Boykins v. Fairfield Board of Education Brief for Appellants

    I W",1 
ga\stftul-r@^ uw

lrasrd on a "platr eorrtainirrg specific netttrol eriteria."
Marsfull v. Rarktuts, 1nc.,436 Il. S. 307, 312,32:t (1978)."

Pur:rto Ilieo's position boils rlown to a cotttetttion that rts

Iav-enforeement probletns are so pressirrg that it should be

grarrted rn exentptiott front the usual rer;uirelnents of the
Fourth Anretrdnrettt. Although we have reeogrtized exceptiotts

to the warrant requirernent when speeific circumstanees rentler
eonrpliar:ee irnpractienble, we have not dispensed with the
funtlanrental Fourth Alnettrlntent prohibitiorr ognittst unrea-
sonable searehes and seizures simply because of a generalized

urgency of Iaw etrforeenrent. Almeida-Sanchez v, United
States, supra, at 273-275; (tnited Stotes v. Di Re,332 U. S.

581,595 (1948).
In any event, Puerto Rieo's law enforcetnelrt needs are

irrrlistirrguislralrk' frorn those of tttatty statcs. Prrerto Rieo is
not urriquc beeause it is- urr islarrrl; likt' Puerto Rieo. rreither
Alaska rior l{awaii are &rutigrrorrs to the eorrtitrctrtal body of
the I'uiterl Statrs. Mureover, thtr rnajority of all the states
have bor<lers which eoineirlt, irr part r,r'ith the irtterrratiotral
frontier of the Ilniterl Stotr'-c; r'irtrrtlly nll lrnvo itrtertrttiottal
airport facilities subjoet to fetleral custorns cotrtrols.

\\'e therefore hold that the search pursuaut to Public Lav 22

violated eonstittttional guaratttees; accordingly evidence ob-

tainetl irr the searclr of appellatrt's luggage should have been

suppresserl. The jrrrlgnrent of the Supreme Court of Puerto
Ii,ico is theref<.rre revcrsed and the ease is retttattded to that
eourt for furtlrer proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.

Seuer$ed and remanded.

)In. .llsrr<:r: Ilru:l seN. n ith rvlrottt ][r. ,It s't'tcr: Srtu'aHL'.
llx. Jr s'r'rr:r: IIeHstt,u,t,. lrrrl IIlt. Juslrcu Bl,rcrltt'x joirr.

cotrturtitrg irr tltc irtrlgrrrt'rrt.

..\plxrllrurt's trrttvictiort of violating tlre Puerto Rieo ('on-

trollerl Sulrstallc(,s i\(:t u ts baserl ott evirlerrce rliseoveretl u'hetr

grolice. arlrrtitt.erlly u'ith<.rut ;rrolrablc causr'. searched appel-
larrt's lrrggagc after he arrivt'rl in Ptterto Rieo frorn Floricla.
'fhe Strpreru'('ourt ttf I)rtcrto llieo has eottstrttr, l Putrlie Lau'
22 to arrthorize sttch searcltes nitltout prolralrL'cause.t

I corrt:ur irr the ('ourt s lrolrlitrg that tht'trbtrrth .{tttettdtrletlt
applies in full foru' to l)ttcrtri Ilico, that the search of appel-
llrrt's lrrggagc u ithottt a \r'artatlt lr:rstrl olt probable earrse

violatlrl the.h'orrrth .\tttettrltnt'ttt. that I'trhlir'[-arv 22 is rttt-
r.orrstitutional itrsofar us it pur'pt-rrts t(, iltltllorize s lrat the

s tTso of nirport motrl deteetors wilh respelt to nflssengers boarding

aircraft, rrrl rcrrclrls of persotts entering militarl'bnses involve consider'

ations nr)t relevrnt !o tlris c:r.co.

*l'orrr of tlrc liglrt tttlrnlrem of llre Sttpreltte ('ottrl of l'tterlo Rico were

of llre,,l,iniort tlrrrt ['ulrlic Lrru J? rts ]o ('r)lttslrtl({l virrl;r(ed the Fottrth
.\rrrrndrrr,,,t rrl llrc l'rrllrrl ('rrlrslilrttirttt. Set'ottte. il 2. nrlt Art. \',
8.1. of tlrr I'rttrlo Iltco (irtt.litttltott provirlx lltrl ltr) lirw slrall lx'lx'ld
Irrr.ol):tilIlioilirl lrr llI Sttpr|tttr'( trttrl rtf l'ttIrlo IliItr Irct'1rt lr1'rl lllrrjor-
rl! rrf llrI lolirl rut,rl( r trl .ittsltIt'. ol wlritll lltt' t'rtttrl l: ('(nllltrlsc{1. l'elr-
lionr.r irrgil(.s llrrrl tlrtr 1r'tlttirt'tttt'ttl t'iolrtlt'r lltc Stlltttlttrt,r ('l,tttst';tttrl lltc
I)rre l'rrrrlss ('lrrr.r.of llrt l"r'r|'rirl ('orslilrrtiorr. lrr ligltl of ottr resoltt-

ti,rtr of llrr rrrlrits ol yrlilirltlr's slirr(lr irl{l seizttrl clitittt. we tttrrl not

lrirss rrrr tlresl conlttrliolt". ('l Ohio et nl. llryunt r..'1,(rol .lluticipol
l'ari. Di"t...lsl l'. S 74 (llr:t0).

'flrr, ('rrrrrrrrotrtvr':rltlr'- rlislttsiiott rrI llrc ilttlrrrrl of .\rt. \', $ { otr lltir
crrsr,, lroulvtt, irulrlrt'itlr slrgg('st: rr lLrittt tlltl tlris ".ttlx'r-ttlrtirrritr " lrro-
tisiott rorr;lilrrlr,: lrrr rtletlttirll irtt,l itttlt'1r'tttlt'ttt trttrftrlt'rrtl grottttd.rtp-

lnrtirrg tlre jrrrlglncrtl rcrrt'ltrrl lrr tlrl l\ttrto llirt Srtprltttt Cirrrrt. 'flris
ctnnot h'. Tlrt' lrrovisiott ttt'itll'r .ttlrplit's rtt ittrhlx'tttlettl sllllslxl)tive
ln.is firr tlre tL.r'isirrr,, rror t'ttttlrol. tltr'prrrlies't'ottrlttt'l ttl llrc litiglrtiolr.
Il rrfli'r t. rrth' tltl rnl('rtt;rl 'uorkittg rttL's" rtf lltt' trtttrt. \1'lrilt' srrcll

nrlr,' unglrt rrlTr.r'l llrl rl.r'tsiott ol rirsr'., lltlr t'rtttttol l)t'rulrl;ttrtlt groutttls

itt sttlrlrorl ol llrost' i['r'isiortt.

t2o79

??-l-Av+,vwfrLv1/\A .

l'ourth:\rnerrtltrtent prolribits, srrtl that the evidenee dis-
r:ovcrerl irr l,ho urrcoustitutional s('arch therefore Irtust be

sttllpt t'sst.rL

.\1l1x,llet t'otrecrlt,s that the l'ourth ,\tttettdtttettt altplies to
tlrr,('orrrrrrorrucalth of l'uerto Rico, Brief for.\plleller'. at 12.

citirg D.rrrrritirtg Btxtrl r'. I'lores tle Utero,426 I'. S. i72.599
{ 11,7(i) : ( rtlt rtt-'l'rilt'dlt \. l'(qrilttt l-utltl l,uuittrT ( ir., .llti l-. S.
(i(i:1. li(iS rr i t l(174). \\'lrutcvcl tltt'r'ulirlity of tht'olrl trages

su<,lr rs l)ntrttt's t . lJid,t ,'ll, l8:l ('. S. 224 ( llX)l L l)u'r l'.
('rtittd litoler. Illi t-. S. l;Jl{ (llx)4). ]dntl Balzr t.l'orto Hii-{t,

2.;S l-. S. 21)li (11122). irr tlrr' plrticulal historicul urrttt'xt itt
slriclr thcv rrt'r'r'rkx'irL',1. tltost'enst's ax't'lt'arh'not lrtrtlr()rit)'
fol r;ucstiotritrg tlrc t;r;rli<'aliotr of tlrr' l'ourth .\tttt'ttrlttretrt--
ot atry o(ltcr' provisiorr ol tlrt' llill of llights-to tltt' ('oltttttotr-

rvt,altlr ol l)rrcrto ll ico irr tlre lll70's. .\s llr' ,lusticc Black
rfr,trlart'tl i llrid \. ('t,rcrl ,3,14 ('. i\. l. 14 (lll;(i) (plurulity
o;rirriorr ): "l\ lt'ithr,r tlrr' ('ases n()r tltt'ir teasotrittg slroukl [-re

givcrr urry fttrtlter'('xl)rtnsi()n. 1'lre urrrct'pt thut tlrc Bill of
[liglrts arrrl otlrcr eotrstittttiorral lrrt-rtt'trtirrtts agaittst arlttttutv
g()v('r'trur(,nt rtr, itro;x'trrtivt' rlltt'tr tlrt'y lxrutrrt ittt:ttttvt'ttit'ttt
or' \rll('n r.xlrcrlicrrey rlietatt's otltt'tuist' is a vt'ry ,latrgctotts

tlot'trittl urrrl if allorrctl to flourish uttulrl rlt'sttrry tlrt lx'rrt'fit
of a r.r'rittr,rr ('orrslitutiorr arrrl urrrk'rtrtitrr. tlrl lxrsis of r.rur'

( iovt'ttutrctrt."

