Ford v. Wainwright Joint Appendix

    No. 85-5542

Jin tl?i> £nt}trntu' (Emu*! of %  l&mtfb Btatw
October Term, 1985

Alvin Bernard F ord, or Connie F ord, individually, 
and as next friend on behalf of 

Alvin Bernard F ord, petitioner

v.

Louie L. Wainwright, Secretary, 
Department of Corrections, respondent

on writ of certiorari to the united  states 
court of appeals for the eleventh  circuit

JOINT APPENDIX

Richard L, J orandby 
Public Defender, 15th 
Judicial Circuit of Florida

Craig S. Barnard 
Chief Assistant Public 
Defender

R ichard H. Burr, III * 
Assistant Public Defender

Laurin A. Wollan, J r.
Of Counsel
Harvey Bldg., 13th Floor 
224 Datura Street 
West Palm Beach, FL 33401 
(305) 837-2150 

Counsel for Petitioner

* Counsel of Record

J im Smith
Attorney General of Florida

J oy B. Shearer *
Assistant Attorney General 
111 Georgia Avenue 
Room 204
West Palm Beach, FL 33401 
(305) 837-5062 

Counsel for Respondent

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED OCTOBER 1,1985 
CERTIORARI GRANTED DECEMBER 9,1985



TABLE OF CONTENTS
DOCUMENT Page

Relevant Docket Entries in the Courts Below .................  1

State v. Ford, No. 74-2159 CF, Circuit Court for the 
Seventeenth Judicial Circuit of Florida, Order, May 
21, 1984 .....................................    4

Ford v. Wainwright, 451 So.2d 471 (Fla. 1984) ............  5

Petition for W rit of Habeas Corpus, Ford v. Wain­
wright, No. 84-6493-Civ-NCR, United States District 
Court for the Southern District of F lorida .................  11

Excerpts from Appendix to Petition for W rit of Habeas 
Corpus in No. 84-6493-Civ-NCR:

Report of Dr. Jamal Amin, June 9, 1983 ................ 87

Report of Dr. Harold Kaufman, December 14,
1983 .................................... ..................... ..................  93

Report of Dr. Peter Ivory, December 20, 1983 .......  97

Report Dr. Umesh Mhatre, December 28, 1983 __  102

Report of Dr. Walter Afield, January 19, 1984___  105

Supplemental Report of Dr. Harold Kaufman, May 
24, 1984..................       107

Affidavit of Dr. Seymour Halleck, May 21, 1984   109

Affidavit of Dr. George Barnard, May 21, 1984   115
Response to Petition for W rit of Habeas Corpus, Ford 

v. Wainwright, No, 84-6493-Civ-NCR, United States 
District Court for the Southern District of Florida.... 125

Excerpt from Transcript of Hearing before United 
States District Court, Ford v. Wainwright, No. 84- 
6493-Civ-NCR, May 29, 1984........... .............................. 141

Order of the United States District Court, Ford v. Wain­
wright, No. 84-6493-Civ-NCR, May 29, 1984 ....... . 158

Fordv. Strickland, 734 F,2d 538 (11th Cir. 1984) ........ 166

Wainwright v. Ford, 104 S.C't. 3498 (1984) ........... ........ 180



ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

DOCUMENT Page

Ford v. Wainwright, 752 F.2d 526 (11th Cir. 1985) ..... 183

Order of the Eleventh Circuit denying rehearing in

Ford v. Wainwright.............       202
Section 922.07, Florida Statutes (1983), as amended

(1985) ..............................................        204

Order of the Supreme Court of the United States grant­
ing leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the peti­
tion for a w rit of certiorari, December 9, 1985........  207



RELEVANT DOCKET ENTRIES
IN THE COURTS BELOW

DATE___  PROCEEDINGS

[Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial 
Circuit of Florida]

May 21,1984 F IL E D : [Mr. Ford’s] Motion for Hear-

May 21,1984

ing and Appointment of Experts for 
Determination of Competency To Be Ex­
ecuted, and for Stay of Execution Dur­
ing the Pendency Thereof

ORDER denying said motion
May 22,1984 FILED : Notice of Appeal

May 23,1984

[Supreme Court of Florida]

FILED : Brief of Appellant [Ford] or 
Application for Extraordinary Relief

May 24,1984 FILED : Answer Brief of Appellee or 
Response to Application for Extraor­
dinary Relief

May 25,1984 ORAL ARGUMENT
May 25,1984 OPINION denying Mr. Ford’s applica­

tion for a hearing to determine com­
petency

[United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Florida]

May 25,1984 FIL E D : Petition for W rit of Habeas 
Corpus

May 25,1984 F IL E D : Response to Petition for W rit 
of Habeas Corpus

May 29,1984 HEARING: argument on petition and 
request for stay of execution

(1)



2

DATE PROCEEDINGS

May 29,1984 ORDER denying Petition for W rit of
Habeas Corpus and stay of execution

May 29,1984 F IL E D : Notice of Appeal

[United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit]

May 30,1984 ORAL ARGUMENT on Mr. Ford’s ap­
plication for stay of execution and for 
certificate of probable cause

May 30,1984 ORDER and OPINION granting stay of 
execution and certificate of probable 
cause

[Supreme Court of the United States]

May 31,1984 F IL E D : Application of the State of

May 31,1984

Florida to Vacate Order of Eleventh Cir­
cuit Granting Stay of Execution

FIL E D : Response to Application of 
Louie L. W ainwright to Vacate Order of 
Eleventh Circuit Granting Stay of Exe­
cution

May 31,1984 ORDER denying application to vacate 
stay of execution

[United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit]

July 30,1984 F IL E D : Brief for Petitioner-Appellant

August 27,1984 F IL E D : Brief for Respondent-Appellee

September 18,1984 ORAL ARGUMENT

January 17,1985 OPINION affirming the denial of habeas 
corpus relief

February 6,1985 F IL E D : Suggestion for Rehearing En
Banc



3

DATE PROCEEDINGS
June 3,1985 ORDER denying rehearing en banc
June 20,1985 ORDER denying stay of mandate and 

issuing mandate

[Supreme Court of the United States]

August 20,1985 ORDER extending time to file petition

October 1,1985
for w rit of certiorari

F IL E D : Petition for W rit of Certiorari

October 23,1985 F IL E D : Respondent’s Brief in Oppo­
sition to Petition for W rit of Certiorari

October 31,1985 FILED : Motion of National Associa­
tion of Criminal Defense Lawyers for 
leave to file brief as amicus curiae

October 31,1985 F IL E D : Motion of Office of Capital 
Collateral Representative for the State 
of Florida, et al. for leave to file brief 
as amici curiae

December 9,1985 ORDER granting petition for w rit of 
certiorari and motions for leave to> file 
briefs as amici curiae



4

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 
SEVENTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 

IN AND FOR BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA

Case No. 74-2159cf 

State of F lorida

vs.

Alvin Bernard F ord, defendant

ORDER

THIS CAUSE having come on before the court upon 
the Defendant’s Motion for Hearing and Appointment of 
Experts for Determination of Competency to be Executed, 
and for Stay of Execution During the Pendency Thereof, 
it is hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Defendant’s 
motion be and it hereby is Denied.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, Broward 
County, Florida, this 21st day of May, 1984.

/%/ John G. Ferris 
Circuit Judge
For and at the Direction of: 
J. Cail Lee, Circuit Judge



5

SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

Nos. 65335, 65343

Alvin Bernard F ord, or Connie F ord, individually, and 
acting as next friend on behalf of Alvin Bernard 
F ord, petitioner

v.

Louie L. Wainwright, Secretary, Dept, of Corrections, 
State of Florida, respondent

Alvin Bernard F ord, etc., appellant

v.

State op F lorida, etc., appellee

May 25, 1984

ADKINS, Justice.
We have before us a petition for habeas corpus and an 

application for stay of execution in order to allow a 
hearing to determine petitioner’s competency. We have 
jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b) (7), (9), Fla. Const.

The petitioner was convicted in the Circuit Court of 
the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit on December 17, 1974, 
for the first-degree murder of a Fort Lauderdale police 
officer. The jury recommended death, and the trial court 
imposed a sentence of death on January 6, 1975. This



6

Court affirmed petitioner’s conviction and sentence of 
death in Ford v. State, 374 So.2d 496 (Fla. 1979), cert, 
denied, 445 U.S. 972, 100 S.Ct. 1666, 64 L.Ed.2d 249 
(1980).

Petitioner then filed a motion to vacate or set aside the 
judgment pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Proce­
dure 3.850. The circuit court denied the motion, and its 
denial was affirmed by this Court. Ford v. State, 407 
So.2d 907 (Fla.1981).

Petitioner’s subsequent petition for writ of habeas 
corpus was denied by the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of Florida. Upon appeal, a divided 
panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of 
relief. Ford v. Strickland, 676 F.2d 434 (11th Cir.1982). 
Rehearing en banc was granted, and the en banc court 
affirmed the district court’s judgment. Ford v. Strickland, 
696 F.2d 804 (11th Cir.1983). Certiorari was denied in
Ford v. Strickland, -----  U.S. ------, 104 S.Ct. 201, 78
L.Ed,2d 176 (1983).

Thereafter proceedings to determine petitioner’s mental 
competency were instituted pursuant to section 922.07, 
Florida Statutes (1983). As required by this statute, 
Governor Graham appointed a commission of three psy­
chiatrists to evaluate petitioner’s sanity. The reports of 
the psychiatrists were submitted to the Governor, and he 
signed a death warrant for petitioner on April 30, 1984, 
requiring petitioner to be executed between noon on May 
25, 1984, and noon on June 1, 1984. Petitioner is cur­
rently scheduled to be executed on May 31, 1984.

In addition to the proceedings that were instituted on 
behalf of petitioner pursuant to section 922.07, peti­
tioner’s counsel also filed a motion in the trial court for a 
hearing to determine petitioner’s competency and for a 
stay of execution during the pendency thereof. The trial 
court denied the motion on May 21, 1984.

Petitioner raises two issues in his petition for writ of 
habeas corpus. The first of these concerns a jury instruc­



7

tion given to the jury in the sentencing phase that its 
advisory verdict of either life imprisonment or death must 
be reached by a majority vote of the jury. Specifically, 
petitioner argues that intervening law has established 
that such an instruction is erroneous, and that but for the 
erroneous instruction the jury’s verdict “most probably” 
would have been for life imprisonment.

This alleged error occurred during the sentencing pro­
ceeding in the trial court and therefore, the explicit pro­
scription contained in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 
3.850 applies here:

An application for writ of habeas corpus in behalf 
of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by 
motion pursuant to this rule, shall not be entertained 
if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply 
for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced 
him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless 
it also appears that the remedy by motion is inade­
quate or ineffective to test the legality of his deten­
tion.

In his first motion for post conviction relief in late 
1981, petitioner raised other challenges to the instructions 
given during the sentencing phase, but did not raise this 
issue. Thus, petitioner is not entitled to raise the issue 
here. See Johnson v. State, 185 So.2d 466, 467 (Fla. 
1966) ; Finley v. State, 394 So.2d 215, 216 (Fla. 1st DCA 
1981) ; Darden v. Wainwright, 236 So.2d 139 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 1970).

Furthermore, petitioner’s reliance on Rose v. State, 425
So.2d 521 (Fla.), cert, denied,------U.S. -------, 103 S.Ct.
1883, 76 L.Ed.2d 812 (1983), and Harich v. State, 437
So.2d 1082 (Fla.1983), cert, denied, ----- U.S. ------- , 104
S.Ct. 1329, 79 L.Ed.2d 724 (1984), is misplaced. This 
Court has recently clarified that the error which peti­
tioner alleges here requires an objection at trial before 
relief can be granted on direct appeal. See Rembert v. 
State, 445 So.2d 337, 340 (Fla.1984) ; Jackson v. State,



8

438 So.2d 4, 6 (Fla.1983). The excerpt from the tran­
script of the sentencing phase of petitioner’s trial which 
is appended to the instant petition shows that there was 
no objection to the instruction in the trial court. Thus, 
any alleged error in the contested jury instruction has 
been waived by the lack of a contemporaneous objection at 
trial, and any relief in this proceeding is precluded by the 
well-established rule that habeas corpus may not be used 
as a vehicle to raise for the first time issues which could 
or should have been raised at trial and on appeal. McCrae 
v. Wainwright, 439 So.2d 868, 870 (Fla.), cert, denied,
___ U.S. -------, 103 S.Ct. 2112, 77 L.Ed.2d 315 (1983) ;
Hargrave v. Wainwright, 388 So.2d 1021 (Fla.1980).

Additionally, the instructions given to the jury accu­
rately tracked the statute that was in effect at the time 
and that remains unchanged. It was a change in the 
standard jury instructions which prompted our decision 
in Harich. However, this Court has held that the Harich 
case does not constitute a change in the law which will 
merit relief in a collateral proceeding under the rule of 
Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922 (Fla.), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 
1067, 101 S.Ct. 796, 66 L.Ed.2d 612 (1980). Jackson, 438 
So.2d at 6.

Moreover, as we held in Harich and Jackson, the record 
in this case does not establish that petitioner was prej­
udiced by the instructions as delivered. Petitioner at­
tempts to construct his claim of prejudice based almost 
entirely upon the response by one juror as the jury was 
being polled regarding whether the verdict was by a ma­
jority vote of the jury, one juror responded: “The second 
time it was.” From this response petitioner reasons that 
initially a majority of the jury did not vote for the death 
penalty, and then builds to a conclusion that “the errone­
ous instruction was determinative of the outcome. . . .” 
However, it is well known that juries often take an 
initial vote to see where the members stand in order to 
channel their discussion. The mere fact that a second 
vote was taken does not establish anything in this record



9

to indicate that the jury felt compelled to reach a conclu­
sion that they would not otherwise have reached. Peti­
tioner’s assertion to that fact is based purely upon conjec­
ture, but this Court has stated that reversible error can­
not be predicated on conjecture. See Sullivan v. State, 
303 So.2d 632, 635 (Fla. 1974), cert, denied, 428 U.S. 
911, 96 S.Ct. 3226, 49 L.Ed.2d 1220 (1976).

Petitioner’s second claim in this proceeding is that the 
death penalty is applied in Florida in an arbitrary and 
discriminatory manner on the basis of race, geography, 
etc., in violation of the eighth and fourtenth amendments. 
This claim has never been raised by petitioner in a motion 
for post-conviction relief; therefore, it cannot be raised 
for the first time in this original habeas corpus proceed­
ing. See Johnson v. State, 185 So.2d 466, 467 (Fla.1966) ; 
Finley v. State, 394 So.2d 215, 216 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) ; 
Darden v. Wainwright, 236 So.2d 139 (Fla. 2d DCA 
1970). Further, this same issue, based upon the same 
data, has been presented to and rejected by this Court in 
Sullivan v. State, 441 So.2d 609 (Fla.1983), and most 
recently in Adams v. State, 449 So.2d 819 (Fla.1984). 
Petitioner concedes as much, but requests that this Court 
reconsider its prior holdings on this issue. We decline to 
do so.

Petitioner’s counsel has also filed a separate brief in 
this proceeding requesting this Court to remand for a 
hearing in the circuit court to determine whether peti­
tioner is presently insane. Petitioner argues that a sepa­
rate judicial determination of sanity must be made apart 
from the statutory procedure in section 922.07, Florida 
Statutes (1983), which directs the governor to make such 
a determination. This is so, petitioner contends, because 
Florida has an established common law right to a deter­
mination of a prisoner’s competency to be executed. How­
ever, when the early Florida decisions held that an appli­
cation to the trial court must be made for a determination 
of sanity, section 922.07 had not been enacted. It is an 
accepted rule of statutory construction that the legislature



10

is presumed to be acquainted with judicial decisions on 
the subject concerning which it subsequently enacts a 
statute. Main Insurance Co. v. Wiggins, 349 So.2d 638, 
642 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) ; Bermudez v. Florida Power 
and Light Co., 433 So.2d 565, 567 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), 
review denied, 444 So.2d 416 (Fla.1984). Thus, the statu­
tory procedure is now the exclusive procedure for deter­
mining competency to be executed.

In Goode v. Wainwright, 448 So.2d 999 (Fla.1984), we 
addressed this issue, agreed “that an insane person cannot 
be executed,” and held that section 922.07 sets forth “the 
procedure to be followed when a person under sentence of 
death appears to be insane. The execution of capital 
punishment is an executive function and the legislature 
was authorized to prescribe the procedure to be followed 
by the governor in the event someone claims to be insane.” 
Thus, in Goode we held that under section 922.07 the gov­
ernor can make the determination; Goode does not stand 
for the proposition that the issue of sanity to be executed 
can be raised independently in the state judicial system. 
As we recognized in Goode, the United States Supreme 
Court in Soleshee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 70 S.Ct. 457, 94 
L.Ed.2d 604 (1950), has held that a procedure like 
Florida’s whereby the governor determines the sanity of 
an already convicted defendant does not offend due 
process. Like Goode, the petitioner has exercised his right 
to use the full processes of the judicial system. Therefore, 
Goode is dispositive of the instant case.

Accordingly, petitioner’s application for a hearing to 
determine competency and a stay of execution is hereby 
denied. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is also 
denied.

It is so ordered.
ALDERMAN, C.J., and BOYD, MCDONALD and 

EHRLICH, JJ., concur.



11

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

[Title Omitted in Printing]

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
BY PERSON IN STATE CUSTODY

To the Honorable Norman C. Roettger, Jr., Judge of 
the District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

1. The Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Cir­
cuit, in and for Broward County, Florida entered the 
judgment under attack. The Court is located in Fort 
Lauderdale, Florida.

2. Mr. Ford entered a plea of not guilty, and a judg­
ment thereon was entered on December 7, 1974. After 
advisory sentence of death was returned by the jury, the 
court entered a death sentence on January 6, 1975.

3. Mr. Ford was sentenced to death by electrocution.
4. Mr. Ford was indicted for first degree murder of 

Dimitri Ilyankoff.
5. Mr. Ford entered a plea of not guilty.
6. Mr. Ford’s trial was before a jury.
7. Mr. Ford did not testify at his trial.
8. Mr. Ford appealed his conviction and sentence.
9. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the convic­

tion and death sentence on July 18, 1979, and denied 
rehearing on September 24, 1979. Ford v. State, 374 
So.2d 496 (Fla. 1979). Certiorari was denied on April 
14, 1980. Ford v. Florida, 445 U.S. 972.

10. Thereafter, Mr. Ford pursued state post-conviction 
and federal habeas corpus remedies. His motion for post­
conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.850 was denied by the Circuit Court in 
Broward County, and its denial was affirmed by the



12

Supreme Court of Florida. Ford v. State, 407 So.2d 907 
(Fla. 1981). Mr. Ford’s subsequent petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Florida was denied in an unreported 
opinion, and Mr. Ford appealed. On April 15, 1982, a 
divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial 
of relief. Ford v. Strickland, 676 F.2d 484 (11th Cir. 
1982). Rehearing en banc was granted, and the en banc 
court affirmed the district court’s judgment. Ford v. 
Strickland, 696 F.2d 804 (11th Cir. 1982). Certiorari
was thereafter denied. Ford v. Strickland, -----  U.S.
------, 104 S.Ct. 201 (1983).

11. On October 20, 1983, the undersigned counsel 
invoked the procedures of Fla. Stat. § 922.07 (1983) on 
behalf of Mr. Ford. Pursuant to this statute, Governor 
Graham appointed a commission of three psychiatrists to 
evaluate Mr. Ford’s current sanity in light of the statu­
tory standards for determining sanity at the time of 
execution. The commission members each thereafter re­
ported their findings to Governor Graham, and on April 
30, 1984, Governor Graham signed a Death Warrant for 
Mr. Ford. No findings were made by Governor Graham 
with respect to Mr. Ford’s sanity, but the signing of the 
Death Warrant signified that the Governor had concluded 
that in his view Mr. Ford was sufficiently sane to be 
executed. The Death Warrant signed by Governor 
Graham permits the execution of Mr. Ford during the 
week beginning noon, Friday, May 25, 1984, and ending 
noon, Friday, June 1, 1984. The Superintendent of Flor­
ida State Prison has scheduled Mr. Ford’s execution for 
Thursday, May 31, 1984, at 7 :Q0 a.m.

12. On May 21, 1984, a “motion for a hearing and 
appointment of experts for determination of competency 
to be executed, and for a stay of execution during the 
pendency thereof” together with a supporting memoran­
dum of law and an appendix containing documentation of 
Mr. Ford’s present incompetency was filed in the state 
trial court on behalf of Mr. Ford. The motion set out in



13

detail the facts relating to Mr. Ford’s mental status and 
was certified under oath to be made in good faith by the 
undersigned counsel. Because of his mental condition, the 
motion was presented by Mr. Ford’s mother, Connie Ford, 
individually and as next friend to her son Alvin Bernard 
Ford. Connie Ford’s affidavit setting forth next friend 
allegations was attached to the motion. Within four hours 
of filing the motion, memorandum, and appendix and 
although the trial judge was out of town, the judge denied 
the motion without findings:

This cause having come before the Court upon the 
defendant’s Motion for Hearing and Appointment of 
Experts for Determination of Competency to Be 
Executed and for Stay of Execution During the 
Pendency thereof, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the defendant’s 
motion is Denied.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Broward 
County, Florida this 21st day of May, 1984.

13. Review of the lower court’s order was sought in 
the Supreme Court of Florida by the filing of a notice of 
appeal on May 22, 1984 and the filing of a brief or appli­
cation for extraordinary relief on May 23, 1984. Oral 
argument was heard on May 25, 1984. On May —, 1984
the Supreme Court denied relief. Ford v. S ta te ,----- So.
2d ----- , No. — (Fla. 1984).

14. In addition to the aforementioned action, Mr. Ford 
also filed an original petition for writ of habeas corpus 
in the Supreme Court of Florida on May 22, 1984. This 
petition was denied by the opinion of May —, 1984.

Next Friend Allegations
15. Movant, CONNIE FORD, is the mother of Alvin 

Bernard Ford, who is presently incarcerated on death row 
at Florida State Prison and is scheduled to be executed on 
May 31, 1984, at 7 :00 a.m.



14

16. Mrs. Ford brings the present proceeding individ­
ually and acting as next friend on behalf of her son, 
because he is presently incompetent and is incapable of 
maintaining the proceedings himself, or of protecting his 
own right not to be subjected to the execution of his death 
sentence when he is incompetent.

17. Mrs. Ford alleges the following facts and incor­
porates the averments in her attached affidavit (Attach­
ment A) in support of her status as next friend acting on 
behalf of Alvin Bernard Ford in this litigation:

A. Until sometime during the first six months of 1982, 
Alvin Bernard Ford suffered from no mental illness or 
disorder known to Mrs. Ford. However, sometime during 
this period in 1982, Alvin Ford began to develop a serious 
mental illness or disorder which, in the intervening time, 
has become so severe that he no longer is competent to 
protect his own legal interests, to understand why he is to 
be executed, or to assist himself in the face of his impend­
ing execution.

B. As demonstrated in Attachment A, during the 
period of time since the summer of 1982, Alvin Ford has 
grown increasingly distant from his mother and his 
family. At the same time, he has begun having delusions 
about the relationship between himself and his family and 
about what he is experiencing and is capable of carrying 
out while he is incarcerated on death row. In particular, 
Mr. Ford has come to believe that he has the power to 
communicate with persons outside prison through various 
devices such as radios and has the power to know what is 
happening in the world outside the prison by his own 
mental and perceptual powers. Because of his exercise of 
these powers, Mr. Ford has come to believe that his family 
and numerous other persons are being held hostage in 
Florida State Prison. As his illness has worsened, Mr. 
Ford has maintained these and other delusions but has 
also begun to feel he has the power to resolve the crises 
which face him. Accordingly, Mr. Ford has indicated that 
he has taken care of the corruption which caused the hos­



15

tage crisis and has, in the course of recent months, 
married ten women upon whom he is relying for finan­
cial support.

C. During the course of Mr. Ford’s deterioration over 
the past two years, Mrs. Ford’s contact with her son has 
led her to the conclusion that he is unable to understand 
and appreciate the reality of his incarceration on death 
row and his impending execution.

18. Accordingly, Mrs. Ford believes that her son is 
incapable of protecting his rights as those rights must 
now be exercised, and she thus asserts his rights upon 
his behalf as his next friend.

Grounds Upon Which Habeas Corpus Relief 
Should Be Granted

Introduction
Since Mr. Ford has previously filed a petition for a 

writ of habeas corpus, the petition now before the Court 
is a “successive” or subsequent” petition, However, this 
fact alone does not permit the Court to decline to enter­
tain the merits of the grounds presented. Only if the 
Court finds in addition (1) that a ground or the grounds 
raised herein were raised in the first petition and were 
at that time adjudicated on the merits, and the ends of 
justice would not be served by reconsideration of such 
grounds; or (2) that although a ground or the grounds 
raised herein were not raised in the first petition, the 
failure to raise the grounds in the first petition consti­
tuted abuse of the writ, see Sanders v. United States, 
373 U.S. 1 (1963); Potts v. Zant, 638 F.2d 727 (5th 
Cir. 1981), can the Court decline to entertain the merits 
of the grounds presented.

Because the “abuse of the writ” doctrine has been so 
broadly applied in recent cases, see, e.g., Sullivan v. 
Wainwright, 721 F.2d 316 (11th Cir. 1983); Goode v.
Wainwright, -----  F.2d ------ (11th Cir. April 4, 1984)
(No. 84-3224), it is crucial that the Court carefully 
analyze Mr. Ford’s position that none of the three grounds 
he presents herein can be dismissed under that doctrine



16

or the related “prior adjudication on the merits” doc­
trine. For this reason, Mr. Ford has filed a separate 
memorandum along with the petition in which he fully 
demonstrates why these doctrines do not apply. As set 
forth in full in the separate memorandum, the doctrines 
do not apply to the first ground (U 19, infra) because 
that ground was not previously raised; and further, be­
cause the facts in support of the ground were not in 
existence at the time the first, petition was filed, the 
failure to raise the ground cannot be deemed an abuse of 
the writ. The doctrines do not apply to the second 
ground (Tf 20, infra), because that ground was not pre­
viously raised, and because the law in support of the 
ground did not support the assertion of that ground at 
the time the first petition was filed. Finally, the doc­
trines do not apply to the third ground (U 21 infra), 
because that ground as well was not previously raised; 
further, because the statistical evidence necessary to sup­
port the ground was not in existence at the time the 
first petition was filed, the failure to raise the ground 
cannot be deemed an abuse of the writ.

Accordingly, for these reasons—as fully documented 
and supported in the separate memorandum directed to 
the “abuse” issue-—the Court cannot decline to entertain 
the merits upon “abuse of the writ” or related doctrines.

The Grounds for Relief
19. At the present time, Mr. Ford is mentally incompe­

tent and his execution would thus violate the eighth 
amendment’s proscription against cruel and punishment 
and the fourteenth amendment’s guarantee of substan­
tive and procedural due process of law.

A. Mr. Ford is presently severely psychotic. Counsel 
believes that Mr. Ford is so psychotic that he no longer 
has the capacity to understand his execution—i.e., the 
nature and effect of execution and why he is to be exe­
cuted—or to communicate to counsel any fact heretofore 
not communicated which would make his execution unjust



17

or unlawful, While the facts material to the question of 
Mr. Ford's competency are set forth in detail infra. 
a summary of these facts at the outset is helpful in 
order to help the Court understand the process of Mr. 
Ford’s deterioration which has led to the instant action.

(1) Mr. Ford’s current illness has been the result of 
a process of deterioration for more than two years. Until 
late December 1981 or early January, 1982, Mr. Ford 
seemed to be in relatively good mental health. However, 
since that time Mr. Ford has gradually developed what 
has become by now grossly debilitating psychosis, Mr. 
Ford began having delusions in early 1982. Thereafter, 
as his delusions took hold, some auditory and olfactory 
hallucinations began accompanying the delusions. Grad­
ually the delusions took over his entire conscious exist­
ence. The delusions centered on his belief that the Ku 
Klux Klan was holding his family and other people 
hostage in Florida State Prison in order to drive him 
to commit suicide. By the summer of 1983 Mr. Ford’s 
delusions seemed to have changed somewhat. He seemed 
to have gained the power to free the hostages, to fire 
and prosecute the officers responsible, and to replace the 
justices of the Florida Supreme Court. At one point he 
referred to himself as Pope John Paul III. Thereafter, 
Mr. Ford’s mental processes began to make “less sense” 
to those of us in communication with him. He began 
speaking in such a disjointed fashion that, while phrases 
could be understood, no sensible communication could be 
had. At some point during this time, Mr. Ford began to 
believe that he had won his case and that the state could 
no longer execute him. He seemed amused that the state 
might “try” to execute him anyway. By December of 
1983, however, Mr. Ford seemed no longer able to com­
municate at all by the same words and syntax that inform 
conventional modes of communication. There has been no 
apparent improvement in his mental status since De­
cember, 1983.



18

(2) Through much of the time that Mr. Ford has 
been ill, he has periodically refused to meet with his 
lawyers. When the current death warrant was signed, 
we were in the midst of such a period. Mr. Ford had 
refused to see us since mid-December, 1983. While he 
still refuses to see us, we have obtained information, 
recounted infra, which confirms that Mr. Ford’s mental 
health is today no better—and is probably worse*—than it 
was when we were last with him on December 19, 1983.

B. The facts concerning Mr. Ford which must be taken 
into account in connection with the motion sub judice 
come from six sources: testimony in his tria l; his written 
correspondence over the last two-and-one-half years; a 
series of psychiatric interviews and evaluations of Mr. 
Ford by Dr. Jamal Amin, from July, 1981 through 
August, 1982; a psychiatric interview and evaluation of 
Mr. Ford by Dr. Harold Kaufman on November 3, 1983; 
an interview with Mr. Ford by his attorney Laurin 
Wollan and paralegals Gail Rowland and Margaret 
Vandiver on December 15, 1983; the interview with 
Mr. Ford on December 19, 1983 by the commission of 
three psychiatrists appointed by the Governor pursuant 
to Fla. Stat § 922.07; and the facts reported about Mr. 
Ford’s mental state at the present time. The facts pre­
sented by these sources are set forth in the pages that 
follow.

Mr. Ford’s Correspondence
C. During Mr. Ford’s period of incarceration on 

death row, he has been a prolific correspondent—with 
his attorneys, his family, his friends, his newly-developed 
(sometimes by correspondence only) acquaintances. His 
letters reveal a very bright, caring, principled person 
who is concerned not only about the events in his l i f e -  
pertaining to his case and to the conditions and treat­
ment of prisoners at Florida State Prison—but also 
about the events in the lives of the people with whom, 
he corresponds and the major events that shape the lives



19

of people collectively. His letters also reveal, and dra­
matically document, his gradual decline into the serious 
mental illness from which he now suffers. Because 
Mr. Ford has spent so much of his time writing and has 
written so articulately, his letters thus provide an extraor­
dinary window into his mental and emotional state and 
how it has changed over recent years. Accordingly, they 
are a unique source of material facts which show the 
gradual but unrelenting deterioration of Mr. Ford’s 
mental health, and of equal importance, which show that 
Mr. Ford’s illness is genuine, not merely a contrivance 
to avoid his fate.

D. Prior to December 5, 1981, Mr. Ford’s letters re­
vealed a seemingly healthy, “normal” human being. For 
example, on August 7, 1981, he wrote to Gail Rowland, 
a staff member of the Florida Clearinghouse on Criminal 
Justice (who served as a paralegal on his case and in the 
course of her work with Mr. Ford became a close and 
trusted friend), as follows:

Dear Rowland:
Content in knowing you and members of the Clear­
inghouse, had a safe trip to and back, from South 
Carolina. Relieved to know, we are still friends. 
Well I wasn’t sure, after, all I’ve said, but it was 
only the truth.
Yea, I did receive your letter explaining you and 
members of the Clearinghouse, would be in a week 
of meetings, in South Carolina. You should have 
gotten, my last letter, showing I understood, you 
would be busy.
Content in knowing the meetings went well. I can 
understand your missing your family, happy you’re 
home. Also, and you were able, to be at the beach.
Will be looking forward, to seeing you. I’m still not 
sure, about some things, especially if I should write, 
about what happens, inside the Prison Walls. Think



20

I’m more lazy, than anything else, think a lot of 
times, how easy this would be, if I had a tape re­
corder. I still stress, the point. No one, should read 
anything I write, about the Prison. I’m still not 
sure, if I should, though. Hope to talk to you, if I 
feel better about this. I may have started, but I 
won’t promise.
Well you need a car, if you don’t have one. Do be 
sure to inform me, when you think you’ll be back at 
Florida State Prison. I am not unreasonable, even if 
I seem, so.
Haven’t received any word, on the Parole Commis­
sion Interview of 31 July 81, from relatives, but will 
inform you, as soon as I do. My sister had men­
tioned, talking with Wollan, by phone earlier, in 
July. I’m sure the interview had them, somewhat, 
not knowing what to think.
Thanks for sending the Amnesty Newsletter, back. 
I will most likely write Williamson, sometime soon.
Will truly be content, in seeing this summer end. 
Hope those days are over, wherein it was near or 
over 100°.
Know you’ll be busy, at home as well as work. Hope 
you’ll be able to visit your family in New York, in 
December.
You are a good friend, so stay in touch. Will think 
about writing about some of the things we discussed.
So take care.
Sincerely, Alvin B. Ford.

Appendix I (submitted herewith), Letters, A. Another, 
longer letter, dated August 31, 1981, to Gail Rowland 
was quite sim ilar-sharing Mr. Ford’s feelings about 
various events in his life, discussing the stresses and the 
boredom of life on death row, expressing his concern for



21

various friends and acquaintances, and mentioning his 
fondness for Dr. Jamal Amin, who was conducting an on­
going psychiatric evaluation for use in Mr. Ford’s clem­
ency and post-clemency proceedings. Appendix I, Let­
ters, B. Again several months later, on December 1, 
1981, three weeks after Mr. Ford’s death warrant had 
been signed and less than one week before his scheduled 
execution, Mr. Ford wrote Gail Rowland a letter typical 
of all his correspondence to that point—expressing his 
gratitude for the hard work people were putting into 
his legal efforts, his special gratitude for Ms. Rowland 
and her daughter, and his happiness that Ms. Rowland 
had a good Thanksgiving holiday. Appendix I, Letters, C.

E. On December 5, 1981, however, health and nor­
malcy began to give way. The first sign of Mr. Ford’s 
break with reality appeared: he wrote in a letter to Ms. 
Rowland on this date that the staff of a radio station in 
Jacksonville, WJAX-FM (often referred to by Mr. Ford 
as “95X”), “have been talking to me, the pass few 
weeks,” not by visiting in person or on the telephone, 
but in their broadcasts.

Dear Rowland:
Thought I would write about WJAX, and the staff 
at 95X-FM, who I had informed you, have been 
talking to me, the pass few weeks.
I wrote and informed them, their names will go in 
my file, so send Fins Esq, Hill Esq., a copy of this 
letter. Plus send Hill Esq. a copy of the letters, 
concerning death watch.
Well a friend Clyde Holmes, use to call 95X 
(WJAX) and ask Otis Gamble to play different 
songs for me. This went on for months.
I would tell Holmes, to give Otis Gamble a message 
(he calls himself, “the Greatest,” the name I gave 
him, but usually Gambini) which would be, a mes­
sage in a joking manner.



22

Then Gambini would get on the radio, and tell me, 
what he would do to me, by his being 6’4”, and 230 
pounds. So I would send a message I lift 400 pounds, 
easy. So this is how it started.
Then the guy who does the news, Scott, would get 
on and talk about 400 pounds. So for whatever, I 
had sent the message, they would let me know, they 
got the message. All this was in kidding.
I never wrote the radio station until a few days after 
the death warrant was signed. This guy Scott got 
on the radio, and was asking could I talk, “What’s 
the matter with you, you can’t talk,” so I wrote.

From the time prison officials gave me the radio, 
Scott has been selling out, so much so. I couldn’t let 
him get the last word in. So Scott and Gambini, has 
kept me laughing.

The guards know, they talk to me over the radio. 
Scott gets on the radio 5:30 A.M. in the mornings, 
and says, “is he up, wake him up,” and the guard 
wakes me up, and I say, “Damn Scott is talking that 
crazy shit, this early in the morning.”

The lady who does the news, Peggy, kids me because 
I kid her. Then while doing the weather, tell me no 
good news. She calls Bob Graham, the “gritch” 
(spell wrong) that stole X-mas. They tell me, all 
sorts of stories. Funny ones.

Then there’s a lady name Destiny. Who takes over 
where they leave off, she said her name was Gail 
Adams, the other night.

The people at the radio station has really, made the 
situation more easier. They told me good luck, be­
fore the hearing Friday. Peggy, the newslady, said 
she hadn’t heard anything about 5:00 P.M., asked 
had I one day I could hear them, turning the pages



23

of the newspaper, someone would ask, “any good 
news,” the other, “I don’t see anything.”
They the four people have said, so much over the 
radio, to me. They told me it was (11) secretaries 
typing the weekend the after the hearing was denied 
in Fort Lauderdale, and so many other things I can’t 
even begin to write.
So I thought I would like in the file, they were 
special people to me. They say, they will be with me, 
until 8 December 81. So I would like to have this 
in the file, if ever its read, by others.
Thank you, Alvin B. Ford.

Appendix I, Letters, D.
F. In a letter to Ms. Rowland nearly three months 

later, February 24, 1982, Mr. Ford again discussed his 
developing relationship with the staff of WJAX. In the 
intervening period since the December 5 letter, it is clear 
that Mr. Ford’s delusional relationship with WJAX had 
become much more complex and more central to his on­
going life. Moreover, this letter introduced what was to 
become an overriding obsession: Mr. Ford’s preoccupa­
tion with, and personal battle against the Ku Klux Klan.

Dear Rowland:
The leader of the Jacksonville NAACP was on the 
noon news, on Channel 4 (of Jacksonville) 23 Febru­
ary 82.
He asked that on one, show up at the Klan rally 25 
February 82. The Klan will feel real strange.
On 21 February 82, I sent the radio station the 
article that was in the February 82 issue of Match­
box (Amnesty International). Also an article on 
this lady from Ireland, who won the Nobel Peace 
Prize, five years ago.



24

Candy Markman of Nashville, Tenn., mailed the arti­
cles, or article her father writes sometimes. He lives 
in St. Petersburg, Florida.
Mailed the article to Big “0 ” (Otis Gamble). That’s 
what I call him. I saw him on television once. He 
runs the opinion line. So guess I’ll start back writ­
ing.
I don’t think Jacksonville, is ready to know, I’ve been 
writing most of the topics for the opinion line.
All except for three programs, this month. The 
reason, missed two this week, because I told the staff, 
at the radio station, I wouldn’t be around this week, 
to hear the people call, and talk of hate, for the 
Klan, and people because of the races.
Destiny was crying Monday night. Guess Big “0 ” 
showed her the picture by Doug Magee, of the Gas 
Chamber.
I have a plan, in this opinion line, if the station 
keeps using the ideas which leads to votes, and gun 
control. But it will take months of the opinion 
line. . . .
Will be in touch.
Sincerely, Alvin B. Ford.

Appendix I, Letters, E.
G. By February 28, 1982, just four days later, Mr. 

