Broadway v. Culpepper Brief of Appellees
Public Court Documents
May 1, 1970

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Broadway v. Culpepper Brief of Appellees, 1970. def76293-b69a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/3a0306db-7e5c-4456-90a9-98a623dc2ef5/broadway-v-culpepper-brief-of-appellees. Accessed May 18, 2025.
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IN THE United States Court of Appeals FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT N o . 29.391 CARL BROADWAY, et a!, U.S.A. versus ROBERT CULPEPPER. JR., et al Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, Honorable J. Robert Elliott, Judge BRIEF OF APPELLEES Frank S. Twitty Frank S. Twitty, Jr. P. O. Box 385 Camilla, Georgia 31730 L. Earl Jones Newton, Georgia 31770 Attorneys for Appellees INDEX Page NATURE AND HISTORY OF CASE COUNTER STATEMENT OF FA CTS....................... 1 ISSUES ON APPEAL ................................................... 3 ARGUMENT AND CITATION OF AUTHORITIES . . 4 REBUTTAL TO GOVERNMENTS POSITION.........13 CONCLUSION .............................................................. 16 CITATIONS Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 89 L. Ed. 1962 ................6 Joni Rabinowitz vs. United States of America, 336 F. (2d) 34 (5th Cir.) ............................................... 6 Michael Waldo Simmons vs. U.S.A., 406 F. (2d) 456 (5th Cir.) .......................................................... 8 Mobley v. U.S., 379 (2d) 768 (5th Cir.) .........................11 Swain vs. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202, 13 L Ed (2d) 759 . . . . 6 Thiel v. Southern Pacific, 328 U. S. 217, 90 L. Ed. 1181 ........................................................................ 12 Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346, 24 L Ed (2d) 567 . . . . 15 U.S.A. vs. Ditommaso and U.S.A. vs. Waugaman, 405 F (2d) 385 .......................................................... 11 United States Ex Rel Seals v. Wiman, 304 F (2d) 53 (5th Cir.) ............................................................... 12 EXHIBITS Certificates of Leslie Bush, Clerk Superior Court Baker County, Georgia ..................................... 18 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 29,391 CARL BROADWAY, et al, U.S.A., versus ROBERT CULPEPPER, JR., et al, Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, Honorable J. Robert Elliott, Judge BRIEF OF APPELLEES I NATURE AND HISTORY OF CASE. COUNTER STATEMENT OF FACTS. This case was initiated as a class action by Negro citizens of Baker County, alleging that Negroes and women had been systematically excluded from the county jury rolls because of their race and sex, in vio lation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu tion of the United States. The complaint sought in junctive relief. Subsequently, the United States was allowed to intervene in the case. 2 Following an evidentiary hearing on the merits, the District Court on May 8, 1969 (App. 291) found the Baker County jury list to be violative of the constitu tional rights of Negro citizens and entered an order requiring the defendants to compile a new jury list in accordance with the laws of the State of Georgia and the Federal Constitutional Mandate, The Court’s decree took notice of the fact that Georgia law requires the jury commissioners to re compile the jury lists periodically and made mention that the Court was aware that at the time of the orig inal hearing on this matter it was mentioned that an other revision of the jury lists in Baker County would be shortly forthcoming. In this connection the Court stated that if the jury lists had been completely re vised since the original hearing the jury commission ers may have taken action on their own initiative to correct the deficiencies noted with regard to the lists which were in existence at the time of hearing, and the decree provided that if such action as was re quired by the decree in regard to the compiling of a new list had already been accomplished by the jury lists as revised and now in use, an affirmative and doc umented showing of such fact could be made forthwith to the Court, the Court specifying what such a docu mented showing should encompass. Such a showing was made in writing to this Court in June, 1969, (App. 339 et seq) the Defendants suggest ing that the new traverse and grand jury lists compiled since the original evidentiary hearing were now so 3 constituted as to meet the requirements of law