.lOSt'-Ptl REMCHO. San [:rancisco, Calif. (ROBIN B. JOI{ANSF.N'
ROSEN, REMCtIO & tIIlNDERSON. CEI-EDONIO MIlI)lN l.(\/AI)A
HERNANDEZ, and CF.[-L.DONIO MEDIN LOZADA GENIILI:. with
him on the brief) ior appellant: ROBHRTo ARMSTRON(;, .1R., I)cputy
Solicitor Cjenerai, Pueriri Rico (HECTOR A. COLON CRUZ, Solicitor
Gcneral. with him on the brief) for appellee.

No. 78-5384

Davitl sarrr'lstr,lrt, Petiti,tt"t, 
I o,, $-rit. of certirrari t. the]D l Sr,r.",,l" Court of l{,.rntana. I

State of iUorrtana. | 
--.1

l,lune 18, 19791

Sr ll:rhrrs

Rrsed rtllrrtt r crln['..iort ;tttrl olhcr evirlert''e, 1tl'titiotter rvrts ehrrgcrl ttntler

l 1[r,rrtrrnrr strrtrrri' urth "rk'lilrnttc lronticitle," in lhrrt hc 'prtr;xrselt'

or krrosirrglr" ('irl:{rl lhe lictinl's <loirlh. Al trial, 1x'titiotter rrguld
tllrt, rtllltortglt he killrrl rlrt tictirn, lrl rlrrl not rlo so "pttrlxtsell or

krrrrrcirqlr," rttxl lltlrcf,rrr' $lr\ Ilr)t gtr:ltv lrf tlt'lihtr;rtl hrtrrri, irlr"flrcT
lrrrl t'ottrl tltsrrtt'lctl lho ltln'tltirt lh0 lilw l)r{'stllll|s llrlrt;r Ir'r''rtt I

itticttrlr tlrc ottlitt;tn ('i,lrs{'(ltlr'ltr'('!r of lli- volrlnt;rrl ilr'1s." o\('r ln'li-J
tioncr's ol4r'r'tiorr tlrrt sttclt inslrlt(tiolI lrrrd lhe ellect of shifting the

lrrrrtl"rr of Proof on lh. is.ttt rtf Ittrpost' or knolltlge. 'l'he jtrrv fottnd

lrctiliorrr,r grtillr.. nrtrl tltc Ilotttrtn:t Sttprtntt'(irrtrl rrllirnred. holdrrrg rlrlt
rrltlrorglr slril'tirrg llrc lrrtrtlt rt ol lrroof ,,f llre dt'fettrlrrttl lrr Irrt'atts of

r lrrlsrrrtrptiotr is prolrrlrttrrl. rtllrtcrtlitrtt of "rrtltr httrrk'n of ltrtxti" to lt
rleferrrLrrrt ir pcrnrisrtl,l,'. l'irrlitrg lhrt rtntler tlx' ittrtrttction itl 'irler-
tiorr lrrlrliorrlr's.ol(.1)rlr(l('l uirs lo l)r(xltl('c "tornr" evidttre lltrti he

drrl not irrtltrl llrr, otrlirutrt (1)ls'rlrl('l('es of Itis Iolrtttlnrr. ttcts, rlttl
not lo rlr-prore thrrt ltc ;rllrrl 'ltttrltos,'lv rrr knosittglr'," tlte IIoIrtrna

-.,lgrl{l 
lrclrl tlr:rl tltt'itt.trttctiott tl.rl tlot violrtlo tlttt';,rttrtss stntltlrtrtls.

(!d/ Ii,.,,,,'r.,, tlr. irrrv nrrrv lrrt'c irrlcrprr.lerl tho elrrrllctrgrrl prenttntJttion

rrs crrrrlllsrvt,, likt. llrr' prlstttrtlrlirrtts itt llttitsrllt t. I'tilttl Stallr.342
ti. S.2.1(i, rrtrl I rri/r',/ Sldlcs v. [.'litlr/ litotrs (iyytttttt Co..4;]S [1. S.

.l?1, rrr rrs rlriflirrg llrc l,ttrrL'tt of ln'rsrllsir)tt, like tlrrrt in lllullanru v.

Wilbur, Dl []. S. fis{, rrrll br',trrse citlrr,r'intt'rlrrotrrtir)u wollld lrrrvo

violirtrrl tlre l'rnrrtecrrlh \rnonrlrrrurt'.r rerprriremerrt tlrrt t,lre Strle prove
evcrt'r'lcrrrrttl of rr lrrtrritrrl ollcttsr lx,r'otttl I rctrsottrtltlo drrrrht, llte!
irr.trrr,'ti,,,, l +,

(rr) l'lrr,r.lflll of;r Itrrsttntlrlirrtt itt rt irtrv irlstnlclion is dcternlirred f
b1'tht: rvrrf in whclr t rerson:rble juror eorrkl hrtve interpreted it, not byf
a slxle (r)rrrl's irrterprr.lation of ils lcgrl iurlrort. J

(b) Couulusivr' presunrptions "conflict rvith the overriding presump-

tton of innoecnce rvith which t.he lnw ttrdows the accttsed and whieh

o\tcnds lo err,rr elrnrrnt of thr crimo," llloriss"tte, sul)ro, tt 275, and

tlror' 'irrrrrrlc ltlrr'l faclfindirrg ftrttetiorr," {'nilrd Slalrs Gupsunr Co.,

25 CrL 3159



' 
"r7,.,r.:rl 

.l.l{i, rrlriclt irr rr crirnitlrl crrsc llrc lrrrv lrssigns to llro irrry. 'fho

I lrr,,.rlrrPli,rn rrrrnorrnrrrl lo pclitiorrcr's irrrt.rrlrt,utll ltrnt lrrul exaclly

I tlil,s" {.0Is'rl!rcrrc0s. sirrr.c trlroI firrrlirtg lrrrxtf Of oIe eletrrent of the
\ crintr' (rrrrr.rrg rl''rth), rrnrl of lrrrls insrrllicictrt l9 r'st:rlrlislr tlre srclnd

| {tlrc vrrlrrntrrirrc*s lrnrl ''orrlirurrv col)scrlrrclrn.s" of pctitioner's rrction),

I tlro jtrrr' .()ul(l lnl'c r('ir\orllrl eolclurl(\l tlrlt it wrrs (lirc(,lrd to fiDd
(.agrrirr*t pelilirrrrer on lllc (,1(rnent of irrtcnl. 'l'lre Slrrto u,ls tltrrs not

forccrl to Irove "hevorrtl lr rcirsonrrhle rlortht overt. frrct neccsstry
to conslitrrle llre ,.rilnn ,,hrrrgorl," lu rt ll'inshi7t,3{}7 lI. S. ll5it, il&1, rnd
Jlt.titirrItr,rlr.lt.tle]rrirrll.,tl'i'...ffi

(e) ,\ prosrrurption rvhich, altlrorrgh rtot eorrr.lrrsivo, hrrrl tho cffoet of
slrrfltng lhc lrrrtlen of 1x'rsrtrsion 1rr lrelitioner, \vould hrve sllfrerod
silnilrrr infirtrrrtics. If llre jrrrr. inlcrlrrclcrl lhe prosutnplion irr lhis
n)rlnlor, it r,orrkl h;rvc rorrllrrrlrrl tlrrt rrprlr ltrrxrI lx.thc Slrte of the
slltvittg, rnd of rtrlrliliornl filcls nol llrr,rrrsr.llcs ostrrlrlisIitrq llre elcrrrent
of inlol)t, llre llrrtlen u'rrs thcn shiltcrl io lx.titioncl.to pror.c tlrnt hc
Iackerl the rorlrrisitc montll sitrlo. Srrch l presrunl)tion was forrnd.con-
stitrrlionallv defir'ierrt in ll illantu. supru.