Ford’s delusional system had taken a quantum leap. On 
February 25, 1982, two events occurred in Jacksonville 
which took on extraordinary significance for Mr. Ford: 
the Ku Klux Klan held a rally; and fire destroyed the 
house and lives of a black family, killing the father and 
six children and leaving only the mother alive, because 
she was pushed out a window by her husband to run for 
help. In a very long letter to “Destiny,” one of the staff



25

members of WJAX, Mr. Ford explained the significance 
and interrelationship between these two events—i.e., the 
Klan started the fire—and explained how God had re­
vealed these facts to him. Because this delusion is of 
central importance to the subsequent development of Mr. 
Ford’s delusional system, and because the way in which 
Mr. Ford reports having discovered that the Klan started 
the fire is so revealing of his increasingly psychotic state 
—in which delusions, loosening of associations and 
hallucinations are manifest1—the letter is reproduced 
here in substantial part.

Destiny:
Please read my letter of 24 February 82, again. 
Then make copies, of both, that letter, and this one.
Then I want Ed Austin, to read the letter of 24 
February 82. Also this letter. Make him a copy 
of both. I’ll need him at the end of this letter. I 
always call him, Ed.
The letter of 24 February 82, was a thought, ques­
tion, answer, letter in a sense. I will just go over it.

1 See American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statisti­
cal Manual (Third Edition, 1980), a t 182-183 [excerpted in rele­
vant part in Appendix I submitted herewith] [hereafter referred 
to as “DSM-1I1” ]. See also the definitions of these term s:
“Delusions” are “false personal belief[s] based upon incorrect in­
ferences about external reality [which are] firmly sustained in 
spite of what almost everyone else believes and in spite of what 
constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the 
contrary.” DSM-III, a t  356.
“Loosening of associations” is a form of “ [t]hinking characterized 
by speech in which ideas shift from one subject to another that is 
completely unrelated or only obliquely related without the speaker’s 
showing any awareness that the topics are unconnected.” DSM-III, 
a t 362.
“Hallucinations” are “sensory perception[s] without external stim­
ulation of the relevant sensory organ.” DSM-III, a t 359.



26

Now that you have read that letter of 24 February 
82.
I didn’t get the 25 February 82, newspaper, Florida 
Times Union. So guess something was in there. 
Then have the feeling, more people are waiting for 
this letter, than in the pass.
Even heard Reagan over 95X talking about the light 
by the plant. That light, is something I can only see 
it, when he is ready. I’m waiting on it now. Have 
saw many things, and didn’t start understanding 
until the newscast 4:20 P.M. by Peggy 95X FM, on 
25 February 82.
There’s times when I write about things, as to when, 
or what date, they will happen. If I can’t see the 
light from the sun, I’m lost. Then it’s not the sun, 
someone much Stronger. Those who read this letter 
will see the light I’m talking about, and know, this 
is the light, I see by, when he wants me to, I have 
no control, it’s only when he wants me to see. I

I never forget, what has happened this pass week, to 
ten days.
I was very content in hearing, the leader of the 
Jacksonville, NAACP (on Channel 4) ask that no 
form of protest be given to the Klan Rally 25 Feb­
ruary 82. (This was aired 23 February 82, on Chan­
nel 4 noon).
I wondered how the Klan members would feel, with 
no one, there to hate. Also was content, some tele­
vision stations, showed little coverage of the Klan 
members, up until 25 February 82.
Was more concerned, as to, how the young students 
and children, would react, to such hate. I learned 
about love, and people, in my own way, and had the



27

best teacher. Everyone, will see that teacher, who 
reads, this letter.
The light, that shines, through the window, to the 
floor, you’ll see it, it’s in the light. It’s no one, but 
God. That’s how, I see things, in the outside world. 
It may seem strange, but he, is much powerful, than 
any of us have ever, conceived, or rather much more 
powerful, than any man, ever conceived.
He showed me, the past seven days, and I will tell 
you how. It really frightens me, once I begin to 
remember.
This all started, when Destiny asked, if I knew her 
age, 95X, the night of 24 February 82. Then asked 
how, I knew, there was a living plant, in the room, 
(at her apartment) with the Bird.
I informed her, the light was shining, on the floor, 
she must have turned, and saw the light while on the 
phone, when she called the radio station, 95X, that 
morning. Guess she didn’t know, he was there, in the 
light. Don’t know, the reason, for her calling, but 
that’s why he was there (God). That’s how, I saw 
the plant. She is a special Friend. As all the mem­
bers of the staff at 95X.

In the 24 February 82, letter, I tried, to explain, to 
Destiny about the light, without mentioning God, 
was the light, because he knows, I know. Already.

In my trying to explain, I mentioned a few things. 
As how sometimes, I can see things, days, sometimes 
weeks ahead, of time. There’s times, when I’m 
wrong. That’s God’s, not with me, or rather I’m 
not with God, because he, is always there.

4:20 P.M. 25 February 82, Peggy’s first news story 
was of the Klan rally. But she sound, so frightened,



28

I’ll never forget the cold chill, I got as if she was 
talking to Death, itself, her voice never has ever 
sound, so frightening, and chilling.
During the second story on the fire (the man and 
six children) I saw three black images, standing 
behind her, in or black images as the outline of 
someone, in the Klan hood and gown. The chill was 
so cold, that it frightened me.
After the newscast, I thought of the letter of 24 
February 82 and somehow, just hoped, Peggy wasn’t 
afraid of me. I didn’t understand what had hap­
pened, until later that evening about 6:00 P.M. 
matter of fact, I didn’t understand what had hap­
pened, until about 6:00 P.M. 25 February 82 (Fri­
day), and still didn’t know, everything, until I saw 
the sunlight, the morning of 27 February 82, with 
Sandy.
He showed me everything, and left something, so 
you’ll know how great he is. He only let me look in 
the window once, I wanted to look again, but he said 
it’s there. Soon you’ll see what I saw, and know.
I know the Klan members, burned that house.

Rather than tell someone, what I was thinking, I 
wrote 95X, and asked Peggy to let me know, if she, 
hear the news, on the cause of the fire. The morn­
ing of 25 February 82.
Watched the 6:00 P.M. news on Channel 4, then 
saw the faces of the Klan members, who, burned the 
house (on pages eleven and twelve). [Mr. Ford is 
here referring to * * * two newspaper articles, * * *.]
They were Bill Wilkson, the leader, Robert McMul­
len, and the Klan member, with the reddish brown 
beard (holding the two signs) with the wood part



29

in his hand. That’s in the 6:00 P.M. Channel 4,
newscast, 28 February 82.
I was wondering, who I could inform. But I see now, 
someone’s waiting on this letter.
Peggy made some type of noise, in her throat, while 
mentioning, the gun law, had pass, as stated in the 
28 February 82, paper, and letter of 24 February 82. 
This made me take a closer look at everything. As 
far as what I had written, in the letter of 24 Feb­
ruary 82, and what had happen.

*  *  *  *

I sat down and looked at that picture on page twelve 
[the picture reported in the Florida Times Union 
edition of February 26, 1982, supra], and went over 
it many times. I saw the man, Robert McMullen, 
pouring something on the roof of the house on page 
twelve. The man with the reddish beard, through 
fire, in the first window on the corner of the house, 
where the meter is, it’s marked (X).

There was a man inside the house, this is why “the 
little girl, said the house frightened her.”

The man pushed the lady out the window, nearest 
to the meter, so she get help, and she called God. 
As I did, after seeing, all this. I asked God to help 
me, with the light, I had saw, by the plant because, 
the investigators couldn’t find the evidence.

Then the sunlight, arrived, in the window, by the 
meter, I saw something in the ashes, I still don’t 
know the name of it, because seemed, as one corner, 
was in the ashes, I wanted, to move it, but couldn’t 
touch, it, to get a better look, it looked like this:

[Drawings Omitted in Printing]



30

The brown picture, is the first one I put on paper, 
so I wouldn’t  forget what I saw. This was the only 
thing, I saw with the light through the window.
I didn’t know, what either of the pictures, on page 
fifteen [the diagrams, supra] was, because it looked 
silver, around the edges, and black engrave, with 
one edge in the ashes, covered, looked as though.
I looked and looked, this is the only thing that looks 
close to it. (on page seventeen) [Mr. Ford is re­
ferring here to page seventeen of his letter, which 
contains the picture of the Klan member, infra.] 
Turn the drawing on page fifteen [diagrams, supra], 
see how it fits, there’s only one thing missing, the 
last corner (as in the house on page twelve).
The lady in the newscast, 6:00 P.M., on Channel 4, 
is the other corner.
The evidence, is in the path, of the light, on the 
floor mark the path of the light, from the window 
on the floor.

I only saw in the window once, and would like to 
see, what the window, showed.

He said, the lady, in the blond or with the blond 
hair, who was in the Klan outfit, go get her (only) 
for now.

*  *  *  *

Then let her read the letters, of 24 February 82,

Then take her to the house, to see what God left, as 
his mark. Then give her the money, and make sure, 
she is safe, and free to go, wherever she wish to go.

She will see the light, also, and she will continue 
to, until she does the right thing. That will be the 
only way she can stop his power.



31

I don’t know you, but saw you at the Klan Rally, 
pretty blonde hair. God, will be talking to you, so 
don’t be afraid. Be still listen, and think, that’s 
how he talks, when you see the light, look at it, 
spinning, on the floor.
Look at your feet, when you get inside, he will make 
you remember, standing right at the fourth end of 
the picture you saw, I saw the light through the 
same window.
The lady, pushed through the window, called God, 
as the house was burning, and he answered. I don’t 
know what you’ll see inside that house, when you 
get there.
But don’t be afraid, you will see what I saw, through 
the window, but you’ll see the light God only allowed 
me to look in the window on page twelve once.
Ed Austin, you may know me, I met you in the 
Fourth Judicial Circuit, Nassau County, Fernandina 
Beach, in 1980.
You remember, in the case of the young white kid, 
who killed the convenient store worker. Judge 
Adams, I know you fear God, this five days pass, I 
learned, how great he is.
He said, give you a copy of this letter, and get one 
of the 24 February 82. Then know, he is God, writ­
ing this, for me.

He said, go get the lady, in the Klan outfit, and 
bring her back alone. Her picture is in the Channel 
4 newscast 6:00 P.M., 25 February 82. Blonde hair.

Let her read the letters, then take her to the house, 
and let her, see his mark.

To tell you the truth, I wanted to see it again, but 
I’m frightened of the glow.



32

I don’t know, what you’ll see, but God help you. 
He also said, to mark the area, whatever it is he 
wants you to see, also. So be there early, and wait 
on him, he will come in the window, by the meter, 
slowly in the light.
Whatever is there, no matter what, they are to look, 
and mark the light. I saw something, in the ashes, 
in the light, looks like on page fifteen (the drawing).
He said, to tell you to look at the light, as it comes 
through the window, then come back, when the lines 
are marked, from the light on the floor, from the 
windows.
Then know, she went for his help. Also, no matter, 
what’s there, go get the girl (blond hair, Klan gown) 
and let her read these letters. Then take her to the 
house. He will do the rest.
He said, give her the money, and make sure, she 
is safe, and give her, a little time, to think, after 
she, see whatever, he left there in the house. Also 
make sure she is free to go.
God bless the staff at 95X, and those who saw this, 
work of God.
Sherlock.
[“Sherlock” is Mr. Ford’s nickname in the prison.] 

Appendix I, Letters, F.
H. During the month that followed the writing of 

this letter, Mr. Ford seemed to return to a relatively 
healthier state. His loosening of associations and hal­
lucinations, so clearly evident in the February 28 letter, 
seemed to have subsided. As evidenced in his letters to 
Gail Rowland of March 8, 9, and 13, 1982 (Appendix I, 
Letters, G, H, and I), Mr. Ford continued to believe his 
delusion about the Ku Klux Klan—e.g., “ [t]he letters



33

concerning the Klan has bothered me some what, because 
I want the Grand-Wizard” (Appendix I, Letter, G)— and 
his delusion about his ability to interact with the WJAX 
staff, but he also seemed to be communicating in the 
“normal” style and about the “normal” subjects he for­
merly wrote about.

I. Mr. Ford continued to communicate in this fashion 
until April 17, 1982, when a letter to Ms. Rowland on 
that date showed some further advance in his delusional 
systems, accompanied by the injection of paranoia into his 
delusions as well as the re-emergence of his loosening of 
associations. In the first half of this letter, Mr. Ford 
wrote matter of factly and “normally” about Ms. Row­
land’s family and associates, the decision by the panel 
of the United States Court of Appeals in his case, and 
an upcoming meeting with one of his attorneys. Then 
abruptly, he wrote:

I saw Graham on television, with water in his eyes, 
talking about that letter I sent the lady D-Miami, 
with the words, unlined. Wait until you read the 
letters, Destiny has at WJAX.

The people at the radio station, Destiny, has in­
formation, on some things that happen, the follow­
ing day, after I had written her. I haven’t been 
writing for their opinion line, because trying to keep 
up, with the Ku Klux Klan, has gotten me tired.

Thank you for nice Easter card. I have stop writ­
ing about anything, as to when or where, it will 
happen, because this whole thing, leaves me very 
tired, and the people at the radio station, keep asking 
for more, when I haven’t rest.

Haven’t wrote Candy Markman’s father, yet because 
the talk about war, scares me. So I just stop, writ­



34

ing anyone, who may seem to ask some strange or 
unusual question.
I have to see what Destiny has done, with all the 
letters. Doug Magee [a writer from New York who 
has published books about death row] is at that radio 
station saying his name is Dale Taylor. I haven’t 
received a letter, from him, so I’m about ready to 
stop writing that station.
Well hope to see you soon. Think I’ll just rest some. 
Tell Geoff and Tao [Ms. Rowland’s husband and 
child] hello for me. I don’t know much about the 
book, but whatever, I write, I don’t plan on sending 
to WJAX, until I find out, what happened to the 
other things I have written so far.
So take care, and hope to see you soon.
Sincerely, Alvin B. Ford.

Appendix I, Letters, J.
J. Over the next three months, Mr. Ford again seemed 

to have “gotten better,” as evidenced in his letters. Ap­
pendix I, Letters, K and L. To be sure, his delusion about 
the Ku Klux Klan remained intact, and he reported 
devoting much effort to seeing that Bill Wilkinson (the 
leader of the Klan) would eventually be prosecuted and 
convicted for the arson-murders in Jacksonville. He also 
took care to be sure that Ms. Rowland and her colleague, 
Scharlette Holdman, knew about what he was doing and 
understood the “evidence” he had against the Klan. And 
his concern for his “Klan work” was so pervasive that he 
reported little concern about anything else, even the legal 
proceedings related to his conviction and sentence:

I have the briefs from the lawyers, Burr III and 
Fins Esq. I’ve been so busy I haven’t had the chance 
to read them, but will this weekend. I don’t worry 
too much about the ruling that will be from the 11th



35

Circuit, on the rehearing. Have many other things 
to keep me busy.

Appendix I, Letters, L. However, he also was able to 
communicate about everyday matters concerned with his 
and Gail Rowland’s friendship, Appendix I, Letters, K, 
and his manner of writing was more coherent, reflecting 
another remission of his loosening of associations.

K. By July 8, 1982, Mr. Ford’s remission ended. On 
that date, he wrote Scharlette Holdman (Florida Clear­
inghouse on Criminal Justice) a letter reporting a sig­
nificant advance in his delusional system: he had just 
discovered that Gail Rowland was “Destiny,” and he 
wanted to know why she had been trying to fool him 
for the many months she had been seeing him.

Dear Holdman:

As soon as, you have time, do reply to this letter. 
I’ve been writing WJAX some time now, to an 
A/K/A Destiny.

Most recently I found out she is Gail Rowland. This 
is because she mentioned, something, I told her, in 
prison, at the prison, during a visit.

A while back this Martin, was sending me messages, 
threatening to kill her. So I asked Angela [news­
person from Channel 4, Jacksonville] to ask Ed 
Austin to put a wire tap on her phone, and watch 
her home. This fraud case came, up. The police, 
was looking for Martin. I wrote Angela and told 
her he was more than likely at Destiny’s. This where, 
police, picked him up, the following morning.

Gail Rowland, has, been writing from this address. 
Granda Apartments, 2131 North Meridian Road. 
Apartment #111, Tallahassee, Florida 32303.

19 June 82 there was a wedding. I put Gail Row­
land’s name on the letter, sent it to Channel 4.



36

The reason I think she (Destiny) is in fact Gail 
Rowland, is she mentioned some things, I have told 
her in prison. Now to the serious part. Destiny 
has been playing games, with me, for three months. 
Most recently, threats.
I’ve been so angry, I had the thought in mind of 
hurting another prisoner. Seriously, I couldn’t be­
lieve this was Gail Rowland.
Haven’t had a reply, from her, in quite a while. I 
have a 50-page letter on her. Threats, etc. . . . she 
can cause me, to get another murder charge.
She always mention, she has been help you. So tell 
me what you know about her. I don’t want to hurt 
her, in any way, or the efforts in the fight against 
the death penalty.
She has caused me, a lot of confusion. There was, 
well, I’ll wait on reply. Do be in touch as soon as 
possible.
Sincerely, Alvin B. Ford.

Appendix I, Letters, M.
L. That Mr. Ford’s July 8 letter was a sign that his 

illness was worsening was powerfully confirmed some 
two months later, in a letter to Deborah Fins, an attorney 
who formerly represented him. By the date of this letter 
to Ms. Fins, September 11, 1982, Mr. Ford’s delusional 
system had become all-pervasive and all-encompassing. 
Because of his work against the Klan, he believed that he 
had become the target of a complex scheme of torture 
ultimately designed to force him to commit suicide. Al­
though this delusion has undergone some change from 
September, 1982 to the present, this is the central de­
lusion which has governed Mr. Ford’s daily existence 
since its onset in September, 1982. There have been no 
remissions—from the grip of the delusion, the loosening



37
of associations, and the hallucinations—since then. Be­
cause this delusion has been so dominating, Mr. Ford’s 
entire September 11 letter has been reproduced, for it 
is the critical stepping stone from the past to the present 
in Mr. Ford’s life.

Dear Fins. Esq.:
Thank you for your letter of 22 July 82, as of this 
date, I still want my, files closed to Doug Magee, 
and no one is to have access other than lawyers.
Also I do not in any way, want Dr. Amin, or Gail 
Rowland, associated with my case in any manner, as 
of this date.
Fm sorry I haven’t replied to your letter, until this 
date. I have had a number of problems, at Florida 
State Prison, over the pass three months, with 
guards, the KKK, and Owl Society or organization.
I really wanted to see you, it’s been such a long 
time, Deborah. I wasn’t able to leave the cell, hope­
fully you got the refusal slips, and the messages, I 
wrote on them, to you.
If you receive any affidavits concerning what has 
been going on inside the prison, do hold them, and 
make sure all persons, attorneys, etc . . . receive 
copies. Do excuse, my saying you were missing, this 
was the only way I could get the prisoners interested 
enough to write, wherein I could get some help.
Dennis Balske of the Southern Poverty Law Center, 
should be sending copies of letters written prison 
officials, and lawyers, concerning the problems, I’ve 
had here over the pass months, mailed them, to the 
Poverty Law Center, because of their Klan-Watch. 
Then asked that they send letters, to or copies, to the 
lawyers.
My situation needs a solution, as soon as, humanly 
possible. I have been threatened 24 hours a day, for



38

the pass three months, by guards and Bill Wilkinson 
of the KKK. He has been working here, under the 
name of Officer McKenzie, Q-Wing.
When you do visit again bring a tape which can play 
six to eight hours. There’s so much has happened, 
until I don’t know where to start.
My life is in danger, by these guards and the KKK, 
and Owl Society, or organization, plus this labor 
union, you should be receiving, copies of letters, to 
this effect.
Other than threats, I have been, okay. Have been 
more less, trying to gather information, and review 
the situation.
Please call Wollan, and Dennis Balske of the Poverty 
Law Center, to get a full report. Wollan, Burr III, 
and Craig Barnard with Vandiver, was at Florida 
State Prison on 11 September 82.
I’ve been hounded by Bill Wilkinson and the KKK, 
24 hours a day, the guards, in the labor union, and 
Owl Society.
They put me on DC for quite some time, for no 
reason. Just got some stamps and Wollan, brought 
some. Just got some pens and paper to write with.
Things have been the same continuous hounding. 
They are at my door now and in the pipe alley at 
the cell, vent.
The story is too long to write, but it’s the truth. 
A lady is being held in the pipe alley on Q-Wing, 
third floor, behind the cell, I’m in.
I’m told the man holding her name is Crooks, the 
only Crooks I know of is one who works at WJAX 
95X, 4:00 P.M. to 6:00 P.M. Sundays.
While waiting to see, the lawyers 10 September 82, 
the Counselor, Harrington, said I’ll be moved to



39

R-Wing, the working week of 9/13-17/82. While in 
the Cage, by the Control Room.
As soon as I got back to Q-Wing, I was told Crooks, 
is to murder me on R-Wing or S-Wing, and either 
make it look as a suicide, or murder. This lady has 
been held in the pipe alley since, well about two 
months, being raped by guards as well as prisoners. 
This is the reason, I haven’t gotten very much help. 
Guards are allowing prisoners to rape this lady, to 
keep things quiet, and no one knows she is in this 
prison.

I hear her now, asking this man, “Please don’t kill 
me.” I have been on Q-Wing since 2 August 82, and 
hounded every day for 24 hours, by the KKK and 
guards. Can’t even eat, without them at the door­
way and cell vent saying they put, “Semen in the 
food, by having this lady, perform oral sex,” this 
is every day, for the pass three months.

While on S-Wing, guards have tried to ease my door 
open in the A.M. hours. Luckily, I was not asleep, 
3:30 A.M., because this plantigraph was waiting to 
enter the cell with a knife and hatchet, this is the 
truth, whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so 
help me God.

Doug Magee, published a book, and changed the 
authors sold for $680,000. I wrote that book. Paul 
Robeson, All American, author Dorothy Butler Gil­
liam. He nor Destiny said a word about it, but I 
found out, the plan was to try to run me insane, 
and make me commit suicide.

This why I don’t want Dr. Amin, on my case, and 
Gail Rowland. No one can get the money from the 
book unleses, Pm dead. As soon as possible I’ll write 
the whole thing. I had but being threatened by the 
KKK, in prison, I had to pass the evidence.



40

I’ve never told you a lie, and this is the truth. 
Deborah, I think these guards, have been killing 
people, and putting the bodies, in these concrete 
enclosures, used for beds, on Q-Wing. Deborah, this 
is the truth.
These concrete enclosures are used for beds, about six 
feet long, four feet wide, and three feet high, just 
a concrete block. The one inside the cell, I’m housed 
in was open from the pipe alley I think, and the 
smell was awful, decomposed bodies.

Do know I’ve never lied to you. While I was out to 
see Wollan, Burr III, Craig Barnard, and Vandiver, 
I was afraid they may try to clean these things out. 
I don’t know what happened, but the lady is still in 
the pipe alley, and at this very moment someone 
outside my cell door, with threats, the voice sounds 
as Bill Wilkinson of the KKK.

Before I moved to Q-Wing to DC, 2 August 82, I 
was on DC on S-Wing-l-North-17. There was a gun 
on the floor, that was pointed at me, told guards. 
No one, did a thing, was a shake down 17 July 82, 
led by Bill Wilkinson.

Got a UCI-666 (Form) (sent to Dennis Balske of 
the Southern Poverty Law Center, asked he send 
all the lawyers copies, notarized) which was written 
by Bill Wilkinson, which said, one altered ink pen, 
and 5 bundles of paper.

That five bundles of paper was evidence on the book, 
mentioned on page five [of this letter], and on the 
KKK, and the hounding by this Destiny at WJAK 
95X Radio Station. The five bundles of paper was 
going to Jim Smith, State Attorney General. They 
were trying to get me, to throw them, away, because 
guards names were mentioned. I wouldn’t throw 
these papers away, so they gave me a DR, for having



41

a knife, when do you know of me having a weapon, 
since being in prison. 17 July 82.
15 July 82, the lady who does ABC radio news, 
told me not to give those same bundles of paper 
(letters) to Classification Officer Dan. I gave them 
to him, after some thought asked for them back. 
As soon as I did, you need a haircut, another DR 
(the letters were four brown envelopes to Jim Smith 
on the KKK, the book, and guards, and hounding by 
this Destiny).
This lady in the pipe alley said, Sergeant Combs, had 
a gun to her head telling her, she better never tell, 
she was beaten and raped, with Officer Adams. In 
the stairwell of S-Wing I heard them, and told her, 
she can tell anyone, because they had no business, 
with her in the pipe alley.
When I said that, they cut off my water to the sink 
and commode. Orders of Bill Wilkinson, on S-Wing. 
Then I was given a DR, saying I threatened to kill 
a guard, by Officer Adams.
So Deborah, I’ve been on DC, quite a while. They 
have been trying to kill me. Their plan was to do 
so on Q-Wing, took everything I owned 2 August 82, 
Had no stamps, pens, paper or envelopes, until Sep­
tember, although I borrowed a pen and paper. Had 
no stamps, but found some reusable ones on old 
envelopes and mailed a letter out.
Didn’t get a slip concerning my property until 8 
September 82. Had over $25.00 stamps, 400 enve­
lopes, 500-600 sheets of paper, 30 pens. Not sure 
where my personal property is, but guess I’ll find 
out when they take me off DC. More than likely will 
have to file suit, under High Risk Management.
These people who have been threaten me, told me, 
they murdered all my family. Hopefully you can, get



42

back down here, and bring a full tape, that will play 
six to eight hours, each day. No haven’t heard a 
word from my relatives.
Channel 4 of Jacksonville has been helping. Keeping 
the guards from killing me. The evidence, I wrote 
to Jim Smith, State Attorney General, concerning 
that book was written over the cell walls of Q-3- 
West-3, the cell I’m in now. (That evidence on the 
book, was removed from my cell, from S-Wing in 
the month of July 82.)
Bill Wilkinson says he has my address book, and is 
killing everyone in there, by address. So I wouldn’t 
have anyone to help me. Guards wouldn’t mail my 
letters, only beat this lady whenever I tried to write 
the outside, for help.
So I’ve had to fight the KKK, guards, and prisoners. 
Also, because the KKK, and guards, has been using 
the prisoners against me, as well allowing to rape 
this lady, being held hostage.
So my life is in danger, and need help. Please send 
a copy of this letter to the FBI, as soon as possible, 
and contact, other lawyers.
Please be in touch as soon as possible.
Sincerely, Alvin B. Ford.
cc: CIA-FBI

Directors 
Washington, DC.

Appendix I, Letters, N.
M. In Mr. Ford’s letters which followed this letter in 

September, 1982, the same information was presented. 
But in a letter dated September 12, 1982, to Ed Austin, 
President Reagan, the United States Attorney General, 
and the directors of the FBI and CIA, three new aspects



43

to the delusion emerged. First, Mr. Ford noted that he 
had been in direct communication with President Reagan 
about the Elan’s crimes in Jacksonville from the very 
beginning:

The President of the United States of America, 
should remember well, this case. He was at Camp 
David, the night, I was writing those letters, con­
cerning the KKK, and mentioned, the “Light by the 
Plant.” He said in the early A.M. hours, this was 
a “grace period,” over the air, live broadcast. I have 
Mr. Reagan as my witness, and these members of 
the CIA, along with the radio tape, of 27 February 
82 (A.M. hours) over the world news, in the last 
four minutes on the hour on the above date.

Appendix I, Letters, 0. Second, Mr. Ford indicated that 
messages had been passed between him and various media 
representatives “through this book, I’ve been writing 
from, the Second College Edition, Webster’s New World 
Dictionary of the American Language, William Collins 
Publishers, Inc., 2080 West 117th Street, Cleveland, Ohio 
44111, Copyright 1979 by William Collins Publishers, 
Inc.” Id. Third, Mr. Ford reported that the women who 
were being tortured and sexually abused in the prison 
might be his mother, Connie Ford, and Angela Estelle, 
of Channel 4 in Jacksonville. In another massive letter 
written in September, on September 26, Mr. Ford im­
plored Deborah Fins and the Attorney General of the 
United States to undertake legal proceedings to expose 
what was going on at the prison and to require his 
transfer to another state prison. For nearly twenty pages 
in that letter Mr. Ford listed the investigative steps 
which needed to be undertaken in connection with those 
proceedings. See Appendix I, Letters, P.

N. Just one month thereafter, on October 22, 1982, 
Mr. Ford began to report yet another new development 
in his delusion—one that, over the course of the next year 
and beyond would become the most significant element in



44

his world of delusions: the taking of hostages by the 
persons who were already tormenting him at Florida 
State Prison. In a letter to counsel, Mr. Ford reported,

The same thing has been going on daily, since I saw 
you. I found out more, this Gail Rowland, along 
with Dr. Amin, is holding my sister, Gwendolyn 
Louise Ford Shaw Williams, and Connie Ford 
(mother) hostage in this prison.

Appendix I, Letters, Q.

0. Less than two months later, on December 5, 1982, 
Mr. Ford’s belief that members of his family were being 
held hostage in the prison had solidified. Moreover, dur­
ing this time, he had come to believe that an increasing 
number of hostages—to this point all family members— 
were being held. When he would receive mail from these 
relatives, he would not at all be shaken from his belief 
that the relatives were nonetheless being held hostage. 
Indeed, because of the loosening of associations in con­
nection with his psychosis, the logic governing his world 
had little to do with the logic governing the rest of the 
world. On December 5, he wrote,

Dear Grandmother,

I received your letter and card. I haven’t written 
because of a number of reasons. I hope you will be 
well, feeling okay when this letter, reaches your 
hand. I have been okay. But I want to tell you 
don’t, ever be afraid, of my dying, because this will 
happen one day.

You mentioned your being 73 years old, well don’t 
let anyone threaten you into doing anything, at all. 
If anyone can, hurt a 73-year woman, they have to 
be really sick, so try to understand, and just believe 
in God, and ask him to forgive those, that do you 
wrong.



45

I know you are inside, this prison, behind my cell. 
I have been wondering, how you got in this prison, 
also with mother, Gwen, and the other relatives.
I have been more surprised, in your not telling me, 
from the first day you were, brought in this prison.
God, put your trust in God, don’t write, and tell me 
lies. This is the reason, I had such a time, finding 
out about all the family, from this prison cell. So 
don’t do anything, against your will, you are not to 
be held hostage, in this prison, by these people. God, 
is the answer, so take care of yourself as well as 
humanly possible.
Hopefully your knee is better. Also you were able 
to have the X-ray. Tell Uncle Henry hello, also he 
must be held hostage here, also. Tell him, he should 
write.
I won’t be having any visits, until all my relatives, 
are safely out of this prison, one way or the other. 
I know now, about the relatives, as well as the out­
side world, so trust in God.
I’ve given these people, every chance, possible, to 
let you, and the relatives to go, but looks as though, 
they refuse. So if they hurt anyone, the crimes, will 
surely, have a lasting effect.
Thank you for the stamps and God bless you, and 
keep you safe. Trust in no one, but God.
Sincerely, Alvin B. Ford A/K/A Sherlock.

Appendix I, Letters, R.
P. As time wore on in 1983, Mr. Ford’s delusional 

system remained very much the same. Gradually, how­
ever, more people became hostages, and as more people 
became hostages, Mr. Ford’s role as the only one who



46

could help the hostages, began to develop. As this role 
grew, Mr. Ford became increasingly angry—righteously 
angry—and increasingly grandiose. On March 28, 1983, 
for example, Gail Rowland received the following angry 
barrage:

Dear Rowland:

I received your 16 March 83, 21 March 83, letter. 
Sorry in my delay, in this reply. Since you have 
been in the pipe alley, behind my cell, with my 
lawyers, family, and prison officials, since July 82, 
even death row inmates, I decided, I would not 
write, until now.

Also I note all the people, who was working at 95X, 
WJAX, are also inside the pipe alley, behind my cell.

You know the story too well. I know very well, you 
have told quite a few lies on my family and me, 
since the first day you had my relatives, brought to 
the prison, back in July 82. Whatever reason, you 
brought them here for, possibly, you will explain it, 
later, in a letter or in person.

As far as your leaving this prison, going to Talla­
hassee, to write for that newspaper, I won’t comment 
on that point, as of yet.

You know, all too well, my problems, and the prob­
lems, of those people you have told lies on. Also 
you know or have known, full well, the attitudes of 
prison officials, since your first visit here in 1981 
when that death warrant was signed.

Also I want an explanation, as to why you have my 
relatives, lawyers, etc . . . here. Then the reason, 
all these death row prisoners, are out their cells, 
bothering my family and lawyers.



47

Then about the book, I was writing, why didn’t you, 
tell me, your name, was the Destiny of 95X, WJAX.
Also why was the book given a different title and 
author, and why didn’t you send me, a copy of my 
own book. Then why was it put in a will.
Then the reason all the people are here from 95X, 
WJAX, also Doug Magee, who I sent, to New York, 
to come to Florida, to write the book. Dale, of 95X, 
also, why wouldn’t he, tell me his name.
The book is written, now 18 August 82. Destiny is 
dead. Why was this in the newspaper. Who should 
I write at WJAX 95X about all my material, since 
Destiny is dead. Also since Dale, Doug Magee, who 
never told me, his name.
Guess all that’s lost, and Destiny is dead. The book 
sold for $680,000, and was put in a will to Gilbert. 
I know the whole story.
I told you long ago, I would give you that book. 
Where is it, you had it, all the letters. What are 
you, pulling on me, and my family.
First I want you to know, I am a man, possibly, 
the best you ever knew. You will not treat me as 
some dumb-ass nigger.

You had no friends, you don’t even know, where my 
book is. Never gave me one penny, since I’ve known 
you. Not sent one package, or anything.

Then you treat my family like they are no one, in 
front of people, who could give less than, a damn 
about you. When there is no money, no drugs, see 
where they go. I

I will write any lady, I want, this jack-off shit, you 
can take to someone else. This talk about Leper, 
etc. . . . want you to understand. I can call any



48

woman, and I demand respect. If you want some­
one, else, go ahead.

Greatest man on this earth or what. There’s quite 
a few things I have to say. First I’ve joined the 
Ku Klux Klan, to get my family out of this prison. 
Because looks as you won’t stop your lies.

The whole while, since July 82, I’ve been trying to 
get my family out of here, you have been trying to 
keep them here, why. Then my lawyers.

The crime watch on Channel 4, what happened to 
all those letters. Was there ever any money, from 
the letter. No, I don’t guess, you never told me, if I 
was ever right on the crime watch.

Since July 82, I’ve sent teletypes, as you know. The 
talk has been on my case on appeal. Now that I’ve 
dismiss, my case, there’s nothing to talk about.

My family know, nothing of the Ku Klux Klan, why 
do you have them talking this foolishness, scaring 
them, with these guards. Whatever lies, you told get 
them straighten out.

Now all these punks, on death row, you have out 
these cells. I’m trying my best not to hurt anyone, 
all of them are punks.

This asking the guard for a cigarette, shit. Trying 
to keep me, from purchasing things from the store is 
some shit. Who is guard Ortagus is he Scott of 95X, 
is Willis, “OC”, and what’s “Steve Fox.” I hear all 
their voices, but neither has come, out and gave me 
their name.

You know, I’ve been on DC, since July 82, and all 
these DR’s these guards have written, even those 
on the Disciplinary Committee.



49

You know, very well your lies have hurt, my family. 
I don’t know, how many have been told, by others, 
but it’s pass time, you stopped lying.
So I joined the Ku Klux Klan. Now what there’s 
no money. I need some. Have you been telling 
people, I have money.
The lawyer will be years, getting the book back. 
Well what now, since I joined the Ku Klux Klan.
I read some on Bill Wilkinson, he no damn fool. 
From what I’ve read he knows of business, and is 
not no small-minded person. Even though these 
people, who are bothering my family treat both him 
and me like, damn fools. And I’m tired of it.
This shit, streak all night, is a bunch of shit, these 
guards don’t know a damn thing, and keep bothering 
my family. I’m tired of it.
Scott, knows the messages, and I damn sure will 
not let, any these punks, snitches, know what he has 
told me. Because now, is the time to move.
These guards and inmates, don’t know a damn thing, 
and I’m tired of this shit from these bastards, bother­
ing my family.
This is not for them to know, and they won’t know. 
These motherfuckers are going, to get from behind 
my damn cell, and my family is going home.
I’m tired of these petty-minded bastards, these in­
mates, it’s more than enough to try to save their 
lives.
I have too much work to do, than this bullshit, you’re 
throwing at me. I expect anything I want or need.
Also to talk to each person from 95X, later. I have 
many people, I need to contact, you know all, my 
problems, so won’t discuss them.



50

Will have you contact some, missing property, DC, 
lawyers, family, visits, schedule, them all, packages, 
stamps, etc. . . .
Be sure to write.
Sincerely, Alvin B. Ford.

Appendix I, Letters, S. And only five days later, on 
April 2, 1983, Scharlette Holdman received a letter, in 
which Mr. Ford recounted the growing magnitude of 
what he, by then, was referring to as “the hostage crisis,” 
and the critical, world-historical importance of his role in 
trying to resolve the crisis:

Dear Holdman:
I’ve heard your voice in the prison in Q-Wing, since 
August 82, when I was housed on Q-3-W-3, and 
Holly Morris, even Margaret Vandiver, Professor 
Wollan, Gail Rowland, Deborah Gianoulis, Tom Wills, 
Julian Bond, Rev. Jessie Jackson, Senator Edward 
Kennedy, all my family members, Dr. Amin, Susan 
Cary, Esq., Richard Burr, III, John Middleton, Esq., 
William Sheppard, Dr. Gwendolyn Tucker, PBS 
Channel 7, Honorable Arnette Girardeau, Honorable 
Haben, just to name a few of the names.
I’ve written many people, from the Superintendent 
of Florida State Prison, to the former Superintend­
ents, prison inspectors, Wainwright, the Attorney 
General, Joy Shearer, the Assistant Attorney Gen­
eral, United States Attorney General, FBI Director, 
even President of the United States, Southern Pov­
erty Law Center, and many others.
All concerning my family being held, hostage inside 
the prison walls, at Florida State Prison, by the Ku 
Klux Klan.
You know, all too well about this, and these mind 
readers. I was very disappointed you didn’t or



51

couldn’t do anything in December, other than join 
the Ku Klux Klan, along with others, who were held 
hostage. It’s been about 263 days, my family has 
been here. I understand you, Rowland, Fins, Esq., 
Carey, Hill, Esq., are ladies, Morris, Tucker, M.D., 
Gianoulis, Jefferson, Silberstein, are women, which 
makes, this much tougher, along with others.
I went ahead and joined the Ku Klux Klan, to save 
the lives of my family. This man holding them 
hostage, is the one in the crime watch of 26 Febru­
ary 83, you haven’t saw those letters.
So far the government hasn’t done a thing. The 
lawyers won’t say, one word, other than, behind my 
cell in the pipe alley Q-2-W-5.
I would guess the whole world knows about this, 
crisis, because it’s been on radio, for months now. 
I’m okay. Just trying to get my family out this 
prison. Thought Gail had gone crazy, bothering my 
family, lawyers, with these people, and prison guards.
I’ve written every prison official, in Tallahassee, and 
not one thing has been done. Even the governor and 
Jim Smith.
Stamps and paper, running very low, the problems 
with legal packages regular packages, pass X-mas 
packages, items from the store (prison), television, 
radio, newspapers, magazines, etc . . . is the same.
Also DC, Disciplinary Confinement, but as well as 
ever. Schedule an interview, whenever you can, 
“Reaching out,” “Amnesty International,” asked if 
I had written the Clearinghouse, just decided to do 
so. Tell the staff, hello and everyone else. Have 
written quite a few people the pass time. I try to 
work on my death case, in which, I’m finding out 
some interesting, facts. Just learned.



