Cummings v. City of Charleston Brief for Appellees

Public Court Documents
March 31, 1961

Cummings v. City of Charleston Brief for Appellees preview

Cite this item

  • Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Cummings v. City of Charleston Brief for Appellees, 1961. f3d9a9c1-ae9a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/3ca2b779-a7a1-4d97-ac85-e4775a25de71/cummings-v-city-of-charleston-brief-for-appellees. Accessed July 30, 2025.

    Copied!

    BRIEF OF APPELLEES

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

JOHN H. CUMMINGS, JOHN L. CHISOLM, WILLIAM 
CROMWELL, ARTHUR PRICE, EDWARD V. 
PAYNE, ROBERT JOHNSON, DAN NOWELL, 
ERNEST CROMWELL, J A M E S  N. FOREST, 
HENRY BOYD, BENJAMIN WRIGHT, CLAR­
ENCE BROWN and HORACE GROSS, for them ­
selves AND ALL OTHER PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
P laintiffs-A ppellants,

versus

THE CITY OF CHARLESTON, a Municipal Corpora­
tion, THE CHARLESTON MUNICIPAL GOLF 
COURSE COMMISSION, GERALD M. CARTER, 
C hairman, ALFRED 0. HALSEY, CORNELIOUS 0. 
THOMPSON, T. MOULTRIE MeKEVLIN, W IL­
LIAM A. DOTTERER, LEROY NELSON and C. 
BISSELL JENKINS, members of the Charleston 
M unicipal Golf Course Commission; and JOHN E. 
ADAMS, Manager of the Charleston Municipal Golf 
Course, D efendants-A ppellees.

MORRIS I). ROSEN,
45 Broad Street,

Charleston, S. C.,
HENRY B. SMYTHE,

30 Broad Street,
Charleston, S. C., 

Attorneys for Appellees.

The R. L. Bryan Company, Legal Printers, Columbia, S. C.



BRIEF OF APPELLEES

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

JOHN H. CUMMINGS, JOHN L. CHISOLM, WILLIAM 
CROMWELL, ARTHUR PRICE, EDWARD V. 
PAYNE, ROBERT JOHNSON, I)AN NOWELL, 
ERNEST CROMWELL, J A M E S  N. FOREST, 
HENRY BOYD, BENJAMIN W7RIGHT, CLAR­
ENCE BROWN and HORACE GROSS, fob t h e m ­
selves AND AT.T. OTHER PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
P lain tiffs-A ppellan ts ,

versus

THE CITY OF CHARLESTON, a M u n icipal  C orpora­
tio n , THE CHARLESTON MUNICIPAL GOLF 
COURSE COMMISSION, GERALD M. CARTER, 
C h a irm a n , ALFRED 0. HALSEY, CORNELIOUS 0. 
THOMPSON, T. MOULTRIE McKEVLIN, W IL­
LIAM A . DOTTERER, LEROY NELSON and C. 
BISSELL JENKINS, members of th e  C harleston  
M u n icipal  G olf C ourse Com m ission ;  and JOHN E. 
ADAMS, M anager of th e  C harleston  M u n icipal  G olf 
C ourse, D efendants-A ppellees.

STATEMENT OF CASE
The respondents take no exception to the appellants’ 

statement of the ease, except they disagree with the state­
ment appearing in the first full paragraph on page 4 of the 
appellants’ brief in which it is stated that “ The court below,



after hearing, decided to recuse itself stating that it dis­
agreed with the United States Supreme Court decisions 
governing this question. (App. p. 57a)” . The court rather 
took under consideration the question of disqualification 
and determined not to disqualify itself.

THE QUESTION PRESENTED
Is a delay of eight months in making effective an order 

enjoining the defendants from operating the municipally 
owned golf course as a segregated facility an abuse of equit­
able discretion on the part of the District Judge?