(d) \\'ithout rnerit is the Stato's nrgltnrer)l thlt since the jrrn, corrld
,h:rr-o inlerpreterl tlre worrl inteirls" in the instrrrction irs referring only
to lletitioner's "prrrpose," irrrrl corrltl havc corrvictcd petitioler sololv lor
his "knowlerlge" withorrl consirlering "prrrpose,', it mighl not have

, relierl rtlrrtt ll,n EB!l^.:.:.]1!Etr :rt rrll. l'irst, il is rrrrt cicrrr tlpt a

\ Jrrr) ur,rrlrl lrirvo so interl)retetl "interrds." llore significrrrrtlt., err,n if a

/ jurl rnrld lrrrrl ignored the Presurn;rtion, il cannot lr certlin thlrt this
) is rvlrrl ther ,lid do, l.s its rtrrlicl u.rrs ir gtneml orre.

' 1n) Si,,"" uhethor the jrrn.'s rulirurce rrlrorr the itrstrrrction constitutefl,
or cottltI ltrrc erer cottstilttted, hlrnrrlcss orror itre issrres tlrirl were not
co.sirlr,rrrl l)\ tlro )lort.r,, srr1ilu-ii-?ffi]this (iorrrt will not reach
thcnr as:rn inilirrl nrrilnr.

- 
IJont. 

-, 
5l|L1l_{6,.r.t,r.,'r"o,l rnd remlnded.

Ilr$:srrr,,T., rlelivr.nrl llr. olrirriorr f{)r ir unrurirnous Cortrt. Jitul;-
eLrs1, ,[., Iilrrl a lorx.rrrrirrg r4rirriorr, in n,hich I]uru;r:rr, C. J., joincrl,

l\In. .h:srrcc BnnNr,rr rlelivered the opinion of the Court.

. The quostior) I)rcsel)te(l is rvhether, in a ease irr ulrich irrtent

,t+M is an elcrncrrt ()f thc crirr)e ehargerl, the iury instructiorr, "the
luv Prcsrrnres tlrat a liersorr intonds the orrlirrary collscquences
of lris voluntary aets," violates the Fourteetrth Anrendntent's
requilernent that the State prove every elelnel)t of a crintirral
offense beyond a reasor)al)le (loubt,

I
On Novenrbet 22, 1976. l8-year-olrl David Sarrrlstroln con-

fcsserl to the slaf irrg of ;\nnie ,Iessen. Rasocl uporr the eolfes-
sion a.n,l eorrolrora , l)otitior)er $'as eharge(l on
f)ecernber 2rrtI uith "rlelibclate horriicide," 1947 NIont. Rev.
('otles. S 94-,,1-102 (('rirrr. ('orlc of 1973), in that he "purl;osely
or krrouingly cailse(l tl)e rlcath of Arrrrie ,Iessen." Inforura-
tiorr, App. 3.' At trial. Sandstronr's atton)ey irrfornred the
iury that, altlrough his elir.nt athnitted killing ,Ies.serr, he did
lrot (lo -so "l)url)osely or knorvingly," and rvas therefore not
grrilty of "rleliberato lrornieitle" brrt of a Iesser erinre. App.
6-8. Tlrc lrtsic sul)lx)r't, for tlris colrtolltior) $'as tl)c testirtrony
of t,\r'o eortrt-nI)l)ointo(l lnontal health exlrrts, each of whom
rleserilrcrl for tlrt' jrrr'1' pctitiorrt'r's nlcl)tal stato at the tirtre of
the irrcirlerrt. Srrrrlslrorrr's attorrrey argucd th&t tlris tcsti-
rnony (lorll()nstral,erI tlrrt lx'titior)or, (hlc to & lrcrsotrtlity rlis-
olrlcr :rgglavlrtrxl lry alcohol consunlptiol), did not kill Annic
,Jr.sv'rr "purlrr)soly or krrowirrgly."'

t The Stltutc ;rrovirlrs:
"9+ 5-101. ('rinrinrl ltorrricrrle. (i) A pcrson eomrnit.q tho offcnse of

rrirnrnirl lrorrricrrlc il lrc lrrrrlrosclr', knorvilglv or negligerrth- earrses the
rlcrrllt ol ltnollrcr lrrrrrrrrn lrlitrq.

"(2) (.'rinrirrrrl lrontilirlo is rleliberltc horrriciri", mitigrrtod rlclibcrate
lronrrcirle, or rrt,gligcnt lrornicirle

"9+-5-l(ll. I)r'liberrrte homicide. (l) l,}ccpt rs pror.iderl in 9,t-FI03
( I ) (rr ), criminal hrxnicidr c(,Dstitrrlrs tlelilrerrtc hornicirle if :

"(a) it i-. conrnritterl purlrrrstlr or krrorvingll. . . ."
2 Prtrtiorrcr Intttalll' filo(l a notiee ol intent to rr,h' on "mcntrl disoase

or defeet exclrrdrng crinrinal responsibilitr"' a,. a defense. That defense

25 CrL 3160

Thc proseerrt,ion rcqueslt,rl tlrc trial judge to itrstruct the
iury that "Itlhe law I)rosurr)es that a person intends the
or(lil)&ry cor)s(!qlrenccs of his voluntary acts." Petitioner'g

:?lifi*#ffi1;l,lilll"f' t#'H il'J'xx::]L"ffi:':: Okrrorvlr.rlgc to thc rlefcrrse. &l)d th&t "that is i
ul)(ler tho Forleral Constit,ution, due process of law." App.
34. IIe offercd to provirle a r)uml)er of ferleral decisione in
supl)ort of the objection, irrelurling this Court's holding in
Mulknrcy v. V'ilbur,42l II. S. 684 (1975), but was told by the
jurlgc: "You con give those to the Suprerne Court. The
ob.iection is overnrled." App. 34. The instruction was de-
livercrl, tlre jrrrv fourrrl pctitior)er guilty of deliberate honrieide,
App. 38, elrd pctitiolter was set)tenced to 100 years in prison.

Santlstrom al)pealed to the Supreme Court of Montana,
again conterrding that the instruction shifted to the rlefendant .a
the hrrrrlen of rlisproving &lr clernerrt of the erime charged. in .t nr {
violation of Mul,ianey i. U'ttUrr, supra, In re W'inship,3g7 ,1#i,C2
II. S. 358 (1970), ana Patterson. v.l\tew York,432 U b. fOZfllf
(1977). The Montana Court eoneeded that these cases didV"
prohibit shifting tlre burdeD of proof to the defendant by
r)rear)s of a l)resun)l)tion, but held that the c&ses "do not
prolribit allocation of stnne burden of.proof to a defendant
under certain circumstances." 580 P. 2d 106, 109 (1978).
Since in ihe (lourt's view, "ldlefendant's sole burden under
instrrretion No. 5 wa^s to ltroduce sorne evi(lenee that he djd
not irrtr.rrrl tlre orrlinary cor)sequences of his voluntary acta,
not, to rlisprove that he act.erl 'prrrltosely' or 'knowingly,' . . .
the irrstruction does not violate due l)rocess standards as de-
firred hy the I'rrited States or Montana Constitution . . . ."
lbid. (ernplrasis arlded).

, Botlr ferleral arrd state courts have held, under a variety of

I rrtiorralr,s. that thtr givirrg of arr instructiou sirnilar to that

Iclrallcrrgerl ]rere is fatal to the validity of a criminal convic-

l-fiotr." We grantcrl eertiolari, 
- 

U. S. 
- 

(1979), to decide
the irnportant questiol of the irrstructioll's constitutionality.
We reverse.

II
The threshold inquiry in aseertairring the constitutional

analysis al)l)licable to this kind of jury instruction is toa'see
(,tlster ('ourtt11 Cottrt t'.,lllen, 

- 
U. S. 

