Stanley v. Darlington County School District Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

    IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

FLORENCE DIVISION

THEODORE WHITMORE STANLEY, et al.. )
)Plaintiffs, )
)and )
)UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)Plaintiff-Intervenor, )
)

v - ) CIVIL ACTION NO.
) 4:62-7749-2DARLINGTON COUNTY SCHOOL )

DISTRICT, et al̂ ., )
)Defendants. )---------)

JOINT PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 

OF PLAINTIFF-INTERVENOR UNITED STATES 
AND PLAINTIFFS STANLEY. ET AL.

r



TABLE OF CONTENTS

£aqe
Citation Form . . . . . . . . . . .  vi

I. BACKGROUND........................................  1

A. The Darlington County School District . . .  1
B. History of School Desegregation Litigation

Against the Darlington County School District . l
1. Case history prior to 1970 . . . . .  1
2. The 1970 desegregation order . . . .  3

3. Case history since the 1970 Order . . .  5

4. Intervention by the United States . . .  7

II. PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT ........................
A. Witnesses ....................................

1. Dr. Terry B. Grier ....................
2. Dr. Betty A. Cox ........................
3. Dr. William M. Gordon . . . . . .
4. Mr. Jimmy Newsom . . . . . . .
5. Mr. Byard Stone, Jr.......................
6. Ms. Valerie Harrison . . . . . .
7. Dr. David J. Armor . . . . . .
8. Dr. Connie Hathorn (Deposition Testimony)
9. Mr. Alvin Heatley (Deposition Testimony)
10. Mr. Jesse Hines (Deposition Testimony)
11. Mr. Ervin Mitchell (Deposition Testimony)

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12
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12. Mr. Richard Puffer (Deposition Testimony)
13. Rev. Samuel Young (Deposition Testimony)

B. The Darlington County School Board
C. The Darlington County School District Has

Stigmatized Mayo High School as an Inferior, 
Black School................................

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14 
14

Bage

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1. Mayo has remained a vestige of segregation. 15
2. The effect of the District's failure

to implement HEW Plan B has been to keep
Mayo isolated as an identifiably black school. 16

3. The Darlington County School District 
stigmatized Mayo by carving out an exception 
to its own attendance zone lines to allow 
white children in the Country Club area
to avoid the Mayo attendance zone. . . . 17

4 .

5.

The Darlington County School District 
has further stigmatized Mayo as the black 
high school by failing to properly enforce 
school attendance zone lines, thereby allowing 
white children who reside in the Mayo 
attendance zone to avoid the school. . . is
a. 1988 - 1991 ....................
b. 1991 - 1994 ....................
The Darlington County School District 
has stigmatized Mayo as an inferior black 
school by providing inferior facilities, 
resources, curriculum and instructional 
quality................................
a. facilities ........................
b. resources ........................
c. curriculum ........................
d. instructional quality . . . .

18
20

21
21
27
28 
30

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D.

E.

Page
The Darlington County School District 
has stigmatized Mayo as the black 
high school through its assignment 
of personnel........................ 31
a. principals • • • • 31
b. faculty • • • • 32
c. classified staff • • • • 33

The Consent Order Entered into by the 
United States, the Private Plaintiffs, and the 
Darlington County School District Promises to Work 
to Eliminate All the Vestiges of Segregation in the District............................
A Desegregation Remedy that Simply Closes the 
Mayo High School Facility Places a Disproportionate 
Share of the Burden of Desegregation on the Black Community................
1.

2.

3 .

4 .

The black community has borne the entire 
burden of the desegregation of the District's secondary schools....................
The District never sought or obtained Court 
approval for closing historically black schools. * * • • • •
Butler Junior/Senior High School could have 
served as the consolidated junior high school 

the Hartsville area, but the District 
instead chose to abandon Butler and spend 
significant sums of money to renovate the 
historically white junior high school for that purpose. • • • • •
The most appropriate manner in which to share 
the burdens of desegregation and to remedy 
the racial stigma suffered by the Mayo 
community is to establish a county—wide, 
dedicated magnet school for grades nine' 
through twelve at the Mayo High School site 
to be named "Mayo School.'» '

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a. The black community must be a full
and equal partner in any desegregation remedy................................

b. The establishment of a dedicated magnet 
at Mayo will remedy the racial stigma 
suffered by the Mayo community.

c. The establishment of a dedicated magnet
at Mayo is necessary to insure that the 
burdens of desegregation are allocated 
fairly................................

d. A dedicated magnet program located 
at a historically black school, when 
properly implemented, can remedy past 
discrimination, further desegregation, 
and serve both the black and white 
communities.

III. PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ................
A. General Principles ........................
B. Reasonableness of the Consent Order
C. Notice to Class Members of the Consent Order 

and the Holding of a Fairness Hearing .
D. The Motion for a New Trial or to Alter or Amend 

the Judgment . . . . . .
E. Appropriateness of a Dedicated Magnet at

Mayo High School ....................
1. The nature of the constitutional violation 

determines the scope of the remedy.
2. The Court, sitting in equity, possesses

broad discretion to fashion appropriate 
desegregation remedies................

^• The Court must fashion a remedy for the 
injury and stigma inflicted on the race 
disfavored by the constitutional violation.

eaqe

38

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39

40

42
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44

46

47 

49

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50 

50

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4. The Court must insure that the burdens 
of desegregation are allocated fairly 
and equitably. . . . . . . . .  51

page

IV. PROPOSED STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF A DEDICATED MAGNET AT MAYO S C H O O L ................ 52

V. CONCLUSION 54

Certificate of Service

Appendix A: United States v. Louisiana. No. 80-3300 (E.D. La.
Sept. 8, 1981) (order approving entry of consent 
decree)
United States v. Louisiana. No. 80-3300 (E.D. La. 
Nov. 30, 1981) (reasons for approving entry of 
consent decree)

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Citation Form

References to transcripts are as follows:
TR I Monday, May 23, 1994
TR II Tuesday, May 24, 1994
TR III Wednesday, May 25, 1994
TR IV Thursday, May 26, 1994
TR V Friday, May 27, 1994
TR VI Tuesday, May 31, 1994
TR VII Wednesday, June 1, 1994
TR VIII Thursday, June 2, 1994
TR IX Friday, June 3, 1994

References to exhibits are as follows:
G EX United States exhibit
D EX Darlington County School District exhibit

vi



I. BACKGROUND
A. The Darlington County School District
The Darlington County School District is located in the 

northeastern part of the State of South Carolina, in the area 
known as the Pee Dee Region.

There are four communities in the county, namely, the City 
of Darlington, which is the county seat; the City of Hartsville; 
the Town of Lamar; and the Town of Society Hill.

According to 1990 census data, the population of Darlington 
County was 61,851. G EX 42 (not admitted into evidence).

In 1993-94 the District operated 24 schools, including two 
high schools with career centers, two high schools, three junior 
high schools, one middle school, and sixteen elementary schools.

The racial composition of the student enrollment in 
Darlington County has remained fairly constant since 1970. In 
1970-71, the total student enrollment was 12,903, of whom 7,044 
(55%) were black and 5,859 (45%) were white; in 1993-94, the 
total student enrollment is 11,710, of whom 6,372 (54%) are black
and 5,294 (45%) are white. (The remaining 44 students are other
ethnic minorities.) G EX 43.

Prior to July 1, 1987, the District was divided into three 
distinct areas. Although there was a superintendent for the 
entire school district, there was an Area Superintendent in each 
of Darlington, Lamar and Hartsville. Each Area Superintendent 
was responsible for the functions that, since July 1, 1987, have 
been handled at the central administration level, including: 
buildings and grounds, budgets, agendas, bus routes, majority-to- 
minority transfers, and enforcement of student attendance zone 
lines. TR V at 57, line 3 - 58, line 13 (Newsom).

B. History of School Desegregation Litigation Against the Darlington County School District
1. Case history prior to 1970

On May 29, 1962, black students in the Darlington County 
School District sued the District for "operating the public 
school system . . . on a racially segregated basis," and for 
"refusfing] to present a plan for desegregating the public 
schools." Complaint at 2, 5 (5/29/62). On July 13, 1964, ten 
years after Brown. this Court found that the District was indeed 
continuing to violate the Constitution by its operation of a dual 
system of education. See Opinion and Order at 6-7 (7/13/64). 
Accordingly, this Court issued an injunction that prohibited the 
District from discriminating on the basis of race, and ordered 
the District to desegregate its school system. From that day 
forward, the District was obligated to come up with a plan that



"promised realistically to work," Green v. Countv Sch. Bd.. 391 
U.S. 430, 439 (1968), and to make sure that, in practice, the 
Plan proved effective in "eliminat[ing] from the public schools 
all vestiges of state imposed segregation." Swann v. Charlotte- 
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.. 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971).

The first plan proposed by the District was a "Free 
Transfer" plan, which was approved by this Court on July 13,
1964. Opinion and Order (7/13/64). Two years later, however, on 
August 25, 1966, this Court vacated the order implementing the 
plan because it found that the plan failed to effectively 
desegregate the school system.1 The Court ordered the District 
to submit another plan. The District submitted plans on January 
27, 1967 and March 10, 1967, each of which was found by this 
Court to be constitutionally defective. See Order at 2 
(3/10/67). Finally, on March 10, 1967, this Court ordered the 
District to implement a "Freedom of Choice" plan. One year 
later, however, this Court found that the "Freedom of Choice" 
plan, though once considered constitutionally valid, did not in 
practice achieve the desegregation requirements articulated by 
the Supreme Court in Green. Order at 1-2 (9/13/68).

The District responded, however, by resubmitting its old 
"Freedom of Choice" plan. On March 31, 1969, this Court again 
declined to find that the plan was sufficiently effective for 
constitutional purposes. Order at 9-10 (3/31/69). This Court 
then ordered the District to work with the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare (HEW) to come up with a new plan. id. If 
the District could not agree on a plan with HEW, the Court said, 
then HEW should submit a constitutional plan for the District on 
its own. Id. In fact, the District refused to accept HEW's 
recommendations, and HEW submitted its own plan on June 2 
1969.2

"It is beyond question that the plan in its present form 
does not, as a matter of law, conform to the directives and 
decisions handed down after the plan was imposed . . . .  The 
Court finds as a fact that in two years of operation the plan has 
not accomplished orderly, significant desegregation of public 
schools." Memorandum Order at 3 (8/25/66).

2The HEW report was entitled "A Desegregation Plan For 
Darlington County Public School District," and contained two 
plans, later referred to as "HEW Plan A" and "HEW Plan B."

Plan B used geographic attendance zone lines to improve the 
racial balance in the schools, whereas Plan A used zone lines and 
pairings of schools to achieve a greater degree of desegregation. 
The Court of Appeals endorsed Plan B only because the Supreme 
Court had not yet handed down its decisions in Swann and Davis v.

(continued...)
2



At a hearing on July 14, 1969, the District rejected the HEW 
report and submitted yet another "Freedom of Choice" Plan. The 
Court, per Judge Martin, approved the District's plan and stated 
that "the School District is operating in good faith to fulfill 
its primary responsibility for abolishing the system of 
segregated schools as required by Brown.11 Order at 4 (7/28/69).

On appeal, however, the Fourth Circuit vacated Judge 
Martin's order, and on January 19, 1970, the Court of Appeals 
ordered the District to implement a desegregation plan based upon 
Plan B of the HEW report, or upon any other plan that would 
create a unitary school system. See Stanley v. Dari incrton County 
Sch. Dist., et al.. 424 F.2d 195, 196-97 (4th Cir.), reh'a 
denied, 424 F.2d 198 (per curiam), cert, denied. 398 TJ.s. qdq (1970) .

2. The 1970 desegregation order
Its previous order having been vacated, this Court 

reconsidered the matter in a hearing on February 3, 1970. 
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's order in Green and the Fourth 
Circuit's immediate order, the District once again submitted a 
Freedom of Choice" plan to this Court. In the alternative, the 
District sought court approval of a version of HEW Plan B "as 
amended and as corrected by the school board." Hearing Tr. at 13

The original, unmodified HEW Plan B was contained in paqes 
48a through 49j of the HEW report. Plan B contained zone maps 
delineating new attendance zones which HEW believed might 
desegregate the schools. Plan B also projected the number of 
black and white students that would attend each school as a result of the new zoning.

At the hearing on February 3, 1970, Judge Martin rejected 
the District's plea for another "Freedom of Choice" plan, and 
indicated his inclination to order implementation of the original 
HEW Plan B. Hearing Tr. at 43, 61. Accordingly, Judge Martin 
asked the District why it had changed HEW Plan B. id. at 61.

2(...continued)
Ipard of .sch. Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33 (1971), which instructed

judges to "'make every effort to achieve the greatest 
possible degree of actual desegregation, taking into account the 
practicalities of the situation.'" Adams v. School Dist. No. 5
4^2 * 4r.T\2d "' 100 (4th cir*) (per curiam) (quoting Davis" 402 U.S. at 37), cert^ denied, 404 U.S. 912 (1971). After Swann and 
givis, Plan B could be adopted only if the defendants proved that 
Plan A was impractical. See Adams. 444 F.2d at 101.

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In response, the District asserted that it had "not changed 
the HEW plan B"; rather, the District claimed that the maps 
submitted to the Court by the District simply superimposed Plan 
B's general lines upon specific streets. See id. at 62-64. 
Moreover, the District claimed that the "corrected" projections 
were simply a more accurate head count of the students within 
each attendance zone. Id. at 62. The plaintiffs, on the other 
hand, pointed out significant changes to the original Plan B zone 
lines, and indicated that the effect of these changes on 
desegregation could not be assessed because the District had not 
provided spot maps to indicate the race of the children in the 
various school zones. Id. at 32-34.

Nevertheless, Judge Martin, believing the District's 
revisions could not be factually evaluated before the Fourth 
Circuit's deadline for a new plan ran out, ordered implementation 
of the District's zoning proposal based on the representations of 
the District's counsel that the District had not changed HEW Plan 
B. See id. at 64-69. Judge Martin emphasized, however, that the 
zone lines submitted by the District were only provisionally 
approved depending on what kind of results the lines produced:
"I just don't want to give the impression that this is the 
finality regardless of what might arise, because it's a 
continuing situation." Id. at 70. From that point until the 
nine-day trial in 1994, this Court at no point was given an 
opportunity to examine whether the zone lines it approved 
actually implemented HEW Plan B.3

Apart from student assignment, this Court's 1970 
desegregation order also contained provisions relating to faculty 
assignment, transportation, curriculum, student activities, 
services, and vocational programs. See Stanley v. Darlington 
County Sch. Dist., et al.. No. 7749, slip op. at 2-3 (D.S.C. Feb. 
5, 1970). In regard to faculty assignment, the order reguired 
that the faculty race ratio at each school be "approximately the 
same as the ratio throughout the system." id. at 3.

When the District reported back to the Court on April 30, 
1970, with the results of the "modified" Plan B, the District's 
own data revealed the following:

(1) Every historically black elementary school 
remained between 80% and 100% black in its student 
enrollment;

Examination of the District's maps, now attached to the 
1970 order, reveal that the revisions submitted by the District 
were significantly different from the HEW Plan B zone lines.

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(2) Every historically black secondary school 
remained between 92% and 99% black in its student 
enrollment;
(3) Nine of the seventeen historically white 
schools remained racially identifiable in its 
student assignment (i . e.. departing from the 
district-wide average by more than 20%)? and
(4) Fifteen of the District's twenty-eight schools 
were out of compliance with the Order's 
requirement that their faculty race ratios be 
approximately the same as the district-wide 
average (i.e.. departing from the district-wide 
average by 10% or more).

See School District Report in Compliance Feb. 5, 1970 Order of 
the Court (filed April 30, 1970).

3. Case history since the 1970 Order
One year after this Court issued its 1970 desegregation 

order for Darlington County, the Supreme Court issued its opinion 
in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.. 402 U.S. 1 
(1971). In Swann, the Supreme Court addressed itself "to the 
problem of defining with more particularity the responsibilities 
of school authorities in desegregating a state-enforced dual 
school system." Id. at 18. The Court recognized that, up to 
that time, district courts "had to improvise and experiment [with 
desegregation remedies] without detailed or specific guidelines." 
IcL_ at 6. This difficulty in developing remedies prior to the 
Supreme Court's directives in Swann is reflected in Judge 
Martin's comments when considering a remedy for Darlington 
County, a year before Swann; "The appellate divisions of the 
federal court have never given we judges on the trial level a 
yardstick so to speak to measure the actions of any board in 
passing on upon that gray area of the law as to what constitutes 
a unitary system." Hearing Tr. at 21 (2/3/70).

In fact, after the Supreme Court articulated the new 
standard for what constituted a constitutionally effective plan 
in Swann and £)avis, the Fourth Circuit ordered all school 
districts awaiting approval of desegregation plans to rewrite 
their plans in accordance with the two decisions.4

" We are now convinced that all of these judgments must be 
vacated, . . . and we must remand to the respective district 
courts with instructions to receive from the respective school 
boards new plans which will give effect to Swann and Davi^ » Adams. 444 F.2d at 100. -----*

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Specifically, the Court of Appeals sought to insure 
implementation of the following principles:

(1) "'The district judge or school authorities 
should make every effort to achieve the greatest 
possible degree of actual desegregation, taking 
into account the practicalities of the 
situation.'" Adams. 444 F.2d at 100 (quoting 
Davis. 402 U.S. at 37);
(2) "The school authorities and the district court 
should consider the use of all techniques for 
desegregation, including pairing or grouping 
schools, noncontiguous attendance zones, 
restructuring of grade levels, and the 
transportation of pupils." Id. at 101; and
(3) "If the district court approves a plan 
achieving less actual desegregation than would be 
achieved under an alternate proposed plan it 
should find facts that are thought to make 
impracticable the achievement of a greater degree 
of integration, especially if there remain any 
schools all or predominantly of one race." id.

