Brown v. Board of Education Vol. II Amicus Curiae Briefs

Public Court Documents
January 1, 1952 - January 1, 1954

Brown v. Board of Education Vol. II Amicus Curiae Briefs preview

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  • Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Brown v. Board of Education Vol. II Amicus Curiae Briefs, 1952. a76ef565-ca9a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/3cd4204b-95a7-47bb-a759-061fd7a41976/brown-v-board-of-education-vol-ii-amicus-curiae-briefs. Accessed July 09, 2025.

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IN THE

Supreme (Emtrt of the llnitefc States
October Teem, 1954

No

Oliver Brown, et al.,
Appellants,

v.
Board of E ducation of 

Topeka, Shawnee Coun­
ty, K ansas, et al.

Harry Briggs, Jr., et al., 
Appellants, 

v.
R. W . E lliott, et al.

.....

—  666 3
Dorothy E. Davis, et al., 

Appellants, 
v.

County School B oard of 
Prince E dward County, 
V irginia, et al.

F rances B. Gebhart, et al., 
Petitioners, 

v.
E thel L ouise Belton, et al.

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF FLORIDA

R ichard W . E rvin

Attorney General of the 
State of Florida 

State Capitol Building 
Tallahassee, Florida

Ralph E. Odum

Assistant Attorney General 
State of Florida





IN THE

Supreme (Eourt of the Hutted States
October Term, 1954

No,

Oliver Brown, et al.,
Appellants,

v.
Board op E ducation of 

Topeka, Shawnee Coun­
ty, K ansas, et al.

Harry Briggs, Jr., et al., 
Appellants, 

v.
R. W . E lliott, et al.

Dorothy E. Davis, et al., 
Appellants, 

v.
County School Board op 

Prince E dward County, 
V irginia, et al.

F rances B. Gebhart, et al., 
Petitioners, 

v.
E thel L ouise Belton, et al.

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF FLORIDA

Richard W . E rvin

Attorney General of the 
State of Florida 

State Capitol Building 
Tallahassee, Florida

Ralph E. Odum

Assistant Attorney General 
State of Florida





Subject Matter Index

. Page
Preliminary Statement ........................................................  1

PART ONE

A Discussion of the Reasons for a Period of Gradual 
Adjustment to Desegregation to be Permitted in Florida 
with Broad Powers of Discretion Vested in Local School 
Authorities to Determine Administrative Procedures.....  3

A. The Need for Time in Revising the State Legal
Structure ....................................................................... 5
L Examples of Legislative Problems ..................  7

(a) Scholarships....................................................  7
(b) Powers and Duties of County School

Boards .............................................................. 10
(c) State Board of Education and State Super­

intendent ........................................................  12
H. Discussion of Legislative Attitudes.................... 14

B. The Need for Time in Revising Administrative
Procedures .................................................................... 17
I. Examples ...............................................................  18

(a) Transportation ...............................................  18
(b) Redistricting ..................................................  19
(c) Scholastic Standards ....................................  19
(d) Health and Moral W elfare........................... 20

C. The Need for Time in Gaining Public Acceptance.. 23
I. A  Survey of Leadership Opinion.......................  23

II. General Conclusions .............................................  24
Regional Variations.........................    32

l



A Note on Responses of Legislators................... 33
III. The Dade County R eport......................................  34
IV. Discussion ................................................................ 34

D. Intangibles in Education............................................  41
E. Reason for H op e .......................................................... 43
F. Regional Variations .................................................... 53
G. Discussion ...................................................................  55

PART TWO

Specific Suggestions to the Court in Formulating a 
Decree ........................... .........................................................  57

Introductory Note ........................................................ 59
Specific Suggestions..................................... ~..............  61

PART THREE

Legal Authority of the Court to Permit a Period of 
Gradual Adjustment and Broad Powers of Administra­
tive Discretion on the Part of Local School Authorities.. 67

A. Judicial Cases Permitting Time ..............................  69
I. United States v. American Tobacco Co..............  69

II. Standard Oil v. United States..............................  70
III. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co...........................  72

