Broadway v. Culpepper Brief of Appellees
Public Court Documents
May 1, 1970
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IN THE
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
N o . 29.391
CARL BROADWAY, et a!, U.S.A.
versus
ROBERT CULPEPPER. JR., et al
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Georgia, Honorable J. Robert Elliott,
Judge
BRIEF OF APPELLEES
Frank S. Twitty
Frank S. Twitty, Jr.
P. O. Box 385
Camilla, Georgia 31730
L. Earl Jones
Newton, Georgia 31770
Attorneys for Appellees
INDEX
Page
NATURE AND HISTORY OF CASE
COUNTER STATEMENT OF FA CTS....................... 1
ISSUES ON APPEAL ................................................... 3
ARGUMENT AND CITATION OF AUTHORITIES . . 4
REBUTTAL TO GOVERNMENTS POSITION.........13
CONCLUSION .............................................................. 16
CITATIONS
Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 89 L. Ed. 1962 ................6
Joni Rabinowitz vs. United States of America, 336
F. (2d) 34 (5th Cir.) ............................................... 6
Michael Waldo Simmons vs. U.S.A., 406 F. (2d)
456 (5th Cir.) .......................................................... 8
Mobley v. U.S., 379 (2d) 768 (5th Cir.) .........................11
Swain vs. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202, 13 L Ed (2d) 759 . . . . 6
Thiel v. Southern Pacific, 328 U. S. 217, 90 L. Ed.
1181 ........................................................................ 12
Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346, 24 L Ed (2d) 567 . . . . 15
U.S.A. vs. Ditommaso and U.S.A. vs. Waugaman,
405 F (2d) 385 .......................................................... 11
United States Ex Rel Seals v. Wiman, 304 F (2d)
53 (5th Cir.) ............................................................... 12
EXHIBITS
Certificates of Leslie Bush, Clerk Superior Court
Baker County, Georgia ..................................... 18
IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 29,391
CARL BROADWAY, et al, U.S.A.,
versus
ROBERT CULPEPPER, JR., et al,
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Georgia,
Honorable J. Robert Elliott, Judge
BRIEF OF APPELLEES
I
NATURE AND HISTORY OF CASE.
COUNTER STATEMENT OF FACTS.
This case was initiated as a class action by Negro
citizens of Baker County, alleging that Negroes and
women had been systematically excluded from the
county jury rolls because of their race and sex, in vio
lation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu
tion of the United States. The complaint sought in
junctive relief. Subsequently, the United States was
allowed to intervene in the case.
2
Following an evidentiary hearing on the merits, the
District Court on May 8, 1969 (App. 291) found the
Baker County jury list to be violative of the constitu
tional rights of Negro citizens and entered an order
requiring the defendants to compile a new jury list in
accordance with the laws of the State of Georgia and
the Federal Constitutional Mandate,
The Court’s decree took notice of the fact that
Georgia law requires the jury commissioners to re
compile the jury lists periodically and made mention
that the Court was aware that at the time of the orig
inal hearing on this matter it was mentioned that an
other revision of the jury lists in Baker County would
be shortly forthcoming. In this connection the Court
stated that if the jury lists had been completely re
vised since the original hearing the jury commission
ers may have taken action on their own initiative to
correct the deficiencies noted with regard to the lists
which were in existence at the time of hearing, and
the decree provided that if such action as was re
quired by the decree in regard to the compiling of a
new list had already been accomplished by the jury
lists as revised and now in use, an affirmative and doc
umented showing of such fact could be made forthwith
to the Court, the Court specifying what such a docu
mented showing should encompass.
Such a showing was made in writing to this Court
in June, 1969, (App. 339 et seq) the Defendants suggest
ing that the new traverse and grand jury lists compiled
since the original evidentiary hearing were now so
3
constituted as to meet the requirements of law and to
satisfy the mandate of the decree issued by this Court.
Subsequently, the Plaintiffs moved for an evidentiary
hearing on the report and the Intervenor (U.S.A.) filed
a motion to compel the Defendants to make further re
vision of the new jury list, these motions being based
on allegations that the new list did not represent a
fair cross-section of the community. Further eviden
tiary hearing was granted and the motions considered
in October, 1969. (App. 295)
The only testimony submitted was the witness Leslie
Bush, a defendant, Clerk of Superior Court of Baker
County, Georgia and also Clerk to the jury commis
sioners of Baker County. (App. p. 299-335)
II
ISSUES ON APPEAL
The appellants contend that the issue to be presented
for review is, “Whether the District Court erred in fail
ing to require the defendants to include the name of
additional Black citizens on the jury lists where the
record showed that in the past Blacks had been syste
matically excluded from the jury rolls and the current
lists resulted in 36.29% of the adult White population
and 17.31% of the adult Black population being repre
sented on the rolls.”