and to satisfy the mandate of the decree issued by this Court. Subsequently, the Plaintiffs moved for an evidentiary hearing on the report and the Intervenor (U.S.A.) filed a motion to compel the Defendants to make further re vision of the new jury list, these motions being based on allegations that the new list did not represent a fair cross-section of the community. Further eviden tiary hearing was granted and the motions considered in October, 1969. (App. 295) The only testimony submitted was the witness Leslie Bush, a defendant, Clerk of Superior Court of Baker County, Georgia and also Clerk to the jury commis sioners of Baker County. (App. p. 299-335) II ISSUES ON APPEAL The appellants contend that the issue to be presented for review is, “Whether the District Court erred in fail ing to require the defendants to include the name of additional Black citizens on the jury lists where the record showed that in the past Blacks had been syste matically excluded from the jury rolls and the current lists resulted in 36.29% of the adult White population and 17.31% of the adult Black population being repre sented on the rolls.” 4 We do not consider this as the real issue as it is based on the premise that there should be a certain percentage of the various races on the jury rolls. We think that the real issue is: “Is the jury list of Baker County, as now constituted, a fair representative cross-section of the upright and intelligent citizens of the county.” Ill ARGUMENT AND CITATION OF AUTHORITIES We feel that the evidence adduced on the hearing held on October 22, 1969 (App. 295 et seq.) shows that the jury commissioners of Baker County fully com plied with the provisions of the decree of the District Court filed May 8, 1969. We feel that the traverse and grand juries, as now constituted, represent a fair cross-section of the qualified citizens of Baker County, without any discrimination as to race, creed, color or sex. We produced sworn testimony in support of the re port filed with this court and the plaintiffs introduced no evidence whatsoever to contradict the report made. Therefore, we think that the jury list of Baker County meets all the tests that have been previously laid down by our courts. It was taken from the voters list, it rep resented a percentage comparable to the percentage on voters list, the plaintiffs suggested names, other prominent Negroes suggested names, an attempt was 5 made to contact all registered voters and the list as made up represents a cross-section of the resident qualified citizens of Baker County. The only other question is that raised by the inter vener, the Department of Justice. It is their claim that the percentage of Negroes on the jury list is not com parable to the percentage of citizens. In other words they contend that the qualified voters should be in ac cordance with the population. However, we call the court’s attention to the fact that no evidence was intro duced by the government or the plaintiffs to show that the jury commissioners were now discriminating a- gainst the Negroes or that Negroes were being kept off the jury solely because of their race. The government overlooks several important things. First the commissioners are admonished to use the voters list as the basis for selecting jurors. The per centage on this list is 63% white and 37% Negro. The jury list is approximately 66% white and 34% Negro. And of course this court admonished the commis sioners to follow the Georgia law and select the jurors from intelligent and upright citizens. There is no dis pute but that this was done. So this leaves us with the question, as to whether, the jurors selected be in proportion to the population by races. This has never been held by any of our courts, to our knowledge. 6 In SWAIN v. ALABAMA, 380 U. S. 202, 13 L. Ed. 2d 759 (1965), the Court said: “Neither the jury roll nor the venire need be a perfect mirror of the community or accurately reflect the proportionate strength of every identifiable group.” (p. 208) Even in the JONI RABINOWITZ v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 366 Federal Reporter (2d) 34 the Fifth Circuit speaking through Judge Rives, said in part: “Lest we be misunderstood, we repeat the caution of the Supreme Court in Swain v. Ala bama 1964, 380 U.S. 202, 208: “But a defendant in a criminal case is not constitutionally en titled to demand a proportionate number of his race on the jury which tries him nor on the venire or jury roll from which Petit jurors are drawn. Neither