State of Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., etc....  72
IV. State of New York v. State of New Jersey, etc... 75
V. Martin Bldg. Co. v. Imperial Laundry ............... 75

B. Administrative Discretion Cases..............................  77
I. United States v. Paramount Pictures................ 77

II. Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern
Railway Co........................................................... 78

People of the State of New York v. United 
States....................................................................  79

III. Burford v. Sun Oil Co..............................................  80

Page

li



IV. Far Eastern Conference, United States Lines 
Co., etc. v. United States and Federal Mari­
time B oard .......................................................... 82

V. Minersville School District v. Gobitis................  82
VI. Cox v. New Hampshire.........................................  83

VII. Barbier v. Connolly................................................ 84
VIII. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co..................................  84
C. Remarks ......................................................................  85

PART FOUR

Considerations Involved in Formulating Plans for 
Desegregation ........................................................................ 87

A. Changes in the L a w ....................................................  89
B. Plans for Integration..................................................  91

PART FIVE

Conclusion .............................................................................  97

Page

m



Appendix A

Page
RESULTS OF A SURVEY OF FLORIDA LEADER. 
SHIP OPINION ON THE EFFECTS OF THE U. S. 
SUPREME COURT DECISION OF MAY 17, 1954, 
RELATING TO SEGREGATION IN FLORIDA
SCHOOLS .............................................................................  99

Introduction........ ..............   101
Attorney General’s Research Advisory Committee for 

the Study of Problems of Desegregation in Florida 
Schools ...................................................................   102

THE REPORT AND THE CONCLUSIONS....... ............105
General Conclusions.......................................................... 107

LEADERSHIP OPINION BY QUESTIONNAIRE—
AND CONCLUSIONS.......................................................... 113

The Questionnaires............................................................ 115
Questionnaire Returns and Method of Analysis........... 116
Findings ..............................................................................118
Regional Variations.......................................................... 124
Responses of Legislators.................................................. 126
Conclusions ........................................................................ 127
Sample Questionnaire ...................................................... 129
Sample Questionnaire ...................................................... 132

Table 1— Questionnaires Sent and Returned, 
by Groups........................................................................135
Table 2—Per Cent Expressing Various Attitudes 
Towards Decision, by Groups.............................. 136,137
Table 3—Per Cent Agreeing or Disagreeing with 
the Decision, by Groups ...............................................138
Table 4—Per Cent Willing or Unwilling to Comply 
with Courts and School Officials, by Groups........... 139

IV



Table 5—Per Gent of Each Group Predicting Mob 
Violence and Serious Violence .................................. 140

Table 6—Per Cent of Each Group Doubting Ability 
of Peace Officers to Cope with Serious Violence.........141
Table 7—Per Cent of Each Group Who Believe 
Peace Officers Could Cope with Minor Violence........ 142
Table 8—Per Cent of Groups Polled Who Believe 
Most of Other Specified Groups Disagree with the 
Decision ..........................................................................143
Table 9—Per Cent of Each Group Designating 
Various Methods of Ending Segregation as Most 
Effective ..........................................................................144
Table 10—Per Cent of Each Group Designating 
Specified Grade Levels as Easiest Place to Start De­
segregation ....................................................................145

Table 11—Per Cent of Each Group Designating 
Various Problems as Being Likely to Arise...............146
Table 12— Confidence of Peace Officers in Ability 
to Cope with Serious Violence, by Attitude Towards 
Desegregation ................................................................ 147
Table 13— Confidence of Peace Officers that Police 
Would Enforce School Attendance Laws for Mixed 
Schools, by Attitude Towards Desegregation........... 147

Table 14—Per Cent of Peace Officers Expressing 
Various Attitudes, by Region ..................................... 148
Table 15—Per Cent of White Principals and Super­
visors Agreeing or Disagreeing with the Decision, 
by R egion ........................................................................149
Table 16— Per Cent of White Principals and Super­
visors Willing or Unwilling to Comply, by Region....149
Table 17—Per Cent of Peace Officers Predicting 
Mob Violence, by R egion..............   150
Table 18—Number and Per Cent of Peace Officers 
and White Principals and Supervisors Predicting 
Serious Violence, by Region .......................................150

