Stanley v. Darlington County School District Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Public Court Documents
July 22, 1994

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Stanley v. Darlington County School District Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 1994. 70357ef8-c49a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/39f63442-e2d8-4b4a-a01f-fb8017a73f78/stanley-v-darlington-county-school-district-joint-proposed-findings-of-fact-and-conclusions-of-law. Accessed April 19, 2025.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA FLORENCE DIVISION THEODORE WHITMORE STANLEY, et al.. ) )Plaintiffs, ) )and ) )UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) )Plaintiff-Intervenor, ) ) v - ) CIVIL ACTION NO. ) 4:62-7749-2DARLINGTON COUNTY SCHOOL ) DISTRICT, et al̂ ., ) )Defendants. )---------) JOINT PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW OF PLAINTIFF-INTERVENOR UNITED STATES AND PLAINTIFFS STANLEY. ET AL. r TABLE OF CONTENTS £aqe Citation Form . . . . . . . . . . . vi I. BACKGROUND........................................ 1 A. The Darlington County School District . . . 1 B. History of School Desegregation Litigation Against the Darlington County School District . l 1. Case history prior to 1970 . . . . . 1 2. The 1970 desegregation order . . . . 3 3. Case history since the 1970 Order . . . 5 4. Intervention by the United States . . . 7 II. PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT ........................ A. Witnesses .................................... 1. Dr. Terry B. Grier .................... 2. Dr. Betty A. Cox ........................ 3. Dr. William M. Gordon . . . . . . 4. Mr. Jimmy Newsom . . . . . . . 5. Mr. Byard Stone, Jr....................... 6. Ms. Valerie Harrison . . . . . . 7. Dr. David J. Armor . . . . . . 8. Dr. Connie Hathorn (Deposition Testimony) 9. Mr. Alvin Heatley (Deposition Testimony) 10. Mr. Jesse Hines (Deposition Testimony) 11. Mr. Ervin Mitchell (Deposition Testimony) 9 9 9 10 11 11 12 12 12 13 13 13 13 I 12. Mr. Richard Puffer (Deposition Testimony) 13. Rev. Samuel Young (Deposition Testimony) B. The Darlington County School Board C. The Darlington County School District Has Stigmatized Mayo High School as an Inferior, Black School................................ 13 14 14 Bage 15 1. Mayo has remained a vestige of segregation. 15 2. The effect of the District's failure to implement HEW Plan B has been to keep Mayo isolated as an identifiably black school. 16 3. The Darlington County School District stigmatized Mayo by carving out an exception to its own attendance zone lines to allow white children in the Country Club area to avoid the Mayo attendance zone. . . . 17 4 . 5. The Darlington County School District has further stigmatized Mayo as the black high school by failing to properly enforce school attendance zone lines, thereby allowing white children who reside in the Mayo attendance zone to avoid the school. . . is a. 1988 - 1991 .................... b. 1991 - 1994 .................... The Darlington County School District has stigmatized Mayo as an inferior black school by providing inferior facilities, resources, curriculum and instructional quality................................ a. facilities ........................ b. resources ........................ c. curriculum ........................ d. instructional quality . . . . 18 20 21 21 27 28 30 ii D. E. Page The Darlington County School District has stigmatized Mayo as the black high school through its assignment of personnel........................ 31 a. principals • • • • 31 b. faculty • • • • 32 c. classified staff • • • • 33 The Consent Order Entered into by the United States, the Private Plaintiffs, and the Darlington County School District Promises to Work to Eliminate All the Vestiges of Segregation in the District............................ A Desegregation Remedy that Simply Closes the Mayo High School Facility Places a Disproportionate Share of the Burden of Desegregation on the Black Community................ 1. 2. 3 . 4 . The black community has borne the entire burden of the desegregation of the District's secondary schools.................... The District never sought or obtained Court approval for closing historically black schools. * * • • • • Butler Junior/Senior High School could have served as the consolidated junior high school the Hartsville area, but the District instead chose to abandon Butler and spend significant sums of money to renovate the historically white junior high school for that purpose. • • • • • The most appropriate manner in which to share the burdens of desegregation and to remedy the racial stigma suffered by the Mayo community is to establish a county—wide, dedicated magnet school for grades nine' through twelve at the Mayo High School site to be named "Mayo School.'» ' iii a. The black community must be a full and equal partner in any desegregation remedy................................ b. The establishment of a dedicated magnet at Mayo will remedy the racial stigma suffered by the Mayo community. c. The establishment of a dedicated magnet at Mayo is necessary to insure that the burdens of desegregation are allocated fairly................................ d. A dedicated magnet program located at a historically black school, when properly implemented, can remedy past discrimination, further desegregation, and serve both the black and white communities. III. PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ................ A. General Principles ........................ B. Reasonableness of the Consent Order C. Notice to Class Members of the Consent Order and the Holding of a Fairness Hearing . D. The Motion for a New Trial or to Alter or Amend the Judgment . . . . . . E. Appropriateness of a Dedicated Magnet at Mayo High School .................... 1. The nature of the constitutional violation determines the scope of the remedy. 2. The Court, sitting in equity, possesses broad discretion to fashion appropriate desegregation remedies................ ^• The Court must fashion a remedy for the injury and stigma inflicted on the race disfavored by the constitutional violation. eaqe 38 38 39 40 42 42 44 46 47 49 49 50 50 iv 4. The Court must insure that the burdens of desegregation are allocated fairly and equitably. . . . . . . . . 51 page IV. PROPOSED STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A DEDICATED MAGNET AT MAYO S C H O O L ................ 52 V. CONCLUSION 54 Certificate of Service Appendix A: United States v. Louisiana. No. 80-3300 (E.D. La. Sept. 8, 1981) (order approving entry of consent decree) United States v. Louisiana. No. 80-3300 (E.D. La. Nov. 30, 1981) (reasons for approving entry of consent decree) v Citation Form References to transcripts are as follows: TR I Monday, May 23, 1994 TR II Tuesday, May 24, 1994 TR III Wednesday, May 25, 1994 TR IV Thursday, May 26, 1994 TR V Friday, May 27, 1994 TR VI Tuesday, May 31, 1994 TR VII Wednesday, June 1, 1994 TR VIII Thursday, June 2, 1994 TR IX Friday, June 3, 1994 References to exhibits are as follows: G EX United States exhibit D EX Darlington County School District exhibit vi I. BACKGROUND A. The Darlington County School District The Darlington County School District is located in the northeastern part of the State of South Carolina, in the area known as the Pee Dee Region. There are four communities in the county, namely, the City of Darlington, which is the county seat; the City of Hartsville; the Town of Lamar; and the Town of Society Hill. According to 1990 census data, the population of Darlington County was 61,851. G EX 42 (not admitted into evidence). In 1993-94 the District operated 24 schools, including two high schools with career centers, two high schools, three junior high schools, one middle school, and sixteen elementary schools. The racial composition of the student enrollment in Darlington County has remained fairly constant since 1970. In 1970-71, the total student enrollment was 12,903, of whom 7,044 (55%) were black and 5,859 (45%) were white; in 1993-94, the total student enrollment is 11,710, of whom 6,372 (54%) are black and 5,294 (45%) are white. (The remaining 44 students are other ethnic minorities.) G EX 43. Prior to July 1, 1987, the District was divided into three distinct areas. Although there was a superintendent for the entire school district, there was an Area Superintendent in each of Darlington, Lamar and Hartsville. Each Area Superintendent was responsible for the functions that, since July 1, 1987, have been handled at the central administration level, including: buildings and grounds, budgets, agendas, bus routes, majority-to- minority transfers, and enforcement of student attendance zone lines. TR V at 57, line 3 - 58, line 13 (Newsom). B. History of School Desegregation Litigation Against the Darlington County School District 1. Case history prior to 1970 On May 29, 1962, black students in the Darlington County School District sued the District for "operating the public school system . . . on a racially segregated basis," and for "refusfing] to present a plan for desegregating the public schools." Complaint at 2, 5 (5/29/62). On July 13, 1964, ten years after Brown. this Court found that the District was indeed continuing to violate the Constitution by its operation of a dual system of education. See Opinion and Order at 6-7 (7/13/64). Accordingly, this Court issued an injunction that prohibited the District from discriminating on the basis of race, and ordered the District to desegregate its school system. From that day forward, the District was obligated to come up with a plan that "promised realistically to work," Green v. Countv Sch. Bd.. 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968), and to make sure that, in practice, the Plan proved effective in "eliminat[ing] from the public schools all vestiges of state imposed segregation." Swann v. Charlotte- Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.. 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971). The first plan proposed by the District was a "Free Transfer" plan, which was approved by this Court on July 13, 1964. Opinion and Order (7/13/64). Two years later, however, on August 25, 1966, this Court vacated the order implementing the plan because it found that the plan failed to effectively desegregate the school system.1 The Court ordered the District to submit another plan. The District submitted plans on January 27, 1967 and March 10, 1967, each of which was found by this Court to be constitutionally defective. See Order at 2 (3/10/67). Finally, on March 10, 1967, this Court ordered the District to implement a "Freedom of Choice" plan. One year later, however, this Court found that the "Freedom of Choice" plan, though once considered constitutionally valid, did not in practice achieve the desegregation requirements articulated by the Supreme Court in Green. Order at 1-2 (9/13/68). The District responded, however, by resubmitting its old "Freedom of Choice" plan. On March 31, 1969, this Court again declined to find that the plan was sufficiently effective for constitutional purposes. Order at 9-10 (3/31/69). This Court then ordered the District to work with the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) to come up with a new plan. id. If the District could not agree on a plan with HEW, the Court said, then HEW should submit a constitutional plan for the District on its own. Id. In fact, the District refused to accept HEW's recommendations, and HEW submitted its own plan on June 2 1969.2 "It is beyond question that the plan in its present form does not, as a matter of law, conform to the directives and decisions handed down after the plan was imposed . . . . The Court finds as a fact that in two years of operation the plan has not accomplished orderly, significant desegregation of public schools." Memorandum Order at 3 (8/25/66). 2The HEW report was entitled "A Desegregation Plan For Darlington County Public School District," and contained two plans, later referred to as "HEW Plan A" and "HEW Plan B." Plan B used geographic attendance zone lines to improve the racial balance in the schools, whereas Plan A used zone lines and pairings of schools to achieve a greater degree of desegregation. The Court of Appeals endorsed Plan B only because the Supreme Court had not yet handed down its decisions in Swann and Davis v. (continued...) 2 At a hearing on July 14, 1969, the District rejected the HEW report and submitted yet another "Freedom of Choice" Plan. The Court, per Judge Martin, approved the District's plan and stated that "the School District is operating in good faith to fulfill its primary responsibility for abolishing the system of segregated schools as required by Brown.11 Order at 4 (7/28/69). On appeal, however, the Fourth Circuit vacated Judge Martin's order, and on January 19, 1970, the Court of Appeals ordered the District to implement a desegregation plan based upon Plan B of the HEW report, or upon any other plan that would create a unitary school system. See Stanley v. Dari incrton County Sch. Dist., et al.. 424 F.2d 195, 196-97 (4th Cir.), reh'a denied, 424 F.2d 198 (per curiam), cert, denied. 398 TJ.s. qdq (1970) . 2. The 1970 desegregation order Its previous order having been vacated, this Court reconsidered the matter in a hearing on February 3, 1970. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's order in Green and the Fourth Circuit's immediate order, the District once again submitted a Freedom of Choice" plan to this Court. In the alternative, the District sought court approval of a version of HEW Plan B "as amended and as corrected by the school board." Hearing Tr. at 13 The original, unmodified HEW Plan B was contained in paqes 48a through 49j of the HEW report. Plan B contained zone maps delineating new attendance zones which HEW believed might desegregate the schools. Plan B also projected the number of black and white students that would attend each school as a result of the new zoning. At the hearing on February 3, 1970, Judge Martin rejected the District's plea for another "Freedom of Choice" plan, and indicated his inclination to order implementation of the original HEW Plan B. Hearing Tr. at 43, 61. Accordingly, Judge Martin asked the District why it had changed HEW Plan B. id. at 61. 2(...continued) Ipard of .sch. Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33 (1971), which instructed judges to "'make every effort to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation, taking into account the practicalities of the situation.'" Adams v. School Dist. No. 5 4^2 * 4r.T\2d "' 100 (4th cir*) (per curiam) (quoting Davis" 402 U.S. at 37), cert^ denied, 404 U.S. 912 (1971). After Swann and givis, Plan B could be adopted only if the defendants proved that Plan A was impractical. See Adams. 444 F.2d at 101. 3 In response, the District asserted that it had "not changed the HEW plan B"; rather, the District claimed that the maps submitted to the Court by the District simply superimposed Plan B's general lines upon specific streets. See id. at 62-64. Moreover, the District claimed that the "corrected" projections were simply a more accurate head count of the students within each attendance zone. Id. at 62. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, pointed out significant changes to the original Plan B zone lines, and indicated that the effect of these changes on desegregation could not be assessed because the District had not provided spot maps to indicate the race of the children in the various school zones. Id. at 32-34. Nevertheless, Judge Martin, believing the District's revisions could not be factually evaluated before the Fourth Circuit's deadline for a new plan ran out, ordered implementation of the District's zoning proposal based on the representations of the District's counsel that the District had not changed HEW Plan B. See id. at 64-69. Judge Martin emphasized, however, that the zone lines submitted by the District were only provisionally approved depending on what kind of results the lines produced: "I just don't want to give the impression that this is the finality regardless of what might arise, because it's a continuing situation." Id. at 70. From that point until the nine-day trial in 1994, this Court at no point was given an opportunity to examine whether the zone lines it approved actually implemented HEW Plan B.3 Apart from student assignment, this Court's 1970 desegregation order also contained provisions relating to faculty assignment, transportation, curriculum, student activities, services, and vocational programs. See Stanley v. Darlington County Sch. Dist., et al.. No. 7749, slip op. at 2-3 (D.S.C. Feb. 5, 1970). In regard to faculty assignment, the order reguired that the faculty race ratio at each school be "approximately the same as the ratio throughout the system." id. at 3. When the District reported back to the Court on April 30, 1970, with the results of the "modified" Plan B, the District's own data revealed the following: (1) Every historically black elementary school remained between 80% and 100% black in its student enrollment; Examination of the District's maps, now attached to the 1970 order, reveal that the revisions submitted by the District were significantly different from the HEW Plan B zone lines. 