4
We do not consider this as the real issue as it is
based on the premise that there should be a certain
percentage of the various races on the jury rolls.
We think that the real issue is:
“Is the jury list of Baker County, as now constituted,
a fair representative cross-section of the upright and
intelligent citizens of the county.”
Ill
ARGUMENT AND CITATION OF AUTHORITIES
We feel that the evidence adduced on the hearing
held on October 22, 1969 (App. 295 et seq.) shows that
the jury commissioners of Baker County fully com
plied with the provisions of the decree of the District
Court filed May 8, 1969. We feel that the traverse and
grand juries, as now constituted, represent a fair
cross-section of the qualified citizens of Baker County,
without any discrimination as to race, creed, color or
sex.
We produced sworn testimony in support of the re
port filed with this court and the plaintiffs introduced
no evidence whatsoever to contradict the report made.
Therefore, we think that the jury list of Baker County
meets all the tests that have been previously laid down
by our courts. It was taken from the voters list, it rep
resented a percentage comparable to the percentage
on voters list, the plaintiffs suggested names, other
prominent Negroes suggested names, an attempt was
5
made to contact all registered voters and the list as
made up represents a cross-section of the resident
qualified citizens of Baker County.
The only other question is that raised by the inter
vener, the Department of Justice. It is their claim that
the percentage of Negroes on the jury list is not com
parable to the percentage of citizens. In other words
they contend that the qualified voters should be in ac
cordance with the population. However, we call the
court’s attention to the fact that no evidence was intro
duced by the government or the plaintiffs to show that
the jury commissioners were now discriminating a-
gainst the Negroes or that Negroes were being kept off
the jury solely because of their race.
The government overlooks several important things.
First the commissioners are admonished to use the
voters list as the basis for selecting jurors. The per
centage on this list is 63% white and 37% Negro. The
jury list is approximately 66% white and 34% Negro.
And of course this court admonished the commis
sioners to follow the Georgia law and select the jurors
from intelligent and upright citizens. There is no dis
pute but that this was done.
So this leaves us with the question, as to whether, the
jurors selected be in proportion to the population by
races. This has never been held by any of our courts,
to our knowledge.
6
In SWAIN v. ALABAMA, 380 U. S. 202, 13 L. Ed. 2d
759 (1965), the Court said:
“Neither the jury roll nor the venire need be a
perfect mirror of the community or accurately
reflect the proportionate strength of every
identifiable group.” (p. 208)
Even in the JONI RABINOWITZ v. UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, 366 Federal Reporter (2d) 34
the Fifth Circuit speaking through Judge Rives, said
in part:
“Lest we be misunderstood, we repeat the
caution of the Supreme Court in Swain v. Ala
bama 1964, 380 U.S. 202, 208: “But a defendant
in a criminal case is not constitutionally en
titled to demand a proportionate number of his
race on the jury which tries him nor on the
venire or jury roll from which Petit jurors are
drawn. Neither the jury roll nor the venire need
be a perfect mirror of the community or ac
curately reflect the proportionate strength of
every identifiable group. Obviously the number
of races and nationalities appearing in the an
cestry of our citizens would make it impossible
to meet a requirement of proportional repre
sentation.”
In the case of AKINS v. TEXAS, 325 U. S. 398, 89 L.
