Cummings v. City of Charleston Brief for Appellees
Public Court Documents
March 31, 1961
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Cummings v. City of Charleston Brief for Appellees, 1961. f3d9a9c1-ae9a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/3ca2b779-a7a1-4d97-ac85-e4775a25de71/cummings-v-city-of-charleston-brief-for-appellees. Accessed November 23, 2025.
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BRIEF OF APPELLEES
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
JOHN H. CUMMINGS, JOHN L. CHISOLM, WILLIAM
CROMWELL, ARTHUR PRICE, EDWARD V.
PAYNE, ROBERT JOHNSON, DAN NOWELL,
ERNEST CROMWELL, J A M E S N. FOREST,
HENRY BOYD, BENJAMIN WRIGHT, CLAR
ENCE BROWN and HORACE GROSS, for them
selves AND ALL OTHER PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
P laintiffs-A ppellants,
versus
THE CITY OF CHARLESTON, a Municipal Corpora
tion, THE CHARLESTON MUNICIPAL GOLF
COURSE COMMISSION, GERALD M. CARTER,
C hairman, ALFRED 0. HALSEY, CORNELIOUS 0.
THOMPSON, T. MOULTRIE MeKEVLIN, W IL
LIAM A. DOTTERER, LEROY NELSON and C.
BISSELL JENKINS, members of the Charleston
M unicipal Golf Course Commission; and JOHN E.
ADAMS, Manager of the Charleston Municipal Golf
Course, D efendants-A ppellees.
MORRIS I). ROSEN,
45 Broad Street,
Charleston, S. C.,
HENRY B. SMYTHE,
30 Broad Street,
Charleston, S. C.,
Attorneys for Appellees.
The R. L. Bryan Company, Legal Printers, Columbia, S. C.
BRIEF OF APPELLEES
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
JOHN H. CUMMINGS, JOHN L. CHISOLM, WILLIAM
CROMWELL, ARTHUR PRICE, EDWARD V.
PAYNE, ROBERT JOHNSON, I)AN NOWELL,
ERNEST CROMWELL, J A M E S N. FOREST,
HENRY BOYD, BENJAMIN W7RIGHT, CLAR
ENCE BROWN and HORACE GROSS, fob t h e m
selves AND AT.T. OTHER PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
P lain tiffs-A ppellan ts ,
versus
THE CITY OF CHARLESTON, a M u n icipal C orpora
tio n , THE CHARLESTON MUNICIPAL GOLF
COURSE COMMISSION, GERALD M. CARTER,
C h a irm a n , ALFRED 0. HALSEY, CORNELIOUS 0.
THOMPSON, T. MOULTRIE McKEVLIN, W IL
LIAM A . DOTTERER, LEROY NELSON and C.
BISSELL JENKINS, members of th e C harleston
M u n icipal G olf C ourse Com m ission ; and JOHN E.
ADAMS, M anager of th e C harleston M u n icipal G olf
C ourse, D efendants-A ppellees.
STATEMENT OF CASE
The respondents take no exception to the appellants’
statement of the ease, except they disagree with the state
ment appearing in the first full paragraph on page 4 of the
appellants’ brief in which it is stated that “ The court below,
after hearing, decided to recuse itself stating that it dis
agreed with the United States Supreme Court decisions
governing this question. (App. p. 57a)” . The court rather
took under consideration the question of disqualification
and determined not to disqualify itself.
THE QUESTION PRESENTED
Is a delay of eight months in making effective an order
enjoining the defendants from operating the municipally
owned golf course as a segregated facility an abuse of equit
able discretion on the part of the District Judge?
ARGUMENT
The court below in its order stated “ I have concluded
that it will be equitable for this court to grant the defend
ants a reasonable period of time within which to resolve
the matters which they have presented” (Appellants’ App.
p. 63a). The court then concluded that such a reasonable
period of time was eight months. The granting of delay in
a case involving racial integration is supported in numerous
cases, beginning with Brown v. Board of Education, 349
IT. S. 295, 75 Su. Ct. 753 (1954), which is the fountainhead
of the modern era of integration cases. In that case the
Supreme Court of the United States recognized that the
District Courts, because of their proximity to local condi
tions, could best perform the judicial appraisal necessary
to implementing the sweeping order of the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court further held that the District Courts
in implementing this order should be governed by equitable
principles, and should proceed not precipitously but with
deliberate speed. Sinee that case courts throughout the
South, trying to work out with a minimum of disruption,
problems which are in every case difficult, have exercised
their equitable discretion and have granted periods of delay
during which tempers could cool, and the public could be
2 Cummings, Appellants, v . the City of Charleston, A ppellees
conditioned to acceptance of what, in many cases, to many
people, are radical changes in the pattern of their lives.
Periods of delay have been granted in cases involving the
identical situation present in this ease, namely municipal
golf courses; Hayes et al. v. Crutcher el al., 137 F. Supp.
853 (1956); Augustus v. City of Pensacola, D.C.N.D. Fla,
Pace Relations Law Reporter 6S1 (1956); Simkins el al. v.
City of Greensboro, 149 F. Supp. 562 (1957).
In the instant case the District Judge who granted the
stay of eight months lives in the affected community and,
to quote the language of the Supreme Court of the United
States in the Brown case, .supra, “because of their proximity
to local conditions” , is perhaps in the best position to know
what delay is reasonable. In his opinion eight months was
a reasonable period. No one can say with mathematical
certainty that in a case such as this equity is best served
by a delay involving an exact number of months, weeks,
days, hours or minutes. The court below in its best judg
ment has reached a decision, and it is submitted that there
is no basis, presented by the appellants, on which this Court
can determine that the decision below is an abuse of dis
cretion.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the period of delay
granted by the court below should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
MORRIS D. ROSEN,
45 Broad Street,
Charleston, S. C.,
HENRY B. SMYTHE,
30 Broad Street,
Charleston, S. C.,
Attorneys for Appellees.
Cummings, Appellants, v . the City op Charleston, Appellees 3
INDEX TO BRIEF
P age
Statement of Case ............................................. ................. 1
The Question Presented 2
Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Conclusion ................................................... . ....................... 3
( i )
P age
Augustus v. City of Pensacola, D.C.N.D. Fla,, 1 Race
Relations Law Reporter 681 (1956) ............................ 3
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 IT. S. 295, 75 Su. Ct,
753 (1954) ............................... .......................................2, 3
Hayes et al. v. Crutcher et al., 137 F. Supp. 853, (1956) 3
Simkins et al. v. City of Greensboro, 149 F. Supp. 562
(1957) ............................................... ................................. 3
TABLE OF CASES
( i i i )