the jury roll nor the venire need be a perfect mirror of the community or ac curately reflect the proportionate strength of every identifiable group. Obviously the number of races and nationalities appearing in the an cestry of our citizens would make it impossible to meet a requirement of proportional repre sentation.” In the case of AKINS v. TEXAS, 325 U. S. 398, 89 L. Ed. 1962, the Supreme Court held in part: 7 “Fairness in selection has never been held to require proportional representation of races upon a jury. Purposeful discrimination is not sustained by a showing that on a single grand jury the number of members of one race is less than that race’s proportion of the eligible in dividuals. The number of our races and na tionalities stands in the way of evolution of such a conception of due process or equal pro tection. Defendants under our criminal statutes are not entitled to demand representatives of their racial inheritance upon juries by whom they are tried. But such defendants are entitled to require that those who are trusted with jury selection shall not pursue a course of conduct which results in discrimination in the selection of jurors on racial grounds.” (p. 403) “Our directions that indictments be quashed when Negroes, although numerous in the com munity, were excluded from, grand jury lists have been based on the theory that their contin ual exclusion indicated discrimination and. not on the theory that racial groups must be rec ognized. The mere fact of inequality in the number selected does not in itself show dis crimination. A purpose to discriminate must be present which may be proven by systematic exclusion of eligible jurymen of the pro scribed race or by unequal application of the law to such an extent as to show intentional discrimination.” (p. 403-4) 8 One of the most recent cases decided by the 5th Cir cuit regarding the composition of juries is the case of MICHAEL WALDO SIMMONS v. U.S.A., 406 Fed. (2d) 456. In that case the court said in part: “Appellant attacks the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that there was racial discrimination in regard to the com position of the jury wheel from which prospec tive jurors were selected. In United States v. Tillman, N.D. Ga, 1967, 272 F. Supp. 908, 910-912, Judge Smith succinctly explained the method by which jurors were chosen in the Atlanta Division: “In brief, the court provided for the selection of every 50th name (or 2%) on the voter registration lists of each county in the Atlanta Division to be mailed questionnaires. The jury questionnaires were properly mailed, with a return of 50-60 per cent. Only those per sons were disqualified by the Clerk and Jury Commissioner whose answers stated that they had not attained the age of 21 years; or had been convicted in a State or Federal court of record of a crime punishable by imprison ment for more than one year; or they could not read, write, speak and understand the Eng lish language; or they had a mental or physi cal infirmity which would prevent them from rendering efficient jury service (except that all females over 70 and all males over 75 were dis qualified). * * * On this basis, approximately 90% of persons returning questionnaires were 9 found qualified, and all persons not disqualified were placed in the jury wheel.” “The net result of this jury selection procedure was that 15.77% of the persons whose names were in the jury wheel were Negroes, whereas Negroes comprised 20.48% of the population of the Atlanta Division, if we assume that the 1960 census figures are still accurate. Thus, it is appellant’s theory that the disparity in per centages between the Negro proportion of the population at large and the Negro proportion of prospective jurors fatally taints his convic tion.” “It is well settled that Negroes may not be systematically and arbitrarily excluded from the jury venires from which the grand jury is selected which has indicted a Negro defend ant and that a conviction cannot stand if the petit jury is drawn from a list similarly com posed.” “ However, neither the jury wheel nor the ve nire need precisely conform to the proportion ate strength of each identifiable group in the total population. Swain v. State of Alabama, 380 U. S. at 208, 85 Ct. 829. See also Mobley v. United States, 379 F. 2d at 771-772; Comment, The Fifth Circuit: New History for an Old Problem Jury Selection, 1 Ga. L. Rev. 674, 680 (1967). It is sufficient, according to the tradi- 10 tional formulation, if jurors are “drawn