Shortly after Swann and Davis were decided, the plaintiffs 
filed a motion for further relief on July 31, 1971, pointing out 
that the 1970 order needed to be examined against the standards 
of effectiveness set forth by the Supreme Court in those two 
cases. Discovery was initiated, but there was never an 
evidentiary hearing to determine whether the plan was 
constitutionally effective. Consequently, this Court never made 
any determination on the merits of the motion, nor did it rule on 
the constitutional adequacy of the 1970 Order —  that is, whether 
it proved to be effective in desegregating the school and 
eliminating all vestiges of the dual system.

Discovery continued on the plaintiffs' Motion for Further 
Relief, and the plaintiffs submitted to the Court a proposed 
desegregation plan on July 22, 1974. A conference was held on 
October 2, 1974, in which Judge Simons issued an oral order 
denying implementation of the plaintiff's proposed order, and 
reiterating that the 1970 Order seemed constitutionally adequate 
on its face. Although requested by the plaintiffs, no 
evidentiary hearing was ever conducted to determine if the 1970 
Order met constitutional standards of effectiveness. in fact in 
the three years that followed, no action was taken by either 
party or the Court, and in 1976 the case was declared inactive.

, case was reactivated on July 6, 1983 by the plaintiff's
motion for further relief. On September 25, 1985, this Court 
allowed the plaintiffs to withdraw the motion. No evidentiary

6



hearing was conducted to determine whether the District was in 
fact complying with the Order, nor was there any evidentiary 
hearing to determine if the Order had proved to be 
constitutionally effective. The Court relied solely upon the 
representations of counsel to find that "it appears that the 
Defendants are not out of compliance of the existing Orders of 
this Court up to the present date."

Subsequently, this Court has made clear that it never 
conducted an evidentiary hearing to determine the District's 
compliance with the Order or the Order's constitutional 
effectiveness. Hearing Tr. at 43 (8/11/92). Referring to the 
1985 order, the Court stated: "I did not have an evidentiary
hearing at that time, and made my ruling primarily, if not all 
together, upon the basis that the plaintiffs stated in open court 
that they could not prove that non-compliance of Judge Martin's 
1970 order existed." Id, at 43; see id. at 16 (no evidentiary 
hearing held).

4. Intervention by the United States
After receiving complaints in 1988 that the Darlington 

County School District was continuing to operate its schools in a 
racially discriminatory manner, the United States Department of 
Justice investigated the District's compliance with federal law. 
After gathering information for over a year, the Department 
concluded that the District had failed in a number of ways to 
comply with its affirmative desegregation obligations. The 
United States brought these violations to the District's 
attention and sought to initiate a discussion on how the District 
could be brought into compliance with federal law.

When the District refused to consider steps to effectively 
desegregate the school system, the United States filed a motion 
for leave to intervene. In its Complaint-In-Intervention, the 
United States requested, among other things, that this Court 
order the defendants "to adopt and implement a plan that will 
eliminate the aforementioned discriminatory practices and fully 
desegregate the public schools of Darlington County." Complaint- 
In-Intervention at 7 (8/15/91). At a hearing on August 15, 1992, 
this Court granted the United States' Motion for Leave to 
Intervene. See Hearing Tr. at 46-47 (8/15/91).

Subsequently, on joint motion of the parties, the Court 
agreed to bifurcate the proceedings into a liability phase and, 
if appropriate, a remedial phase. The Court also granted the 
District's motions to join the State of South Carolina as a 
defendant, pursuant to Rule 19, Fed. R. Civ. P., Order (5/14/93); 
and to amend its Answer (Hearing Tr. at 56 (9/24/93)).

On January 8, 1993, the United States filed a motion for 
summary judgment, which was later joined by the plaintiffs to the

7



fullest extent consistent with the Court's rulings. See 
Plaintiffs' Response to the Plaintiff-Intervenor's Motion for 
Summary Judgment (2/3/93). On January 8, 1993, the defendants 
filed a motion in limine and a motion for partial summary 
judgment, which essentially sought the same relief, namely, a 
judgment barring evidence of the defendants' discriminatory 
practices and non-compliance with federal law prior to September 
27, 1985. On March 30, 1993, the United States filed a 
supplemental memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment.

At a hearing on September 24, 1993, the Court denied the 
parties' motions and scheduled the case for trial. In so doing 
the Court addressed the District's assertions that the Court had 
previously found it to have complied with the February 5, 1970 
desegregation plan:

. . . . Let's seize on that statement so there 
won't be any misunderstanding. Nobody has ever 
found that this plan has been complied with.
Nobody. I haven't. Judge Simons hasn't. Judge 
Martin hasn't. Nobody has. Nobody has ever asked 
to do that. The plaintiffs have raised that issue 
on several occasions, and defaulted, withdrawn the 
issue, whatever, but no court that I've been able 
to find has ever factually determined that the 
plan has been complied with, and I don't think you 
can show me where they have. . . . There's never 
been any finding of fact made, period, since the order was signed.

Hearing Tr. at 34-35 (9/24/93).
Shortly before the case was to go to trial in April 1994 

the trial was rescheduled to begin on May 23, 1994. Pre-trial 
hearings were held on April 12 and April 29, 1994. At the latter 
hearing, the Court: (1) ordered that the liability and remedial
issues be consolidated into a single trial; (2) granted the 
United States' motion to preclude the District from introducing 
evidence and testimony, including results of a public opinion 
survey commissioned by the District, purporting to show that 
further desegregation measures at racially identifiable schools 
would be impractical or infeasible because of resulting "white 
flight" from the District;5 and (3) ruled that the prior rulings

/Evidence purporting to show "white flight" can be 
considered by a school district, not under a desegregation order 
that is trying to voluntarily maximize racial balance, see 
Riddick v.— School Bd. of Norfolk. 784 F.2d 521, 539-40 (4th 
Cir.), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986); and it can be

(continued...)
8



of the Court did not preclude a full evidentiary hearing on the 
District's activities from 1970 through the present.

Meanwhile, the parties (except for the State Defendants) had 
entered into serious negotiations in an effort to settle all or 
some of the issues in the case. Ultimately, the United States, 
Plaintiffs Stanley, et al,. and the Darlington County School 
District were able to agree on a proposed consent order, which 
was submitted to the Court for consideration on May 23, 1994.
Left unresolved, however, was the fate of the last remaining 
historically black high school in Darlington County, Mayo, which, 
along with the question of State liability, was presented to the 
Court.

A full evidentiary trial on these two issues, and a fairness 
hearing on the proposed consent order, was held over the course 
of nine days from May 23 - June 3, 1994.

II. PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 
A. Witnesses

1. Dr. Terry B. Grier
Dr. Terry B. Grier was superintendent of the Darlington 

County School District from about July 1, 1988 through April 1, 
1991. A native of North Carolina, he holds a B.S. degree and two 
Master's degrees from East Carolina State University, and a 
Doctorate in school administration from Vanderbilt University.
He has served as a teacher, assistant principal and principal in 
various districts, and has served as superintendent in McDowell 
County, North Carolina; Amarillo, Texas; Darlington County; the 
33,000-student Akron, Ohio school district; and was recently 
named superintendent of the 50,000-student Sacramento Unified 
School District, in California. TR I at 108, line 25 - 109, line 
18; 186, lines 2-6; 186, lines 7-8; TR II at 51, lines 11-13. 5

5(...continued)
considered by a court when choosing between constitutionally 
permissible desegregation plans where each plan would desegregate 
every racially identifiable school to the extent practicable.
See Stell v. Savannah-Chatham Countv Bd. of Educ.. 888 F.2d 82, 
84-85, reh'q and reh'q en banc denied. 891 F.2d 907 (11th cir.' 
1989). But the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit have made 
clear that evidence purporting to show "white flight" is not 
relevant to the question of whether further desegregation 
measures are practicable or feasible at schools that remain 
racially identifiable in a former de jure system. See United 
States v. Scotland Neck Bd. of Educ.. 407 U.S. 484, 491 (1971); 
Riddick. 784 F.2d at 539.

9



Dr. Grier has received a number of awards and recognitions, 
including being named by Executive Educator Magazine as one of 
the country's top 100 school administrators, and he has served on 
a number of professional boards and committees. He has made 
presentations at national education conferences, has served as a 
consultant for school districts around the country, and is the 
author of over 33 articles published in national and state 
educational journals. TR I at 109, line 19 - 111, line 6.

When Dr. Grier arrived in Darlington County in 1988, the 
District had neither long-range facility and maintenance plans 
nor a long-range plan for school improvement. The development of 
such plans was among Dr. Grier's goals, as was working with the 
community to garner support for the public schools. TR I at ill 
lines 10-17; 112, lines 2-12.

Dr. Grier's efforts resulted in, among other things, "A 
Curriculum Audit of the Darlington County Public Schools, 
Darlington, South Carolina" (conducted December 12 -16, 1988) (G 
EX 45); Dr. John H. Tunstall's "Educational Facility Master Plan 
Study for Darlington, South Carolina" (July 1989) (G EX 46); and 
the "Darlington County School District Strategic Plan 1990 - 1995" (G EX 20).

In an effort to work with the community, Dr. Grier met on a 
regular basis with a variety of civic and community 
organizations, including ministerial groups, the Darlington 
County Task Force, school P.T.A.s, and members of the news media. 
During his third year in Darlington County, the District won 23 
awards from the National School Public Relations Association for 
efforts to communicate and work with the public. The year after 
Dr. Grier left Darlington County, the District received the South 
Carolina School Public Relations Association award for the 
State's outstanding school public relations effort. TR 112 line 13 - 113, line 12.

2. Dr. Betty A. Cox
Dr. Betty A. Cox was superintendent of the Darlington County 

School District from about July 1, 1991 through March 1, 1994. a 
native of Tennessee, she holds a B.S. degree and a Master's 
degree from the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga and a 
Doctorate in educational administration from the University of 
Tennessee at Knoxville. She has served as a teacher, assistant 
principal, principal, and has served as superintendent in 
Towanda, Pennsylvania; Darlington County; and, as of March 1994 
superintendent of the 26,000-student Rapides Parish School 
District, in Louisiana. TR II at 120, line 24 - 122 line 2- 122, lines 10-22.

During her tenure in Darlington County, Dr. Cox met on a 
regular basis with parents' groups, P.T.O.'s and P.T.A.'s,

10



various civic and community groups, and countless individual 
parents to discuss concerns about the schools. TR II at 138 lines 1-20 (Cox). '

3. Dr. William M. Gordon
Dr. William M. Gordon was accepted by the Court as an expert 

in school desegregation. Dr. Gordon, a native of South Carolina, 
is Professor of Educational Leadership at Wright State University 
in Dayton, Ohio, where he teaches graduate level courses in 
school administration, school supervision, school law, and 
curriculum. Dr. Gordon holds a B.A. in Finance and Banking and a 
Master's degree in Remedial and Diagnostic Education, both from 
Miami University in Oxford, Ohio. Dr. Gordon also holds a 
Doctorate in Secondary School Education, Curriculum and 
Administration from Indiana University, as well as a J.D. from 
the University of South Carolina, and he is admitted to practice 
law m  South Carolina. Dr. Gordon has published many scholarly 
works on school desegregation, and has prepared more than seventy 
school desegregation plans since he began his work as a 
desegregation expert in 1967. Dr. Gordon has been qualified as 
an expert in school desegregation by federal courts in more than 
flftY cases, and has appeared in federal court to offer expert 
testimony on desegregation issues on several hundred occasions.G EX 68; TR III at 97-104.

4. Mr. Jimmy Newsom
Mr. Jimmy Newsom has been superintendent of the Darlington 

County School District since March 2, 1994. He holds a B.S. 
degree from Appalachian State University, and a Master's degree 
and an Educational Specialist degree from East Tennessee State 
University. He has worked continuously for the District since 
1960, serving as teacher and coach (1960-67); Principal, Lamar 
Elementary School (1967-75); Principal, Lamar High School (1975- 
77); Area Superintendent, Lamar Area (1977-84); Area 
Superintendent, Lamar and Hartsville Areas (1984-87); Deputy 
Superintendent (1987-94); Interim Superintendent (fall 1987 - 
June 30, 1988). TR V at 53, line 7 - 54, line 19.

At a Board meeting in February 1994, Mr. Newsom was 
appointed to serve as interim superintendent until June 30 1994
and was given a three-year contract to serve as superintendent 
beginning July 1, 1994. Neither position was publicly noticed or 
advertised. TR V at 142, line 14 - 143, line 6 (Newsom).

Prior to his becoming Deputy Superintendent in July 1987 
Mr. Newsom played no role in and would have had no specific ' 
knowledge of: the assignment of principals, faculty and staff in
the Darlington Area; the enforcement of attendance zone lines in 
the Darlington Area; any efforts to insure that white high school 
students residing in the Mayo attendance zone attended that

11



school; the curriculum offered at Mayo High School; or the 
facilities at Mayo. TR V at 119, line 8 - 122, line 18 (Newsom).

5. Mr. Byard Stone, Jr.
Mr. Stone is currently the District's Assistant 

Superintendent for Operations, a position he has held since 1991. 
He holds a B.S. from Clemson University and a Master's degree and 
an Educational Specialist degree from the University of South 
Carolina. He has worked continuously for the Darlington County 
School District since 1975, serving as Assistant to the Area 
Superintendent in charge of federal programs and finance (1975- 
76); Assistant Area Superintendent for Finance and Personnel 
(1976-80); District-wide Director of Federal Programs (1980-82); 
Assistant to the District Superintendent (1982-87); and Assistant 
Superintendent for Finance and Operations (1987-91). TR V at 
169, lines 1-25.

Prior to assuming his duties as Assistant Superintendent for 
Finance and Operations in 1987, Mr. Stone had no primary role in 
the day-to-day maintenance of schools, and he would not have been 
directly familiar with the resources or curriculum offered at 
Mayo as compared with St. John's High School. TR VII at 45, line 
23 - 46, line 1; 46, line 17 - 47, line 6 (Stone).

6. Ms. Valerie Harrison
Ms. Harrison is currently the District's interim Assistant 

Superintendent for Curriculum and Instruction, a position she has 
held since April 1994. She holds a B.A . and a Master's degree 
from South Carolina State University, and a "Master's plus 30 
certification" from the State Department of Education through 
courses at the University of South Carolina. She has worked 
continuously for the Darlington County School District since 
1981, serving as a teacher at Rosenwald and St. John's High 
Schools (1981-89), Chapter One Parent Coordinator, Curriculum 
Development Coordinator, and Secondary Coordinator. TR VIII at 
77, line 18 - 78, line 24; D EX 100.

Ms. Harrison would have had no personal knowledge of the 
curriculum, resources, equipment, textbooks and reference 
materials offered and available at Mayo High School from 1981 
through 1989. TR VIII at 88, lines 3-23.

Ms. Harrison was promoted to the District administration by 
Dr. Grier. TR VIII at 88, line 24 - 89, line 1.

7. Dr. David J. Armor
The District relied upon the testimony of its consultant,

Dr. David Armor. Dr. Armor is a sociologist who has served as a 
consultant for many school districts involved in desegregation

12



litigation. He holds a Bachelor's Degree in Mathematics and 
Sociology from the University of California, and a Ph.D. in 
Sociology from Harvard University. TR VI at 42, lines 9-25; 173, 
lines 5-22; 174, lines 17-20.

8. Dr. Connie Hathorn (Deposition Testimony)
Dr. Hathorn was principal of Mayo High School from 1989 to 

1991. He holds a B.S. from Arkansas A&M, a Master's degree from 
the University of Arkansas at Fayetteville, and a Doctorate from 
Iowa State University. Hathorn Dep. at 5, line 9 - 8 ,  line 24 
(7/15/92).

9. Mr. Alvin Heatley (Deposition Testimony)
Mr. Heatley was employed by the Darlington County School 

District from 1964 to 1991, serving as the Executive Director for 
Elementary Education (1989-91); Principal, Rosenwald Elementary 
School (1987-89); teacher and coach, Hartsville High School 
(1981-87); teacher and coach, Butler High School (1977-81); 
teacher and coach, Hartsville Junior High School (1976-77); and 
teacher and coach, Rosenwald High School (1964-76). Mr. Heatley 
attended the Darlington County public schools and was graduated 
from Butler High School in 1956. He holds a B.A . from South 
Carolina State College and a Master's degree from Winthrop 
College. He also has completed further studies at South Carolina 
State College and Winthrop College. Heatley Dep. at 5, line 5 - 
7, line 3 (7/16/92).

10. Mr. Jesse Hines (Deposition Testimony)
Mr. Hines was a member of the Darlington County School Board 

from 1991 to 1992. He holds a B.S. degree and a Master's degree 
from South Carolina State University, and an Educational 
Specialist degree from the University of South Carolina. Hines 
Dep. (vol. I) at 5, lines 10-18; 6, lines 3-8 (11/10/92).

11. Mr. Ervin Mitchell (Deposition Testimony)
Mr. Mitchell was principal of Mayo High School in 1992. He 

holds a Bachelor's degree from Florida A&M University, a Master's 
degree from the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, an 
Educational Specialist degree from the University of Tennessee at 
Knoxville and, at the time of his deposition, was expecting to 
receive a Doctorate from Vanderbilt University. Mitchell Dep. at 
6, line 25 - 9, line 1 (11/16/92).