Ed. 1962, the Supreme Court held in part:
7
“Fairness in selection has never been held to
require proportional representation of races
upon a jury. Purposeful discrimination is not
sustained by a showing that on a single grand
jury the number of members of one race is less
than that race’s proportion of the eligible in
dividuals. The number of our races and na
tionalities stands in the way of evolution of
such a conception of due process or equal pro
tection. Defendants under our criminal statutes
are not entitled to demand representatives of
their racial inheritance upon juries by whom
they are tried. But such defendants are entitled
to require that those who are trusted with jury
selection shall not pursue a course of conduct
which results in discrimination in the selection
of jurors on racial grounds.” (p. 403)
“Our directions that indictments be quashed
when Negroes, although numerous in the com
munity, were excluded from, grand jury lists
have been based on the theory that their contin
ual exclusion indicated discrimination and. not
on the theory that racial groups must be rec
ognized. The mere fact of inequality in the
number selected does not in itself show dis
crimination. A purpose to discriminate must
be present which may be proven by systematic
exclusion of eligible jurymen of the pro
scribed race or by unequal application of the
law to such an extent as to show intentional
discrimination.” (p. 403-4)
8
One of the most recent cases decided by the 5th Cir
cuit regarding the composition of juries is the case of
MICHAEL WALDO SIMMONS v. U.S.A., 406 Fed. (2d)
456. In that case the court said in part:
“Appellant attacks the denial of his motion to
dismiss the indictment on the ground that there
was racial discrimination in regard to the com
position of the jury wheel from which prospec
tive jurors were selected. In United States v.
Tillman, N.D. Ga, 1967, 272 F. Supp. 908, 910-912,
Judge Smith succinctly explained the method
by which jurors were chosen in the Atlanta
Division: “In brief, the court provided for the
selection of every 50th name (or 2%) on the
voter registration lists of each county in the
Atlanta Division to be mailed questionnaires.
The jury questionnaires were properly mailed,
with a return of 50-60 per cent. Only those per
sons were disqualified by the Clerk and Jury
Commissioner whose answers stated that
they had not attained the age of 21 years; or
had been convicted in a State or Federal court
of record of a crime punishable by imprison
ment for more than one year; or they could
not read, write, speak and understand the Eng
lish language; or they had a mental or physi
cal infirmity which would prevent them from
rendering efficient jury service (except that all
females over 70 and all males over 75 were dis
qualified). * * * On this basis, approximately
90% of persons returning questionnaires were
9
found qualified, and all persons not disqualified
were placed in the jury wheel.”
“The net result of this jury selection procedure
was that 15.77% of the persons whose names
were in the jury wheel were Negroes, whereas
Negroes comprised 20.48% of the population of
the Atlanta Division, if we assume that the
1960 census figures are still accurate. Thus, it
is appellant’s theory that the disparity in per
centages between the Negro proportion of the
population at large and the Negro proportion
of prospective jurors fatally taints his convic
tion.”
“It is well settled that Negroes may not be
systematically and arbitrarily excluded from
the jury venires from which the grand jury
is selected which has indicted a Negro defend
ant and that a conviction cannot stand if the
petit jury is drawn from a list similarly com
posed.”
“ However, neither the jury wheel nor the ve
nire need precisely conform to the proportion
ate strength of each identifiable group in the
total population. Swain v. State of Alabama,
380 U. S. at 208, 85 Ct. 829. See also Mobley v.
United States, 379 F. 2d at 771-772; Comment,
The Fifth Circuit: New History for an Old
Problem Jury Selection, 1 Ga. L. Rev. 674, 680
(1967). It is sufficient, according to the tradi-
10
tional formulation, if jurors are “drawn from a
fair cross-section of the community.” Mobley
v. United States, supra at 771. See also Smith
v. State of Texas, 311 U. S. 128, 61 S. Ct. 164, 85
L. Ed. 84 (1940); Glasser v. United States, 315
U. S. 60, 62 S. Ct. 457, 86 L. Ed. 680 (1942); Thiel
v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 66 S.Ct. 984,
90 L. Ed. 1181 (1946); Scott v. Walker, 5 Cir.,
1966, 358 F. 2d 561, 564; Chance v. United States
5 Cir., 1963, 322 F. 2d 201, 204, 205; United States
v. Dennis, 2 Cir., 1950, 183 F. 2d 204, 224 (Judge
Learned Hand); Rabinowitz v. United States, 5
Cir., 1966, 366 F. 2d 34, 57, and cases cited there
in. See Note, The Defendant’s Challenge to a
Racial Criterion in Jury Selection: A Study in
Standing, Due Process and Equal Protection,
74 Yale L.J. 919, 923-924 (1965). The determina
tion of what is a fair cross-section depends
upon the facts of each case, and under the cir
cumstances herein presented, we find that the
underrepresentation of Negroes in the jury
wheel in comparison with their share of the
total population was not of such magnitude as
to warrant overturning the appellant’s convic
tion.”
