Cummings v. City of Charleston Brief for Appellees
Public Court Documents
March 31, 1961

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Cummings v. City of Charleston Brief for Appellees, 1961. f3d9a9c1-ae9a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/3ca2b779-a7a1-4d97-ac85-e4775a25de71/cummings-v-city-of-charleston-brief-for-appellees. Accessed July 30, 2025.
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BRIEF OF APPELLEES United States Court of Appeals FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT JOHN H. CUMMINGS, JOHN L. CHISOLM, WILLIAM CROMWELL, ARTHUR PRICE, EDWARD V. PAYNE, ROBERT JOHNSON, DAN NOWELL, ERNEST CROMWELL, J A M E S N. FOREST, HENRY BOYD, BENJAMIN WRIGHT, CLAR ENCE BROWN and HORACE GROSS, for them selves AND ALL OTHER PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED, P laintiffs-A ppellants, versus THE CITY OF CHARLESTON, a Municipal Corpora tion, THE CHARLESTON MUNICIPAL GOLF COURSE COMMISSION, GERALD M. CARTER, C hairman, ALFRED 0. HALSEY, CORNELIOUS 0. THOMPSON, T. MOULTRIE MeKEVLIN, W IL LIAM A. DOTTERER, LEROY NELSON and C. BISSELL JENKINS, members of the Charleston M unicipal Golf Course Commission; and JOHN E. ADAMS, Manager of the Charleston Municipal Golf Course, D efendants-A ppellees. MORRIS I). ROSEN, 45 Broad Street, Charleston, S. C., HENRY B. SMYTHE, 30 Broad Street, Charleston, S. C., Attorneys for Appellees. The R. L. Bryan Company, Legal Printers, Columbia, S. C. BRIEF OF APPELLEES United States Court of Appeals FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT JOHN H. CUMMINGS, JOHN L. CHISOLM, WILLIAM CROMWELL, ARTHUR PRICE, EDWARD V. PAYNE, ROBERT JOHNSON, I)AN NOWELL, ERNEST CROMWELL, J A M E S N. FOREST, HENRY BOYD, BENJAMIN W7RIGHT, CLAR ENCE BROWN and HORACE GROSS, fob t h e m selves AND AT.T. OTHER PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED, P lain tiffs-A ppellan ts , versus THE CITY OF CHARLESTON, a M u n icipal C orpora tio n , THE CHARLESTON MUNICIPAL GOLF COURSE COMMISSION, GERALD M. CARTER, C h a irm a n , ALFRED 0. HALSEY, CORNELIOUS 0. THOMPSON, T. MOULTRIE McKEVLIN, W IL LIAM A . DOTTERER, LEROY NELSON and C. BISSELL JENKINS, members of th e C harleston M u n icipal G olf C ourse Com m ission ; and JOHN E. ADAMS, M anager of th e C harleston M u n icipal G olf C ourse, D efendants-A ppellees. STATEMENT OF CASE The respondents take no exception to the appellants’ statement of the ease, except they disagree with the state ment appearing in the first full paragraph on page 4 of the appellants’ brief in which it is stated that “ The court below, after hearing, decided to recuse itself stating that it dis agreed with the United States Supreme Court decisions governing this question. (App. p. 57a)” . The court rather took under consideration the question of disqualification and determined not to disqualify itself. THE QUESTION PRESENTED Is a delay of eight months in making effective an order enjoining the defendants from operating the municipally owned golf course as a segregated facility an abuse of equit able discretion on the part of the District Judge? ARGUMENT The court below in its order stated “ I have concluded that it will be equitable for this court to grant the defend ants a reasonable period of time within which to resolve the matters which they have presented” (Appellants’ App. p. 63a). The court then concluded that such a reasonable period of time was eight months. The granting of delay in a case involving racial integration is supported in numerous cases, beginning with Brown v. Board of Education, 349 IT. S. 295, 75 Su. Ct. 753 (1954), which is the fountainhead of the modern era of integration cases. In that case the Supreme Court of the United States recognized that the District Courts, because of their proximity to local condi tions, could best perform the judicial appraisal necessary to implementing the sweeping order of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court further held that the District Courts in implementing this order should be governed by equitable principles, and should proceed not precipitously but with deliberate speed. Sinee that case courts throughout the South, trying to work out with a minimum of disruption, problems which are in every case difficult, have exercised their equitable discretion and have granted periods of delay during which tempers could cool, and the public could be 2 Cummings, Appellants, v . the City of Charleston, A ppellees conditioned to acceptance of what, in many cases, to many people, are radical changes in the pattern of their lives. Periods of delay have been granted in cases involving the identical situation present in this ease, namely municipal golf courses; Hayes et al. v. Crutcher el al., 137 F. Supp. 853 (1956); Augustus v. City of Pensacola, D.C.N.D. Fla, Pace Relations Law Reporter 6S1 (1956); Simkins el al. v. City of Greensboro, 149 F. Supp. 562 (1957). In the instant case the District Judge who granted the stay of eight months lives in the affected community and, to quote the language of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Brown case, .supra, “because of their proximity to local conditions” , is perhaps in the best position to know what delay is reasonable. In his opinion eight months was a reasonable period. No one can say with mathematical certainty that in a case such as this equity is best served by a delay involving an exact number of months, weeks, days, hours or minutes. The court below in its best judg ment has reached a decision, and it is submitted that there is no basis, presented by the appellants, on which this Court can determine that the decision below is an abuse of dis cretion. CONCLUSION It is respectfully submitted that the period of delay granted by the court below should be affirmed. Respectfully submitted, MORRIS D. ROSEN, 45 Broad Street, Charleston, S. C., HENRY B. SMYTHE, 30 Broad Street, Charleston, S. C., Attorneys for Appellees. Cummings, Appellants, v . the City op Charleston, Appellees 3 INDEX TO BRIEF P age Statement of Case ............................................. ................. 1 The Question Presented 2 Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Conclusion ................................................... . ....................... 3 ( i ) P age Augustus v. City of Pensacola, D.C.N.D. Fla,, 1 Race Relations Law Reporter 681 (1956) ............................ 3 Brown v. Board of Education, 349 IT. S. 295, 75 Su. Ct, 753 (1954) ............................... .......................................2, 3 Hayes et al. v. Crutcher et al., 137 F. Supp. 853, (1956) 3 Simkins et al. v. City of Greensboro, 149 F. Supp. 562 (1957) ............................................... ................................. 3 TABLE OF CASES ( i i i )