Page

v



Table 19—Number and Per Cent of Peace Officers 
and White Principals and Supervisors Doubting 
that Peace Officers Could Cope with Serious 
Violence, by Region .....................................................151
Table 20—Number and Per Cent of Legislators 
Favoring Each of Five Possible Courses of Legisla­
tive A ction .....................................................................152

Page

LEADERSHIP OPINION BY PERSONAL INTER. 
VIEW—AND CONCLUSIONS.......................................... 153

Selection of Counties ........................................................ 153
Method of Study................................................................154
Findings ..............................................................................155
The Personal Interview Schedule...................................160
Personnel Interviewed...................................................... 162
Reliability of Judgments in the Analysis of Recorded 
Interviews on the Subject of the Supreme Court’s 
Segregation Decision ........................................................ 164

Table 1—Per Cent Agreement Between Judges.....167
Table 2—Frequencies of Ratings of Interviewee 
Feeling by Judges I & I I ...............................................168
Table 3—Frequencies of Ratings of Interviewee 
Feeling by Judges III & I V .........................................169
Table 4—Frequencies of Ratings of Interviewee 
Feeling by Judges V  & V I.............................................170
Table 5—Frequencies of Ratings of Interviewee 
Feeling by Judges VII & V I I I .....................................171
Table 6—Frequencies of Classification of Interviews 
by Judges I & I I ............................................................ 172
Table 7—Frequencies of Classification of Interviews 
by Judges III & I V ........................................................ 173
Table 8—Frequencies of Classification of Interviews 
by Judges V  & V I .......................................................... 174
Table 9—Frequencies of Classification of Interviews 
by Judges VII & V I I I .................................................. 175

vi



ANALYSIS OF NEGRO REGISTRATION AND 
VOTING IN FLORIDA, 1940.1954....................................177

Summary Sheet of Attorney General’s 
Questionnaire, July 15,1954..................................... 180-184

Page

EXISTING PUBLIC SCHOOL F A C IL IT IE S  IN 
FLORIDA AND FACTORS OF SCHOOL ADMINIS­
TRATION AND INSTRUCTIONAL SERVICES  
AFFECTING SEGREGATION.......................................... 185

Achievement Test Scores ................................................ 189
Counties with No Negro High Schools...........................191
Examples of Inter-Racial Cooperation .........................191

Table 1— Summary of Expenditures—all funds— 
Both Races, 1952-53 ...................................................... 193
Table 2— Significant Trends in the Growth of 
Florida Schools under Dual System of Education 
1930 to 1953 ....................................................................194
Table 3—Enrollment .................................................... 195
Table 4— Comparison of Percentile Ranks for White 
and Negro Examinees in the Florida Statewide 
Twelfth-Grade Testing Program Spring 1949 
through Spring 1953 .................................................... 196
Table 5—Counties with No Negro High School 
1952-53 ............................................................................197
Table 6— Status of Elementary Principals 1953-54....198
Map—Amount and Per Cent of Nonwhite Popu­
lation: 1950 ..................................................................... 199
Map—Proportion of Negro Enrollment to Total 
Enrollment by Counties 1952-53 ................................200

AN INTENSIVE STUDY IN DADE COUNTY AND 
NEARBY AGRICULTURAL AREAS — AND CON.
CLUSIONS..............................................................................201

General Conclusions.......................................................... 201
Factors Indicating a Gradual Approach as the So­
lution to this Problem .......................................................204

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .....................................................207
Vll



Appendix B

Page
EXAMPLES OF FLORIDA’S CONSTITUTIONAL, 
STATUTORY AND STATE SCHOOL BOARD  
REGULATORY PROVISIONS RELATING TO
SEGREGATION....................................................................211

Florida Constitution ........................................................ 213
Florida Statutes.......................................................... 215-218
State School Board Regulations .............................219-243

