Consti
tutional and statutory provisions are unconstitutional. The
real question posed by the pleadings is the application
by defendants of Section 4-22 of Title 70, Oklahoma Stat
utes Annotated. Plaintiff admits that this section is Con
stitutional on its face, but contends that it is unconstitution
ally applied. Defendants, by their answer, state that all
actions taken by them were under the authority of this
statute only, and that it is not being and has not been
unconstitutionally applied.
The jurisdiction of the Court is invoked pursuant to Title
28 U.S. Code, Section 1343 (3) as a suit in equity authorized
by Title 42 U.S. Code, Section 1983, seeking to redress the
deprivation, under color of law, regulation, custom and
usage, of rights, privileges and immunities secured by the
Order Dissolving Three-Judge Court
46a
due process and equal protection clauses of the United
States Constitution, 14th Amendment, Sec. 1, and rights
protected by Title 42 U.S. Code, Sections 19S1 and 1983.
Plaintiff contended that the subject matter of this action
is cognizable by a statutory three-Judge District Court,
Title 28 U. S. Code, Sections 2281 and 2284, being a civil
action for permanent injunction, and to enjoin and restrain
the enforcement, operation and execution of a State statute.
Under the complaint, seeking the relief above mentioned,
Honorable Luther Bohanon, District Judge for the West
ern, Eastern and Northern Districts of Oklahoma, made the
initial requisite declaration that a substantial Federal ques
tion was involved, notified the Honorable Alfred P. Murrah,
Chief Judge, Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals of the filing
of the case. A three-Judge District Court, comprised of
Chief Judge Murrah, Honorable Fred Daugherty and
Honorable Luther Bohanon, District Judges, was consti
tuted by order of Chief Judge Murrah.
The three-Judge Court as so constituted, heard the evi
dence of all the parties concerned in order that the matter
would not be delayed in the event it was finally determined
that a three-Judge Court had jurisdiction.
Section 4-22 Title 70, Oklahoma Statutes Annotated, au
thorizes Boards of Education “ to designate the schools to
be attended by the children of the District.” The evidence
shows that the plaintiff came from a dependent school dis
trict, where there was no high school, into the defendant
school district, and made his election to attend Douglass
High School. After attending Douglass High School for
one year, he then made an application to be transferred
from Douglass High School to Northeast High School be
cause a course of study offered at Northeast High School
was not available at Douglass High School, and this trans-
Order Dissolving Three-Judge Court
47a
fer was permitted on the condition that the plaintiff enroll
in this course of study and diligently pursue the same.
The plaintiff’s evidence failed to show that the above
mentioned statute is or was unconstitutionally applied by
the defendants.
Under the pleadings and evidence the Court is of the
opinion that there is no justiciable controversy presented
as to any of the constitutional or statutory provisions set
out in the plaintiff’s first amended complaint, and there
remained only for determination the cpiestion relating to
defendant’s application of the above mentioned statute.
There Avas no evidence to show that the unconstitutional
proA’isions of the Oklahoma Constitution and the unconsti
tutional statutes of Oklahoma relating to segregation of
the races in public schools have been used and there is
no controversy Avith respect thereto and nothing to strike
doAvn. Under the pleadings there Avas only the issue as
to defendant’s application of Section 4-22 Title 70, Okla
homa Statutes Annotated. This issue is a factual one and
does not address itself to a three-judge Court.
It further appears from the evidence that there has been
no order made or promulgated by the defendants acting
under the above statute, within the purvieAv of 28 U. S.
Code Section 2281, which the plaintiff presents or points
out to be unconstitutional by discriminating against the
plaintiff and his class by reason of race or color.