12. Mr. Richard Puffer (Deposition Testimony)
Mr. Puffer has been a member of the Darlington County School 

Board since 1984, and he currently serves as Chairman. He holds 
a Bachelor's degree from the State University of New York at

13



Portland and a Master's degree from 
Carolina. Puffer Dep. at 3, lines 
(6/3/92) .

the University 
14-22; 4, lines

of South 
10-23

13. Rev. Samuel Young (Deposition Testimony)
Rev. Young has been a member of the Darlington County School 

oard since 1978. He holds a Bachelor's degree from Morris 
College. Young Dep. at 6, lines 18-24 (4/22/92)

B. The Darlington County School Board
The Darlington County School Board consists of twelve 

members, who are elected from single-member districts. TR III at 8, lines 9-13 (Cox).

- T1?e of the Darlington County School Board are setforth in the Board Policy Manual, Darlington County School District" (G EX 19).

. , ^Thf School Board is responsible for setting the policies of 
he District; the superintendent, who works at the pleasure of 
the Board is charged with carrying out these policies and making 
recommendations to the Board. TR I at 113, lines 15-22 (Grier); TR II at 122, lines 13-22 (Cox).

The School Board has sole authority for transferring and 
assigning pupils. G EX 19 at § ABB, C.4; TR II at 125 lines 13- 
I7 (Cox); TR V at 151, lines 7-10 (Newsom). '

The School Board has ultimate authority in the District for 
15-18°(Cox)1 °f SCh°01 attendance zone lines. TR II at 144, lines

. . The School Board has ultimate authority in the District for
hiring, assigning and dismissing all personnel, including 
principals, faculty and staff. TR I at 113, line 18 - ??4 iinP
7 (Grier); TR II at 122, line 23 - 123, lini 4 ; 124, liji i4 -
125, line 6; 190, line 24 - 191, line 11 (Cox); TR V at 151 
lines 11-19 (Newsom); G EX 19 at § GBC-R. '

The School Board has ultimate authority in the District for
authorizing school construction. TR I at 114 lines 8-1n 
(Grier); TR II at 122, line 23 - 123, line 4
. The School Board has ultimate authority in the District for 

maintaining and upgrading the District's facilities since no 
money can be spent unless approved by the Board ?r I a? l?4
lines n-17; 115, linen 2-4 (Grier); TR II at 122, line 23 - i23 line 4; 147, lines 21-23 (Cox). 123'

14



The School Board has ultimate authority for the allocation 
of resources throughout the District. TR I at 114, line 24 - 
115, line 1 (Grier); TR II at 122, line 23 - 123, line 4 (Cox).

The School Board is responsible for choosing the curriculum 
offered at each school in the District. The School Board has 
ultimate authority in insuring the uniformity of curriculum 
throughout the District. TR I at 191, lines 6-9; 191, line 19 - 
192, line 5 (Grier); TR II at 122, line 23 - 123, line 4 (Cox).

Unlike many school boards, the Darlington County School 
Board enjoys fiscal autonomy, in that it can simply vote to raise 
the millage, i.e.. property taxes in the county. TR I at 175, 
lines 21-24; 176, lines 12-21 (Grier); TR V at 156, lines 1-14 
(Newsom).

C. The Darlington County School District Has Stigmatized Mayo High School as an Inferior, Black School.
The evidence shows that, through action and inaction, the 

Darlington County School District has over many years stigmatized 
Mayo High School as an inferior black school. Dr. Gordon 
testified that the history of the District's treatment of Mayo 
High School revealed that the District had taken affirmative 
steps to maintain Mayo as a racially identifiable black school 
with inferior facilities, resources and curriculum. TR III at 
181, lines 15-23; 187, lines 13-19 (Gordon).

Nothing prevented the School Board from providing Mayo 
students what it provided students at the other three high 
schools: properly maintained facilities, quality instruction,
and equal educational opportunities in terms of curriculum. TR 
II at 214, line 21 - 215, line 1 (Cox).

1. Mayo has remained a vestige of segregation.
In the Consent Order signed by the parties and entered by 

the Court on June 3, 1994, the parties stipulated that "the 
D^xiiugton County School District has not fully complied with the 
desegregation order and federal law in this case, and that 
vestiges of the prior dual system remain in the Darlington County 
School District." Consent Order at 2 (6/3/94).

The parties further stipulated that Mayo High School is one 
of eleven racially identifiable schools in the District that 
remains as a vestige of the prior dual system and is in need of 
remedial measures. Consent Order at 2 (6/3/94).

Mayo High School, which was designated for black children in 
the days of legalized segregation, has never lost its racial 
identifiability. A review of the student enrollment figures for 
each year from 1970 through 1993-94 shows that Mayo's racial

15



identifiability has remained constant since 1970. In other 
words, the link between the dual system and the current disparity 
has never been broken. G EX 43.

Even though concerns about racially identifiable schools and 
recommendations to further desegregate the District's schools, 
including Mayo, were expressed to the School Board by Dr. Grier, 
Dr. Cox, the Curriculum Auditors and the Southern Association of 
Colleges and Schools, the School Board refused to take any 
action. Dr. Grier was told by one white board member that the 
community was not ready for integration and that that would never 
happen in their lifetime. TR I at 166, line 8 - 169, line 4;
206, lines 18-23 (Grier); G EX 45 (Curriculum Audit) at 59-62; G 
EX 47 (SACS Report) at § IV.

While the School Board implemented strategies to address 
many of the recommendations contained in the audit, the Board did 
nothing to address the auditors' discussion about integrating the 
schools, including Mayo. TR V at 138, line 19 - 142, line 6 (Newsom).

A Strategic Plan developed by Darlington citizens and led by 
School Board members called for the pairing of historically white 
and black schools, including St. John's High and Mayo High, to 
assure curricular equity and accessibility. The Board, however, 
refused to implement any of these proposals, and instructed Dr.' 
Grier and his staff not to take any steps to implement them or 
redraw attendance zone lines. TR II at 21, line 19 - 23 line 18 (Grier); G EX 20.

Dr. Grier also contacted Dr. Larry Winecoff, a school 
desegregation expert, to study the possibility of pairing schools 
or redrawing attendance zone lines to further desegregation. The 
Board thereupon voted to instruct Dr. Grier and his staff not to 
pursue this matter further with Dr. Winecoff. TR I at 167 lines 
14-23; TR II at 24, lines 1—5 (Grier).

The defendants' own witness, Superintendent Jimmy Newsom, 
testified that even though steps could have been taken to further 
desegregate Mayo High School, the Board has not chosen to take 
such action. TR V at 152, lines 3-8.

2. The effect of the District's failure to implement 
HEW Plan B has been to keep Mayo isolated as an identifiably black school.

The District took affirmative steps to maintain Mayo as a 
racially identifiable black school by failing to assign white 
students to the school. First, the District failed to implement 
the secondary school attendance zone line of HEW Plan B, which 
would have assigned one historically white elementary school 
(Pate) and one historically black elementary school (Brockington)

16



to the Mayo High School feeder pattern. Instead, the District 
implemented an attendance zone line that assigned the three 
historically white elementary schools (Pate, Spring and St 
John's) to the historically white St. John's High School feeder 
pattern, and assigned the two historically black elementary 
schools (Brockington and Cain) to the historically black Mayo 
High School._ According to Dr. Gordon, the zone lines substituted 
by the District for the HEW Plan B zone lines maintained Mayo as 
a racially identifiable black school and sent a message to the 
community that Mayo "is the black school. [The] school for black 
children." Dr. Gordon concluded that the District's practice of 
maintaining Mayo as a racially identifiable school stigmatized 
the school, regardless of the pride the Mayo students and 
community take in the school. As Dr. Gordon pointed out, even in 
the days of de lure segregation, black citizens took pride in 
t^®^‘r .s5:h°?ls Regardless of the stigma inflicted upon them by 
official discrimination. G EX 4 at 48 (a)-48 (j); G EX 14; TR tit 

„14?! line 23 - 152, line 25; 154, lines 2-15; 163, line 24 -
3; 167' lines 5-13; 181, lines 11-23; 209, line 15 - 210, line 23 (Gordon).
3. The Darlington County School District stigmatized Mayo by carving out an exception to its own 

attendance zone lines to allow white children in 
the Country Club area to avoid the Mayo attendance zone.

The 1970 Court Order requires that students attend school 
according to the "geographic zon[e]" in which their "residence" 
^.Q°ca^?d- Stanley v. Darlington County Sch. Dist.. at ai No 7749, slip op. at 2, 1 I (D.S.C. Feb. 5, 1 9 7 0 ) . -------

c . ^c^ordin? to its own Policy manual, the Darlington County 
pSpUs. T ex ?9 af! §^hority for transferring and assigning

An examination of the District's attendance zone map shows 
unequivocally that the "residences" of students living in the 
Darlington Country Club" area are located in the attendance 
zones of historically and identifiably black schools (i.e., Mayo

GafY and Cain>- G EX 17/ 18, 18a, 18b; TR I at llTTline 21 - 134, line 16; 136, lines 10-15 (Grier).

of f J heJ 0li°Wing streets ali lie on the Mayo-B.A.Gary-Cain side 
f L f t h P ? nKe.ZOue boundary, which separates these schools from the St. John s High-Brunson-Dargan-Spring school zones- 
Ervins Pasture Road, Tee Circle, Fairway DrivS, Green Drite
woo^S of C°unJry club Road, Arapaho Circle, Roanoke Drive, Woodcreek Road, Wyandot Street, Shoshone Drive, Nez Perce Road
-ni 3 5 ^ U n f l S^rier).G EX ” ’ 18a' 18b; TR 1 at 134' line'l7

17



The students who reside on these streets are, however, 
assigned to St. John's High, Brunson-Dargan and Spring schools.
G EX 18 ("Access and exit to Darlington Country Club provides 
attendance to St. John's High, Brunson-Dargan Junior High, and 
Spring Elementary, per previous determination."); TR I at 137, 
lines 2-4 (Grier) .

The residents of the "Country Club" area are white. TR I at 
136, line 18 - 137, line 1 (Grier).

On several occasions, Dr. Grier discussed with District 
officials the possibility of changing the assignment of students 
residing in the Country Club area, but was told not to pursue the 
matter further because of the political liability of doing so.
TR I at 138, line 21 - 139, line 23 (Grier).

If the students living in the "Country Club" area attended 
the schools that, based on the location of their "residences" 
they ought to have attended, further desegregation at the 
racially identifiable black schools (Mayo, B.A . Gary and Cain) 
would have been achieved. TR I at 139, line 24 - 140, line 6 
(Grier).

A review of the record of this case, including the earlier 
court transcripts and orders of this Court, reveals that the 
School Board never sought and, therefore, never received, 
approval from this Court to grant a special attendance zone 
dispensation to the "Country Club" area citizens.

Dr. Gordon testified that Mayo High School was stigmatized 
as an inferior black school by the District's deliberate 
assignment of the white children in the "Country Club" area to 
St. John's High School —  even though those students clearly 
resided within the Mayo High School zone. G EX 17; TR III at 
182, line 15 - 183, line 15.

The District therefore undermined desegregation of the 
Darlington County schools and perpetuated the stigma of 
inferiority on Mayo High School by assigning the "Country Club" 
area students to the historically white schools outside their 
attendance zone.

4. The Darlington County School District has further stigmatized Mayo as the black high school by 
failing to properly enforce school attendance zone 
lines, thereby allowing white children who reside in the Mayo attendance zone to avoid the school.
a. 1988 - 1991

Dr. Grier testified that, based on his observations and 
experiences, when he arrived in the District in 1988 the District

18



was not properly enforcing the school attendance zone lines. TR 
I at 116, lines 13-22.

Dr. Grier testified that enforcement of the attendance zone 
lines had not been a priority when he arrived in the District.
He characterized enforcement as "loose," and there had been no 
procedures in place to monitor compliance. TR I at 123, line 20 
- 124, line 17.

Dr. Grier personally investigated issues relating to zone 
line compliance, including meeting with parents and school 
officials, reviewing permanent records, and driving through 
neighborhoods and visiting alleged residences. Based on his 
personal investigations and observations, Dr. Grier concluded 
that when he first came to the District, the problem of students 
attending schools not within their proper zones was "widespread." 
TR I at 124, line 18 - 125, line 19.

Based on his personal investigations and observations, Dr. 
Grier concluded that the predominant race of those attending 
schools not within their proper zones was white, and the schools 
these individuals sought to avoid were the historically black 
schools, including Mayo High School. TR I at 125, line 20 - 126, 
line 11; TR II at 21, lines 2-6.

Dr. Grier had many discussions with District officials about 
students attending schools not within their proper zones, 
including Deputy Superintendent Jimmy Newsom; Assistant 
Superintendent Byard Stone; Transportation Coordinator Willie 
Boyd; Board members Edward Hursey, Tommy Jeffords, Thelma Dawson, 
Jack Ham, Alex Stanton, William Howell and Hardin Evans; a number 
of principals, including Frank Bouknight and Connie Hathorn; and 
other school officials. TR I at 128, line 16 - 129, line 10.

Based on these discussions, Dr. Grier understood that white 
students sought to avoid schools like Mayo, in part, because of 
the perception that the schools were inferior in terms of 
facilities and curriculum. TR I at 129, lines 11-22.

Prior to Dr. Grier's arrival in the District, it is unclear 
whether any District official was responsible for insuring that 
the District's attendance zone lines were enforced. Dr. Grier 
filled this vacuum in 1988 by making Deputy Superintendent Jimmy 
Newsom specifically responsible for enforcing attendance zone 
lines. TR II at 90, lines 10-25 (Grier); TR V at 123, lines 13- 24 (Newsom).

During his tenure as superintendent, Dr. Grier instituted 
procedures to enforce the attendance zone lines, including 
requiring parents to fill out verification forms and present 
proof of residence (e.g., a utility bill). TR II at 91, lines

19



qt_1Z ^Gr:'-er) ' TR v at 122» line 19 - 123, line 4 (Newsom); D EX 3t 3 •
b. 1991 - 1994

Dr* C°X t?stified that, upon arriving in the District in 1991, she received a number of complaints about students 
attending schools outside of the attendance zones in which thev 
resided. TR II at 125, lines 20-25? 126, line 25 - 127, line 2 ̂LUX j •

Early in her tenure as superintendent, Dr. Cox brought 
complaints about zone line violations to Deputy Superintendent 
Jimmy Newsom for a determination. Later on, however, as Dr. Cox 
received more complaints and investigated the matters personally 
she concluded that there were, in fact, students attending
TRhTT1^°??Q°f1■°ne that Mr* Newsom was not doing anything about. TR II at 129, lines 10-25 (Cox).

Dr. Cox testified that she personally knows of students in 
two predominantly white subdivisions in the Mayo attendance zone 

Palmetto Shores and Dewitt Acres —  who are attending public 
schools in Florence. TR II at 131, line 11 - 132, line 25- 135 line 16 - 137, line 14 (Cox); G EX 18(b). '

?r* ?OX hestified that the "instability" at Mayo High 
chool, with its frequent turnover of principals during the past 
several years, has contributed to the District's inability to 
enforce the Mayo attendance zone lines. TR II at 134, lines 2-18\ j •

Dr. Cox testified that she had had numerous discussions with 
parents, citizens and community groups about the refusal of white 
citizens m  the Mayo attendance zone to send their children to 
Mayo. TR II at 140, line 19 - 141, line 2.

?r* C°x testified that, during her nearly three years as 
penntendent, she provided Mr. Newsom numerous names of

Save ?he May? attendance but not attending
(Cox) TR 111 1 25’ llnes 18_20; 26' lines 18-24; 29, lines 1-7

Mf: News°m admitted that he has received many complaints and 
allegations about students not attending schools in the
f H en??nCe zones in which they reside. TR V at 68, lines 16-21- 126, lines 7-9; TR VII at 10, line 25 - 16, line l'(Newsom); G EX

-BaZed hfr nearly three years as superintendent of the i^gton County School District, Dr. Cox concluded that the 
Mayo attendance zone lines were neither "consistently" nor 
"aggressively" enforced. TR II at 144, lines 5-14 (Cox)?

20



5. The Darlington County School District has
^ i ^ - 1Zed 5ay° aS an inferior black school by providing inferior facilities, resources, Y curriculum and instructional quality.

Darlington °Su£ty UP°n arrivin<? inSsr
SStgp-pS r & S 5? « ' a.Dust that sad. I saw it firsthand." TR I at 130, liles 4-13?