4 (2) Every historically black secondary school remained between 92% and 99% black in its student enrollment; (3) Nine of the seventeen historically white schools remained racially identifiable in its student assignment (i . e.. departing from the district-wide average by more than 20%)? and (4) Fifteen of the District's twenty-eight schools were out of compliance with the Order's requirement that their faculty race ratios be approximately the same as the district-wide average (i.e.. departing from the district-wide average by 10% or more). See School District Report in Compliance Feb. 5, 1970 Order of the Court (filed April 30, 1970). 3. Case history since the 1970 Order One year after this Court issued its 1970 desegregation order for Darlington County, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). In Swann, the Supreme Court addressed itself "to the problem of defining with more particularity the responsibilities of school authorities in desegregating a state-enforced dual school system." Id. at 18. The Court recognized that, up to that time, district courts "had to improvise and experiment [with desegregation remedies] without detailed or specific guidelines." IcL_ at 6. This difficulty in developing remedies prior to the Supreme Court's directives in Swann is reflected in Judge Martin's comments when considering a remedy for Darlington County, a year before Swann; "The appellate divisions of the federal court have never given we judges on the trial level a yardstick so to speak to measure the actions of any board in passing on upon that gray area of the law as to what constitutes a unitary system." Hearing Tr. at 21 (2/3/70). In fact, after the Supreme Court articulated the new standard for what constituted a constitutionally effective plan in Swann and £)avis, the Fourth Circuit ordered all school districts awaiting approval of desegregation plans to rewrite their plans in accordance with the two decisions.4 " We are now convinced that all of these judgments must be vacated, . . . and we must remand to the respective district courts with instructions to receive from the respective school boards new plans which will give effect to Swann and Davi^ » Adams. 444 F.2d at 100. -----* 5 Specifically, the Court of Appeals sought to insure implementation of the following principles: (1) "'The district judge or school authorities should make every effort to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation, taking into account the practicalities of the situation.'" Adams. 444 F.2d at 100 (quoting Davis. 402 U.S. at 37); (2) "The school authorities and the district court should consider the use of all techniques for desegregation, including pairing or grouping schools, noncontiguous attendance zones, restructuring of grade levels, and the transportation of pupils." Id. at 101; and (3) "If the district court approves a plan achieving less actual desegregation than would be achieved under an alternate proposed plan it should find facts that are thought to make impracticable the achievement of a greater degree of integration, especially if there remain any schools all or predominantly of one race." id. Shortly after Swann and Davis were decided, the plaintiffs filed a motion for further relief on July 31, 1971, pointing out that the 1970 order needed to be examined against the standards of effectiveness set forth by the Supreme Court in those two cases. Discovery was initiated, but there was never an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the plan was constitutionally effective. Consequently, this Court never made any determination on the merits of the motion, nor did it rule on the constitutional adequacy of the 1970 Order — that is, whether it proved to be effective in desegregating the school and eliminating all vestiges of the dual system. Discovery continued on the plaintiffs' Motion for Further Relief, and the plaintiffs submitted to the Court a proposed desegregation plan on July 22, 1974. A conference was held on October 2, 1974, in which Judge Simons issued an oral order denying implementation of the plaintiff's proposed order, and reiterating that the 1970 Order seemed constitutionally adequate on its face. Although requested by the plaintiffs, no evidentiary hearing was ever conducted to determine if the 1970 Order met constitutional standards of effectiveness. in fact in the three years that followed, no action was taken by either party or the Court, and in 1976 the case was declared inactive. , case was reactivated on July 6, 1983 by the plaintiff's motion for further relief. On September 25, 1985, this Court allowed the plaintiffs to withdraw the motion. No evidentiary 6 hearing was conducted to determine whether the District was in fact complying with the Order, nor was there any evidentiary hearing to determine if the Order had proved to be constitutionally effective. The Court relied solely upon the representations of counsel to find that "it appears that the Defendants are not out of compliance of the existing Orders of this Court up to the present date." Subsequently, this Court has made clear that it never conducted an evidentiary hearing to determine the District's compliance with the Order or the Order's constitutional effectiveness. Hearing Tr. at 43 (8/11/92). Referring to the 1985 order, the Court stated: "I did not have an evidentiary hearing at that time, and made my ruling primarily, if not all together, upon the basis that the plaintiffs stated in open court that they could not prove that non-compliance of Judge Martin's 1970 order existed." Id, at 43; see id. at 16 (no evidentiary hearing held). 4. Intervention by the United States After receiving complaints in 1988 that the Darlington County School District was continuing to operate its schools in a racially discriminatory manner, the United States Department of Justice investigated the District's compliance with federal law. After gathering information for over a year, the Department concluded that the District had failed in a number of ways to comply with its affirmative desegregation obligations. The United States brought these violations to the District's attention and sought to initiate a discussion on how the District could be brought into compliance with federal law. When the District refused to consider steps to effectively desegregate the school system, the United States filed a motion for leave to intervene. In its Complaint-In-Intervention, the United States requested, among other things, that this Court order the defendants "to adopt and implement a plan that will eliminate the aforementioned discriminatory practices and fully desegregate the public schools of Darlington County." Complaint- In-Intervention at 7 (8/15/91). At a hearing on August 15, 1992, this Court granted the United States' Motion for Leave to Intervene. See Hearing Tr. at 46-47 (8/15/91). Subsequently, on joint motion of the parties, the Court agreed to bifurcate the proceedings into a liability phase and, if appropriate, a remedial phase. The Court also granted the District's motions to join the State of South Carolina as a defendant, pursuant to Rule 19, Fed. R. Civ. P., Order (5/14/93); and to amend its Answer (Hearing Tr. at 56 (9/24/93)). On January 8, 1993, the United States filed a motion for summary judgment, which was later joined by the plaintiffs to the 7 fullest extent consistent with the Court's rulings. See Plaintiffs' Response to the Plaintiff-Intervenor's Motion for Summary Judgment (2/3/93). On January 8, 1993, the defendants filed a motion in limine and a motion for partial summary judgment, which essentially sought the same relief, namely, a judgment barring evidence of the defendants' discriminatory practices and non-compliance with federal law prior to September 27, 1985. On March 30, 1993, the United States filed a supplemental memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment. At a hearing on September 24, 1993, the Court denied the parties' motions and scheduled the case for trial. In so doing the Court addressed the District's assertions that the Court had previously found it to have complied with the February 5, 1970 desegregation plan: . . . . Let's seize on that statement so there won't be any misunderstanding. Nobody has ever found that this plan has been complied with. Nobody. I haven't. Judge Simons hasn't. Judge Martin hasn't. Nobody has. Nobody has ever asked to do that. The plaintiffs have raised that issue on several occasions, and defaulted, withdrawn the issue, whatever, but no court that I've been able to find has ever factually determined that the plan has been complied with, and I don't think you can show me where they have. . . . There's never been any finding of fact made, period, since the order was signed. Hearing Tr. at 34-35 (9/24/93). Shortly before the case was to go to trial in April 1994 the trial was rescheduled to begin on May 23, 1994. Pre-trial hearings were held on April 12 and April 29, 1994. At the latter hearing, the Court: (1) ordered that the liability and remedial issues be consolidated into a single trial; (2) granted the United States' motion to preclude the District from introducing evidence and testimony, including results of a public opinion survey commissioned by the District, purporting to show that further desegregation measures at racially identifiable schools would be impractical or infeasible because of resulting "white flight" from the District;5 and (3) ruled that the prior rulings /Evidence purporting to show "white flight" can be considered by a school district, not under a desegregation order that is trying to voluntarily maximize racial balance, see Riddick v.— School Bd. of Norfolk. 784 F.2d 521, 539-40 (4th Cir.), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986); and it can be (continued...) 8 of the Court did not preclude a full evidentiary hearing on the District's activities from 1970 through the present. Meanwhile, the parties (except for the State Defendants) had entered into serious negotiations in an effort to settle all or some of the issues in the case. Ultimately, the United States, Plaintiffs Stanley, et al,. and the Darlington County School District were able to agree on a proposed consent order, which was submitted to the Court for consideration on May 23, 1994. Left unresolved, however, was the fate of the last remaining historically black high school in Darlington County, Mayo, which, along with the question of State liability, was presented to the Court. A full evidentiary trial on these two issues, and a fairness hearing on the proposed consent order, was held over the course of nine days from May 23 - June 3, 1994. II. PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT A. Witnesses 1. Dr. Terry B. Grier Dr. Terry B. Grier was superintendent of the Darlington County School District from about July 1, 1988 through April 1, 1991. A native of North Carolina, he holds a B.S. degree and two Master's degrees from East Carolina State University, and a Doctorate in school administration from Vanderbilt University. He has served as a teacher, assistant principal and principal in various districts, and has served as superintendent in McDowell County, North Carolina; Amarillo, Texas; Darlington County; the 33,000-student Akron, Ohio school district; and was recently named superintendent of the 50,000-student Sacramento Unified School District, in California. TR I at 108, line 25 - 109, line 18; 186, lines 2-6; 186, lines 7-8; TR II at 51, lines 11-13. 5 5(...continued) considered by a court when choosing between constitutionally permissible desegregation plans where each plan would desegregate every racially identifiable school to the extent practicable. See Stell v. Savannah-Chatham Countv Bd. of Educ.. 888 F.2d 82, 84-85, reh'q and reh'q en banc denied. 891 F.2d 907 (11th cir.' 1989). But the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit have made clear that evidence purporting to show "white flight" is not relevant to the question of whether further desegregation measures are practicable or feasible at schools that remain racially identifiable in a former de jure system. See United States v. Scotland Neck Bd. of Educ.. 407 U.S. 484, 491 (1971); Riddick. 784 F.2d at 539. 9 Dr. Grier has received a number of awards and recognitions, including being named by Executive Educator Magazine as one of the country's top 100 school administrators, and he has served on a number of professional boards and committees. He has made presentations at national education conferences, has served as a consultant for school districts around the country, and is the author of over 33 articles published in national and state educational journals. TR I at 109, line 19 - 111, line 6. When Dr. Grier arrived in Darlington County in 1988, the District had neither long-range facility and maintenance plans nor a long-range plan for school improvement. The development of such plans was among Dr. Grier's goals, as was working with the community to garner support for the public schools. TR I at ill lines 10-17; 112, lines 2-12. Dr. Grier's efforts resulted in, among other things, "A Curriculum Audit of the Darlington County Public Schools, Darlington, South Carolina" (conducted December 12 -16, 1988) (G EX 45); Dr. John H. Tunstall's "Educational Facility Master Plan Study for Darlington, South Carolina" (July 1989) (G EX 46); and the "Darlington County School District Strategic Plan 1990 - 1995" (G EX 20). In an effort to work with the community, Dr. Grier met on a regular basis with a variety of civic and community organizations, including ministerial groups, the Darlington County Task Force, school P.T.A.s, and members of the news media. During his third year in Darlington County, the District won 23 awards from the National School Public Relations Association for efforts to communicate and work with the public. The year after Dr. Grier left Darlington County, the District received the South Carolina School Public Relations Association award for the State's outstanding school public relations effort. TR 112 line 13 - 113, line 12. 2. Dr. Betty A. Cox Dr. Betty A. Cox was superintendent of the Darlington County School District from about July 1, 1991 through March 1, 1994. a native of Tennessee, she holds a B.S. degree and a Master's degree from the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga and a Doctorate in educational administration from the University of Tennessee at Knoxville. She has served as a teacher, assistant principal, principal, and has served as superintendent in Towanda, Pennsylvania; Darlington County; and, as of March 1994 superintendent of the 26,000-student Rapides Parish School District, in Louisiana. TR II at 120, line 24 - 122 line 2- 122, lines 10-22. During her tenure in Darlington County, Dr. Cox met on a regular basis with parents' groups, P.T.O.'s and P.T.A.'s, 10 various civic and community groups, and countless individual parents to discuss concerns about the schools. TR II at 138 lines 1-20 (Cox). ' 3. Dr. William M. Gordon Dr. William M. Gordon was accepted by the Court as an expert in school desegregation. Dr. Gordon, a native of South Carolina, is Professor of Educational Leadership at Wright State University in Dayton, Ohio, where he teaches graduate level courses in school administration, school supervision, school law, and curriculum. Dr. Gordon holds a B.A. in Finance and Banking and a Master's degree in Remedial and Diagnostic Education, both from Miami University in Oxford, Ohio. Dr. Gordon also holds a Doctorate in Secondary School Education, Curriculum and Administration from Indiana University, as well as a J.D. from the University of South Carolina, and he is admitted to practice law m South Carolina. Dr. Gordon has published many scholarly works on school desegregation, and has prepared more than seventy school desegregation plans since he began his work as a desegregation expert in 1967. Dr. Gordon has been qualified as an expert in school desegregation by federal courts in more than flftY cases, and has appeared in federal court to offer expert testimony on desegregation issues on several hundred occasions.G EX 68; TR III at 97-104. 4. Mr. Jimmy Newsom Mr. Jimmy Newsom has been superintendent of the Darlington County School District since March 2, 1994. He holds a B.S. degree from Appalachian State University, and a Master's degree and an Educational Specialist degree from East Tennessee State University. He has worked continuously for the District since 1960, serving as teacher and coach (1960-67); Principal, Lamar Elementary School (1967-75); Principal, Lamar High School (1975- 77); Area Superintendent, Lamar Area (1977-84); Area Superintendent, Lamar and Hartsville Areas (1984-87); Deputy Superintendent (1987-94); Interim Superintendent (fall 1987 - June 30, 1988). TR V at 53, line 7 - 54, line 19. At a Board meeting in February 1994, Mr. Newsom was appointed to serve as interim superintendent until June 30 1994 and was given a three-year contract to serve as superintendent beginning July 1, 1994. Neither position was publicly noticed or advertised. TR V at 142, line 14 - 143, line 6 (Newsom). Prior to his becoming Deputy Superintendent in July 1987 Mr. Newsom played no role in and would have had no specific ' knowledge of: the assignment of principals, faculty and staff in the Darlington Area; the enforcement of attendance zone lines in the Darlington Area; any efforts to insure that white high school students residing in the Mayo attendance zone attended that 11 school; the curriculum offered at Mayo High School; or the facilities at Mayo. TR V at 119, line 8 - 122, line 18 (Newsom). 