ARGUMENT
The court below in its order stated “ I have concluded 

that it will be equitable for this court to grant the defend­
ants a reasonable period of time within which to resolve 
the matters which they have presented” (Appellants’ App. 
p. 63a). The court then concluded that such a reasonable 
period of time was eight months. The granting of delay in 
a case involving racial integration is supported in numerous 
cases, beginning with Brown v. Board of Education, 349 
IT. S. 295, 75 Su. Ct. 753 (1954), which is the fountainhead 
of the modern era of integration cases. In that case the 
Supreme Court of the United States recognized that the 
District Courts, because of their proximity to local condi­
tions, could best perform the judicial appraisal necessary 
to implementing the sweeping order of the Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court further held that the District Courts 
in implementing this order should be governed by equitable 
principles, and should proceed not precipitously but with 
deliberate speed. Sinee that case courts throughout the 
South, trying to work out with a minimum of disruption, 
problems which are in every case difficult, have exercised 
their equitable discretion and have granted periods of delay 
during which tempers could cool, and the public could be

2 Cummings, Appellants, v . the City of Charleston, A ppellees



conditioned to acceptance of what, in many cases, to many 
people, are radical changes in the pattern of their lives. 
Periods of delay have been granted in cases involving the 
identical situation present in this ease, namely municipal 
golf courses; Hayes et al. v. Crutcher el al., 137 F. Supp. 
853 (1956); Augustus v. City of Pensacola, D.C.N.D. Fla, 
Pace Relations Law Reporter 6S1 (1956); Simkins el al. v. 
City of Greensboro, 149 F. Supp. 562 (1957).

In the instant case the District Judge who granted the 
stay of eight months lives in the affected community and, 
to quote the language of the Supreme Court of the United 
States in the Brown case, .supra, “because of their proximity 
to local conditions” , is perhaps in the best position to know 
what delay is reasonable. In his opinion eight months was 
a reasonable period. No one can say with mathematical 
certainty that in a case such as this equity is best served 
by a delay involving an exact number of months, weeks, 
days, hours or minutes. The court below in its best judg­
ment has reached a decision, and it is submitted that there 
is no basis, presented by the appellants, on which this Court 
can determine that the decision below is an abuse of dis­
cretion.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the period of delay 

granted by the court below should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

MORRIS D. ROSEN,
45 Broad Street,

Charleston, S. C.,

HENRY B. SMYTHE,
30 Broad Street,

Charleston, S. C.,
Attorneys for Appellees.

Cummings, Appellants, v . the City op Charleston, Appellees 3



INDEX TO BRIEF
P age

Statement of Case ............................................. .................  1

The Question Presented 2

Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2

Conclusion ................................................... . .......................  3

( i )



P age

Augustus v. City of Pensacola, D.C.N.D. Fla,, 1 Race 
Relations Law Reporter 681 (1956) ............................ 3

Brown v. Board of Education, 349 IT. S. 295, 75 Su. Ct,
753 (1954) ............................... .......................................2, 3

Hayes et al. v. Crutcher et al., 137 F. Supp. 853, (1956) 3

Simkins et al. v. City of Greensboro, 149 F. Supp. 562 
(1957) ............................................... ................................. 3

TABLE OF CASES

( i i i )

Copyright notice

© NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.

This collection and the tools to navigate it (the “Collection”) are available to the public for general educational and research purposes, as well as to preserve and contextualize the history of the content and materials it contains (the “Materials”). Like other archival collections, such as those found in libraries, LDF owns the physical source Materials that have been digitized for the Collection; however, LDF does not own the underlying copyright or other rights in all items and there are limits on how you can use the Materials. By accessing and using the Material, you acknowledge your agreement to the Terms. If you do not agree, please do not use the Materials.


Additional info

To the extent that LDF includes information about the Materials’ origins or ownership or provides summaries or transcripts of original source Materials, LDF does not warrant or guarantee the accuracy of such information, transcripts or summaries, and shall not be responsible for any inaccuracies.

Return to top