Mr. Mitchell testified that, compared with St Tnhn ie «
SMT'SirSiS.TiJf"1"  schOD1- »“*>£?.£: T ^ t:  KJS.
as an^inferior b?ack' has stigmatized Mayo
maintenance, a poor physical annaaV1 lng bhe sch°o1 with inferior 
materials, inferior grounds jS?,.,.fanCe' lnadei3uate instructional 
facilities. BaJed on hiS ?;u^ of the £ 0? ? ^ "  a"d substandard

According ^  - ' ^ S i a U yir“iesnĉsii;?L":nviE?a-rovided
hto “ ss .High School, Mayo offered an comPared Wlth St. John's

o ^ t h I i ? f in s ? r S c W o ia ? a^ y ? aU™ n? I H ?

a« facilities

and v ? i i t e d X o ? S^ fsJw ^ocLrs^ith C?”e t0 the District

bathrooms; a new science wina devoid o-f kh ^ the
and other laboratory materials- teanhor.bUbffa burners, beakers 
desks during a c a d e m i c behlnd 
hallways. This all contralted ItaJklJ Sf?h fu an?!ring the
testimony ^ l o ^ t s T ^ t ^  “ *
c o n d i t i o L  o f  t h e  S y o ^ T ^ ^ :  U n e s V i s ,

21



63, ' lineal. 157' llne 8 (Grier) ; Heatley Dep. at 62, line 17 -

walked Hathorn' "i
my eyes to see someone being edu^ted^iL b^ought tears to
conditions." Dr. Hathorn testified that^ th°Se

l.t I0*?*7 in the 1960's in Mississippi it was better than it was at Mayo [in 19891
our'facil?t'1 Went t0 an all"bla^  schooi, 
than S  W®re 9t leaSt a little b*tter

Hathorn Dep. at 12, line 16 - 13, line 16; 14, lines 5-8.

facility w ^ ^ ^ o u f  a n ^provid^Ho^ W?lk^ Y behind the May° inside the classroom? Protection from rain;
there were no florescent liqhts^th had n0t been droPPed and 
Mayo; the media center was "Sark an? Si??? «° C°mputer lab at in disrepair; the science fShioc Ieabi and the tables were
no gas hooked in; many of the^cho^l^elfetrepair and there was 
dysfunctional; and the school ?????; ? eleftncal outlets were
painted in five to ten years. §£ l l i ^ e s 1! - ^  ( ^ e r P

roof ^ a t e d ^ a n d ^ S ^ u r ? ^ ^ ^ ^ ^  C!lllng da"age becaus® its
of the other high schools sSff2?edsi»f? "ere HI"3"  uater- None 143, lines 7-20 (Grier) sutfered similar problems. tr i at

the gymnasium and the^SckS^rooms at Mav^ Came„to the District 
and m  "deplorable" condition and ht H Y ^  embarrassing" 
to those of the other high schools as n??Ear^  ”ayo'5 facilities at 161, lines 6-17. like night and day." tr I

marquee in front ̂ f  the^Shool ^ S e n ^ t h ^ ^ '..Mayo did not have a 
schools did. TR I at 142, lin4 23 - l ^ ^ U n e V ^ ^  high

Dargan JuniS^High^chSSl01^ ^ ^ ^ ! ? i StrfCt' SUCh as Bruns°n- 
comparison with Mayo's. In^isculSi^a ?hS needs'.they Paled in 
Tunstall, for example, Dr. Grier analysis of Dr. John
needs identified at Brunson-Daraan t?tad ^  that many of the 
related to overcrowdingIt\ £ V * g cilitv T^ s t a 1 1 report Brunson-Dargan, however the 1 tY*, There was not at
over years" at Mayo.VGtr ITztVl l°in exlsted' -Line 20 _ 73, line 9 (Grier).

22



In short, at the time Dr. Grier arrived in 1988, Mayo "was a 
pretty sad environment" in comparison with the other high schools 
m  the District. TR I at 141, lines 23-25 (Grier).

At Dr. Grier's initiative, the District took steps to 
redress some of the problems at Mayo High School. The covered 
walkways were replaced; the ceilings were dropped; a computer lab 
was installed; the tables from the media center were removed and 
refinished; paint was provided and members of the community came 
in and painted the hallways and classrooms (even though, as Dr. 
Grier testified, the historically and identifiably white Pate 
elementary school had been painted twice in two years by the 
District's staff); Mayo's then-principal, Dr. Connie Hathorn, 
organized Sunday clean-ups at Mayo where members of the community 
came in and landscaped the grounds; a commons area with paved 
walkways and picnic tables was built behind the school; a marguee 
was erected in front of the school; and $50-60,000 were spent 
°Y®r a two-year period to upgrade Mayo's media center and replace 
old reference materials. TR I at 157, line 9 - 159, line 12 (Grier). '

Nonetheless, Dr. Grier testified that when he left the 
blsbricb in 1991, a great deal more work was needed at Mayo 
Moreover while the curriculum at Mayo had been upgraded, it was
Ttli1nnot ^?mParable to that of the other three high schools. TR I at 193, line 19 - 194, line 22; TR II at 77, lines 14-20 (Grier).

. Nothing has prevented the School Board from properlv 
^Grier^1115 MaY°’ TR 1 at 143' lines 21-24; 193, lines 10-18

. Tbe_School Board has ultimate authority in the District for 
maintaining and upgrading the District's facilities, since no 
money can be spent unless approved by the Board. TR I at 114 
lines 11-17; 115, lines 2-4 (Grier); TR II at 122, line 23 - 123 line 4; 147, lines 21-23 (Cox). '

... the. superintendent of the District, Dr. Cox was familiar 
with the maintenance of the District's schools and she visited 
the schools frequently and regularly, including visits to several 
schools each week. TR II at 144, line 19 - 145, line 6 (Cox).

Typically, maintenance is performed at a school after the 
principal submits a work order to the maintenance department. 
Typically, also, it is not the Superintendent's job to get 
involved in the day-to-day maintenance of schools, since that 
responsibility has been delegated to the Assistant Superintendent 
for Operations, Mr. Stone. However, because of the many 
complaints she received about work not being performed, Dr Cox 
was involved in the maintenance of schools Almost on a da^to-day

23



,?R 11 at 145' ^ines 7-23; 155, lines 19-25 (Cox); TR VII at 35, line 16 - 36, line 24 (Stone).
Dr. Cox testified that, in general, schools with 

predominantly black student enrollments received less attention 
from the maintenance department than other schools. According to 
Dr. Cox, either the work did not get done or, if it did it was 
done in a "shabby" manner. TR II at 146, lines 4-15 (Cox).

Dr Cox further testified that, of all the schools in the 
istrict, the school that received the least attention from the

maintenance department was Mayo High School. TR II at 147, lines 2 4 (Cox)•

Dr. Cox testified that on many occasions she discussed the 
poor maintenance of Mayo High School with the individual 
responsible for school maintenance in the District, Assistant 
i-UJJrinte£jent f°̂l Operations and Maintenance, Byard Stone, and that Mr. Stone offered the excuse that there was no reason to put 
much effort into Mayo because the people there do not take care 
of the facility and vandals tear up the work. TR II at 147
3-4^S22213l i i ^ ^ in<%?1 '-,147' linS 5 <Cox)' TR V at 207, lines ' 2, lines 23 223, line 11 (Stone) (citing vandalism).

Or. Cox testified that Mr. Stone referred to Mavo1s 
demographics" as the reason for difficulty in maintaining the

Dr- ?ox understood Mr. Stone to be referring to the fact 
th3ty,!?aY? 1S 1?cated ln a predominantly African-American neighborhood with, what Mr. stone indicated, significant violence 
and police problems. TR II at 206, lines 4-12 (Cox).

Dr. Cox disagreed with Mr. Stone's assessment of the 
probiems at Mayo, emphasizing that the problem at Mayo was not 
vandalism, but poor workmanship by the District's maintenance
n£es“ (c ™ "  at 147' lines 14‘20; 165' lines «-»■■ “ “

qrhon?r'fSoX^te^^5^ed that/ in comparison With St. John's High thJ facilities at Mayo are "significantly inferior" and 
that Mayo has "many more" facilities needs than any other school 
in the District. The magnitude of the maintenance problems at 
TRYllWat greater than at any other school in the District. 
Icox*. 1 8' lines 25; 152' lines 16-20; 158, lines 18-23

Dr. Cox testified that when work is finally performed at
and°then m u s t ^ l V 0 inferior that it: does more harm than good, and then must be done over. In her opinion, "virtually nothincr
l?nVJ7 y? « aSibeen quality." TR II at 148, lines 6-25; 164 line 17 - 165, line 21; III at 44, line 17 (Cox).

24



25



list was incomplete and a misrepresentation of Mayo's actual 
needs. The document failed to accurately show, among other 
things Mayo's needs for: carpeting; repairs to or ^placements
f inside doors, including gym doors; ventilation in the gym and

of ttl lZr Paintin *̂ re-roofing, including repairsof the roof of the administrative building, which leaks; a
covered walkway from the administrative building to the other

the 5ampUS; Plastering; elimination of the flooding of Mayo s grounds; new lights in the gym and library; science 
equipment; and a weightroom, since Mayo is the only high school

.Dlstrj-ct without one. D EX 86; TR II at 179, line 11 - 187, line 16 (Cox). '

District administrators continue to apply a double-standard
CSmeSc5° deterTTlinin<3 maintenance needs at Mayo High

$201 765 Rut Sh6 est^ t®d Mayo's current maintenance needs at$201,765. But when asked to estimate the possible cost of
implementing a dedicated magnet school at Mayo —  a school that 
would attract white and black students from throughout the 
District --Mr Stone testified that the capital costs associated
facLpPgradln' thS facillty "" including construction of a new facade, canopies, an elevator, and replacement of rooms and doors
™  v S  ft ?7a\ at ^ ast ».6 million. TR V at 179, lines t-2°7 TR VII at 77, line 1 - 81, line 1; TR VIII at 49, line 12 - 5n line 21 (Stone); D EX 86. ' 12 50'

District's failure to properly maintain and make
re?ainS 9 May° has had a detrimental impact on Mayo's students. As Dr. Cox testified: y

When you're there year after year and you see a 
uildmg falling apart, then it certainly makes 

you question, whether you're an educator or 
whether you're a student, what value is my 
education here? How good is this school?
[T]he_students and the staff there start to 
question if people can allow my school to get in 
this condition, then how good am I as a student
there. I must not be very valued to be in that school.

TR II at 160, line 2 - 161, line 2 (Cox).

According to Mr. Mitchell, it seemed that the Mayo facilitv 
"was just left to deteriorate." He testified that such In Y 
environment "had a direct effect on how the kids felt about 
themselvee and their school, and that the neglect of tSe Mayo 
facility was an important part of "the major problem at Mavo" 
£ r n n e T dUOe<J teem..' Mitchell

26



b. resources
The School Board has ultimate authority for the allocation 

of resources throughout the District. TR I at 114 line 24 - 
115, line 1 (Grier); TR II at 122, line 23 - 123, line 4 (Cox).

Mr. Mitchell testified that in terms of the quantity and 
type of resources, Mayo was an inferior school when compared with 
St. John's. Mitchell Dep. at 63, line 24 - 64, line 5.

Dr. Grier testified that when he first visited the media 
center at Mayo the most recent reference books and encyclopedias 
were over twenty years old, while at the other three high schools 
the materials were new. TR I at 130, lines 19-24 (Grier).

Dr. Grier's administration initiated a "uniform textbooks 
adoption process" to insure that all schools adopted the same 
textbooks for the courses being offered. This process has not 
been completed, and it was discovered recently that one high 
school Mayo -- still had older textbooks TR VIII at 85 
lines 4-9; 95, line 22 - 96, line 20 (Harrison).

Dr. Grier's administration also initiated a process of 
allocating resources uniformly, a process that has not yet been 
completed. Ms. Harrison conceded that Mayo has lagged behind the 
other high schools in terms of the resources that have been 
allocated to it. TR VIII at 94, line 9 - 95, line 21 (Harrison).

When Dr. Grier arrived in the District, Mayo had no computer 
lab even though the other three high schools did. In 1992 when 
Mr. Mitchell became the Mayo principal, there was still no* 
computer lab at Mayo, and the science equipment was totally 
inadequate, lacking such basic resources as microscopes and 
dissecting equipment. TR I at 142, lines 12-22 (Grier); Mitchell 
Dep. at 76, line 2-23; 60, line 21 - 61, line 16.

According to Dr. Grier, the District neither allocated the 
;resources to Mayo as was provided to other high schools, nor 

allocated adequate resources to Mayo to redress past deficieAcies 
at-that school. TR I at 143, line 25 - 144, line 19; 145, lines

At the time Dr. Grier arrived, the District also employed 
. fee structures that students were charged to help pay for 

such things as books, computers and other educational equipment. 
Since many Mayo students are from lower economic backgrounds 
they were unable to pay these fees. Thus, even though the 
District was allocating money to schools on a per pupil basis at 
the time Dr. Grier arrived, Mayo was shortchanged because iJ was 
already behind the other schools in terms of facilities and 
resources and because per pupil allocations failed to provide 
for Mayo students what other high schools were being provided

27



through the payments of fees. 
21; 146, lines 2-18 (Grier)." TR I at 144, line 23 145, line

Sh°r L e  ^

Mayo trcompa?eYto.Th?Serrju2ttw^sn'teqUiP?;nt at What was there was t st wasn 1 any there,
answer your o«  L  d’v» „And agai"' I'U
St doh^s b2t f iould say ^ o u ^ C  to
eniarge that and say compared to Hartsville Hiah or [Lamar] High and I'd answer the Hlgh
:ust was not in existence. ILleTas “
had ' computers9°and t h l v ^ S i  SChools £and] they
2 2 . ^  ~  ^ f ^ y Chra0dSCe0^?pm:ntd

TR I at 142, lines 3-11.

c. curriculum

o«ereSea?Cea°S s ^ o l  V?hTSis t r i c t ° r the ™«iculu»
ultimate authority in insuriSa th£ f SCh°o1 Board hasthroughout the District TR I ati!?lf°fmity of curriculum 
192, line 5 (Grier); TR II at 122, liAe^T? ^  ^  "

Manual'hrequires^'thatCevery s t ^ t “ « * * « ' B°“ d Policy
opportunities regardless of ethnic or JaciJ?^ "®qual educational 19 at JAA. nic or racial background." g EX

The manual also states" "Th-ic
opportunity serves as a guide f o r t h * k PS °f equal educational 
making decisions relatJd^o school *nd the staff inpersonnel, selection of educational e3nPloy»ent of
curriculum and regulation^a ° ? ^ ^ S ; ; . . ^ ^ ^ ' a t  JAA.
its o i S * p ^ i ^ b? ,S S y g ; t.“ ;iD^ r i o t  has, however, violated 
students at Mayo High School.9 tr !l

County "school Board^pproved t h e ^ o M S I i o ^  and the Darlih9ton curriculum audit. TRP? at 1 4 ? f *“ •

DarlingtoJ^County SchoS^Diltrict WSS born6 bV th®
the SONOCO Products Company, which has' tY

28



29



The other three high schools in the District nf f ^

^ ril-24a (?o^;eL ^ i ! ^ YD°p.C: r 54? U n e s M^ ? 6 . TR 111

to taKet^u?sesa?hafar;nn:tCo?fer;deettS J°Sn 'S High Sch°o1 
p a ? ? I L l « °  StUdents can that the scAoo? 0? ^ ° ^
travel to anoSI?'scSoSf ?oJCJ cou^sfand"^ arehunwillln9 to 
particular^616 Students have requested the Boa?d ?o o ? f e r T  "

s t -

r  -function of the size of Lvo k°?her three high schools is not a 
the District. TR I at 152, line 17 - 1I3, l i n ^ ^ r i e ? 69166' by

curriculurahguides'throughoutrtheSDistrict6baP^n9 Unl f° ™accelerated upon her arrival f ^  process that Dr,
Curriculum Audit were considered "gospel^bv^hofe^ ^  $he • developing these curriculum guides r a n  charged with

”■ ““ i v t t i w i z  l l ;  IIs:

u p grad ed  d S ^ h i J ^ n u r e ^ A e f h ^ l e f ?  S e ^ i s S  S t -MaY°  was

a?f 7 "iK 11 at 77, lines 14-20 (Grier).

entity ultimately^espo^sibl^fo?9cSrricu?tY SJh°o1 Board' as the 
the District, from insu?iia thf? 5, • at each sch°o1 in
High School was comparable to that of f e r e d ^ t ^ t ^ at .MaY° 
school. TR I at 191, line 19 - 192 l?Sfs (Griir^ S Hlgh

Cox

d. instructional quality

followSdTpatte^o? £ ^ i £ Pfrinten*enta' the Board hasteachers to h i s t o r i c a l 1JSS1competent or problem
School. Mayo has been perceived*^0 andPt£tlCUlarly May° High a "dumping ground" for years for som<r extent has been,teachers, who were not L i !  teachers, particularly white 
at 164, line 1 line 22 jatisfactoriiy elsewhere. TR I
TR II at 190, lines £-13 (Cox). llnas 20"23

30



t v S ’Y lr J P "ba°«ay° May°
not teaching, tid^itting around doing°nothingC”Sein°^ 1seaCh6rS 
A^cSrding torM^°UMit?h^ilS''thaS "Very ”UCh" ® p^oble'" *  Mayo.