5. Mr. Byard Stone, Jr. Mr. Stone is currently the District's Assistant Superintendent for Operations, a position he has held since 1991. He holds a B.S. from Clemson University and a Master's degree and an Educational Specialist degree from the University of South Carolina. He has worked continuously for the Darlington County School District since 1975, serving as Assistant to the Area Superintendent in charge of federal programs and finance (1975- 76); Assistant Area Superintendent for Finance and Personnel (1976-80); District-wide Director of Federal Programs (1980-82); Assistant to the District Superintendent (1982-87); and Assistant Superintendent for Finance and Operations (1987-91). TR V at 169, lines 1-25. Prior to assuming his duties as Assistant Superintendent for Finance and Operations in 1987, Mr. Stone had no primary role in the day-to-day maintenance of schools, and he would not have been directly familiar with the resources or curriculum offered at Mayo as compared with St. John's High School. TR VII at 45, line 23 - 46, line 1; 46, line 17 - 47, line 6 (Stone). 6. Ms. Valerie Harrison Ms. Harrison is currently the District's interim Assistant Superintendent for Curriculum and Instruction, a position she has held since April 1994. She holds a B.A . and a Master's degree from South Carolina State University, and a "Master's plus 30 certification" from the State Department of Education through courses at the University of South Carolina. She has worked continuously for the Darlington County School District since 1981, serving as a teacher at Rosenwald and St. John's High Schools (1981-89), Chapter One Parent Coordinator, Curriculum Development Coordinator, and Secondary Coordinator. TR VIII at 77, line 18 - 78, line 24; D EX 100. Ms. Harrison would have had no personal knowledge of the curriculum, resources, equipment, textbooks and reference materials offered and available at Mayo High School from 1981 through 1989. TR VIII at 88, lines 3-23. Ms. Harrison was promoted to the District administration by Dr. Grier. TR VIII at 88, line 24 - 89, line 1. 7. Dr. David J. Armor The District relied upon the testimony of its consultant, Dr. David Armor. Dr. Armor is a sociologist who has served as a consultant for many school districts involved in desegregation 12 litigation. He holds a Bachelor's Degree in Mathematics and Sociology from the University of California, and a Ph.D. in Sociology from Harvard University. TR VI at 42, lines 9-25; 173, lines 5-22; 174, lines 17-20. 8. Dr. Connie Hathorn (Deposition Testimony) Dr. Hathorn was principal of Mayo High School from 1989 to 1991. He holds a B.S. from Arkansas A&M, a Master's degree from the University of Arkansas at Fayetteville, and a Doctorate from Iowa State University. Hathorn Dep. at 5, line 9 - 8 , line 24 (7/15/92). 9. Mr. Alvin Heatley (Deposition Testimony) Mr. Heatley was employed by the Darlington County School District from 1964 to 1991, serving as the Executive Director for Elementary Education (1989-91); Principal, Rosenwald Elementary School (1987-89); teacher and coach, Hartsville High School (1981-87); teacher and coach, Butler High School (1977-81); teacher and coach, Hartsville Junior High School (1976-77); and teacher and coach, Rosenwald High School (1964-76). Mr. Heatley attended the Darlington County public schools and was graduated from Butler High School in 1956. He holds a B.A . from South Carolina State College and a Master's degree from Winthrop College. He also has completed further studies at South Carolina State College and Winthrop College. Heatley Dep. at 5, line 5 - 7, line 3 (7/16/92). 10. Mr. Jesse Hines (Deposition Testimony) Mr. Hines was a member of the Darlington County School Board from 1991 to 1992. He holds a B.S. degree and a Master's degree from South Carolina State University, and an Educational Specialist degree from the University of South Carolina. Hines Dep. (vol. I) at 5, lines 10-18; 6, lines 3-8 (11/10/92). 11. Mr. Ervin Mitchell (Deposition Testimony) Mr. Mitchell was principal of Mayo High School in 1992. He holds a Bachelor's degree from Florida A&M University, a Master's degree from the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, an Educational Specialist degree from the University of Tennessee at Knoxville and, at the time of his deposition, was expecting to receive a Doctorate from Vanderbilt University. Mitchell Dep. at 6, line 25 - 9, line 1 (11/16/92). 12. Mr. Richard Puffer (Deposition Testimony) Mr. Puffer has been a member of the Darlington County School Board since 1984, and he currently serves as Chairman. He holds a Bachelor's degree from the State University of New York at 13 Portland and a Master's degree from Carolina. Puffer Dep. at 3, lines (6/3/92) . the University 14-22; 4, lines of South 10-23 13. Rev. Samuel Young (Deposition Testimony) Rev. Young has been a member of the Darlington County School oard since 1978. He holds a Bachelor's degree from Morris College. Young Dep. at 6, lines 18-24 (4/22/92) B. The Darlington County School Board The Darlington County School Board consists of twelve members, who are elected from single-member districts. TR III at 8, lines 9-13 (Cox). - T1?e of the Darlington County School Board are setforth in the Board Policy Manual, Darlington County School District" (G EX 19). . , ^Thf School Board is responsible for setting the policies of he District; the superintendent, who works at the pleasure of the Board is charged with carrying out these policies and making recommendations to the Board. TR I at 113, lines 15-22 (Grier); TR II at 122, lines 13-22 (Cox). The School Board has sole authority for transferring and assigning pupils. G EX 19 at § ABB, C.4; TR II at 125 lines 13- I7 (Cox); TR V at 151, lines 7-10 (Newsom). ' The School Board has ultimate authority in the District for 15-18°(Cox)1 °f SCh°01 attendance zone lines. TR II at 144, lines . . The School Board has ultimate authority in the District for hiring, assigning and dismissing all personnel, including principals, faculty and staff. TR I at 113, line 18 - ??4 iinP 7 (Grier); TR II at 122, line 23 - 123, lini 4 ; 124, liji i4 - 125, line 6; 190, line 24 - 191, line 11 (Cox); TR V at 151 lines 11-19 (Newsom); G EX 19 at § GBC-R. ' The School Board has ultimate authority in the District for authorizing school construction. TR I at 114 lines 8-1n (Grier); TR II at 122, line 23 - 123, line 4 . The School Board has ultimate authority in the District for maintaining and upgrading the District's facilities since no money can be spent unless approved by the Board ?r I a? l?4 lines n-17; 115, linen 2-4 (Grier); TR II at 122, line 23 - i23 line 4; 147, lines 21-23 (Cox). 123' 14 The School Board has ultimate authority for the allocation of resources throughout the District. TR I at 114, line 24 - 115, line 1 (Grier); TR II at 122, line 23 - 123, line 4 (Cox). The School Board is responsible for choosing the curriculum offered at each school in the District. The School Board has ultimate authority in insuring the uniformity of curriculum throughout the District. TR I at 191, lines 6-9; 191, line 19 - 192, line 5 (Grier); TR II at 122, line 23 - 123, line 4 (Cox). Unlike many school boards, the Darlington County School Board enjoys fiscal autonomy, in that it can simply vote to raise the millage, i.e.. property taxes in the county. TR I at 175, lines 21-24; 176, lines 12-21 (Grier); TR V at 156, lines 1-14 (Newsom). C. The Darlington County School District Has Stigmatized Mayo High School as an Inferior, Black School. The evidence shows that, through action and inaction, the Darlington County School District has over many years stigmatized Mayo High School as an inferior black school. Dr. Gordon testified that the history of the District's treatment of Mayo High School revealed that the District had taken affirmative steps to maintain Mayo as a racially identifiable black school with inferior facilities, resources and curriculum. TR III at 181, lines 15-23; 187, lines 13-19 (Gordon). Nothing prevented the School Board from providing Mayo students what it provided students at the other three high schools: properly maintained facilities, quality instruction, and equal educational opportunities in terms of curriculum. TR II at 214, line 21 - 215, line 1 (Cox). 1. Mayo has remained a vestige of segregation. In the Consent Order signed by the parties and entered by the Court on June 3, 1994, the parties stipulated that "the D^xiiugton County School District has not fully complied with the desegregation order and federal law in this case, and that vestiges of the prior dual system remain in the Darlington County School District." Consent Order at 2 (6/3/94). The parties further stipulated that Mayo High School is one of eleven racially identifiable schools in the District that remains as a vestige of the prior dual system and is in need of remedial measures. Consent Order at 2 (6/3/94). Mayo High School, which was designated for black children in the days of legalized segregation, has never lost its racial identifiability. A review of the student enrollment figures for each year from 1970 through 1993-94 shows that Mayo's racial 15 identifiability has remained constant since 1970. In other words, the link between the dual system and the current disparity has never been broken. G EX 43. Even though concerns about racially identifiable schools and recommendations to further desegregate the District's schools, including Mayo, were expressed to the School Board by Dr. Grier, Dr. Cox, the Curriculum Auditors and the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools, the School Board refused to take any action. Dr. Grier was told by one white board member that the community was not ready for integration and that that would never happen in their lifetime. TR I at 166, line 8 - 169, line 4; 206, lines 18-23 (Grier); G EX 45 (Curriculum Audit) at 59-62; G EX 47 (SACS Report) at § IV. While the School Board implemented strategies to address many of the recommendations contained in the audit, the Board did nothing to address the auditors' discussion about integrating the schools, including Mayo. TR V at 138, line 19 - 142, line 6 (Newsom). A Strategic Plan developed by Darlington citizens and led by School Board members called for the pairing of historically white and black schools, including St. John's High and Mayo High, to assure curricular equity and accessibility. The Board, however, refused to implement any of these proposals, and instructed Dr.' Grier and his staff not to take any steps to implement them or redraw attendance zone lines. TR II at 21, line 19 - 23 line 18 (Grier); G EX 20. Dr. Grier also contacted Dr. Larry Winecoff, a school desegregation expert, to study the possibility of pairing schools or redrawing attendance zone lines to further desegregation. The Board thereupon voted to instruct Dr. Grier and his staff not to pursue this matter further with Dr. Winecoff. TR I at 167 lines 14-23; TR II at 24, lines 1—5 (Grier). The defendants' own witness, Superintendent Jimmy Newsom, testified that even though steps could have been taken to further desegregate Mayo High School, the Board has not chosen to take such action. TR V at 152, lines 3-8. 2. The effect of the District's failure to implement HEW Plan B has been to keep Mayo isolated as an identifiably black school. The District took affirmative steps to maintain Mayo as a racially identifiable black school by failing to assign white students to the school. First, the District failed to implement the secondary school attendance zone line of HEW Plan B, which would have assigned one historically white elementary school (Pate) and one historically black elementary school (Brockington) 16 to the Mayo High School feeder pattern. Instead, the District implemented an attendance zone line that assigned the three historically white elementary schools (Pate, Spring and St John's) to the historically white St. John's High School feeder pattern, and assigned the two historically black elementary schools (Brockington and Cain) to the historically black Mayo High School._ According to Dr. Gordon, the zone lines substituted by the District for the HEW Plan B zone lines maintained Mayo as a racially identifiable black school and sent a message to the community that Mayo "is the black school. [The] school for black children." Dr. Gordon concluded that the District's practice of maintaining Mayo as a racially identifiable school stigmatized the school, regardless of the pride the Mayo students and community take in the school. As Dr. Gordon pointed out, even in the days of de lure segregation, black citizens took pride in t^®^‘r .s5:h°?ls Regardless of the stigma inflicted upon them by official discrimination. G EX 4 at 48 (a)-48 (j); G EX 14; TR tit „14?! line 23 - 152, line 25; 154, lines 2-15; 163, line 24 - 3; 167' lines 5-13; 181, lines 11-23; 209, line 15 - 210, line 23 (Gordon). 3. The Darlington County School District stigmatized Mayo by carving out an exception to its own attendance zone lines to allow white children in the Country Club area to avoid the Mayo attendance zone. The 1970 Court Order requires that students attend school according to the "geographic zon[e]" in which their "residence" ^.Q°ca^?d- Stanley v. Darlington County Sch. Dist.. at ai No 7749, slip op. at 2, 1 I (D.S.C. Feb. 5, 1 9 7 0 ) . ------- c . ^c^ordin? to its own Policy manual, the Darlington County pSpUs. T ex ?9 af! §^hority for transferring and assigning An examination of the District's attendance zone map shows unequivocally that the "residences" of students living in the Darlington Country Club" area are located in the attendance zones of historically and identifiably black schools (i.e., Mayo GafY and Cain>- G EX 17/ 18, 18a, 18b; TR I at llTTline 21 - 134, line 16; 136, lines 10-15 (Grier). of f J heJ 0li°Wing streets ali lie on the Mayo-B.A.Gary-Cain side f L f t h P ? nKe.ZOue boundary, which separates these schools from the St. John s High-Brunson-Dargan-Spring school zones- Ervins Pasture Road, Tee Circle, Fairway DrivS, Green Drite woo^S of C°unJry club Road, Arapaho Circle, Roanoke Drive, Woodcreek Road, Wyandot Street, Shoshone Drive, Nez Perce Road -ni 3 5 ^ U n f l S^rier).G EX ” ’ 18a' 18b; TR 1 at 134' line'l7 17 The students who reside on these streets are, however, assigned to St. John's High, Brunson-Dargan and Spring schools. G EX 18 ("Access and exit to Darlington Country Club provides attendance to St. John's High, Brunson-Dargan Junior High, and Spring Elementary, per previous determination."); TR I at 137, lines 2-4 (Grier) . The residents of the "Country Club" area are white. TR I at 136, line 18 - 137, line 1 (Grier). On several occasions, Dr. Grier discussed with District officials the possibility of changing the assignment of students residing in the Country Club area, but was told not to pursue the matter further because of the political liability of doing so. TR I at 138, line 21 - 139, line 23 (Grier). If the students living in the "Country Club" area attended the schools that, based on the location of their "residences" they ought to have attended, further desegregation at the racially identifiable black schools (Mayo, B.A . Gary and Cain) would have been achieved. TR I at 139, line 24 - 140, line 6 (Grier). A review of the record of this case, including the earlier court transcripts and orders of this Court, reveals that the School Board never sought and, therefore, never received, approval from this Court to grant a special attendance zone dispensation to the "Country Club" area citizens. Dr. Gordon testified that Mayo High School was stigmatized as an inferior black school by the District's deliberate assignment of the white children in the "Country Club" area to St. John's High School — even though those students clearly resided within the Mayo High School zone. G EX 17; TR III at 182, line 15 - 183, line 15. The District therefore undermined desegregation of the Darlington County schools and perpetuated the stigma of inferiority on Mayo High School by assigning the "Country Club" area students to the historically white schools outside their attendance zone. 4. The Darlington County School District has further stigmatized Mayo as the black high school by failing to properly enforce school attendance zone lines, thereby allowing white children who reside in the Mayo attendance zone to avoid the school. a. 1988 - 1991 Dr. Grier testified that, based on his observations and experiences, when he arrived in the District in 1988 the District 18 was not properly enforcing the school attendance zone lines. TR I at 116, lines 13-22. Dr. Grier testified that enforcement of the attendance zone lines had not been a priority when he arrived in the District. He characterized enforcement as "loose," and there had been no procedures in place to monitor compliance. TR I at 123, line 20 - 124, line 17. Dr. Grier personally investigated issues relating to zone line compliance, including meeting with parents and school officials, reviewing permanent records, and driving through neighborhoods and visiting alleged residences. Based on his personal investigations and observations, Dr. Grier concluded that when he first came to the District, the problem of students attending schools not within their proper zones was "widespread." TR I at 124, line 18 - 125, line 19. Based on his personal investigations and observations, Dr. Grier concluded that the predominant race of those attending schools not within their proper zones was white, and the schools these individuals sought to avoid were the historically black schools, including Mayo High School. TR I at 125, line 20 - 126, line 11; TR II at 21, lines 2-6. Dr. Grier had many discussions with District officials about students attending schools not within their proper zones, including Deputy Superintendent Jimmy Newsom; Assistant Superintendent Byard Stone; Transportation Coordinator Willie Boyd; Board members Edward Hursey, Tommy Jeffords, Thelma Dawson, Jack Ham, Alex Stanton, William Howell and Hardin Evans; a number of principals, including Frank Bouknight and Connie Hathorn; and other school officials. TR I at 128, line 16 - 129, line 10. Based on these discussions, Dr. Grier understood that white students sought to avoid schools like Mayo, in part, because of the perception that the schools were inferior in terms of facilities and curriculum. TR I at 129, lines 11-22. Prior to Dr. Grier's arrival in the District, it is unclear whether any District official was responsible for insuring that the District's attendance zone lines were enforced. Dr. Grier filled this vacuum in 1988 by making Deputy Superintendent Jimmy Newsom specifically responsible for enforcing attendance zone lines. TR II at 90, lines 10-25 (Grier); TR V at 123, lines 13- 24 (Newsom). During his tenure as superintendent, Dr. Grier instituted procedures to enforce the attendance zone lines, including requiring parents to fill out verification forms and present proof of residence (e.g., a utility bill). TR II at 91, lines 19 qt_1Z ^Gr:'-er) ' TR v at 122» line 19 - 123, line 4 (Newsom); D EX 3t 3 • b. 1991 - 1994 Dr* C°X t?stified that, upon arriving in the District in 1991, she received a number of complaints about students attending schools outside of the attendance zones in which thev resided. TR II at 125, lines 20-25? 