“Compare Swain v. State of Alabama. 380
U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824 (1965) (Male Negroes con
stitute 26% of all males in the county, but only
constitute 10 to 15% of jury panels. System, of
selection held to be ‘imperfect’ but still law
ful.), and Chance v. United States, supra
11
(Negroes constitute 12% of population, but only
10% of names in jury box. Held lawful.)” .
In the case of: U.S.A. v. DITOMMASO and U.S.A. v.
WAUGAMAN, 405 F. (2d) 385, 389, it was said:
“The constitutional principle that juries must
be selected from a fair cross-section of the com
munity is now well established. While the
cross-sectional concept is firmly embedded in
law, the constitution does not require that the
jury or jury venire be a statistical mirror of
the community. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U. S. 57, 7
L. Ed. (2d) 118; Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202,
13 L. Ed. (2d) 759; Mobley v. U.S., 379 F. 2d 768
(5 Cir. 1967); Dow v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel
Corporation, 224 F. 2d 414, 100 L. Ed. 842.”
It should be observed that the jury commissioners
did send out questionnaires to everyone on the voters
list 2525 persons and received replies to 1039 of which
number 550 were qualified and desired to serve. It is
to be noted that there are 590 names on the present
traverse jury list. The questionnaires were almost
duplicate copies of the ones being sent to all prospec
tive jurors for our Federal Courts. I would like to point
out this method has been approved by the Judicial
Conference of United States as found in 26 F. R. D.
400, 421. The report made the following recommenda
tions.
“V. In order to determine whether persons
12
under consideration for selection of jurors
possess the required qualifications, it is recom
mended that, when practicable, the practice
should be followed in every district of requir
ing each prospective juror to answer a ques
tionnaire — where such practice is followed,
no name should be placed in the jury box or
wheel, or added to the jury lists, until the jury
commissioner, from its investigation is satis
fied that the juror is qualified.”
Also in UNITED STATES EX REL SEALS v. WI-
MAN, 5 Cir. 1962, 304 F 2d 53, that court said the test
was to be made largely on the basis of objective results,
The third circuit court of appeals has described the
test in terms of negligence — federal jury officials may
not exclude any economic, social, religious, racial,
political or geographical groups either intentionally or
through negligence. Dow v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel
Corporation, 224 F. 2d 414.
And a good summary of the problem is found in the
case of: THIEL v. SOUTHERN PACIFIC CO., 328 U. S.
217, 90 L. Ed 1181, wherein it was said:
“The American tradition of trial by jury con
sidered in connection with either criminal or
civil proceedings, necessarily contemplates an
impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of
the community. Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128;
Glasser v. U. S., 315 U. S. 60. This does not mean,
of course, that every jury must contain repre
13
sentatives of all the economic, social, religious,
racial, political and geographical groups of
community, frequently such complete repre
sentation would be impossible. But it does
mean that prospective jurors shall be selected
by court officials without systematic and in
tentional exclusion of any of these groups.
Jury acceptance is an individual rather than a
group or class matter. That fact lies at the very
heart of the jury system.”
REBUTTAL TO GOVERNMENTS POSITION
In addition to the cases cited above, which have
declared that no segment of the population is entitled
to a certain percentage of their number on the jury
rolls, we would call the courts attention to certain
factual situations.
The government claims that the source of most
names of the most recent jury revision in Baker Coun
ty was the voters list, which it claims is underrepre
sentative of the Negro community.
We submit that it has been held by the Appellate
Courts that it is not illegal to use the voters list as the
main source.
Furthermore, neither the government nor the plain
tiffs introduced any evidence to show that there had
been any discrimination in the makeup of the voters
list. As a matter of fact the witnesses stated they did
14
not know of any discrimination that now existed as far
as the voters list was concerned.
Counsel for the government stated that the District
Court had held that the jury list selected from the voters
list was unconstitutional. That is not a true statement.
What the District Court held was that the original
jury list was unconstitutional because of the use of the
segregated tax digest. The court further said that even
though the jury list was used the taint of the segregated
tax digest made the revision void. But in the latest re
vision approved by the court the jury list (as provided
by the laws of Georgia) was used, but not the tax di
gest. Also other methods were used as set out herein.
Typically, counsel for the government asserted in its
motion to compel another revision of the jury list, filed
July 7, 1969 (appendix p. 405). “The defendants claimed
to have used sources other than the voters list. Yet none
of the 70 names in the Newton, Georgia telephone direc
tory which are not on the voters list appear on the jury
list.”