4; 47, line 24 - 49, lin4 4 ' ' llne 18 ~ 120' line

personnel, and nothiig^reJented0!?1^ ^  the assi^nment of 
inetructots to Mayo „?g£ SSSS?f ^ " ^ - ^ ^ i n e  4

6. The Darlington County School District has
its^assignment^of*8 bla°* »^hSchool through its assignment of personnel. y
a. principals

h i r i n g handa a is J g M n g Cp S n L p a ? r L B? h f s hh S ? ° l e  a u t h ° r i t V f o r
a t  GBC/GBD; id ^  a t  GBC-R/GBD-R, p?  f  ( - - m J e  f?iSaT j C t: -G EX 19
r e g a r d in g  em ploym ent in  t h e  sc A o S l d i s t r i c t  s h a ? ? h f eC12 10S 
b o a r d .” ) ;  TR II a t  191, l i n e s  5 - l i  (c S x )^  made bV t b e

that P ^ feDs ^ S 0pe?sonnn % S1 n°=\^d1nSr ^ r S 'OW? P°licies « 0 » i ™
t h e  b a s i s  o f  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  a iS  i e ? r ? 9 ..Pand i h ^ S .'. b e  M r e d  "on
e d u c a t o r s  r e c e i v e  f a i r  and e q u a l t r e a t m e n t  1 n i? ,0J  •t y
em ploym en t o p p o r t u n i t i e s ."  g EX 19 a t  GBC/CRn * ^n c ^ dln(? • • • 
D i s t r i c t  " i s  co m m itted  t o  n r n v in in !  ^ GBC/GBD. F u r th e r m o r e , th e
en h a n ced  by t h e  P» S i f S n S r ^ » i 3 b S i S S ° S j 1S S i  - P j r i e n c i  
c r e e d s ,  s e x e s  and e t h n i c

i;de;s;,*a£ S S ™ 8 - a
b la c k  p r i n c i p a l .  G EX 37 ; TR V a t  1? 6 , U n e s  ^ " ^ w s o m ?.3

s c h o o f “ a S S„ h i t e r p r t a c iS a ^ s  bJ a ck  P r i n c i p a l s  t o  " w h ite"
t h e  D a r l in g to n  C ounty S c h o o l Board a°n S/ ° o l s  w ere  b lo c k e d  by  
members t h l t  h e  c “ ld  nS£ a s s i m  a 'w h ? ? ;  G n e r “ a s  t o l d  b>" B° « d
at 1 6 1 , l i n e  1 8  -  163 , ? in e  I f f c r i e r )  P r in C lp a l  t o  May ° -  ™  I

31



Nothing prevented the Darlington County School Board from
aJSt??in?-PrinCipalS tC> any sch°o1 without regard to race. TR I at 198, lines 16-20 (Grier). * x

nic+.T.?y1_aS^ gniI!? °*}ly black principals to Mayo High School, the District stigmatized Mayo as a school for black children.
?r-.Gofdon' the District's practice of assigning only black principals to Mayo caused the school to retain its

lit 3 bla°k SCh°0l‘ G EX 39' NOS- 4' III at

former Darlington County School Board member Jessie Hines 
testified, white applicants may not have been interested in 
applying for the position of principal at Mayo High School 
simply because it's Mayo." Hines Dep. at 34, lines 10-25!

Since 1991, Mayo High School has had five principals and 
other interim personnel running the school. The contract of the
for^the ?jQ4-q?al,KR°?SeVelt Davis' was not renewed by the Board _J9®4 5 scb°°l year, even though Dr. Cox had placed a

re<;01™ endation f°r renewal in his personnel file prior
24 ^Cox?!P Ure fr°m thS District- TR 191> line 14 - 192,Pline

^ tUrj°Ver in a school's leadership adversely affects
of a unffo™ and Sta5f/ negatively impacts on the implementation 
192 lii5 ?? ^ cu^um' and lmPedes the learning process. TR
i?n4 81 (Harrison)!' ^  2° (C°X) ; TR VI11 at 100' 15 - 101,

No other school in the District has had as much instabilitv 
linee2mtcSj)PrinC1Pal tUrnover' as May°- TR 203, line 20 - 204^'

b. faculty
. P 1® ?;970 court order requires that the faculty of each

facJniv f aJ bS ^nte^rated so that the ratio of N^gro and^hite faculty members of each school shall be approximately the same as 
“ h " E ?  th^U9hcut the system Stanley.
ff 11970  ̂ ' et a1 •' No* 7749> slip op. at 3, f III (D.S.C. Feb.

. . The Darlington County School Board has final authority to 
hire professional/certified teaching personnel, based on thp 
recommendation of the superintendent. G EX 19 at GBD.

Throughout the 1980s, the percentage of black faculty at 
39y°No?S2?°re than tWiCe that °f the Strict-wide fveSgJ. G EX

32



i opp Df,l G£^ f testified that, when he arrived in the District in 
tu®8' 55 District was n0t even close to being in compliance with the 1970 order, and that he transferred 35 teachers to try to
•ringJab0^t comPliance- °ne school board member, Edward Hursev introduced a motion at a board meeting to try and block the 
transfers and another board member, Thelma Dawson, succeeded in 
blockmg transfers of white teachers to Mayo, ther4by leaving 
Mayo out of compliance. TR I at 194, line 23 - 195, line (Grier); G EX 39, No. 2.

a ,Dr\ Gofd°n tesbified that the District stigmatized Mayo as a 
black school by assigning a disproportionate number of black 
faculty and staff to the school, in violation of the requirements 
of the 1970 court order. G EX 39, No. 2; TR III at 182 lines 7- 
14; TR IV at 172, line 8 - 174, line 11. ' S 7

c. classified staff
the suneT-?nfon2gt?n County Sch°o1 Board, upon recommendations of the superintendent, is responsible for hiring classified personnel. G EX 19 at GCC/GCD.

The personnel office is responsible for assigning classified 
personnel to the various schools/departments." g EX 19 at GCE.

According to the School District's definition, classified 
c l e ^ n i d ^ h e ? 65 library aideS' - V a r i e sclerks and other assistants. G EX 19 at GC.

ha?- aiways had a disproportionately high number of black classified staff. TR V at 137, lines 18-24 (Newsom)?
D* C01} 3 ^  Order Entered into by the United States,the Private Plaintiffs, and the Darlington County 

schooi District Promises to Work to Eliminate All the Vestiges of Segregation in the District.
In an effort to resolve the claims of the private clainti ffc 

and the United States against the Darlington County School 
District, the parties entered into good faith negotiations anrt 
Y0l- tarl)y agreed to the stipulations and S e  JImedfal plaS set 
J?ne 3?ni99?.C°nSent °rder' which was entered by the Cou?t on

Jordon testified that, in his opinion, the desegregation 
plan set forth in the Consent Order promised to effectivelv 
desegregate the Darlington County schools and eliminate th^ 
vestiges of segregation in the areas of faculty and staff Dr 
Gordon concluded that if the provisions regarding student 
assignment, faculty and staff assignment, transportation 
curriculum and extra-curricular activities were implemented in 
good faith, the Consent Order promised to effectively desegregate

33



TRer??ratn?n?n ?°Untyschools to the maximum degree practicable ik iii at 106, lines 24-25; 107 iinPQ i-n. n  „ 77 p accicaoie.lines 20-25. ' ±ines 1 1> H4, lines 2-7; 117,

E. A Desegregation Remedy that Simply Closes the Mavo Hi
l u r l l n  JS°ility PlaC6S 3 ^Proportionate sSare o? Burden of Desegregation on the Black Community.

s s a S s
that closes Mayo High School^ould not privj t ^ n S y 0" reI"edY

is essential for^ successful H^o0teStlfled that a ma(?net at Mayo 
because; (l) it would enhance g r e g a t r e m e d y for Darlington 
students back Into the S£lir Segre?at^ n by attracting white it would remedy the stiSS ^  schools in the Darlington area; (2)

— S S  in f3f  ̂"
131, lines 1-10; 202, lines 2-10. 130' llnes 12‘25;

minority Children has^otTbeen one^f bJJJdens of.dese9regation on

S S F S  ?  ss.

High (in Society Hill); and SDauldinrr t R?sei")wald Junior/Senior 
Lamar). The District ooeratfS^ 9 Juni°r/Senior High (in 
children; Hartsvill^ High lL ^ h' secondary schools for white 
Darlington). ^  Lamar Hlgh' and st* John's High (in

s c h o o l s ,  i t  haS d S n e ^ o ^ y ^ l o s i n q ' ^ t h ^ h i s t  c ? n s °J-i d a t e  h ig h

5^5i., the
whit^IeconL^rschSoir^oMt^ct^16 ““  “ ree'^istorically0'different site in ll?7 f„S S? t J ?9 a n e " faciiity on a 
H I  at 192, lines U - L ^ G o r d i n U *  Hl9h SCh°o1' G E* 3S, TR

34



When Rosenwald High School was closed after the 1981-82
r Ex ^?ai enroii- nt

iqoi_o^en uUt}Br Junior/Senior High School was closed after the 198i 82 school year, at had a total enrollment of 400 students of whom 97% were black. G EX 43. sruaents,

When Spaulding High School was consolidated with Lamar- w-irrv, 
School and downgraded to a junior high school aJter ^he w L - s f
vhCr ^ n er r e S^ ^ nV ? 2  « ? ° t a l  ° f 250 « " o f

. . Thf closings of Rosenwald and Butler disproportionatelv
«s “  »• ™

Butler were closed, were able to identify any steps taken or amr 
ftSdent^or^^ bY the District' to assist the displaced black Y 
respectively^0 S ^ T a T l ^  ^ ^ f - n w a l d  and Butler,
T s l o ^ 1 ' llneS 10-17; 53:

S s s ^ i S 3llysf  ̂ ehh!gh SShools to the children were6assigned St. John's and Hartsville resnoot-i voi \r

3- - t i - o e -

r̂adiS lrr n¥t¥i>s“a""ha" s°nl- - - c-
j o i „ r u ns s ..b a?Rk^ ? “ t t i -  :% ? % •* _  t r t r n i r v t i T e i R~ ^

2. The District never sought or obtained Court
approval for closing historically black schools.

Obtaining prior court approval has not been ono nf
S S t S S . ^ S  vya r ? o o r h S e n - r i 3 f 0L S 10! ^ L SlS°?31S (^  t h e ,183, lines 19-21 (Stone). ' SS 20 23 (Newsom);

and °tSn? = ? n " l9h
High, all without having obtained prior court app?ovafPor 9 
demonstrating to the Court that these changes compiled SIth

35



3.
w e ^ „ a l„ ^  ^ ? n i! !“ S S S ) bT i S ^ ? V thCourt that no such approval has eve? beeA g _(state”ent bV the

Junior/Senior High School could have served 
Har£«J-M?nSOl:Ldate<i junior high school for the Hk 116 area/ but the District instead chose to abandon Butler and spend significant sums of money to renovete the historically white junior high Y school for that purpose. ’

could^SfhPPn1,0 DS' Gordon' the Butler High School facility could have been used as a consolidated junior high for the
H a^t^nJ6 yTea' rather than using the historically white
S r d e M  Cha~ Ct- L e d  «  "theline iQ 1 0 1 Y that he had seen. TR III at 192 

community. TR V at 189, line 21 - 190, line 4 (Itone?

District’s'^own'witness^^Mr^stone ttT'"
Butler and Hartsville lunior was "b??i?I??v h® acr?age at
;.“mVss r r ^ :

facility and’is lS?atIde?ntaab4tt?rhsitIithanBHaJ?r “?? * better 
High. TR IV at 169, line 10 - 170, line S  ?Go?do?I JUnl°r

48 class??o?s "of whiSh 6e2i?f1S?tti?tusefttVii1fiJUni°r High had 
testimony was iontradStedb” t“ Mst???! • s ° o w f J T  * 29' hls 
responses, which Mr. stone helped prepare Sh?oh 1"terJ°9atory

Una 3; 89, line 18 - 3 ^ ' l ^ J ?  g ^ ' l ^ t V ^ I  ^ e ’8'

had a ^ p e r m a n e n t ^ la s s r o o n ^ c a p a c i t y ^ f  ̂ ^ o s ^ s t u d 6 ^  f a c 1 1 1 ^  
Z tllty ttT X IHi9S ^ ^  parmanent^classroom^he

w as a c t u a l l y  i s  p e r s o n r h f g h e r ^ h a n ^ ?  I j a r t s v n f r i S a S r  W g J "  G

36



EX 111 at 3 (Butler capacity); G EX 35 at 48 (Hartsville Junior 
Hrgh capacity); TR VII at 65, line 18 - 66, line 5 Tstone)

1Q(n Ebe U?dl?puted student enrollment data show that from the 1982-83 school year (the first year of the consolidation of 
Butler and Hartsville Junior High) through the 1993-94 school

w°^al f^udent enrollment at Hartsville Junior High has been well below the total capacity of Butler. In 1982-83 for 
example the combined enrollment at Hartsville Junior High was 
897, or 183 students below Butler's capacity; in 1993-94 for 
example, the enrollment at Hartsville Junior High was 800 or 280

(£££.'• °apacity- G EX 43! TR ?I1 at

Harf EYf!? ^ough the evidence clearly established the Butler and 
rh^SVtlleHJU21°rDHi?h facilltles were comparable, the District 
l9Rfi%o <• an?°? ®utler and sPend 51-17 million beginning in Junei986 to "completely renovate" the main building of the formerly 
all white Hartsville Junior High School. G EX 39, No. 9.

In addition to the $1.17 million spent by the District to
?h»Pn? “ n?vate the M in Gilding at Hartsville Junior H^gh the District also spent considerable additional sums there- The

$1h'4?2 f°^ r°°f W°rk; installed heat pumps as P ?f a four-school project costing $628,101; painted two other 
buildings on the campus for $7,500; and converted one building
G EX !9?°No?C9.dePart”'ent at 3 °°St t0 thS “ -triot of $49 480.

Moreover, even assuming that the construction of ten more 
classrooms would have been needed at Butler to accommodate all 
the junior high school students in the Hartsville area the cost 

construction, in Mr. Stone's estimation, would have 
totaled about $550,000. In contrast, the District spent over 
$1.4 million over the course of several years to renovate and

Hartsville Junior High School. TR VII at 68, lines 13- 24, 75, line 5 - 76, line 16 (Stone); G EX 39, No. 9.
During the 1986-87 school year, while Hartsville Junior Hiah 

was being renovated, the School District used the Butler facilitv 
o house Hartsville Junior High students. During the time the  ̂

School District was using the Butler facility to house HaJts^l i * 
Junior High students, the facility was called "Hartsville Tnni 
High School Annex." Heatley Dep.at 36, lines 3-22? ^

... Drw Gfi®r made recommendations and initiated discussions
which^e^1^ 09^  rnember® about reopening the Butler facility which he believed was suitable for regular classes and XiniS*,
diicuISionser°TOU?iat ?590t?*r S^ ° ols‘ Nothin9 cane of these ^  aiscussions. TR I at 159, line 23 - 161, line 5 (Grier).

A fire later destroyed part of the Butler facility.
37



4 . S !  "ost »PPr°Priate manner in which to share the burdens of desegregation and to remedy the racial stigma suffered by the Mayo community is to 
establish a county-wide, dedicated magnet school for grades nine through twelve at the Mayo High School site, to be named "Mayo School."
a. The black community must be a full and equal partner in any desegregation remedy.

Based on his extensive experience with school deseareaation 
Plans or. Gordon testified that, in order for a desegSqition
must haveSaVse!?sJ ^  th* DJrlin<?ton area> the black community a sense ownership of the plan. According to Dr 
Gordon, such a sense of ownership could be achieved only if the 
historically black Mayo High School facility was given a
^ r ^ r i I n i e25n-t?3lPl^ „ e 8l ^ C°Unty-Wide SCh°o1‘ TR

b. The establishment of a dedicated magnet at 
Mayo will remedy the racial stigma suffered by the Mayo community.

A dedicated magnet high school at Mayo High School Un»iri
b H S  1JhfliCted ^  cZinity
t L  D a r l i n Z n Z Z l Z Z Z Z Z A Z Z Z Z i Z o Z ?01 "
UnePi8r(G;rdon“ 0nal qUallty' TR 111 1” . line 24 to 194,

z z  d f e j ;  r lMayo community by the District. The Court, however finds Dr Armor's testimony unpersuasive. ' nnds Dr-

d e s e g r e g a t io n ^ m a n d a te  COUrt ' S

inflicted upon "the disfavored r a c e " Z  le^reoItZ S  

"failure to^ocument^efiSti^ a^°meaning?ir4ducational and” 3

38



the Mayo community must be given little weight.6 TR VI at 244
\ l t 5’ i1;; iy’-,3e;-line 20 to 39- 7; 182- ‘U V i -24, 178, lines 4-24; 182, line 25 to 185, line 21.

Second, while Dr. Armor admitted that Mayo is a vestiqe of 
the prior dual system in terms of students assignment, faculty
t S ? CS a1'' the quality of the facility, Dr. Armor testifiedthat he simply does not believe that Mayo High School has been 
stigmatized by the District. Dr. Armor testified that a schoSl 
community cannot be suffering under a stigma if that community1 
till takes pride m  its school and wants to keep the school 
open._ Thus, even though Dr. Armor admitted that Mayo is 
perceived as an inferior school by the Darlington County
mmunity, he testified that the school was not suffering from

thp9^ahbe?aUSe the students and Parents of Mayo wanted to keep the school open. The Court cannot accept such a view As Dr?
h a ^ h ^ GStlflGd; Slack <ritizens attending schools under even’the harshest segregated conditions still cherished their schools and 
took pride in their achievements, often opposing the c?osin? of 
their community schools. Such resilience howe'er does 2
thP nnY Sup^eme Court’s finding that the principal harm of the operation of racially segregated school is the iniurv and 
stigma inflicted upon the black community. Finally, Dr Armor's 
testimony that he did not believe that the District had* 
stigmatized Mayo in the past was itself discrediting given his 

tha^ he "dldn't know very much" about how^ayo was treated from 1970 to 1988. TR VI at 193, line 7 - 194Y line 22- 
201, Une 24 - 202, line 11; 204, lines 9-23; 212, lin4s 3-17- 
62, line 6 - 63, line 1; 246, line 14 - 245 line TR* R7

1 227' line 73;'2415?eii=;s5^ - i 7lne 7 (Armor), TR III at 210, lines 1-23 (Gordon); TR VI at 194 line 
18 - 196, line l; 217, line 1 - 218, line 25 (Armor).

c. The establishment of a dedicated magnet at
Mayo is necessary to insure that the burdens of desegregation are allocated fairly.

was

entlre burden of the consolidation —  eliminating from the

Regarding Dr. Armor's 
desegregation, the Seventh 
had acted "well within its 
of Dr.[] Armor . . . since 
court can overrule Brown." 
Comm'rs, Indianapolis. 503

sociological critique of 
Circuit held that the district court 
discretion in excluding the testimony 
neither the district court nor this 
United States v. Board of s<-h 
F.2d 68, 85 (7th Cir. 1974).