126, line 25 - 127, line 2 ̂LUX j • Early in her tenure as superintendent, Dr. Cox brought complaints about zone line violations to Deputy Superintendent Jimmy Newsom for a determination. Later on, however, as Dr. Cox received more complaints and investigated the matters personally she concluded that there were, in fact, students attending TRhTT1^°??Q°f1■°ne that Mr* Newsom was not doing anything about. TR II at 129, lines 10-25 (Cox). Dr. Cox testified that she personally knows of students in two predominantly white subdivisions in the Mayo attendance zone Palmetto Shores and Dewitt Acres — who are attending public schools in Florence. TR II at 131, line 11 - 132, line 25- 135 line 16 - 137, line 14 (Cox); G EX 18(b). ' ?r* ?OX hestified that the "instability" at Mayo High chool, with its frequent turnover of principals during the past several years, has contributed to the District's inability to enforce the Mayo attendance zone lines. TR II at 134, lines 2-18\ j • Dr. Cox testified that she had had numerous discussions with parents, citizens and community groups about the refusal of white citizens m the Mayo attendance zone to send their children to Mayo. TR II at 140, line 19 - 141, line 2. ?r* C°x testified that, during her nearly three years as penntendent, she provided Mr. Newsom numerous names of Save ?he May? attendance but not attending (Cox) TR 111 1 25’ llnes 18_20; 26' lines 18-24; 29, lines 1-7 Mf: News°m admitted that he has received many complaints and allegations about students not attending schools in the f H en??nCe zones in which they reside. TR V at 68, lines 16-21- 126, lines 7-9; TR VII at 10, line 25 - 16, line l'(Newsom); G EX -BaZed hfr nearly three years as superintendent of the i^gton County School District, Dr. Cox concluded that the Mayo attendance zone lines were neither "consistently" nor "aggressively" enforced. TR II at 144, lines 5-14 (Cox)? 20 5. The Darlington County School District has ^ i ^ - 1Zed 5ay° aS an inferior black school by providing inferior facilities, resources, Y curriculum and instructional quality. Darlington °Su£ty UP°n arrivin<? inSsr SStgp-pS r & S 5? « ' a.Dust that sad. I saw it firsthand." TR I at 130, liles 4-13? Mr. Mitchell testified that, compared with St Tnhn ie « SMT'SirSiS.TiJf"1" schOD1- »“*>£?.£: T ^ t: KJS. as an^inferior b?ack' has stigmatized Mayo maintenance, a poor physical annaaV1 lng bhe sch°o1 with inferior materials, inferior grounds jS?,.,.fanCe' lnadei3uate instructional facilities. BaJed on hiS ?;u^ of the £ 0? ? ^ " a"d substandard According ^ - ' ^ S i a U yir“iesnĉsii;?L":nviE?a-rovided hto “ ss .High School, Mayo offered an comPared Wlth St. John's o ^ t h I i ? f in s ? r S c W o ia ? a^ y ? aU™ n? I H ? a« facilities and v ? i i t e d X o ? S^ fsJw ^ocLrs^ith C?”e t0 the District bathrooms; a new science wina devoid o-f kh ^ the and other laboratory materials- teanhor.bUbffa burners, beakers desks during a c a d e m i c behlnd hallways. This all contralted ItaJklJ Sf?h fu an?!ring the testimony ^ l o ^ t s T ^ t ^ “ * c o n d i t i o L o f t h e S y o ^ T ^ ^ : U n e s V i s , 21 63, ' lineal. 157' llne 8 (Grier) ; Heatley Dep. at 62, line 17 - walked Hathorn' "i my eyes to see someone being edu^ted^iL b^ought tears to conditions." Dr. Hathorn testified that^ th°Se l.t I0*?*7 in the 1960's in Mississippi it was better than it was at Mayo [in 19891 our'facil?t'1 Went t0 an all"bla^ schooi, than S W®re 9t leaSt a little b*tter Hathorn Dep. at 12, line 16 - 13, line 16; 14, lines 5-8. facility w ^ ^ ^ o u f a n ^provid^Ho^ W?lk^ Y behind the May° inside the classroom? Protection from rain; there were no florescent liqhts^th had n0t been droPPed and Mayo; the media center was "Sark an? Si??? «° C°mputer lab at in disrepair; the science fShioc Ieabi and the tables were no gas hooked in; many of the^cho^l^elfetrepair and there was dysfunctional; and the school ?????; ? eleftncal outlets were painted in five to ten years. §£ l l i ^ e s 1! - ^ ( ^ e r P roof ^ a t e d ^ a n d ^ S ^ u r ? ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ C!lllng da"age becaus® its of the other high schools sSff2?edsi»f? "ere HI"3" uater- None 143, lines 7-20 (Grier) sutfered similar problems. tr i at the gymnasium and the^SckS^rooms at Mav^ Came„to the District and m "deplorable" condition and ht H Y ^ embarrassing" to those of the other high schools as n??Ear^ ”ayo'5 facilities at 161, lines 6-17. like night and day." tr I marquee in front ̂ f the^Shool ^ S e n ^ t h ^ ^ '..Mayo did not have a schools did. TR I at 142, lin4 23 - l ^ ^ U n e V ^ ^ high Dargan JuniS^High^chSSl01^ ^ ^ ^ ! ? i StrfCt' SUCh as Bruns°n- comparison with Mayo's. In^isculSi^a ?hS needs'.they Paled in Tunstall, for example, Dr. Grier analysis of Dr. John needs identified at Brunson-Daraan t?tad ^ that many of the related to overcrowdingIt\ £ V * g cilitv T^ s t a 1 1 report Brunson-Dargan, however the 1 tY*, There was not at over years" at Mayo.VGtr ITztVl l°in exlsted' -Line 20 _ 73, line 9 (Grier). 22 In short, at the time Dr. Grier arrived in 1988, Mayo "was a pretty sad environment" in comparison with the other high schools m the District. TR I at 141, lines 23-25 (Grier). At Dr. Grier's initiative, the District took steps to redress some of the problems at Mayo High School. The covered walkways were replaced; the ceilings were dropped; a computer lab was installed; the tables from the media center were removed and refinished; paint was provided and members of the community came in and painted the hallways and classrooms (even though, as Dr. Grier testified, the historically and identifiably white Pate elementary school had been painted twice in two years by the District's staff); Mayo's then-principal, Dr. Connie Hathorn, organized Sunday clean-ups at Mayo where members of the community came in and landscaped the grounds; a commons area with paved walkways and picnic tables was built behind the school; a marguee was erected in front of the school; and $50-60,000 were spent °Y®r a two-year period to upgrade Mayo's media center and replace old reference materials. TR I at 157, line 9 - 159, line 12 (Grier). ' Nonetheless, Dr. Grier testified that when he left the blsbricb in 1991, a great deal more work was needed at Mayo Moreover while the curriculum at Mayo had been upgraded, it was Ttli1nnot ^?mParable to that of the other three high schools. TR I at 193, line 19 - 194, line 22; TR II at 77, lines 14-20 (Grier). . Nothing has prevented the School Board from properlv ^Grier^1115 MaY°’ TR 1 at 143' lines 21-24; 193, lines 10-18 . Tbe_School Board has ultimate authority in the District for maintaining and upgrading the District's facilities, since no money can be spent unless approved by the Board. TR I at 114 lines 11-17; 115, lines 2-4 (Grier); TR II at 122, line 23 - 123 line 4; 147, lines 21-23 (Cox). ' ... the. superintendent of the District, Dr. Cox was familiar with the maintenance of the District's schools and she visited the schools frequently and regularly, including visits to several schools each week. TR II at 144, line 19 - 145, line 6 (Cox). Typically, maintenance is performed at a school after the principal submits a work order to the maintenance department. Typically, also, it is not the Superintendent's job to get involved in the day-to-day maintenance of schools, since that responsibility has been delegated to the Assistant Superintendent for Operations, Mr. Stone. However, because of the many complaints she received about work not being performed, Dr Cox was involved in the maintenance of schools Almost on a da^to-day 23 ,?R 11 at 145' ^ines 7-23; 155, lines 19-25 (Cox); TR VII at 35, line 16 - 36, line 24 (Stone). Dr. Cox testified that, in general, schools with predominantly black student enrollments received less attention from the maintenance department than other schools. According to Dr. Cox, either the work did not get done or, if it did it was done in a "shabby" manner. TR II at 146, lines 4-15 (Cox). Dr Cox further testified that, of all the schools in the istrict, the school that received the least attention from the maintenance department was Mayo High School. TR II at 147, lines 2 4 (Cox)• Dr. Cox testified that on many occasions she discussed the poor maintenance of Mayo High School with the individual responsible for school maintenance in the District, Assistant i-UJJrinte£jent f°̂l Operations and Maintenance, Byard Stone, and that Mr. Stone offered the excuse that there was no reason to put much effort into Mayo because the people there do not take care of the facility and vandals tear up the work. TR II at 147 3-4^S22213l i i ^ ^ in<%?1 '-,147' linS 5 <Cox)' TR V at 207, lines ' 2, lines 23 223, line 11 (Stone) (citing vandalism). Or. Cox testified that Mr. Stone referred to Mavo1s demographics" as the reason for difficulty in maintaining the Dr- ?ox understood Mr. Stone to be referring to the fact th3ty,!?aY? 1S 1?cated ln a predominantly African-American neighborhood with, what Mr. stone indicated, significant violence and police problems. TR II at 206, lines 4-12 (Cox). Dr. Cox disagreed with Mr. Stone's assessment of the probiems at Mayo, emphasizing that the problem at Mayo was not vandalism, but poor workmanship by the District's maintenance n£es“ (c ™ " at 147' lines 14‘20; 165' lines «-»■■ “ “ qrhon?r'fSoX^te^^5^ed that/ in comparison With St. John's High thJ facilities at Mayo are "significantly inferior" and that Mayo has "many more" facilities needs than any other school in the District. The magnitude of the maintenance problems at TRYllWat greater than at any other school in the District. Icox*. 1 8' lines 25; 152' lines 16-20; 158, lines 18-23 Dr. Cox testified that when work is finally performed at and°then m u s t ^ l V 0 inferior that it: does more harm than good, and then must be done over. In her opinion, "virtually nothincr l?nVJ7 y? « aSibeen quality." TR II at 148, lines 6-25; 164 line 17 - 165, line 21; III at 44, line 17 (Cox). 24 25 list was incomplete and a misrepresentation of Mayo's actual needs. The document failed to accurately show, among other things Mayo's needs for: carpeting; repairs to or ^placements f inside doors, including gym doors; ventilation in the gym and of ttl lZr Paintin *̂ re-roofing, including repairsof the roof of the administrative building, which leaks; a covered walkway from the administrative building to the other the 5ampUS; Plastering; elimination of the flooding of Mayo s grounds; new lights in the gym and library; science equipment; and a weightroom, since Mayo is the only high school .Dlstrj-ct without one. D EX 86; TR II at 179, line 11 - 187, line 16 (Cox). ' District administrators continue to apply a double-standard CSmeSc5° deterTTlinin<3 maintenance needs at Mayo High $201 765 Rut Sh6 est^ t®d Mayo's current maintenance needs at$201,765. But when asked to estimate the possible cost of implementing a dedicated magnet school at Mayo — a school that would attract white and black students from throughout the District --Mr Stone testified that the capital costs associated facLpPgradln' thS facillty "" including construction of a new facade, canopies, an elevator, and replacement of rooms and doors ™ v S ft ?7a\ at ^ ast ».6 million. TR V at 179, lines t-2°7 TR VII at 77, line 1 - 81, line 1; TR VIII at 49, line 12 - 5n line 21 (Stone); D EX 86. ' 12 50' District's failure to properly maintain and make re?ainS 9 May° has had a detrimental impact on Mayo's students. As Dr. Cox testified: y When you're there year after year and you see a uildmg falling apart, then it certainly makes you question, whether you're an educator or whether you're a student, what value is my education here? How good is this school? [T]he_students and the staff there start to question if people can allow my school to get in this condition, then how good am I as a student there. I must not be very valued to be in that school. TR II at 160, line 2 - 161, line 2 (Cox). According to Mr. Mitchell, it seemed that the Mayo facilitv "was just left to deteriorate." He testified that such In Y environment "had a direct effect on how the kids felt about themselvee and their school, and that the neglect of tSe Mayo facility was an important part of "the major problem at Mavo" £ r n n e T dUOe<J teem..' Mitchell 26 b. resources The School Board has ultimate authority for the allocation of resources throughout the District. TR I at 114 line 24 - 115, line 1 (Grier); TR II at 122, line 23 - 123, line 4 (Cox). Mr. Mitchell testified that in terms of the quantity and type of resources, Mayo was an inferior school when compared with St. John's. Mitchell Dep. at 63, line 24 - 64, line 5. Dr. Grier testified that when he first visited the media center at Mayo the most recent reference books and encyclopedias were over twenty years old, while at the other three high schools the materials were new. TR I at 130, lines 19-24 (Grier). Dr. Grier's administration initiated a "uniform textbooks adoption process" to insure that all schools adopted the same textbooks for the courses being offered. This process has not been completed, and it was discovered recently that one high school Mayo -- still had older textbooks TR VIII at 85 lines 4-9; 95, line 22 - 96, line 20 (Harrison). Dr. Grier's administration also initiated a process of allocating resources uniformly, a process that has not yet been completed. Ms. Harrison conceded that Mayo has lagged behind the other high schools in terms of the resources that have been allocated to it. TR VIII at 94, line 9 - 95, line 21 (Harrison). When Dr. Grier arrived in the District, Mayo had no computer lab even though the other three high schools did. In 1992 when Mr. Mitchell became the Mayo principal, there was still no* computer lab at Mayo, and the science equipment was totally inadequate, lacking such basic resources as microscopes and dissecting equipment. TR I at 142, lines 12-22 (Grier); Mitchell Dep. at 76, line 2-23; 60, line 21 - 61, line 16. According to Dr. Grier, the District neither allocated the ;resources to Mayo as was provided to other high schools, nor allocated adequate resources to Mayo to redress past deficieAcies at-that school. TR I at 143, line 25 - 144, line 19; 145, lines At the time Dr. Grier arrived, the District also employed . fee structures that students were charged to help pay for such things as books, computers and other educational equipment. Since many Mayo students are from lower economic backgrounds they were unable to pay these fees. Thus, even though the District was allocating money to schools on a per pupil basis at the time Dr. Grier arrived, Mayo was shortchanged because iJ was already behind the other schools in terms of facilities and resources and because per pupil allocations failed to provide for Mayo students what other high schools were being provided 27 through the payments of fees. 21; 146, lines 2-18 (Grier)." TR I at 144, line 23 145, line Sh°r L e ^ Mayo trcompa?eYto.Th?Serrju2ttw^sn'teqUiP?;nt at What was there was t st wasn 1 any there, answer your o« L d’v» „And agai"' I'U St doh^s b2t f iould say ^ o u ^ C to eniarge that and say compared to Hartsville Hiah or [Lamar] High and I'd answer the Hlgh :ust was not in existence. ILleTas “ had ' computers9°and t h l v ^ S i SChools £and] they 2 2 . ^ ~ ^ f ^ y Chra0dSCe0^?pm:ntd TR I at 142, lines 3-11. c. curriculum o«ereSea?Cea°S s ^ o l V?hTSis t r i c t ° r the ™«iculu» ultimate authority in insuriSa th£ f SCh°o1 Board hasthroughout the District TR I ati!?lf°fmity of curriculum 192, line 5 (Grier); TR II at 122, liAe^T? ^ ^ " Manual'hrequires^'thatCevery s t ^ t “ « * * « ' B°“ d Policy opportunities regardless of ethnic or JaciJ?