It is always the duty of any Court to inquire into its
jurisdiction, and in vieAV of Avhat has been above set forth
this Court holds that it is Avithout jurisdiction, and is of
the opinion that the subject matter of this suit is properly
one for determination by one Judge. The case having
been originally assigned to Honorable Luther Bohanon,
District Judge, it is hereby reassigned to him for further
Order Dissolving Three-Judge Court
46a
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Order Dissolving Tliree-Judge Court
due process and equal protection clauses of the United
States Constitution, 14th Amendment, Sec. 1, and rights
protected by Title 42 U.S. Code, Sections 1981 and 1983.
Plaintifi contended that the subject matter of this action
is cognizable by a statutory three-Judge District Court,
Title 28 U. S. Code, Sections 2281 and 2284, being a civil
action for permanent injunction, and to enjoin and restrain
the enforcement, operation and execution of a State statute.
Under the complaint, seeking the relief above mentioned,
Honorable Luther Bolianon, District Judge for the West
ern, Eastern and Northern Districts of Oklahoma, made the
initial requisite declaration that a substantial Federal ques
tion was involved, notified the Honorable Alfred P. Hurrah,
Chief Judge, Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals of the filing
of the case. A three-Judge District Court, comprised of
Chief Judge Hurrah, Honorable Fred Daugherty and
Honorable Luther Bolianon, District Judges, was consti
tuted by order of Chief Judge Hurrah.
The three-Judge Court as so constituted, heard the evi
dence of all the parties concerned in order that the matter
would not be delayed in the event it was finally determined
that a three-Judge Court had jurisdiction.
Section 4-22 Title 70, Oklahoma Statutes Annotated, au
thorizes Boards of Education “ to designate the schools to
be attended by the children of the District.” The evidence
shows that the plaintiff came from a dependent school dis
trict, where there was no high school, into the defendant
school district, and made his election to attend Douglass
High School. After attending Douglass High School for
one year, he then made an application to be transferred
from Douglass High School to Northeast High School be
cause a course of study offered at Northeast High School
was not available at Douglass High School, and this trans-
' ' - V ' r -r
47a
Order Dissolving Tliree-Judge Court
fer was permitted on the condition that the plaintiff enroll
m this course of study and diligently pursue the same.
Ihe plaintiff’s evidence failed to show that the above
mentioned statute is or was unconstitutionally applied by
the defendants. J
Under the pleadings and evidence the Court is of the
opinion that there is no justiciable controversy presented
as to anj of the constitutional or statutory provisions set
out m the plaintiff’s first amended complaint, and there
remained only for determination the question relating to
pendant’s application of the above mentioned statute.
1 here was no evidence to show that the unconstitutional
provisions of the Oklahoma Constitution and the unconsti
tutional statutes of Oklahoma relating to segregation of
the races in public schools have been used and there is
no controversy with respect thereto and nothing to strike
down Under the pleadings there was only the issue as
to defendant’s application of Section 4-22 Title 70, Okla
homa Statutes Annotated. This issue is a factual one and
does not address itself to a three-Judge Court.
It further appears from the evidence that there has been
no order made or promulgated by the defendants acting
under the above statute, within the purview of 28 U. S.
Code Section 2281, which the plaintiff presents or points
out to be unconstitutional by discriminating against the
plaintiff and his class by reason of race or color.
. 11 is always the ^ t y of any Court to inquire into its
jurisdiction, and m view of what has been above set forth
this Court holds that it is without jurisdiction, and is of
the opinion that the subject matter of this suit is properly
one for determination by one Judge. The case having
been originally assigned to Honorable Luther Bohanon,
District Judge, it is hereby reassigned to him for further
—y HQ Mil IJij ■g ■ \pjgm»I m IMMWTOWi
48a
procedings, and this three-Judge statutory Court is hereby
dissolved.
E ntered this 10 day of July, 19G2.