39



black community its educational center, its primary social and
recreational facility, and its central reposito?? of commun??v
heritage. Nor would the loss of the community high school be
compensated for by the placement of the consolidated junior hiah
at the historically black B.A. Gary Middle School. As Dr Go^dSn
for^J1^' thG hi19h sch°o1' as the terminal point of education
cannot be^nTaJ^S' v, a d^stin?tive P^ce in the community that cannot be replaced by a junior high. To close Mayo Hiah School
Mayo? that isC°?hUIninate ^  Stigma that has been inflicted upon Mayo, that is, the perception that Mayo does not have the same
value as other schools. As Dr. Gordon testified: "When you shut
riaht Y°U SSy t0 Darlington County folks, 'You'reIIT^t lojat sctoo! was substandard, and we got rid of it."' TR
H 1 ^c188' llne 2 “ 189> Ime 24; TR IV at 127, line 12 - 128 line 25; 188, lines 12-21 (Gordon). 28'

. Df* Armor testified, however, that keeping Mayo ooen as a 
edicated magnet school was not necessary for the purposes of

b?a?vCln9 the burdens of desegregation between the white and black community. According to Dr. Armor the fact that
scSoor?BWAUlGa??finUe t0 °perate the historically black middle cnool (B.A. Gary) as a consolidated junior hiah school nhvista^
the need to take any further steps to equalize the burdenfo?thP 
desegregation plan. The Court dSes not agree Both S  
and Dr Gordon testified that a high scho h s a JSry difJe-nt 
community standing than a junior high school. ConseSentlvtht 
maintenance of a historically black junior high school Cannot be 

sumed to compensate for the burden incurred by the closina of 
the community high school. Furthermore, Dr. Armor admitted thit 
he could not affirmatively testify that the DiS?ict had 
considered the balance of burdens between the white and black 
community when it closed all other historicallyblCck hiaJ 
schools in the County. TR VI at 48, line 12 -49 line S  ,Q1 lines 9-21; 206, lines 9-20 (Armor). ' ' 191'

d. A dedicated magnet program located at a 
historically black school, when properly

Can r?medY Past discrimination, further desegregation, and serve both the black and white communities.

consul^? that

18; TR IV at 148, lines 9-20 (Gordo^fTp J'at ^l^lIne 25 
188, lines 6—18 (Grier) * TR tt at- iqq i •

(Cox); TR VI at 193, lines 3-9 (A^ir) 199' llneS 19‘22

40



Ohio DJ ^ GriKr ?e5^i£i®d that during his administration in Akron, Ohio, the school district there implemented successful maqnet
in ten schools, including two at the high school level.TR I at 170, lines 7-12; 171, line 19.

, , . magnets in Akron was placed at a historically
black high school that had been closed for 12 to 15 years in a 
neighborhood that, it was thought, white parents would be' 
unwilling to sendtheir children to. According to Dr. Grier the 
program has been in existence almost a year and it has 
absolutely worked marvelously." Procedures were put in place to

th^ £ he Program included a black child forevery Shite child, and the student enrollment has, in fact, been racially 
balanced. TR I at 172, line 1 - 173, line 20 (Grier).

Based on his knowledge of Darlington County and his
^  A*fon' Dr- Grier testified that a magnet could 

May° lf ^  was a dedicated program (i.e.. not a program within an otherwise regular high school); if outstanding 9 
administrators and teachers were selected for the school and 
given specialized training in the magnet curriculum; if the 
school s facilities and equipment were upgraded; if there was no

scho?1 board members in the school's operations; 
ivLthe Dlstr?;ct committed itself publicly to quality; and if 
there was substantial parental participation. These sentiments 
were echoed by Dr. Cox. TR I at 173, line 21 - 175, line To -
(Cox)line 14 ~ 180, llne 12 (Grier); TR 11 at 199> lines 7-18

A dedicated magnet program can be funded in a varietv of 
ways, including through the receipt of federal funds after filina 
a grant application and grants from local businesses and 9
industries. TR I at 175, lines 11-21 (Grier).

... Federal funds can be used to cover start-up costs associated with magnet schools. TR I at 190, lines 1-4 (Grier). Clated

her tei™ re in Darlington County, Dr. Cox had ubmitted a proposal for a Padaiae program, to be located at St 
David's Academy in Society Hill. Society A i n  is aboSt twenty
Te^?SS-ffr^in H^rt^vllle' twenty minutes from Darlington, and Y neariy forty minutes from Lamar. Notwithstanding these 
differences, m  studying the feasibility of and the interest in 
such a program, Dr. Cox found significant parental support in all 
ommunities of the county for the proposal. TR II at 194, line 
15 - 195, line 1; 196, line 18 - 197, line 24 (Cox).

SimUarly, the District currently operates an alternative- 
type school for at-risk and expelled students, located at St 
John s High School, which attracts students from throughout the 
county^hc volunteer to attend. TR II at 198, line ? - ?99, Une

41



Among the types of magnets that could work at Mayo are an 
aeronautical engineering program in conjunction with Florence- 
Darlmgton Technical College; a program in medical sciences in 
conjunction with area hospitals; a performing arts program; and 
an international baccalaureate program. TR I at 177 line 1 - 
178, line 2 (Grier); TR II at 201, line 25 - 202, liAe 18 (Cox).

HI- PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF T.aw 
A. General Principles
In 1954, the United States Supreme Court declared that a 

racially segregated school system violated the Constitution 
grown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, (1954) (Brown T). The
Court subsequently held that school district authorities "denied 
Negro children equal protection of the laws" by establishing a 
pattern of separate 'white' and 'Negro' schools," and it made 
clear that more is required of the offending school district than 
simply putting an end to its segregative practices. Green v 
County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435-37 (1968). --

that violated the Constitution must remedy its violation by eliminating the pattern of racially 
i entifiable schools. IcL at 436-37 (citing Brown v. Board n-f 
Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II)). As the Supreme Court
a 9 9 2 ^  ^  — eemai? V’ Pitts> H 2  S. Ct. 1430, 1443(1992) The duty and responsibility of a school district once
egregated by law is to take all steps necessary to eliminate the 

vestiges of the unconstitutional de jure system!" ellminate the
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that "the

veaBoJrd°Jfa?Yhde?egrTgati°n Plan iS itS effectiveness." Davis v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs. 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971) The
made equally clear that if the plan proves ineffective it must be 
replaced with a plan that _is effective —  "if it fails to nnrto 
segregation, other means must be used to achieve this end "

391 U.S. at 440 (citation omitted). MoreoveJ S School 
district "must be required to formulate a new plan ^Ad 
fashion steps which promise realistically to convert promptly to
L h ^ . . K1S ? Uata„'“hite" SCh°01 °r 3 "[bla°k]" but7just

.. . *n eacb case, the desegregation plan submitted by the school 
district and approved by the district court is simply a means to
t h ^ ™  1S' ^ means bY which the district hopes to achievethe required remedy. The Supreme Court has stated that "whatever 
plan is adopted will require evaluation in practice, and tl^

?ourt should retain jurisdiction until it is clear 
at 438tate_imP°Sed segregatlon has been completely removed." id_

42



The school officials are under a "continuing duty to take 
whatever action may be necessary to create a 'unitary, non-racial 
system.'" Id. at 439-440 (citations omitted).

A school district does not discharge its duty to remedy its 
constitutional violation by simply implementing a court-ordered 
plan. As the Fourth Circuit stated, "the mere implementation of 
a desegregation plan does not convert a dual system into a 
unitary one." Riddick v. School Bd. of Norfolk. 784 F.2d 521 
533 (4th Cir.), cert. denied. 479 U.S. 938 (1986). See also '
United States v._Lawrence County Sch. Dist. . 799 F.2d 1031, 1037
(5th Cir. 1986) ("It should go without saying that a system does 
not become unitary merely upon entry of a court order intended to 
transform it into a unitary system.") (citing Riddick); Vauahns
— Board of Educ._of Prince George's Countv. 758 F.2d 983, 989

(4th Cir. 1985) ("[IImplementation of the court ordered plan
alone could not relieve the Board of all future responsibility to bring about a unitary system.").

The only way the district can discharge its legal duty is to 
actually remedy the violation; that is, to implement a plan that 
.proves effective" in eliminating the racial identifiabilitv of its schools. 1

The sch°°l district continually bears the burden of proving 
that it has^effectively remedied its original violation. 
Implementation of a court ordered plan creates no presumption 
that the district has remedied the effects of its prior 
segregated system; for even after a plan has been approved by a 
court as one which "promises" to work, it is the district which 
must prove that it has actually worked in practice. The district 
court, therefore, ’"should address itself to whether the Board 
ha[s] complied in good faith with the desegregation decree since 
it was entered, ^nd whether the vestiges of past discrimination 
ha[ve] been eliminated to the extent practicable.'" Freeman n;
S. Ct. at 1446 (emphasis added) (Quoting Board of Educ. of 
Oklahoma_City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell. Ill s. Ct. 630, 638 (1991)).
In the final analysis, the school district "bears the burden of 
showing that any current racial imbalance is not traceable in a 
14471”ate WaY' t0 the prior violation." Freeman. 112 S. Ct. at

Moreover, the mere passage of time does not absolve the 
school district of its affirmative obligations. The "lingering

7See also Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1452 (Scalia J 
concurring) ("Only in rare cases . . . , where the racial 
imbalance had been temporarily corrected after the abandonment of 
de jyre segregation, can it be asserted with any degree of 
confidence that the past discrimination is no longer playing a proximate role."). 2 y

43



e££eCts:.°f se9re<?ati°n do not "magically dissolve" without 
affirmative efforts by the school district, and the Constitution 
does not Permit the courts to ignore today's reality because it 
is temporally distant from the initial finding that the school 
system was operated in violation of the constitutional rights of 
its students." Brown v. Board of Educ.. 978 F.2d 585 590 noth
Cir•) , cert;, denied, H 3  S. Ct. 2994 (1993)! ' U °th

Among other things, the school district is also obligated to 
hJ°fhrlY lmPlement.and monitor the attendance zone lines ordered
(5th glg°Ull701Ca^ f J - - BOard SCh- 430 F-2S 883 88833 (1971). ' ~"ff  ̂—  E-art - -ev -d other grounds. 402 U.S.

The Fourth Circuit has instructed district courts that 
may approve a plan that "achievers! less actual thfb th Y

V - SCh°01 "" '■ **4 ^ a t  93,

th;
signment. As the Supreme Court explained in Green <=oVi i

s s r - extending
’ ' ; ' but to eve;fy facet of school operations —  facultv 

! transportation, extracurricular activities and Y' facilities." Green. 391 U.S. at 435. tlviries/ a”d
B. Reasonableness of the Consent Order

a g r e e L r : r ; h e 0£p a ° « i i r a de SLSr e ^  ^

8°'3300' SllP °P- 3t 1 <I7d- *-• S-Pt. t. 1981) 

To approve an agreement reached by arms length noaoH
is

44



unreasonable. See United States y. Miami 
(5th Cir. 1980) (citation omitted). 614 F.2d 1322, 1333

in Miami® it^entitleS®? the £°Ur re<3ui«inents outlined' . ' V ?  entitled to a presumption of validity meaninghat the district court must have a "principled reason" for 9
refusing to sign it. Miami. 614 F.2d at 1333 . a refusal tr, =•:
unacSI^t^?eCrec ?KSed °n 9eneralized notions of unfairness is ^  unacceptable. Rather, the Court must state specific reasons uhv 
a proposed consent decree unduly burdens one class or Jno?^er 

4--In fum' ,when the remedy that is jointly proposed bv thP parties is within reasonable bounds and is not illeaal
T t T ^ ^ t T ^ f  a? ^ nSt PUbllC the^ourt^should give

z b  :k v s  i n s " , i u s u 's £  r

118 ^ nc* Know the issues involved. TR ix at

i ^ affls£S¥£53̂  *•%&&£&?at
Conse^d;?d4rbL 1dJs^ne3'..tSeachUviaJhe1mn C°ntained “  the
s t m ^ jk -ssss^ i at
curriculum enhancements would appear t^furthSJ ^  = J andstipulations preceding the plan further that end. The
providing a fLtual £Lis fSr ?he Lmedi!? Dlstrict's liability, 
and the plan itself addresses e a ™ « f  UP°n'

45



basis on whic^to0^ject^he^onseSt0^ ^  is.unable to find any and remedial plan. D Consent Order with its stipulations

Holding^f^^airnesshearing® C°nsent 0rder and the
RuIg 23 (e) . Fed r -d •

not be compromised without the court?!1!®3 tha? 3 class action 
of the proposed compromise mu!t £! !i! *P?r°V^ ' 3nd that notice 
class "in such ma n n L  as JhS Sour? T °f the
to encourage those with divergent view! ! e ls intendedthe trial court to identify possible inaH com? forward, "helping

(9th

f!pp‘ 68 (S-D- Ohiostudents notifying parents and • flyer sent home with
settlement and publication ^ dJ Uardlans of the proposed 
requirement. id. at 72. 63 newsPaPers met this

Similarly, in Mendoza. 623 F 2d at itsi -i-k 
notice of a proposed school deseqreaa?!™ 6 f°Urt aPPr°ved
that was published "in two°maj!!e!!!!!!i!3 ClaSS acJion settlement broadcast media, and distributednewspap^ers, aired by local 
class members' community. b locations throughout the

satisfied not only6! ! ! ^ ? ( e ^ ^ t T h e ^  t0 C‘!'aSS members 
class notification set forth in Ruli ^ ? ! ^  r^ ° ^ ous standard for 
the Court direct to the members of th23 ! ' whlch requires that 
practicable under the cirS!mSn!L ® C^ S the best notice 
to all members who can be iS!!?i!!!d ^ cludin(? individual noticeidentified through reasonable effort."

distributed aTlchoo? £ ItuIeSfo StUdents « »School District. The flyersnotif?!d f,the ?arlmgton County 
public hearing would be held d.a1  ̂recipients that (l) a
proposed settlement of the deseq^eSati^ 1^ 0™ 3111011 re9arding the Darlington County School D i s t r i c t f  lawsuit against the 
be held to permit class members and cit?7S lrJeSSJhearing would 
regarding the proposed settlement; and m  add^ess the Court
settlement were available for their review flfP16S of.tbe proposed location. The flyers stated th*! at a specified
attorneys for the^Darlington C ^ t ! * ! ^ ® ? ®  being Provided by 
States, and the pri^t!npfSn!!ffs! SCh°01 District' the United

regional°newspaper^ t h ^ o r e n c e  S!blished in the largest 
newspapers within Darlington Countv^th9 News, and two local 
the Darlington News L d n?r!L?OUntY' thS HartsviHe Messenger and

46



Finally, informal notice was given to class members through 
the daily coverage of the trial and reporting of the upcoming 
public hearing and fairness hearing by the Florence Morning News; 
through the near daily coverage by the State newspaper and 
regional media outlets, including WPDE-TV and WBTW-TV; and 
through the coverage by the Hartsville Messenger (publishing on 
Mondays and Wednesdays) and the Darlington News and Press 
(publishing on Wednesdays). TR I at 24, line 17 - 25, line 4.

The lawyers for the United States, private plaintiffs, and 
the Darlington County School District attended the public hearing 
on Tuesday, May 31, 1994. The Consent Order was read aloud and 
explained by an attorney for the United States, and questions 
were taken from the audience. All interested persons were also 
given the opportunity to speak at the fairness hearing, which was 
held in open court on Thursday, June 2, 1994. By any reasonable 
standard, ample notice to members of the class and to the 
community at large was provided.

D. The Motion for a New Trial or to Alter or Amend the Judgment

As previously discussed, under the circumstances of this 
case, the Consent Order to which the United States, the private 
plaintiffs, and the Darlington County School District agreed is 
entitled to a presumption of validity, and the burden is on a 
movant to prove that the settlement should be disapproved. See Miami. 614 F.2d at 1333-34. ---

On June 17, 1994, pursuant to Rule 59, Fed. R. Civ. P. five 
individuals purporting to be class members [hereinafter the 
"proposed plaintiffs"] filed a "Motion for a New Trial and/or to 
Alter or Amend Judgment," alleging that the Court "has 
misapprehended the position of several plaintiffs" and requesting 
that a new trial be held "to reconsider the important issues and 
receive further evidence." Memorandum at 4 ; Motion at l.8

The Fourth Circuit recognizes only three grounds for 
granting such a motion under Rule 59: "(1) to accommodate an
intervening change in controlling law; (2) to account for new 
evidence not available at trial; or (3) to correct a clear error
of law or prevent manifest injustice." Hutchinson v. Staton. 954
F.2d 1076, 1081 (4th Cir. 1993). None of these circumstances exists here.