^ "®qual educational 19 at JAA. nic or racial background." g EX The manual also states" "Th-ic opportunity serves as a guide f o r t h * k PS °f equal educational making decisions relatJd^o school *nd the staff inpersonnel, selection of educational e3nPloy»ent of curriculum and regulation^a ° ? ^ ^ S ; ; . . ^ ^ ^ ' a t JAA. its o i S * p ^ i ^ b? ,S S y g ; t.“ ;iD^ r i o t has, however, violated students at Mayo High School.9 tr !l County "school Board^pproved t h e ^ o M S I i o ^ and the Darlih9ton curriculum audit. TRP? at 1 4 ? f *“ • DarlingtoJ^County SchoS^Diltrict WSS born6 bV th® the SONOCO Products Company, which has' tY 28 29 The other three high schools in the District nf f ^ ^ ril-24a (?o^;eL ^ i ! ^ YD°p.C: r 54? U n e s M^ ? 6 . TR 111 to taKet^u?sesa?hafar;nn:tCo?fer;deettS J°Sn 'S High Sch°o1 p a ? ? I L l « ° StUdents can that the scAoo? 0? ^ ° ^ travel to anoSI?'scSoSf ?oJCJ cou^sfand"^ arehunwillln9 to particular^616 Students have requested the Boa?d ?o o ? f e r T " s t - r -function of the size of Lvo k°?her three high schools is not a the District. TR I at 152, line 17 - 1I3, l i n ^ ^ r i e ? 69166' by curriculurahguides'throughoutrtheSDistrict6baP^n9 Unl f° ™accelerated upon her arrival f ^ process that Dr, Curriculum Audit were considered "gospel^bv^hofe^ ^ $he • developing these curriculum guides r a n charged with ”■ ““ i v t t i w i z l l ; IIs: u p grad ed d S ^ h i J ^ n u r e ^ A e f h ^ l e f ? S e ^ i s S S t -MaY° was a?f 7 "iK 11 at 77, lines 14-20 (Grier). entity ultimately^espo^sibl^fo?9cSrricu?tY SJh°o1 Board' as the the District, from insu?iia thf? 5, • at each sch°o1 in High School was comparable to that of f e r e d ^ t ^ t ^ at .MaY° school. TR I at 191, line 19 - 192 l?Sfs (Griir^ S Hlgh Cox d. instructional quality followSdTpatte^o? £ ^ i £ Pfrinten*enta' the Board hasteachers to h i s t o r i c a l 1JSS1competent or problem School. Mayo has been perceived*^0 andPt£tlCUlarly May° High a "dumping ground" for years for som<r extent has been,teachers, who were not L i ! teachers, particularly white at 164, line 1 line 22 jatisfactoriiy elsewhere. TR I TR II at 190, lines £-13 (Cox). llnas 20"23 30 t v S ’Y lr J P "ba°«ay° May° not teaching, tid^itting around doing°nothingC”Sein°^ 1seaCh6rS A^cSrding torM^°UMit?h^ilS''thaS "Very ”UCh" ® p^oble'" * Mayo. 4; 47, line 24 - 49, lin4 4 ' ' llne 18 ~ 120' line personnel, and nothiig^reJented0!?1^ ^ the assi^nment of inetructots to Mayo „?g£ SSSS?f ^ " ^ - ^ ^ i n e 4 6. The Darlington County School District has its^assignment^of*8 bla°* »^hSchool through its assignment of personnel. y a. principals h i r i n g handa a is J g M n g Cp S n L p a ? r L B? h f s hh S ? ° l e a u t h ° r i t V f o r a t GBC/GBD; id ^ a t GBC-R/GBD-R, p? f ( - - m J e f?iSaT j C t: -G EX 19 r e g a r d in g em ploym ent in t h e sc A o S l d i s t r i c t s h a ? ? h f eC12 10S b o a r d .” ) ; TR II a t 191, l i n e s 5 - l i (c S x )^ made bV t b e that P ^ feDs ^ S 0pe?sonnn % S1 n°=\^d1nSr ^ r S 'OW? P°licies « 0 » i ™ t h e b a s i s o f q u a l i f i c a t i o n s a iS i e ? r ? 9 ..Pand i h ^ S .'. b e M r e d "on e d u c a t o r s r e c e i v e f a i r and e q u a l t r e a t m e n t 1 n i? ,0J •t y em ploym en t o p p o r t u n i t i e s ." g EX 19 a t GBC/CRn * ^n c ^ dln(? • • • D i s t r i c t " i s co m m itted t o n r n v in in ! ^ GBC/GBD. F u r th e r m o r e , th e en h a n ced by t h e P» S i f S n S r ^ » i 3 b S i S S ° S j 1S S i - P j r i e n c i c r e e d s , s e x e s and e t h n i c i;de;s;,*a£ S S ™ 8 - a b la c k p r i n c i p a l . G EX 37 ; TR V a t 1? 6 , U n e s ^ " ^ w s o m ?.3 s c h o o f “ a S S„ h i t e r p r t a c iS a ^ s bJ a ck P r i n c i p a l s t o " w h ite" t h e D a r l in g to n C ounty S c h o o l Board a°n S/ ° o l s w ere b lo c k e d by members t h l t h e c “ ld nS£ a s s i m a 'w h ? ? ; G n e r “ a s t o l d b>" B° « d at 1 6 1 , l i n e 1 8 - 163 , ? in e I f f c r i e r ) P r in C lp a l t o May ° - ™ I 31 Nothing prevented the Darlington County School Board from aJSt??in?-PrinCipalS tC> any sch°o1 without regard to race. TR I at 198, lines 16-20 (Grier). * x nic+.T.?y1_aS^ gniI!? °*}ly black principals to Mayo High School, the District stigmatized Mayo as a school for black children. ?r-.Gofdon' the District's practice of assigning only black principals to Mayo caused the school to retain its lit 3 bla°k SCh°0l‘ G EX 39' NOS- 4' III at former Darlington County School Board member Jessie Hines testified, white applicants may not have been interested in applying for the position of principal at Mayo High School simply because it's Mayo." Hines Dep. at 34, lines 10-25! Since 1991, Mayo High School has had five principals and other interim personnel running the school. The contract of the for^the ?jQ4-q?al,KR°?SeVelt Davis' was not renewed by the Board _J9®4 5 scb°°l year, even though Dr. Cox had placed a re<;01™ endation f°r renewal in his personnel file prior 24 ^Cox?!P Ure fr°m thS District- TR 191> line 14 - 192,Pline ^ tUrj°Ver in a school's leadership adversely affects of a unffo™ and Sta5f/ negatively impacts on the implementation 192 lii5 ?? ^ cu^um' and lmPedes the learning process. TR i?n4 81 (Harrison)!' ^ 2° (C°X) ; TR VI11 at 100' 15 - 101, No other school in the District has had as much instabilitv linee2mtcSj)PrinC1Pal tUrnover' as May°- TR 203, line 20 - 204^' b. faculty . P 1® ?;970 court order requires that the faculty of each facJniv f aJ bS ^nte^rated so that the ratio of N^gro and^hite faculty members of each school shall be approximately the same as “ h " E ? th^U9hcut the system Stanley. ff 11970 ̂ ' et a1 •' No* 7749> slip op. at 3, f III (D.S.C. Feb. . . The Darlington County School Board has final authority to hire professional/certified teaching personnel, based on thp recommendation of the superintendent. G EX 19 at GBD. Throughout the 1980s, the percentage of black faculty at 39y°No?S2?°re than tWiCe that °f the Strict-wide fveSgJ. G EX 32 i opp Df,l G£^ f testified that, when he arrived in the District in tu®8' 55 District was n0t even close to being in compliance with the 1970 order, and that he transferred 35 teachers to try to •ringJab0^t comPliance- °ne school board member, Edward Hursev introduced a motion at a board meeting to try and block the transfers and another board member, Thelma Dawson, succeeded in blockmg transfers of white teachers to Mayo, ther4by leaving Mayo out of compliance. TR I at 194, line 23 - 195, line (Grier); G EX 39, No. 2. a ,Dr\ Gofd°n tesbified that the District stigmatized Mayo as a black school by assigning a disproportionate number of black faculty and staff to the school, in violation of the requirements of the 1970 court order. G EX 39, No. 2; TR III at 182 lines 7- 14; TR IV at 172, line 8 - 174, line 11. ' S 7 c. classified staff the suneT-?nfon2gt?n County Sch°o1 Board, upon recommendations of the superintendent, is responsible for hiring classified personnel. G EX 19 at GCC/GCD. The personnel office is responsible for assigning classified personnel to the various schools/departments." g EX 19 at GCE. According to the School District's definition, classified c l e ^ n i d ^ h e ? 65 library aideS' - V a r i e sclerks and other assistants. G EX 19 at GC. ha?- aiways had a disproportionately high number of black classified staff. TR V at 137, lines 18-24 (Newsom)? D* C01} 3 ^ Order Entered into by the United States,the Private Plaintiffs, and the Darlington County schooi District Promises to Work to Eliminate All the Vestiges of Segregation in the District. In an effort to resolve the claims of the private clainti ffc and the United States against the Darlington County School District, the parties entered into good faith negotiations anrt Y0l- tarl)y agreed to the stipulations and S e JImedfal plaS set J?ne 3?ni99?.C°nSent °rder' which was entered by the Cou?t on Jordon testified that, in his opinion, the desegregation plan set forth in the Consent Order promised to effectivelv desegregate the Darlington County schools and eliminate th^ vestiges of segregation in the areas of faculty and staff Dr Gordon concluded that if the provisions regarding student assignment, faculty and staff assignment, transportation curriculum and extra-curricular activities were implemented in good faith, the Consent Order promised to effectively desegregate 33 TRer??ratn?n?n ?°Untyschools to the maximum degree practicable ik iii at 106, lines 24-25; 107 iinPQ i-n. n „ 77 p accicaoie.lines 20-25. ' ±ines 1 1> H4, lines 2-7; 117, E. A Desegregation Remedy that Simply Closes the Mavo Hi l u r l l n JS°ility PlaC6S 3 ^Proportionate sSare o? Burden of Desegregation on the Black Community. s s a S s that closes Mayo High School^ould not privj t ^ n S y 0" reI"edY is essential for^ successful H^o0teStlfled that a ma(?net at Mayo because; (l) it would enhance g r e g a t r e m e d y for Darlington students back Into the S£lir Segre?at^ n by attracting white it would remedy the stiSS ^ schools in the Darlington area; (2) — S S in f3f ̂" 131, lines 1-10; 202, lines 2-10. 130' llnes 12‘25; minority Children has^otTbeen one^f bJJJdens of.dese9regation on S S F S ? ss. High (in Society Hill); and SDauldinrr t R?sei")wald Junior/Senior Lamar). The District ooeratfS^ 9 Juni°r/Senior High (in children; Hartsvill^ High lL ^ h' secondary schools for white Darlington). ^ Lamar Hlgh' and st* John's High (in s c h o o l s , i t haS d S n e ^ o ^ y ^ l o s i n q ' ^ t h ^ h i s t c ? n s °J-i d a t e h ig h 5^5i., the whit^IeconL^rschSoir^oMt^ct^16 ““ “ ree'^istorically0'different site in ll?7 f„S S? t J ?9 a n e " faciiity on a H I at 192, lines U - L ^ G o r d i n U * Hl9h SCh°o1' G E* 3S, TR 34 When Rosenwald High School was closed after the 1981-82 r Ex ^?ai enroii- nt iqoi_o^en uUt}Br Junior/Senior High School was closed after the 198i 82 school year, at had a total enrollment of 400 students of whom 97% were black. G EX 43. sruaents, When Spaulding High School was consolidated with Lamar- w-irrv, School and downgraded to a junior high school aJter ^he w L - s f vhCr ^ n er r e S^ ^ nV ? 2 « ? ° t a l ° f 250 « " o f . . Thf closings of Rosenwald and Butler disproportionatelv «s “ »• ™ Butler were closed, were able to identify any steps taken or amr ftSdent^or^^ bY the District' to assist the displaced black Y respectively^0 S ^ T a T l ^ ^ ^ f - n w a l d and Butler, T s l o ^ 1 ' llneS 10-17; 53: S s s ^ i S 3llysf ̂ ehh!gh SShools to the children were6assigned St. John's and Hartsville resnoot-i voi \r 3- - t i - o e - r̂adiS lrr n¥t¥i>s“a""ha" s°nl- - - c- j o i „ r u ns s ..b a?Rk^ ? “ t t i - :% ? % •* _ t r t r n i r v t i T e i R~ ^ 2. The District never sought or obtained Court approval for closing historically black schools. Obtaining prior court approval has not been ono nf S S t S S . ^ S vya r ? o o r h S e n - r i 3 f 0L S 10! ^ L SlS°?31S (^ t h e ,183, lines 19-21 (Stone). ' SS 20 23 (Newsom); and °tSn? = ? n " l9h High, all without having obtained prior court app?ovafPor 9 demonstrating to the Court that these changes compiled SIth 35 3. w e ^ „ a l„ ^ ^ ? n i! !“ S S S ) bT i S ^ ? V thCourt that no such approval has eve? beeA g _(state”ent bV the Junior/Senior High School could have served Har£«J-M?nSOl:Ldate<i junior high school for the Hk 116 area/ but the District instead chose to abandon Butler and spend significant sums of money to renovete the historically white junior high Y school for that purpose. ’ could^SfhPPn1,0 DS' Gordon' the Butler High School facility could have been used as a consolidated junior high for the H a^t^nJ6 yTea' rather than using the historically white S r d e M Cha~ Ct- L e d « "theline iQ 1 0 1 Y that he had seen. TR III at 192 community. TR V at 189, line 21 - 190, line 4 (Itone? District’s'^own'witness^^Mr^stone ttT'" Butler and Hartsville lunior was "b??i?I??v h® acr?age at ;.“mVss r r ^ : facility and’is lS?atIde?ntaab4tt?rhsitIithanBHaJ?r “?? * better High. TR IV at 169, line 10 - 170, line S ?Go?do?I JUnl°r 48 class??o?s "of whiSh 6e2i?f1S?tti?tusefttVii1fiJUni°r High had testimony was iontradStedb” t“ Mst???! • s ° o w f J T * 29' hls responses, which Mr. stone helped prepare Sh?oh 1"terJ°9atory Una 3; 89, line 18 - 3 ^ ' l ^ J ? g ^ ' l ^ t V ^ I ^ e ’8' had a ^ p e r m a n e n t ^ la s s r o o n ^ c a p a c i t y ^ f ̂ ^ o s ^ s t u d 6 ^ f a c 1 1 1 ^ Z tllty ttT X IHi9S ^ ^ parmanent^classroom^he w as a c t u a l l y i s p e r s o n r h f g h e r ^ h a n ^ ? I j a r t s v n f r i S a S r W g J " G 36 EX 111 at 3 (Butler capacity); G EX 35 at 48 (Hartsville Junior Hrgh capacity); TR VII at 65, line 18 - 66, line 5 Tstone) 1Q(n Ebe U?dl?puted student enrollment data show that from the 1982-83 school year (the first year of the consolidation of Butler and Hartsville Junior High) through the 1993-94 school w°^al f^udent enrollment at Hartsville Junior High has been well below the total capacity of Butler. In 1982-83 for example the combined enrollment at Hartsville Junior High was 897, or 183 students below Butler's capacity; in 1993-94 for example, the enrollment at Hartsville Junior High was 800 or 280 (£££.'• °apacity- G EX 43! TR ?I1 at Harf EYf!? ^ough the evidence clearly established the Butler and rh^SVtlleHJU21°rDHi?h facilltles were comparable, the District l9Rfi%o <• an?°? ®utler and sPend 51-17 million beginning in Junei986 to "completely renovate" the main building of the formerly all white Hartsville Junior High School. G EX 39, No. 9. In addition to the $1.17 million spent by the District to ?h»Pn? “ n?vate the M in Gilding at Hartsville Junior H^gh the District also spent considerable additional sums there- The $1h'4?2 f°^ r°°f W°rk; installed heat pumps as P ?f a four-school project costing $628,101; painted two other buildings on the campus for $7,500; and converted one building G EX !9?°No?C9.dePart”'ent at 3 °°St t0 thS “ -triot of $49 480. Moreover, even assuming that the construction of ten more classrooms would have been needed at Butler to accommodate all the junior high school students in the Hartsville area the cost construction, in Mr. Stone's estimation, would have totaled about $550,000. In contrast, the District spent over $1.4 million over the course of several years to renovate and Hartsville Junior High School. TR VII at 68, lines 13- 24, 75, line 5 - 76, line 16 (Stone); G EX 39, No. 9. During the 1986-87 school year, while Hartsville Junior Hiah was being renovated, the School District used the Butler facilitv o house Hartsville Junior High students. During the time the ̂ School District was using the Butler facility to house HaJts^l i * Junior High students, the facility was called "Hartsville Tnni High School Annex." Heatley Dep.at 36, lines 3-22? ^ ... Drw Gfi®r made recommendations and initiated discussions which^e^1^ 09^ rnember® about reopening the Butler facility which he believed was suitable for regular classes and XiniS*, diicuISionser°TOU?iat ?590t?*r S^ ° ols‘ Nothin9 cane of these ^ aiscussions. TR I at 159, line 23 - 161, line 5 (Grier). A fire later destroyed part of the Butler facility. 37 4 . S ! "ost »PPr°Priate manner in which to share the burdens of desegregation and to remedy the racial stigma suffered by the Mayo community is to establish a county-wide, dedicated magnet school for grades nine through twelve at the Mayo High School site, to be named "Mayo School." a. The black community must be a full and equal partner in any desegregation remedy. Based on his extensive experience with school deseareaation Plans or. Gordon testified that, in order for a desegSqition must haveSaVse!?sJ ^ th* DJrlin<?ton area> the black community a sense ownership of the plan. According to Dr Gordon, such a sense of ownership could be achieved only if the historically black Mayo High School facility was given a ^ r ^ r i I n i e25n-t?3lPl^ „ e 8l ^ C°Unty-Wide SCh°o1‘ TR b. The establishment of a dedicated magnet at Mayo will remedy the racial stigma suffered by the Mayo community. A dedicated magnet high school at Mayo High School Un»iri b H S 1JhfliCted ^ cZinity t L D a r l i n Z n Z Z l Z Z Z Z Z A Z Z Z Z i Z o Z ?01 " UnePi8r(G;rdon“ 0nal qUallty' TR 111 1” . line 24 to 194, z z d f e j ; r lMayo community by the District. The Court, however finds Dr Armor's testimony unpersuasive. ' nnds Dr- d e s e g r e g a t io n ^ m a n d a te COUrt ' S inflicted upon "the disfavored r a c e " Z le^reoItZ S "failure to^ocument^efiSti^ a^°meaning?ir4ducational and” 3 38 the Mayo community must be given little weight.6 TR VI at 244 \ l t 5’ i1;; iy’-,3e;-line 20 to 39- 7; 182- ‘U V i -24, 178, lines 4-24; 182, line 25 to 185, line 21. Second, while Dr. Armor admitted that Mayo is a vestiqe of the prior dual system in terms of students assignment, faculty t S ? CS a1'' the quality of the facility, Dr. Armor testifiedthat he simply does not believe that Mayo High School has been stigmatized by the District. Dr. Armor testified that a schoSl community cannot be suffering under a stigma if that community1 till takes pride m its school and wants to keep the school open._ Thus, even though Dr. Armor admitted that Mayo is perceived as an inferior school by the Darlington County mmunity, he testified that the school was not suffering from thp9^ahbe?aUSe the students and Parents of Mayo wanted to keep the school open. The Court cannot accept such a view As Dr? h a ^ h ^ GStlflGd; Slack <ritizens attending schools under even’the harshest segregated conditions still cherished their schools and took pride in their achievements, often opposing the c?osin? of their community schools. Such resilience howe'er does 2 thP nnY Sup^eme Court’s finding that the principal harm of the operation of racially segregated school is the iniurv and stigma inflicted upon the black community. Finally, Dr Armor's testimony that he did not believe that the District had* stigmatized Mayo in the past was itself discrediting given his tha^ he "dldn't know very much" about how^ayo was treated from 1970 to 1988. TR VI at 193, line 7 - 194Y line 22- 201, Une 24 - 202, line 11; 204, lines 9-23; 212, lin4s 3-17- 62, line 6 - 63, line 1; 246, line 14 - 245 line TR* R7 1 227' line 73;'2415?eii=;s5^ - i 7lne 7 (Armor), TR III at 210, lines 1-23 (Gordon); TR VI at 194 line 18 - 196, line l; 217, line 1 - 218, line 25 (Armor). c. The establishment of a dedicated magnet at Mayo is necessary to insure that the burdens of desegregation are allocated fairly. was entlre burden of the consolidation — eliminating from the Regarding Dr. Armor's desegregation, the Seventh had acted "well within its of Dr.