/ s / A le red P. M urrah
A lfred P. M urrah, Chief Judge,
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
/ s / L uther B ohanon
United States District Judge
/ s / F red Daugherty
United States District Judge
Order Dissolving Three-Judge Court
tiiavifiarwftiiSi •„ • *ltU,w ,1
49a
[Title Omitted]
A dmitted F acts
It is agreed that the defendant, Independent School Dis-
dist • f° ■ +°f ° klahoma County> is an independent school
tl f f nC T ! US UDder thG laWS ° f the State of Oklahoma;
Phi C B thiS aCti° n ° tt0 F - Thompson,Phil C. Bennett, AY illiam F. Lott, Eloise Welch (otherwise
known as Mrs. Warren F. Welch), and Luke F. Skaggs
S ch oll1V ! ° V lu members 0f the Board of the Defendant
School District; that since the filing of this action Foster
Estes has succeeded Luke F. Skaggs, Jr., as member of
said Board and has been by the order of this Court sub-
Jack F P a, def?lldant in the «toad of said Skaggs; that
i t l ' P o 'ker 18 Supermtendent of the Schools of the
Defendant School District and that M. J. Burr is Assistant
Superintendent of such schools.
It is agreed that the plaintiffs are a father and minor
son, citizens of the United States and the State of Okla-
oma, and that they are members of the Negro race; that
minor plaintiff resides with his parents in a school
strict adJoining the Defendant Independent School Dis-
uct Lo. 89 of Oklahoma County (last named school dis-
tnct 89 is mentioned hereinafter as Defendant School Dis-
tu ct ); that the school district of the residence of the plain
tiff does not, but the Defendant School District does offer
coupes of instruction above the 8th grade level; that the
nnnor plmntiff is a pupil of the 10th grade; that the minor
plaintiff made application to the County Superintendent of
ols of Oklahoma County that such minor plaintiff be
ransferred from his home school district to the defendant
school district for the reason that the home district of the
Pretrial Order and Stipulations
50a
minor plaintiff did not offer instruction above the 8th
grade level; that the first of said applications was made for
the school year of 1960-61 Exhibit “1” and that the second
was made to cover the school year of 1961 and 1962; Ex
hibit “ 2” ; that each of said applications was granted by
the County Superintendent of Schools of Oklahoma County
as is evidenced by the copies of such transfers which have
been furnished to and filed with the Clerk of this Court,
which copies are exact copies of the originals of said ap
plications for and grant of such transfers, and that the
same may be introduced in evidence without further identi
fication. That after the granting of said application for the
school year 1960-61 the minor plaintiff entered Douglass
High School, one of the schools of the defendant school dis
trict that is attended solely by pupils of the Negro race.
It is agreed that after the granting of the transfer to
the minor plaintiff for the year 1961-62 that the plaintiffs
made application to the defendant school district for per
mission to attend as a pupil, Northeast High School which
is high school of the defendant school district, located in
an area that is predominately populated by members of
the white race and is attended by both Negroes and white
children.
Thereafter the plaintiffs and their attorney, Mr. Green,
appeared before the Board of Education of the Defendant
School District and after discussion of said request a
minute was made of said meeting, a copy of which minute
has been filed with the Clerk of this Court, and it is stipu
lated that said copy of said minute may be introduced in
evidence without further identification, Exhibit “3” .
It is agreed that the Board of the Defendant School Dis
trict by a unanimous vote adopted on August 1, 1955, the
resolution of desegregation, a copy of which is attached
Pretrial Order and Stipulations
ftyftViBiiiitalii*l > ^ - - ^ j i i ( '1iiirriMif,l < ii. •
Pretrial Order and Stipulations
hereto as Exhibit ”4” , which copy may be introduced in
evidence without further identification.
It is agreed that thereafter the Board of the Defendant
School District adopted a map, a copy of which has been
delivered to the Clerk of the Court, which map showed what
is commonly called attendance areas, that is, it showed the
area of the school district surrounding various schools
and the Board provided that an individual within the at
tendance area of a school be a pupil of and attend the
school of that particular area, Exhibit “5” .