52

Very difficult, to show a positive outlook, on the 
capital punishment, situation. With the death row 
inmates, committing crimes, in prison, testifying to 
the public, destroying that image, I’ve tried to main­
tain, in showing, the state should not kill, these in­
mates, on death row.

For the first time, we have the lawmakers, take a 
look at death row, and look at what we get. Rape, 
attempted extortion, assault, among other crimes, 
which will make it that much difficult, for these 
stays of execution.

God knows, I’ve tried my level, best, to show, law­
makers, they shouldn’t kill me. Then try to protect 
the others, by giving the State of Florida, my life, 
to show the world, how wrong this death penalty is.

God has blessed me, in this crisis, to have known, 
some great people. I would not, otherwise, have 
known. Pray God they will remain, in our cause.

People are real strange, even though who work at 
this prison. As you can see, I never lied, to you, or 
Middleton, Hill, Esq., Fins, Esq., or Rowland.

All I can do now, is pray God, everyone will make 
it out of this crisis safe. Don’t ever worry about me, 
my God is too strong.

Do give my regards to everyone, I’ll just wait around, 
and see what happens, this is all I can do, at this 
point.

Write as many people as possible, about this crisis, 
my God has brought help, in attention, in our cause, 
in fighting capital punishment.

Content in knowing, my name will be, left in some 
respect, of the shame, I’ve cause others, including 
my family, in my being on death row.



53

Have very little paper, but will try to write more 
often. God bless you, and the staff of the FCJ, give 
everyone my regards, including Rowland.
Sincerely, Alvin B. Ford.

Appendix I, Letters, T.
Q. Gradually, in these days and weeks that followed 

these letters, anger gave way to grandiosity. For ex­
ample, less than one month after Mr. Ford wrote Ms. 
Holdman, Mr. Ford wrote an attorney in Miami, Randall 
Berg,

Dear Mr. Berg:
I was given your name as a source to contact con­
cerning the hostage crisis, by Beryl N. Jones of the 
ACLU Washington, DC.
I’m sure you have information on the hostage crisis, 
at Florida State Prison, this is day 287, the Ford 
family, lawyers, news reporters, senators, Senator 
Kennedy and many other leaders.
This crisis has to end, it is causing the racial unrest 
in your city, namely Liberty City. To curve the 
crime rate, we will need your help.
Please do not disregard this letter. Your national 
political leaders, are here inside the walls, of Florida 
State Prison.
Please brief yourself, by contacting CBS Channel 4, 
Eyewitness News, WJXT, Jacksonville, Florida. Also 
Jerri Hamilton, ABC Radio News, Dave Barret, Rita 
and staff. Also President Reagan.
You will have to bring someone, with you a lawyer, 
call CBS Channel 4 WJXT.
Do not disregard this letter, you will have to sched­
ule an interview with Alvin Bernard Ford No. 
044414.



54

This is day 287. Do reply by United States mail.

Sincerely, Alvin Bernard Ford A/K/A Sherlock.

cc: U.S. Attorney General 
President Reagan

Appendix I, Letters, U. As this letter made clear, the 
hostage crisis was still growing worse by the end of April, 
1983. Moreover, the hostages by then included “senators, 
Senator Kennedy, and many other leaders,” and the crisis 
was of such global importance that it was shaping the 
events of history. Indeed by May 8, 1983, the list of 
hostages included some 135 people, many of whom were 
nationally-known public figures. See Appendix I, Letters, 
V.

R. As Mr. Ford’s delusions became increasingly gran­
diose, a new element entered the delusions: Mr. Ford 
felt that he was becoming powerful enough that he him­
self could end the crisis and force the release of the 
hostages and thereafter, punish those responsible. The 
development of this element was apparent in a letter to 
Attorney General Jim Smith on May 10, 1983.

Dear Mr. Smith:

I know the Department of Corrections is well aware 
of this hostage crisis, as well as your offices. We 
have spoken over the FCC in November at the FSU 
football game (1982) concerning this crisis. You 
were with Joy Shearer and Governor Graham, some 
six months ago.

This is day 317, my family and lawyers have been 
held hostage. The Department of Corrections has en­
dangered the lives of my family, lawyers, and news 
reporters, from the institution level to the state level.
Please schedule an interview with Alvin B. Ford, 
Florida State Prison No. 044414. Report all findings 
to President Reagan, and the United States Attorney



55

General and Ed Austin, District Attorney, Jackson­
ville, Florida.

As you know, Gwendolyn Louise Ford Shaw Williams 
RN had a baby inside the prison walls in these pipe 
alleys. The baby’s at the clinic. Also my sister-in- 
law, Elsa Marie Perkins Ford (United States Army) 
had a baby while living in these pipe alleys. Thank 
God they were pregnant before being kidnapped.

I have fired a number of officials at the institutional 
level and state level, with the final approval, from 
the Governor, and President of the United States. 
Also your offices.

There will be a number of lawsuits, criminal charges, 
all listed on the Federal Communication Commission. 
Also there will be testimony before a Presidential 
Subcommittee, on this hostage crisis.

Also please note, I write crime watch on CBS Chan­
nel 4, Eyewitness News. Please note the crimewateh 
of 26 February 82. I wrote these letters on these 
murders for President Reagan, he called a “grace 
period,” will please try under these same persons 
have, my family, lawyer, reporters and our country’s 
leaders hostage, inside Florida State Prison, Q-Wing, 
in these pipe alleys.

Pm not sure, how many persons, are inside these 
pipe alleys, through the prison, but I think there, 
is others, on other wings, although, Pm not sure, 
because Pm inside the cell. I

I have request prison officials to call the FBI. Hope­
fully we know (government) how many persons, have 
been taken hostage. Some have been here since 
August of last year.



56

I have been in solitary confinement, since July 82. 
The President of the United States, Mr. Reagan and 
the United States Attorney General, know everything 
about this case.
Each person at the institutional level know, full well, 
the rules of DOC, being employed by the State of 
Florida. I have fired everyone, I’ve written, the final 
approval, will be from the President of the United 
States, Mr. Reagan, and the United States Attorney 
General, at DOC both the institution level and state 
level.

Sincerely, Alvin R. Ford A/K/A Sherlock
cc: U.S. Attorney General

President Reagan
Appendix I, Letters, W. As this sense of his own power 
grew, Mr. Ford summoned national and international 
leaders to Florida State Prison “to help end this hostage 
crisis.” For example, on May 19, 1988, Mr. Ford wrote 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor as follows :

Dear Madam Justice O’Connor:
I have been waiting on your reply, to my pass corre­
spondence. Please give all Justices a copy of my 11 
March 83, letter and 23 April 83 letter.
Please each Justice follow, the directions of this 
letter, Steward, Blackman, Powell, Stevens, Marshall, 
Brennan, Burger, White, Relinquish
Each will have to travel to Jacksonville, Florida. The 
mayor of Jacksonville, will meet each at the airport, 
with CBS, ABC, NBC television stations.
All this nation’s leaders, have assembled in Jackson­
ville, Florida. CBS Channel 4 Eyewitness News, will 
bring you. We need you to help end this hostage 
crisis. Also contact ABC radio news.



57

Then each of the following, Senator John Glenn, 
Walter Mondale, Senator Gary Hart, Senator Ernest 
Boilings, Senator Cranston, President Reagan, Sena­
tor Edward Kennedy, Julian Bond, Rev. Jesse Jack- 
son, Reubin Askew, Benjamin Hooks NAACP, Ted 
Koppel ABC Nightline.

There are kings and queens, Prime Minister Mar­
garet Thatcher, many of our nations leaders, each 
Justice. Please reply by United States mail.

Sincerely, Alvin B. Ford A/K/A Sherlock

cc: U.S. Attorney General
President Reagan

Appendix I, Letters, X. See also Appendix I, Letters, Y 
(similar letter to Judge Joseph W. Hatchett, United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit).

S. By July 27, 1983, the hostage crisis seemed to be 
nearly over. Mr. Ford wrote Gail Rowland on that date, 
reporting much success in resolving the crisis. Signifi­
cantly, Mr. Ford’s view of his own power and national/ 
international esteem was also continuing to grow. Mr. 
Ford began to refer to himself as “Pope John Paul, III.” 
In this “resolution phase” of the hostage crisis, Mr. Ford 
for the first time was also beginning to allow himself 
to think about other matters—some of which were clearly 
delusional and some of which were not.

Dear Rowland:

I am replying to your 12 May 83 letter on the above 
date. Thank you for the legal supplies, I did, in fact, 
receive them. Sorry I didn’t write. Since you have 
been standing outside my door, I pass, the writing. I

I have been in the need for legal supplies, for months. 
You know, very well of the problems you have 
created. This hostage crisis is in day 377.



58

I’ve written Counselor Harrington for 1061 forms 
for legal supplies, and he refuses to send them. So 
he is fired and under arrest, as the others.
This investigation has been very successful, and to 
the exact point of my pass letters. It’s unfortunate 
so many, prison personnel will be cast in prison.
Thankfully the CIA/FBI was in fact able to investi­
gate UCI, the Attorney General’s Office, all level of 
state and federal court. The Florida State Supreme 
Court, I’ve appointed new Justices, I appointed nine.
Especially UCI’s investigation of the Fort case, of 
the pass 60 minutes, we even have the staff of UCI 
thinking with all intentions, they are holding my 
family hostage, for extortion.
Thank God they did the things they, because no 
human being will ever forget, the shame and mental 
suffering. Each their arrest, excuse1, will seek their 
arrest.
The questions I asked you about my family you state, 
“You can’t answer,” well explain, “Why you can’t 
answer.” How could could you be confused, about 
what’s going on in the prison. I am still on DC, this 
is the 352 day, I have been in the need for many 
things, but passed. I’ll survive this crisis.
Do you know Patti Reagan? What kind of wife do 
you think she will make. Thinking about asking her 
to marry me. You may see it in the newspaper, 
magazines, on the news each day. Be sure to look 
at the gifts I’m leaving, daily at the White House, 
100 each day, for 100 days.
Hopefully she will say “yes,” send her a teletype, 
for me. I
I need the 1983-1984 football schedule, college and 
pro. Also I need you to get a weekly copy of “Doc’s



59

Football Sports Journal,” send it in the mail. Use 
regular mail. Each week.
Then a copy of point wise, and the weekly newspaper 
column, on college and pro lines. Point spreads. 
Also gold sheet. This will be in regular mail. This 
is too important, for you not to fill this request.
Do be in touch.
Sincerely, Alvin B. Ford A/K/A Sherlock, Pope John 
Paul, III

Appendix I, Leters, Z.
T. In the last letter which is available from Mr. Ford, 

dated November 28, 1983, the hostage crisis appeared to 
have been resolved and was referred to only in passing. 
Mr. Ford was still grandiose, referring with irritation 
to his “aides’ ” failure to review his letter, but his 
delusional system seemed to have changed significantly in 
content. For example, he seemed to have picked up ten 
wives in recent months. Morover, his form of communi­
cation was becoming quite esoteric and incoherent, as 
commonly occurs in severely psychotic individuals.2

Dear Mother,
Its been a while, since I wrote, but there was no 
need, with this government, or rather this state, 
having so many problems.
Couldn’t imagine this state, and the U.S. Government 
could be so, corrupt. Also the other countries of this, 
universe. Excuse the above mistakes, rushed and 
making notes for the service. If my aides, were at

2 See DSM-III, supra, a t 183: “Where loosening of associations 
is severe, incoherence may occur, that is, speech may become! in­
comprehensible. There may be poverty of content of speech, in 
which speech is adequate in amount but conveys little information 
because it is vague, overly abstract or overly concrete, repetitive, 
or stereotyped.”



60

hand, the mistakes would have been cleared. So 
overlook them.
Expect some lawsuits about this letter so, to all, con­
cerned, be well informed.
If you can send some money and stamps, say what­
ever, you can, I have asked Wife 1, Britian, she said 
$400.00, Wife 2 $500.00, Sandra Wife 3 said $1.00, 
Wife 4 said $300.00, Wife 5 $600.00, Wife 6 said 
$200.00, Wife 7 $100.00, Wife 8 (no reply) Wife 9 
said (it’s a damn insult) Wife 10 said, (No com­
ment) .
Also send some stamps, they’re 30 cents so, listen you 
take care. Laugh God won, Daniel won, page 7 one 
2 one, 6 one fort note D won, right one wrong one, 
wrong one right one. D one 3 one % one, years one.
Can’t imagine people can try, what they have. Need 
anything. No never, as long as my family and wifes 
are safe.
Rushed so the letter, shall be review by reporters, 
mistakes? Note private. Aides tapes, etc. . . . Take 
care.
Love you, Sherlock.

Appendix I, Letters, AA.
The Interviews By Dr. Amin

U. Counsel for Mr. Ford initially arranged for Dr. 
Jamal A. Amin, a psychiatrist from Tallahassee, to evalu­
ate Mr. Ford in July, 1981, in connection with pending 
clemency proceedings. Even after clemency had been 
denied, counsel asked Dr. Amin to continue seeing Mr. 
Ford, for therapeutic purposes, because of the deteriora­
tion of Mr. Ford’s mental health which began in Decem­
ber, 1981. Dr. Amin continued to see Mr. Ford until 
August, 1982. At that point Mr. Ford came to believe



61

that Dr. Amin was conspiring against him, in concert 
with Gail Rowland and the Ku Klux Klan, and would 
no longer see Dr. Amin. On the basis of his four “in- 
person evaluations” of Mr. Ford over this fourteen-month 
period, together with his review of Mr. Ford’s letters, 
a taped conversation between Mr. Ford and his attorneys, 
reports of various persons who had the opportunity to 
observe Mr. Ford’s behavior directly, and Mr. Ford’s 
prison medical records, Dr. Amin reported the following 
“SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS RELATED TO MENTAL 
STATUS” :»

(1) During the last psychiatric evaluation—the ex­
aminer was impressed with the feelings of “emo­
tional distance” and an inability to establish a pre­
viously on-going empathic rapport.
(2) Affect and moods are no longer appropriate or 
adequate to Mr. Ford’s present situation indicating 
some disturbance in the regulation of his affect or 
emotions.
(3) The content of Mr. Ford’s speech increasingly 
leans toward the symbolic, the esoteric, and the ab­
stract.
(4) Episodes of the abrupt blocking of the stream 
of thought when Mr. Ford ceases to speak in the 
middle of a sentence.
(5) Mr. Ford has difficulty in organizing his thoughts 
by the usual rules of universal logic and reality. His 
associations are loose, his attention span is diminished, 
and he appears unable to prevent the intrusion of 
irrelevant material into his thought processes. Also, 
he has difficulty in maintaining appropriate levels 
of abstractness as he accentuates obscure features 
while ignoring central issues. This decrease in his

13 These findings are excerpted from Dr. Amin’s report of June 9, 
1983, a copy of which is included in Appendix I.



62

abstract attitude has been accompanied by an in­
crease in his concrete thinking.
(6) Mr. Ford is unable to differentiate fantasy from 
reality and his fantasies become part of the basis for 
his delusions. He relates fantasies which indicate 
that he feels his thoughts are being controlled or 
influenced by “outside forces” such as a female disk 
jockey in Jacksonville, Florida.
(7) Mr. Ford has developed complex, yet logical 
paranoid and delusional systems usually after the 
false interpretation of some actual occurrence. His 
paranoia and delusional thinking have centered 
around “the Ku Klux Klan”, nonexistent love affairs 
with any female showing interest in his predicament, 
and secret messages from the radio, television, and 
books.
(8) There are convincing and consistent indications 
that Mr. Ford suffers from auditory and visual hal­
lucinations. He has consistently maintained that he 
sees and hears incidents on his cell block involving 
his mother’s murder; an unidentified inmate threat­
ening to kill him with a gun, knife, or cleaver; and 
an unidentified woman repeatedly being beaten and 
raped. Reality testing does nothing to shake Mr. 
Ford’s faith in his hallucinations which were first 
reported approximately twenty months ago. Prison 
guards and other Death Row Inmates have reported 
episodes of Mr. Ford speaking out loud and angrily 
to seemingly nonexistent persons.
(9) There is strong evidence of suicidal ideation 
both past and present.
(10) Florida State Prison Medical Records indicate 
that Mr. Ford has been treated for “Peptic Ulcer 
Disease” since 1978 and that there was one instance 
of treatment for an “Agitated Depression” in 1982.



63

His medical records also reflect numerous stress re­
lated somatic complaints such as chest pains, joint 
pains, and skin reactions,
(11) There is a documented history of severe drug 
abuse of substances such as Cocaine, LSD, Alcohol, 
and Amphetamines.
(12) Mr. Ford appears to have very little insight 
into the fact that he has any emotional problems and 
goes to great lengths to deny mental illness.

The Interview and Evaluation by Dr, Kaufman
V. In January, 1983, counsel for Mr. Ford asked Dr. 

Harold Kaufman, of Washington, D.C., to consult with 
us concerning Mr. Ford’s progressively deteriorating men­
tal health. There were three reasons for the consult at 
that point in time. First, Mr. Ford was beginning to 
say with some frequency that he wanted to dismiss his 
appeals and be executed. Because counsel believed that 
his desire to do this was the product of his mental ill­
ness, counsel did not believe he was competent to make 
such a decision. However, expert opinion was needed to 
support these views in the event that Mr. Ford insisted 
on pursuing this course. Second, because by that time, 
Dr. Amin was perceived by Mr. Ford as a co-conspirator 
against him, and for that reason, Mr. Ford would not 
see Dr. Amin, counsel decided that a psychiatrist other 
than Dr. Amin must be engaged. And third, Dr. Kauf­
man is highly respected in forensic psychiatry and came 
highly recommended. See Dr. Kaufman’s curriculum 
vitae, included in the Appendix I.

W. Even though Dr. Kaufman was available to evalu­
ate Mr. Ford in January, 1983, he was not able to do so 
then, or for a number of months thereafter, because Mr. 
Ford would not agree to see him. Indeed, between Jan­
uary and October, 1983, Mr. Ford refused to see nearly 
everyone who tried to see him—counsel, family members,



64

and friends. By mid-October, however, Mr. Ford again 
seemed willing to see whoever wished to see him, and at 
this time, agreed to see Mr. Kaufman. By the time Dr. 
Kaufman conducted his in-person interview with Mr. 
Ford, therefore, he had known about Mr. Ford for ten 
months and during that time, had reviewed much of Mr. 
Ford’s correspondence and had listened to approximately 
three hours of taped interviews between Mr. Ford and 
counsel. Accordingly, Dr. Kaufman approached the inter­
view with a good deal of knowledge about Mr. Ford.

X. Dr. Kaufman interviewed Mr. Ford for three 
hours on November 3, 1983, and reported the content 
of the interview as follows:

Mr. Alvin Ford entered the interview room in ap­
parent high spirits and bantered for about fifteen 
minutes with you [Richard Burr] and Professor 
Wollan. He generally ignored me and my occasional 
questions. It should be noted that your and Professor 
Wollan’s presence was deemed necessary by me to 
allow the interview to progress at all because of Mr. 
Ford’s previous (and I understand subsequent) ex­
treme reluctance to be interviewed. I also suggested 
your presence in order to set him more at ease so 
that he would be more inclin [ed] to be trustful, open 
and relaxed with me, whom he had never before met.
After about fifteen minutes of questioning by him 
and answers by the two of you he turned to me and 
said, “You a good guy? You OK?” I replied that I 
thought I was “OK.”
Up to this point his questions had been disjointed, and 
had ranged from personal details (“food’s OK—how 
you eat’ ” ) to delusional questions (“When’s CBS 
cornin’ in here.” ). But after 15 minutes the inco­
herence of his mental associations and the almost to­
tally delusional nature of anything to do with his 
case emerged as his facade crumbled. One thought



65

led to another with no seeming relation to the pre­
vious one with such rapidity that I have come to the 
conclusion that there is no reasonable possibility that 
Mr. Ford was dissembling, malingering or otherwise 
putting on a performance to induce me to believe 
him to be psychotic or incompetent to be executed.
It is unfortunate that no tape, especially a video­
tape, exists to preserve for concerned observers the 
obvious fact that he was not “acting” for my benefit 
—or for his own. I think the best way to convey the 
spontaneous and psychotic nature of his ramblings is 
to simply record them (see below). These are not 
selected passages, but a stream of consciousness, 
either spontaneously rendered or spoken in response 
to a previous question. It is to be noted that there 
was very little animation or feeling in Mr. Ford’s 
voice as he spoke, only a kind of “flatness” or lack 
of intensity of affect.
Mr. Ford **: The guard stands outside my cell and 
reads my mind. Then he puts it on tape and sends 
it to the Reagans and CBS . . .  I know there is some 
sort of death penalty, but I’m free to go whenever 
I want because it would be illegal and the execu­
tioner would be executed . . . CBS is trying to do a 
movie about my case . . .  I know the KKK and 
news reporters all disrupting me and CBS knows it. 
Just call CBS crime watch . . . there are all kinds 
of people in pipe alley (an area behind Mr. Ford’s 
cell) bothering me—Sinatra, Hugh Heffner, people 
from the dog show, Richard Burr, my sisters and 
brothers trying to sign the death warrants so they 
don’t keep bothering me . . .  I never see them, I only 
hear them especially at night. (Note that Mr. Ford 
denies seeing these people in his delusions. This 
suggest that he is honestly reporting what his mental

** Comments in parentheses are my own.



66

processes are.) I won’t be executed because of no 
crime . . . maybe because I’m a smart ass . . . my 
family’s back there (in pipe alley) . . . you can’t 
evaluate me. I did a study in the army . . . alot 
of masturbation . . .  I lost alot of money on the 
stock market. They’re back there investigating my 
case. Then this guy motions with his finger like 
when I pulled the trigger. Come on back you’ll see 
what they’re up to—Reagan’s back there too. Me and 
Gail bought the prison and I have to sell it back. 
State and federal prisons. We changed all the other 
countries and because we’ve got a pretty good group 
back there I’m completely harmless. That’s how 
Jimmy Hoffa got it. My case is gonna save me.
At this point I should comment that none of this 
“idea salad” is out of context. Indeed there is no 
apparent context for these ramblings, disorganized 
delusional bits of ideational material.
I asked, “Are you going to be executed?” Mr. Ford 
replied, “I can’t be executed because of the landmark 
case. I won. Ford v. State will prevent executions 
all over.”
Dr. Kaufman (Q) : Are you on death row?
Mr. Ford (A) : Yes.
Q Does that mean that the State intends to execute 
you?
A No.
Q Why not?
A Because Ford v. State prevents it. They tried to 
get me with the FOC tape but when the KKK came 
in it was up to CBS and the Governor, These 
prisoners are rooming back there raping everybody. 
I told the Governor to sign the death warrants so 
they stop bothering me.



67

Appendix I, Kaufman Report, at 1-8.
Y. On the basis of his interview with Mr. Ford and 

his familiarity with Mr. Ford’s history over the previous 
two years, Dr. Kaufman concluded that Mr. Ford

is suffering from schizophrenia, undifferentiated type, 
acute and chronic. The delusional material, the free- 
floating and disorganized ideational and verbal pro­
ductivity, and his flatness of affect are the high­
lights of the signs leading to this diagnosis of psy­
chosis. The possibility that he could be lying or 
malingering is indeed remote in my professional 
opinion.

Appendix I, Kaufman Report, at 3.
Z. Further, in response to counsel’s request to assess 

Mr. Ford’s competency to be executed in light of his opin­
ion that Mr. Ford suffers from schizophrenia, Dr. Kauf­
man concluded that Mr. Ford was incompetent:

You have asked me to relate Mr. Ford’s phychiatric 
condition to several standards which might be used 
to determine his competence to be executed. It is my 
conclusion, using the Florida Statutory standard you 
have supplied me with, that because of his psychi­
atric illness, while he does understand the nature of 
the death penalty, he lacks the mental capacity to 
understand the reasons why it is being imposed on 
him. His ability to reason is occluded, disorganized 
and confused when thinking about his possible execu­
tion. He can make no connection between the homi­
cide he committed and the death penalty. Even when 
I pointed this connection out to him he laughed 
derisively at me. He sincerely believes that he is not 
going to be executed because he owns the prisons, 
could send mind waves to the Governor and control 
him, President Reagan’s interference in the execu­
tion process, etc.



68

Moreover, it is my conclusion that the disorganized 
state of his thinking is sufficiently severe to prevent 
Mr. Ford from being executed under the Solesbee v. 
Balkcom standard of Justice Frankfurter which you 
forwarded to me. In particular, Mr. Ford’s “defects 
of facilities” prevent him from being capable of un­
derstanding “the purpose of his punishment.”
In summary, it is therefore my professional opinion, 
based on my interview with Mr. Alvin Ford, that he 
is suffering from schizophrenia, undifferentiated 
type, acute and chronic, which is of such severity 
that he cannot sufficiently appreciate or understand 
either the reasons “why the death penalty was im­
posed on him” or “the purpose” of this punishment. 
It is therefore my opinion that Mr. Ford is in­
competent to be executed.

Appendix I, Kaufman Report, at 3-4.
The Interview By Wollan, Rowland, and Vandiver

AA. Following the interview with Dr. Kaufman on 
November 3, 1983, Mr. Ford again entered a period of 
time when he refused to see anyone seeking a visit with 
him. Mr. Wollan attempted to see Mr. Ford on November 
18, and Mr. Ford abruptly and angrily left the interview 
after only ten minutes. Again on December 8, Mr. Wol­
lan, accompanied by a paralegal (and friend of Mr. 
Ford), Margaret Vandiver, attempted to see Mr. Ford, 
but Mr. Ford refused to come to the visiting area. And 
again on December 15, 1983, Mr. Wollan, accompanied 
this time by Margaret Vandiver and Gail Rowland, at­
tempted to see Mr. Ford. On this occasion, Mr. Ford did 
come to the visiting area and stayed for a few minutes. 
However, the content of this interview was quite different 
from any that had gone on before. While Mr. Ford’s 
associations had become increasingly “loose” (see DSM- 
III in the Appendix I) during the course of his illness, 
in the interval between November 3, and December 15,



69

1983, his loosening of associations became “severe” (see 
DSM-III, at 182), in much the same way as Mr. Ford’s 
letter of November 28, 1983 to his mother (supra, at 
pages 36-37) demonstrated a severe loosening of associa­
tions. The interview on December 15, 1983, transcribed 
from a tape recording, consisted entirely of the following:

Mr. Wollan . . . .  How are you Alvin?
Mr. Ford . . . .  (no response)
Mr. Wollan . . . .  Do you mind if I sit a little closer 
with this mike?
Mr. Ford . . . .  (no response)
Mr. Wollan . . . .  What’s the matter, Alvin? Are you 
going to sit there and not talk? What’s troubling 
you? Alvin, it seems to me there’s a lot in there you 
need to say and just sitting here and glowering at 
us is not going to help.
Mr. Ford . . . .  (no response)
Mr. Wollan . . . .  What would you like us to know? 
What would you like us to do?
Mr. Ford . . . .  (kicks foot toward Mr. Wollan, 
showing bottom of flip flop)
Mr. Wollan . . . .  What’s that mean?
Mr. Ford . . . .  (no response)
Mr. Wollan . . . .  What’s the trouble?
Mr. Ford . . . .  (no response)
Ms. Rowland . . . .  You have your jacket on. Are 
you cold? It’s a little cool today. Are your feet cold 
in just the flip flops? I know I was pretty cold out­
side. We had to wait a few minutes outside before 
we could come in and it was chilly.
Mr. Ford . . . .  Code one.



70
Ms. Rowland . . . .  I’m real glad to see you. It’s 
been a long time. I’m so glad you were able to come 
out. Are you still angry with me?
Mr. Ford . . . .  No one.
Ms. Rowland . . . .  No? It’s been so long, I’m glad 
I was able to come here today and see you. I hope 
that we can talk some because I know you’ve been 
having a real hard time and I want so badly to be 
able to help. I haven’t heard from you in a long 
time.
Mr. Ford . . . .  Code one.
Ms. Rowland . . . .  You need to tell me a little more 
than that because I’m not sure what you mean.
Mr. Ford . . . .  Killed one.
Ms. Rowland . . . .  I still don’t understand.
Mr. Ford . . . .  Killed one. Break one.
Ms. Rowland . . . .  Killed one, break one?
Mr. Ford . . . .  No one. Dead one.
Mr. Wollan . . . .  Alvin, what does that mean?
Mr. Ford . . . .  (no response)
Ms. Roivland . . . .  I’m not sure what you mean. 
Can I sit a little bit closer? Will that bother you?
Mr. Ford . . . .  No one.
Ms. Rowland . . . .  Okay. I’ll move my chair, my 
stuff . . .  I brought my notebook in case you had 
anything you wanted me to write down. So you just 
tell me if you have something you want me to write 
down.
Mr. Ford . . . .  State one. Electric one.
(pause)
Code one, take one.



71

Ms. Rowland . . . .  Do you want me to write this 
down?
Mr. Ford . . . .  Take one, off one. Code one, take one, 
say one, threaten one. Code one, off one.
Mr. Wollan . . . .  Alvin, who should we tell this to?
Mr. Ford . . . .  (no response)
Mr. Wollan . . . .  Is there somebody who will know 
what this means?
Mr. Ford . . . .  (spits in Mr. Wollan’s direction, but 
not on him)
(pause)
Ms. Rowland . . . .  Do you have anything else? I 
know there’s something you’d like to say. Did you 
get my Christmas card?
Mr. Ford . . . .  Seen one.
Ms. Rowland . . . .  Did you get your birthday card, 
too? I sent, you a birthday card.
Mr. Ford . . . .  No one.
Mr. Wollan . . . .  Have you been getting letters from 
your mother, Alvin?
Mr. Ford . . . .  Jesus one.
Mr. Wollan . . . .  Did you get my letter this week? 
Mr. Ford . . . .  No one.
(pause)
Write one.
(pause)
Ms. Rowland . . . You’ve lost a lot of weight since 
I saw you last. Have you not been very hungry?
Mr. Ford . . . .  Yes, one.



72

Mrs. Rowland . . . .  Don’t you like the food here? 
Mr. Ford . . . .  No one.
Ms. Rowland . . . .  Well, it doesn’t always look too 
good.
Mr. Ford . . . .  Certainly one.
Ms. Rowland . . . .  You should eat a little, though, 
so you don’t get sick.
Mr. Ford . . . .  Say one.
(pause)
Ms. Rowland . . . .  I’m glad that you came out. I 
was worried that you might not because I knew 
Larry and Margaret were here about a week ago . . .
Mr. Ford . . . .  (grunts)
Ms. Rowland . . . .  But you came out today. I’m 
glad. I’m real glad to see you.
Mr. Ford . . . .  Night one.
(pause)
Today one.

Ms. Rowland . . .  Do you have any two’s? Or is 
everything one’s today?
Mr. Ford . . . .  Hands one, face one. Mafia one. 
God one, father one, Pope one. Pope one. Leader one.
Ms. Rowland . . . .  I have to turn the page.
Mr. Ford . . . .  Leader one. Now one, say one, crazy 
one. Track one.
(pause)
God one. Kill one.
Ms. Rowland . . . .  Have you seen any newspapers or 
anything in awhile?



73

Mr. Ford . . . .  Yes one.
Ms. Rowland . . . .  Did you read about the Pope?
Mr. Ford . . . .  Looking one.
Ms. Rowland . . . .  And Bob Sullivan and the Pope 

Mr. Ford . . . .  Looking one.
Ms. Rowland . . . .  He made a nice statement. You 
saw it. I was very moved.
Mr. Ford . . . .  Hello one, need you one.
(pause)
Gail one, threaten one, kill one.
(pause)
Remember one, letter one? Say one, God one, blind 
one, klan one, Destiny one?
(pause)
Mr. Ford . . . .  Mine one. Stab one, say one crazy 
one.
(pause)
Need one, love one.
(pause)
But one, starve one, damn one.
(pause)
Damn one, say one.
Ms. Rowland . . . . I see . .  .
Mr. Ford . . . .  Excuse one, need you one.
(pause)
Tell him one. Hello one.
Ms. Rowland . . . .  I see what you’re saying and . . ... 
Mr. Ford . . . .  Review one, law one. Dead one. 
(long silence)



74

Ms. Rowland . . . .  I do remember all your letters 
and I’ve read them, but sometimes it’s hard for me 
to understand what’s happening with you.
Mr. Ford . . . .  Need one. Love one.
Ms. Rowland . . . .  I care about you. I love you,
Alvin. I love you like my brothers, like my own 
family.
Mr. Ford . . . .  Time one.
(stands up)
Ms. Rowland . . . .  Where are you going?
Mr. Ford . . . .  Little one.
Mr. Wollan . . . .  You ready to go?
Mr. Ford . . . .  (opens door for guards to get him) 
Ms. Rowland . . . .  May I say goodbye?
Mr. Ford . . . .  Yes one.
Ms. Rowland . . . .  I’m sorry you weren’t  able to see 
us any longer. Goodbye.
Mr. Ford . . . .  Little one.
(leaves with guards)

The Interview and Evaluation By The Commission of 
Psychiatrists

BB. On December 19, 1983, just four days after 
Mr. Ford’s interview with Mr. Wollan, Ms. Vandiver, 
and Ms. Rowland, the commission of psychiatrists ap­
pointed pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 922.074 interviewed 
Mr. Ford for approximately thirty minutes. Based upon 
the individual commission members’ reports, confirmed

i Members of the commission were Dr. Peter Ivory (Chatta­
hoochee), Dr. Umesh Mhatre (Lake City), and Dr. Walter Afield 
(Tam pa).



75

by the observation of all those present for the commis­
sion’s interview, Mr. Ford responded in the same manner 
to questions on December 19 as he had responded on 
December 15 in the Wollan, Vandiver, Rowland interview.

CC. On the basis of this brief interview with Mr. Ford, 
their subsequent observation of his cell, and their conver­
sations with correctional officers about Mr. Ford, two of 
the three commission members concluded, as have Dr, 
Kaufman and Dr. Amin, that Mr. Ford suffers from 
psychosis. Dr. Mhatre concluded on December 28, 1983, 
that Mr. Ford suffers from “psychosis with paranoia.” 
Appendix I, Mhatre Report. Dr. Afield concluded on 
January 19, 1984, that Mr. Ford suffers from a profound 
emotional illness that “forces me to put a ‘psychotic’ 
label on the inmate.” Appendix I, Afield Report. Only 
Dr. Ivory, the third commission member, concluded that 
Mr. Ford does not suffer from psychosis or any other 
condition which impairs his ability to appreciate reality. 
Appendix I, Ivory Report.5 The members of the 922.07 
commission found, however, that Mr. Ford was, notwith­
standing his condition, competent under the test of com­
petency prescribed by Section 922.07.6

5 I t  should be noted however tha t Dr. Ivory refused to review the 
history of Mr. Ford’s illness, as documented in Mr. Ford’s corres­
pondence and as documented by the reports of Dr. Kaufman and 
Dr. Amin. Counsel offered Dr. Ivory these materials, but he re­
fused to accept them until after the interview. Moreover, his re­
port reflects no review of the materials. (Indeed, in light of his 
submission of his report to the governor the day afte r the inter­
view with Mr. Ford, it is improbable th a t Dr. Ivory considered 
these materials at all.) The materials were accepted and reviewed 
by Dr. Mhatre and Dr. Afield. See Appendix I, Mhatre Report 
and Afield Report.

6 In the 922.07 proceeding before the governor, counsel and Mr. 
Ford demonstrated tha t the conclusions of the two commission 
members who found Mr. Ford psychotic but nonetheless competent 
was as flawed as the opinion of the third commission member who 
found Mr. Ford free of psychosis. Unlike the third commission 
member, the two who found Mr. Ford psychotic did review Mr.



76
Current Observations About Mr. Ford

DD. After December 19, 1983 Mr. Ford refused to 
see his lawyers or the paralegals who have worked on 
his case until May 23, 1984. During this time, he did 
not respond to correspondence; nor did he initiate corre­
spondence.

EE. Insight is available into Mr. Ford’s current mental 
state through two sources. The first is the person who 
had a death warrant signed on the same date as Mr. Ford, 
John O’Callaghan, who has been housed next to Mr. Ford 
since April 30, 1984. He has provided the following ob­
servations of Mr. Ford:

During the entire time we have been housed together 
Mr. Ford has acted and talked in a bizarre fashion:
(a) Mr. Ford has repeatedly threatened to kill me 
and various guards. After he has made such threats, 
however, he will often ask me for a cigarette.
(b) Mr. Ford talks to himself in a high-pitched 
voice. He then frequently gets into arguments with 
this “other” person which become violent fights, with 
Mr. Ford punching, rolling around, and struggling. 
At the end of these fights Mr. Ford is panting.
(c) Mr. Ford frequently bangs his head against the 
wall and has fits, during which he is snorting and 
growling.

Ford’s history and the prior psychiatric evaluations of Mr. Ford. 
However, in so doing, these commission members did not evaluate'— 
indeed ignored—the delusions from which Mr. Ford suffered which 
bore directly upon his ability to understand why he was to  be 
executed: the delusions which led him to believe that he was no 
longer under sentence of death. However, since no evidentiary 
proceeding was held by the governor, counsel for Mr. Ford has 
never been able to' demonstrate1—in an evidentiary sense’—that 
the evaluations by the commission members were so flawed that 
their conclusions were worthless in comparison to the conclusions 
of Dr. Kaufman and Dr. Amin. As demonstrated in Appendix lib, 
a t Barnard Affidavit and Halleck Affidavit, counsel was prepared 
to oflfer such evidence.



77

(d) When his mail is given to him, Mr. Ford throws 
it on to the walk without ever reading it.
(e) Mr. Ford sometimes walks around his cell as
if he were a robot.
(f) Every now and then Mr. Ford draws marks on 
the walls of his cell and touches the marks with 
various parts of his body.
(g) On May 18, 1984, when Mr. Ford was told 
that he had a legal visit, he responded, “Thank you 
one. Thank you one. Someone on J-Wing will see 
me.”
During the time that we have been housed together, 
I have tried repeatedly to get Mr. Ford to talk sensi­
bly with me. However, I have gotten no sensible 
response from him.

Appendix I, Affidavit of John O’Callaghan. The second 
is Dr. Harold Kaufman, who saw Mr. Ford again on 
May 28, 1984. Dr. Kaufman found that Mr. Ford had 
“seriously deteriorated” since he saw him on November 3, 
1983; that Mr. Ford’s paranoid schizophrenia had become 
severe; that Mr. Ford’s contact with reality is nowT only 
minimal; and that Mr. Ford has no understanding of the 
fact that he is about to be executed. Further Dr. Kauf­
man found “highly unlikely” any possibility that Mr. 
Ford is malingering. See Appendix I, Kaufman Supple­
mental Report.

FF. The foregoing facts demonstrate that Mr. Ford is 
currently incompetent. His execution when he is incompe­
tent would violate the eighth and fourteenth amendments.