[] Armor . . . since court can overrule Brown." Comm'rs, Indianapolis. 503 sociological critique of Circuit held that the district court discretion in excluding the testimony neither the district court nor this United States v. Board of s<-h F.2d 68, 85 (7th Cir. 1974). 39 black community its educational center, its primary social and recreational facility, and its central reposito?? of commun??v heritage. Nor would the loss of the community high school be compensated for by the placement of the consolidated junior hiah at the historically black B.A. Gary Middle School. As Dr Go^dSn for^J1^' thG hi19h sch°o1' as the terminal point of education cannot be^nTaJ^S' v, a d^stin?tive P^ce in the community that cannot be replaced by a junior high. To close Mayo Hiah School Mayo? that isC°?hUIninate ^ Stigma that has been inflicted upon Mayo, that is, the perception that Mayo does not have the same value as other schools. As Dr. Gordon testified: "When you shut riaht Y°U SSy t0 Darlington County folks, 'You'reIIT^t lojat sctoo! was substandard, and we got rid of it."' TR H 1 ^c188' llne 2 “ 189> Ime 24; TR IV at 127, line 12 - 128 line 25; 188, lines 12-21 (Gordon). 28' . Df* Armor testified, however, that keeping Mayo ooen as a edicated magnet school was not necessary for the purposes of b?a?vCln9 the burdens of desegregation between the white and black community. According to Dr. Armor the fact that scSoor?BWAUlGa??finUe t0 °perate the historically black middle cnool (B.A. Gary) as a consolidated junior hiah school nhvista^ the need to take any further steps to equalize the burdenfo?thP desegregation plan. The Court dSes not agree Both S and Dr Gordon testified that a high scho h s a JSry difJe-nt community standing than a junior high school. ConseSentlvtht maintenance of a historically black junior high school Cannot be sumed to compensate for the burden incurred by the closina of the community high school. Furthermore, Dr. Armor admitted thit he could not affirmatively testify that the DiS?ict had considered the balance of burdens between the white and black community when it closed all other historicallyblCck hiaJ schools in the County. TR VI at 48, line 12 -49 line S ,Q1 lines 9-21; 206, lines 9-20 (Armor). ' ' 191' d. A dedicated magnet program located at a historically black school, when properly Can r?medY Past discrimination, further desegregation, and serve both the black and white communities. consul^? that 18; TR IV at 148, lines 9-20 (Gordo^fTp J'at ^l^lIne 25 188, lines 6—18 (Grier) * TR tt at- iqq i • (Cox); TR VI at 193, lines 3-9 (A^ir) 199' llneS 19‘22 40 Ohio DJ ^ GriKr ?e5^i£i®d that during his administration in Akron, Ohio, the school district there implemented successful maqnet in ten schools, including two at the high school level.TR I at 170, lines 7-12; 171, line 19. , , . magnets in Akron was placed at a historically black high school that had been closed for 12 to 15 years in a neighborhood that, it was thought, white parents would be' unwilling to sendtheir children to. According to Dr. Grier the program has been in existence almost a year and it has absolutely worked marvelously." Procedures were put in place to th^ £ he Program included a black child forevery Shite child, and the student enrollment has, in fact, been racially balanced. TR I at 172, line 1 - 173, line 20 (Grier). Based on his knowledge of Darlington County and his ^ A*fon' Dr- Grier testified that a magnet could May° lf ^ was a dedicated program (i.e.. not a program within an otherwise regular high school); if outstanding 9 administrators and teachers were selected for the school and given specialized training in the magnet curriculum; if the school s facilities and equipment were upgraded; if there was no scho?1 board members in the school's operations; ivLthe Dlstr?;ct committed itself publicly to quality; and if there was substantial parental participation. These sentiments were echoed by Dr. Cox. TR I at 173, line 21 - 175, line To - (Cox)line 14 ~ 180, llne 12 (Grier); TR 11 at 199> lines 7-18 A dedicated magnet program can be funded in a varietv of ways, including through the receipt of federal funds after filina a grant application and grants from local businesses and 9 industries. TR I at 175, lines 11-21 (Grier). ... Federal funds can be used to cover start-up costs associated with magnet schools. TR I at 190, lines 1-4 (Grier). Clated her tei™ re in Darlington County, Dr. Cox had ubmitted a proposal for a Padaiae program, to be located at St David's Academy in Society Hill. Society A i n is aboSt twenty Te^?SS-ffr^in H^rt^vllle' twenty minutes from Darlington, and Y neariy forty minutes from Lamar. Notwithstanding these differences, m studying the feasibility of and the interest in such a program, Dr. Cox found significant parental support in all ommunities of the county for the proposal. TR II at 194, line 15 - 195, line 1; 196, line 18 - 197, line 24 (Cox). SimUarly, the District currently operates an alternative- type school for at-risk and expelled students, located at St John s High School, which attracts students from throughout the county^hc volunteer to attend. TR II at 198, line ? - ?99, Une 41 Among the types of magnets that could work at Mayo are an aeronautical engineering program in conjunction with Florence- Darlmgton Technical College; a program in medical sciences in conjunction with area hospitals; a performing arts program; and an international baccalaureate program. TR I at 177 line 1 - 178, line 2 (Grier); TR II at 201, line 25 - 202, liAe 18 (Cox). HI- PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF T.aw A. General Principles In 1954, the United States Supreme Court declared that a racially segregated school system violated the Constitution grown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, (1954) (Brown T). The Court subsequently held that school district authorities "denied Negro children equal protection of the laws" by establishing a pattern of separate 'white' and 'Negro' schools," and it made clear that more is required of the offending school district than simply putting an end to its segregative practices. Green v County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435-37 (1968). -- that violated the Constitution must remedy its violation by eliminating the pattern of racially i entifiable schools. IcL at 436-37 (citing Brown v. Board n-f Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II)). As the Supreme Court a 9 9 2 ^ ^ — eemai? V’ Pitts> H 2 S. Ct. 1430, 1443(1992) The duty and responsibility of a school district once egregated by law is to take all steps necessary to eliminate the vestiges of the unconstitutional de jure system!" ellminate the The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that "the veaBoJrd°Jfa?Yhde?egrTgati°n Plan iS itS effectiveness." Davis v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs. 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971) The made equally clear that if the plan proves ineffective it must be replaced with a plan that _is effective — "if it fails to nnrto segregation, other means must be used to achieve this end " 391 U.S. at 440 (citation omitted). MoreoveJ S School district "must be required to formulate a new plan ^Ad fashion steps which promise realistically to convert promptly to L h ^ . . K1S ? Uata„'“hite" SCh°01 °r 3 "[bla°k]" but7just .. . *n eacb case, the desegregation plan submitted by the school district and approved by the district court is simply a means to t h ^ ™ 1S' ^ means bY which the district hopes to achievethe required remedy. The Supreme Court has stated that "whatever plan is adopted will require evaluation in practice, and tl^ ?ourt should retain jurisdiction until it is clear at 438tate_imP°Sed segregatlon has been completely removed." id_ 42 The school officials are under a "continuing duty to take whatever action may be necessary to create a 'unitary, non-racial system.'" Id. at 439-440 (citations omitted). A school district does not discharge its duty to remedy its constitutional violation by simply implementing a court-ordered plan. As the Fourth Circuit stated, "the mere implementation of a desegregation plan does not convert a dual system into a unitary one." Riddick v. School Bd. of Norfolk. 784 F.2d 521 533 (4th Cir.), cert. denied. 479 U.S. 938 (1986). See also ' United States v._Lawrence County Sch. Dist. . 799 F.2d 1031, 1037 (5th Cir. 1986) ("It should go without saying that a system does not become unitary merely upon entry of a court order intended to transform it into a unitary system.") (citing Riddick); Vauahns — Board of Educ._of Prince George's Countv. 758 F.2d 983, 989 (4th Cir. 1985) ("[IImplementation of the court ordered plan alone could not relieve the Board of all future responsibility to bring about a unitary system."). The only way the district can discharge its legal duty is to actually remedy the violation; that is, to implement a plan that .proves effective" in eliminating the racial identifiabilitv of its schools. 1 The sch°°l district continually bears the burden of proving that it has^effectively remedied its original violation. Implementation of a court ordered plan creates no presumption that the district has remedied the effects of its prior segregated system; for even after a plan has been approved by a court as one which "promises" to work, it is the district which must prove that it has actually worked in practice. The district court, therefore, ’"should address itself to whether the Board ha[s] complied in good faith with the desegregation decree since it was entered, ^nd whether the vestiges of past discrimination ha[ve] been eliminated to the extent practicable.'" Freeman n; S. Ct. at 1446 (emphasis added) (Quoting Board of Educ. of Oklahoma_City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell. Ill s. Ct. 630, 638 (1991)). In the final analysis, the school district "bears the burden of showing that any current racial imbalance is not traceable in a 14471”ate WaY' t0 the prior violation." Freeman. 112 S. Ct. at Moreover, the mere passage of time does not absolve the school district of its affirmative obligations. The "lingering 7See also Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1452 (Scalia J concurring) ("Only in rare cases . . . , where the racial imbalance had been temporarily corrected after the abandonment of de jyre segregation, can it be asserted with any degree of confidence that the past discrimination is no longer playing a proximate role."). 2 y 43 e££eCts:.°f se9re<?ati°n do not "magically dissolve" without affirmative efforts by the school district, and the Constitution does not Permit the courts to ignore today's reality because it is temporally distant from the initial finding that the school system was operated in violation of the constitutional rights of its students." Brown v. Board of Educ.. 978 F.2d 585 590 noth Cir•) , cert;, denied, H 3 S. Ct. 2994 (1993)! ' U °th Among other things, the school district is also obligated to hJ°fhrlY lmPlement.and monitor the attendance zone lines ordered (5th glg°Ull701Ca^ f J - - BOard SCh- 430 F-2S 883 88833 (1971). ' ~"ff ̂— E-art - -ev -d other grounds. 402 U.S. The Fourth Circuit has instructed district courts that may approve a plan that "achievers! less actual thfb th Y V - SCh°01 "" '■ **4 ^ a t 93, th; signment. As the Supreme Court explained in Green <=oVi i s s r - extending ’ ' ; ' but to eve;fy facet of school operations — facultv ! transportation, extracurricular activities and Y' facilities." Green. 391 U.S. at 435. tlviries/ a”d B. Reasonableness of the Consent Order a g r e e L r : r ; h e 0£p a ° « i i r a de SLSr e ^ ^ 8°'3300' SllP °P- 3t 1 <I7d- *-• S-Pt. t. 1981) To approve an agreement reached by arms length noaoH is 44 unreasonable. See United States y. Miami (5th Cir. 1980) (citation omitted). 614 F.2d 1322, 1333 in Miami® it^entitleS®? the £°Ur re<3ui«inents outlined' . ' V ? entitled to a presumption of validity meaninghat the district court must have a "principled reason" for 9 refusing to sign it. Miami. 614 F.2d at 1333 . a refusal tr, =•: unacSI^t^?eCrec ?KSed °n 9eneralized notions of unfairness is ^ unacceptable. Rather, the Court must state specific reasons uhv a proposed consent decree unduly burdens one class or Jno?^er 4--In fum' ,when the remedy that is jointly proposed bv thP parties is within reasonable bounds and is not illeaal T t T ^ ^ t T ^ f a? ^ nSt PUbllC the^ourt^should give z b :k v s i n s " , i u s u 's £ r 118 ^ nc* Know the issues involved. TR ix at i ^ affls£S¥£53̂ *•%&&£&?at Conse^d;?d4rbL 1dJs^ne3'..tSeachUviaJhe1mn C°ntained “ the s t m ^ jk -ssss^ i at curriculum enhancements would appear t^furthSJ ^ = J andstipulations preceding the plan further that end. The providing a fLtual £Lis fSr ?he Lmedi!? Dlstrict's liability, and the plan itself addresses e a ™ « f UP°n' 45 basis on whic^to0^ject^he^onseSt0^ ^ is.unable to find any and remedial plan. D Consent Order with its stipulations Holding^f^^airnesshearing® C°nsent 0rder and the RuIg 23 (e) . Fed r -d • not be compromised without the court?!1!®3 tha? 3 class action of the proposed compromise mu!t £! !i! *P?r°V^ ' 3nd that notice class "in such ma n n L as JhS Sour? T °f the to encourage those with divergent view! ! e ls intendedthe trial court to identify possible inaH com? forward, "helping (9th f!pp‘ 68 (S-D- Ohiostudents notifying parents and • flyer sent home with settlement and publication ^ dJ Uardlans of the proposed requirement. id. at 72. 63 newsPaPers met this Similarly, in Mendoza. 623 F 2d at itsi -i-k notice of a proposed school deseqreaa?!™ 6 f°Urt aPPr°ved that was published "in two°maj!!e!!!!!!i!3 ClaSS acJion settlement broadcast media, and distributednewspap^ers, aired by local class members' community. b locations throughout the satisfied not only6! ! ! ^ ? ( e ^ ^ t T h e ^ t0 C‘!'aSS members class notification set forth in Ruli ^ ? ! ^ r^ ° ^ ous standard for the Court direct to the members of th23 ! ' whlch requires that practicable under the cirS!mSn!L ® C^ S the best notice to all members who can be iS!!?i!!!d ^ cludin(? individual noticeidentified through reasonable effort." distributed aTlchoo? £ ItuIeSfo StUdents « »School District. The flyersnotif?!d f,the ?arlmgton County public hearing would be held d.a1 ̂recipients that (l) a proposed settlement of the deseq^eSati^ 1^ 0™ 3111011 re9arding the Darlington County School D i s t r i c t f lawsuit against the be held to permit class members and cit?7S lrJeSSJhearing would regarding the proposed settlement; and m add^ess the Court settlement were available for their review flfP16S of.tbe proposed location. The flyers stated th*! at a specified attorneys for the^Darlington C ^ t ! * ! ^ ® ? ® being Provided by States, and the pri^t!npfSn!!ffs! SCh°01 District' the United regional°newspaper^ t h ^ o r e n c e S!blished in the largest newspapers within Darlington Countv^th9 News, and two local the Darlington News L d n?r!L?OUntY' thS HartsviHe Messenger and 46 Finally, informal notice was given to class members through the daily coverage of the trial and reporting of the upcoming public hearing and fairness hearing by the Florence Morning News; through the near daily coverage by the State newspaper and regional media outlets, including WPDE-TV and WBTW-TV; and through the coverage by the Hartsville Messenger (publishing on Mondays and Wednesdays) and the Darlington News and Press (publishing on Wednesdays). TR I at 24, line 17 - 25, line 4. The lawyers for the United States, private plaintiffs, and the Darlington County School District attended the public hearing on Tuesday, May 31, 1994. The Consent Order was read aloud and explained by an attorney for the United States, and questions were taken from the audience. All interested persons were also given the opportunity to speak at the fairness hearing, which was held in open court on Thursday, June 2, 1994. By any reasonable standard, ample notice to members of the class and to the community at large was provided. D. The Motion for a New Trial or to Alter or Amend the Judgment As previously discussed, under the circumstances of this case, the Consent Order to which the United States, the private plaintiffs, and the Darlington County School District agreed is entitled to a presumption of validity, and the burden is on a movant to prove that the settlement should be disapproved. See Miami. 