It is agreed that there are now white children of high
school age who live within the Douglass High School at
tendance area that are not attending Douglass High School
and that there are Negro children now attending Douglass
High School who live outside of the Douglass attendance
area.
51a
S tipulation’s
The parties to this action stipulate and agree as to the
following for the purpose of the trial of the issues. Each
party, however, reserves the right to object to the intro
duction of any evidence as to any fact on the ground of
competence, relevancy, or materiality.
1.
It is stipulated and agreed by plaintiff and defendant
that there are no amendments to be made to plaintiff’s
first amended complaint and that there are no amendments
or additions to be made to the defendant’s answer to plain
tiff’s first amended complaint.
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Pretrial Order and Stipulations
2 .
Defendant stipulates and agrees that plaintiff has served
proper live day notice on the Governor of the State of
Oklahoma and the Attorney General of the State of Okla
homa as provided by law for a Three Judge Federal Court
proceeding.
3.
It is stipulated and agreed between plaintiff and defen
dant that this Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter
of this case.
A. The defendant contends as stated in their amended
answer that the plaintiffs are not entitled under the
law and the facts in this case, to have a three Judge
Court convened to hear this matter.
B. Planitilfs contend that the subject of this lawsuit
is cognizable by a statutory three Judge Court and
that a three Judge Court must determine its jurisdic
tion.
• 4.
It is stipulated and agreed by plaintiff and defendant
that the following provisions of the Oklahoma constitution
and the State statutes of the State of Oklahoma as are
now carried on the statute books of the State of Oklahoma,
and being unrepealed, are unconstitutional under the Con
stitution of the United States of America by reason of the
decisions of the Supreme Court in the Brown case of May
17, 1954 and subsequent segregation opinions, to-wit:
(1.) Declare that provision of Section 5, Article I, of
the Constitution of Oklahoma, which reads: “And pro-
**■»!> «* •? f •V’ "wrf ** .r - J y*» *-mmi
53a
vided, further, that this shall not be construed to prevent
the establishment and maintenance of separate schools for
white and colored children,” is unconstitutional and void;
(2.) Declare that Section 3 of Article XIII of the Con
stitution of Oklahoma, which reads:
“Separate schools for white and colored children with
like accommodations shall be provided by the Legislature
and impartially maintained. The term ‘colored children’
as used in this Section, shall be construed to mean children
of African descent. The term ‘white children’ shall include
all other children,” to be unconstitutional and void;
(3.) This provision hereafter treated.
(4.) Declare Section 5-1 of Title 70, Oklahoma Statutes,
Separation of races Impartial facilities. “The public schools
of the State of Oklahoma shall be organized and main
tained upon a complete plan of separation between the
white and colored races with impartial facilities for both
races.” Laws 1949, p. 536, Art. 5, Sec. 1, unconstitutional
and void;
(5.) Declare Section 5-2 of Title 70, Oklahoma Statutes,
definitions. “The term ‘colored,’ as used in the preceding
section, shall be construed to mean all persons of African
descent who possess any quantum of Negro blood, and the
term ‘white’ shall include all other persons. The term
‘public school’ within the meaning of this Article shall in
clude all schools provided for or maintained, in whole or
in part, at public expense.” Laws 1949, p. 536, Art. 5,
Sec. 2, unconstitutional and void;
(6.) Declare Section 5-3, of Title 70, Oklahoma Statutes,
separate school defined—Designation—Membership of dis-
Pretrial Order and Stipulations
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trict board. “ The separate school in each district is hereby
declared to be that school in said school district of the
race having the fewest number of children in said district.
Provided, that the county superintendent of schools shall
have authority to designate what school or schools in the
school district shall be the separate school or schools and
which class of children, either white or colored, shall have
the privilege of attending such separate school or schools
in said school district. Members of the district school
board shall be of the same race as the children who are
entitled to attend the school of the district, not the separate
school.” As amended Laws 1955, p. 423, Sec. 15, uncon
stitutional and void ;
(7.) Declare Section 5-4, of Title 70, Oklahoma Statutes,
teacher permitting child to attend school of other race.