(1) The right of a condemned person not to be exe­
cuted when incompetent is well-established as a clear 
legal entitlement under Florida law. Perkins v. Mayo, 
92 So.2d 641, 644 (Fla. 1957). That right is also pro­
tected by the eighth amendment’s prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment. Under the two-part test 
for evaluating the eighth amendment constitutionality of



78

an aspect of the death penalty, Enmund v. Florida, 458 
U.S. 782 (1982) ; Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), 
the execution of the mentally incompetent is intolerable 
under contemporary standards of decency, and is viola­
tive of established constitutional doctrine requiring that 
a punishment must serve legitimate penological goals and 
not itself deprive the person punished of due process.

(2) The right of the condemned not to be executed 
when incompetent cannot, therefore, be voided without a 
due process proceeding in which the condemned person’s 
competency is fairly determined. Only upon the conclu­
sion of such a hearing, with the determination that the 
condemned person is competent, can the condemned per­
son about whose competency there has been a reasonable 
doubt be executed.

(3) By providing only a proceeding before the Gov­
ernor, in which there are no procedural due process 
protections, as the exclusive remedy for determining 
competency at the time of execution, see the opinion of 
the Supreme Court of Florida, May ——, 1984, in peti­
tioner’s case, the State of Florida has thus provided no 
remedy that is consistent with the fourteenth amendment 
for the protection of the condemned person’s right not to 
be executed when incompetent. Such a remedy must, 
therefore, be provided in connection with the proceeding 
sub judice if sufficient facts have been alleged to invoke 
that remedy.

(4) The facts alleged herein create at least a reason­
able doubt about Mr. Ford’s current competency, thus 
necessitating a due process inquiry into his competency. 
See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975); Pate v. 
Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966).

*  *  *  *

Other Required Information
22. All of the grounds presented herein were pre­

sented to the state courts in the collateral proceedings 
discussed in flf 12-14, supra.



79

23. There is no other pending proceeding, state or 
federal, which attacks the judgment and sentence com­
plained of herein, except for the following: petitioner has 
something an appeal in the United States Court of Ap­
peals from this Court’s disposition of the remand of Ford 
v. Strickland, (No. 81-6663-Civ-NCR). As the court 
knows, a stay of execution in connection therewith was 
denied by this Court on May 18, 1984.

24. Petitioner has been represented by the following 
counsel in the course of proceedings related to the judg­
ment under attack herein:

A. At all pretrial proceedings, trial, and on direct 
appeal, petitioner was represented by Bob Adams, who 
has offices in Mariana and Fort Lauderdale, Florida.

B. In the state and federal collateral proceedings which 
are described in 'If 10, supra, petitioner was represented by 
Richard H. Burr, West Palm Beach, Florida, and Laurin 
A. Wollan, Tallahassee.

C. In every state and federal collateral proceeding 
since those proceedings, petitioner has been represented 
by Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender of the Fif­
teenth Judicial Circuit, and various of his assistants.

WHEREFORE, petitioner prays that the Court grant 
all relief to which he may be entitled in this proceeding, 
including but not limited to:

1. a stay of the execution of his death sentence during 
the pendency of these proceedings;

2. the grant of sufficient funds to enable petitioner to 
present expert testimony and lay testimony necessary to 
prove the facts as alleged herein;

3. the grant of discovery as requested by separate 
motion submitted herewith;

4. the grant of an evidentiary hearing at which peti­
tioner is present to enable him to prove the facts as 
alleged herein;

5. the opportunity to submit post-hearing briefs; and



80

6. The granting of this petition for writ of habeas 
corpus.

Respectfully submitted,

[Counsel for Connie Ford as next 
friend for Alvin Bernard Ford]

[Names/Ad dresses of Counsel 
Omitted in Printing]

[Certificate of Service Omitted in Printing]



81

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

[Title Omitted in Printing]

[AFFIDAVIT OF NEXT FRIEND]

CONNIE FORD, being duly sworn according to law, de­
poses and says:

1. I am the natural mother of Alvin Bernard Ford. 
I currently live in Palmetto, Florida, and have lived in 
Manatee County, Florida, most of my life.

2. My son, Alvin, was born on September 22, 1953. 
Alvin lived with me at home until he graduated from 
high school. After his high school graduation, he moved 
to Gainesville, Florida, where lived until he was charged 
with the crime for which he is now on death row. During 
the time between his high school graduation and his 
arrest for this crime, my son and I were in frequent 
contact with each other by telephone and by mail.

3. My son was sent to death row at Florida State 
Prison in January of 1975. From that time until the 
end of October, 1982 I made frequent visits to the prison 
to see my son, and I corresponded with him regularly and 
frequently.

4. Until the summer of 1982, I knew of no mental 
health problem from which Alvin suffered. During the 
time he was growing up and living with me at home, 
he was never treated by a psychologist or a psychiatrist 
for any mental illness or disorder. As far as I knew, he 
suffered from no such condition. After Alvin left home, 
and even after he was sent to death row, I still knew of 
no mental health problem from which he suffered. This 
began to change, however, sometime during 1982.



82

5. In the summer of 1982, I first began to notice that 
my son was acting and talking in a very strange way. 
During a visit, he talked very strangely to me. He talked 
about marrying a girl at a radio station in Jacksonville 
who was later killed in an automobile accident. He also 
said that he saw the Klu Klux Klan set a house afire in 
Jacksonville where people were burned to death and that 
one of the Klansmen was staying at the prison. He also 
talked about seeing “the light” come through the ceiling 
of the house where the fire had been. After this visit, I 
began to think that there was something seriously wrong 
with his mind.

6. In my next visit with Alvin, on October 24, 1982, I 
felt certain that there was something wrong with his 
mind. In that visit, Alvin was very distant from me and 
from my daughter and her child, who accompanied me 
on the visit. He said over and over that we were not his 
family. After this had gone on for a while, I asked the 
correctional officers in the visitation area to let me and 
my daughter and granddaughter leave. Alvin was act­
ing so strangely that I was bewildered and very upset. 
Alvin has refused to see me since that day.

7. Since that visit in October, 1982, I have received 
very few letters from Alvin. I have continued trying to 
write him during this period of time, but most of my 
letters are returned to me with a notation on the letters 
that Alvin has refusd to accept the letters. In this period 
of time, I or members of my immediate family have 
received three letters from Alvin. In all of these letters, 
Alvin has talked about me and other members of my 
family being held hostage in the prison. In the last letter 
I received from Alvin, he also talked about a number of 
other things which made no sense to me. In these letters, 
Alvin has said the following:

(a) Letter of December 5, 1982, to Alvin’s grand­
mother :



83

Dear Grandmother,
I received your letter and card. I haven’t written 
because of a number of reasons. I hope you will be 
well, feeling okay when this letter, reaches your 
hand. I have been okay. But I want to tell you 
don’t, ever be afraid, of my dying, because this will 
happen one day.
You mentioned your being 73 years old, well don’t 
let anyone threaten you into doing anything, at all. 
If anyone can, hurt a 73-year old woman, they have 
to be really sick, so try to understand, and just be­
lieve in God, and ask him to forgive those, that do 
you wrong.
I know you are inside, this prison, behind my cell. 
I have been wondering, how you got in this prison, 
also with mother, Gwen, and the other relatives.
I have been more surprised, in your not telling me 
from the first day you were, brought in this prison.
God, put your trust in God, don’t write, and tell me 
lies. This is the reason, I had such a time, finding 
out about all the family, from this prison cell. So 
don’t do anything, against your will, you are not to 
be held hostage, in this prison, by these people. God, 
is the answer, so take care of yourself as well as 
humanly possible.
Hopefully your knee is better. Also you were able 
to have the x-ray. Tell Uncle Henry hello, also he 
must be held hostage here, also. Tell him, he should 
write.
I won’t be having any visits, until all my relatives, 
are safely out of this prison, one way or the other. 
I know now, about the relatives, as well as the outside 
world, so trust in God.
I’ve given these people, every choice, possible, to 
let you, and the relatives go, but looks as though,



84

they refuse. So if they hurt anyone, the crimes, will 
surely, have a lasting effect.
Thank you for the stamps and God bless you, and 
keep you safe. Trust in no one, but God.
Sincerely, Alvin B. Ford A/K/A Sherlock.

(b) Letter of May 8, 1983 to me:
Dear Mother:
Here is a list of people trying to help, and there’s 
many more. This postage stamp, showing the mail 
is illegal, or no stamp on the mail, stealing money 
from the U.S. Government.
This has been done some 315 days, stealing the mail 
from my cell door, then taking it, to the pipe alley 
on N-Wing, S-Wing, R-Wing and Q-Wing.
The world knows you are here and been hostage 
with your family since July, 1982.
Thank God he has sent so many great leaders. This 
hounding was meant to drive my lawyers insane. 
Please listen to my lawyers no matter, what these 
prison people say.
There’s FBI, I know about, so keep them safe, as 
they do you also try, no to bother, others, with the 
hounding. They do this because you don’t know the 
full story. Trying to hurt my lawyers, sorry I had to 
say something. The lawyers are human, and hurt 
the same as you, even worst, because they see, how 
you have been hurt.
Just try to stay alive, do what Deborah Fins tell 
you, not matter what she would tell you anything 
wrong. . . .
Hopefully you are well. You have been 315 days 
inside Florida State Prison, with [the names of 135 
people are then listed].



85

(c) Letter of November 28, 1983, to me:
Dear Mother,
Its been a while, since I wrote, but there was no 
need, with this government, or rather this state, 
having so many problems.
Couldn’t imagine this state, and the U.S. Government 
could be so, corrupt. Also the other countries of this, 
universe. Excuse the above mistakes, rushed and 
making notes for the service. If my aides, were at 
hand, the mistakes would have been cleared. So over­
look them.
Expect some lawsuits about this letter so, to all, 
concerned, be well informed.
If you can send some money and stamps, say what­
ever, you can, I have asked Wife 1, Britian, she said 
$400.00, Wife 2 $500.00, Sandra Wife 3 said $1.00, 
Wife 4 said $300.00, Wife 5 $600.00, Wife 6 said 
$200.00, Wife 7 $100.00, Wife 8 (no reply) Wife 9 
said (it’s a damn insult) Wife 10 said, (No com­
ment) .
Also send stamps, they’re 30 cents so, listen you take 
care. Laugh God won, Daniel won, page 7 one 2 one, 
6 one fort note D won, right one wrong one, wrong 
one right one. D one 3 one I t  one, years one.
Can’t imagine people can try, what they have. Need 
anything. No never, as long as my family and wifes 
are safe.
Rushed so the letter, shall be review by reporters, 
mistakes? Note private. Aides tapes, etc . . . Take 
care.
Love you, Sherlock.

8. On the basis of everything I have known about my 
son all his life, I believe that he is severely ill. He had



86

no mental illness until sometime in 1982, beginning in 
that year, he became more and more ill. I am convinced 
that he no longer has the ability to protect himself or 
his interests. I believe very strongly that he no longer 
knows what may happen to him in prison or why it may 
happen to him. Because of these beliefs, and on the basis 
of the facts I have talked about in this affidavit, I believe 
that he needs me to protect his interests because of his 
inability to do so.

/sJ Connie Ford 
Connie F ord
Mother of Alvin Bernard Ford

[Jurat Omitted in Printing] 

[Verification Omitted in Printing]



87

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

[EXCERPT FROM APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT 
OF HABEAS CORPUS: REPORT OF DR. JAMAL AMIN,

JUNE 9,1983]

[Return Address/Greeting Omitted in Printing]

PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY
Requested by Defense Attorneys to present my profes­

sional opinions regarding Mr. Alvin Ford’s present mental 
status using the following paradigm—in spite of his re­
fusal to currently cooperate with any mental health pro­
fessional: (1) A total of four separate in-person evalua­
tions at Florida State Prison commencing July, 1981 and 
ending August, 1982. (2) A recently taped conversation 
between Mr. Ford and his attorneys. (3) Recent letters 
written by Mr. Ford to Relatives, Attorneys, and Myself.
(4) Interviews with relatives, attorneys, other inmates, 
prison personnel, and others with direct observations of 
Mr. Ford’s behavior in the past three months. (5) July 
and August, 1982—Psychological Evaluations by Psychol­
ogists Pittman and Fleet, (6) August, 1982—Psychiatric 
Evaluation by Prison Psychiatrist Doctor Innocent. (7) 
Florida State Prison Medical Records.

CURRENT SITUATION
Mr. Ford is presently incarcerated on Death Row at 

Florida State Prison while his legal efforts proceed 
through the courts. He is not receiving treatment for any 
mental disorder in spite of gradual changes in his be­
havior first noted in December, 1981. He has steadfastly 
refused psychotrophic medication and has become in-



88

creasingly withdrawn, uncooperative, and bizarre in his
interactions with familiar persons.

SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS RELATED TO
MENTAL STATUS

(1) During the last psychiatric evaluation—the exam­
iner was impressed with the feelings of “emotional 
distance” and an inability to establish a previously 
on-going empathic rapport.

(2) Affect and moods are no longer appropriate or ade­
quate to Mr. Ford’s present situation indicating 
some disturbance in the regulation of his affect or 
emotions.

(3) The content of Mr. Ford’s speech increasingly leans 
toward the symbolic, the esoteric, and the abstract.

(4) Episodes of the abrupt blocking of the stream of 
thought when Mr. Ford ceases to speak in the mid­
dle of a sentence.

(5) Mr. Ford has difficulty in organizing his thoughts 
by the usual rules of universal logic and reality. 
His associations are loose, his attention span is 
diminished, and he appears unable to prevent the 
intrusion of irrelevant material into his thought 
processes. Also, he has difficulty in maintaining 
appropriate levels of abstractness as he accentuates 
obscure features while ignoring central issues. This 
decrease in his abstract attitude has been accom­
panied by an increase in his concrete thinking.

(6) Mr. Ford is unable to differentiate fantasy from 
reality and his fantasies become part of the basis 
for his delusions. He relates fantasies which indi­
cate that he feels his thoughts are being controlled 
or influenced by “outside forces” such as a female 
disk jockey in Jacksonville, Florida.



89

(7) Mr. Ford has developed complex, yet logical para­
noid and delusional systems usually after the false 
interpretation of some actual occurrence. His para­
noia and delusional thinking have centered around 
“the Klu Klux Elan”, nonexistent love affairs with 
any female showing interest in his predicament, 
and secret messages from the raido, television, and 
books.

(8) There are convincing and consistent indications that 
Mr. Ford suffers from auditory and visual halluci­
nations. He has consistently maintained that he 
sees and hears incidents on his cell block involving 
his mother’s murder; an unidentified inmate threat- 
ning to kill him with a gun, knife, or cleaver; and 
an unidentified woman repeatedly being beaten and 
raped. Reality testing does nothing to shake Mr. 
Ford’s faith in his hallucinations which were first 
reported approximately twenty months ago. Prison 
guards and other Death Row Inmates have reported 
episodes of Mr. Ford speaking out loud and angryly 
to seemingly nonexistent persons.

(9) There is strong evidence of suicidal ideation both 
past and present.

(10) Florida State Prison Medical Records indicate that 
Mr. Ford has been treated for “Peptic Ulcer Disease 
since 1978 and that there was one instance of 
treatment for an “Agitated Depression” in 1982. 
His medical records also reflect numerous stress 
related somatic complaints such as chest pains, 
stomach pains, joint pains, and skin reactions.

(11) There is a documented history of severe drug abuse 
of substances such as Cocaine, LSD, Alcohol, and 
Amphetamines.

(12) Mr. Ford appears to have very little insight into 
the fact that he has any emotional problems and 
goes to great lengths to deny mental illness.



90

CLINICAL IMPRESSIONS AND DYNAMIC 
FORMULATIONS

Mr. Ford’s above outlined list of at least twelve present 
and past abnormal signs and symptoms—coupled with 
the reality of severe on-going tensions and anxieties pro­
duced by Death Row confinement should be overwhelm­
ingly convincing for a psychiatric diagnosis related to a 
“Paranoid Schizophrenic Breakdown”.

Since there are no psychological tests for Schizophrenia 
which are comparable to an empirical test for something 
like Syphilis—it is not unusual for Schizophrenic patients 
to show the “normal psychological profile” which Prison 
Psychologists Pittman and Fleet obtained from adminis­
tering psychological tests approximately ten months ago.

Mr. Ford’s psychotic episodes which initially were in­
termittent have increasingly become sustained and in the 
typical pattern of psychiatric decompensation he goes to 
great lengths to deny any mental illness and to give the 
appearance of being mentally intact. Therefore, it is 
understandable how Prison Psychiatrists concluded “Ma­
lingering” because it is not unusual for “Functional 
Schizophrenics” such as Mr. Ford to muster enough 
“psychic glue” to remain mentally intact during periods 
of time when they are dealing with persons they distrust. 
However, prison reports of “Malingering” seem to ignore 
psychotic symptomatology noted in their own reports. For 
example, all prison reports state that Mr. Ford alleges 
that he sees and hears unusual things (auditory & visual 
hallucinations) and that he acquired a knife for his pro­
tection against an imaginary enemy (paranoia). Further­
more, prison evaluations which state that part of their 
reason for concluding malingering is based upon the 
“absence of psychological difficulties in the subject’s his­
tory” are in error when one considers a Prison Psy­
chiatrist’s diagnosis of “Agitated Depression” and the 
prescribing of tranquilizing/anti-depressant medication 
known as “Sinequan”. It should be noted that in the



91

typical fashion of someone experiencing psychotic decom­
pensation—Mr. Ford was suspicious of his medication 
and refused to take it. Also, his history of drug abuse 
and treatment of Peptic Ulcer Disease would cast doubts 
on statements indicating no past psychological difficulties.

Mr. Ford’s delusional thinking which cannot be cor­
rected by reasoning or reality testing—represents a des­
perate attempt to regain control because he is strictly 
confined and feels harassed, powerless, and increasingly 
fragmented. He appears grandiose because he has deluded 
himself into feelings of exaggerated importance because 
so much effort revolves around his prosecution and de­
fense.

Alvin Ford’s suicidal ideation is dynamically related to 
the following factors: (1) The intense, on-going stress 
and anxiety of an impending electrocution. (2) Psychotic 
behavior which is becoming increasingly ineffective as a 
defense against overwhelming depression. 13) An un­
conscious desire to succumb to a mental disease so that 
himself and his socio-cultural community can better ac­
cept his disgraceful situation.

CONCLUSIONS
In my professional opinion—Mr. Alvin Ford is pres­

ently suffering from a severe, uncontrollable, mental dis­
ease which closely resembles “Paranoid Schizophrenia 
With Suicidal Potential”. This major mental disorder is 
severe enough to substantially affect Mr. Ford’s present 
ability to assist in the defense of his life.

It should be noted that Mr. Ford’s ambivalence around 
whether to continue his legal fight is in and of itself an 
indication of a psychotic disorder so severe that it sui- 
cidally compels him to embrace his own death.

RECOMMENDA TIONS
(1) Arrangements should be made for Mr. Ford to re­

ceive a complete Psychiatric, Neurological, and



92

Nutitional Work-up to rule out causes related to 
toxins, organic lesions, and/or Vitamin Deficiencies.

(2) Psychothrophic medication in a liquid or injectable 
form should be considered to ameliorate some of the 
more blatant symtomatology.

Respectfully submitted,

/s /  Jamal A. Amin, M.D.,M.P.H. 
Psychiatrist/Nutritionist



93

[Return Address/Greeting Omitted in Printing]

I am writing this report in response to your request that 
I present the findings of my three hour interview with 
Alvin Ford which I conducted at Starke, Florida, on 
November 3, 1983, to determine his competency to be 
executed.
You will recall that both you and Professor Laurin Wol- 
lan, who has taken an interest in Mr. Ford’s case, where 
present for about ninety minutes of the interview which 
took place in an interview room at the Starke Prison. I 
have received from you the standards for “competency 
for execution,” and, as discussed below, have applied them 
to my psychiatric findings.
Mr. Alvin Ford entered the interview room in apparent 
high spirits and bantered for about fifteen minutes with 
you and Professor Wollan. He generally ignored me and 
my occasional questions. It should be noted that your 
and Professor Wollan’s presence was deemed necessary 
by me to allow the interview to progress at all because 
of Mr. Ford’s previous (and I understand subsequent) 
extreme reluctance to be interviewed. I also suggested 
your presence in order to set him more at ease so that 
he would be more inclince to be trustful, open and re­
laxed with me, whom he had never before met.
After about fifteen minutes of questioning by him and 
answers by the two of you he turned to me and said, 
“You a good guy? You OK?” I replied that I thought I 
was “OK.”
Up to this point his questions had been disjointed, and 
had ranged from personal details (“food’s OK—how you 
eatin’ ” ) to delusional questions (“When CBS cornin’ in

[EXCERPT FROM APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS: REPORT OF

DR. HAROLD KAUFMAN, DECEMBER 14,1983]



94

here.” ). But after 15 minutes the incoherence of his 
mental associations and the almost totally delusional na­
ture of anything to do with his case emerged as his facade 
crumbled. One thought led to another with no seeming 
relation to the previous one with such rapidity that I 
have come to the conclusion that there is no reasonable 
possibility that Mr. Ford was dissembling, malingering 
or otherwise putting on a performance to induce me to 
believe him to be psychotic or incompetent to be executed.
It is unfortunate that no tape, especially a videotape, 
exists to preserve for concerned observers the obvious 
fact that he was not “acting” for my benefit—or for his 
own. I think the best way to convey the spontaneous and 
psychotic nature of his ramblings is to simply record 
them (see below). These are not selected passages, but 
a stream of consciousness, either spontaneously rendered, 
or spoken in response to a previous question. It is to be 
noted that there was very little animation or feeling in 
Mr. Ford’s voice as he spoke, only a kind of ‘flatness'” or 
lack of intensity of affect.
Mr. Ford**: The guard stands outside my cell and reads
my mind. Then he puts it on tape and sends it to the 
Reagans and CBS . . .  I know there is some sort of 
death penalty, but I’m free to go whenever I want be­
cause it would be illegal and the executioner would be 
executed . . . CBS is trying to do a movie about my 
case . . .  I know the KKK and news reporters all dis­
rupting me and CBS knows it. Just call CBS crime 
watch . . . there are all kinds of people in pipe alley 
(an area behind Mr. Ford’s cell) bothering me—Sinatra, 
Hugh Heffner, people from the dog show, Richard Burr, 
my sisters and brother trying to sign the death warrants 
so they don’t keep bothering me . . .  I never see them, I 
only hear them especially at night. (Note that Mr. Ford 
denies seeing these people in his delusions. This suggests

** Comments in parentheses are my own.



95

that he is honestly reporting what his mental processes 
are.) I won’t be executed because of no crime . . . maybe 
because I’m a smart ass . . . my family’s back there (in 
pipe alley) . . . you can’t evaluate me. I did a study in 
the army . . . alot of masturbation . . .  I lost alot of 
money on the stock market. They’re back there investi­
gating my case. Then this guy motions with his finger 
like when I pulled the trigger. Come on back you’ll see 
what they’re up to—Reagan’s back there too. Me and 
Gail bought the prison and I have to sell it back. State 
and federal prisons. We changed all the other counties 
and because we’ve got a pretty good group back there 
I’m completely harmless. That’s how Jimmy Hoffa got it. 
My case is gonna save me.
At this point I should comment that none of this “idea 
salad” is out of context. Indeed there is no apparent con­
text for these rambling, disorganized delusional bits of 
ideational material. I
I asked, “Are you going to be executed?” Mr. Ford 
replied, “I can’t be executed because of the landmark 
case. I won. Ford v. State will prevent executions all 
over.
Dr. Kaufman (Q) : Are you on death how?
Mr. Ford (A) : Yes.
Q: Does that mean that the State intends to execute
you?
A: No.
Q: Why not?
A: Because Ford v. State prevents it. They tried to get 
me with the FCC tape but when the KKK came in it 
was up to CBS and the Governor. These prisoners are 
rooming back there raping everybody. I told the Gov­
ernor to sign the death warrants so they stop bothering 
me.



96

Pulling this material together I have come to the con­
clusion that Mr. Ford is suffering from schizophrenia, 
undifferentiated type, acute and chronic. The delusional 
material, the free-floating and disorganized ideational 
and verbal productivity, and his flatness of affect are the 
highlights of the signs leading to this diagnosis of psy­
chosis. The possibility that he could be lying or malinger­
ing is indeed remote in my professional opinion.
You have asked me to relate Mr. Ford’s psychiatric con­
dition to several standards which might be used to deter­
mine his competence to be executed. It is my conclusion, 
using the Florida Statutory standard you have supplied 
me with, that because of his psychiatric illness, while he 
does undertsand the nature of the death penalty, he lacks 
the mental capacity to understand the reasons why it is 
being imposed on him. His ability to reason is occluded, 
disorganized and confused when thinking about his possible 
execution. He can make no connection between the homi­
cide he committed and the death penalty. Even when I 
pointed this connection out to him he laughed derisively 
at me. He sincerely believes that he is not going to be 
executed because he owns the prisons, could send mind 
waves to the Governor and control him, President Rea­
gan’s interference in the execution process, etc.
Moreover, it is my conclusion that the disorganized state 
of his thinking is sufficiently severe to prevent Mr. Ford 
from being executed under the Solesbee v. Balkom stand­
ard of Justice Frankfurter which you forwarded to me. 
In particular, Mr. Ford’s “defects of facilities” prevent 
him from being capable of understanding “the purpose of 
his punishment.”
In summary, it is therefore my professional opinion, 
based on my interview with Mr. Alvin Ford, that he is 
suffering from schizophrenia, undifferentiated type, acute 
and chronic, which is of such severity that he cannot 
sufficiently appreciate or understand either the reasons



97

“why the death penalty was imposed on him” or “the 
purpose” of this punishment. It is therefore my opinion 
that Mr. Alvin Ford is incompetent to be executed.

Sincerely yours,

Harold Kaufman, M.D. and LLB. 
Psychiatrist



98

[Return Address/Greeting Omitted in Printing]

Pursuant to Executive Order Number 83-197, accom­
panied by Doctors Afield and Mhatre, I examined inmate 
Alvin Bernard Ford from 10:50 a.m. to 11:25 a.m. at 
Florida State Prison on December 19, 1983. We later 
talked to prison officers, viewed the inmates cell, and 
talked to a prison psychiatrist.

The interview was conducted with great difficulty, from 
a verbal point of view, since the inmate responds to 
questions in a stylized, manneristic doggerel. Thus, an 
answer to a question might be “beckon one, cane one, 
Alvin one, Q one, King one”.

It soon became apparent that our opinions would have 
to be based largely on inferential deduction from physical 
behaviorial observation, and only to a limited extent from 
his verbalizations.

From a behavioral point of view, then, the inmate en­
tered the examination room in a quiet, cooperative, and 
appropriate manner. By helpful and responsive body 
movements, he helped the officer adjust the handcuffs. 
In an alert fashion he seemed interested and concerned 
about meeting the group of us, who also included attor­
neys and legal interns. When questioned, he answered 
promptly and then awaited the next question quietly and 
alertly. During his doggerel, and nonsensical, answers, 
if one of the examiners asked a question before he was 
finished, the inmate would raise his voice so as to domi­
nate the situation and thus maintain control.

I formed the opinion that the inmate knows exactly 
what is going on and is able to respond promptly to 
external stimuli. In other words, in spite of the verbal 
appearance of severe incapacity, from his consistent and 
appropriate general behavior, he showed that he is in 
touch with reality.

[EXCERPT FROM APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS: REPORT OF
DR. PETER IVORY, DECEMBER 20,1983]



99

Later exchanges seem to bear this out, if one “reads 
between the lines” :

Q “Are you aware they can electrocute you?’
A “Nine one, C one, hot one, die one”
A “Die one, gone one”
Q “Are your attorneys trying to prevent your death?” 
A “Assasinate one, Bob Graham liable one, Jim Smith 

liable one, Senate one”
Q “What happens if you die?’
A “Hell one, Heaven one”
Q “Which?”
A “Hopefully it’ll be Heaven, but if I listen, it’ll be 

Hell”
And later:
A “If I die—no more fat cats 

—no more homicide 
—no more racism 
—in Heaven with God”

Q “Are you crazy?”
A “Are you crazy (Said in such a tone as to indi­

cate that he was no more crazy than I was)
At a time when we had been trying to establish if he 

read the Bible, he commented: “blood on the door posts, 
you know” (said with a knowing smile that indicated 
that he would be spared by the Angel of Death, Exodus 
12:7)

By this time, I had formed the opinion that the inmate 
did comprehend the nature and effect of the death penalty 
and why it was imposed on him.

However, because of the severe adaptational disorder 
that had been developed by the inmate, by which he is 
trying to “hold at bay” on intolerable future that he 
cannot otherwise deal with, I decided to validate my ideas 
by examining his cell and talking to staff members. The 
rationale for this course of action was dictated by the



100

reasoning that if the inmate was truly as disorganized 
as he would have one believe, there would be ample signs 
of it in his environment. The results were as follows:

1) the cell was spotlessly clean and in order
2) his toilet articles were neatly arranged around the 

sink
3) his personal papers were all stacked neatly in the 

cell bars, arranged by category
4) his writings were extensive, and the choice of vo­

cabulary showed a good intelligence
5) the arrangements were all logical, and there was 

nothing in the cell that seemed bizarre, as if he was 
out of contact with the real world

6) the officers stated that the inmate behaves normally 
in that he feeds himself, clothes himself and keeps 
himself clean. He utilizes the available resources 
to his maximum advantage.

7) he talks normally to the guards, but during the 
last week they have heard him practicing the 
strange speech from lists of words he had written 
in nonsensical order

To comment briefly, a natural insanity is not selective, 
but is pervasive. This inmates disorder, although severe, 
seems contrived and recently learned.

My final opinion, based on observation of Alvin Bernard 
Ford, on examination of his environment, and on the 
spontaneous comments of group of prison staff, is that 
the inmate does comprehend his total situation including 
being sentenced to death, and all of the implications of 
that penalty.

From a humanitarian point of view, this inmate is 
obviously having enormous problems dealing with his 
possible destiny. It is suggested that a medical review 
to look into the feasibility of psychotropic medication



101

might be helpful, to allow the inmate to better assist 
his attorneys, and to set his affairs in order.

Please let me know if I can provide further informa­
tion or be of other assistance.

Very truly,

/ s /  Peter B.C.B. Ivory, M.D. 
Peter B.C.B. Ivory, M.D. 
Psychiatrist



1 0 2

[Return Address/Greeting Omitted in Printing]

As per your order I examined Mr. Alvin Ford, on 
December 19, 1983 at Florida State Prison, along with 
my distinguished colleagues, Dr’s. Peter Ivory and 
Walter Afield. Following is the summary of my evalua­
tion with my conclusions:

Mr. Ford was evaluated at 11:00 a.m. in the courtroom 
of Florida State Prison. He was appropriately dressed, 
and exhibited good eye contact with all the people in the 
room, he did not exhibit any stranger anxiety or fears. 
He settled down in a chair, accompanied by his lawyers, 
and his friends through the Florida Clearinghouse on 
Criminal Justice. As per prior arrangement, Dr. Afield 
began to ask him questions. Mr. Ford did not initially 
respond but did so after his lawyer encouraged him. 
Most of his responses to the questions were bizarre. He 
continued to respond by jibberish talk such as “break 
one”, “God one”, “heaven one”. However, throughout 
these bizarre responses, Mr. Ford kept good eye contact 
with the examiners. After awhile, his responses to ques­
tions became a little more appropriate indicating that 
he did understand the meaning of the questions asked of 
him, even though his responses remained somewhat bi­
zarre. Throughout the interview which lasted about thirty 
minutes, there was no evidence of any hallucinations and 
Mr. Ford exhibited good ability to concentrate. He was 
relaxed and did not exhibit any physical aggression. In 
response to Dr. Afield’s question, “what will haopen when 
you die?”, Mr. Ford responded “heaven one, hell one”, 
indicating that he did understand the meaning of the 
question.

His mood appeared to be normal and affect was blunted. 
He did however smile and exhibited good range of affect

[EXCERPT FROM APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS: REPORT OF

DR. UMESH MHATRE, DECEMBER 28,1983]



103

with his friends from his lawyer’s office. His orientation 
and memory were not formerly tested, but he did appear 
to be oriented to people and place. He did not exhibit 
any suicidal or homocidal thoughts.

The conversation with the guards at Florida State 
Prison who have been working with Mr. Ford, furnished 
the following information. His jibberish talk and bizarre 
behavior started after all his legal attempts failed. He 
was then noted to throw all his legal papers up in the air 
and was depressed for several days after that. He espe­
cially became more depressed after another inmate, Mr. 
Sullivan, was put to death and his behavior has rapidly 
deteriorated since then. In spite of this, Mr. Ford con­
tinues to relate to other inmates and with the guards 
regarding his personal needs. He has also borrowed books 
from the library and has been reading them on a daily 
basis. A visit to his cell indicated that it was neat, 
clean and tidy and well organized.

The review of the extensive material provided by his 
lawyers including reports by Dr. Kaufman and Dr. Amin, 
and his correspondence with Gil Roland of Florida Clear­
inghouse and Criminal Justice indicate that Mr. Ford 
has been gradually decompensating since July and has 
worsened since the death of Mr. Sullivan.

It is my medical opinion that Mr. Ford has been suffer­
ing from psychosis with paranoia, possibly as a result of 
the stress of being incarcerated and possible execution 
in the near future. In spite of psychosis, he has shown 
ability to carry on day to day activities, and relate to his 
fellow inmates and guards, and appears to understand 
what is happening around him. It is my medical opinion 
that though Mr. Ford is suffering from psychosis at the 
present time, he has enough cognitive functioning to un­
derstand the nature and the effects of the death penalty, 
and why it is to be imposed upon him.

I may further add that considering his present state 
of mind, Ford is in need of appropriate antipsychotic 
medication, without such treatment he is likely to de­



104

teriorate further and may soon reach a point where he 
may not. be competent for execution. I have discussed this 
with the psychiatrist of the Florida State Prison and 
hopefully, by the time you receive this report, Mr. Ford 
will be on appropriate treatment regiment.

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to be of some 
help to you. If I can be of any further assistance in the 
future, please do not hesitate to call upon me.

Sincerely,

Umesh Mhatre, M.D.



105

[Return Address/Greeting Omitted in Printing]

At your request, I examined Alvin Bernard Ford in the 
Florida State Prison, at Starke on December 19, 1983. 
As part of this evaluation, I reviewed the extensive 
records provided to me by legal counsel from your office. 
I had an in-depth conference with both attorneys for 
the inmate and reviewed the medical records that they 
had available. I talked at length with a variety of guards 
who had dealings with the inmate and reviewed the 
contents of Mr. Ford’s writings in his cell. I discussed 
his medical condition with the prison psychiatrist and 
examined the man in the presence of all counsels and two 
other state-appointed psychiatrists. My examination con­
sisted of a complete mental status examination. Subse­
quently, I spoke at length with Attorney Burr and re­
viewed complete medical records from the prison, which 
included psychiatric evaluations and reports from several 
prison psychologists. I reviewed in depth Dr. Kaufman’s 
findings.
It is my medical opinion that Mr. Ford does indeed suffer 
from serious emotional problems. He is presenting him­
self in a very disorganized manner with a bizarre picture 
which does not fit any classical description of psychiatric 
illness. The nature of his disorganization is somewhat 
“put on,” but the profoundness of it forces me to put a 
“psychotic” label on the inmate. Again, this is not a 
classical psychiatric diagnosis, but the man clearly is 
quite emotionally ill. Much of this had to do with the 
sentence that he is currently facing and his situation 
within the prison setting. On the basis of all the data and 
in light of the Florida Statute 922.07, it is my opinion 
that although this man is severely disturbed, he does 
understand the nature of the death penalty that he is

[EXCERPT FROM APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS: REPORT OF
DR. WALTER AFIELD, JANUARY 19,1984]



106

facing and is aware that he is on death row and may 
be electrocuted. The bottom line, in summary is, although 
sick, he does know fully what can happen to him. If 
there is anything further you wish please let me know.

Sincerely yours,

Walter E. Afield, M.D.



107

[Return Address/Greeting Omitted in Printing]

I am writing this report to summarize the findings of 
my examination of Alvin Ford at Florida State Prison 
in Starke on May 23, 1984.
The examination took place in a small room on the 
ground floor of the prison and lasted approximately two 
hours. As you recall you, Laurin Wollan, Esq., and 
Deborah Fins, Esq. were present during much of the 
interview.
Mr. Ford was in the interviewing room handcuffed when 
we arrived. He appeared to have lost at least twenty 
(20) pounds since I had last examined him on Novem­
ber 3, 1983. He was neatly dressed and was wearing 
rubber shower sandals. He did not greet the four of us as 
we entered and sat down. He sat with his body immobile 
and his handcuffed hands in a prayerful position in front 
of his mouth. Occasionally he moved his hands, still in 
the praying mode, to each of us for no apparent reason. 
His lips were pursed intermittently, but his head moved 
little. His eyes were closed or fluttering most of the time, 
although he occasionally glanced at one or more of us. 
His hands and fingers appeared to be trembling. We 
took turns asking him questions, and little or no response 
was forthcoming. He began muttering to himself after 
about five minutes. These utterances were largely un­
intelligible. This is the overall picture of what took place 
for two hours.
Because of his lack of responsiveness to the group, each 
of us tried speaking with him alone with the others out 
of the room. His utterances increased in number, but 
they remained soft- mumbles. To the extent that they 
could be understood they were largely incoherent state­

[EXCERPT FROM APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS: SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT

OF DR. HAROLD KAUFMAN, MAY 24,1984]



108

ments about “God,” “Hell,” and a recitation of numbers. 
His hands remained in a praying position for the full 
two hours of the interview.
When I asked him whether he understood that the Gov­
ernor of Florida had signed his death warrant and that 
he was to be executed on May 31, Mr. Ford gave no 
evidence of understanding what I asked him: his mutter­
ing continued and his hands remained in front of his 
face.
He occasionally motioned to be taken to the bathroom: it 
appeared that interaction with prison personnel was 
equally disorganized. The level of autism was much more 
profound than in November.
It is my conclusion based on this interview that Mr. 
Ford’s condition has seriously deteriorated since Novem­
ber 3, 1983, when I last examined him. It is highly un­
likely that he is malingering because he could not pos­
sibly know what the legal consequences of his behavior 
might be. Mr. Ford’s condition, severe paranoid schizo­
phrenia, has seriously worsened, so that he now has at 
best only minimal contact with the events of the external 
world. Accordingly, he has no understanding that he is 
soon to be executed, or what execution means, as a result 
of his psychosis. It is my opinion therefore that he is not 
competent to be executed under the provisions of Florida’s 
statute.

Sincerely yours,

Harold Kaufman, Psychiatrist



109

[Opening Jurat Omitted in Printing]

SEYMOUR L. HALLECK, being duly sworn according 
to law, deposes and says:

1. I am a professor of psychiatry in the School of 
Medicine at the University of North Carolina in Chapel 
Hill, North Carolina. My address is Department of 
Psychiatry, North Carolina Memorial Hospital, University 
of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina.

2. For many years I have taught and practiced fo­
rensic psychiatry. During this time I have also pub­
lished numerous articles and treatises on this subject. 
(A copy of my curriculum vitae is attached hereto).