Counsel for the government has attached Appendix
A which is a list of names found in the Newton, Georgia
telephone book that are not on the official registered
voters list of Baker County.
Attached to our brief is a certification, that of the
names appearing in Appendix A, 5 are on voters list in
own name, 28 are on voters list in another name; 17 are
non-residents of the county; 9' are deceased and 6 un
15
accounted for. So a great majority of those eligible
and who are in the telephone directory are on the
voters list.
Also, we would call the courts attention to the fact
that three cases were tried at the January Term 1970
of Baker Superior Court, being as follows:
1. State Highway Dept, of Ga. vs. Mrs. Eunice O.
Rooks Case No. 6
2. Henry Hall & L. W. Johnson vs. Orange Hawkins
Case No. 3003-4
3. State vs. Stephen Peace Case No. 1458
In case No. 1 the makeup of the jury was 7 white and
5 black. In case No. 2, 5 white and 7 black. In case No.
3, 6 white and 6 black. See certificate of Clerk attached
to this brief.
The Supreme Court of the United States held in the
case of: TURNER v. FOUCHE, 396 U. S. 346, 24 L Ed
(2d) 567
“The provisions of Georgia law conferring dis
cretion on county officials in the selection of
jury commissioners and prospective grand
jurors were not unconstitutional on their face
as providing officials an opportunity to dis
criminate on the basis of race, the procedure
not being inherently unfair or necessarily in-
16
capable of administration without regard to
race.”
CONCLUSION
I think I could best sum up by quoting what two of
the plaintiffs in this suit testified at the original hear
ing. They said that while Baker County had in the past
discriminated against the Negroes and women, that
they are now doing a good job and anyone can vote
who so desires and the juries contain fair representa
tion of all races.
However, we submit that the report of the jury com
missioners and the testimony of Clerk Leslie Bush re
veal that the jury as now drawn represents a fair
cross-section of all eligible citizens of Baker County.
The number of Negroes on the jury list has continued
to rise and as a matter of fact in one district the “ Hog-
gard Mill District” there are actually more Negroes in
the jury box than whites. The score being 45 Negroes
and 38 white.
The evidence is certainly overwhelming that the jury
commissioners have honestly tried and have achieved
a jury roster that fairly represents every segment of
society of Baker County.
The contention of the Justice Department that the
present percentage of Negroes is unlawful is not borne
out either by the facts or the decisions of our Federal
17
Courts. They have failed to show any discrimination
whatsoever and we feel the percentages are well within
accepted bounds.
We therefore respectfully request the court to ap
prove the list of traverse and grand jurors of Baker
County as shown by the revision of June 6, 1969, and
approved by the District Court on December 15, 1969.
EARL JONES
Newton, Georgia
TWITTY & TWITTY
Attorney for Jury
Commissioners of Baker
County, Georgia.
P. O. Box 385
Camilla, Georgia 31730
APPENDIX
18
A
This appendix shows the names o f persons found in
the Newton, Georgia telephone book that are hot on the
o f f i c i a l reg istered voters l i s t f o r Baker County;
Adkins, A H ,
r s jM h lr C c . A llen , Hugh P. t
B a rfie ld , Glenn
Blackett;, H ill
Blades; ea r l F.
Clzacao^uw Broadwater, Joe
I 'U ttfr H . gyg-jjj j l M rs, ,
Carr; B a ilie C MrS.
•-------- Cherry, E lizabeth
c w 'u-cc&hi J-̂ aA C hriBti, Frank
Cowart; Saul
CP ya~« Y/Wc.H'ir Dean, A lic e Mrs.
Edwards, Bessie MrS.
Gv H- ToA**/* Edwards, C A
a .tf. wi/i*y kc(s
<CL-eC dd>. N. tfVlna. UJ, b'
o - A', ywa®,-/ImA*4W
Edwards, Jas Mrs;
Etheridge, L A Mrs;
Etheridge, Mae Mrs;
*<re*s»</Hudson; Gary B.
.m>ce'< I rv in ; Idaouise Mrs.
Johnson, Behgbie
£?,/¥, A ^•'tlohnaon, Smil 1 ey Mrs.
o,Wir&*. Or,v jg l h i r ; Mary Jane Mrs.