-, --- 
(1979)

(slip op., at 15-21). That ileterrnination requires careful at
terrtion to the *'orrls actually .el)oken to the jury. see id., at

- 
l). 16. fol rvhether a rlefenrlant has been a,ccorded hir

constitutiollal riglits rlenorrrls rr|on the u'ay irr u'hich a reason-

alrle.iulor eoulrl havo irrterPreterl tlre irrstruetiorL
Responrlent argues. first. that the instruction merely de-

scrihc(l a l)ernlissive irrferonee--that is, it allowed but did not

:
rcr;uircrl evrrlt,nr.c thrrt rlr.lerrrlrrnl rvls "rrnlblc either to appreciale thc
erinrrrnlill of ltrs runrluet or to conforur lris eondrrcl to the requiremeotr
of Lrs ." Nftrrrt. Iler'. Orxks $ {|.'h,',(}l (19.17). The defense wrr ritL
rlrrurr lrl trirrl, rvitlr llrc lx,tiliorrcr rorrlcnrling tl)lrt although he *'er mt
''rrnirblr:" lo fornl llx' rcrlrrisitc inlcnl,, lre did rrot lrrt,e it &t the tirD!of
tlrl krllrrrA.

ttSrc (lhappt,ll t. I'titttl ,S.atrs. 270 lt.2d 274 (CA9 1959): Slcl
v, ('nitart Statrs, 221 l'. 2r1 7S6 (('-\9 t955) i Btrl;ottitz t,. United Stala,
213 l'. 2rl .108 ((',\5 195.1); Il'arr/1orr v. L'nited Statcr, 20il F.2d US.l (CAj
l95ll); Slrte r.ll'arbritton,2l I l(nns. 506, s(Xi P. 2d 1152 (19731; ltdt.
Stntt,27') So. '..lrl 5tX), 59li (r\lrr. Ct. (lrirn. A14r. l97li). Sr.e also L'ritld
,Slolrr r,, ll'htrton, 139 U. S. .\pP. I). C:. 203, 433 F. 2d .l5l (1970). b
rrdrlitior, two (lrrcrrrl ('orrrls ol .\p1x'rr)s hrve orrk'rerl tlrtir dislrict rwilr
to rlelr,lo tlro inslrrrr.tion irr frrlrrrc erses. Scc (.tnitcd Statett. Garret!.fi1
l'. 2,1 ;7si (('.\j'l ll);s) : I ntl,.,l Stot.s \', Chiontest.560 F. !d 12.14 (Cfs
llfjj-l 1'lre slrur(lirr(l r,.fcrr.rrce uork for fr,tlcrirl rnstrut:tions, E. Drit
rrrrl C. Illackrnrrr. l'trlerrl ,lrrrv l)rrcticc rrrul Ilrstnrctions (3d ed. ly.A,
dtscrilrr.s thc irrstrrrr.liorr rs 'r,I'irrlr'('rrollcoltr," l irl., lt {05, nndlrc
stitutir)g ' rcvr:rsiblc eLror," I rrl., al ,l-lti.

62079-,

,_1 r.-,

,.;,

k-,:,
d.,ri

nI



r(.{luirc tlrc jrrrv to rlrarv eorrclusiorrs nlrorrt rlcferrrlnrrt's irrterrt
Ilorn his aetiorrs-'arrrl tlrat, suelr inferorees are corrstitutional.
Rrief for Rcsponrlort 3. lir. Tlrose algurncrt,s rrcerl rot, rletain
rrs long, for even responrlerrt arlurits tlrat "it's possiblr"' that
the iury believerl they wt're rcquirctl to apply the presurnp-
tion. Tr. of Oral Arg. 28. Sanrlstrorn's jurors u-ore tolrl t.hat
"t.he larv preslln)es that, a persorr intenrls the orrlinary conse-
quences of his voluntary aets." They were not told that
they had a choiee, or tlrat they rrright infer that conclusion;
they were told only that the law presurned it. I-t is elear that
a reasonable iuror could easily lrave viewecl such an instrue-

tsTTT.r11fti. c. 2eB, 2e8. 4BB F. 2d 451, 4r-ni (1e70);
Greett v. United States, 132 t.I. S. App. D. C. 08, 99, 405 F.
2rl 1368. 1369 (1908). See also Montana Rules of Evidence
301 (a).'

Lr the alternative. respdhdent urges that even if viewed as

a nraltdatory presurnptiorr rather than as a ltorrnissive infer-
enee, the presurnption dirl not conclusively establish irrtent
but rather could be rebutter-I. On this view. the instnrction
requirerl the jury, if satisfietl as to the faets u'hieh trigger the
prestttnptiotr, to finrl itrtout u,rles.s tlre rlefcrrrlant offered
eviderrce to the eorrtrary. Moreover, aeeorrling to the State,
all the defenrlarrt, harl to do to rellrt the prosurnptiorr was
produce "sonre" eontrary evidence; he t[id not have to "prove"
that he lacked the required mental state. Thus, "[a]t rnost,
it lrlaced a burden ol product.ion on the petitioner," but l'did
not shift to petitioner tlte burden ol persuasiort. with respect to
any elenrent of the offense. . . ." Brief for Respondent 3
(emphasis added). Agairr. respondent conterrds that pre-
sun.rptions rvith this lirrrited effect pass constitutional muster.

\trre neerl not revieu resl;onrlent's corrstitutional argument
on this 1>oint either, hou'ever. for tve rejeet tlris characteriza-
tiorr of the presutnption as n'ell. Resytondent coneedes there
is a "tjS" that the july, ouce havirrg found petitioner's aet
voluntarl'. l'ould irrterpret the instruetion as autoniatically
direet.ing a firrdirrg of irrtent. Tr. of Olal Arg. 29. N{oreover,
the State also coueerle-" tliat lurnelorrs eourts "have differed
as to the effoet of thc presumption u'herr given as a jury
irr-struetion s'ithout, furthcr explaration as to its use by the

\ ,jrrry." anrl that sorne have found it, to shift more than the

l_!g,rr,lorr of grrorluetion. and even to have conelusive effect.
Brief for Resl>orrrlcrrt 17. Nonetheless, the State contends
that the orrly authoritative leadirrg of the efleet of the pre-
surnption resirles in the Suprerne Court of Montana. And
the State rrgues that by Iroklirrg that "lrlleferrdant's sole
burderr utrrit.r itrstrttctiorr No. 5 was to 1;rorluct sonze evidence
that he rlid rrot intcnd the ordinary consequences of his
volutrtary acts, not to tlisprove that he actcrl ';rurposely' or
'knouirrglv.' " 580 P. 2rl, at 109 (curphasis arlrlerl), the Mon-
tarra Srtprerrte (lourt r-L.cisivoly establishorl that the prosurnp-
tiorr rrt tnost nffr'et<'rl only tlrc llrrrlt.rr of goirrg forrvarrl rvith
cvirlerrec of rrrt.r,rrt tlrrit is, tlrc lrurrL'rr of lrrorlrrctiotr.n

r-:-, - ---
I t 'll"l,' jjol {rr) l}rr'srrrr;rtiorr rL'lirrrrl. \ lrrr.srrrnlrliorr is rrrr nssrrrnlrlion

frrl Irrcl l/rol tl,, l,rtr r,,1rtnts lrt lr ntu,l, lttrtu rrtrrllrr.r Irtcl or grottlt of

I lrr,'ts lirrrrrrl or otlrlrrti.r' r..trrlrlishlrl ir lhc rrr'trotr or ;rtrr,'rrrlittg." (F)n-
Ilrhrr.r* rrrLIr"l I\-,,.- lior l,lrlrlsr,s oI lrrgutrrr,t)1. $o ltc('el,t tr.sponrlont's rlr,firrilion of lltc

^O!1{rprrrrlrrclton lrrrrrlcn u lten rrl,plrcrl lo ;r rlcfctrrhnt rn l crinrurll errst'. We'(,tr)Fi,r,n. 
l)our,rr.r, thrrt tlre.lrrrrdru rs_oltr.rr.rlcscrrbttl qrrite rlillcrrulll_rvhen-il

rfsls ul)or) tlrr.lrrosecrttion. See [,'rrrlerl Sa(t('.r \'. l'uitrh,1(l) 1'. S.62,72
n 7 (l1l7l) ("elrrlerrce frrxu wlrich r jrrrv crrrld find r rlelerrdrnt grriltl'
berrrttd r rcasonrble dorrlrt"); ][cCormrck on I,]r'irler:ce $ 331t. nt 790 nnd
r ;Jll (llt7:.1 ql.), l0l, rrnrl rr. jil.l (l{t7s <,',,,,.,. \\i',rlso Ir(,lr,lhlt thc
eflrr,t ol rt frrrlutc lo trtrr'l llre prrrlrrclrott llttrrL,n ii.igrrilirrrtrllr rliUlr'rrt
lirr tlrl rl'llrrrlirnl rl)(l pto:('('lrlion. \\'ltr.tr tlr' pro.t.r'ttlirttt flils lo Inr,ct

i1, rr rlrrlr.trrl lr.rrlir.l nr l;rror ol tlro rloli,rrsc re"rrlt.. Such,r lorsr,,lrrr.rrcc
is l{rl lrr}.iil,l('ttlrott rr rlllctttlrttt'. Iirtlttrr'. lrottcvlr. rs \'{'r(li('1r tltirt lol