3. On May 16, 1984, I was contacted by Richard H. 
Burr, from the Office of the Public Defender in West 
Palm Beach, Florida. Mr. Burr informed me that he 
represented a man named Alvin Ford who was on death 
row in Florida and was scheduled to be executed on May 
31, 1984. He further informed me that Mr. Ford’s com­
petency to be executed has been in question since October, 
1983. In this regard, he described to me the process by 
which Mr. Ford’s competency had been evaluated by three 
psychiatrists who had been commissioned by the Governor 
of Florida, pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 922.07 (1983), to 
assist the Governor in determining whether Mr. Ford 
understood the nature and effect of the death penalty 
and why it was to be carried out against him. Mr. Burr 
asked that I comment upon this process from the perspec­
tive of the standard of care which must be followed to 
render an adequate, reliable forensic psychiatric evalua­
tion under the circumstances described.

4. The purpose of this affidavit is to provide the com­
mentary requested by Mr. Burr.

[EXCERPT FROM APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR
W R IT  O F  HABEAS CORPUS: AFFIDAVIT OF

SEYMOUR HALLECK, MAY 21,1984]



110

5. In my review of the process followed by the 922.07 
commission in evaluating Mr. Ford, I have examined the 
following:

(a) the documents provided by Mr. Burr to each com­
mission member in advance of the evaluation of Mr. 
Ford;

(b) a transcript of an interview with Mr. Ford on 
December 15, 1983 which was similar in content to the 
commission’s interview on December 19, 1983; and

(c) the written evaluations by the commission mem­
bers.

6. In addition I have relied upon the following (pro­
vided by Mr. Burr) as the description of the process of 
evaluation followed by the commission:

The commission members appointed by Governor 
Graham to examine Mr. Ford were Dr. Peter Ivory 
(Florida State Hospital, Chattahoochee), Dr. Umesh 
Mhatre (private practitioner, Lake City), and Dr. 
Walter Afield (private practitioner, Tampa). The 
commissioners were scheduled to see Mr. Ford on 
December 19, 1983. On December 15, 1983, in order 
to orient the commission members to Mr. Ford’s ill­
ness and to the reasons counsel for Mr. Ford thought 
he was incompetent, counsel sent a letter and a num­
ber of documents along with that letter to each 
commission member. Those documents included the 
following: an excerpt from the transcript of Mr. 
Ford’s trial in December of 1974 in which Dr. David 
Taubel provided a psychiatric profile of Mr. Ford; 
a large sampling of correspondence from Mr. Ford 
over the previous two years which counsel for Mr. 
Ford thought provided the best history of Mr. Ford’s 
illness that could be obtained; a psychiatric evalua­
tion prepared in June, 1983 by Dr. Jamal Amin, a 
psychiatrist from Tallahassee; and a psychiatric 
evaluation prepared by Dr. Harold Kaufman, of 
Washington, D.C., in December 1983. When counsel



I l l

tendered these materials and his letter to Dr. Ivory, 
he refused to accept them. Dr. Mhatre and Dr. Afield 
did accept them.
On December 19, 1983, Dr. Afield, Dr. Mhatre, and 
Dr. Ivory conducted the interview of Mr. Ford in 
the courtroom at Florida State Prison. Present in 
the courtroom along with the three psychiatrists and 
Mr. Ford were Arthur Wiedinger (counsel from the 
Governor’s Office), one or two correctional officers, 
two paralegals who had worked closely with Mr. Ford 
(Gail Rowland and Margaret Vandiver), and the 
two lawyers who had worked with Mr. Ford (Laurin 
Wollan and Richard Burr). The interview lasted 
approximately thirty minutes. During the course of 
the interview, the psychiatrists asked very simple, 
straight-forward questions attempting to solicit 
whether Mr. Ford understood the nature and effect 
of the death penalty and why the death penalty was 
being imposed upon him, and he responded in the 
same manner to these questions as he had responded 
in an interview by Mr. Wollan, Ms. Vandiver, and 
Ms. Rowland on December 15, 1983.
After approximately thirty minutes, the commis­
sion members determined that further interview of 
Mr. Ford would be fruitless and thus terminated the 
interview. Thereafter, they requested that they be 
able to examine Mr. Ford’s cell. Their request was 
granted, and the three of them were taken back to 
Mr. Ford’s cell. Their observations of Mr. Ford’s 
cell and their conversations with correctional of­
ficers who were available to them in their visit to 
Mr. Ford’s cell are recounted in their reports. Fol­
lowing their visit to Mr. Ford’s cell, the commis­
sion members, or at least some of them, reviewed 
Mr. Ford’s medical records and discussed his condi­
tion with the prison’s medical staff. Following their 
review of medical records, the commission members 
concluded their on-site evaluation. Before leaving the



112

prison, Dr. Ivory, who had refused to accept the ma­
terials previously offered to him, requested that he be 
provided the materials. A copy was provided to him 
at approximately noon on December 19, 1983.
In the days that followed, the commission members 
prepared and sent their reports to Governor Graham. 
Dr. Ivory sent his report the very next day, Decem­
ber 20, 1983. In his report, he made no mention of 
having reviewed any of the materials counsel pro­
vided to him, and his evaluation reflected no knowl­
edge of these materials. Dr. Mhatre and Dr. Afield, 
on the other hand, did report that they had reviewed 
these materials, and their evaluations reflected that 
they had done so.

7. In my opinion, the process of evaluating Mr. Ford’s 
competency, as reflected in the foregoing account as well 
as in the material I have reviewed, fell below the gen­
erally accepted standard of care necessary to produce a 
reliable forensic psychiatric evaluation. The reasons for 
my opinion are as follows:

(a) The conditions under which the interview was con­
ducted, including the amount of time spent interviewing 
Mr. Ford, were unlikely to produce sufficient data for 
reliable forensic evaluation. The interview was conducted 
in a courtroom, and a “room full” of people, including 
one or more correctional officers, was present. The en­
vironment was thus not conducive to the informal, inti­
mate setting which is generally necessary to establish 
sufficient rapport for a psychiatric interview. In the 
setting described it would have been extremely difficult 
for Mr. Ford to fully reveal his problems or the nature 
of his illness. The thirty minute effort to establish com­
munication under the conditions already noted was also 
inadequate. On rare occasions some patients can be ac­
curately diagnosed in such a brief period. Mr. Ford’s 
diagnosis, however, was not easily made due to the un­
usual nature of his behavior and his unusual method of



ns
communicating. If the issue involved in the evaluation 
was simply an accurate medical diagnosis one or more 
hours of interviewing in a private setting would have 
been essential. Since there were difficult legal issues to 
be resolved, however, such as the nature of Mr. Ford’s 
understanding of his situation, even more detailed exami­
nation was required. Furthermore, there was ample 
reason to suspect from previous psychiatric reports that 
Mr. Ford was difficult to interview and would not dis­
close himself early in an interview. In a letter from Mr. 
Burr, the examining doctors were urged to interview Mr. 
Ford patiently.

(b) One important requisite for conducting a reliable 
forensic evaluation may not have been adhered to in Mr. 
Ford’s case. It is unclear if all of the available data 
concerning Mr. Ford’s mental status were sufficiently 
considered.

(i) It is unclear whether Dr. Ivory considered the re­
ports of previous psychiatrists or other available informa­
tion in making his evaluation. It is clear that he did not 
have access to that information when he examined Mr. 
Ford. This lack of data could have seriously compromised 
the quality of his examination. It is also clear that Dr. 
Ivory does not refer to earlier psychiatric findings in his 
report.

(ii) While Dr. Mhatre’s and Dr. Afield’s evaluations 
both did take into account the history and previous evalu­
ation of Mr. Ford’s condition, both, as did Dr. Ivory’s, 
failed to account for the facts contained in this history 
which were central to the forensic task as hand: whether 
Mr. Ford’s delusional processes which, among other 
things, had led him to believe that he had won his case 
and could no longer be executed, were relevant to the 
issue of his incompetence, in that he failed to under­
stand why he was to be executed or, as Dr. Kaufman put 
it, failed to understand “the purpose” of his execution. 
Dr. Kaufman had previously concluded that Mr. Ford 
was incompetent precisely because of these delusional



processes. Yet neither Dr. Ivory, Dr, Mhatre nor Dr. 
Afield dealt with this most crucial data in their reports.

8. In sum, therefore, I believe that the forensic evalu­
ation of Mr. Ford by the 922.07 commission is unreliable 
because of its failure to be conducted in accord with the 
standard of care necessary for forensic psychiatric evalu­
ation.

/s /  Seymour L.Halleck 
Seymour L. Halleck

[Closing Jurat Omitted in Printing]

[Curriculum Vitae of Dr. Halleck Omitted in Printing]

114



115

[EXCERPT FROM APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR 
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS: AFFIDAVIT OF 

DR. GEORGE BARNARD, MAY 21,1984]

[Opening Jurat Omitted in Printing]

George W. Barnard, M.D., being duly sworn according 
to law deposes and says :

1. Pursuant to a request by Richard H. Burr, III of 
counsel to the public defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, 
West Palm Beach, Florida 33401, the following material 
was reviewed and considered in the process of evaluating 
Alvin Ford under Florida § 922.04, a. memorandum to 
Governor Bob Graham prepared by Attorney Dick Burr 
including correspondence of Alvin Ford over a time span 
of almost two years; b. transcript of testimony of psy­
chiatrist David Taubel, M.D. at the trial of Alvin Ford;
c. transcript of an attempted interview between Attorney 
Laurin Wollan along with paralegals Margaret Vandiver 
and Gail Rowland with Alvin Ford on December 15, 1983;
d. phychiatric report of Jamal Amin, M.D. dated June 9, 
1983 to Attorney Richard Burr; e. psychiatric report of 
Harold Kaufman, M.D. dated December 14, 1983, to 
Attorney Richard Burr; f. letter from the Office of the 
Public Defender to psychiatrist Walter Afield, M.D. con­
cerning Alvin Ford, dated December 15, 1983; g. psychi­
atric report of Peter Ivory, M.D. to Governor Bob Graham 
re: Alvin Ford, dated December 20, 1983; h. psychiatric 
report of Umesh Mahtre, M.D. to Governor Bob Graham 
re: Alvin Ford, dated December 28, 1983; and i. psychi­
atric report of Walter Afield, M.D. to Governor Bob 
Graham re: Alvin Ford, dated January 19, 1983.

2. In his testimony at the trial of Ford, Dr. Taubel 
indicated that he thought Alvin Ford had minimal brain 
damage with dyslexia and that he had very consistent 
problems handling numbers and became easily frustrated. 
He indicated that. Ford had been a responsible employee 
until a short time before his crime and after he had



116

become frustrated he had quit several jobs and subse­
quently felt depressed and had suicidal thoughts. Subse­
quently, he took cocaine and through its stimulus effect 
did not feel depressed and became involved in several 
robberies. Later he took out a $25,000.00 insurance 
policy but found out that he would have to have a natural 
death for his mother to collect the money.
3. In the memorandum prepared by Dick Burr for Gov­
ernor Graham, Attorney Burr documents that Ford was 
sentenced to death in January 1975 and indicates as 
documented through a letter dated August 7, 1981, that 
there was no indication of a thought disorder. Subse­
quently, Alvin Ford’s death warrant was signed in No­
vember 1981, and by December 5, 1981, in a letter Ford 
demonstrated material which I consider to be delusion 
of receiving messages from a radio staff and of thought 
broadcasting. In a letter of February 28, 1982, Ford had 
delusions regarding the Ku Klux Klan and the delusion 
that Ford could predict what will happen. His thought 
processes had disorganized with loosening of associations 
and delusion of a visual hallucinatory experience. He 
also expressed delusions of grandeur with God writing 
for him and a report of a visual hallucination. In his 
letter of April 17, 1982, Ford was preoccupied with the 
Ku Klux Klan and he was so busy with this preoccupation 
that he did not have time to read legal material from 
his attorneys. In the letter dated July 8, 1982, his de­
lusional belief had spread to persecutory beliefs concern­
ing former friends. He was saying that his former friend 
could cause him to get another murder charge. In his 
letter dated September 11, 1982, there was indication of 
delusions of persecution with threats and fear that his 
life was in danger and the belief that “they” were in the 
“pipe alley” at the prison. He also had auditory halluci­
nations hearing a female ask a man not to kill her plus 
there was indication he had delusions of grandeur, that 
he had written a book in which the authorship was 
changed and another person had received $680,000. He



117

had paranoid beliefs and delusions concerning his previous 
friends and he thought they were against him. There was 
indication he had olefactory hallucinations of decomposing 
bodies along with a visual hallucination of a gun and a 
delusion that his family was being murdered. In a letter 
of September 12, 1982, there was a delusion of his being 
in contact with President Reagan and in a letter dated 
October 22, 1982, there was a delusion that his family 
members had been taken hostage within the prison sys­
tem. In the December 5, 1982, letter he had delusions 
that his grandmother was being held in the prison behind 
his cell as a hostage and in a March 28, 1983, letter he 
had multiple delusions of various people being hostage 
within the prison system. He had the belief that he had 
joined the Ku Klux Klan in order to get his family out 
of prison and there was indication of loosening of asso­
ciations. In a letter of April 2, 1983, there was indication 
of auditory hallucinations of a female along with delu­
sions of persecution and a belief in mindreading and 
thought broadcasting. He indicated some movement to 
give his own life in order to protect others. In the 
letter of April 1983, there was a delusion of grandeur 
and persecution concerning the hostage situation in the 
prison. In the letter of May 10, 1983, he still referred 
to the delusions of the hostages, delusions of grandeur 
about his own ability to fire officials with the final ap­
proval coming from President Reagan. In the letter of 
May 19, 1983, there was a delusion of grandeur involving 
national and international persons. In the letter of July 
27, 1983, there were delusions of persecution regarding 
the hostage crisis and delusions of grandeur concerning 
his own ability to fire and place others under arrest and 
about marrying Patty Regan with 100 gifts per day 
being presented 100 days at the White House. In his 
last letter dated November 28, 1983, to his mother there 
was indication of delusion of grandeur in that he had 
aides and 10 wives. There was also indication of thought 
perservation concerning the word “one”.



118

4. The report of Harold Kaufman, M.D., dated Decem­
ber 14, 1983, indicated that he had conducted an examina­
tion of Alvin Ford on November 3, 1983, and for the first 
15 minutes Ford ignored him and subsequently Ford’s 
thoughts became incoherent with delusions being ex­
pressed. His thoughts were not related and there was 
indication he had a flat affect. Ford expressed the de­
lusional belief that he was free to go and it would be 
illegal for the state to execute him and that in turn if 
they did the executioner would be killed. There were 
delusions of grandeur that CBS was making a movie 
about him and the delusions of persecution that there 
were people in the pipe alley. There were reported audi­
tory hallucinations that Ford could hear the people and 
delusions of grandeur that he had bought the prison. 
Ford’s thoughts were rambling, disorganized and reflected 
delusional ideas. Ford indicated his belief to Dr. Kauf­
man that he, Ford, could not be executed because he had 
won his case in Ford v. State and he expressed the de­
lusional belief that the state did not intend to execute 
him. Dr. Kaufman’s diagnosis was schizophrenia, undif­
ferentiated type, with delusions of disorganized ideas and 
verbal productions along with a flat affect. Dr. Kaufman 
expressed the belief that the possibility of Ford’s lying 
or malingering was remote in his opinion. Dr. Kaufman 
thought that Ford understood the nature of the death 
penalty but lacked the mental capacity to understand the 
reasons it was imposed on him. He indicated that Ford 
believed that he owned the prison and could send mind 
waves to Governor Graham and President Reagan and 
through these could control and influence them in their 
decisions.
The report of Jamal Amin, M.D., dated June 9, 1983, re­
flected that since December 1981, Ford had become with­
drawn, uncooperative, and had shown bizarre behavior. 
He reflected that Ford steadfastly had refused psycho­
tropic medicines. Dr. Amin listed 12 significant findings 
concerning the mental status of Ford and these included



119

that Ford was no longer able to establish rapport as he 
previously had done, that there was indication of inappro­
priate affect in moods, that Ford's speech was more sym­
bolic and showed indication of thought blocking, disorgan­
ization, and loosening of associations. There was thought 
insertion of irrelevant material so that Ford could not 
concentrate on relevant issues. There were delusional 
beliefs that his thoughts were controlled or influenced by 
outside sources and he expressed paranoid beliefs concern­
ing the Ku Klux Klan. There was indication of auditory 
and visual hallucinations with the delusional belief that 
his mother had been killed in the prison system. Dr. 
Amin’s diagnosis was paranoid schizophrenia with sui­
cidal potential.
In the transcribed record of an attempted interview be­
tween Attorney Laurin Wollan, Jr., along with paralegals 
Margaret Vandiveer and Gail Rowland on December 15, 
1983, Ford sat and glowered at them and at times made 
no responses. Later when he did respond, he was pre­
occupied with the word “one” and he persevered on this 
word and attached it to his irrelevant responses to ques­
tions put to him. For example, he said “killed one electric 
one break one Jesus one Mafia one God one Pope one 
threaten one leader one claim one stab one”. All of his 
responses reflected a paranoid reference and outlook. He 
walked out on the interview and essentially poeple with 
whom he previously had had a trusting relationship were 
not able to make significant contact with him.
5. In his report to the Governor Peter Ivory, M.D. indi­
cated that he along with Drs. Afield and Mahtre exam­
ined Ford for 35 minutes. Dr. Ivory indicated that later 
he talked with prison officers, viewed Ford’s cell, and 
talked to a prison psychiatrist. Dr. Ivory did not indicate 
if he had reviewed any records provided by Attorney 
Burr concerning Ford. Dr. Ivory indicated that the 
interview was carried out with great difficulty since Ford 
responded in a “stylized, manneristic doggerel” and with



120

nonsensical answers such as he gave answers to questions 
with responses “beckon one, came one, Alvin one, Q one, 
king one.” It should be noted that his preoccupation and 
dwelling on the word “one” was the same kind of 
irrelvant response that he had given to Attorney Wollan 
on December 15, 1983. Dr. Ivory then noted that it was 
necessary for him to depend on inferential deduction 
from nonverbal material to a large extent. It should be 
noted that if a subject does not have the ability to co­
operate verbally with the psychiatrist and if therefore the 
psychiatrist must rely on nonverbal material, it greatly 
enhances the opportunity for error and misinterpretation 
on the part of the examining psychiatrist. Dr. Ivory 
indicated that by his ability to “read b etw een  the lines” 
of verbal responses which Ford did give that Dr. Ivory 
was of the opinion that Ford knew exactly what was 
going on but if one relies on the transcript of the inter­
change between the psychiatrist and Ford then there is 
great doubt, at least to this observer, that there was a 
rational interchange between Ford and the psychiatrist, 
because Ford gave irrelevant responses to questions put 
to him although the words he used had some association 
with the questions asked. Ford’s responses do not indicate 
he had a rational understanding of the process and in 
fact some of Ford’s responses were interpreted by Dr. 
Ivory to mean Ford maintained the belief that he would 
be spared by the angel of death and this delusional belief 
is in keeping with other delusional beliefs that Ford 
manifested to others in his correspondence. Dr. Ivory 
expressed his belief that because Ford had a clean and 
organized cell that this indicated to him that Ford could 
not have a disorganized mind or thought system in that 
insanity was not selective but pervasive. To this reviewer, 
it appears that Dr. Ivory is of the opinion that there is 
a significant correlation between disorganization of in­
ternal thoughts and the way that one keeps a room. 
From my understanding of the literature it is apparent 
that one can be highly disorganized internally and yet



121

keep a clean room as well as one can be highly dis­
organized in the way he keeps his room and yet be very 
organized and productive in his thought processes. Dr. 
Ivory gives his belief that Ford shows a “severe adapta- 
tional disorder”. This diagnostic opinion does not reflect 
a diagnosis from D. S. M. III. Dr. Ivory expresses the 
belief that Ford’s disorder although severe “seems con­
trived and recently learned”. Although Dr. Ivory did not 
comment on whether or not he had reviewed materials 
provided by Attorney Richard Burr, he at least was given 
the materials and these materials, in my opinion, docu­
ment severe though disturbance with delusions as early 
as December 5, 1981, so: there is nothing recent about the 
disorder and if they are contrived, Ford has expressed 
this delusional belief system to a number of different 
parties in a consistent manner and has not done so just 
for examining psychiatrists.
6. The report of Dr. Umesh Mahtre indicated that most 
of Ford’s responses to questions were bizarre and were 
gibberish talk but that Ford maintained good eye contact. 
Mahtre found Ford to have a blunted affect. There: is 
no clear indication of exactly what the three examiners 
did in the way of a mental status examination but 
Dr. Mahtre indicated that doctors relied on prison guards 
who said that Ford’s gibberish talk and bizarre behavior 
started after all legal attempts had failed yet as previ­
ously mentioned there is documentation that Ford’s 
thought processes reflected a disturbance with delusional 
ideas as early as December 5, 1981, shortly after his 
death warrant was signed in November 1981. Dr. Mahtre 
said the guards indicated that Ford had become more 
depressed after Sullivan had been executed. Dr. Mahtre 
gave his diagnostic opinion that he felt Ford showed 
“psychosis with paranoia”. By definition, if a person has 
a psychosis there is a break with reality. Dr. Mahtre 
indicated that Ford “appears” to understand what is 
happening around him but Dr. Mahtre did not give the



122

basis for this inferential statement. Dr. Mahtre presents 
no documentation for his opinion as to why he believes 
Ford understands the nature and effects of the death 
penalty and why it is imposed if Ford is psychotic. 
Dr. Mahtre recommended that Ford receive anti-psychotic 
medicine but did not mention whether or not he was 
aware of the fact that Ford consistently refused to take 
anti-psychotic medicine. Dr. Mahtre did not say if he 
believed that Ford was incompetent to refuse medicine 
and, therefore, it could be given to him against his will.
7. In his report dated January 19, 1984, Dr. Walter 
Afield stated that his examination consisted of a complete 
mental status examination yet he did not document what 
his examination consisted of. In his report Dr. Mahtre 
had said that orientation and memory of Ford were not 
tested so it is not readily apparent exactly what Dr. 
Afield considers to be necessary in a “complete” mental 
status examination. Dr. Afield said that in his opinion 
Ford does not present a classical description of a psy­
chiatric illness so he makes no official diagnosis other 
than to say that in his opinion he believes Ford to be 
psychotic and to be severely disturbed. In spite of Dr. 
Afield’s believing that Ford was psychotic, Dr. Afield 
went on to express the conclusionary statement that he 
felt Ford did understand the nature of the death penalty 
and that he may be executed but he presents no docu­
mentation of data on which he reaches this conclusionary 
belief.
8. In his letter to the three examining psychiatrists dated 
December 15, 1983, Attorney Richard Burr clearly docu­
mented that Ford had the delusional belief that he had 
won his case in Ford v. State and had deprived the State 
of lawful authority to execute him. Attorney Burr went 
on to outline for the psychiatrists how he believed Ford 
had deteriorated across time with the development of 
delusional beliefs as early as February 1982. These de­
lusional beliefs were persecutory and grandiose in nature. 
Later in November 1982, Ford began refusing to see his



123

attorneys. Furthermore, Attorney Burr expressed his 
belief that Ford had continued to be paranoid and sus­
picious of others. He said to the psychiatrists that Ford 
sometimes refused to talk and predicted that this may 
happen in their examination and encouraged them if it 
did to be patient with Ford and persist so that once he 
opened up to them his pathological thought processes 
would become readily apparent. In spite of this precau­
tionary note and encouragement by Attorney Burr for 
the psychiatrists to be patient and take time with Ford, 
the psychiatrists spent 35 minutes in their examination 
of him. None of the three psychiatrists appointed by the 
Governor commented on or made note of the evidence 
pointing toward Ford’s delusional belief system over a 
period of about two years. None of them dealt with 
Ford’s delusion that he had won his case and could not 
be executed.
9. The materials which I reviewed give evidence of docu­
menting symptoms in Ford which are consistent of the 
diagnosis of schizophrenia, paranoid type. These symp­
toms include delusions of persecution, delusions of gran­
deur, thought blocking, thought insertion, thought broad­
casting, flat affect, loosening of associations and dis­
turbance of speech with word gibberish. In the psychi­
atric interview conducted by the three examiners ap­
pointed by the Governor, Ford was uncooperative and he 
gave them few meaningful verbal responses so that they 
relied heavily on his nonverbal productions and their 
ability to read between the lines for what he might be 
meaning with his nonsensical replies to their questions. 
In my opinion, the three examiners give conclusionary 
opinions about Ford’s competency to be executed without 
documenting in a satisfactory manner their evidence or 
facts upon which their inferences are based. As a result, 
in my opinion, the factfinder and, in this case, Governor 
Graham and/or the Court is left with the dilemma of 
depending on conclusionary belief statements by the psy­
chiatrists that Ford is competent to be executed without



124

adequate documentation by the psychiatrists so that the 
factfinder must rely on the credentials of the psychi­
atrists rather than their data. In my opinion, this leaves 
the factfinder in a very unsatisfactory position when a 
man’s life is at stake and in the absence of additional 
checks and balances is not in keeping with my under­
standing of due process.

/ s / George W. Barnard
George W. Barnard, M.D.

[Closing Jurat Omitted in Printing]

[Curriculum Vitae of Dr. Barnard Omitted in Printing]



125

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

[Title Omitted in Printing]

RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR 
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Respondent, Louie L. Wainwright, as Secretary of the 
Florida Department of Corrections, hereby responds in 
opposition to the instant petition for writ of habeas 
corpus as follows:

INTRODUCTION
This pleading is being filed in conjunction with re­

spondent’s response in opposition to petitioner’s applica­
tion for a stay of execution. Both pleadings are being 
drafted on an anticipatory basis; that is, due to the ab­
breviated time schedule, respondent has not yet received 
any of petitioner’s pleadings. Therefore, both responses 
have been drafted based upon what counsel anticipate 
will be raised in the pleadings to be filed by petitioner.

/

COURSE OF PRIOR PROCEEDINGS 
AND BASIS OF DETENTION

On July 26, 1974, petitioner was charged by indictment 
with the first-degree murder of police officer Dimitri 
Walker Ilynkoff during the course of an attempted rob­
bery. On December 17, 1974, petitioner was convicted of 
murder in the first degree and, following a jury recom­
mendation of the death penalty, petitioner was sentenced 
to death on January 6, 1975.

The judgment and sentence were affirmed by the 
Florida Supreme Court. Ford v. State, 374 So.2d 496 
(Fla. 1979), and the United States Supreme Court denied 
certiorari. Ford v. Florida, 445 U.S. 972 (1980).



126

Petitioner was one of one hundred twenty-three death 
row inmates who filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus 
in the Florida Supreme Court, challenging that court’s 
alleged practice of receiving non-record material in con­
nection with its review of capital cases. The supreme 
court dismissed that petition, Brown v. Wainwright, 392 
So.2d 1327 (Fla.), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 1000 (1981).

A death warrant was signed by the Governor of Florida 
requiring that petitioner be executed by December 11, 
1981, the execution itself having been scheduled for De­
cember 8, 1981. Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for 
post-conviction relief pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850 in 
the state trial court, which motion was eventually denied 
after an evidentiary hearing held on the issue of the al­
leged ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and peti­
tioner’s application for a stay of execution in conjunction 
with that proceeding was also denied. Petitioner there­
after appealed the denial of his motion for post-conviction 
relief to the Florida Supreme Court, and filed an original 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in that court alleging 
that his counsel on direct appeal had been ineffective. 
Those two matters were consolidated, and shortly there­
after the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the denial of 
the motion for post-conviction relief, denied the petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus, and denied petitioner’s re­
quest for a stay of execution. Ford v. State, 407 So.2d 
907 (Fla. 1981).

Petitioner filed his first petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus in this court on December 3, 1981, and after hear­
ings held on December 4, 6 and 7, 1981, this court denied 
all relief, including petitioner’s request for a stay of 
execution, in a written order detailing the court’s findings 
of fact and conclusions of law. However, that evening a 
stay was entered by the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit. The appellate court granted 
respondent’s request for an expedition of the appeal, and 
initially a divided panel of that court affirmed this court’s 
rulings. Ford v. Strickland, 676 F.2d 434 (11th Cir.



127

1982). Rehearing on en banc was granted, oral argu­
ment was entertained before the court en banc, and 
eventually a lengthy opinion was filed which again af­
firmed this court’s rulings. Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 
804 (11th Cir. 1982). Certiorari was thereafter denied 
by the United States Supreme Court. Ford v. Strickland, 
----- U .S.-------, 104 S.Ct. 201 (1983).

On April 30, 1984, the Governor of Florida signed a 
second death warrant in petitioner’s case; the warrant 
will expire on June 1, 1984 at 12:00 noon, and the execu­
tion itself is presently scheduled for Thursday, May 31, 
1984 at 7 :QQ a.m. On Monday, May 21, 1984, petitioner 
filed a motion for hearing and appointment of experts for 
determination of competency to be executed and a motion 
for a stay of execution in the state trial court (Exhibit 
A ). His motions were denied by the state trial judge on 
that same day (Exhibit B). Thereafter, petitioner ap­
plied for the same relief to the Florida Supreme Court 
(Exhibit E ), and also filed an original petition for writ 
of habeas corpus in the Florida Supreme Court alleging 
that the jury had been erroneously instructed during the 
penalty phase of his trial (Exhibit C). Responsive plead­
ings were filed (Exhibits D and F), and oral argument 
was heard by the Supreme Court on May 25, 1984. On 
that same date the Florida Supreme Court denied the 
application for appointment of experts, denied the peti­
tion for writ of habeas corpus, and denied the application 
for a stay of execution (Exhibit G).

This proceeding follows.



128

APPLICABILITY OF RULE 9(b)
Rule 9(b) of the Rules governing Section 2254 Cases 

in the United States District Courts 28 U.S.C. § 2254 
(1977) provides as follows:

A second or successive petition may be dismissed if 
the judge finds that it fails to allege new or different 
grounds for relief and the prior determination was 
on the merits or, if new and different grounds are 
alleged, the judge finds that the failure of the peti­
tioner to assert those grounds in a prior petition 
constituted an abuse of the writ.

Respondent submits that it is the latter section of Rule 
9(b) that applies to Petitioner’s claims, and that this 
petition should be dismissed as an abuse of the writ. See 
Potts v. Zant, 638 F. 2d 727, 740 (5th Cir. Unit B), cert, 
denied, 454 U.S. 877 (1981).

Where new grounds are raised in a second or successive 
petition the burden is on the government to specifically 
allege that the Petitioner is abusing the writ by having- 
omitted these grounds in his earlier petition. Price v. 
Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 292 (1948). As the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals recently explained in Jones v. Estelle, 
722 F.2d 159, 164 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc), the initial 
pleading burden is met if the government “notes Peti­
tioner’s prior writ history, indicates the claims appearing 
for the first time in the successive petition, and affirms 
its belief that Petitioner is abusing the writ in a matter 
proscribed by Rule 9(b).” Once the government has met 
its burden of pleading abuse of the writ, the Petitioner 
has the “burden of answering the allegation and of prov­
ing by a preponderance of the evidence that he has not 
abused the writ,” Jones v. Estelle, supra, 722 F. 2d at 
164 quoting Price v. Johnston, supra 334 U.S. at 292 
(emphasis original).

The court in Jones further explained that the govern­
ing principles



129

boil down to the idea that a petitioner can excuse 
his omission of a claim from an earlier writ if he 
proves he did not know of the “new” claims when 
the earlier writ was filed. The inquiry is easily 
anwered when the claim has been made possible by a 
change in the law since the last writ or a develop­
ment in facts which was not reasonably knowable 
before. 722 F. 2d at 165.

As the court noted, the objective of the procedural rules 
is to

preserve the proper use of the writ of habeas corpus 
to win review of unlawful action, while recognizing 
that ‘the advancing of grounds for habeas corpus 
relief in a one-at-a-time fashion when the evidence 
is available which would allow all grounds to be 
heard and disposed of in one proceeding, is an in­
tolerable abuse of the Great Writ.’ Id. at 164-165 
(citations omitted).

The principles of law enunciated in Jones are highly 
significant to the instant petition, because the Fifth Cir­
cuit held that abuse of the writ may properly be found 
where a Petitioner was represented by competent counsel 
in a prior federal habeas corpus proceeding; where, as 
in the instant case, the Petitioner was not proceeding- 
pro se in the first federal habeas case, a Rule 9(b) bar is 
not limited to those claims that the Petitioner himself 
deliberately and knowingly withheld. Rather,

the inquiry into excuse for omitting a claim from an 
earlier writ will differ depending upon whether Peti­
tioner was represented by counsel in the earlier writ 
prosecution. Representation by competent counsel 
has an immediate impact upon the quality of proof 
necessary to prove an excuse for omitting a prior 
claim. With counsel the inquiry is not solely the 
awareness of a Petitioner, a layman, but must in­
clude that of his competent counsel. When a Peti­



130
tioner was represented by competent counsel in a 
fully prosecuted writ he cannot by testimony of his 
personal ignorance justify the omission of claims 
ivhen awareness of those claims is chargeable to his 
competent counsel. 722 F. 2d at 167.

Another factor which must be considered by this Court 
in determining whether there has been an abuse of the 
writ is the timing of the presentation of the claim. Autry 
v. Estelle, 719 F. 2d 1247, 1250 (5th Cir. 1983). As
Justice Powell stated in Woodward v. Hutchins,----- U.S.
----- , 104 S. Ct. 752, 78 L. Ed. 2d 541, 543 (1984) “this
is another capital case in which a last minute application 
for a stay of execution and a new petition for writ of 
habeas corpus relief having been filed with no explana­
tion as to why the claims were not raised earlier or why 
they were not all raised in one petition. It is another 
example of abuse of the writ.”

In the instant case, the Petitioner filed his first petition 
for writ of habeas corpus in this Court on December 2, 
1981. Ford v. Wainwright, Case No. 81-6663-CIV-NCR. 
On December 7, 1981, this court orally denied the peti­
tion, and after a stay of execution was granted by the 
Eleventh Circuit on that same day, this Court on De­
cember 10, 1981, entered its written order denying the 
petition. In the first petition, Petitioner did not raise 
any of the issues which he now raises in the present 
petition. However, it must be noted that in the evi­
dentiary hearing on December 7, 1981, before this Court, 
the Petitioner presented the testimony of Dr. Jamal 
Amin, one of the psychiatrists upon whose opinion he 
relies on to prove that Petitioner is not incompetent to be 
executed.

As this Court may recall, the gist of Dr. Amin’s testi­
mony was that trial counsel was ineffective for having 
called Dr. Taubel to testify during the sentencing phase 
because Dr. Taubel, a white psychiatrist did not have 
sufficient socio-cultural compatibility with the Petitioner 
to properly present the psychiatric testimony. However,



131

Dr. Amin did testify that from his interview with the 
Petitioner in the latter part of July, or first part of 
August, 1981, that he would classify the Petitioner as 
having an extreme mental and emotional disturbance 
which contributed to his actions at the time of the murder 
(H.C.T. 98),1 and that in his opinion the Petitioner was 
acting under a ‘violent dissociative reaction whereby 
someone can in the course of a violent incident be com­
pletely out of control and in a psychotic state.” (H.C.T. 
105).

After this Court denied the first petition for writ of 
habeas corpus, the Petitioner appealed to the Eleventh 
Circuit, en banc, in which the dismissal of the petition 
was affirmed, Ford v. Strickland, 696 F. 2d 804 (11th 
Cir. 1983) (en banc), and after denial of certiorari by 
the United States Supreme Court, Ford v. Strickland,
-----  U.S. ------, 104 S. Ct. 201 (1983), the- cause was
remanded to this Court for consideration of the effect of
Barclay v. Florida, -----  U.S. ------, 103 S. Ct, 3418
(1983) on the issue of whether the trial judge’s erroneous 
reliance upon certain aggravating circumstances was 
properly determined by the Florida Supreme Court to 
be harmless error. The mandate from the Eleventh Cir­
cuit was issued on October 6, 1983. From that date until 
March 22, 1984, this Court had jurdisdiction to consider 
any additional claims which were ripe for federal habeas 
review.1 2 See, e.g., Arango v. Wainwright, 716 F.2d 1353 
(11th Cir. 1983) (motion for rehearing pending).

Petitioner has alleged in this petition that his current 
mental problems began around December 5, 1981, and he 
has consistently deteriorated through December 19, 1983, 
when Petitioner was examined by the three psychiatrists

1 “H.C.T.” refers to transcript of habeas corpus hearing before 
this Court on December 7, 1981.

2 On March 22, 1984, after finding that the resolution of Barclay 
v. Florida, supra, was in accordance with the Eleventh Circuit’s 
affirmance of this Court’s decision in the first petition, this Court 
dismissed the petition.



132
appointed by Governor Graham pursuant to Executive 
Order 83-197. Yet despite all the letters and other com­
munication by the Petitioner to counsel, and the reports 
of Dr. Amin and Dr. Kaufman, counsel did not see fit 
to challenge Petitioner’s compentency through the state or 
federal courts until May 21, 1984, ten days before his 
scheduled execution. The Respondent submits that Pe­
titioner could have brought the substantive due process 
and eighth amendment claims on the issue of insanity 
vel non barring execution, prior to the governor’s imple­
mentation of the statutory procedures of Section 922.07, 
Florida Statutes. An issue as to post-conviction insanity 
becomes ripe for determination upon the state court sen­
tence of death. See generally Goode v. Wainwright, -----
F. 2d ----- , Eleventh Circuit, Case No. 84-3224, slip
opinion filed April 4, 1984. Furthermore, the showing 
of changed conditions does not mean that post-conviction 
insanity can be held back as an issue until the eve of 
execution and then raised for the first time. Goode v. 
Wainwright, supra, slip opinion at 4.

Respondent submits that as in Goode v. Wainwright, 
supra, Petitioner is barred from raising the issue of the 
constitutionality of the procedures in Section 922.07, be­
cause of abuse of the writ. In his first federal habeas 
corpus petition, Petitioner contended that trial counsel 
was incompetent for having Dr. Taubel testify. In sup­
port of this allegation, Petitioner presented the testimony 
of Dr. Amin, who stated that Petitioner suffered from 
an extreme mental and emotional disturbance, such as to 
be in a psychotic state at the time of the murder. This 
Court rejected the contention as to ineffective assistance 
of counsel. Petitioner’s mental state, as in Goode, has 
been an issue known to Petitioner for the past two and 
one half years. Yet, now, Petitioner claims that there 
is new evidence that Petitioner has become incompetent. 
This claim must be rejected.

In Hutchins v. Woodward, supra, the Supreme Court 
rejected a “new claim” that there was new evidence that 
Hutchins was insane, stating:



133

A pattern seems to be developing in capital cases of 
multiple review in which claims that could have been 
presented years ago are brought forward—often in 
a piecemeal fashion—only after the execution date is 
set or becomes imminent. Federal courts should not 
continue to tolerate—even in capital cases—this type 
of abuse of the writ of habeas corpus. 78 L. Ed. 2d 
at 544-545.

Thus, Respondent submits that because Petitioner’s men­
tal state has been an issue since 1981, the issue raised 
herein regarding the alleged unconstitutionality of the 
procedures to determine Petitioner’s alleged incompetency 
to be executed should be deemed an abuse of the writ.