614 F.2d at 1333-34. --- On June 17, 1994, pursuant to Rule 59, Fed. R. Civ. P. five individuals purporting to be class members [hereinafter the "proposed plaintiffs"] filed a "Motion for a New Trial and/or to Alter or Amend Judgment," alleging that the Court "has misapprehended the position of several plaintiffs" and requesting that a new trial be held "to reconsider the important issues and receive further evidence." Memorandum at 4 ; Motion at l.8 The Fourth Circuit recognizes only three grounds for granting such a motion under Rule 59: "(1) to accommodate an intervening change in controlling law; (2) to account for new evidence not available at trial; or (3) to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice." Hutchinson v. Staton. 954 F.2d 1076, 1081 (4th Cir. 1993). None of these circumstances exists here. Notwithstanding the three grounds enunciated by the Fourth Circuit, the proposed plaintiffs would have the Court adopt a _ One week later, on June 24, 1994, the same proposed plaintiffs filed a second motion, seeking the same relief but raising other allegations concerning the District's operations. 47 fourth, namely, the "misapprehen[sion] of the position of many members of the class.” Mem. at 3. While the Court declines to establish new grounds under Rule 59, it has considered the proposed plaintiffs' motion in the context of preventing manifest injustice." Even so, the proposed plaintiffs' motion must fail because it identifies no new evidence, legal error or changes in law. . both their June 17 and June 24 filings, the proposed plaintiffs offer nothing more than excerpts of the evidence adduced at trial by the United States and private plaintiffs District's operation of attendance zone lines, closing of historically black schools, and allocation of resources for Mayo). See generally Proposed Findings of Fact, supra. The several fragmented claims raised by the proposed plaintiffs were litigated over several years, fully aired during the nine-day trial held from May 23 to June 3, 1994, and among the matters considered by the Court prior to entering the Consent Order on June 3, 1994 and its Order on June 23, 1994.9 , Moreover, the assertion that the Court misapprehended the position of "several" members of class, Mem. at 4, highlights yet another flaw in the proposed plaintiffs' motion: What was most clear from the fairness hearing was that there was no single view among members of the plaintiff class — or among the citizens of arlington County, for that matter — as to the appropriate remedy for 40 years of discrimination by the Darlington County School District. The Consent Order signed by the parties and approved by the Court represents the informed judgment of the parties, including the Department of Justice and the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., as to how best to remedy the District's acknowledged liability. y f? essence, the proposed plaintiffs' motion is nothing more than the expression of one viewpoint of the Consent Order, albeit a dissenting °ne, by five citizens of Darlington County. But as the Fourth Circuit stated, "mere disagreement" with the Court's * 77 9The Court is mystified by the proposed plaintiffs' "decision of the Court, with its accompanying Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment, are not in ^he, ColnPetent and compelling evidence in the case and the applicable law. Mem. at 2. It is unclear as to which Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the proposed plaintiffs 77fe^qqflnCeHthlf did not enter its conclusions until June *•'j - 94' and only t?daY ls entering its written detailed findings and conclusions. Nor can the Court glean anything from the reference to "competent and compelling evidence," since the proposed plaintiffs offer no explanation for this standard? or from the reference to "applicable law," since the proposed plaintiffs offer none. 48 action does not support a Rule 59 motion. Hutchinson. 994 F.2d at 1082. The absence of any new evidence underscores the point that what the proposed plaintiffs have offered is "mere disagreement" with the outcome of the settlement and trial, not with the underlying evidentiary or legal foundations. The fact that disagreement exists among class members about aspects of the consent judgment dictates neither that the judgment be amended nor that a new trial be held. It also does not indicate that counsel for the private plaintiffs failed to discharge their responsibilities, since "[c]lass counsel's duty to the class as a whole frequently diverges from the opinion of either the named plaintiff or other objectors." Walsh v. Great fttl.— &—Pac.— Tea—Co. , 726 F.2d 956, 964 (1983), reh1 a denied (3d Cir. 1984) (citations omitted). Given that disagreement among class members is almost inevitable, "it may be impossible for the class attorney to do more than act in what he believes to be the best interests of the class as a whole." Pettwav v. American Cast Iron.Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1216 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979). See also TBK Partners. Ltd, v Western Union Corp., 675 F.2d 456, 462-63 (2d Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (holding that majority opposition may not serve as a bar to a settlement that the district court determines is reasonable after considering the relevant circumstances). Accordingly, the motion of the proposed plaintiffs is denied. E. Appropriateness of a Dedicated Magnet at Mayo Hiqh School 1. The nature of the constitutional violation determines the scope of the remedy. It is well settled that in school desegregation cases in which the court sits in equity, "the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy." Swann v. Charlotte- Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971). Once liability has been determined, the remedy must be tailored to correct "the condition that offends the Constitution." id. at 16. For example, in addition to the traditional Green factors discussed above, the Supreme Court has also held that a district court may appropriately examine the "quality of education" offered at various schools. See Freeman. 112 S. Ct. at 1446. A district court may also examine any "other elements" of a school <̂ls^rict "to determine whether minority students [are] beinq disadvantaged in ways that require[] the formulation of new and further remedies to insure full compliance with the court's decree" to desegregate its schools to the maximum degree practicable. id. 49 The Court must, therefore, fashion a remedy that redresses the specific constitutional violations found. Here, the evidence shov/s that the; District stigmatized Mayo as an inferior black school. If the "nature of the violation" was the District's iscrimmation against Mayo, then the remedy cannot be one that rewards the District by closing the school. To allow the last remaining historically black secondary school in the county would be to consummate, not remedy, the stigma and injury inflicted upon "the race disfavored by the violation." Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1443. Y 2 . The Court, sitting in equity, possesses broad discretion to fashion appropriate desegregation remedies. hhe Court stated in Swann, where, as here, the school authorities have defaulted on their affirmative obligations to ^1;L vasti9es of segregation, and once a right and a violation have been shown, "the scope of a district court's remfdY Past wrongs is broad, for breadth and .. , cb ̂ 1 q ty afe 1J?herent m equitable remedies." Swann, 402 U.S at 15. See also icK at 16 (district court "has broad power to a-7f?medy that wil1 assure a unitary school system"); Riddick, 784 F.2d at 535 (same); Vaughns. 758 F.2d at 993 (relief granted must be "reasonably related to the objective of ( desegregation"). J 3. The Court must fashion a remedy for the injury and stigma inflicted on the race disfavored by the constitutional violation. . ■ . ‘F1’1 ddscussing the duty of a formerly segregated school systemCt-t-h° ®llln;Lnate a11 the vestiges of its unconstitutional system, the Supreme Court stated: This is required in order to insure that the principal wrong of the de iure system, the injuries and stigma inflicted upon the race disfavored by the violation, is no longer present. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1443. The Supreme Court has emphasized that "felach insi-anro ̂ failure or refusal to fulfill this affinities' duty cSntinSes the Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." Columbus Rd nf fhnr- ,, S t f f ^ 443 U'S- 449’ 455 (1979) (emphasir added) (citations ^ Accordingly, the Court must fashion a remedy that redresses and stigma inflicted upon the disfavored race by the School^ S °peratlon of an m f e n o r "black school" at Mayo High 50 4 . The Court must insure that the burdens of desegregation are allocated fairly and equitably. In desegregation cases, it is incumbent on the Court to insure that the burdens associated with any remedial actions are allocated equitably between the black and white communities. See Djaz v. San Jose Indep. Sch. Dist. . 861 F.2d 591, 596 (9th Cir" The law is clear that if a consolidation requires the closing of a predominantly black school and the relocation of students to a predominantly white school, the school district "bears a 'very heavy burden of justification'" to explain why the predominantly black school was chosen for closing rather than the predominantly white school. Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ.. 448 F.2d 746, 753, reh'g and reh ' q en banc denied (5th Cir. 1971) (citation omitted). The school district bears "a heavy burden to explain the closing of facilities used for the instruction of minority children." Arvizu v. Waco Indep. Sch. Dist.. 495 f 2d 499, 505 (5th Cir. 1974~K When a school district that is under a court order decides to close a facility "used for the instruction of minority children," it must do more than provide post hoc justifications f°r its action. Rather, it must present evidence to the Court showing the need for the proposed closing, whether other alternatives were considered, and why other alternatives were rejected. See United States and Webb v. School Dist. of n-mah* 575 F. Supp. 1398, 1407 (D. Neb. 1983) (citing Davis v. Board of Edug_s_, 674 F. 2d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 1982)). See also Fit.znstrirV -- Board of Educ., 578 F.2d 858, 861 (10th Cir. 1978) (setting forth six-part test for determining whether proposed closing violates federal law). y Since the closing of a school necessarily involves the alteration of attendance zone lines, school districts operating under desegregation plans must obtain court approval for such action, typically through a motion to amend the desegregation plan. See, e.g., Harris v. Crenshaw Countv Bd. of Educ. 968 F.2d 1090, 1093, 1095 (11th Cir. 1992) (school board fil4d petition for approval of proposed consolidation); Davis. 674 F.2d at 685 (school district sought permission to revise its desegregation plan); Tasby v. Wright. 585 F. Supp. 453, 454 fN n Tex. 1984) (school district filed "Motion to Revise Feeder Patterns"). In determining whether to allow the District to close the one remaining historically black high school in the county therefore, this Court must consider the District's undistinguished history regarding Mayo and the other black high schools, as well as the relative burdens of desegregation. Cf Valley v.„,Rapides Parish Sch. Bd. r 702 F.2d 1221, 1228, rehjjft 51 rehifl en banc denied, 705 F.2d 113 (per curiam), 707 F 2d lie C5th Cir. 1983) (the court "was impelled to siek out, within practical limitations, an equitable alloos-Mon o-f +-v, !^ r ^ o ^ r ^ 10" ^ * - o n f M t ? " Butle^Hiah Scho^tS"3 historically black Rosenwald andaurier High Schools and to downgrade Spauldinq Hiah Srhoni District neither sought nor obtained this CoS?t•sapp?Sval'aJ iu„io? M go z& zsrisr™ e ^isrrict failed to meet this "heavy burden." grant the request of t^uJitedhstStes^SrpiaintiflrstaSley et £ t h e „ay°o°„r?gehr SSlSoJ 1^ " ^ ' IV. PROPOSED STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES FOR THE IMPLPMFNtittdxt OF A DEDICATED MAGNET RT Mayo school IMPLEMENTATION 1. The dedicated magnet at Mavo School chaii implemented beginning the 1995-96 school year. £orthe9partiesfy SCh°0i< D*s^ict°lh!S anS (a) includil?g but not limited to t--rh tYpe of Pr°gnam, (n) projected costs reside?^?6?*6? enrollment' hy race and area of residence, (i v ) projected staffing and resource needs; (v) proposed timetable for the reSOUrce implementation of each stage of the Droce^c; I ^ s u ^ t T e« ° rtS ^ m . r c l & S , for upgrading Mayo's facilities and resource! io ?t " ; g n e t p ^ogram and t o c S S S S ^ Sreaerai and state requirements; (c) proposed criteria for selection to the maanet program that (i) gives appropriate ( b ) 52 weight/preference to black students residing in the current Mayo attendance zone and (ii) insures that selections will not have a disparate impact on black students or on the desegregation of the county's other high schools; (d) proposed criteria for the selection of magnet school administrators and staff; and (e) proposed changes/additions to the Board Policy Manual, as appropriate, regarding the governance of the magnet school. 1-0 The Soi?th Carolina Department of Education is directedprovide expert assistance in all facets of the magnet schoolproposal and implementation. y scnooi Dariin<?ton County School District shall, commencincr .Y after the filing of the information set forthsection (2) above, and then every sixty (60) days thereafter eading up to the opening of the magnet school, file with the Court and the parties reports on the District's progress in implementing the Court-approved magnet plan. tk i-heginniing ?ith the first year of the magnet school in 1995-96 the oariington County School District shall file with Pities,at the end of each semeste“ 1;;<JWlth thereafter at the end of every vear rel pvani- riai-a -t-v program, including but not limited to (a) race, gender and™99116 ar^a °f every Participating student; (b) number of by race' gender and residence area; (c) selection critena and results; (d) performance/progress results- (e) of programs and outstanding needs; and (f) racial breakdown n? administrators and certified faculty in the magnet pJogram? 53 V. CONCLUSION Plaintiff-lntervenor United States and Plaintiffs Stanley — ^spectfully submit for the Court's approval the above Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Proposed Standards and Procedures for the Implementation of a Dedicated Magnet at Mayo School. J. PRESTON STROM, JR. United States Attorney TERRI H. BAILEY Assistant U.S. Attorney 1441 Main Street Suite 500 Columbia, S.C. 29201 (803) 929-3000 Respectfully submitted, DEVAL L. PATRICK distant Attorney General ^THANlELlDOUGLAS FRANZ'R. MARSHALL MICHAEL S. MAURER GARY A. HAUGEN Attorneys U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division Educational Opportunities Litigation Section P.O. Box 65958 Washington, D.C. 20035-5958 (202) 514-4092 Educational Fund, Inc. 99 Hudson St., Suite 1600 New York, N.Y. 10013 (212) 219-1900 Arthur c. McFarland 12 Magazine Street Charleston, S.C. 29401 (803) 722-3376 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that copies of the Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of Plaintiff-Intervenor United States and Plaintiffs Stanley, et ah have been sent, by Federal Express, on this twenty-second day of July, 1994, to the following attorneys of record: Dennis D. Parker, Esg. N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. 99 Hudson Street Suite 1600 New York, N.Y. 10013 Arthur C. McFarland, Esq. 12 Magazine Street P.0. Box 1452 Charleston, S.C. 29402-1452 John M. Milling, Esq. 88 Public Square P.O. Drawer 519 Darlington, S.C. 29532 Alfred A. Lindseth, Esq. Sutherland, Asbill and Brennan 999 Peachtree Street, Northeast Atlanta, Ga. 30309-3996 J. Emory Smith, Jr., Esq. Deputy Attorney General Rembert C. Dennis Building Suite 520 U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division Educational Opportunities Litigation Section P.O. Box 65958 Washington, D.C. 20035-5958 (202) 514-4092 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA^? l Woo,t»’W UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS. STATE OF LOUISIANA CIVIL ACTION No. 80-3300 SECTION "A" ORDER AND REASONS FOR APPROVING ENTRY OF CONSENT DECREE 9 This cause came on for hearing on this date to determine whether the Court should adopt the consent decree of the parties. Amicus Curiae representing Grambling State University concurs. Amicus Curiae The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and Dr. Gladys W. Milliner representing herself and the class of faculty members of Southern University in New Orleans have filed memoranda urging the Court to reject the compromise. It has always been a basic premise of our adversary system of justice that settlements of law suits by agreement of the parties are favored. Further, with respect to discrimination cases, a basic philosophy which has become hornbook law is that voluntary compliance is preferable to court action. This Court hasV&ce April 30, 19 80 conducted at least eight lengthy pre-trial conferences with the parties in an ef fort to prepare the^ase for an orderly trial and to resolve the issues in dispute. It has had the opportunity to review the pre-trial statements and memoranda of the parties as well as the two amicus curiae filings in opposition to the proposed con sent decree. Thus, it is cognizant and knowledgeable of the issues and contentions that pertain to this litigation. Moreover by reason of representations made to the Court it knows that those persons in an adversary position most familiar with the practices involved, including amicus representing Grambling State University, have spent many long hours in hard negotiations -2- The law in this Circuit is that a proposed consent decree in a discrimination case is entitled to a presumption of validity unless the Court finds that it is unlawful, unreasonable, inequitable, or contrary to public policy. United States v. City of Miami, Fla^, 614 F.2d 1322 (5 .Cir. 1980); United States v. City of Alexandria, 614 F.2d 1358 (5 Cir. 1980) ; accord: State of North Carolina v. Department of Education, No. 79-217-Civ.