62G79

Tlro Srrprr.nro ('orrrt of Morrtarra is, of eourse, the finnl I
arrtholity on the logal wcight to be given a presumption underI
l\Iontana law, but it is not the final euthority on the interpre- [
tation u'hir:h a jury coulrl have giverr the instruction. If
Montana intended its ltresumption to have only the effeet
deseribed by its Suprenre Court, then we are convinced that
a reasonable iuror eorrlrl well have been rnisled by the instruc-
tion given, and eould have believed that the presumption was
rrot lirnite<l to requirirrg thc defendant to satisfy only a burden
of lrroduction. Petitiouer's jury was told that "th.e law pre-
szrnes that a l)ersoll intenrls the ordinary consequences of his
voluntary aets." They u'ere not told that the presunrption
could be rebutted, as the Montana Supreme Court held, by the
deferrrlarrt's sirnltle lrresentation of "sorne" evidence; nor even
that it eoull be rebutted at all. Given the cornnron defini--l
tion of "lircsurrre" as "to supyrose to be true wjftg1qppgf."J
Wehster's Nerl' Collegiate Dietionary 911 (1974), and given
the taek of qualifyins irrstruetions as to the leEal cffect of the
prosunrption. 14'e ear)not rliseount the possibility that the jury
nrrry have irrtcrllreterl the insLruction in either of t.wo n)ore
strirrgeut rvays.

!'irst, a roasonable iury could well have interpreted the I
presurnptiun as "eorrclusive." that is, not technically as a pre- (
sumlrtion at all. but, rather as arr irrebuttable rlirec0iorr hy the f
eourt to firrr.l irrterrt orrer'eorrvirrcerl of the facts triggerirrg th{
llrcsuurptiort. Altcrrratively. the jury nray have intorltreterl
the instructit)ll as a rliroetiorr to 6url iuterrt uporr;lroof
of the r'leferrrlant's volurrtary actions (and their "ordinary"
consequer)ces), unless th.e rlelendan.t proved the contrary by
sorne quauturn of proof which may well have been consider-
ably greater than "sorne" evidence-thus effectively shifting
the burrlerr of 1x'rsuasion orr the elernent of intent. Nutnerous
ferleral arrd state courts have warned that instructions of the
type given hele ean be interpreted in just these ways. See
generalll' (!trited Srates r'. ll'harton,,l39 U. S. App. D. C.293,
433 tr'. 2rl 4;-r1 (1()70); Berk'oui,tz v. [tnited Stotes, 213 F. 2d
468 (C;\5 19;i4) ; .Slatc r'. Boberls, 88 \\'ash. 337 341-342.
5ti2 P. 2rl 12;9, 1261-1262 \1977) (en banc); State v. ll'ar-

l2;; ((',\,i 1077). ,\rrtl althouglr the Montarra Sullreme
('outt holrl to tlro corrtrary irr this ease, Montana's ow'n Rules
of Ilvirlerrce oxplcssly state that the presumption at issue here
nray be ()\:oreonre orrlv "lly a preponrlerauce of evidence colt-
trary to tht. plesurrrption.'' Nlontana Rules of Ilvidence 301
(b)(2)." Srrch a rcquirenierrt shifts not only the burden of

lx, rlirrttlrl rrgrrirrst rL,li.rrrlrurls irr rrinrirr:rl rirx,:. I.rril(,r/ Slatlr r'. ,1/o,'tirr
Litrtt Stpplq (i,.. tlj0 t'. S.;li-I. i72-;;3 (197i\: Bxihtthoorl ttl ('nr
lttttltrs t. ( tttrtl ,\tolts.3ii0 t'. S. lll)ir, {Oti (l\llil,, }limt \', Uilil?d
Slalls, ljTir 1". 2tl l:i,-r, I l\ (C'.\; l!xi7).

0 I\hrttl. llov. ('rrlos ${lil-li}01-7 (lfllT) FtrtoH llurt,i

"l l)lislrllrrlrlr, lrtl.slrrl,ti{lli tntr)' lx' coulrovcrl(xl by otlror evidcnco,
'fhr, lirllos'irrg irrr ol' llrrrl kirrrl:

"il. 'l'hrrl r l)clsor) irrtorrrls llre oldirr:rrv consc(pleneo of lris volrrntary act."
l\[ottlrttut llrtk's ol l']r'trlrrtco il0l providt's:

"(1,)(2) .\ll prlsrrrnplirrrr.-, olhor lllan eonehrsive presuml)trons, are dis-

lrrrlirlrle lrresrrurptrorrs rrrrl nrrv be controverted. .4 tlisputohle presunrption
tno11 be otcrrotne bu n prcpotrlerattrt ol ettitlence rontrary to the pr<t-

sutnption. ('ttlcss tht ppsunption i,: ouerconrc. the trier ol lar.t mtut
finrl the ts:stttuul lut tn orrordolu'e u'ith tho preawnptirtn " (Emphasis
trldr,rt. )

Ser, rrlso ,l.Ioraglrrrr r'. ,\larrlarrl Jlotor (o..96 \lout. 165, 173-174,25 P.2d
37S, 371)-:jS0 (l{):j{). .\t olrll nrguulenl tho .{ltorne.)' (krrentl of llon-
trnr ;rgtcrrl llrrrl 'rrrlnritlcrllr'\Lrrrlrrltrr lrrn-. ..-lrrtos tlttrt lr prt'surrrplion
reqrrircs a l)ers-oll lo overcon)r, that llresrrmption b1' I prepondt'rancc of

11''x

.rd, *
\h1,,,,
r\ *o,

l1 Karr. .i06. i 2<l IL12. 1155 (1973):

Soc also ('nited,Sfatcs r'. Chiantese, 560 F.2rl 1244,

25 CrL 3161



I)ro(luet,ion, brtt also tho ultirrrat.e burrk'tt of ltcrsuasiotr ort thc
issue of intetrt.T

Wt: rlo not reiect the possibility that sornc jurors nray have

intr,rpretrd the challerrgctl ilrstnretion as pttrtnissive. or, if
rnanrlntory, as requiring only that the rleferrdartt eottte fonvard
with "sorne" evidence irr rebuttal. Horvever, the faet that a

reasonable juror eqqld have givetr the presurnption conclusive
' "-:>or persuasion-shiftiifi effect means that rve canl)ot diseount

the lrcssibility that Sarrdstrottt's jttrors aetually did llroceed
upon ono or the other of these latter interprr:tntiotrs. And
that nreans tlrat unloss these kirttls of presrtrnptiotls &rc con-
st,itutional, the instructiott caurtot be atljutlged valid.t Lllster
Couttty Court t'. .4llen, -- Ir. S., at __ l). 17' id., et 

-(Powrrr,, J., rlissenting) (slip op.. at g); IlachelLar v. Mary'
land,397 [T. S. 564, 570-i:'71 (1070); Leary t. (tnited Stotes,

395 U. S. 6. 31-32 (1969); protherhood ol Carpenters v.
(;niterl Stolcs, 330 I'. S. 39,5. 40&*409 (1947 1; Rollenlnch v.

L'nited Stotes, 326 tl. S. 607. 6ll-614 (1946). It is the line
of cases urgerl by lretitiorrr:r, anrl exemplifir.dby IyH-@,
397 I'. S.3i8 (1970 l. that provirles the appropriato mocle of
cr',sTt-ffi ,GIf, ffi Iv-sisf ortlrt'sekindsof lrresuttrptiotts.n

evidrncc." Tr. of Orrl Arg.30.
lVr rlo not, ol course, cit('this RrtI'of I:}irk'ttce to rlisptttc the Ilon-

tana Srrlrreme C'ortrt's interprt'tttiolr ol its own law. It merell'serl'es as

eviderrce lhal a rersonrble matt-here, apparentll', the dmfter of NIon-

lana's olvn Rrrles of Evidene-eorrld interpret the pre"strmplion at isstte

in this crrse ls shilting lo lhe rlefenrltnt tho llrrden of provittg ltis inno-
cerrce lrv a lrropotrderattce of lhe evitlcltce.