*  #  *  *

DETERMINATION OF SANITY TO BE EXECUTED 
AND THE SCOPE OF FLA.STAT. 922.07

The contention of petitioner that, separate and apart 
from the procedure outlined in § 922.07 Fla.Stat. there 
is a common law light to a determination of a prisoner’s 
competency to be executed, which as a corollary entitles 
him to certain due process guarantees, is erroneous. It 
is true that the early state judicial decisions recognized 
such right, and provided that application for a determina­
tion of sanity to be executed should be addressed to the 
trial court, “there being no statute covering the subject.” 
Ex Parte Chesser, 93 Fla. 291, 111 So. 720, 721 (1927) ; 
State ex rel Debh v, Fabisinski, 111 Fla. 454, 152 So. 207, 
211 (1933). In Hysler v. State, 136 Fla. 563, 187 So. 261 
(1939), the court reaffirmed ExParte Chesser, supra, and 
again held that on the question of sanity to be executed, 
application should be made to the trial court for a deter­
mination.

Following the decision in Hysler, the legislature en­
acted what is now § 922.07, Fla.Stat., which sets forth 
the procedings to be followed by the Governor when a 
person under sentence of death appears to be insane.



134

It is an accepted rule of statutory construction that the 
legislature is presumed to be acquainted with judicial 
decisons on the subject concerning which it subsequently 
enacts a statute. Mains Ins. Co. v. Wiggins, 349 So.2d 
638, 642 (1 DCA Fla. 1977), Bermudez v. Fla. Bower 
and Light Co., 433 So.2d 565, 567 (3 DCA Fla. 1983). 
Aware that previously applications for determinations of 
sanity to be executed were to be made to the trial court, 
the legislature enacted a statute which decreed this func­
tion would be henceforth fulfilled by the Governor. This 
statute is now the controlling law within its sphere of 
operation. DeGeorge v. State, 358 So.2d 217, 220 (4th 
DCA Fla. 1978). The Governor’s authority to determine 
sanity, with the aid of an appointed commission of three 
psychiatrists as outlined in § 922.07, is entirely appro­
priate. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950). Thus 
Florida has accepted the legal proposition that an insane 
person cannot be executed and has provided through 
§ 922.07, the means to invoke it.

In Goode v. Wainwright, ----- - So.2d------No. 65,098
(Op. filed 4-2-84), the Florida Supreme Court addressed 
the issue, agreed “that an insane person cannot be exe­
cuted,” (slip op. at 3), and held that § 922.07 sets forth 
“the procedure to be followed when a person under sen­
tence of death appears to be insane. The execution of 
capital punishment is an executive function and the legis­
lature was authorized to prescribe the procedure to be 
followed by the Governor in the event someone claims 
to be insane.” Thus in Goode the Court held under 
§ 922.07 the Governor can make the determination; 
Goode does not stand for the proposition that the issue 
of sanity to be executed can be raised independently in 
the state judicial system.

The petitioner argues that execution of an insane per­
son would violate the Eighth Amendment. Assuming 
arguendo, without addressing the merits, that this is true, 
there is no need for this court to decide the issue because 
Florida law does not provide for executing insane per­



135
sons. Moreover, the petitioner’s assertion of insanity has 
already been resolved against him by the Governor.

The fact that the determination of sanity to be exe­
cuted is, pursuant to Florida law, made by the Governor, 
is in accord with controlling precedent of the United 
States Supreme Court. In Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 
515 (1897) the court held the question of insanity after 
verdict did not give rise to an absolute right to have the 
issue tried before a judge and jury, but was addressed 
to the discretion of the judge. The court concluded the 
manner in which the sanity question was to be deter­
mined was purely a matter of legislative regulations. 
Subsequently, in Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950), 
the court noted it was unnecessary to decide if execution 
of an insane person is “cruel and unusual punishment” 
because Georgia did not approve the practice of executing 
insane persons, and it held the Georgia procedure where­
by the Governor determined the sanity of an already 
convicted defendant did not offend due process:

We are unable to say that it offends due process 
for a state to deem its Governor an “apt and special 
tribunal” to pass upon a question so closely related 
to powers that from the beginning have been en­
trusted to governors. And here the governor had the 
aid of physicians specially trained in appraising the 
elusive and often deceptive symptoms of insanity. 
It is true that governors and physicians might make 
errors of judgment. But the search for truth in this 
field is always beset by difficulties that may beget 
error. Even judicial determination of sanity might 
be wrong.

#  #  *  #

To protect itself society must have power to try, 
convict, and execute sentences. Our legal system de­
mands that this governmental duty be performed 
with scrupulous fairness to an accused. We cannot 
say that it offends due process to leave the question 
of a convicted person’s sanity to the solemn respon­



136

sibility of a state’s highest executive with authority 
to invoke the aid of the most skillful class of experts 
on the crucial questions involved.

Finally, in Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549 (1958), 
the court affirmed on the authority of Solesbee v. 
Ballccom, supra. In his concurring opinion, Justice Har­
lan approved the California procedure whereby the prison 
warden was given the initial responsibility to prelimi­
narily determine a condemned prisoner’s sanity, ex parte, 
as not violative of due process.

It is apparent from these decisions that in the post­
conviction post-sentencing stage of a capital proceeding, 
the determination of a prisoner’s sanity may be made by 
the Governor as provided by § 922.07. The petitioner’s 
argument that Solesbee and the other decisions are no 
longer good law is not supported by the cases he cites: 
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971) ; Furman 
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and Gardner v. Florida, 
430 U.S. 349 (1977) ; for these cases do not affect the 
validity of Solesbee’s holding that sanity for execution can 
be determined by the Executive.1 The continued validity
of Solesbee was recognized in Goode v. Wainwriglit,-----
So.2d ----- , No. 65,098 (Op. filed 4-2-84) where it was
cited at length (slip, op at 4-5), and in Goode v. Wain-
ivright, —— F.2d -----  (11th Cir. 1984) No. 84-3224,
Op. filed 4-4-84 (slip op. at 2-3), where it was held the 
statute meets minimum due process standards.

The petitioner asserts the sanity test for execution 
should be the same as for competency at the time of trial. 
The respondent maintains the standard set forth in 
§ 922.07(1), Fla.Stat., which is whether the condemned

1 None, of these, cases have held that execution per se violates the 
Eighth Amendment; the procedure of how the death penalty is im­
posed has been the issue, and it has been decided in the context 
of the Eighth Amendment as applied to the states through the 
Fourteenth. Therefore, the resolution of Solesbee on due process 
grounds satisfies the petitioner’s Eighth Amendment argument.



137

man “understands the nature and effect of the death 
penalty and why it is to be imposed upon him,” is suffi­
cient. The third prong suggested by petitioner, that the 
prisoner possesses sufficient understanding to be aware 
of any facts that may make his punishment unjust and 
have the ability to convey such information to his coun­
sel is taken from the compentency to stand trial stand­
ard set forth in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 
(1960), i.e. “whether [the defendant] has sufficient pres­
ent ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable 
degree of rationale understanding.” In the present posture 
of this case—post conviction, post sentence, post appeal, 
post collateral attack—this suggested standard is inappro­
priate. The petitioner has already had full access to the 
state and federal courts. See, Ford v. State, 374 So.2d 
496 (Fla. 1979), cert, denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980) ; Ford 
v. State, 407 So.2d 907 (Fla. 1981) ; Ford v. Strickland, 
696 F.2d 804 (11th Cir. 1983) (en banc); cert, denied,
-----  U.S. ----- , 78 L.Ed.2d 176 (1983). He has not
been deprived of the opportunity to litigate any and all 
issues arising from his 1974 trial.

The present allegation that the petitioner’s competency 
must be evaluated in terms of whether he is able to sup­
ply new information which would warrant still more 
litigation is absurd in view of the history of this case. 
Like Arthur Goode, the petitioner sub judice “has exer­
cised his right to use the full processes of the judicial
system.” Goode v. Wainwright, -----  So.2d ------, No.
65,098 (Op. filed 4-2-84) (slip op at 3). The competency 
standard for purposes of determining sanity to be exe­
cuted set forth in § 922.07(1), Fla.Stak, is legally and 
constitutionally sufficient.2

2 In Gray v. Lucas, 710 F.2d 1048, 1054 (5th. Cir. 1983), the court 
merely noted “both parties in the present case are content to rest 
on this test.” In did not decide th a t the prisoner’s ability to know 
facts which would make the punishment unjust and to communicate 
them to his attorney was a requisite element of the determination 
of sanity to be executed.



138

The petitioner’s argument that he is entitled to the 
same procedural protections that are applicable to a claim 
of incompetency to stand trial was rejected by the Florida
Supreme Court in Goode v. Wainwright,----- So.2d-------,
(Fla. 1984), No. 65,098 (Op filed 4-2-84). The same 
basic contention was raised in Goode, and the court de­
termined therein that “The Governor has the inherent 
right to grant a stay of execution and to make a de­
termination as to the sanity of an individual who has 
been sentenced to death. We find no abuse of authority, 
nor do we find any denial of due process.” (slip op at 5).

As respondent has discussed, § 922.07 Fla.Stat. by its 
terms outlines the “proceedings when [a] person under 
sentence of death appears to be insane,” and it provides the 
exclusive means by which the sanity of a condemned pris­
oner is to be determined. It does not coexist with any 
separate right to a judicial determination.3 The statute, 
which delegates the function of determining sanity in 
these circumstances to the Governor, is akin to the clem­
ency power which likewise reposes exclusively in the 
Chief executive. Sullivan v. Askew, 348 So.2d 312 (Fla. 
1977) ; Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 617- 
19 (5th Cir. 1978). Since in Goode the Florida Supreme 
Court held the statute comports with due process and the
Eleventh Circuit agreed, Goode v. Wainwright, ------ F.2d
— , (Hth Cir. 1984) No. 84-3224 (op filed 2-4-84) that 
ends the matter.

The Governor’s determination that the petitioner is 
competent to be executed is supported by the reports of 
the psychiatrists who examined the petitioner. Dr. Ivory 
reported:

I formed the opinion that the inmate knows exactly 
what is going on and is able to respond promptly to

3 That portion of the Eleventh Circuit’s Goode decision, cited 
infra, which appears to permit judicial litigation of mental com­
petency is mere dicta, as that issue was not squarely before the 
court. The court’s opinion was grounded on a finding tha t Goode 
has abused the writ.



1B9

external stimuli. In other words, in spite of the 
verbal appearance of severe incapacity, from his con­
sistent and appropriate general behavior he showed 
that he is in touch with reality . . . This inmate’s 
disorder, although severe, seems contrived and re­
cently learned. My final opinion, based on observa­
tion of Alvin Bernard Ford, on examination of his 
environment, and on the spontaneous comments of 
group of prison staff, is that the inmate does com­
prehend his total situation including being sentenced 
to death, and all of the implications of that penalty.

Dr. Mhatre reported:
The conversation with the guards at Florida State 

Prison who have been working with Mr. Ford, fur­
nished the following information. His jibberish talk 
and bizarre behavior started after all his legal at­
tempts failed. He was then noted to throw all his 
legal papers up in the air and was depressed for 
several days after that. He especially became more 
depressed after another inmate, Mr. Sullivan, was 
put to death and his behavior has rapidly deterio­
rated since then. In spite of this, Mr. Ford con­
tinues to relate to other inmates and with the guards 
regarding his personal needs. He has also borrowed 
books from the library and has been reading them 
on a daily basis. A visit to his cell indicated that it 
was neat, clean and tidy and well organized. . .

It is my medical opinion that Mr. Ford has been 
suffering from psychosis with paranoia, possibly as 
a result of the stress of being incarcerated and pos­
sible execution in the near future. In spite of psy­
chosis, he has shown ability to carry on day to day 
activities, and relate to his fellow inmates and 
guards, and appears to understand what is happen­
ing around him. It is my medical opinion that though 
Mr. Ford is suffering from psychosis at the present 
time, he has enough cognitive functioning to under­



140

stand the nature and the effects of the death penalty, 
and why it is to be imposed upon him.

Dr. Afield’s opinion is :
. . . Although this man is severely disturbed, he does 
understand the nature of the death penalty that he 
is facing, and is aware that he is on death row and 
may be electrocuted. The bottom line, in summary is, 
although sick, he does know fully what can happen 
to him.

The petitioner’s assertion of insanity, based on Dr. 
Kaufman’s report, presents nothing more than an issue 
of fact which has already been resolved against him by 
the Governor of Florida following the statutorily pre­
scribed fact finding procedure which entailed an examina­
tion of the petitioner by three psychiatrists, as discussed 
above. That factual determination is non-reviewable in 
a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Solesbee v. Balcom, 
supra; Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981) ; Goode v. 
Wainwright, USDC No. 84-68-Civ-F&M-10 (M.D. Order 
entered 4-4-84).

CONCLUSION
THEREFORE, respondent respectfully requests that 

the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus and re­
lated motions be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

[Counsel for Respondent]

[Names,/Addresses of Counsel 
Omitted in Printing]

[Certificate of Service Omitted in Printing]



141

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

[Title Omitted in Printing]
TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING BEFORE 

THE HONORABLE NORMAN C. ROETTGER, JR.
#  *  *  *  *

[3] MR. BURR: Your Honor, I would like to address,
first of all, the competency issue and the facts of com­
petency and the abuse of the writ question related to 
competency because those two go hand in hand; and cer­
tainly abuse of the writ is a special issue that we have 
to get over before there is anything else to talk about 
with respect to the competency issue. So I will limit my 
opening [4] remarks to what we submit is the right of 
Alvin Bernard Ford not to be executed when he is in­
competent.

THE COURT: Well why are we arguing about that?
Isn’t the law fairly settled that executions don’t take 
place if someone is incompetent?

MR. BURR: We submit that it is.
THE COURT: Why don’t you address yourself to

something that might be in issue?
MR. BURR: Well I think abuse of the writ is in

issue. It certainly is an issue that the State has raised.
THE COURT: So you are addressing the question

not on whether or not an incompetent person can be exe­
cuted but whether or not there’s abuse of this writ.

MR. BURR: That is correct.
THE COURT: Very well.
Please proceed.
MR. BURR: As I said the facts of competency and

the question of abuse are intertwined.
The most important thing to note about abuse of the 

writ from our perspective and I think from the Court’s 
perspective is that Alvin Ford did not become incompetent 
in the estimate of Counsel and observers of Mr. Ford 
until October of 1983—



142

THE COURT: Hasn’t the State contended differently?
MR. BURR: The State does contend differently and

[5] to the extent that it rests on a different interpreta­
tion of facts I think the facts would have to be resolved 
in a hearing; but I don’t think that the facts which 
genuinely go to any issue arose are in dispute because I 
don’t think the State has been able to put them in dispute.

THE COURT: Well that psychiatrist testified before
me nearly three years ago.

MR. BURR: That’s right; but he said nothing about
competency. His testimony was solely related to whether 
at the time of the incident Mr. Ford was laboring under 
any extreme mental or emotional disturbance, and he 
postulated that he was. At that point in time we made 
no claim about his current competency. There was no 
claim made about his competency at trial. There was no 
claim ever made about Alvin Ford’s competency.

THE COURT: No. But could you have.
MR. BURR: In my estimation—
THE COURT: In December of 1981 when I had a

hearing in this matter, evidentiary hearing.
MR. BURR: Absolutely not. I had no reason on

earth to believe Alvin Ford was incompetent. He could 
speak with me about the issues in the case and explained 
what went on in the incident without any degree of 
difficulty at all.

THE COURT: But you were not his Counsel then,
were you?
[6] MR. BURR: I became his Counsel in the course
of that proceeding and had the opportunity while he was 
in Fort Lauderdale for that proceeding to spend a good 
deal of time with him. There was no question in my mind 
of competency.

THE COURT: Wait a minute. Let’s go into that a
little bit.

You became his Counsel during the course of that 
proceeding?



143

MR, BURR: I appeared with Mr. Wollan from Talla­
hassee.

The Friday evening when we first appeared before 
Your Honor, Mr. Wollan was the only Counsel and at 
that point shortly after the proceeding started that 
Friday night, Your Honor admitted me to assist in rep­
resentation of Mr. Ford.

THE COURT: When did your co-Counsel leave?
MR. BURR: He is still co-Counsel.
THE COURT: He’s not here.
MR. BURR: He’s not here. Since that day, since that

time, my circumstances have changed. I have become a 
member of the Public Defender’s Office for this State 
Judicial Circuit and that office has taken over the repre­
sentation of Mr. Ford along with Mr. Wollan.

THE COURT: Very well.
Please proceed.
MR. BURR: From December of 1981 on, there began

[7] to be some deterioration of Mr. Ford. The deteriora­
tion was hardly noticeable at first. In late December, 
early January, he began talking about his ability to com­
municate with the staff of the radio station in Jackson­
ville. Seemed quirky but who knew what that meant. 
Sometime later, in late February of 1982, Mr. Ford began 
what became a genuine obsession with the Ku Klux 
Klan. Mr. Ford became convinced that in late February 
’82, that a Ku Klux Klan had burned a house in Jackson­
ville where a black family had been killed and he at­
tempted to communicate that message to a number of 
people through letters. He says that he talked with the 
staff of the radio station about his insight. He wrote 
one very, very long letter, which is in habeas petition, 
explaining how he got the insight about the Ku Klux 
Klan’s role in that arson.

Again, we knew about that. We got copies of the 
letters that he wrote. But there was at that point noth­
ing to suggest that whatever was happening with Mr. 
Ford was intertwined with his understanding of his case.



144

He continued. Several months later in 1982 he began 
to think that the Ku Klux Klan had members serving as 
correctional officers at Florida State Prison. He thought 
that these officers were put there to harass him and to 
make him commit suicide. He believed that these officers 
were holding people hostage and there is what he calls a
[8] “pipe alley” a tunnel behind his cell at Florida State 
Prison where he thought hostages were being held. He 
describes in his letters the torture of the hostages and 
torture of himself emotionally again by what was going 
on. Again, strange stuff. Certainly an indication that 
he might be becoming pyschotic. But when we visited 
with Mr. Ford he was able to talk with us about his 
case, he had an understanding where the case was in the 
Courts and he seemed to be becoming more concerned 
about what he called the hostage crisis than about any­
thing else. But we were still able to communicate with 
him.

That proceeded through 1982 pretty much in that 
fashion with the delusions growing in scope and with 
more people being brought into the delusions; the num­
ber of hostages that he thought were being held increased. 
He began writing more impassioned letters to people that 
he thought had the power to help him.

THE COURT: What did you do about that?
MR. BURR: Well we talked, we tried to see Mr. Ford

as often as we could, and we engaged the services of—
THE COURT: “We”? “We”?
MR. BURR: “We,” meaning Counsel for Mr. Ford.
At that point in the fall of 1982 I was in West Palm 

Beach and my colleagues in the Public Defender’s Office 
and I attempted to counsel with Mr. Ford. We also ob­
tained [9] the services of a psychiatrist, Doctor Jamal 
Amin who testified before, has been seeing Mr. Ford all 
along and was able to see Mr. Ford through about August 
of 1982 and at that point Mr. Ford began to think that 
Doctor Amin was one of his persecutors, began to think 
that he was in conspiracy with the Ku Klux Klan to hold



145

hostages and drive him crazy so he refused to see Doctor 
Amin in about August of ’82, Doctor Amin continued 
consulting with us to help us in our dealings with Mr. 
Ford to try to bring some sense of reality to him. But 
by January of 1983 it was clear that we needed another 
psychiatrist to try to get in to see Mr. Ford.

At that point we asked for the assistance of a psychia­
trist from Washington D.C. named Harold Kaufman, and 
from that point through the present Doctor Kaufman has 
consulted with us and has seen Mr. Ford on a couple of 
occasions. He has also reviewed hours of taped inter­
views with Mr. Ford.

THE COURT: Why would you go to Washington
D.C. for a psychiatrist?

MR. BURR: Well, we were looking—
THE COURT: Is he one who was going to say what

you wanted him to say?
MR. BURR: We had no reason to know what he

would say.
THE COURT: I mean some psychiatrists have that

[10] reputation both ways.
MR. BURR: Why sure. I did not know anything

about Doctor Kaufman’s reputation except that he was, 
had been for a number of years a consultant with the 
D.C. Court of Appeals, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
on psychiatric issues. He was also himself a lawyer and 
in our situation that was important because in late 1982 
Mr. Ford began to suggest that he wanted to drop his 
appeals in his case. We at that point thought that he 
might be not competent to make an intelligent choice 
about dropping his appeals and that in fact had reason 
to believe that he had reason to do that as a way of 
ending the hostage crisis. So we got Doctor Kaufman’s 
assistance for that reason initially. We knew we might 
be in a position of questioning Mr. Ford’s ability to drop 
his appeals because he was making, he was saying those 
things at that point. So we turned to a psychiatrist who 
knew forensic psychiatry and the law and in our situa­



146

tion we thought that would be very helpful and he came 
well recommended by virtue of his consultation with the 
D.C. Circuit.

Through 1983 Mr. Ford’s delusional system continued 
to change somewhat. The hostage crisis theme was still 
there but he began to develop other delusions as well and 
I believe in about April of 1983 or May Mr. Ford indi­
cated that he had joined the Ku Klux Klan and not too
[11] long after that he started writing in his letters that 
he was ending the hostage crisis, that he himself had 
brought a number of the perpetrators into the Courts, had 
appointed new justices of the Florida Supreme Court and 
there was a sentence that within his delusional world 
he had gained some resolution of what he had called the 
hostage crisis. Even at that point at the times that 
Mr. Ford would come out to visit, and he frequently 
would not come out to see us when we went to see him 
at the prison, we had no reason to believe that he thought 
that he couldn’t be executed or that he had no under­
standing of why he was on Death Row; and for us that 
was the critical factor that we were looking at. We 
were at a point in his case where consultation with him 
about the issues in his case was not necessary because 
the issues were proceeding through the Courts in a fairly 
regular manner and there were legal decisions to be 
made but the choice of issues to litigate had been made 
long before.

THE COURT: Why would you just watch all this as
you have described then, and do nothing?

MR. BURR: Your Honor, we did not do nothing. We
retained the services of psychiatrists—

THE COURT: Why didn’t you file something in the
Courts?

MR. BURR: I didn’t-—I had no reason to file any­
thing because I had no reason to think there was a legal
[12] claim related to his state. This was—



147

THE COURT: Why?
MR. BURR: Pardon me?
THE COURT: Why would they tell us he was fine

and dandy?
MR, BURR: No. Both Doctor Amin—
THE COURT: What were they telling you then?
MR. BURR: Doctor Amin and Doctor Kaufman were

saying to us they thought Mr. Ford was psychotic but his 
psychosis at that point focused on nothing to do with this 
case, had nothing to do with his ability as far as he 
could tell to understand his case. He seemed in our con­
versations with him to be aware that he was on Death 
Row in Florida for the murder of Dimitri Waiter 
Ilyankoff and that he was under sentence of death and 
at that point in time that much orientation to reality was 
all that the law required. We had no basis for a claim.

I have to stress that our contact with Mr. Ford, 
though we attempted to have a good deal of contact, was 
not as frequent as we would have liked. We went to the 
prison to see him quite often and he would not come out 
and the prison’s policy is not to bring somebody out that 
doesn’t want to see their lawyer. We questioned a good 
deal of the prison staff about whether he was being 
treated. The prison’s medical staff took the position that 
there was [13] nothing wrong with Mr. Ford. So we 
were caught in a position of not being able to get him 
any treatment for what our psychiatrists thought was 
a serious illness because the prison wouldn’t treat him. 
We were in a position—

THE COURT: But you didn’t file any suit to compel
this?

MR. BURR: I did not file a right to treatment suit,
no.

THE COURT: How come?
MR. BURR: At that point—
THE COURT: You think you just wait until you

lose all the appeals and you got in a situation like this, 
then you would bring it up?



148

MR. BURR: No, Your Honor. I had no reason to
believe at this point that his illness would invade his 
ability to understand his sentence of death and why he 
got it. I had absolutely no reason to believe that. Cer­
tainly looking back on it I can see that that would have 
been something to look for and in fact, we did look for.

The first indication, the very first indication that we 
had that Mr. Ford’s illness crept into his ability to 
understand his sentence of death was in October of 1983. 
In about the middle of October Mr. Ford came out to see 
a minister from Nashville who had been corresponding 
with him for a number of years and had seen him occa­
sionally, I was [14] with the minister, and at that point 
was the very first time that I had any knowledge of 
Mr. Ford thinking that he was no longer on Death Row. 
At that point in time for the first time I had heard he 
began talking about the case of Ford versus State as he 
calls it. And he explained that Ford versus State had 
overturned the current death penalty statute in Florida, 
had required that the death sentence be imposed by 
panels of twelve judges, and that he was no longer under 
sentence of death. In fact he was free to leave the prison 
but that he had decided that he would stay. At that 
point in time:—

THE COURT: October, when, ’83?
MR. BURR: October the 14th, ’83, I believe was the

exact date. October of ’83. Within a week thereafter we 
did something. We invoked the statutory procedure in 
Florida, Section 922.07 for the Governor to inquire into 
his competency to be executed. That was the very first 
time that we had any knowledge of his underlying psy­
chotic processes invading his ability to understand the 
nature and effect of the death penalty.

At that point in time in the law we were not certain 
whether the administrative remedy under 922.07 was 
something that we had to follow in order to adopt our 
remedies before moving into Federal Court or whether 
we could move into Federal Court immediately. We



149

determined, on the basis [15] of what we understood the 
law to be then—

THE COURT: Go ahead.
MR. BURR: We determined, “we,” meaning I and

my colleagues at the Public Defender’s Office determined 
that the safest course was to proceed through the ad­
ministrative remedy first prior to moving into Court so 
that there would be no question about exhausting all 
available State remedies. We did that. We invoked the 
procedure. Governor Graham appointed three psychia­
trists to go evaluate Mr. Ford. We spoke and communi­
cated with those psychiatrists in advance. We were 
present at their evaluation of Mr. Ford. We were pro­
vided their reports thereafter. And we filed a written 
response to their reports. Interestingly enough though, 
during the entire process, the Governor’s office, when I 
would make inquiries of the Governor’s office as to when 
they would like something from me or whether I would 
have the opportunity to submit input, the Governor’s 
Office took the consistent position that we could give them 
whatever we wanted to but they weren’t sure whether 
they would consider it or not. We did have the oppor­
tunity in November after we had invoked the procedure, 
but before the Governor’s psychiatrists saw Mr. Ford, we 
had the opportunity for Mr. Ford to see Doctor Kaufman 
and Doctor Kaufman prepared a report which we pro­
vided to the Governor and to the psychiatrists that he 
appointed. We, I believe, submitted [16] to the Governor 
in writing, again not knowing whether it would be even 
read or not. At the end of February, 1st of March of 
1984, and about a month later—I’m sorry, two months 
later on April the 30th, Governor Graham answered the 
question posed by 922.07 by signing the death warrant 
which represents his conclusion of that proceeding.

At that point we knew that we needed to move into 
Court and we moved into Court as quickly as we were 
able. The circumstance that intervened between April 
30th and the middle of May was our representation of



150
another client, James Adams, who was ultimately exe­
cuted and for whose case our entire capital staff was 
working on that case.

So that’s the sequence of events. If there is any ques­
tions I submit about the factual representation that I 
make, that I have made in this argument, seems to me 
the only proper way to resolve that is for me to be sworn 
as a witness and questioned and to answer under oath 
because it is a factual question and I, as the person in 
this office who has had the ongoing contact with Mr. Ford 
and the person that is uniquely possessed of the knowl­
edge upon which our office acted or should have acted on 
behalf of Mr. Ford.

With that as the factual background, the question of 
abuse of the writ comes into this. Abuse of the writ, as the 
Court knows, applies to a successive petition which raises 
an issue that could have been raised in the first [17] 
petition but was not. If there is such a situation, abuse 
of the writ would be found. The law is very clear on 
that and well settled. The law is equally well settled that 
if there is no factual basis to raise a claim there can be 
no abuse of the writ if the factual basis arises after the 
1st proceedings. And that is precisely where we are 
here. The factual basis was not available before October 
of 1983 and at that point in time the case had left the 
Court, had gone through the U.S. Court of Appeals and 
had had certiorari denied in the U.S. Supreme Court. 
There was a limited remand pending between October 
and March of 1984 limited to a single narrow question 
which the Court has already now disposed of. We did 
not think we had an opportunity to supplement that pro­
ceeding because it was the mandate that had issued had 
limited the remand to the single issue under Barclay.

So with that analysis, we submit there is no question 
of abuse of the writ. Claims could not have been raised, 
if the facts which we have alleged in support of our claim 
are true could not have been raised. The claim did not 
arise until after the first proceeding was entirely com­
plete.



151

The next question that comes is if abuse of the writ is 
not a bar, then is there any other procedural bar for this 
claim? We submit there is none.
[18] The State has argued the question of delay. The 
only delay issue, however, which can be considered in 
Federal habeas corpus is the issue of delay described in 
Rule 95 of the Rules describing habeas proceedings un­
der Section 2254. That Rule incorporates the traditional 
Latches rule from equity. And the critical factor there 
is that the State be able to show in order to have benefit 
of that Rule of delay, that the State be able to show that 
the delay has prejudiced its ability to defend on the 
merits of the issue presented. The State has made no 
suggestion that the short delay between October and May 
has prejudiced their ability to defend against the merits 
of this issue at all. So where does that leave us? That 
leaves us with no abuse, with no delay and with the State 
in the middle saying somehow this has to stop, these eve 
of execution applications have to be put under wraps and 
done away with and you have to find either abuse or 
delay or some sort of equitable remedy barring the con­
sideration of this issue. We submit there is none. There 
is abuse of the writ and there is delay. And those are 
the only two matters under the Federal habeas statute 
that can preclude the Court’s ruling on the merits that is 
a Federal matter. Obviously there’s procedural default, 
but that’s not material to this issue.

#  *  *  *  *

[Argument by counsel for respondent Wainwright:]
[38] I’d like to start off with the abuse of the writ 
argument and Fm going to apply it to all the claims that 
were raised in this particular petition.

I think to start with let’s look at the background of 
abuse of the writ. I think the Fifth Circuit opinion in 
Jones versus Estelle is a very well reasoned opinion. It 
gives the Court background on when abuse of the writ 
should be applied. Jones versus Estelle talks about abuse



152

of the writ boils down to whether or not Petitioner can 
excuse his admission of claim from an earlier writ by 
proving he did not know of the new claims when the 
earlier writ was filed and we give examples when there 
has been a change in the law for development in the facts 
which was and I stress reasonably knowable before.

It is the State’s position, and we are not disputing the 
facts presented by Petitioner here, that’s [39] one reason 
why there is no reason to have evidentiary hearing on 
abuse of the writ. We are only disputing the interpreta­
tion of facts, and I don’t think you need an evidentiary 
hearing for a dispute on the interpretation of facts.

I think also when you are talking about abuse of the 
writ, the Courts have recently added perhaps another 
element to abuse of the writ; that is the timing of the 
second petition. The Court in Autry versus Estelle as 
cited in the response and I think in Woodard versus 
Hutchins, Justice Powell talking for the majority of the 
United States Supreme Court said, and again it’s im­
portant to know that Woodard versus Hutchins involved 
a claim of insanity again at the time of execution but 
there were new facts which had arisen from the time of 
trial to the time of execution which Mr. Woodard is now 
insane. Justice Powell said “This is another capital case 
in which a last minute application for stay of execution 
and new petition for habeas corpus relief has been filed 
with no explanation as to why the claims were not raised 
earlier or why they were not raised in one petition. It is 
another example of abuse of the writ.” So I think from 
reading that you can read the interpretation that one of 
the factors to consider in whether or not there has been 
abuse of the writ is the timing of the second petition; 
and that is what the State is relying on.

I want to make it clear we are not arguing delay [40] 
as Petitioner has set out. Delay only insomuch as the 
timing of the second petition, not because we cannot re­
spond on the merits.



153

I’d like to go over the facts just from the Defendant’s 
own pleading in this particular case. This is quoting 
from Petitioner’s petition itself:

“On December 5, 1981, Mr. Ford’s health and nor­
malcy began to give way.” This is at Page 13 in the pe­
tition. “By February 28, 1982, Mr. Ford’s”—

THE COURT: December 5th was the first day of
hearing.

MS. BRILL: That’s correct, Your Honor. That’s why
I’m quoting. I’m quoting from the Petitioner, from 
Counsel’s own words; so we are not talking about dis- 
putive facts. These are his own words that are in his 
petition.

At Page 13 he says that “His health and normalcy 
began ti give way. Then by February 28, 1982, Mr. 
Ford’s delusional system had taken a quantum leap.” 
This is at Page 16. “By April 17, 1982, Petitioner 
showed some further advance in his delusional systems 
accompanied by the injection of paranoia into his delu­
sions as well as the re-emergence of his loosening of as­
sociations. By July 8, 1982, Mr. Ford’s remission ended.” 
And he goes on later at Page 31, “By September 11, 
1982, Mr. Ford’s delusional system had become all-per­
vasive and all-encompassing. There [41] has been no 
remissions from the grip of the delusion, the loosening of 
associations and the hallucinations since then. Then on 
September 12, 1982, three new aspects to the delusion 
emerged.” That is at Page 37. Then at Page 39 Peti­
tioner alleged, “On October 22, 1982, Mr. Ford began to 
report yet another new development in his delusion, one 
that, over the course of the next year and beyond, would 
become the most significant element in his world of delu­
sions—the taking of hostages by the persons who were 
already tormenting him at Florida State Prison. Then 
by May 10th, 1983, Mr. Ford’s delusions became increas­
ingly grandiose, a new element entered the delusions. 
Then, in the last letter available from Mr. Ford on No­



154

vember 28, 1983, “Petitioner alleges at Page 53 of the 
Petition, “That Mr. Ford was still grandiose, but his 
delusional systems seem to have changed significantly in 
content. His form of communication was becoming quite 
esoteric and incoherent, as commonly occurs in severely 
psychotic individuals.”

Thus, it is the State’s position from Counsel’s own 
words which are in the petition that there were facts 
which were available to his support in good faith asser­
tion as to the Petitioner’s mental capacity to be executed. 
This is long before October 20, 1983, when he invoked the 
procedures under 922.07.

I think it is important to remember the issue in [42] 
the case is not the issue of the Petitioner’s competency in 
fact; but the issue is whether or not he is entitled to, 
procedurally entitled to judicial determination of com­
petency as opposed to being forced to rely solely on the 
Governor’s determination.

Now Counsel has not given any reason why he could 
not have brought forth back in, let’s take from December, 
from the day when the Governor appointed the three 
psychiatrists who all found Mr. Ford competent to be 
executed, why he couldn’t at that point, from December 
1983 until he finally files some sort of petition in State 
Court on May 21, 1984, ten days before his execution, he 
could not have filed some sort of proceedings in State 
Court and then into the Federal Court asking that he 
should have judicial determination of his competency. 
This is never done until ten days before the execution.

THE COURT: December of ’83 was when the exami­
nation was.

MS. BRILL: Yes. And I believe within a couple of 
weeks after that all three psychiatrists had reported that 
Mr. Ford was competent and understood the reasons that 
he was to be executed and reasons why he was to be 
executed. And from that point on Counsel never did any­
thing to bring this issue to the attention of any Court in



155

the State’s system or in the Federal system until May 21, 
ten days before Mr. [43] Ford’s scheduled execution.

Furthermore, I think it’s important to note some addi­
tional history. After the Defendant initially filed his 
first habeas petition in this Court on December 2nd, 1981 
and this Court denied the petition on December 7th enter­
ing your written order on December 10th, the case then 
progressed to the Eleventh Circuit, through the panel 
decision and the en banc decision which was rendered by 
the Eleventh Circuit on January 7, 1983; and in that 
order of January 7, 1983 there was an order for remand 
to remand this case back on the Barclay issue. Now at 
that time according to Petitioner’s own statements Mr. 
Ford was suffering under some very heavy delusions at 
this point in January of 1983. Yet Counsel never asked 
the Eleventh Circuit in that remand can we add an addi­
tional claim as to his competency to be executed. He 
moved for a re-hearing in the Eleventh Circuit, I believe, 
on January 28th, but in that new motion for re-hearing 
of the en banc decision, he never asked for it, to have 
that, the remand to this Court, expanded to include other 
claims that have since arisen. And I think the facts cer­
tainly by then were available for Counsel to have done so. 
And especially I think that that idea of asking the Court 
or having this Court take jurisdiction over the new 
claims is supported by the Eleventh Circuit’s recent deci­
sion in Thompson versus Wainwright which is at 714 
F 2d 1495 and [44] Arango versus Wainwright, which 
I had cited in the response. In both those cases the 
Eleventh Circuit has held that the District Court has the 
authority to continue a case to allow petitioners to either 
amend the petition, file a second petition, consolidate 
them, and leaving that petition dormant on the district 
court docket while the Petitioner goes back to exhaust the 
State remedies. So he could have done that. But he 
didn’t. Instead his claim is dormant, stays quiet until 
ten days before the execution.



156

I think the instruction in Goode versus Wainwright in 
the Eleventh Circuit is applicable here. In Goode the 
Court said that a showing of changed conditions does not 
mean that post-conviction insanity can be held back of an 
issue until the eve of execution and then raised for the 
first time. And again in Hutchings versus Woodard the 
Supreme Court stated that a pattern seems to be develop­
ing in capital cases of multiple review in which claims 
could have been presented years ago or brought forth or 
in piecemeal fashion only after the execution date is set 
or becomes imminent. Federal Courts should not continue 
to tolerate even in capital cases this type of abuse of the 
writ. And it is the State’s position this Court should not 
either.

*  *  *  *

[Rebuttal argument by counsel for petitioner Ford:]
[61] Finally on the issue of abuse. It seems to me that 
Ms. Brill’s presentation leaves us in the following posture 
on abuse. She says that if you read through the pleadings 
starting with the letter of December the 5th, you find 
that we have alleged various facts which could have been 
a good faith basis to assert a claim of incompetency. The 
letter of December the 5th that she referred to where 
normalcy began to give way I had not seen until some­
time later. So when I represented to you before that on 
December [62] the 5th Alvin Ford seemed fine to me I 
wasn’t aware of that letter; but at the time it would not 
have mattered because Alvin Ford sitting in front of me 
appeared to be competent.

I t’s terribly important to differentiate between the 
process of an evolving psychosis which has been going on 
with Alvin Ford for the last two-and-a-half years and 
when the level of psychosis and quality of psychosis 
makes someone incompetent to be executed. They are 
very different analyses, very different factual phenomenon. 
Someone can be terribly psychotic for a long time and 
still have an understanding as to where he is and why he



157

is there. And that’s the issue. If there is any question 
about when we, as Mr. Ford’s Counsel, first had notice 
that he did not understand where he was and why he was 
there, which are critical competency facts then we should 
have a hearing; otherwise, our representation that we 
first knew about this in mid-October 1983 stands undis­
puted. We have simply alleged the fact of his growing 
psychosis to demonstrate the genuineness of the condition 
that has led to his incompetency. If there is any question 
about when it first came to our attention, a hearing on 
it ought to be held.