(U.S.D.C. North Carolina, Raliegh Division). Apropos the conclusions we reach herein is the language which we borrow from United States v. City o_f Miami, supra, p. 1333, rWhen the remedy that is jointly proposed is within reasonable bounds and is not illegal, un- constitutional or against public policy,, the courts should give it a chance to work. Although the Court will at a later date further articulate the reasons for its conclusions stated herein, it is of the opinion that it would not be appropriate to further delay the parties from implementing the remedies they propose. Accordingly since the Court finds that the proposed consent decree is not unlawful, unreasonable, inequitable or contrary to public policy it htê efcy APPROVES same and orders that it be entered by the Clerk of* Court as a judgment of this Court. * ■ New Orleans, Louisiana, this 8th day of September, 1981. JOHN MINOR WISDOM UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA c UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V S . STATE OF LOUISIANA, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION No. 80-3300 SECTION "A" BEFORE WISDOM, Circuit Judge, and SCHWARTZ and WICKER, District Judges SCHWARTZ, J. This matter came on for hearing September 8, 1981 to determine whether the Court should adopt the consent decree proposed by the parties. The Court entered an order approving the consent decree on said date, and now sets forth, as promised therein, the further articulation of the reasons for its approval. This is only the latest of many federal cases to secure minority rights in Louisiana's public system of higher edu cation.^ Although this action was formally commenced on 2/ 3/ March 14, 1974, the consent decree may be justly regarded as the culmination of negotiations which have extended over twelve years and which have involved almost every branch of state and federal government; as well as a variety of Amici. ' 1 The consent decree is itfelf the product of over a year of hard negotiation, and i ̂.embodies a comprehensive desegregation » < plan which "promises realistically to work." Swann v. Charlotte- Mechklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971). As we said in our September 8, 1981 order: When the remedy that is jointly proposed is within reasonable bounds and is not illegal, unconstitutional or against public policy, the courts should give it a chance to work. United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322, 1333 (5 Cir. 1980). Although a trial court ordinarily plays little or no part in overseeing the settlement of a lawsuit, there are certain special situations in which court approval of a -2- proposed settlement is required because important public interests are implicated. United States v. City of supra at 1330 (and cases therein cited). Consent decrees in discrimination cases require such approval since these cases raise substantial public questions in addition to those which concern the named parties. As noted in our original order,a proposed consent decree in a discrimination case is to be presumed valid by the trial court unless found to be unconstitutional, unlawful, contrary to public policy or unreasonable. United States v. Miami, su£ra at 1333-1334; rottnn v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326 (5 Cir. 1977); see also Ant^ strong v. Board of School Directors of the City of Milwaukee, 616 F.2d 305 (7 Cir. 1980). After careful consideration of the contentions of counsel, the record, the lew, end the proposed consent decree, the Court determined on September 8, 1981 for reesons therein end hereinafter set out, that the consent decree must be ep- proved. On March 14, 1974, the Attorney General commenced this action on behalf of the United States pursuant to the pro visions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, aSjTitle VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, codified as 42 Ĵ .S.C. S2000d et seq^ in its complaint', the United States alleged: first, that the state of Louisiana and its agencies of higher education had established, maintained and were perpetuating an unlawful dual system of higher education based on race; second, that the defendants were the recipients of substantial federal financial assistance and had agreed to comply with the pro visions of Title VI, as well as all the requirements imposed by the regulations of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare issued pursuant to said Title; finally, the United States contended that its continued efforts from January 1969 -3- until the date of the complaint to secure the defendants' voluntary compliance had failed, and that the defendants had steadfastly refused to submit a constitutionally ac ceptable plan to disestablish the dual system of public higher education. The United States sought injunctive re lief, including the formulation and implementation of a detailed desegregation plan whereby the dual system could be promptly and completely dismantled. For their part, the 5/ defendants contended (as they had since first contacted 6/ by HEW in 1969) that the Louisiana School system of higher education was in full compliance with the provisions of Title VI and the Fourteenth Amendment. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§2000d, 2000d-l and 28 U.S.C. SS1345, 2281, and 2284, a Three Judge Court was convened on March 28, 1974 to hear and determine the case. Although the Court's involvement remained relatively limited between 1974 and the beginning of 1980, during this period the parties were engaged in discovery, the disposition of several overlapping cases and with certain issues of intervention. See, e.g.: United States v. Louisiana, No. 74-3856 (5 Cir. 1976). On April 30, 198&v ajt the first of eight pre-trial con ferences, the Court suggested that the parties explore the possi bility of settling thijT’action* thereby avoiding the substantial * commitment of resources that would be necessary to bring the case 7 to trial and through appeal. The Court reasoned that an early settlement would not only result in a saving of judicial time, but would more importantly, allow the speedy vindication of minority rights. The consentual nature of an approved settle ment provides. In comparison with a court order, a much surer foundation for fundamental change, and is much more likely to foster the full acceptance and commitment by all con cerned that is necessary for any plan to realize its full potential. -4- The parties began active settlement negotiations in May of 1980, exchanged a number of settlement proposals, and conducted numerous negotiating sessions. These negotiations intensified in February of 1981, and by August, proposals were being exchanged on an almost daily basis. When accord was ultimately reached, the parties' proposed consent decree was presented and approved by the Court on September 8, 1981. In approving the consent decree, the Court has carefully considered the provisions of the consent decree itself, the briefs of all counsel (including those of amici), the record, and the law. The factors hereinafter set out substantiate that in this particular action, the consent decree is within reasonable bounds and is not "unreasonable, inequitable, or contrary to public policy." United States v. Miami, supra. The consent decree is therefore entitled to a "presumption of validity," id., and this Court's approval. The Court con cludes that: (A) The consent decree resulted from vigorous arm's length negotiations which were conducted by knowledgeable and ex perienced counsel. T£e £ourt has had many opportunities to become acquainted witlr'counsel during conferences. It has also had ample opportunity to assess counsels' knowledge and skill in pleadings, memoranda, and briefs. The Court is con vinced from its own observation, that the consent decree was the product of bona fide negotiations conscientiously conducted by capable attorneys. (B) The record reflects that during the course of seven and a half years, the parties, counsel, and this Court have each devoted hundreds of hours to these proceedings. Substantial liti gation expenses have been incurred by all the parties to this lawsuit. If this suit is not settled now, it might be several years, including appeals, before this matter could be resolved. rr 'V v o — o % 1 • r~ fr.«i tt>c . j c v f . . . W f » ) 1 t" ^ . . .w h i0 .r—R ^ , to* ., . - -5- benefit most from the consent^decree: minority students and traditionally Black colleges. The sooner that the measures contained in the consent decree designed to enhance Black colleges and speed the integregation of the Louisiana system are implemented, the better. (C) It is difficult to speculate about the precise in junctive relief this Court would have fashioned if the action had gone to trial and the plaintiff prevailed; however, the Court notes that the desegregation plan embodied in the Consent Decree is substantially similar to that which the parties might have formulated pursuant to a Court Order subsequent to factual findings by this Court of a history of de iure segre gation. The Court further notes that a desegregation plan arising in the context of a consent decree enjoys substantial advantages over an identical plan formulated pursuant to a court order. Implementation is likely to be more effective and acceptance speedier where, as here, the plan is not the result of a command from a court, but is rather, the result of conscientious effort and cooperation among educators, federal and state officials, in conjunction with responsible members of the community. (D) The plan itself ^ppears to be a sound one for achieving a unitary system of pubtic higher education within a Constitution ally acceptable timetable. The Consent Decree provides a reason able and. comprehensive statewide approach to both the systematic integration of the Louisiana higher educational system, and the enhancement of its traditionally Black institutions. The Court, in evaluating the plan, has taken cognizance of the well recognized and important differences between higher education and elementary or secondary education. Geier v. Punn, 337 F. Supp. 573, 578-580 (M.D. Tenn. 1972); Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Norris v. State Council of Higher Education, 327 F. Supp. 1368, 1373 (E.D. Va. 1971) affM per curiam, 404 U.S. 907 (1971); Sanders v. Ellington,, 288 F. Supp. 937, 943 (M.D. Tenn. 1968); see also, the Revised Criteria Specifying the Ingredients of Accept able Plans to Desegregate State Systems of Public Higher Education, 43 Fed. Reg. 6658, 6660 (February 15, 1973). Al though there is now available a considerable record of ex periences which the courts and other agencies of government have had in fashioning remedies for racial discrimination in primary and secondary schools, experience with state systems of higher education is limited and of only recent occurrence. S Adams v. Richardson, supra at 1164. Therefore the Court is, and should be, reluctant to substitute its own judgment for that of the parties, until after the plan here, as well as 10/ those proposed in other states, have had a chance to work, or until experience has clearly demonstrated that measures which today seem promising are in fact not so. As educators, the Courts and members of government charged with enforcing anti-discrimination laws move into an unaccustomed area, perhaps all that is clear is that the well tested remedial measures that have proved effective in the context of primary and secondary education, must be abandoned in favor of un- tested measures more appropriate for eliminating discrimination '«.l/ in a university system.'' The Court finds £ftat the Consent Decree's desegregation plan makes specific commitments to (1) shaping the processes 12/ 13/ of admissions and recruitment; (2) solving the problem14/ of student attrition (especially "other race" students); (3) resolving the issues and problems arising out of program duplication, and the allocation of curricular offerings among 15/ the state's institutions; (4) understanding the appropriate role to be played by traditionally Black institutions and 16/ making provisions for their immediate enhancement; (6) taking substantial steps to achieve a more equitable balance in the racial composition of the staff, faculty, and governing boards -7- of the university system. The Consent Decree provides specific goals and time tables for increasing other race participation in every * I7/aspect of the university system's life. These are reasonable, specific, and realistic. Happily, there is nothing which indicates the plan will lead to a lowering of academic standards in any way. On the contrary, in the long term, the plan seems likely to allow the system to marshal its considerable resources with considerably greater efficiency in the future than it has done in the past. T’h®^Consent Decree also provides a system-wide reporting system which the Court believes will: (1) promote compliance with the plan; (2) make the process of monitoring the system's progress simple and inexpensive for both state and federal government personnel; and (3) provide all the parties, as well as the general public, a quick and sure means of evaluating the merits of the plan as implemented, and to correct any un suspected inadequacies which might be revealed thereby. In summary the Court finds that the consent decree which it approved in its order of September 5, 1981 embodies a reasonable and specific system-wide desegregation plan which promises realistically l<£work.% New Orleans, Louisiana, thisJOtAday of November, 1981 f' F O O T N O T E S 1/ See for example: Wilson v. Board of Supervisors, 92 F. Supp. 986 (E.D. La. 1950); Tureaud v. Board of Supervisors, 116 F. Supp. 248 (E.D. La. 1953); Ludley v. Board of Super visors of L.S.U., 150 F. Supp. 900 (E.D. La. 1957) , aff'd 252 F.2d 372; McCoy v. Louisiana State Board of Edu cation, 332 F.2d 915 (5 Cir. 1964). 2/ A complaint was filed by the United States on this date in the Middle District of Louisiana against the State of Louisiana, the Louisiana State Board of Education, and forty- two named individuals in their various capacities as officers of the governing boards of the Louisiana higher educational system: The Louisiana State Board of Education, the Louisiana Coordinating Council for Higher Education, the Louisiana State Board of Supervisors, and the Louisiana Board of Regents. 3/ Consent Decree of the parties dated September 8, 1981. 4/ The complaint was subsequently amended to reflect changes made to the governing structure of the Louisiana higher edu cation system. After January 1, 1975, the old governing boards were superseded by four new boards: the Board of Regents, the Board of Trustees for State Colleges and Univer sities, the Board of Supervisors of Southern University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, and the Board of Super visors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College. See L.S.A. Const. Art. 8. 5/ See Answer filed May 10, 1974 , 1il4, and the defendant's Information for Preliminary Pre-Trial Conference filed May 2, 1980. 6/ Louisiana was one of many states which were the subject of an HEW evaluation of compliance with Title VI. In January 1969, HEW concluded Louisiana was operating a racially segre gated system of higher education. Mississippi, Oklahoma, North Carolina, Florida, Arkansas, Pennsylvania, Georgia, Maryland and Virginia were subsequently found to be operating higher education systems in violation of Title VI. See Adams v. Richard son , 356 F. Supp. 92 (D.C; 19?3) 94 and generally. 7/ The memorandum submitted by the United States in support of its Motion for Pretrial Conference dated March 13, 1980, con tains the suggestion J^hat this action could require twenty trial days. *8/ In particular, Grambling College and the Southern University System. 9/ See Consent Decree, 11(7) pp. 17-26. 10/ For example, Oklahoma, North Carolina, Florida, Arkansas, Georgia, Maryland and Virginia. 11/ For example, only under the most extraordinary circumstances would a district court consider compulsory student or faculty assignment in the context of higher education although such remedies have been used in the context of primary and secondary education. See Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala., E.D. 1967). 12/ Consent Decree, II (2)(c), p. 4. 13/ Consent Decree, II (2) (D), pp. 4-8. -2- 15/ Consent De«ee 23. tt f 7 ̂(C) , P. 22; II W/ t' pp, 8-9 16/ See Footnote 19. 17/ see consent Decree II sener.lly. 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