“Any teacher in this state who shall wilfully and know
ingly allow any child of the colored race to attend the
school maintained for the white race shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall
be fined in any sum not less than ten dollars ($10.00)
nor more than fifty dollars ($50.00), and his certificate
shall be cancelled and he shall not have another issued
to him for a term of one (1) year.” Laws 1949, p. 537,
Art. 5, Sec. 4, to be unconstitutional and void;
(8.) Declare Section 5-5, of Title 70, Oklahoma Statutes,
maintaining or operating institution for both races. “ It
shall be unlawful for any person, corporation or associa
tion of persons to maintain or operate any college, school
or institution of this State where persons of both white
and colored races are received as pupils for instruction,
and any person or corporation who shall operate or main
tain any such college, school, or institution in violation
54a
Pretrial Order and Stipulations
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hereof shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon
conviction thereof shall be fined not less than one hundred
dollars ($100.00) nor more than five hundred dollars
($500.00), and each day such school, college or institution
shall be open and maintained shall be deemed a separate
offense.” Laws 1949, p. 537, Art. 5, Sec. 5, to be uncon
stitutional and void;
(9.) Declare Section 5-6, of Title 70, Oklahoma Statutes,
teaching in institution receiving both races. “Any instructor
who shall teach in any school, college or institution where
members of the white and colored race are received and
enrolled as pupils for instruction shall be deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof, shall be
fined in any sum not less than ten dollars ($10.00) nor
more than fifty dollars ($50.00) for each offense, and each
day any instructor shall continue to teach in any such col
lege, school or institution shall be considered a separate
offense.” Laws 1949, p. 537, Art. 5, Sec. 6, to be uncon
stitutional and void;
(10.) Declare Section 5-7, of Title 70, Oklahoma Statutes,
white person attending institution receiving colored pupils.
“It shall be unlawful for any white person to attend any
school, college or institution where colored persons are
received as pupils for instruction, and anyone so offending
shall be fined not less than five dollars ($5.00) nor more
than twenty dollars ($20.00) for each offense, and each
day such person so offends as herein provided shall be
deemed a distinct and separate offense: Provided nothing
in this Article shall be construed as to prevent any private
school, college or institution of learning from maintaining
a separate or distinct branch thereof in a different locality.”
Laws 1949, p. 537, Art. 5, Sec. 7, to be unconstitutional
and void;
Pretrial Order and Stipulations
56a
(11.) Declare Section 5-8, of Title 70, Oklahoma Statutes,
support and maintenance of Separate Schools. “ The annual
budget of each school district maintaining separate schools
for white and colored children shall provide for the sup
port and maintenance of both the school or schools for the
white children and the school or schools for the colored
children.” As amended Laws 1955, p. 423, Sec. 16, to be
unconstitutional and void ;
(12.) Declare Section 5-11, of Title 70, Oklahoma Stat
utes, transfer of pupils. “ When any school district having
both white and colored children of school age does not
maintain schools for both races, the county superintendent
of schools shall transfer the children of the race for which
a school is not maintained to a school of their own color
in another district when the same can be done with the
consent of their parents, guardians or custodians, or with
out such consent when such children can be transferred
without compelling them to walk more than one and one-
half miles to attend such school; provided, that such chil
dren may be required to travel more than one and one-
half (IV2 ) miles when proper provision is made for the
transportation of such children, and the consent of the
parents, guardian or custodian of any child being required
to travel more than one and one-half (IV2 ) miles shall
not be required when such transportation is furnished.” As
amended Laws 1955, p. 424, Sec. 18, to be unconstitutional
and void;
Pretrial Order and Stiimlations
5.