*  *  *  *



158
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

No. 84-6498-Civ.-NCR

Alvin Bernard F ord, etc., petitioner

vs.
Louie L. Wainwright, etc., respondent 

[ORDER TRANSCRIBED IN RECORD OF HEARING]

*  *  #  *

[63] THE COURT: If matters like this weren’t so 
serious, I’m sure someone like that fellow on 60 Minutes 
that does these humorous observations could really do one 
on us in this situation. I haven’t ruled yet and I under­
stand there’s already been a motion to stay filed in the 
Court of Appeals and a response by the Attorney Gen­
eral’s Office and the Florida Supreme Court is already 
asking questions about what happened.

Well what happened so far, I guess, is somewhat pre­
dictable. It’s kind of like watching Casablanca on TV. 
You know about every three years it comes around again. 
And almost three years ago I had this case before and I 
dropped everything and heard it all day Friday and all 
day Saturday and all day Monday and issued my order, 
and by the time I issued the order the stay was already 
entered in the Court of Appeals from December of that 
year to the following October and issued a mandate that 
they did agree with my opinion and they established a 
lot of law for this Circuit in the process.

The first contention of the Defendant seems to be 922.07 
is—They don’t contest the constitutionality of it; they 
just contend that even if the Governor follows the statute 
that is not enough, there’s still got to be an independent 
judicial review when the question of competency [64] is 
raised. I don’t find any support for that theory at all. 
Certainly not in Goode versus Wainwright which was the



159

decision handed down April 4th, 1984, by the Eleventh 
Circuit, and as I recall, that also was the same date 
Judge Hodges entered his opinion in Tampa in the Lower 
Court. And that explains the urgency of these things 
because the execution was scheduled for the next day, and 
in this situation, the warrant, which has been signed by 
the Governor, the warrant of execution must be carried 
out by the 31st of May and this is now the 29th and so 
there is good reason for all this planning in advance the 
system tries to anticipate and still give as complete a 
review.

The matter was filed in this Court on Friday last a 
couple minutes before 5:00 o’clock and after the Supreme 
Court of Florida had denied the relief sought by Peti­
tioner earlier in the day. Of course 5:00 o’clock Friday 
began the holiday weekend and this is now the first work­
ing day after the holiday.

Counsel have presented extremely good argument, I 
think in your memoranda and in view of the flood and 
torrent of recent decisions on the matter I’ve got to be­
lieve at this point that such excellence either results from 
an extreme professional interest in these questions or the 
fact that you anticipate there’s going to be one gigantic 
last-minute deluge of pleadings and so the [65] prepara­
tion is made in advance.

This matter was not started in the State trial court 
until May 21st following the filing of the Governor’s writ 
of execution and the reason given by Counsel for Peti­
tioner for that delay for the period of time in May was 
because of its being tied up with the Adams matter, and 
Mr. Adams was executed also sometime in May.

There are two or three—Well two basic claims in this 
matter. One that the Petitioner Ford has become in­
competent and therefore cannot be executed; and sec­
ondly, that the instruction as to the majority vote denied 
his right to have the jury instructed on the question of 
the majority vote on the issue of the recommendation of 
life vis-a-vis death penalty.



160

As to the matter of incompetency. In December of 
1981 when I considered this question before, had an 
extended evidentiary hearing and appeals were taken, 
there were, as I recall, seven issues. None of those dealt 
with the question of competency. There are several dis­
turbing facts about it, and that is the claim, now that in 
December of 1981, at the time of the hearing Mr. Ford 
became incompetent, and in fact as I recall there was 
some testimony to that effect by Doctor Amin at the 
time of the hearing. And Doctor Amin, as I recall, was 
the psychiatrist, forensic psychiatrist. He was the only 
one in the State of Florida and he felt [66] nobody else 
but him could be a valid witness in the matter. I am 
trying to find the refutation Doctor Amin made. In this 
flurry I have read it but I have not made a note of it. He 
made a comment then that would have triggered anybody, 
I think, into seeking some form of judicial determination 
about the question of—I apologize that in the rush of this 
thing I just cannot put my finger on it—And I made 
some notes as to matters present in the argument by 
Counsel and Ms. Brill made a number of comments dur­
ing her argument and I think those are worth re­
examining.

The petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by De­
fendant Ford, “On December 5th, 1981,” which by the 
way was the first day of the hearing before me in 1981, 
“health and normalcy began to give way.” There used to 
be some debate about the word “normalcy,” whether or 
not it was a real word, but one popularized by a fellow 
resident of my home county, President Warren Harding. 
There are many people who criticize that word as being 
an improper word; however, I do think Harding has been 
borne out in this as he has in some other things. And 
then “by February 28, 1982, Mr. Ford’s delusional system 
had taken a quantum leap.” My notes indicate that some­
thing more specific had happened by that time; that Mr. 
Ford had become obsessed with a reference to the Ku 
Klux Klan. And then in April he “showed some further



161

advance in his delusional systems, accompanied [67] by 
the injection of paranoia into his delusions as well as the 
re-emergence of his loosening of associations.” I take it 
those are psychiatric phrases because I don’t know any 
lawyers that talk that way. “By July 8, 1982, Mr. Ford’s 
remission ended.” However, by August of ’82, the De­
fendant Ford thought Doctor Amin was his persecutor 
and refused to see him. It is at that point the Defendant, 
Counsel at least, wanted Ford to see Doctor Harold Kauf­
man in Washington D.C. in January of ’83. And there 
was some dispute with the prison authorities, whether 
Strickland or Wainwright or the hierarchy there because 
they refused to treat Mr. Ford.

I think it significant to note that although they re­
fused to treat him in January, February of 1983, noth­
ing, absolutely nothing was filed to compel treatment. I 
don’t understand that at all. Such a major inconsistency 
in all this.

Mind you, before we get to January 1983, Page 31 of 
the petition, “Mr. Ford’s delusional system had become 
all-pervasive and all-encompassing.” Same page: “There 
has been no remission from the grip of the delusion, the 
loosening of associations, and the hallucinations, since 
then,” September of ’82. And so, September 12th, a day 
later, “Three new aspects to the delusion emerged. On 
October 22, 1982 Mr. Ford began to report yet another 
new development in his [68] delusion, one that, over the 
course of the next year and beyond, would become the 
most significant element in his world of delusion—the 
taking of hostages by the persons who were already 
tormenting him at Florida State Prison.”

Move on past January and failure to file suit. By May 
10th, 1983, “Mr. Ford’s delusions become increasingly 
grandiose, a new element entered the delusions,” Page 
48 of the petition. The last letter available, November 
28, 1983, “Mr. Ford was still grandiose, but his delusional 
system seemed to have changed significantly in context. 
His form of communication was becoming quite esoteric



162

and incoherent, as commonly occurs in severely psychotic 
individuals.”

I ruled on this matter previously on December 8th of 
1981, a stay was entered that night and when it moved 
into the Court of Appeals and it remained there as I said 
for about 22 months. There was a panel opinion decision 
and then it went en banc and the Court of Appeals en 
banc handed down a major decision on these issues affect­
ing death sentences particularly in the State of Florida 
as well as throughout the Circuit in Ford versus Strick­
land. That key situation came down January 7th, 1983.

Barclay decision was already in the Supreme Court 
and there was some eongruity between that decision, at 
least in the sphere of applicability between that Barclay 
decision and Ford, and in the end of the opinion, the 
Court affirmed [69] this Court but remanded it for any 
further effect that the Barclay decision might have on it. 
Barclay came down last July, July of ’83, about July 6th.

The next date that really strikes me as being signifi­
cant in all this is October the 11th, 1983. That’s sig­
nificant folks, because that’s the date the mandate was 
entered by the Court of Appeals remanding it to this 
Court. It was a Tuesday. That’s significant because on 
the 14th of October, three days later, just about time 
for the mandate to come down, be received, there was a 
meeting between Counsel for Mr. Ford and Mr. Ford 
and about a week later was the assertion of Counsel they 
invoked Section 922.07. Now what I deduce from all that 
is this is absolutely a classic pattern of a Defendant al­
legedly having a mental problem and perceiving a rook 
card in their possession, a high trump shall we say and 
holding it in the vest pocket until the last minute and 
then the minute the mandate came down they played the 
card and invoked 922.07.

The pattern did not end there. It continued. 922.07 
was followed. The Governor appointed three psychiatrists. 
They examined him in the presence of the Defense Coun­
sel, received submissions from the Defense Counsel and



163
returned their report a couple weeks after that examina­
tion. The examination was in December of 1983. Still 
nothing other than the request for 922.07.
[70] And as the Court of Appeals pointed out in Goode, 
Defendant was free to assert this contention that he 
could not be executed because of post-conviction insanity- 
in State and Federal Courts from the time that- the State 
Court sentenced him to death; thereby he could secure 
an orderly determination of his then current mental con­
dition. Certainly, he could have raised the issue when the 
Governor signed his first execution warrant in 1982. 
Goode has made no such contention in his State merits 
appeal, in his State collateral attack on his conviction 
or in his first Federal habeas case.

Certainly sounds like they are talking about the De­
fendant Ford.

The contention of the Defendant, however, is Goode 
doesn’t cover this case like a blanket because Goode had 
raised the question of competency to stand trial in his 
first Federal habeas. But it raised that question and the 
Defendant perceives that this thereby is a judicial invi­
tation to a clear, fast track for habeas corpus relief as 
to the death warrant in this case.

I don’t find anything in the cases or certainly in 
Goode that would indicate any such solace for the De­
fendant.

Instead we find again as I indicated earlier that it was 
filed on May 21st, ten days prior to the expiration of 
the writ of execution, filed a motion for [71] hearing and 
appointment of experts for determination of competency 
and motion for stay of execution in the State trial court, 
knowing that the route of litigation at that point, has to 
be the State trial court, the State Supreme Court and 
then inevitably here and then inevitably the Court of 
Appeals and then inevitably the U.S. Supreme Court in 
ten days.

This is not the first time this type situation has come 
up obviously because Justice Powell referred to another 
one in Woodard as an example of abuse of the writ in



164

a capital case when there is a last minute application 
for a stay of execution and new petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus is filed with no explanation as to why the 
claims were not raised earlier. There has been an 
explanation advanced but I don’t find any credibility to 
it or why they were not all raised in one petition. There 
is no doubt in my mind that this was all held back until 
the very last minute and these five Courts have been 
plunged into this frantic last-minute drop-everything and 
turn their attention to this one petition. It’s just got to 
be a gross abuse on the system as well as an abuse of 
the writ.

I find that there is an abuse of the writ throughout 
this matter. But reaching the merits of the matter as 
well I find no reason to grant the relief sought by the 
Petitioner. The Governor of this State acting under 
922.07 [72] the Court finds that he has acted properly, 
has followed the steps. Each of the three psychiatrists 
whom he appointed has found the Defendant sufficiently 
competent to be executed under the law and so on the 
merits, as well as on this issue, the petition must fail.

As to the matter on the instruction, the merits of 
that also the Defendant can only present conjecture of 
prejudice and ignores the findings of the trial court that 
all eight aggravating circumstances were there. Even 
though the Supreme Court of Florida subsequently de­
cided that one of those aggravating circumstances was 
a duplicate of another one set forth in the statute, the 
two others were not supported, they still probably sup­
ported the death sentence imposed by the State trial 
judge. I cannot read this comment of one juror to indi­
cate that there was some prejudice to the Petitioner at 
that time in connection with the sentence or recommenda­
tion as to the sentence.

Petition is denied because I think it is an abuse of 
the writ.

I will also deny the granting of a certificate of prob­
able cause.



165
Inasmuch as Mr. Ford is a pauper, I have no choice 

but to saddle the taxpayers with the preparation of an 
instant transcript and it is so ordered.

I will deny your application for a stay.
[73] MS. SHEARER: Your Honor, I have prepared
some proposed—

THE COURT: I will not file any written order.
There isn’t time.

MS. SHEARER: I just had an order directing the
transcript be prepared and an order that the oral findings 
be the order of the Court.

THE COURT: These oral findings are considered as
the Court’s findings and conclusions, my findings from 
the bench. I don’t see how anybody has time to do 
anything else. I marvel at my fellow judges that are 
able to get out an opinion under these conditions.

MS. SHEARER: Well would you consider signing
these orders or would you rather—

THE COURT: May I see it? I don’t agree to any­
thing in advance. My lawyer told me never to sign 
anything without reading it.

I think it’s exactly what I just did but I will sign it.
Thank you very much.
I appreciate all the hard work everybody has done.
Thank you.
MR. BURR: Your Honor, I have orders denying prob­

able cause if you would like a separate written order.
THE COURT: If you’d like it, I will sign it.

[74] MR. BURR: Thank you.
And we would apply for a stay pending appeal, and 

I think I know what the order would be on that as well. 
There is an order denying that.

THE COURT: I figure my work is done. If the
Court of Appeals wants to stay it, they may. They 
don’t agree with me on that procedure. Just seems to 
me that’s clearly where it fails. And I will call the Court 
of Appeals right now to tell them of the rulings I have 
made.

*  *  *



166

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE ELEVENTH FIRCUIT

Nos. 84-5293, 84-5372
Alvin Bernard F ord, petitioner-appellant

v.
Charles G. Strickland, J r., Warden, Florida State 

Penitentiary, Louie L. Wainwright, Secty., Dept, of 
Offender Rehabilitation, Florida, and Jim Smith, Atty. 
Gen., Florida, respondents-appellees

Alvin Bernard F ord, or Connie F ord, individually, 
and acting as next friend on behalf of 

Alvin Bernard F ord, petitioners-appellants

v.
Louie L. Wainwright, Secretary, 

Department of Corrections,
State of Florida, respondent-appellee

May 30, 1984

Before HENDERSON, ANDERSON and CLARK, 
Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:
In Case No. 84-5293 we deny the application for a 

certificate of probable cause and we deny the application 
for stay of execution. The single issue raised, i.e., the 
Barclay issue, requires no discussion.

In Case No. 84-5372, we grant the application for a 
certificate of probable cause, and we grant the applica­
tion for a stay of execution, finding that two of the 
grounds asserted warrant this relief.



167

First, Ford asserts that he is entitled to a procedural 
due process hearing to determine whether he is cur­
rently insane. If so, this should delay his execution be­
cause such could be cruel and unusual punishment and 
thus proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. Ford has 
raised a substantial question and we stay his execution 
so that a panel of this court may answer it. Credible 
evidence presented by the petitioner indicates that Ford 
is insane. Two psychiatrists appointed by Florida’s Gov­
ernor found him psychotic.

The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether in­
fliction of the death penalty upon an insane condemnee 
is cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of 
the Eighth Amendment. See Caritativo v. People of the 
State of California, 357 U.S. 549, 78 S.Ct. 1263, 2 L.Ed. 
2d 1531 (1958) ; Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 70 
S.Ct. 457, 94 L.Ed. 604 (1950) ; Nobles v. Georgia, 168 
U.S. 398, 18 S.Ct. 87, 42 L.Ed. 515 (1897). The Florida 
Supreme Court in holding that Ford was not entitled to 
a due process hearing relied upon Solesbee. At the time 
of Solesbee the United States Supreme Court had not 
applied the Eighth Amendment to the states through the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 
L.Ed.2d 758 (1962), the Supreme Court incorporated 
the Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and 
unusual punishment to the states. For still another rea­
son, Solesbee seems of dubious support. Since that time, 
as a result of Furman, the Supreme Court has drastically 
altered the constitutional framework in which a citizen 
in this country can be executed.

We believe the district court erred in holding that 
Ford violated Rule 9(b) of the Rules governing § 2254 
cases. The district court dismissed the petition on the 
ground that the petitioner should have asserted the in­
sanity ground in his prior petition and that he thus 
abused the writ.



168

The district court made this ruling without taking any 
evidence. We then have been caused to review the factual 
context of Ford’s first petition for the writ, which was 
considered in December of 1981 by the district court. 
Neither the evidence at that hearing, which we have 
reviewed, nor the district court order reflects that the 
district court was presented with an issue of Ford’s in­
sanity at that time. The record does reflect that in 
late 1981 and in 1982, counsel for Ford became ap­
prehensive about his mental state and sought psychiatric 
examinations for Ford. From December of 1981 until 
October of 1983, Ford’s case was on appeal to this court 
and to the United States Supreme Court from the dis­
trict court’s denial on December 10, 1981, of Ford’s 
petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Since we find no evidence in the record to suggest that 
the incompetency issue was available in December of 
1981 when Ford’s first petition was filed, we conclude 
for the purpose of staying Ford’s execution that there 
was no abuse of the writ.

The state argues that Ford should have filed a peti­
tion for some type of relief with respect to the insanity 
issue before filing the petition now under consideration.1 
However, the state does not explain to us just what 
Ford should have filed and when. On October 20, 1983, 
Ford, through his attorneys, sought exhaustion of state 
remedies pursuant to Florida Statute § 922.07. This was 
after the mandate issued from the court on October 6, 
1983. The Governor did not render a decision with

1 We have found no precedent, and none was cited by the State, 
holding that it is a per se abuse of the w rit to fail to file a second 
habeas petition while the first petition is still pending. Assuming 
that the law might and should evolve to impose such a duty, we 
would not be inclined to do so without the benefit of an evidentiary 
hearing to give Ford and his counsel an opportunity to explain 
their actions. Such actions would fall more clearly under Rule 9(a) 
of the Rules governing § 2254 cases, allowing dismissal of delayed 
petitions if the State’s ability to respond is impaired. However, 
the State makes no such argument here.



respect to the § 922.07 proceeding until he signed the 
death warrant.

If Ford had filed a petition for an evidentiary hearing 
with respect to insanity in the state courts, he would 
most probably have been met with a ruling that Ford’s 
sole relief was pursuant to Florida Statute § 922.07. In 
this very case, the Florida Supreme Court held that “the 
statutory procedure is now the exclusive procedure for 
determining competency to be executed.” Ford v. Wain- 
wright, 451 So.2d 471 at 475 Supreme Court of Florida, 
May 25, 1984. We believe if Ford had filed in the United 
States District Court for such relief, his petition would 
have met the same fate.

We conclude that this court’s opinion in Goode v. Wain- 
wright, 731 F.2d 1482 (1984), does not control this case. 
There, Goode’s claim of incompetency came after he had 
been twice adjudicated competent in state court proceed­
ings which were affirmed by our court. Thus, there were 
clear grounds for abuse of the writ in the Goode case 
because at the time of the filing of the successive petition, 
Goode had asserted the insanity ground in a prior pro­
ceeding.

Because we find that Ford’s petition for relief filed in 
the district court did not constitute an abuse of the writ 
and because we believe his claim of privilege not to be 
executed while insane raises substantial procedural and 
substantive Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment grounds, 
we stay the execution on this first issue.

Ford’s second ground for relief is his argument that 
Florida administers the death penalty arbitrarily and 
discriminatorily on the basis of the race of the victim, 
the race of the defendant, and other impermissible fac­
tors, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend­
ments. The district court rejected this claim as an 
abuse of the writ.

This issue, in the context of the Georgia death penalty 
statute, is now pending en banc consideration in this 
circuit. Spencer v. Zant, 715 F.2d 1562, vacated for 
rehearing en banc, 715 F.2d 1583 (11th Cir. 1983) ;

169



170

McCleskey v. Zant (11th Cir. 1984) (oral argument 
scheduled for June 12, 1984).

As we noted in Adams v. Wainwright, 734 F.2d 511, 
512 (11th Cir. 1984). “The state of the law with respect 
to these issues is unsettled.” In chronological order, 
see Spinkellink v. Wainivright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 
1978) (rejecting argument that the Florida statute was 
being applied arbitrarily, and discriminatorily in viola­
tion of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because 
statistical evidence proffered was insufficient), cert, denied, 
440 U.S. 976, 99 S.Ct. 1548, 59 L.Ed.2d 796 (1979), 
Smith v. Balkcom, 671 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1982) (deny­
ing Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims because 
statistics unreliable, but stating “in some instances cir­
cumstantial or statistical evidence of racially dispropor­
tionate impact may be so strong that the results permit 
no other inference but . . . racially discriminatory intent 
or purpose” ) ; Adams v. Wainwright, 709 F.2d 1443 (11th
Cir. 1983) (same), cert, denied,----- U.S. ———, 104 S.Ct.
745, 79 L.Ed.2d 203 (1984) ; Spencer v. Zant, 715 F.2d 
1562, 1578-83 (remanding Eighth and Fourteenth Amend­
ment challenges for evidentiary hearing); Spencer v. 
Zant, 715 F.2d 1583 (1983) (vacating panel opinion, 715 
F.2d 1562, for rehearing en banc); Sullivan v. Wain­
wright, 721 F.2d 316, 317 (11th Cir. 1983) (following 
Spinkellink and Adams), petitions for stay of execution
denied, —— U.S. ----- , 104 S.Ct. 450, 78 L.Ed.2d 210
(1983) ; Stephens v. Kemp, 722 F.2d 627 (11th Cir. 1983) 
(denying petition for rehearing en banc with six judges
dissenting), Stephens v. Kemp, ------ U.S. ------ , 104 S.Ct.
562, 78 L.Ed.2d 370 (1923) (granting stay of execution 
pending Eleventh Circuit’s en banc consideration of Spen­
cer) ; Smith v. Kemp, -----  U.S. ------, 104 S.Ct. 565, 78
L.Ed.2d 732 (1983) (denying petition for rehearing from 
denial of certiorari; Adams v. Wainivright, 734 F.2d 511 
(11th Cir. 1984) (granting stay pending en banc con­
sideration of Spencer), vacated without opinion, -----
U.S. ----- •, 104 S.Ct. 2183, 80 L.Ed.2d 809 (1984).



171

Our effort to faithfully apply the principles enunciated 
by the Supreme Court is unusually difficult in these cases. 
Because of time constraints under which these issues 
invariably arise, both this court and the Supreme Court 
have found it impossible in some cases to write an opin­
ion providing a rationale for the decision.

We can discern two possible interpretations of the 
Supreme Court’s recent treatment of this issue; either 
(1) the Supreme Court sees some significant difference 
between the contours of the issue as it has been pre­
sented in the Florida context, as opposed to the Georgia 
context, or (2) the procedural posture of cases has been 
decisive, in that the Supreme Court has declined to 
entertain this issue when the issue was repeated on the 
merits in a prior petition.

The State argues with considerable force that the 
Supreme Court declined to stay the Florida executions in 
Sullivan and Adams, while granting a stay of the Georgia 
execution in Stephens, because of some significant (but 
unstated) difference between Florida and Georgia. Sev­
eral factors undermine our confidence in the State’s 
position. First, the position does not satisfactorily ac­
count for Smith v. Kemp, ----- U. S. ———, 104 S.Ct. 565,
78 L.Ed.2d 732 (1983), in which the Supreme Court, 
when presented with this issue, declined to grant a stay of 
a Georgia execution to reconsider its denial of certiorari. 
Instead, the Supreme Court’s action in Smith is readily 
explained by the procedural posture, see infra. Second, 
no Justice of the Supreme Court and no judge of this 
court has expressed the view that there is a difference 
between the issue as presented in Florida, as compared to 
the issue as presented in Georgia. Third, although pressed 
at oral argument, counsel for the State could not point 
to any facet of the evidentiary proffer which might 
distinguish Florida from Georgia. Finally, our own study 
of the two proffers (e.g., the Baldus study in Georgia 
and the Gross and Mauro study in Florida) leaves us



unpersuaded that there is a significant difference between 
them.2

The other possible interpretation of the Supreme Court 
cases is that the procedural posture has been the dis­
tinguishing factor. In both Smith (Georgia) and Adams 
(Florida), in which stays of execution were denied, the 
issue was presented as a successive petition after the same 
claim on the initial position had been rejected on the 
merits. Although Stephens, in which the Court granted 
a stay of execution, involved a second or successive writ, 
it did not involve an attempt to relitigate an issue wdiich 
had already been rejected on the merits in a prior writ 
of habeas corpus. There is a well-established distinction 
in the case law, see Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 
1, 15-19, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 1077-1079, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963), 
between the Stephens posture, in which the rather more 
difficult abuse of the writ must be shown, and the Smith- 
Adams posture, in which the writ will be denied unless 
the “ends of justice” require otherwise.

As might be expected, Ford urges that we adopt the 
procedural distinction between his case and Adams be­
cause Ford, like Stephens, involves a successive writ, 
which can be barred only by a showing of abuse of the 
writ. This interpretation, however, must account for 
Sullivan, in which the Supreme Court declined to disturb

2 Substantive differences between the Baldus study on Georgia and 
the Gross and Mauro Florida results are not readily apparent. Both 
studies examined a number of factors potentially influencing the 
imposition of the penalty under the respective statutes and cor­
rected the deficiencies in methodology and results that character­
ized studies previously found inadequate to state a claim. Both 
studies respectively concluded that, all legitimate sentencing vari­
ables held constant, in Florida and Georgia: (1) a white victim
murder is significantly more likely to result in a death sentence 
than is a black victim murder, and (2) a black perpetrator is more 
likely to receive a death sentence. The Gross and Mauro study 
expressly compared its results to the Baldus results, and found them 
comparable. Gross & Mauro> Patterns of Death: A n Analysis of 
Racial Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimiza­
tion, man. pp. 105-110 (October 1983).

172



173

this court’s denial of a stay, declining to grant a stay of 
execution pending the filing of certiorari. Our brother, 
J. Henderson, places his reliance on Sullivan, and we 
readily acknowledge, in this uncertain state of the law, 
a reasonable basis for his position because Sullivan in­
volved a successive writ in the same abuse of the writ 
posture as this case and Stephens. However, two factors 
persuade us that Sullivan is not controlling.

The first is that the decision in Sullivan to deny a 
stay was not a decision on the merits of Sullivan’s con­
stitutional challenge. As we recently noted in Ritter v. 
Smith, 726 F.2d 1505 at 1511 & nn. 16-17 (11th Cir. 
1984), denial of a stay pending filing and disposition 
of a writ of certiorari “imports no more than a decision 
to deny certiorari, which does not express any views on 
the merits of the claims presented.” Id. at n. 16 (citing 
Graves v. Barnes, 405 U.S. 1201, 1204, 92 S.Ct. 752, 754, 
30 L.Ed.2d 769 (1972) (Powell J. in chambers)).

The second and more important factor is that Sullivan 
was decided before the Eleventh Circuit voted in Spencer 
to consider the issue en banc and before the Supreme 
Court granted the stay of execution in Stephens. Sullivan 
was decided on November 29, 1983. The Spencer issue 
was voted en banc on December 11, 1983. Also on De­
cember 11, 1983, six judges of this court dissented from 
an order denying en banc rehearing of the panel order 
denying a stay in Stephens v. Kemp, 722 F.2d 627 (11th 
Cir. 1983) (Godbold, Chief Judge, Johnson, Hatchett, 
Anderson and Clark, Circuit Judges, dissenting) (Kra- 
vitch, Circuit Judge, dissenting on similar grounds), 
stating that Stephens presented the same issue that the 
en banc court would consider in Spencer and that the 
issue “beyond peradventure . . . presents a substantial 
question in this circuit.” Id. at 628. Thereafter, on 
December 13, 1983, the Supreme Court in Stephens 
granted a stay of execution “pending decision of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
in Spencer v. Zant.” ------  U.S. ----- , 104 S.Ct, 562, 78
L.Ed.2d 370 (1983). Thus the Supreme Court in Sulli­



174

van was not presented with an argument that the issue 
was a substantial issue in this circuit because of its 
pendency en banc,3 an argument which was later ap­
parently accepted in Stephens. We thus conclude that 
Sullivan is not controlling.

Thus, our best judgment is that the Supreme Court 
cases do not distinguish Florida from Georgia, but rather 
teach that we should not be entertaining an attempt to 
relitigate this issue in a successive petition when the 
issue has already been rejected on the merits in a prior 
petition. By contrast, the issue can be entertained in a 
second habeas petition where there is no abuse of the 
writ. Stephens.

We conclude that Ford’s assertion of his Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendment claims was not an abuse of the 
writ. Just as in Stephens, where the Supreme Court 
granted a stay, the evidence and legal precedent upon 
which Ford relies were not available at the time of his 
first habeas petition. Unlike Adams and Smith, Ford 
is not seeking to relitigate an issue previously presented 
and dismissed on the merits.

We have also determined after close scrutiny that 
Ford presents a claim that in substance is identical to 
the issues currently under consideration in Spencer and 
McCleskey, and is the same claim that led to a stay in 
Stephens. Accordingly, finding in regard to this issue 
that Ford has presented “substantial grounds upon which
relief may be granted,” Barefoot v. E stelle ,----- U.S.
----- , — , 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3395, 77 L.Ed.2d 1090, 1105
(1983), we alternatively grant his application for a 
stay of execution pending en banc consideration of 
Spencer.

For the two foregoing reasons, in case number 84- 
5372, we GRANT the certificate of probable cause and 
STAY the execution.

8 In fact, footnote 3 of the Sullivan opinion reflects the Supreme 
Court’s then understanding that the issue before the Spencer panel 
was merely tha t the district court had not had an opportunity to 
consider the proffer.



175

HENDERSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

At the outset, I note my agreement with the ma­
jority’s view that neither the Barclay harmless error 
issue nor the jury instruction claim merit habeas corpus 
relief. I disagree, however, with the views expressed by 
the majority that either Ford’s mental incompetency 
argument or the allegation of arbitrary imposition of the 
death penalty in Florida deserves serious consideration 
by this court.

Turning to the latter issue first, Ford claims that the 
death penalty is being imposed arbitrarily in Florida. 
He grounds this claim in a study written by professors 
Gross and Mauro. On several previous occasions, this 
court has addressed the validity of this study in a habeas 
corpus setting and found it to be inadequate. I see no 
reason to stray from our path of clear precedent.

In Sullivan v. Wainwright, 721 F.2d 316 (11th Cir. 
1983), the petitioner challenged Florida’s application of 
the death penalty based on this very same study. In 
denying relief, the Sullivan court found that the study 
was “ [in]sufficient to show the Florida system to have 
intentionally discriminated . . . .” Id. at 317. The ma­
jority asserts that because Sullivan dealt with the dis­
position of a stay, it is not a decision on the merits. 
However, the clear wording of Sullivan indicates its 
clear intent to reach the merits. The majority also dis­
tinguishes Sullivan because it was decided before the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals voted to consider this 
issue en banc in Spencer v. Zant, 715 F.2d 1562, 1583 
(11th Cir. 1983). This seems to be an indication that 
the full court’s decision to consider the merits of the 
Baldus study as it applies to administration of the death 
penalty in Georgia has some bearing on the Gross- 
Mauro report in Florida. I do not agree with this eval­
uation and my conclusion has been reinforced by the 
recent disposition of Adams v. Wainwright, 734 F.2d 
511 (11th Cir. 1984) (appeal from denials of second 
habeas corpus petition and motion for stay of execution).



176

The petitioner in Adams, a black convicted of the mur­
der of a white, precisely as in this case, interposed a 
challenge to the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty 
in Florida. On appeal from the denial of a writ of 
habeas corpus, a majority of a panel of this court voted 
to grant a stay pending further consideration of this is­
sue in the Georgia case. I dissented on the ground that 
the Sullivan panel previously addressed the validity of 
the Gross-Mauro study as it pertains to Florida and 
found it to be insufficient, a decision affirmed by the 
United States Supreme Court. See Sullivan v. Wain-
wright, -----  U.S. ----- , 104 S.Ct, 450, 78 L.Ed.2d 210
(1983). On appeal by the state, the Supreme Court dis­
solved the stay. Because of the factual similarity of this 
case to Adams, I feel a reiteration of the position I took 
in dissent in Adams is justified here.

The majority disagrees. It reasons that the Supreme 
Court’s vacation of the stay in Adams was due to the 
fact that Adams previously had advanced this ground 
of relief in a prior petition. I cannot accept this reason­
ing. The differing procedural postures of Adams, who 
previously raised this point, and Ford, who does so now 
for the first time, have no bearing on the fact that both 
petitioners ultimately relied on the Gross-Mauro study 
which has been adjudicated lacking in substance. A dif­
ferent study affecting another state that has not yet 
been evaluated by any panel of this court is not relevant 
to whether Florida is properly administering its death 
penalty laws. Accordingly, on the bases of both Sulli­
van and the factually-similar Adams, I conclude that this 
claim does not justify our grant of the writ.

I note also the likelihood that this claim should be 
procedurally barred at this time since it was not as­
serted previously in Ford’s first petition for habeas 
corpus. Albeit unsuccessful when made then, as now, 
the ground for relief advanced in Adams was well-known 
and capable of prosecution at the time of Ford’s first



177

habeas eorpus application. See, e.g., Adams v. Wain- 
wright, 709 F.2d 1443 (11th Cir. 1983) (unsuccessful as­
sertion of claim of arbitrary application of death penalty 
prior to Gross-Mauro study). The information which 
forms the basis of such a claim has always been avail­
able. Petitioners cannot simply wait to state a claim 
until new study upon new study emerges when those 
reports are predicated upon currently available informa­
tion. To withhold such a ground from an initial peti­
tion when the argument was known and available at the 
time is an abuse of the writ.

I also believe a similar procedural default bars our 
consideration of Ford’s claim that he is presently in­
sane and, consequently, is constitutionally immune from 
execution,1 In light of the evidence presented in Ford’s 
first federal petition for habeas corpus in December of 
1981, it is evident that, even at that time, counsel for 
Ford had serious doubt about his mental capacity. Ad­
ditionally, the record demonstrates that in June of 1983 
counsel was well-aware of this potential ground of relief. 
See Report of Dr. Jamal Amin, App. 1, Petition for 
Habeas Corpus. Regardless of the exact time that his 
claim of incompetency ripened, however, Ford’s counsel 
readily admits to their knowledge of this alleged defi­
ciency in October of 1983. In light of this admission 
and the clear holding of the court in Goode v. Wain- 
wright, 731 F.2d 1482 (11th Cir. 1984), I conclude that 
the failure of counsel to bring this matter to the atten­
tion of a court until now to be an abuse of the writ.

In Goode, after this court denied the writ on appeal 
from the petitioner’s first habeas corpus petition, the 
governor began his § 922.07 inquiry. On March 6, 1984, 
Goode filed a habeas corpus petition in the state court

1 I t  should be emphasized that the state is in no way attempting 
to execute an insane person. On the contrary, Florida employs a 
statutory procedure to avoid tha t result, see Fla.Stats. :§ 922.07, 
which has been upheld under a due process challenge. See Goode v. 
Wainwright, 731 F.2d 1482 (11th Cir. 1984).



178

which raised, inter alia, his incompetency to be executed. 
That petition was denied on April 2, 1984, and on the 
following day, he filed a petition in the district court 
which denied the writ on April 4, 1984 without a hear­
ing. He then appealed to this court.

The state maintained that Goode’s last minute at­
tempt to avoid the consequences of the death penalty was 
an abuse of the writ under Rule 9(b). Goode contended 
in response that he was unable to assert his “newly 
ripened claim” until completion of the § 922.07 proce­
dures. The court did not accept this argument, stating 
that his

theory assumes that the issue of insanity vel non 
barring execution is dependent upon the governor’s 
implementation of the statutory procedures of 
§ 922.07. This is not so. If Goode contended, on sub­
stantive due process and eighth amendment grounds, 
that he could not be executed because of post-con­
viction insanity, he was free to assert this conten­
tion in state and federal courts from the time that 
the state court sentenced him to death; thereby he 
could secure an orderly determination of his then 
current mental condition.

Id. at 1483 (footnote omitted). Therefore, even accept­
ing Ford’s best argument that a claim of incompetency 
did not ripen until October of 1983, Goode makes clear 
that federal habeas corpus relief was available at that 
time.

Ford seeks to distinguish Goode on the ground that 
Goode continually asserted his incompetency throughout 
the course of the proceedings while Ford claims it now 
for the first time. I fail to see the value of this dis­
tribution since Goode was allowed to pursue his succes­
sive claim only because it was “newly ripened,” that is, 
the court did not view his claim of incompetency as a 
reallegation of the previous insanity plea but as a new 
and distinct assertion of post-conviction incompetence.



179

Thus, in the eyes of the Goode court, this ground was 
treated as a new claim for relief. This view is further 
evidenced by the court’s admonishment that “post-con­
viction insanity [cannot] be held back as an issue until 
the eve of execution and then raised for the first time.” 
Id.

In my view, the conclusion is inescapable that Goode 
binds squarely on our decision here today. Accordingly, 
because the issue of incompetency matured months ago 
at the very minimum, the failure to bring it to the fed­
eral courts until the eleventh hour is the sort of abuse 
condemned in Goode. I would affirm the judgment of 
the district court on all issues thereby denying both the 
stay of execution and the application for a certificate of 
probable cause.



180

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. A-980

Louie L. Wainwright, Secretary, 
F lorida Department of Corrections

v.
Alvin B. F ord

On application to vacate stay.

May 31, 1984. The application of the State to vacate 
the order of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit, dated May 30, 1984, staying the execu­
tion of sentence of death presented to Justice POWELL 
and by him referred to the Court, is denied.

Justice POWELL, with whom Justice WHITE and 
Justice BLACKMUN join, and with whom Justice 
STEVENS joins in Part I, concurring.

On May 30, 1984, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit, reversing the judgment of the District Court, 
granted respondent Ford a stay of execution of the sen­
tence of death set for no later than noon on Friday June 
1, 1984. The Court of Appeals granted the stay on two 
separate grounds. First, it stated that Ford’s claim that 
he is entitled under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend­
ments to a procedural due process hearing to determine 
whether he is currently insane [the “competency claim”] 
raises substantial issues that warrant review. Second, the 
Court of Appeals held that Ford’s claim that Florida 
administers the death penalty in a discriminatory manner 
on the basis of race and other impermissible factors [the 
“discrimination claim”] should be held pending en banc 
consideration by the Eleventh Circuit of Spencer v. Zant,



181

715 F.2d 1562, vacated for rehearing en banc, 715 F.2d 
1583 (CA11 1983).

I
The Court of Appeals found that Ford’s claim of en­

titlement to a due process hearing on competency to be 
executed did not constitute an abuse of the writ of habeas 
corpus, and held that the District Court had erred in 
holding to the contrary. On the merits, the Court of 
Appeals stated that this claim “raises substantial pro­
cedural and substantive Eighth and Fourteenth Amend­
ment grounds” that warrant review of Ford’s federal 
habeas petition. The Court of Appeals reviewed the rele­
vant record. In view of its findings, I cannot say in this 
case that the court abused its discretion in staying Ford’s 
execution on this issue.* I concur, therefore, in the order 
of the Court denying the State’s application to vacate the 
stay.

II
The Court of Appeals also held that a stay of execution 

should be granted so that Ford’s discrimination claim 
could be held pending en banc hearing and decision by 
that court in Spencer v. Zant, supra. The District Court 
had found that Ford had abused the writ by failing to 
raise this claim in his first federal habeas petition. The 
Court of Appeals provides no convincing explanation for 
ignoring that factual determination. Moreover, the Flor­
ida Supreme Court held that Ford’s discrimination claim 
was procedurally barred for failure to present it in a 
motion for post-conviction relief as required by Fla.R.
Crim.Pro. 3.850. Ford v. Wainwright, -----  So.2d-----
a t --------------slip op. at 4-5 (Nos. 65,335, 65,343 May
25, 1984). Neither the Court of Appeals nor the District 
Court found cause and prejudice to excuse this procedural

* This Court has never determined whether the Constitution pro­
hibits execution of a criminal defendant who currently is insane, 
and I imply no view as to the merits of this issue.