£>,#; Jgnda; K E , „•
dopes; o l i i d t.k Mrs.
O'H.&Mt set K elly , Ulysee C.
— Kendrick, w aiter
M W j W U idd , Thelma Mrs,
<5, A/, tg.ri Kidd, w i, ,
M ansfield, Morgan Mrs.
ig^A.YTMartin, wm Mrs.
6m \-*»*** Matthews, c t J t ;
/?o». AkiiJLJMontgomery, Cohnie
d !A/- a/, Mddrd, Jimmy
o.V. ■**>.«. r. M u llls , Mary B. Mrs..rfae . - A * •Etheridge, T r e l l is Mrs. 4 6 »;^«,^yH esbitt, .Jim
Fairman, Fred W
Freeman, Abbott
Freeman, E s te lle Mrs
, . __Glaze, Owen R.
M-A' Haire, Bonnie N»
fil. rf, H all, Annie Mae
' H all, Joe Henry
, /X,-e.« ljr'ii'e“!*T — Hans le y . Jewel Mrs,
'd-V. Keif'll* )* '*! Hawkins, Dock ■*
Hawkins, Jas
O- n' , jLur'i//f'i*F»i_. ,̂4«nHawkins, L u c ille
, ------- ---- ^ Henry, Edgar
1n,«r v f-w «< <^vr, H ilbum , W I Mrs
H olt, Jim
J '- i - Hudgins, K 0
View
S. ■ ft Hgwtdn, BPrV- , parr , 1, A
h ; m- p a u lin , k L
Peace, Janie Miss
pow ell, Matthew
n. v. (wtoV-r- Rent*, Annie Ruth
,N*#> Revis, P olly . Ann
d 'V .4 s » ^ r * J i l iy ' Rosa Mrs;
/t,W_ /ST, Rockwell; W illard J r .
M X , Slocumb, Kenneth L.
--------- smith, Paul J.
MW. ^ J J .W .l'^ ^ ^ fi'H tk y , Addison
crj-AJoolC. Taylor, Coy
i, h. riiliKKA'' Weathersby, Nelson Rev.
W illiams, Robt Lee
'h 'F h J -OM ^UecCb /j d e
A jL^taA jLLeJLs lA isr-d
GEORGIA, BAKER COUNTY,
A?
f
' 7
/
d
I, Leslie Bush, Clerk Of the Superior Court of Baker County,
Georgia and Clerk of the Board of the Registrars do certify that the above
list represents the category of those persons Whose names are listed in the
Newton, Georgia telephone book. r ...
A \
This 3 , 7 day of April. 19?Q.
19
CERTIFICATE
GEORGIA, BAKER COUNTY.
I, Leslie Bush, Clerk Superior Court of Baker Coun
ty, Georgia, do hereby certify that at the January
Term, 1970, three cases were tried by juries.
1. State Highway Dept, of Ga. vs. Mrs. Eunice O.
Rooks, et al Case No. 6
2. Henry Hall & L. W. Johnson vs. Orange Hawkins
Case Nos. 3003 & 3004
3. State vs. Stephen Peace Case No. 1458
In Case No. 1 the trial jury was composed of 7 white
and 5 black.
In Case No. 2 the trial jury was composed of 5 white
and 7 black.
In case No. 3 the trial jury was composed of 6 white
and 6 black.
WITNESS my hand and seal this 28 day of April,
1970.
(Signed) LESLIE BUSH
CLERK OF SUPERIOR
COURT, BAKER COUNTY,
GEORGIA
(SEAL)
20
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
GEORGIA, MITCHELL COUNTY.
I, Frank S. Twitty, of counsel for defendants, Jury
Commissioners of Baker County, Georgia, do hereby
certify that I have this day served plaintiffs and plain-
tiff-intervenor with a copy of the within and foregoing
Brief of Jury Commissioners of Baker County by mail
ing the same to Mr. C. B. King, of counsel for the
plaintiffs, at his correct address, Post Office Box 1024,
Albany, Georgia, and to Mr. Walt Gorman, Attorney,
Department of Justice, of counsel for the plaintiff-in-
tervenor, United States of America, at his correct ad
dress in Washington, D.C. 20530.
This the ___day of May, 1970.
Of Counsel for Defendants
Jury Commissioners of
Baker County
Scofields’ Quality Printers, Inc, — New Orleans, La.