It is further stipulated between plaintiff and defendant
in relation to the foregoing articles of the Oklahoma Con
stitution and sections of the Oklahoma statutes that the
a ysaapy
57a
plaintiff will offer no oral testimony showing a use of the
said Articles of the Oklahoma Constitution and sections of
the Oklahoma state statutes in the operation of defendant
schools.
A. Except plaintiff reservies the right to contend that
the defendants have continued to operate and are
now operating segregated schools under said statutes
or otherwise contrary to the decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States, under said designated
Articles of the Constitution and statutes.
Plaintiffs’ PriuCipaa Issue
(Item 3, Above Referred To)
Oklahoma Statutes, Title 70, Section 4-22 authorizes
Boards of Education in part as follows: “ To designate the
schools to be attended by the children of the district.”
Plaintiffs say the foregoing is unconstitutional as applied
to and used by defendants as to these plaintiffs and as to
members of the class of persons that plaintiffs represent
who are similarly situated because of their race and color.
The defendants’ contention is that the last mentioned
statute is constitutional and that any question that can be
raised in this cause by the plaintiffs as to the application
and use of said statute in this matter is purely factual.
Plaintiffs’ Proof
Plaintiff may offer such proof as he may have showing
a trend of conduct during the preceding five years prior to
September, 1960, establishing the grievance set out in the
complaint, and in this connection, plaintiff will have the
following witnesses:
Pretrial Order and Stipulations
i5-i
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Pretrial Order and Stipulations
A 0klnT' Hign0n’ Superintendent Of Schools, Oiaahoma County;
^ S ch o o l^ ’ ASSIStaUt SuPeri*tendent of Defendant
Nora Belle Oringdorff.
-T. P. Cherry, Oklahoma City;
M. 0. McDaniels, Douglass High School;
P. D. Moon, former Principal, Douglass High School;
Ira D. Hall, Page Elementary School;
rs. Ruby Fleming, "Woodson Elementary School;
B. V. Watkins, Dunbar Elementary School;
William Johnson, Creston Hills Elementary School;
MSchool;y M° Ulder’ PfinCipa1’ Elementary
Delbert Burnett, Culbertson Elementary School;
Mrs. Hazel Kibler, Lincoln Elementary School;
Lederle Scott;
Mrs. Etoise Flenoid, Oklahoma City;
John Flenoid, Oklahoma City;
Gloria Burse.
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Pretrial Order and Stipulations
D efendants’ Proof
Defendants’ conception of the issue in tills cause is not
that set forth by the plaintiffs, but that under the segrega
tion opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States,
the province of this Court is to determine whether or not
the defendants have adopted a plan which is a good faith
attempt to comply with the said decisions on desegregation
as rapidly as possible, all things being considered; and that
by those decisions the local School Board has imposed on
it the duty of devising such a plan, and the contention will
be that the plan adopted by the Defendant District is such
reasonable plan which entitles it to be approved by this
Court, and that all complaints by the plaintiffs are made of
actions honestly and in good faith done under said plan.
Witnesses who may be called to testify in addition to the
defendants are:
Nellie Melton and John C. Pearson, Jr., former mem
bers of the School Board;
and in general personnel employed by the School District,
all of whom, in the belief of the defendants, have been
named as witnesses by the plaintiffs.
T rial D ate
On information from Judge Murrah’s office and Judge
Daugherty’s office that they will be available for April 3,
1962, it is stipulated and agreed by all parties concerned
that the trial of this case will commence on April 3, 1962
at the hour of 9 :30 a.m. and continue thereafter until sub
mitted.
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60a
Pretrial Order and Stipulations
E xhibits
Attached is a map or plat showing Pleasant Hill District
D-45, and attendance area covering Douglass High School
and Northeast High School, which is admitted in evidence
and made a pgrt of this stipulation, being Exhibit “B” .
Dated this 26th day of January, 1962.
L uther B ohanon
Luther Bohanon, U. S. District Judge
A pproved:
John E. Green
For the Plaintiff
W. A. L ybrand
For the Defendant.
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