?'Ihe lntenlirrl lor these irrtorpretatiolts of tltc ltrestttnpttotl wxs not
removed bv the other instrttctiorts givetr al the trirrl. It is trrrc that thc
jrrrv rrrrs Inslnleted generalll t)rrtt thc [rccttsnd urts ltresttntetl ittnoccnl
until proven grrltr', and tlrrt llri'Strtte hrrd lhc hrtrrk'rt of llroving bclond
I reasonrhlo donl, tlltl the defrnrlnnt carrsed the rleath of the decer-.ed

prrrposelv or knowinglr'. :\1rp. ll.1_35; Brief for Rcslnrtrlent 21. But
this is not rhetorirrllt' itteonsistr'nt u'itlt I cortclttsile or lrrrrden-'"hifting

l)resun)J)tion. 1'he ,lurv eottld hlve interpreted the tl'o set"- of instrue-
tions as rndierlirrg thrrt llte prmttmptiotl rlts a. rnenn"" bv rvlticlt llroof
lrevonrl a relsonrtl;le dortlrt ts to intertt cottlrl lre srrti.-fierl. For exittrtple,

I if ,l,n 1,.,=r,nr1,linrr rvcro vicsetl rts cottclttsive, llre jttrv cottltl ltrve bcliclcd

I rlr,rt irlth,rrrglr irrlottl tntt-t he provett lrt'r'ottrl I rertsotrrlrlo rkltbt, prttof

I of tlrl volrrrrlirrt slrrlirtg rttrl its ollinrrrv conscrlll0lt('cs cot)stittllc(l proof tlf
lirrtcnl lrrron,l l rr,:rsorutl,lt' rlorrlri. ('f. trlultoney r'. Il'i/bur. 421 lr. S.

| 6\{,;l,il n.:ll (lft75) ( Tlrcse procerlrrrrl derrecs rcrlrrire (in the case of

I a prcsrrnrptron) lhp lrier of frret ro concltttit'lhnl tlre proscettlion

I l,..,nnr rls lrrrrrlr,n of l,toof rvttlt rospecl to tlte ltresttnred .. ftct by
I ltrvi,tg srtlisfrtetrrrtll lstrrhli.ltlrl rttltlr lrlts.' l

i (lirln orrr rrltrrnrrtc resttlt rtr lltts ciue, ue tLr nrrt net'd to consir-ler what

kind of constitrrliorrrl nrrallsis rvorrld be appropritte lor otltr'r kinds of
I)rosl rl)l )l iorl-e.

1'.\rother lino of ottr crrsls rrlso derls uillr tlrc vrrlrd.ll of certrrin kinds

of Jrrcsuntptiotts. Srr' ['lslr v ('outtttt (irtrrl t. All(n, 
- 

1r. S. 
- 

(1979) :

Borrr"s r.. I'nrlcrl States, .l1J t'. S. 337 (1973) i 'I'urncr r'. [-ritcrl States,

31)6 Ir. S. lxg (1970)', It'arq t. {'ritrd,s/atrs. 395 t'. S.6 (1969): (inited
Sfalls r. I?rtntanrt.3l.l II S. I36 (1061-r); ['riterllilntcs t. Gaittctl,3S0 II. S.

63 (lrfll.'r) i Rot,rar,, t. ( nitti Stalrr. iJ5il I'. S. llil (l()57): ?irl v. f'ritrri
,qlotrs.;llll Ir. S..lli{) (11)tll) 'l'lrcsr,r'rr*os rlrrl rrot, ho$'r'r'or, irr|olvc Ire-
sunrplrors ol Ilrr. r'ottcltrsi\'(, or I)r'h..rlrtsiott-sltilttrrg vrrrillr'. Scc {.'/sllr
('tunltl ('t)utl r. All,,rr, --- lt. S .--- lslip o;t, rtl 15. l(i tr. l(i)l
rrrl, rrt -. (l\)sr:t.r,..1., rlr-s,'rrlirx) (slip op., tl')): Altlltttru t. ll'illtu,
421 tr S., rrt 7{lll tt. ;tl (lll75); lt'ot4 t. I ttilrrl Sl.ol,':, illll'r II. S., rrt

illt; ll,tt'iont t. I'uttd Slr/r's, ilSll I'. S., rrl liil; IIt'('orrrrick olt IlvirL'ltco
S:ll tl07? rrl.).

A litrc of r.r'etr oltlt,r ('irs('! rlrAo(i ttlxrt lts ltv rcsltrtltrL'ltl is rrllrttlll ilt-
n1r;rlilllrlr'. In .417ri,'tl t. l'nittl,Slolrs. l{i;'r t'. S.36,5() (lN1)7). the lrial
colrrl: rlslnlrlroll r.xl,ro:^slI slrtled lhtrt lltr' ltrostttn;tlirttl u'its I)ot aoll-

clrrsirr,, rrrrrl llris ('rnrrt forrrrrl tllrl ollrer lrrol,lctns tvitlt lho itrstrrrrtion w.ro
rrrrrrl lx thc ehltrgc rortsirlt'rtrl its r wltolc. Tlte olhtr profli'red crtsos

sirnplv involvtd gclr0rirl r'oltttttcnt. lx tht' ('ottrt ttpotr tlrc i'rlirlrtl of

lrrr,srrnritrg ir:lcrrt lrorn rclitrt. Soc llarlio OlJierrs r. Lthor Iloard. 317

t'. S. 17. -15 (1951)'. Cranrr t. ('nttd Stalrs. :]?5 lt. S. l. 3l (l$'15). Sce

nlso ,/lcuriolrls r'. [:rrtrrl "\tolcs.9S l:. S. l{5, l(i7 (lx7li) (religrrus oLir'-
tion lo lxrllgrrtrtr lirrr ttol 'r doli'ttsc).

25 CrL 3162

tIt
In II'irrshlp, this Court state(l:

"Lest the're rcrnain ar)y (loubt about the constitutional
statlrre of tlre rcasonable-rloullt standard, we explicitly
lroltl that the l)ue Proeess Clause protects the accused

against eor)vieti()n excel)t ul)on proof beyond a reasonable
doubt oI euery /oct trecessarv to colrstitute thp crirnp -irh
r{!g.!Lbg is._g]El4tt" 397 U. S., at 364 (emphasis

ar lded ) .

Aeerrrrl, Pattcrson v. :\'trtt, l'ork', 432 II. S., at 210. The
l)etitionor here u'as charged with and eonvicted of <leliberate
hornicide. eornurittotl l)rlrl)osely or knou'ingly, under 1947

Nlont. Rev. C<.rdes S 9,1-5-102 (a) (Crim. Code of 1973). See

Alrp. 3, 42. lt is clear that under Motttatta law. whether thJl
crirne \r'as comu)itted l)url)osely or knowirrgly is a fact neces--l
sary to eonstitute the erinre of deliberate honticide.'o Indeed,
it was tlre lone eletnetrt of the oflerrse at issue in Sartdstrom's
trial, as hc eonfessed to eausirrg the death of the victim, told
the jury that krrowledge arrrl l)url)ose were the only\uestions
he n'as cor)tro\rrting, arxl intro(lueed evirlettet'solely on thosel

l)oints. App. O-it. Iloreover. it, is eoneeded tlrat proof of 
I

tlefendant's "intent" uould be sumcient to establish this ele- i
nlorrt.'r Thus, the question before this Court is whether the
challenged jury instruetiou had the effect of relieving the State
of the burden of proof enunciated in ll/insh,":p on the critical
questiorr of petitioner's state of mind. \\'e conclude that
ur)der either of the two possible interlxetatior)s of the instru-
tiorr set out above. precisely tlrat effect rvould result, ettd that
the irrstructior) therefore rel)resel)ts col)stitutioltal error.

\\'e corrsider first the validity of a cg1fujgg l)resum!!o\
This ('ourt has eonsidered such a l)resunrl)tion oll at least t$'o
prior occasior)s. In Morissette t'. (inited Sfates, 342 I:. S. 246

(1952). the rlefendarrt was chargcd with willful sntl knowil)g
theft of govenu)rent prol)crty. Although his attonrey argued

that for his clit'rrt to be found guilty. "the taking rnust have

becrr rl'ith fclonious irttetrt." the t.rial jurlge ruletl that "It]hat
is lrrcsurnetl by ltis ol'rr act." Id., * 249. After first cort:
clrrrlirrp that irrterrt \\'as in faet arr eletttertt of the erilne
charsetl, an([ after rleclarirrg that "lw'lhere irttent of the ac-

euse(l is an irrgredient of the crinre eharged, its existence is

a . . . jury issue," Jlorissettc helrl:

l)rcsuntpti(,tt ol itttell!1o14 sn-a(L- It often is tetnpting
to cast iu terrns of a'presuluptiott'a col)clusion which a

court thir)ks l)rollal)le frotrr giveu faets . . . . lButl Iw]e
think l.rresunrptive irrtent has rto place iu this case. A

con(:lu.sil)e presutnption u:hich testitrtotty could not ouer'

i"'l'll' .trrltttt' is slt oul rtl ll. l, rtr/rrrt. Itt ,Jlalc r. llrRtnzir', 
-\lorrl .--, 

-, 
i)hl l). LIl l:1o5, ll;j2 (l!l7H), llrt' \lotttntrrt Sttpr0tne Oourt

slrrlrrl:
"lrr ll,rrrlrurr, r Ix'rsr)n rr)lrltnlls lltr ofTrrtso rrf rleltltorntc lrornieirlo rf

Ir,prrrpo.r,ll or lilrrs'tttglr crtttst': llte rlertlt of rrttrrtlter htltttan beittg.