Notwithstanding the three grounds enunciated by the Fourth 
Circuit, the proposed plaintiffs would have the Court adopt a

_ One week later, on June 24, 1994, the same proposed 
plaintiffs filed a second motion, seeking the same relief but 
raising other allegations concerning the District's operations.

47



fourth, namely, the "misapprehen[sion] of the position of many 
members of the class.” Mem. at 3. While the Court declines to 
establish new grounds under Rule 59, it has considered the 
proposed plaintiffs' motion in the context of preventing 
manifest injustice." Even so, the proposed plaintiffs' motion 

must fail because it identifies no new evidence, legal error or changes in law.

. both their June 17 and June 24 filings, the proposed 
plaintiffs offer nothing more than excerpts of the evidence 
adduced at trial by the United States and private plaintiffs

District's operation of attendance zone lines, closing 
of historically black schools, and allocation of resources for 
Mayo). See generally Proposed Findings of Fact, supra. The 
several fragmented claims raised by the proposed plaintiffs were 
litigated over several years, fully aired during the nine-day 
trial held from May 23 to June 3, 1994, and among the matters 
considered by the Court prior to entering the Consent Order on 
June 3, 1994 and its Order on June 23, 1994.9

, Moreover, the assertion that the Court misapprehended the 
position of "several" members of class, Mem. at 4, highlights yet 
another flaw in the proposed plaintiffs' motion: What was most
clear from the fairness hearing was that there was no single view 
among members of the plaintiff class —  or among the citizens of 
arlington County, for that matter —  as to the appropriate 
remedy for 40 years of discrimination by the Darlington County 
School District. The Consent Order signed by the parties and 
approved by the Court represents the informed judgment of the 
parties, including the Department of Justice and the NAACP Legal 
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., as to how best to remedy the District's acknowledged liability. y

f? essence, the proposed plaintiffs' motion is nothing more 
than the expression of one viewpoint of the Consent Order, albeit 
a dissenting °ne, by five citizens of Darlington County. But as 
the Fourth Circuit stated, "mere disagreement" with the Court's * 77

9The Court is mystified by the proposed plaintiffs'
"decision of the Court, with its accompanying Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment, are not in

^he, ColnPetent and compelling evidence in the case and the applicable law. Mem. at 2. It is unclear as to which 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the proposed plaintiffs
77fe^qqflnCeHthlf did not enter its conclusions until June
*•'j - 94' and only t?daY ls entering its written detailed findings and conclusions. Nor can the Court glean anything from 
the reference to "competent and compelling evidence," since the 
proposed plaintiffs offer no explanation for this standard? or 
from the reference to "applicable law," since the proposed plaintiffs offer none.

48



action does not support a Rule 59 motion. Hutchinson. 994 F.2d 
at 1082. The absence of any new evidence underscores the point 
that what the proposed plaintiffs have offered is "mere 
disagreement" with the outcome of the settlement and trial, not 
with the underlying evidentiary or legal foundations.

The fact that disagreement exists among class members about 
aspects of the consent judgment dictates neither that the 
judgment be amended nor that a new trial be held. It also does 
not indicate that counsel for the private plaintiffs failed to 
discharge their responsibilities, since "[c]lass counsel's duty 
to the class as a whole frequently diverges from the opinion of 
either the named plaintiff or other objectors." Walsh v. Great 
fttl.— &—Pac.— Tea—Co. , 726 F.2d 956, 964 (1983), reh1 a denied (3d 
Cir. 1984) (citations omitted). Given that disagreement among 
class members is almost inevitable, "it may be impossible for the 
class attorney to do more than act in what he believes to be the 
best interests of the class as a whole." Pettwav v. American 
Cast Iron.Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1216 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979). See also TBK Partners. Ltd, v 
Western Union Corp., 675 F.2d 456, 462-63 (2d Cir. 1982) (per 
curiam) (holding that majority opposition may not serve as a bar 
to a settlement that the district court determines is reasonable 
after considering the relevant circumstances).

Accordingly, the motion of the proposed plaintiffs is denied.

E. Appropriateness of a Dedicated Magnet at Mayo Hiqh School
1. The nature of the constitutional violation determines the scope of the remedy.

It is well settled that in school desegregation cases in 
which the court sits in equity, "the nature of the violation 
determines the scope of the remedy." Swann v. Charlotte- 
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971). Once liability 
has been determined, the remedy must be tailored to correct "the 
condition that offends the Constitution." id. at 16.

For example, in addition to the traditional Green factors 
discussed above, the Supreme Court has also held that a district 
court may appropriately examine the "quality of education" 
offered at various schools. See Freeman. 112 S. Ct. at 1446. A 
district court may also examine any "other elements" of a school 
<̂ls^rict "to determine whether minority students [are] beinq 
disadvantaged in ways that require[] the formulation of new and 
further remedies to insure full compliance with the court's 
decree" to desegregate its schools to the maximum degree practicable. id.

49



The Court must, therefore, fashion a remedy that redresses 
the specific constitutional violations found. Here, the evidence 
shov/s that the; District stigmatized Mayo as an inferior black 
school. If the "nature of the violation" was the District's 
iscrimmation against Mayo, then the remedy cannot be one that 

rewards the District by closing the school. To allow the
last remaining historically black secondary school in the county would be to consummate, not remedy, the 

stigma and injury inflicted upon "the race disfavored by the
violation." Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1443. Y

2 . The Court, sitting in equity, possesses broad 
discretion to fashion appropriate desegregation remedies.

hhe Court stated in Swann, where, as here, the school
authorities have defaulted on their affirmative obligations to

^1;L vasti9es of segregation, and once a right and a violation have been shown, "the scope of a district court's
remfdY Past wrongs is broad, for breadth and 

.. , cb ̂ 1 q ty afe 1J?herent m  equitable remedies." Swann, 402 U.S
at 15. See also icK at 16 (district court "has broad power to

a-7f?medy that wil1 assure a unitary school system"); Riddick, 784 F.2d at 535 (same); Vaughns. 758 F.2d at 993 (relief 
granted must be "reasonably related to the objective of ( desegregation"). J

3. The Court must fashion a remedy for the injury and stigma inflicted on the race disfavored by the constitutional violation.
. ■ . ‘F1’1 ddscussing the duty of a formerly segregated school
systemCt-t-h° ®llln;Lnate a11 the vestiges of its unconstitutional system, the Supreme Court stated:

This is required in order to insure that the 
principal wrong of the de iure system, the 
injuries and stigma inflicted upon the race 
disfavored by the violation, is no longer present.

Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1443.

The Supreme Court has emphasized that "felach insi-anro  ̂
failure or refusal to fulfill this affinities' duty cSntinSes the 
Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." Columbus Rd nf fhnr- ,,
S t f f ^  443 U'S- 449’ 455 (1979) (emphasir  added) (citations ^

Accordingly, the Court must fashion a remedy that redresses 
and stigma inflicted upon the disfavored race by the 

School^ S °peratlon of an m f e n o r  "black school" at Mayo High

50



4 . The Court must insure that the burdens of 
desegregation are allocated fairly and equitably.

In desegregation cases, it is incumbent on the Court to 
insure that the burdens associated with any remedial actions are 
allocated equitably between the black and white communities. See 
Djaz v. San Jose Indep. Sch. Dist. . 861 F.2d 591, 596 (9th Cir"

The law is clear that if a consolidation requires the 
closing of a predominantly black school and the relocation of 
students to a predominantly white school, the school district 
"bears a 'very heavy burden of justification'" to explain why the 
predominantly black school was chosen for closing rather than the 
predominantly white school. Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ..
448 F.2d 746, 753, reh'g and reh ' q en banc denied (5th Cir. 1971) 
(citation omitted). The school district bears "a heavy burden to 
explain the closing of facilities used for the instruction of 
minority children." Arvizu v. Waco Indep. Sch. Dist.. 495 f 2d 499, 505 (5th Cir. 1974~K

When a school district that is under a court order decides 
to close a facility "used for the instruction of minority 
children," it must do more than provide post hoc justifications 
f°r its action. Rather, it must present evidence to the Court 
showing the need for the proposed closing, whether other 
alternatives were considered, and why other alternatives were 
rejected. See United States and Webb v. School Dist. of n-mah*
575 F. Supp. 1398, 1407 (D. Neb. 1983) (citing Davis v. Board of 
Edug_s_, 674 F. 2d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 1982)). See also Fit.znstrirV 
-- Board of Educ., 578 F.2d 858, 861 (10th Cir. 1978) (setting 
forth six-part test for determining whether proposed closing violates federal law). y

Since the closing of a school necessarily involves the 
alteration of attendance zone lines, school districts operating 
under desegregation plans must obtain court approval for such 
action, typically through a motion to amend the desegregation 
plan. See, e.g., Harris v. Crenshaw Countv Bd. of Educ. 968
F.2d 1090, 1093, 1095 (11th Cir. 1992) (school board fil4d 
petition for approval of proposed consolidation); Davis. 674 F.2d 
at 685 (school district sought permission to revise its 
desegregation plan); Tasby v. Wright. 585 F. Supp. 453, 454 fN n 
Tex. 1984) (school district filed "Motion to Revise Feeder Patterns").

In determining whether to allow the District to close the 
one remaining historically black high school in the county 
therefore, this Court must consider the District's 
undistinguished history regarding Mayo and the other black high 
schools, as well as the relative burdens of desegregation. Cf 
Valley v.„,Rapides Parish Sch. Bd. r 702 F.2d 1221, 1228, rehjjft

51



rehifl en banc denied, 705 F.2d 113 (per curiam), 707 F 2d lie 
C5th Cir. 1983) (the court "was impelled to siek 

out, within practical limitations, an equitable alloos-Mon o-f +-v,
!^ r ^ o ^ r ^ 10" ^  * - o n f M t ? "

Butle^Hiah Scho^tS"3 historically black Rosenwald andaurier High Schools and to downgrade Spauldinq Hiah Srhoni
District neither sought nor obtained this CoS?t•sapp?Sval'aJ

iu„io? M go z& zsrisr™
e ^isrrict failed to meet this "heavy burden." 

grant the request of t^uJitedhstStes^SrpiaintiflrstaSley et
£ t h e  „ay°o°„r?gehr SSlSoJ 1^ " ^ '

IV. PROPOSED STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES FOR THE IMPLPMFNtittdxt OF A DEDICATED MAGNET RT Mayo school IMPLEMENTATION
1. The dedicated magnet at Mavo School chaii 

implemented beginning the 1995-96 school year.

£orthe9partiesfy SCh°0i< D*s^ict°lh!S anS

(a) includil?g but not limited to t--rh tYpe of Pr°gnam, (n) projected costs
reside?^?6?*6? enrollment' hy race and area of residence, (i v ) projected staffing and resource
needs; (v) proposed timetable for the reSOUrce
implementation of each stage of the Droce^c;
I ^ s u ^ t T  e« ° rtS ^ m . r  c l & S ,

for upgrading Mayo's facilities and resource! io
?t " ; g n e t  p ^ogram  and t o  c S S S S ^ Sreaerai and state requirements;

(c) proposed criteria for selection to the maanet 
program that (i) gives appropriate

( b )

52



weight/preference to black students residing 
in the current Mayo attendance zone and (ii) 
insures that selections will not have a 
disparate impact on black students or on the 
desegregation of the county's other high schools;

(d) proposed criteria for the selection of magnet 
school administrators and staff; and

(e) proposed changes/additions to the Board 
Policy Manual, as appropriate, regarding the 
governance of the magnet school.

1-0 The Soi?th Carolina Department of Education is directedprovide expert assistance in all facets of the magnet schoolproposal and implementation. y scnooi

Dariin<?ton County School District shall, commencincr 
.Y after the filing of the information set forthsection (2) above, and then every sixty (60) days thereafter 

eading up to the opening of the magnet school, file with the 
Court and the parties reports on the District's progress in 
implementing the Court-approved magnet plan.

tk i-heginniing ?ith the first year of the magnet school in 1995-96 the oariington County School District shall file with
Pities,at the end of each semeste“ 1;;<JWlth

thereafter at the end of every vear rel pvani- riai-a -t-v 
program, including but not limited to (a) race, gender and™99116 

ar^a °f every Participating student; (b) number of 
by race' gender and residence area; (c) selection critena and results; (d) performance/progress results- (e) 

of programs and outstanding needs; and (f) racial breakdown n? 
administrators and certified faculty in the magnet pJogram?

53



V. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff-lntervenor United States and Plaintiffs Stanley 

—  ^spectfully submit for the Court's approval the above 
Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Proposed 
Standards and Procedures for the Implementation of a Dedicated Magnet at Mayo School.

J. PRESTON STROM, JR. 
United States Attorney
TERRI H. BAILEY 
Assistant U.S. Attorney
1441 Main Street 
Suite 500
Columbia, S.C. 29201 
(803) 929-3000

Respectfully submitted,
DEVAL L. PATRICK

distant Attorney General

^THANlELlDOUGLAS 
FRANZ'R. MARSHALL 
MICHAEL S. MAURER 
GARY A. HAUGEN
Attorneys
U.S. Department of Justice 
Civil Rights Division 
Educational Opportunities 
Litigation Section 

P.O. Box 65958 
Washington, D.C. 20035-5958 
(202) 514-4092

Educational Fund, Inc. 
99 Hudson St., Suite 1600 
New York, N.Y. 10013 
(212) 219-1900
Arthur c. McFarland 
12 Magazine Street 
Charleston, S.C. 29401 
(803) 722-3376



CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that copies of the Joint Proposed Findings of Fact 

and Conclusions of Law of Plaintiff-Intervenor United States and 
Plaintiffs Stanley, et ah have been sent, by Federal Express, on
this twenty-second day of July, 1994, to the following attorneys 
of record:

Dennis D. Parker, Esg. 
N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense

and Educational Fund, Inc. 
99 Hudson Street 
Suite 1600
New York, N.Y. 10013
Arthur C. McFarland, Esq.
12 Magazine Street 
P.0. Box 1452
Charleston, S.C. 29402-1452
John M. Milling, Esq.
88 Public Square 
P.O. Drawer 519 
Darlington, S.C. 29532
Alfred A. Lindseth, Esq. 
Sutherland, Asbill and Brennan 
999 Peachtree Street, Northeast 
Atlanta, Ga. 30309-3996
J. Emory Smith, Jr., Esq. 
Deputy Attorney General 
Rembert C. Dennis Building Suite 520

U.S. Department of Justice 
Civil Rights Division
Educational Opportunities 
Litigation Section 

P.O. Box 65958
Washington, D.C. 20035-5958 
(202) 514-4092



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA^? l Woo,t»’W

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
VS.
STATE OF LOUISIANA

CIVIL ACTION 
No. 80-3300 
SECTION "A"

ORDER AND REASONS FOR 
APPROVING ENTRY OF CONSENT DECREE

9

This cause came on for hearing on this date to determine 
whether the Court should adopt the consent decree of the parties. 
Amicus Curiae representing Grambling State University concurs. 
Amicus Curiae The National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People and Dr. Gladys W. Milliner representing 
herself and the class of faculty members of Southern University 
in New Orleans have filed memoranda urging the Court to reject 
the compromise.

It has always been a basic premise of our adversary system 
of justice that settlements of law suits by agreement of the 
parties are favored. Further, with respect to discrimination 
cases, a basic philosophy which has become hornbook law is that 
voluntary compliance is preferable to court action.

This Court hasV&ce April 30, 19 80 conducted at least 
eight lengthy pre-trial conferences with the parties in an ef­
fort to prepare the^ase for an orderly trial and to resolve 
the issues in dispute. It has had the opportunity to review the 
pre-trial statements and memoranda of the parties as well as 
the two amicus curiae filings in opposition to the proposed con­
sent decree. Thus, it is cognizant and knowledgeable of the 
issues and contentions that pertain to this litigation. Moreover 
by reason of representations made to the Court it knows that 
those persons in an adversary position most familiar with the 
practices involved, including amicus representing Grambling 
State University, have spent many long hours in hard negotiations



-2-
The law in this Circuit is that a proposed consent 

decree in a discrimination case is entitled to a presumption 
of validity unless the Court finds that it is unlawful, 
unreasonable, inequitable, or contrary to public policy.
United States v. City of Miami, Fla^, 614 F.2d 1322 (5 .Cir. 
1980); United States v. City of Alexandria, 614 F.2d 1358 
(5 Cir. 1980) ; accord: State of North Carolina v. Department 
of Education, No. 79-217-Civ.(U.S.D.C. North Carolina, Raliegh 
Division).

Apropos the conclusions we reach herein is the
language which we borrow from United States v. City o_f 
Miami, supra, p. 1333,

rWhen the remedy that is jointly proposed is 
within reasonable bounds and is not illegal, un- 
constitutional or against public policy,, the 
courts should give it a chance to work.

Although the Court will at a later date further articulate the 
reasons for its conclusions stated herein, it is of the opinion 
that it would not be appropriate to further delay the parties 
from implementing the remedies they propose.

Accordingly since the Court finds that the proposed consent 
decree is not unlawful, unreasonable, inequitable or contrary 
to public policy it htê efcy APPROVES same and orders that it be 
entered by the Clerk of* Court as a judgment of this Court.

* ■  New Orleans, Louisiana, this 8th day of September, 1981.

JOHN MINOR WISDOM



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

c

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
V S .

STATE OF LOUISIANA, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION 
No. 80-3300 
SECTION "A"

BEFORE WISDOM, Circuit Judge, and SCHWARTZ and WICKER, District 
Judges
SCHWARTZ, J.