from a fair cross-section of the community.” Mobley v. United States, supra at 771. See also Smith v. State of Texas, 311 U. S. 128, 61 S. Ct. 164, 85 L. Ed. 84 (1940); Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60, 62 S. Ct. 457, 86 L. Ed. 680 (1942); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 66 S.Ct. 984, 90 L. Ed. 1181 (1946); Scott v. Walker, 5 Cir., 1966, 358 F. 2d 561, 564; Chance v. United States 5 Cir., 1963, 322 F. 2d 201, 204, 205; United States v. Dennis, 2 Cir., 1950, 183 F. 2d 204, 224 (Judge Learned Hand); Rabinowitz v. United States, 5 Cir., 1966, 366 F. 2d 34, 57, and cases cited there in. See Note, The Defendant’s Challenge to a Racial Criterion in Jury Selection: A Study in Standing, Due Process and Equal Protection, 74 Yale L.J. 919, 923-924 (1965). The determina tion of what is a fair cross-section depends upon the facts of each case, and under the cir cumstances herein presented, we find that the underrepresentation of Negroes in the jury wheel in comparison with their share of the total population was not of such magnitude as to warrant overturning the appellant’s convic tion.” “Compare Swain v. State of Alabama. 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824 (1965) (Male Negroes con stitute 26% of all males in the county, but only constitute 10 to 15% of jury panels. System, of selection held to be ‘imperfect’ but still law ful.), and Chance v. United States, supra 11 (Negroes constitute 12% of population, but only 10% of names in jury box. Held lawful.)” . In the case of: U.S.A. v. DITOMMASO and U.S.A. v. WAUGAMAN, 405 F. (2d) 385, 389, it was said: “The constitutional principle that juries must be selected from a fair cross-section of the com munity is now well established. While the cross-sectional concept is firmly embedded in law, the constitution does not require that the jury or jury venire be a statistical mirror of the community. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U. S. 57, 7 L. Ed. (2d) 118; Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202, 13 L. Ed. (2d) 759; Mobley v. U.S., 379 F. 2d 768 (5 Cir. 1967); Dow v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation, 224 F. 2d 414, 100 L. Ed. 842.” It should be observed that the jury commissioners did send out questionnaires to everyone on the voters list 2525 persons and received replies to 1039 of which number 550 were qualified and desired to serve. It is to be noted that there are 590 names on the present traverse jury list. The questionnaires were almost duplicate copies of the ones being sent to all prospec tive jurors for our Federal Courts. I would like to point out this method has been approved by the Judicial Conference of United States as found in 26 F. R. D. 400, 421. The report made the following recommenda tions. “V. In order to determine whether persons 12 under consideration for selection of jurors possess the required qualifications, it is recom mended that, when practicable, the practice should be followed in every district of requir ing each prospective juror to answer a ques tionnaire — where such practice is followed, no name should be placed in the jury box or wheel, or added to the jury lists, until the jury commissioner, from its investigation is satis fied that the juror is qualified.” Also in UNITED STATES EX REL SEALS v. WI- MAN, 5 Cir. 1962, 304 F 2d 53, that court said the test was to be made largely on the basis of objective results, The third circuit court of appeals has described the test in terms of negligence — federal jury officials may not exclude any economic, social, religious, racial, political or geographical groups either intentionally or through negligence. Dow v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation, 224 F. 2d 414. And a good summary of the problem is found in the case of: THIEL v. SOUTHERN PACIFIC CO., 328 U. S. 217, 90 L. Ed 1181, wherein it was said: “The American tradition of trial by jury con sidered in connection with either criminal or civil proceedings, necessarily contemplates an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community. Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128; Glasser v. U. S., 315 U. S. 60. This does not mean, of course, that every jury must contain repre 13 sentatives of all the economic, social, religious, racial, political and geographical groups of community, frequently such complete repre sentation would be impossible. But it does mean that prospective jurors shall be selected by court officials without systematic and in tentional exclusion of any of these groups. Jury acceptance is an individual rather than a group or class matter. That fact lies at the very heart of the jury system.” REBUTTAL TO GOVERNMENTS POSITION In addition to the cases cited above, which have declared that no segment of the population is entitled to a certain percentage of their number on the jury rolls, we would call the courts attention to certain factual situations. The government claims that the source of most names of the most recent jury revision in Baker Coun ty was the voters list, which it claims is underrepre sentative of the Negro community. We submit that it has been held by the Appellate Courts that it is not illegal to use the voters list as the main source. Furthermore, neither the government nor the plain tiffs introduced any evidence to show that there had been any discrimination in the makeup of the voters list. As a matter of fact the witnesses stated they did 14 not know of any discrimination that now existed as far as the voters list was concerned. Counsel for the government stated that the District Court had held that the jury list selected from the voters list was unconstitutional. That is not a true statement. What the District Court held was that the original jury list was unconstitutional because of the use of the segregated tax digest. The court further said that even though the jury list was used the taint of the segregated tax digest made the revision void. But in the latest re vision approved by the court the jury list (as provided by the laws of Georgia) was used, but not the tax di gest. Also other methods were used as set out herein. Typically, counsel for the government asserted in its motion to compel another revision of the jury list, filed July 7, 1969 (appendix p. 405). “The defendants claimed to have used sources other than the voters list. Yet none of the 70 names in the Newton, Georgia telephone direc tory which are not on the voters list appear on the jury list.” Counsel for the government has attached Appendix A which is a list of names found in the Newton, Georgia telephone book that are not on the official registered voters list of Baker County. Attached to our brief is a certification, that of the names appearing in Appendix A, 5 are on voters list in own name, 28 are on voters list in another name; 17 are non-residents of the county; 9' are deceased and 6 un 15 accounted for. So a great majority of those eligible and who are in the telephone directory are on the voters list. Also, we would call the courts attention to the fact that three cases were tried at the January Term 1970 of Baker Superior Court, being as follows: 1. State Highway Dept, of Ga. vs. Mrs. Eunice O. Rooks Case No. 6 2. Henry Hall & L. W. Johnson vs. Orange Hawkins Case No. 3003-4 3. State vs. Stephen Peace Case No. 1458 In case No. 1 the makeup of the jury was 7 white and 5 black. In case No. 2, 5 white and 7 black. In case No. 3, 6 white and 6 black. See certificate of Clerk attached to this brief. The Supreme Court of the United States held in the case of: TURNER v. FOUCHE, 396 U. S. 346, 24 L Ed (2d) 567 “The provisions of Georgia law conferring dis cretion on county officials in the selection of jury commissioners and prospective grand jurors were not unconstitutional on their face as providing officials an opportunity to dis criminate on the basis of race, the procedure not being inherently unfair or necessarily in- 16 capable of administration without regard to race.” CONCLUSION I think I could best sum up by quoting what two of the plaintiffs in this suit testified at the original hear ing. They said that while Baker County had in the past discriminated against the Negroes and women, that they are now doing a good job and anyone can vote who so desires and the juries contain fair representa tion of all races. However, we submit that the report of the jury com missioners and the testimony of Clerk Leslie Bush re veal that the jury as now drawn represents a fair cross-section of all eligible citizens of Baker County. The number of Negroes on the jury list has continued to rise and as a matter of fact in one district the “ Hog- gard Mill District” there are actually more Negroes in the jury box than whites. The score being 45 Negroes and 38 white. The evidence is certainly overwhelming that the jury commissioners have honestly tried and have achieved a jury roster that fairly represents every segment of society of Baker County. The contention of the