Scr'lirrrrs ()l-5-l()J ( I ) (rr), 0.1-l-r-lOI (1,, It. ('. ]1. 1947. 'l'ht atatulorily
drlittul drnrntr ol tltt olltrtsr, eirllt ol rvltielt lltl Stitle tnrlF-l l)rove be)ond

rl r(,irsr)nrl)le rLrttlrl, ntl lhtrt!on rnu.sitry lht rltnth ol unolhtr hutnon

btrng u'ith tht'Anrttlttlllr lltirl \'oll ilr('c:lllslllg or tith the purpose lo
ctll:r, tlr(, rlcrtlt rrl' lltrtt httttrttl ltr'ittg." (Fintlrlrrrsis rrtlrlcd.)

A(r'orrl,,St(te v. ('ol/irs. 
- 

\lot)1. 5l'i2 l'.2d 1179, llit'l (l97li)
( rrrrrrrnittrng llre lromicirle'pttrpost'lv or ktlortilrglf is an elcment of
rlcliberrrlc honrrcrtle. ..')

l,llcsporrrl,rrl agr({,s thrl "ttttrttt'rttcl "1rt11xrse" are rottghlv s1'non1'-

nlous, soe:rlso \\i'hster's Nerv ('ollegirte l)icltonitn'601 (1974), but con-

tesls the relevance of "rnl('ul ' to 'kttoslcdge." See Tr. of Oral Arg. 18;

[]rrcf for llcslxrttrletrl N-9 'fhis prolrlettt ts rliscttsstrI lrr I'lrt I\', il/ra.

"lt Jollotrs thot tlte trial court na
Wsiud(/e the iswe bg instructio'n t

62079



.-^ prosurnt)tion in this ease wog[l"ggflict u'ith the overriding

-

Q?W"' 'Dlesurnption of inrrocerrce vyith wlrich the law errdows the
accused and u'hich extends to every element of tlie crime,"
and would "invarle Ithe] factfindirrg function" which in a

eriminai ease t e-

tion announeed to David Sandstrorn's jury may well have had

. exaetly these eonsequenees. llpon finding proof of one ele-

\ rncnt of tlre erime (eausirrg rlcath), and of facts irrsufficient

Ito estnlrlislr l,hr, soeorrrl (thc voluntaritrcss attrl "orrlittary cotr-

f sequerrecs" of rlr.fenrlnrrt's action), Satrdstrottt's jurors could

f roasorrnl,ly hovc corrclurlerl tlrat they u'ere rlirr-'ctcrl to firrd

.r I 
asainst deferrrlant on the elernent of inient. The State was

+- \ thus not forcerl to prove "beyonrl a reasonable rloubt

\ every faet rreeessary to constitute the crime . . . charged," 397

I U * , at 364, anr,l clefen<lant was deprived of his constitutional
I rights as explieated in Il'in.shp.

t.hnttr rutuld elJrctiuely elinrinntc intrnt as art inlTradit nt
ol lhe olJtttst'. A prcsrrrrrption rrlrir,lr tvorrLl porrrrit lrrrt
ttot reqrrire tlro irrry to assunre irrterrt florn an isolaled
Iact, u'orrlrl prcjurlge n eorrelrrsion whiclr thc irrry shorrld
reaeh of its oun volitiorr. A prr.srrrrrptiorr u'hieh worrlrl
pernrit tlre .lrrrv to rnnkc an rssrrrrrptiorr wlrieh all the
evirlerrce eorrsir.lererl together does not krgieally establish
rrould give to a proven faet an artificial anrl fictional-
effect- Irr either ease, ti.is grreswn'ption. u,ould rcn.flictl
u,i.th, the ouetidi.ng presumption ol in.nocence u,ith, wh.ichl
th,e lau' endouts th.e acaused an.d uhich ea'tends to euera I

element ol the crbne." 342 ll. 5., at 274-275. (Ern:J
phasis added.)

Just Iast Tenn, iu [t'nited Slafes r'. (ln,ited States Gypsum,
438 t'. S. 422 (1978), we reaffirrned the holding of Morissette.
In that case clefenrlants. who rvere eharsetl with eriminal
violations of the Shenn?n Act, challenged 

"the 
following jury

instruction:

"The law presumes that a person intends the necessary
and natural corrsequenees of his aets. Therefore, if the
effect of the excharrges of prieing information was to r&ise,
fix, nraintairr. and stabilize priees. theu the lrarties to
then'r are presuured, as a matter of law, to have intended
that result." Id., at 430.

After again determining that the offense included the element
of intent. u'e held

I "[e] rleferrclant's state of mind or intent i^s an element
I ol a criminal antitrust offense u'hich . .. cannotbe taken

I fro,n the trier of fa.ct through reliance on, alegal presump-

I tion, of u'rongful intent frorn proof of effect on prices.
/ Cf. Morissette t'. United Srates . , . .

"Although ,n off..t on p.i.o. may well .r1rpo.t un ,'of*
eJrce !hat the defendant had knowlerlge of the probability
of such a consequer)ce at the time he acted, the jury must
renrain free to consider additional evidencc, before accept-
ing or rejecting the infercnce [lllltimately, the

l rleeision on the issue of intent must be left to the trier

\ of fact alorre. The instructiou giveu invaderl this fact-
l[nrling furrctiorr." 438 U. S., at 435, t[46 (emphasis

--ia.aj
See also HicA'ory v. [tnited Stotes, 160 U. S.408, 422 (1896).

As in Morissette anrl (,'nited States (lgpzum, a conelusive

A presurnption whieh, although not conclusive, had the
effect of shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant,
would have suffered from similar infirnrities. If Sandstrom's
jury interpreted the presurnption in that m&nrrer, it could
have concluded that upon proof by the Statc of the slaying,

G2G79

nrrrl of nrlrlitiorrnl facl,s rrot tlrcnrselves estoblislrirrg thn ele-
nront of irrterrt, llre llrrrrlcir was s.hiftcrl to the rlt.ftrtrlnnt to
llrove that hc laekotl the requisite rnerrtal state. Such a pre-
sutnlrticrrr wns fourrd eorrstitutionally deficient in Mullaney v,
lf ilbur,42l (T. S. 684 (1975). In Mullaney the charge was
trrurrler. wlrich rrrrrler Mairre law required proof rrot only of
intent but of rnalice. The trial court charged the jury that
"'rnalice aforethought is an essential and indispensable ele-
ment of the crime of rnurder.' " Id., at 686. However, it
also instrueted that if the prosecution established that the
homicide was both intentional and unlawful, malice afore-
thought was to be irnplied unless the defendant proved by a
fair preponderarree of the evidence that he aeted in the heat
of passiorr on sudrleu provocation. Mullaney t'. V'ilbur, 421

U. S., at 686. As we recounted just two Terms ago in Patter-
son,v. New l/orlc, "[t]his (hurt... unanimously agreed with
the Court of Appeals that lVilbur's due process rights had
been invaded by the presurnption casting upon him the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
he had aeted in the heat of passion upon sudden provocation."
432 11 . S.. at 214. And Potterson reaffirmed that "& Stetel
nrust prove every ingredient of &n offense beyond a reasonablel
doubt, and may not shift the burden of proof to thel
defendant" by nreans of such a presumption. Id., at 215.

Because f)avid Sandstrom's jury may have interpreted the I
judge's instruction as constituCing either a burden-shifting 

I
presumptiorr like that in Mullawy, or a, conclusive presump- I
tiorr like those in Morissette and United States Gypnrm, elrfi, I
because either interpretation woul<l have deprived defendant I

of his right to the due process. of law, tyg hols_qe irsqucti:" )s@' -,-l
Iv

Respondent has proposed two alternative rationales for
affirming petitioner's eonviction, even if the presumption at
issue in this case is unconstitutional. First, the State notes
that the jury was instructed that deliberate hornicide may be
comrnitted "lrurposely or krwwingly."'" App. 35 (emphasis

added). Sinee the jury was also ingtructed that a ferson
"interrrls" the ordiuary eousequences of his voluntery ects,
but, was not providetl with a definition of "intends," respond-
ent argues that iurors eould have interpreted the word as
referring only to the defeudant's "purpose." Thus. e jury
whieh convieted Sandstrom solely for his "knowledge," and
whieh irrtcrpreted "interr<ls" as relevant only to "1)urpose",
would not have neecled t<l rely upon the tainted presumption
at all.