This matter came on for hearing September 8, 1981 to
determine whether the Court should adopt the consent decree 
proposed by the parties. The Court entered an order approving 
the consent decree on said date, and now sets forth, as 
promised therein, the further articulation of the reasons 
for its approval.

This is only the latest of many federal cases to secure 
minority rights in Louisiana's public system of higher edu­
cation.^ Although this action was formally commenced on 

2/ 3/
March 14, 1974, the consent decree may be justly regarded 
as the culmination of negotiations which have extended over 
twelve years and which have involved almost every branch of
state and federal government; as well as a variety of Amici.

' 1
The consent decree is itfelf the product of over a year of
hard negotiation, and i ̂.embodies a comprehensive desegregation 

» <
plan which "promises realistically to work." Swann v. Charlotte-
Mechklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971). As
we said in our September 8, 1981 order:

When the remedy that is jointly proposed is 
within reasonable bounds and is not illegal, 
unconstitutional or against public policy, 
the courts should give it a chance to work.
United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322,
1333 (5 Cir. 1980).
Although a trial court ordinarily plays little or 

no part in overseeing the settlement of a lawsuit, there are 
certain special situations in which court approval of a



-2-
proposed settlement is required because important public 

interests are implicated. United States v. City of 
supra at 1330 (and cases therein cited). Consent decrees 
in discrimination cases require such approval since these 
cases raise substantial public questions in addition to 
those which concern the named parties. As noted in our 
original order,a proposed consent decree in a discrimination 
case is to be presumed valid by the trial court unless found 
to be unconstitutional, unlawful, contrary to public policy 
or unreasonable. United States v. Miami, su£ra at 1333-1334; 
rottnn v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326 (5 Cir. 1977); see also Ant^ 
strong v. Board of School Directors of the City of Milwaukee,

616 F.2d 305 (7 Cir. 1980).
After careful consideration of the contentions of 

counsel, the record, the lew, end the proposed consent decree, 
the Court determined on September 8, 1981 for reesons therein
end hereinafter set out, that the consent decree must be ep- 
proved.

On March 14, 1974, the Attorney General commenced this 
action on behalf of the United States pursuant to the pro­
visions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States, aSjTitle VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, codified as 42 Ĵ .S.C. S2000d et seq^

in its complaint', the United States alleged: first, that 
the state of Louisiana and its agencies of higher education 
had established, maintained and were perpetuating an unlawful 
dual system of higher education based on race; second, that 
the defendants were the recipients of substantial federal 
financial assistance and had agreed to comply with the pro­
visions of Title VI, as well as all the requirements imposed 
by the regulations of the Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare issued pursuant to said Title; finally, the United 
States contended that its continued efforts from January 1969



-3-
until the date of the complaint to secure the defendants' 
voluntary compliance had failed, and that the defendants 
had steadfastly refused to submit a constitutionally ac­
ceptable plan to disestablish the dual system of public 
higher education. The United States sought injunctive re­
lief, including the formulation and implementation of a 
detailed desegregation plan whereby the dual system could
be promptly and completely dismantled. For their part, the

5/
defendants contended (as they had since first contacted

6/
by HEW in 1969) that the Louisiana School system of higher 
education was in full compliance with the provisions of Title 
VI and the Fourteenth Amendment.

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§2000d, 2000d-l and 28 U.S.C.
SS1345, 2281, and 2284, a Three Judge Court was convened on 
March 28, 1974 to hear and determine the case.

Although the Court's involvement remained relatively 
limited between 1974 and the beginning of 1980, during this 
period the parties were engaged in discovery, the disposition 
of several overlapping cases and with certain issues of 
intervention. See, e.g.: United States v. Louisiana, No.
74-3856 (5 Cir. 1976).

On April 30, 198&v ajt the first of eight pre-trial con­
ferences, the Court suggested that the parties explore the possi­
bility of settling thijT’action* thereby avoiding the substantial *
commitment of resources that would be necessary to bring the case

7
to trial and through appeal. The Court reasoned that an early 
settlement would not only result in a saving of judicial time, 
but would more importantly, allow the speedy vindication of 
minority rights. The consentual nature of an approved settle­
ment provides. In comparison with a court order, a much 
surer foundation for fundamental change, and is much more 
likely to foster the full acceptance and commitment by all con­
cerned that is necessary for any plan to realize its full potential.



-4-
The parties began active settlement negotiations in May 

of 1980, exchanged a number of settlement proposals, and 
conducted numerous negotiating sessions. These negotiations 
intensified in February of 1981, and by August, proposals 
were being exchanged on an almost daily basis. When accord 
was ultimately reached, the parties' proposed consent decree 
was presented and approved by the Court on September 8,

1981.
In approving the consent decree, the Court has carefully 

considered the provisions of the consent decree itself, the 
briefs of all counsel (including those of amici), the record, 
and the law. The factors hereinafter set out substantiate 
that in this particular action, the consent decree is within 
reasonable bounds and is not "unreasonable, inequitable, or 
contrary to public policy." United States v. Miami, supra.
The consent decree is therefore entitled to a "presumption 
of validity," id., and this Court's approval. The Court con­

cludes that:
(A) The consent decree resulted from vigorous arm's length 

negotiations which were conducted by knowledgeable and ex­
perienced counsel. T£e £ourt has had many opportunities to 
become acquainted witlr'counsel during conferences. It has 
also had ample opportunity to assess counsels' knowledge and 
skill in pleadings, memoranda, and briefs. The Court is con­
vinced from its own observation, that the consent decree was 
the product of bona fide negotiations conscientiously conducted 

by capable attorneys.
(B) The record reflects that during the course of seven

and a half years, the parties, counsel, and this Court have each 
devoted hundreds of hours to these proceedings. Substantial liti­
gation expenses have been incurred by all the parties to this 
lawsuit. If this suit is not settled now, it might be several 
years, including appeals, before this matter could be resolved. 
rr 'V v o  — o  %  1 • r~ fr.«i tt>c  . j c v f . . .  W f » )  1 t" ^  . . .w h i0 .r—R  ^ , to* ., . -



-5-
benefit most from the consent^decree: minority students and 
traditionally Black colleges. The sooner that the measures 
contained in the consent decree designed to enhance Black 
colleges and speed the integregation of the Louisiana system
are implemented, the better.

(C) It is difficult to speculate about the precise in­
junctive relief this Court would have fashioned if the action 
had gone to trial and the plaintiff prevailed; however, the 
Court notes that the desegregation plan embodied in the Consent 
Decree is substantially similar to that which the parties 
might have formulated pursuant to a Court Order subsequent to 
factual findings by this Court of a history of de iure segre­
gation. The Court further notes that a desegregation plan 
arising in the context of a consent decree enjoys substantial 
advantages over an identical plan formulated pursuant to a 
court order. Implementation is likely to be more effective 
and acceptance speedier where, as here, the plan is not the 
result of a command from a court, but is rather, the result of 
conscientious effort and cooperation among educators, federal 
and state officials, in conjunction with responsible members 
of the community.

(D) The plan itself ^ppears to be a sound one for achieving 
a unitary system of pubtic higher education within a Constitution­
ally acceptable timetable. The Consent Decree provides a reason­
able and. comprehensive statewide approach to both the systematic 
integration of the Louisiana higher educational system, and the 
enhancement of its traditionally Black institutions.

The Court, in evaluating the plan, has taken cognizance 
of the well recognized and important differences between higher 
education and elementary or secondary education. Geier v. Punn, 
337 F. Supp. 573, 578-580 (M.D. Tenn. 1972); Adams v. Richardson, 
480 F.2d 1159, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Norris v. State Council of 
Higher Education, 327 F. Supp. 1368, 1373 (E.D. Va. 1971) affM



per curiam, 404 U.S. 907 (1971); Sanders v. Ellington,,
288 F. Supp. 937, 943 (M.D. Tenn. 1968); see also, 
the Revised Criteria Specifying the Ingredients of Accept­
able Plans to Desegregate State Systems of Public Higher 
Education, 43 Fed. Reg. 6658, 6660 (February 15, 1973). Al­
though there is now available a considerable record of ex­
periences which the courts and other agencies of government 
have had in fashioning remedies for racial discrimination in 
primary and secondary schools, experience with state systems 
of higher education is limited and of only recent occurrence. S 
Adams v. Richardson, supra at 1164. Therefore the Court is, 
and should be, reluctant to substitute its own judgment for
that of the parties, until after the plan here, as well as

10/
those proposed in other states, have had a chance to work, 
or until experience has clearly demonstrated that measures 
which today seem promising are in fact not so. As educators, 
the Courts and members of government charged with enforcing 
anti-discrimination laws move into an unaccustomed area, 
perhaps all that is clear is that the well tested remedial 
measures that have proved effective in the context of primary 
and secondary education, must be abandoned in favor of un- 
tested measures more appropriate for eliminating discrimination

'«.l/
in a university system.''

The Court finds £ftat the Consent Decree's desegregation
plan makes specific commitments to (1) shaping the processes 

12/ 13/
of admissions and recruitment; (2) solving the problem14/
of student attrition (especially "other race" students);
(3) resolving the issues and problems arising out of program
duplication, and the allocation of curricular offerings among

15/
the state's institutions; (4) understanding the appropriate
role to be played by traditionally Black institutions and

16/
making provisions for their immediate enhancement; (6) taking 
substantial steps to achieve a more equitable balance in the 
racial composition of the staff, faculty, and governing boards



-7-
of the university system.

The Consent Decree provides specific goals and time­
tables for increasing other race participation in every 

* I7/aspect of the university system's life. These are 
reasonable, specific, and realistic. Happily, there is 
nothing which indicates the plan will lead to a lowering of 
academic standards in any way. On the contrary, in the long 
term, the plan seems likely to allow the system to marshal 
its considerable resources with considerably greater efficiency 
in the future than it has done in the past.

T’h®^Consent Decree also provides a system-wide reporting 
system which the Court believes will: (1) promote compliance 
with the plan; (2) make the process of monitoring the system's 
progress simple and inexpensive for both state and federal 
government personnel; and (3) provide all the parties, as 
well as the general public, a quick and sure means of evaluating 
the merits of the plan as implemented, and to correct any un­
suspected inadequacies which might be revealed thereby.

In summary the Court finds that the consent decree which
it approved in its order of September 5, 1981 embodies a
reasonable and specific system-wide desegregation plan which
promises realistically l<£work.%

New Orleans, Louisiana, thisJOtAday of November, 1981
f'



F O O T N O T E S

1/ See for example: Wilson v. Board of Supervisors, 92 F.
Supp. 986 (E.D. La. 1950); Tureaud v. Board of Supervisors,
116 F. Supp. 248 (E.D. La. 1953); Ludley v. Board of Super­
visors of L.S.U., 150 F. Supp. 900 (E.D. La. 1957) , 
aff'd 252 F.2d 372; McCoy v. Louisiana State Board of Edu­
cation, 332 F.2d 915 (5 Cir. 1964).
2/ A complaint was filed by the United States on this date 
in the Middle District of Louisiana against the State of 
Louisiana, the Louisiana State Board of Education, and forty- 
two named individuals in their various capacities as officers 
of the governing boards of the Louisiana higher educational 
system: The Louisiana State Board of Education, the Louisiana 
Coordinating Council for Higher Education, the Louisiana State 
Board of Supervisors, and the Louisiana Board of Regents.
3/ Consent Decree of the parties dated September 8, 1981.
4/ The complaint was subsequently amended to reflect changes 
made to the governing structure of the Louisiana higher edu­
cation system. After January 1, 1975, the old governing 
boards were superseded by four new boards: the Board of
Regents, the Board of Trustees for State Colleges and Univer­
sities, the Board of Supervisors of Southern University and 
Agricultural and Mechanical College, and the Board of Super­
visors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural and 
Mechanical College. See L.S.A. Const. Art. 8.
5/ See Answer filed May 10, 1974 , 1il4, and the defendant's 
Information for Preliminary Pre-Trial Conference filed May 2, 
1980.
6/ Louisiana was one of many states which were the subject 
of an HEW evaluation of compliance with Title VI. In January 
1969, HEW concluded Louisiana was operating a racially segre­
gated system of higher education. Mississippi, Oklahoma, North 
Carolina, Florida, Arkansas, Pennsylvania, Georgia, Maryland 
and Virginia were subsequently found to be operating higher 
education systems in violation of Title VI. See Adams v. Richard­
son , 356 F. Supp. 92 (D.C; 19?3) 94 and generally.
7/ The memorandum submitted by the United States in support of 
its Motion for Pretrial Conference dated March 13, 1980, con­
tains the suggestion J^hat this action could require twenty 
trial days.
*8/ In particular, Grambling College and the Southern University 
System.
9/ See Consent Decree, 11(7) pp. 17-26.
10/ For example, Oklahoma, North Carolina, Florida, Arkansas, 
Georgia, Maryland and Virginia.
11/ For example, only under the most extraordinary circumstances 
would a district court consider compulsory student or faculty 
assignment in the context of higher education although such 
remedies have been used in the context of primary and secondary 
education. See Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, 267 F. 
Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala., E.D. 1967).
12/ Consent Decree, II (2)(c), p. 4.
13/ Consent Decree, II (2) (D), pp. 4-8.



-2-

15/ Consent De«ee 23.
tt f 7  ̂(C) , P. 22; II W/ t'

pp, 8-9

16/ See Footnote 19.
17/ see consent Decree II sener.lly. PP 
IB/ Consent Decree VIII. P- 26-28.

2-16.



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This form aerves as ycur (Lipping label and must accompany all Federal Express rx rmtjSt le a rn  aad package* aeat through ibe DOI 
Dvemigb P i iprrie m TVtr m L-b Service (DOI OSDS). DO) OSDS wiU DCt accept a without tbit form or i t  (be form b  bcocplete.

)V mc near tbn  Federal Expr-cxi doe* act deliver K> a Fact Office Boa or Poe Office Bax Zip Cade. T hb  form a  for ahipmens to all 
SO U S  a m  only. Ybu most bjc a Federal Express INTERNATIONAL AIR WAybH 1 for all other Incarioca.

Outgoing Federal Express thipmenn placed b  your office's caegoing mall box will be picked op Monday through Friday, during regular 
man pickup times, and nkra totbe Federal Express Service Cesser. Outgoing shipments prepared afer 4 p.m. taext be a im  as your building's 
KwHrootn or placed b  a Federal Express drop baa located b  your bunding for pickup by DOJ OSDS.

g ' lpimr nn nVw directly to Federal Express or prepared for Santrtay pickup must have a completed Federal Express Airbill ard not thb 
form. Ybur account nunbet muxt be mdicated on tbe abbill. AmngeTnens for Federal Express pickup oc Saturdays must be made by- 
calling HOO-238-3355. or tbe shipment may be taken to a Federal Express Service Cemrr that b  open oc Saturdays.

Federal Express mailing packages, boxes and tubes are available in limned quantities from the mailroom located b  your building and may­
be ordered from Federal Express by calling 1-800-238-5353. T hb form b  available from tbe mailroom k x aed  b  yctir building and may­
be ordered through normal Ripply channels- -

V ysuhrec-que-sdons or need information regarding Federal Express services, cal] your building's mailroom, Justice-Management Divbion'i 
Mail Management Services at 202-514-2353. or Federal Express at 1-800-238-5355.

JUS . 2

U S. GOVERMENT SHIPMENT - GSA CONTRACT NO. GS-OOF-13300 WITH FEDERAL EXPRESS

r
SENDER'S FEDERAL EXPRESS ACCOUNT NUMBER 1 DATE

1 5 D 7 ~ S ^ 1 4 - 6  ;  7/22/94 j f l f  ?  r
FROM (Type or print clearly )

U n i t p d  S t a t e s  D e p a r t m e n t  of J u s t i c e
TO (Utc this libel ooJ> for sh ip s ra a  within 50 U.S. sates)

Sender's Name
M i c h a e l  S. M a u r e r ,  E s .

Sender's Pbooe Number
C O 2) 5 1 4 - 4 0 9 2

Recipient's Name
Artnur C. M c F a r l a n d ,  Esq.

Rccipieni's Pbooe Number
£03) 722-3376

Office, Board, Division, or Bureau Name

., C i v i l  R i g h t s  D i v i s i o n ,  E O L S
Organiratioc Name

Street Address and Room Number
10t h  &  P e n n s y l v a n i a  A v e n u e ,  N.W., Rm.

Some: Address and Room Number (No poet office baa) .

12 Magazine Street
Oty

W a s h i n g t o n '
S atr Zip Cede
D C  2 0 5 3 0

Csy
C h a r l e s t o n

Suts
- SC

Zip Code
29402-1452

JW M ENT (Check oedy one box)

O  Bill Rcdpiexn's FedEx Acet. No.r 

O  Bill 3rd Piny's FedEx Acre No t

EF HOLD FOR PICKUP. PRINT FEDERAL EXPRESS ADDRESS HERE 
Street Address

Cay Stas Z i p  Code

SERVICES (Check ooly ooe box) _  _

D  Government Overnight Service (Delivery by 5 p.m. next business day)

D  Priority Overnight Service (Delivery by 13.30 a.m. next h trin rtt day)

D  Heavyweight Service (For any shipment over 150 fot.)

iRfcCLAL HANDLING (Check aervicc required, as appropriate) 

D Hold for Pickup (Fill b  address block aboe)
D  Saturday Delivery (Extra charge)

D  Holiday Delivery. If Offered (Extra charge)
YOUR DECLARED VALUE (If o e r  E 5 0  per piece, o: over 59.07 per lb. per 
piece If g reatr)