Justice Department that the present percentage of Negroes is unlawful is not borne out either by the facts or the decisions of our Federal 17 Courts. They have failed to show any discrimination whatsoever and we feel the percentages are well within accepted bounds. We therefore respectfully request the court to ap prove the list of traverse and grand jurors of Baker County as shown by the revision of June 6, 1969, and approved by the District Court on December 15, 1969. EARL JONES Newton, Georgia TWITTY & TWITTY Attorney for Jury Commissioners of Baker County, Georgia. P. O. Box 385 Camilla, Georgia 31730 APPENDIX 18 A This appendix shows the names o f persons found in the Newton, Georgia telephone book that are hot on the o f f i c i a l reg istered voters l i s t f o r Baker County; Adkins, A H , r s jM h lr C c . A llen , Hugh P. t B a rfie ld , Glenn Blackett;, H ill Blades; ea r l F. Clzacao^uw Broadwater, Joe I 'U ttfr H . gyg-jjj j l M rs, , Carr; B a ilie C MrS. •-------- Cherry, E lizabeth c w 'u-cc&hi J-̂ aA C hriBti, Frank Cowart; Saul CP ya~« Y/Wc.H'ir Dean, A lic e Mrs. Edwards, Bessie MrS. Gv H- ToA**/* Edwards, C A a .tf. wi/i*y kc(s <CL-eC dd>. N. tfVlna. UJ, b' o - A', ywa®,-/ImA*4W Edwards, Jas Mrs; Etheridge, L A Mrs; Etheridge, Mae Mrs; *<re*s»</Hudson; Gary B. .m>ce'< I rv in ; Idaouise Mrs. Johnson, Behgbie £?,/¥, A ^•'tlohnaon, Smil 1 ey Mrs. o,Wir&*. Or,v jg l h i r ; Mary Jane Mrs. £>,#; Jgnda; K E , „• dopes; o l i i d t.k Mrs. O'H.&Mt set K elly , Ulysee C. — Kendrick, w aiter M W j W U idd , Thelma Mrs, <5, A/, tg.ri Kidd, w i, , M ansfield, Morgan Mrs. ig^A.YTMartin, wm Mrs. 6m \-*»*** Matthews, c t J t ; /?o». AkiiJLJMontgomery, Cohnie d !A/- a/, Mddrd, Jimmy o.V. ■**>.«. r. M u llls , Mary B. Mrs..rfae . - A * •Etheridge, T r e l l is Mrs. 4 6 »;^«,^yH esbitt, .Jim Fairman, Fred W Freeman, Abbott Freeman, E s te lle Mrs , . __Glaze, Owen R. M-A' Haire, Bonnie N» fil. rf, H all, Annie Mae ' H all, Joe Henry , /X,-e.« ljr'ii'e“!*T — Hans le y . Jewel Mrs, 'd-V. Keif'll* )* '*! Hawkins, Dock ■* Hawkins, Jas O- n' , jLur'i//f'i*F»i_. ,̂4«nHawkins, L u c ille , ------- ---- ^ Henry, Edgar 1n,«r v f-w «< <^vr, H ilbum , W I Mrs H olt, Jim J '- i - Hudgins, K 0 View S. ■ ft Hgwtdn, BPrV- , parr , 1, A h ; m- p a u lin , k L Peace, Janie Miss pow ell, Matthew n. v. (wtoV-r- Rent*, Annie Ruth ,N*#> Revis, P olly . Ann d 'V .4 s » ^ r * J i l iy ' Rosa Mrs; /t,W_ /ST, Rockwell; W illard J r . M X , Slocumb, Kenneth L. --------- smith, Paul J. MW. ^ J J .W .l'^ ^ ^ fi'H tk y , Addison crj-AJoolC. Taylor, Coy i, h. riiliKKA'' Weathersby, Nelson Rev. W illiams, Robt Lee 'h 'F h J -OM ^UecCb /j d e A jL^taA jLLeJLs lA isr-d GEORGIA, BAKER COUNTY, A? f ' 7 / d I, Leslie Bush, Clerk Of the Superior Court of Baker County, Georgia and Clerk of the Board of the Registrars do certify that the above list represents the category of those persons Whose names are listed in the Newton, Georgia telephone book. r ... A \ This 3 , 7 day of April. 19?Q. 19 CERTIFICATE GEORGIA, BAKER COUNTY. I, Leslie Bush, Clerk Superior Court of Baker Coun ty, Georgia, do hereby certify that at the January Term, 1970, three cases were tried by juries. 1. State Highway Dept, of Ga. vs. Mrs. Eunice O. Rooks, et al Case No. 6 2. Henry Hall & L. W. Johnson vs. Orange Hawkins Case Nos. 3003 & 3004 3. State vs. Stephen Peace Case No. 1458 In Case No. 1 the trial jury was composed of 7 white and 5 black. In Case No. 2 the trial jury was composed of 5 white and 7 black. In case No. 3 the trial jury was composed of 6 white and 6 black. WITNESS my hand and seal this 28 day of April, 1970. (Signed) LESLIE BUSH CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT, BAKER COUNTY, GEORGIA (SEAL) 20 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE GEORGIA, MITCHELL COUNTY. I, Frank S. Twitty, of counsel for defendants, Jury Commissioners of Baker County, Georgia, do hereby certify that I have this day served plaintiffs and plain- tiff-intervenor with a copy of the within and foregoing Brief of Jury Commissioners of Baker County by mail ing the same to Mr. C. B. King, of counsel for the plaintiffs, at his correct address, Post Office Box 1024, Albany, Georgia, and to Mr. Walt Gorman, Attorney, Department of Justice, of counsel for the plaintiff-in- tervenor, United States of America, at his correct ad dress in Washington, D.C. 20530. This the ___day of May, 1970. Of Counsel for Defendants Jury Commissioners of Baker County Scofields’ Quality Printers, Inc, — New Orleans, La.