\Ye earrnot aeeept respondent's argument. As an initial-l
matter, !r'e are not at all eertain that a jury would interpret 

I
the word "intends" as bearing solely upon purpose. As we-[

12 The jnrors were in.qtruetod that:
.,INSI'IIIICTION NO. 7

"'I(nowinglv' is dcfincrl ns follows: A person ncts knowingly with re-
Fpcct, to r,ondrrct or to n cirerrrnrtnnce dorcribed by o Btalute defining an
ofTrrnsc when ho is nwnro of hip conduct or that the circumstance existe. A
peraon ncts knowinglv with rcspect to the resrrlt of conduct described by
& statute defining rn offense wlron ho is aware that it is highly probable
tlrnt suelr rmult will be carrsed by hin eonduct. When knowlodge of the
existence of a partierrlar fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is
established if a person is aware of a high probabilitl' of its existence.

Equivalent terms such as 'knowing'or 'with knowledge'have the same

meaning.

..INSTNIICTION NO. 8

"'Prrrposeh'' is defined as follows: A person aets prrqroselv with respect
to a resrrli or to conduel described hv n slatrrte defining an offense if it
is hir cousciorrs object to engrrge in that eonduct or to c&rtse thet result,"
App. 35-36.

25 CrL 3163



sni(l in I'ttitt'l Sla/r's r'. {'ttiltd S/a1rs (/47rsuar,43fl II. S., ot
44i,. "ltllto r,lr'rrrr'rrl. of itrtont irr tlrt't'r'itrritrl'l law lrns trarli-
tiorrallv lx't'rr vicscrl rts n l)iflrr('lll('rl rrrtrtrcpt ctrtlrt'rrcirrg citlter
tlrc spceifie t'c(luir('nr('nt of pttt';lttsc or tlto lt)()ro got)('ral olte
of krroslcrlgr'or:l\\':lr'('n('ss." St'c nlso \\'. Lal''nvt'rt .\. Sctltt,
(i'irrrirral [,aw l()(i ( l1)72).

Rut. rrrore significarrtlv. evorr if a jrrry loakl lrave ignored
the presrrrnptiorr atttl fotttrrI rlt'fcrrrlarrt grriltv het:ause lrc aeted

krron'irrglr,. \\'('ealrrot lrc et'rtairr tlrat this is uhat lhoy did
rlo."' .\s tlre irtry's vcrrliet \\'as a gorr('r'al orre. App. 38. we

hnve rro sav of kttou irrg tltat Sarrtlstl'<)tIt \\'as ttot r:otrvicterl

on tl)o hasis of thc ttrreotrstitutiorrnl instrttetiott. .{rrrl "lilt
has lorrg lrer.rr sr.t.tlcrl tlrat whcn t t'ast'is stthtrrittt'rl ttt the jrrry
on altenrative theories the urreorrstitutionality of any of the
theories requires that the eorrvietiorr be set asirle. See, e. 9.,
Strombergl t'. Californi.a,283 IT. S. 350 (1931)." Leary v.
(nited Statcs, :195 I'. S.. at'!ll-32. Soe ['lstpr County Court
v. illlcn, 

- 
fr. s., at 

- 
n. 17; id., 6[ 

- 
(p611rpr,l. J., dis-

serrtirrg) (sli1r. op., ttt 9\', Barhellar t'. Marulorrd, 397 1I. S..

at ir70-,-r7l 1 Brotherhood of Corpcttters t,. (|rtitt:d Stntes, 330
I'. S.. at 40tt-4(X); Rollerrbatlt t'. ('rtited Sfates,326 li. S., at
611-614.

Ilesporrderrt's fiual argutrrent is that everr if the jury did
roly upon the urreonstitutiorrrrl itrstnretiorr. this corrstituted
harrrrless error turrler (ilta"pttran t'. (ialilorttia,380 tI. S. l8
(1967). beeause both rleferrrlarrt's eotrfessiorr arrd the psychia-
trist's tt'stirrrorry dernorrstraterl that Sanrlstrorn possessed the
requisite rrrerrtal state. Brief for Respondent 4-13. In relrly,
it is sairl tlrat petitioner corrfesst.rl orrlv to the slavirrg and not
to his nrerrtal state. that the psyehiatrist's testirnorry anrlrly
supportcrl his tleferrse . Brief for Petitiorrer 15-16. arrd that in
any event an utrconstitutiorral jury instruetiorr orr an elenrent
of the erirne c&l) never eorrstitute harrnless error. see generally
Brotherhood o! Carltttnters t'. (;ni.ted Slates,330 l-. S., at 408-
409: Bollanbath t. ('rtited.States, 326 [:. S., at 614, 615. As
norre of these issues \r'as colrsi(lered by the Suprerne Court of
\Iorrtarra. we tlcelirre to reaeh therrr as an initial uratter here.

Soe l/oore r'. Illirrois, 434 I-. S. 220.232 (1977) ; aolernan v.
Alabama,,330 t-'. S. l. 1l (1070). Tho Morrtana Court u'ill.
of eourse. be frec to corrsirlrr thern orr rerrranrl if it so desires.
Ibi.d. t\ccorrlirrgly. the jurlgnrcrrt of tlre Suprctne Court of
Moutana is reversecl anrl lenratrdetl for furtht:r l)roeeedirlgs
not irreonsistent with tlris opinion,

1l is so ordered,

l\Irr. ,h'strcr: R.rlrNqrrrsr, with whoru Trru Clrrrrr Jusrrcr
ioitrs. rcrrcurrirrg.

'I'he Fourtecrrth r\rnerrdment to the United States Con-
stitution prohihits arry State frotn deprivirrg a person of lib-
ctty u'itlrout rlur. process of law. and in Mullaney v. W'ilbur,
421 I-. S. 684 (1()7ll). this ('ourt held that the Fourteenth
Aurerrrlrnent's guaranties prohibit a State fronr shifting to the
deferrrlarrt the burrlen of disl;rovirrg au elerrrent of the erime
charged. I arn loath to see this Court go into the business
of parsirrg jury instructions giverr by sta.te trial courts, f,lr I
as rve have eolsisterrtly recognized, "a sirrgle instruction to I
a jury nray rrot be judged in artificial isolation, but rnust be/
vieu'crl in the context of the overall charge." Qupp v.,
\auohten,414 l;. S. 141. 147 (1973). And surely if this
charge had, in the wonls of the Court, "nrerely described a
pcnrrissive inference," ante, at 4. it could not couceivably have
run afoul of the eonstitutional decisions cited by the Court
iu its opirriorr. But a nrajority of nry Brethren conclude that
"it is clear that a reasorrable juror could have easily viewed
sueh ar) instructiou as nrantla.tory," ibid., and counsel for the
State adrnitted in oral argurnent "that 'it's l)ossible' that the
jury believed they were required to apply the presurnptiou."
Ante, p.4.

\\'hile I continue to have doubts as to whether this partic-
ular jury was so atterrtively atturred to the iustructions of the
trial eourt ihat it divinerl the difference recognized by lawyers
betweetr "iufer" anrl "presutne." I defer to the judgrnent of
the rrraiority of the Court that this differerrce irr nreaning may
have beerr critieal in its effect on the jury. I therefore coucur
in the C'ourt's opir)ior) arxl judglnent.

'? Itrrkrrl, rritlr rc.lrrrrrl.rrl': illt'rprr'lrrlion o[ "intctrrls' lts going sololl
lrr "1rrrrlxr.r,." il srrrrlrl lx,iurl)ririlg ii rlrr,jrrrl rrrrrsirlt.rrrl 'krns'lrlge"
lr.[0rr. r1 r,orsirl('r(,(l ''Irtrlxrsr'.' \fitlr tlr llsiislitilrr' ol tllo lrr(,slilnlJtiol).
tllo lrtt('t $orrlrl lrrr!r'lrrrlr |irsiIr'to firrrl tlrrrr tlr0 fornter. xI(l tlt('re ii Ilo
teirsot) lo lx.lir,rr, lhl irlrr uorrkl Irrrlc rk,lilrr,rrrtell rtrrrlerlrtktrt the ntorc
,Iiflicrrll trsk-

I

I

25 CrL 31O4 6-20-79