1 8 2

bar. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 71 
L.Ed.2d 783 (1982). Finally, we have held in two prior 
cases that the statistical evidence relied upon by Ford 
to support his claim of discrimination was not sufficient 
to raise a substantial ground upon which relief might be
granted. See Sullivan v. Wainwright, -----  U.S. ------,
104 S.Ct. 450, 78 L.Ed.2d 210 (1983); Wainwright v.
Adams, -----  U.S. ------, 104 S.Ct. 2183, 80 L.Ed.2d 809
(1984). I am of the opinion that the Court of Appeals 
abused its discretion in also granting a stay of execution 
on Ford’s discrimination claim pending its decision in 
Spencer v. Zant, supra.

Justice STEVENS, having joined in Part I above, is 
of the view that it is unnecessary to consider the dis­
crimination claim presented in Part II.

Justice BRENNAN and Justice MARSHALL join in 
the order of the Court.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Justice REHNQUIST and 
Justice O’CONNOR would grant the State’s application 
to vacate the stay of execution of sentence of death.



183

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 84-5372

Alvin Bernard F ord, or Connie F ord, individually 
and acting as next friend on behalf of 

Alvin Bernard F ord, petitioners-appellants

v.
Louie L. Wainwright, Secretary, 

Department of Corrections,
State of Florida, respondent-appellee

January 17, 1985

Before VANCE and CLARK, Circuit Judges, and 
STAFFORD,* District Judge.

PER CURIAM:
Over ten years ago, on July 21, 1974, Alvin Bernard 

Ford murdered a helpless, wounded police officer by shoot­
ing him in the back of the head at close range. Ford was 
captured, tried in state court and sentenced to death. The 
history of these events and the various steps in the ju­
dicial proceedings that followed are set forth in more 
detail in our original panel opinion, Ford v. Strickland, 
676 F.2d 434 (11th Cir.1982), and in our 1983 en banc 
opinion, Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804 (11th Cir.)
(en banc), cert denied,----- U .S .-------, 104 S.Ct. 201, 78
L.Ed.2d 176 (1983).

* Honorable William H. Stafford, Jr., U.S. D istrict Judge for 
the Northern District of Florida, sitting by designation.



184

The 1983 en banc opinion affirmed the district court’s 
denial of Ford’s habeas petition but remanded for a de­
termination of the possible effect on this case of Barclay 
v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 103 S.Ct. 3418, 77 L.Ed.2d 1134 
(1983), which was then pending in the Supreme Court. 
That determination resulted in the district court’s dis­
missal of Ford’s petition on March 22, 1984. Ford’s 
merits appeal and all collateral attacks to that point had 
been concluded with results unfavorable to him.

Before resolution of his first federal habeas procedure 
Ford invoked the procedures of Fla.Stat. § 922.07 (1983). 
The Florida governor appointed a commission of three 
psychiatrists to evaluate Ford’s current sanity in light of 
the appropriate statutory standards. The commission 
members reported their findings and on April 30, 1984, 
the governor signed a death warrant setting Ford’s execu­
tion for the week beginning at noon Friday, May 25, 
1984.

Ford’s mother, as next friend, then filed a motion in 
state trial court requesting a stay of execution, a hear­
ing and court appointment of experts to determine Ford’s 
competency to be executed. The motion was denied sum­
marily. After hearing oral argument, the Florida su­
preme court also denied relief. Ford v. Wainwright, 451 
So.2d 471 (Fla.1984). The present petition was filed in 
district court on May 25, 1984. The district court held a 
hearing on May 29, 1984, heard argument of counsel and 
concluded the hearing by denying Ford’s petition on the 
alternative grounds of abuse of the w rit1 and the merits. 
On May 30, 1984, a divided panel of this court granted 
Ford’s application for certificate of probable cause and 
stayed Ford’s execution. Ford v. Wainwright, 734 F.2d
538 (11th Cir.) aff’d, ----- U.S. -------, 104 S.Ct. 3498, 82
L.Ed.2d 911 (1984).

1 The summary holding of abuse of the w rit on the insanity issue 
is troublesome under the facts presented. In light of our resolution 
of the merits of this issue, however, i t  is not necessary that we 
reach the question.



185

Ford contends that presently he is insane.2 He does not 
contend that he was insane at the time of the murder, 
that he was incompetent to stand trial or that he lacked 
competence to pursue his initial collateral attack. He 
argues, however, that his mental condition has deterio­
rated, so that presently he is insane.

Either by statute or case law, states that authorize 
the death penalty uniformly prohibit the execution of 
presently insane persons. The origin of the rule is in the 
common law. Its initial justification is obscure.3 Florida’s 
prohibition is incorporated in Fla.Stat. § 922.07 (1983), 
which prescribes both the test of insanity and the pro­

2 As a second claim for relief, Ford restates his contention that 
Florida administers the death penalty arbitrarily  and discrimina- 
torily on the basis of the: race of the victim, the race of the defendant 
and other impermissible factors. With respect to this contention, we 
conclude that the district court’s abuse of the w rit holding was 
clearly correct. In addition, this contention fails on the merits. We 
do not belabor these conclusions since they have been the subject of 
expressions of approval by a majority of the justices of the Su­
preme Court. Wainwright v. Ford, —— U.S. —•—, 104 S.Ct. 3498, 
82 L.Ed.2d 911 (1984).

3 Justice F rankfurter and several commentators have discussed 
the variety of justifications offered for the common law rule. See 
Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 14-19, 70 S.Ct. 457, 459-62, 94 
L.Ed. 604 (1950); Hazard & Louisell, Death, the State, and the 
Insane: Stay of Execution, 9 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 381, 383-89 (1962); 
Note, The Eighth Amendment and the Execution of the Presently 
Incompetent, 32 Stan.L.Rev. 765, 778-79 (1980) ; Note, Insanity of 
the Condemned, 88 Yale L.J. 533, 535-37 (1979). The most fre­
quently discussed justifications are: (1) an insane person is in­
capable of assisting counsel in the fight to keep the sentence from 
being imposed; (2) the person’s insanity is punishment enough; 
(3) a humanitarian mandate exists which prohibits executing in­
sane persons; (4) the deterrence rationale would not be served by 
executing the insane because executing an insane individual does 
not serve as an example to others; (5) retribution is not had by 
executing the insane because killing one who is insane does not 
have the same moral quality as killing one who is sane; and (6) a 
person should not be executed while he is incapable of making 
peace with his maker. Id.



186

cedure for determining the sanity of a person under a 
death sentence. The test is whether the prisoner has the 
mental capacity to understand the nature of the death 
penalty and the reason it is to be imposed on him. Fla. 
Stat. § 922.07(2) (1983). The statutory procedure re­
quires the governor to appoint a commission of three 
psychiatrists and to make a determination as to the 
prisoner’s sanity after receiving the commission’s report. 
Ford does not challenge the state’s compliance with the 
statutory procedure.

Ford contends that the prohibition against execution 
because of insanity is rooted in the eighth amendment. 
No federal appellate court has so held. There has, how­
ever, been considerable comment supportive of his conten­
tion.4 * Prior references in Justice Frankfurter’s dissent in 
Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 14, 70 S.Ct. 457, 459, 
94 L.Ed. 604 (1950), and Justice Harlan’s concurring 
opinion in Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549, 550, 78 
S.Ct. 1263, 2 L.Ed.2d 1531 (1958), were to the effect of 
due process rights on the execution of insane persons. 
Ford argues, however, that these opinions failed to con­
sider the implication of the eight amendment because they 
predated recognition that the eighth amendment is in­
corporated by the fourteenth as a limitation on the power 
of the states.6 The only substantive difference between 
Ford’s eighth amendment claim and the Florida statute 
is based on Frankfurter’s contention in Solesbee that a 
defendant must be sufficiently competent to cooperate with 
his attorney in providing reasons why his execution should 
not be carried out. Since Ford has exhausted both his 
merits appeal and his collateral attacks, he concedes that 
this substantive distinction is not material in his case.

4 See Note, The Eighth Amendment and the Execution of the 
Presently Incompetent, 32 Stan.L. Rev. 765 (1980) ; Note, Insanity
of the Condemned, 88 Yale L.J. 533 (1979).

6 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 
1420, 8 L.Ed.2d 758 (1962).



187

Ford argues, however, that procedural protections com­
porting to federal due process standards would inexorably 
follow from recognition of the federal constitutional basis 
of his substantive right. He contends that the Florida 
statute, which is essentially an ex parte procedure con­
ducted by the executive, falls short of those due process 
standards.

If the matter were being presented for the first time, 
Ford’s contention might present considerable difficulty. 
The panel majority, however, feels that Ford’s contention 
is foreclosed by binding authority. In Solesbee the Su­
preme Court examined a Georgia procedure which was 
virtually identical to that now incorporated in the Florida 
statute. In the controlling portion of the opinion the 
Supreme Court held: “We are unable to say that it 
offends due process for a state to deem its Governor an 
‘apt and special tribunal’ to pass upon a question so closely 
related to powers that from the beginning have been 
entrusted to governors.” Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 
at 12, 70 S.Ct. at 458 (footnote omitted).

Ford argues that the development of eighth amend­
ment law has so eroded the underpinnings of Solesbee 
that it no longer can be considered as binding authority. 
That contention is confronted, however, with this court’s 
opinion in Goode v. Wainwright, 731 F.2d 1482 (11th 
Cir.1984), in which we considered an attack on the spe­
cific statute now in question and held: “The second claim, 
the attack on the Florida statute, is made on procedural 
due process grounds. We hold that the statute meets mini­
mum standards required by procedural due process.” Id. 
at 1483. The authority cited in support of that holding 
was Solesbee and Caritativo. Under the rule of precedent 
applicable in this circuit,6 the majority regards this hold­
ing as binding. Ford contends that his facts are some­
what distinguishable from those in Goode, but the statute 
is precisely the same. Ford contends that the analytical

8 See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (1981).



188
underpinnings of Solesbee have been eroded but the facts 
are indistinguishable from those now before us. Together, 
our recent reliance on Solesbee and our determination 
that the Florida statute meets minimum standards re­
quired by procedural due process is sufficient to require 
that a panel of this court reject Ford’s contention. If 
our application of Solesbee and Goode is to be altered, 
it must be done by the Supreme Court or at least by this 
court sitting en banc.

AFFIRMED.

CLARK, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. In the law, as in many other 

disciplines, where one ends up is frequently determined 
by where one begins. The majority fails to address and 
decide whether there is a constitutional prohibition 
against execution of an insane person. The court says 
that “ [n]o federal appellate court has so held.” Majority 
opinion at 4. Before addressing a party’s constitutional 
due process rights, it is necessary to first decide the sub­
stantive constitutional right to which he is entitled, if 
any. Dissenting, Justice Frankfurter challenged the ma­
jority of the Court in Solesbee to reach the issue, saying:

If the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment does not bar the State from infliction of the 
death sentence while such insanity persists, of course 
it need make no inquiry into the existence of super­
vening insanity. If it chooses to make any inquiry it 
may do so entirely on its own terms. If the Due 
Process Clause does limit the State’s power to execute 
such an insane person, this Court must assert the 
supremacy of the Due Process Clause and prohibit 
its violation by a State.

The Court in an easy, quick way puts crucial 
problem to one side as not before us. But in deter­
mining what procedural safeguards a State must 
provide, it makes all the difference in the world



189

whether the United States Constitution places a sub­
stantive restriction on the State’s power to take the 
life of an insane man. If not to execute is merely a 
benevolent withholding of the right to kill, the State 
may exercise its benevolence as it sees fit. But if 
Georgia is precluded by the Due Process Clause from 
executing a man who has temporarily or permanently 
become insane, it is not a matter of grace to assert 
that right on behalf of the life about to be taken. 
If taking life under such circumstances is forbidden 
by the Constitution, then it is not within the benevo­
lent discretion of Georgia to determine how it will 
ascertain sanity. Georgia must afford the rudimen­
tary safeguards for establishing the fact. If Georgia 
denies them she transgresses the substance of the 
limits that the Constitution places upon her.

Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 15, 70 S.Ct. 457, 460, 
94 L.Ed. 604 (1950) (Justice Frankfurter dissenting).

A panel of this court granted Ford’s application for a 
certificate of probable cause and stayed his execution so 
that this court could fully address Ford’s substantial pro­
cedural and substantive Eighth and Fourteenth Amend­
ment” claim of right not to be executed while insane. 734 
F.2d 538. A majority of the Supreme Court refused the 
State of Florida’s application to vacate this court’s stay 
of execution of sentence of death and explicitly turned its 
decision on the issue presented by the majority opinion
and this dissent. Wainwright v. Ford, -----  U.S. ------,
104 S.Ct. 3498, 82 L.Ed.2d 911 (1984). Justice Powell, 
the writing Justice, in a footnote stated: “This Court has 
never determined whether the Constitution prohibits exe­
cution of a criminal defendant who currently is insane, 
and I imply no view as to the merits of this issue.” Id. 
104 S.Ct. at 3498.

Believeing that it is necessary that we first resolve 
whether Ford has a substantive Constitutional claim, this 
will be considered before analyzing the due process pro-



190

cedural requirements. Because the majority and I have 
different starting points, we therefore come to different 
conclusions. In my view, a proper resolution of the issues 
in this case must begin with an inquiry into whether 
there is an Eighth Amendment right not to be executed 
while insane.

The Eighth Amendment and the Right Not to be 
Executed While Insane

The Supreme Court has developed a two-part standard 
for assessing Eighth Amendment claims. This analysis 
inquires whether a challenged punishment is both accept­
able to contemporary standards of decency and comports 
with the dignity of man. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 
173, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2925, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (plu­
rality opinion). The contemporary standards of decency 
test examines the constitutionality of a challenged punish­
ment by referring to domestic public acceptance of that 
sanction. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 288- 
301, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2983-2989, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) 
(plurality opinion); Gregg, supra, 428 U.S. at 176-82, 
96 S.Ct. at 2926-29. The human dignity component gen­
erally examines whether a punishment is grossly dispro­
portionate because of the severity of the offense and/or 
is accompanied by the unnecessary infliction of pain. 
Gregg, supra, 428 U.S. at 173, 96 S.Ct. at 2925. The 
Court has looked primarily to objective evidence such as 
historical usage in the statutes of the various states to 
give content to the concepts of decency and dignity. See, 
e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 
2866, 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977) (plurality opinion); Gregg, 
supra, 428 U.S. at 173, 96 S.Ct. at 2925. However, the 
Court has also said that it will perform an independent 
judicial assessment of the constitutionality of the practice 
in question in addition to relying on the objective evi­
dence. For example, in Coker v. Georgia, supra, the Court 
stated that contemporary public attitudes towards punish­



191

ing rape by death informed and confirmed its own in­
dependent judgment but did not wholly determine the 
controversy, for “the Constitution contemplates in the end 
our own judgment will be brought to bear on the ques­
tion.” 438 U.S. at 597, 97 S.Ct. at 2868. The Court in 
Coker held that the death penalty was disproportionate 
for the crime of rape. An application of the Supreme 
Court’s analysis of Eighth Amendment claims to the issue 
in question in this case leads to the conclusion that the 
execution of one who is presently insane would violate 
the Eighth Amendment.

The History of Executing of Insane
It has been a part of the English common law since 

the medieval period that the presently incompetent should 
not be executed. Feltham, The Common Law and the 
Execution of Insane Criminals, 4 Mel.U.L.Rev. 434, 466- 
67 (1964). See also E. Coke, Third Institute 4, 6 (London 
1797) (1st ed. London 1644) ; 4 W. Blackstone, Com­
mentaries 24.1 In the United States, early commentary 
and decisions reflected the same attitude towards the exe­
cution of the presently insane. See, e.g., 1 F, Wharton, 
A Treatise on the Criminal Law § 59, at 89 (8th ed. 
Philadelphia 1880 (1st ed. Philadelphia 1846) ; State v. 
Vann, 84 N.C. 722 (1881). State courts have continued 
to reaffirm the English common law rule of preventing 
the execution of the presently insane. See, e.g., Ex Parte 
Chesser, 93 Fla. 590, 594, 112 So. 87, 89 (1927); Hawie v. 
State, 121 Miss. 197, 216-18, 83 So. 158, 159, 160 (1919) ; 
In re Grammer, 104 Neb. 744, 746-49, 178 N.W. 624, 625- 
26 (1920). Therefore, the English and American common 
law prevented the execution of the presently insane. At 
present, virtually all of the states that have the death

1 For a more detailed analysis of the common law history, see 
Note, The Eighth Amendment and the Execution of the Presently 
Incompetent, 32 Stan.L.Rev. 765; Note, Insanity of the Condemned, 
88 Yale L.J. 533 (1979).



1 9 2

penalty have statutes that prohibit executing the insane,2 
although the procedures for enforcing the legislative man­
date of the various jurisdictions varies widely. Regard-

2 Twenty-two states have enacted statutory procedures explicitly 
prohibiting the execution of a prisoner who has been found pres­
ently incompetent. Ala.Code § 15-16-23 (1981) ; Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. 
§ 13-4021 et seq. (1982) ; Ark.Stat.Ann. § 43-2622 (1977) ; Cal.Penal 
Code § 3700 et seq. (1979); Conn.Gen.Stat. § 54-101 (1980); Fla. 
Stats. § 922.07 (1983) ; Ga.Code Ann. § 17-10-60 et seq. (1982) ; 
Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 38, § 1005-2-3 (1982) ; Kan.Stat. § 22-4006 (Supp. 
1981) ; Md.Ann.Code art. 27, § 75 (Cum.Supp. 1983); Mass.Gen. 
Laws Ann. ch. 279, § 62 (Supp. 1984); Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-57 
(Supp, 1983) ; Mo.Rev.Stat. § 552.060 (Supp. 1983) ; Mont.Code 
Ann. § 46-19-201 et seq. (1983) ; Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-2537 et seq. 
(1979) ; Nev.Rev.Stat. § 176.425 et seq. (1983) ; N.M.Stat.Ann. 
§ 31-14-4 et seq. (1978); N.Y.Correc.Law § 655 et seq. (Supp. 1983) ; 
Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2949.28 et seq. (Supp. 1982) ; Okla.Stat.Ann. 
title 22, § 1004 et seq. (1983) ; Utah Code Ann. § 77-19-13 (1982) ; 
Wyo.Stat. §7-13-901 et seq. (Cum.Supp. 1984).
Five states which authorize capital punishment have adopted 
statutes requiring the transfer of any mentally disordered prisoner 
to a state mental hospital. See 11 Del.Code Ann. § 406 (1982) ; 
Ind.Code Ann. § 11-10-4-1 et seq. (1983) ; N.C.Gen.Stat. § 15A-1001 
(1983) ; S.C. Code Ann. § 44-23-210 et seq. (Supp. 1983); Va. 
Code § 19.2-177 (1983).
Except in cases involving a woman supposedly pregnant, only the 
governor can reprieve a death sentence in Idaho, Idaho Code 
§ 19-2708 (1979). But Idaho adopts the common law absent a spe­
cific statutory provision, id. § 73-116 (1973), and the common law 
prohibits the execution of the presently incompetent. Therefore, the 
Idaho statute should apply for the presently incompetent.
Four states have statutes that g rant the governor, or some other 
authority discretion to stay the execution of the presently incom­
petent. See Ark.Stat.Ann. ;§ 43-2622 (1977); Ga.Code Ann. § 27- 
2602 (1978) ; Mass.Ann.Laws ch. 279, § 48 (Michie/Law.Co-op 
1963); N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 4-24 (1970).
Four states have adopted, by case law, the common law rule pro­
hibiting the execution of the presently incompetent. State v. Allen, 
204 La. 513, 516, 15 So.2d 870, 871 (1943) ; Commonwealth v. 
Moon, 383 Pa. 18, 22-23, 117 A.2d 96, 99, 100 (1955) ; Jordan v. 
State, 124 Tenn. 81, 90-91, 135 S.W. 327, 329-30 (1911); State v. 
Davis, 6 Wash.2d 696, 717, 108 P.2d 641, 651 (1940) (dictum).



193

less, the objective criteria both historical and present are 
uniform in their rejection of the penalty of death for the 
presently insane. Contemporary standards of decency 
clearly indicate the execution of an insane person would 
violate the Eighth Amendment.

The question of whether the execution of the insane 
would be in conflict with the dignity of man, the basic 
concept underlying the Eighth Amendment, Gregg, supra, 
428 U.S. at 173, 96 S.Ct. at 2925, is closely linked to an 
assessment of the contemporary standards of decency. 
428 U.S. at 175, 96 S.Ct. at 2926. However, an inde­
pendent assessment of such a practice leads to the same 
conclusion. It is a basic tenet in our society that true 
mental illness is not a voluntary disease that can be 
controlled. To execute one who is insane is to extinguish 
the life of a person in a completely helpless condition. 
This person cannot truly understand what is about to 
happen to him, cannot assist an attorney in any viable 
legal issue that may still be present in his case, cannot 
adequately prepare for imminent death, or depending on 
the particular person and his religion, make his peace 
with God. The execution of an insane person will not 
further the penalogical justifications for capital sentenc­
ing, deterrence and/or retribution.

Retribution is generally perceived as “an expression of 
society’s moral outrage.” Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183, 96 S.Ct. 
at 2929. However, the social goal of retribution is frus­
trated when the power of the State is exercised against 
one who does not comprehend its significance. See Note, 
Imcompetency to Stand Trial, 81 Harv.L.Rev. 454, 458-59 
(1967); Musselwhite v. State, 215 Miss. 363, 60 So.2d 
807 (1952).3

3 “Amid the darken midst of mental collapse, there is no light 
against which the shadows of death may he cast. I t  is revealed 
that if you were taken to the electric chair, he would not quail or 
take account of its significance.” Id. 60 So.2d a t 809. See also Note, 
Insanity of the Condemned, 88 Yale L.J. 533, 536 n. 17 (1979) 
(execution of the presently insane is executing a person who for 
all moral purposes is not the same person who committed the crim e).



194

Furthermore, deterrence is not served by the execution 
of the mentally incompentent. Prospective offenders of 
capital crime would not identify with an insane person 
who is executed. As one commentator said: “ [H]ow could 
the execution of a man incapable of understanding any 
law, operate more as a warning to others to avoid the 
violation of the law, than the public punishment of a dog? 
The one would be a spectacle of horror, the other of 
ridicule.” Collinson, A Treatise on Law Concerning 
Idiots, Lunatics, and Other Persons Non Compos Mentis 
472 (1812).

Therefore, a view of the historical and objective evi­
dence as well as an independent judicial assessment of the 
execution of the presently insane leads to the conclusion 
that such an act violates both contemporary standards of 
decency and the basic dignity of man. Therefore, there 
is an Eighth Amendment right not to be executed while 
presently insane.

Further support for this conclusion regarding the 
Eighth Amendment is found in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 
277, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637. The Supreme Court 
said that there can be no doubt that the Bill of Rights 
guaranteed at least the liberties and privileges that 
Englishmen had at the time the Bill of Rights was 
adopted. The Court went on to say:

When the framers of the Eighth Amendment adopted 
the language of the English Bill of Rights, . . . one 
of the consistent themes of the era was that Ameri­
cans had all of the rights of English subjects . . . . 
Thus, our Bill of Rights was designed in part to in­
sure that these rights were preserved. Although the 
framers may have intended the Eighth Amendment 
to go beyond the scope of its English counterpart, 
their use of the language of the Bill of Rights is 
convincing proof that they intended to provide at 
least the same protection—including the right to be 
free from excessive punishments.



195

103 S.Ct. at 3007, n. 10. The framers of the Bill of 
Rights were familiar with the English common law. As 
stated earlier in this opinion, the execution of the insane 
was seen as cruel and unusual punishment in England at 
the time of the adoption of the Eighth Amendment. 
Therefore, even under a strict view of the Eighth Amend­
ment, i.e. that a punishment is cruel and unusual only 
if it is similar to punishments considered cruel and un­
usual at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted, Furman 
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 264, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 2739, 33 
L.Ed.2d 346 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring), the exe­
cution of the insane is prohibited. At the time the Bill of 
Rights was adopted, the execution of the insane was 
clearly perceived to be a different kind of punishment 
than was the execution of one who is not insane. There­
fore, as a first principle, it is unequivocably established 
that there is a constitutional right not to be executed 
while insane. The question then becomes whether Flor­
ida’s procedures are adequate to protect this Eighth 
Amendment right.

The Procedural Requirements Stemming from the Eighth
Amendment Right Not to be Executed While Insane

The State of Florida has created an administrative 
proceeding in which the governor determines whether an 
individual under sentence of death is competent to be 
executed. F.S.A. § 922,07 (1983). That proceeding es­
sentially provides little due process rights for the indi­
vidual. When the governor is informed that a person 
may be insane, he must stay the execution of sentence and 
appoint three psychiatrists to examine the convicted per­
son “to determine whether he understands the nature 
and effect of the death penalty and why it is to be im­
posed upon him.” F.S.A. § 922.07(1). The examination 
is to take place with all three psychiatrists present at 
the same time. Defense counsel and the prosecutor may 
be present at the examination and if the prisoner sen­



196

tenced to death has no counsel the trial court shall ap­
point counsel to represent him. Id. However, no hearing 
is held and no provision is made for advocacy. The pres­
ent governor has a publicly announced policy of “exclud­
ing all advocacy on the part of the condemned from the 
process of determining whether a person under sentence 
of death is insane.” 4 After receiving the psychiatrists’ 
report, the governor makes a decision. If the governor 
decides that the convicted person does not meet the pre­
scribed competency test, then he orders the person com­
mitted to the state hospital. If he decides that the person 
is sane, then the governor issues the death warrant order­
ing execution. F.S.A. § 922.07(2) and (3). There are no 
written findings and there is no judicial review of the 
decision. The Florida Supreme Court held in this case 
that “the statutory procedure is now the exclusive pro­
cedure for determining competency to be executed.” Ford 
v. Wainwright, 451 So.2d 471, 475 (Fla.1984). The issue 
of sanity cannot be raised independently in the state 
judicial system. Id.

This procedure does not adequately protect a person’s 
Eighth Amendment right not to be executed while insane. 
The fact that we are considering a federal constitutionally 
protected right (rather than a state created right which 
may be afforded some due process protections5) requires 
more process than the Florida procedure gives. Because 
of the qualitative difference of the death penalty, the 
Supreme Court has articulated a procedural component 
to the Eighth Amendment. In this vein, the Court has 
been chiefly concerned “with the procedure by which the 
state imposes the death sentence . . . .” California v. 
Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 3451, 77 L.Ed.2d 
1171 (1983). The qualitative difference of the death 
penalty requires a “corresponding difference in the need 
for reliability in the determination that death is the ap­

4 Goode v. Wainwright, 448 So.2d 999 (Fla. 1984).

5 See discussion, supra, pages 528-529.



197

propriate punishment in a specific case.” Woodson v. 
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991, 
49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976). Just last term, the Court stated, 
“We reaffirm our commitment to the demands of relia­
bility in decisions involving death . . .” Spaziano v.
Florida, -----  U.S. ------, -----, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 3160, 82
L.Ed.2d 340, 349 (1984). Florida’s procedures do not 
comport with the procedural component of the Eighth 
Amendment’s standards for reliability.

Admittedly, we are not reviewing here the question of 
whether death is the appropriate punishment for Mr. 
Ford and the procedures used to make that decision. 
Nevertheless, the procedure used to determine whether the 
death penalty is a permissible punishment for him at this 
time is being reviewed. The reliability required for 
capital decisions is still relevant and adequate procedures 
to determine his present death eligibility are still re­
quired. We have not held in any case that a substantive 
constitutional right is adequately protected by an ad­
ministrative ex parte hearing conducted by the executive 
branch of state government. It is the role of the courts, 
both state and federal, as the expositors of the dimen­
sions of constitutional rights to make this decision. Mar- 
bury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 
(1803).

A judicial hearing is required in order to provide the 
“adversarial debate our system recognizes as essential 
for the truth seeking function.” Gardner v. Florida, 430 
U.S. 349, 359, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1205, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 
(1977). It is a fundamental tenet of our judicial system 
and, therefore, our system for protecting constitutional 
rights, that there is “no better instrument . . . for arriv­
ing at truth.” Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Commission v. 
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171, 71 S.Ct. 624, 648, 95 L.Ed. 
817 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Adversary 
hearings serve as an institutional check on arbitrary and 
impermissible action and no other procedure effectively



198

fosters the same belief that one has been dealt with fairly 
even if there remains a disagreement with the result. 
Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d 146, 162 (D.C.Cir. 
1980). The Florida procedure is totally lacking in due 
process protection. There is no room for advocacy,6 no 
written findings, and no judicial review. The executive 
branch of state government which prosecuted the de­
fendant makes an unreviewable decision as to whether 
he receives the protection of the constitutional right not 
to be executed if insane. Therefore, there are no protec­
tions against erroneous or arbitrary decisions as to the 
person’s competency.

The conclusion that the Florida procedure is inade­
quate is supported by the Supreme Court’s habeas corpus 
decisions. In Toivnsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 
745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963), the Court addressed the 
situation of whether it was mandatory to hold an evi­
dentiary hearing on constitutional claims presented in 
habeas corpus actions. The Court said: “Where the facts 
are in dispute, the federal court in habeas corpus must 
hold an evidentiary hearing if the habeas applicant did 
not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing in his 
state court, either at the time of the trial or in a col­
lateral proceeding. In other words a federal evidentiary 
hearing is required unless the state court trier of fact 
has, after a full hearing, reliably found the relevant 
facts.” 372 U.S. at 312, 83 S.Ct. at 756. See also Thomas 
v. Zant, 697 F.2d 977, 980-81 (11th Cir.1983). The Court 
in Townsend then set out categories of cases where a 
hearing must be held. These categories focus upon the 
reliability of the state court proceedings to vindicate 
the constitutional right. Townsend, supra, 372 U.S. at 
313, 83 S.Ct. at 757. These categories were enacted in 
the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), 
where Congress defined the situations in which state court

8 The petitioner cannot call witnesses, cross-examine the doctors 
who render the decision, or present argument on his behalf.



199

fact-findings are entitled to a “presumption of correct­
ness by the federal courts.” Again, the focus is on 
reliability. Townsend thus sets forth the threshold stand­
ards of determining whether a hearing must be held and 
whether § 2254(d) governs the state decision. See Guice 
v. Fortenberry, 661 F.2d 496 (5th Cir.1981) (en banc).

Section 2254(d) assumes that there will be findings 
made by a state court. In this case, there was no hearing 
and thus no court determination. Furthermore, § 2254 
(d) (1) provides that federal courts will not defer to state 
fact-finding if the merits were not resolved in the state 
court hearing. Subsection (2) of § 2254(d) precludes 
giving deference to a fact-finding procedure employed by 
the state which was not adequate to afford a full and fair 
hearing. Subsection ,(3) of the same statutory section 
precludes deference if the material facts, were not ade­
quately developed at the state court hearing. Finally, 
subsection (6) requires that no deference be accorded if 
the petitioner did not receive a full, fair and adequate 
hearing in the state court proceeding. The facts as to 
Ford’s sanity are in sharp dispute and have never been 
reached or resolved by a hearing in the state court or 
otherwise. As we said in our previous decision in this 
case, “credible evidence . . . indicates that Ford is insane.” 
Ford v. Strickland, 734 F.2d 538, 539 (11th Cir. 1984).

Contrary to the holding of the majority, Ford’s crimes 
are not foreclosed by Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 70 
S.Ct. 457, 94 L.Ed. 604 (1950) ; Caritativo v. California, 
357 U.S. 549, 78 S.Ct. 1263, 2 L.Ed.2d 1531 (1958), or, 
Goode v. Wainwright, 731 F.2d 1482 (11th Cir.1984). In 
none of these three cases did the Court reach a judicial 
determination that a person has a constitutional right not 
to be executed when insane. The majority opinion and 
the dissent concur that no federal appellate court has 
decided this issue.

Solesbee and Caritativo were decided before the Eighth 
Amendment was applied to the states through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The



200

Eighth Amendment was incorporated in the case of 
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 
L.Ed.2d 728 (1962). Additionally, those two cases were 
decided before the Supreme Court drastically altered the 
constitutional framework in which a citizen in this coun­
try can be executed.7 Therefore, they are inapplicable in 
deciding what the Eighth Amendment requires proce- 
durally before a person who maintains that he is incom­
petent can be executed.

A certificate of probable cause was denied in Goode 
because “ [a] ssuming that there is such a right [not to 
be executed when insane], we agree with the district 
court that petitioner is barred from raising it in this 
case because of abuse of the writ.” Goode v. Waimvright, 
731 F.2d 1482, 1483 (11th Cir.1984) (citations omitted). 
The denial of a certificate is a holding that the appeal 
is frivolous and is a decision by the court that it will 
not consider the case on its merits. Barefoot v. Estelle, 
463 U.S. 880, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 77 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1983).

The majority thus errs in relying upon an opinion that 
did not consider on their merits the issues considered 
herein. The decision of this court to deny Goode’s certifi­
cate for probable cause was appealed to the Supreme 
Court which summarily refused to stay the execution.
Goode v. Wainwright,----- U .S.-------, 104 S.Ct. 1721, 80
L.Ed.2d 192 (1984) (unpublished order denying cer­
tiorari). Both courts decided the case on April 4, 1984.

7 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 
346 (1972); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 
L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), as well as the above discussion. A t the time 
Solesbee and Caritativo were decided, there was nothing consti­
tutionally impermissible with “committing to the untrammeled dis­
cretion of the jury  the power to pronounce life or death in capital 
cases.” McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 207, 91 S.Ct, 1454, 
1467, 28 L.Ed.2d 711 (1971). McGautha, like Solesbee and Carita­
tivo, was decided on the basis of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
not on Eighth Amendment grounds. In Furman and Gregg, the 
Court recognized and began to explicate the Eighth Amendment 
parameters of capital sentencing.



201

The present case has a different history. The panel of 
this court granted the certificate of probable cause on 
May 30, 1984, because there was no abuse of the writ. 
The execution was stayed to permit decision of the im­
portant issue. As stated previously, the Supreme Court 
refused to vacate our stay. Wainwright v. Ford, —
U.S. ----- , 104 S.Ct. 3498, 82 L.Ed.2d 911, and Justice
Powell noted that this issue has not been decided by 
the Supreme Court Supra, 104 S.Ct. at 3498.

It is apparent that the Supreme Court considered that 
Goode was decided on the issue of abuse of the writ and 
that it was presented the issue of whether our court erred 
in denying the certificate of probable cause. It is just as 
apparent that the Supreme Court refused to vacate the 
May 30, 1984, stay of execution so that this court could 
consider the important issues of whether a person sen­
tenced to die has the right not to be executed if he is 
insane, and if he has that right, whether he is entitled to 
a due process hearing to make the determination of this 
factual issue.

The district court should be reversed and the case 
remanded for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d) to determine whether Ford is insane.



202

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 84-5372

Alvin Bernard F ord, or Connie F ord, individually, 
and acting as next friend on behalf of 

Alvin Bernard F ord, petitioners-appellants

versus
Louie L. Wainwright, Secretary 

Department of Corrections,
State of Florida, respondent-appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Florida

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND 
SUGGESTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

(Opinion January 17, 1985, 11 Cir., 198—, -----F.2d------ ).
(June 3, 1985)

Before VANCE and CLARK, Circuit Judges, and STAF­
FORD *, District Judge.

* Hon. William H. Stafford, Jr., U.S. D istrict Judge for the 
Northern D istrict of Florda, sitting by designation.



203

PER CURIAM:

(X) A member of the Court in active service having re­
quested a poll on the reconsideration of this cause en 
banc, and a majority of the judges in active service not 
having voted in favor of it, rehearing en banc is DE­
NIED.

E ntered for the Court:

/ s /  [Illegible]
United States Circuit Judge



204

[Section 922.07, F lo rid a  S ta tu te s  (1983), as amended (1985)]

922.07 Proceedings when person under sentence of 
death appears to be insane.—

(1) When the Governor is informed that a person un­
der sentence of death may be insane, he shall stay execu­
tion of the sentence and appoint a commission of three 
psychiatrists to examine the convicted person. The Gov­
ernor shall notify the psychiatrists in writing that they 
are to examine the convicted person to determine whether 
he understands the nature and effect of the death penalty 
and why it is to be imposed upon him. The examination 
of the convicted person shall take place with all three 
psychiatrists present at the same time. Counsel for the 
convicted person and the state attorney may be present 
at the examination. If the convicted person does not 
have counsel, the court that imposed the sentence shall 
appoint counsel to represent him.

(2) After receiving the report of the commission, if 
the Governor decides that the convicted person has the 
mental capacity to understand the nature of the death 
penalty and the reasons why it was imposed upon him, 
he shall issue a warrant to the warden directing him 
to execute the sentence at a time designated in the 
warrant.

(3) If the Governor decides that the convicted person 
does not have the mental capacity to understand the 
nature of the death penalty and why it was imposed on 
him, he shall have him committed to the state hospital 
for the insane.

(4) When a person under sentence of death has been 
committed to the state hospital for the insane, he shall 
be kept there until the proper official of the hospital de­
termines that he has been restored to sanity. The hos­
pital official shall notify the Governor of his determina­
tion, and the Governor shall appoint another commission 
to proceed as provided in subsection (1).



205

(5) The Governor shall allow reasonable fees to psy­
chiatrists appointed under the provisions of this section 
which shall be paid by the state.

History.—s. 268, ch. 19554, 1939; CGL 1940 Supp. 8663 
(278) ; s. 134, ch. 70-339.

CHAPTER 85-193 

Senate Bill No. 1185
An act relating to executions; amending s. 922.07, 

F.S.; directing the Governor to have certain con­
demned persons committed to the Department of 
Corrections Mental Health Treatment Facility; 
directing the facility administrator to notify the 
Governor of certain findings; providing an ef­
fective date.

Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:
Section 1. Subsections (3) and (4) of section 922.07, 

Florida Statutes, are amended to read:
922.07 Proceedings when person under sentence of 

death appears to be insane.—
(3) If the Governor decides that the convicted person 

does not have the mental capacity to understand the na­
ture of the death penalty and why it was imposed on 
him, he shall have him committed to a Department of 
Corrections mental health treatment facility [the state 
hospital for the insane.]

(4) When a person under sentence of death has been 
committed to a Department of Corrections mental health 
treatment facility [the state hospital for the insane,] he 
shall be kept there until the facility administrator 
[proper official of the hospital] determines that he has 
been restored to sanity. The facility administrator hos­
pital official shall notify the Governor of his determina­
tion, and the Governor shall appoint another commission 
to proceed as provided in subsection (1).



206

Section 2. This act shall take effect upon becoming 
a law.

Approved by the Governor June 18, 1985.
Filed in Office of Secretary of State June 18, 1985.

CODING: Words in [Bracketed Type] are deletions from existing 
law; words in [Italicized Type] are additions.



207

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 85-5542

Alvin Bernard F ord, etc., petitioner

v.

Louie L. Wainwright, Secretary,
Florida Department of Corrections

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

On Consideration of the motion for leave to proceed 
herein in forma pauperis and of the petition for writ of 
certiorari, it is ordered by this Court that the motion 
to proceed in forma pauperis be, and the same is hereby, 
granted; and that the petition for writ of certiorari be, 
and the same is hereby, granted.

December 9, 1985