Table of Authorities

Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern Rail­
way Company, 341 U.S. 341, 95 L. Ed. 1002, 71 S. Ct. 762 
1951 ...................      78
Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 5 S. Ct. 357, 28 L. Ed.
923 (1885) ................................................................................ 84
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 87 L. Ed. 1424, 63
S. Ct. 1098 (1943) ................................................................  80
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 61 S. Ct. 762, 85 
L. Ed. 1049 (1941) ............................................. ................  83
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114.
71 L. Ed. 303 (1926) ...............................................................  84

vin



Far Eastern Conference, United States Lines Co., States 
Marine Corporation, et al. v. United States and Federal 
Maritime Board, 342 U.S. 570, 96 L. Ed. 576, 72 S. Ct.
492 (1952)...............................................................................  82
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 51 L. Ed. 
1038, 27 S. Ct. 618 (1907)......................................................  73
Martin Bldg. Co. v. Imperial Laundry Co., 220 Ala. 90,
124 So. 82 (1929) .............................................................. . 75

Minersville School Distict v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 60 S.
Ct. 1010, 84 L. Ed. 1375 (1940) ........................................56, 82

New York v. United States, 331 U.S. 284, 334-336 (1947).. 79

New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 473, 75 L. Ed. 1176,
51 S. Ct. 519 (1931); 284 U.S. 585, 75 L. Ed. 506, 52 S. Ct. 
120; 289 U.S. 712; 296 U.S. 259, 80 L Ed. 214, 56 S. Ct.
188 ........................................................   70,71,72

People of the State of New York v. State of New Jersey 
and Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners, 256 U.S. 
296, 65 L. Ed. 937, 41 S. Ct. 492 (1921)..............................  75

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,16 S. Ct. 1138, 41 L. Ed.
256 (1896)...........................................................................6, 55

Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649....................................... 177

Standard Oil Co. v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1, 31 S. Ct. 502, 55 
L. Ed. 619 (1910).................................................................... 70

State of Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. and Ducktown 
Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., Ltd., 237 U.S. 474, 59 L. Ed. 
1054, 35 S. Ct. 631 (1915); 237 U.S. 678, 59 L. Ed. 1173,
35 S. Ct. 752 (1915); 240 U.S. 650, 60 L. Ed. 846, 36 S. Ct.
465 (1916)...........................................................................73, 74

United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 31
S. Ct. 632, 55 L. Ed. 663 (1911)..........................................  69

United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 92 L.
Ed. 1260, 68 S. Ct. 915 (1948) ..............................................  77

Page

IX



UNITED STATES LAW

26 State at L., 209, Ch. 647, USC Title 15, §1
Page

(Anti-Trust Act) .................................................................  70

FLORIDA CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES

Art. 12, Sec. 1, Florida Constitution................................213
Art. 12, Sec. 12, Florida Constitution.................5, 6,15, 213
Sec. 228.09, Florida Statutes............................................... 215
Sec. 229.07, Florida Statutes................................................12, 215
Sec. 229.08, Florida Statutes............................................ ....12, 216
Sec. 229.16, Florida Statutes ........................................ 13,216
Sec. 229.17, Florida Statutes................................................13, 217
Sec. 230.23, Florida Statutes................................................10, 217
Sec. 239.41, Florida Statutes ...................................7,8,9,218
Sec. 242.46, Florida Statutes...............................................  41

STATE SCHOOL BOARD REGULATIONS

The Calculation of Instruction Units and Salary 
Allocations from the Foundation Program.................13, 219
Administrative and Special Instructional Service.....13, 220
Units for Supervisors of Instruction............................ 13, 221
Establishment, Organization and Operation of Small 
Schools ...................................................................................225
School Advisory Committees............................................... 13, 226
Qualifications, Duties and Procedure for Employment 
of Supervisors of Instruction................................................13, 228
Isolated Schools .............................................................. 13, 232
The Distribution of General Scholarships.........._.......13, 235
Scholarship Committee ....................................................... 240

x



Scholarship for Pi*eparation of Teachers and House and
Page

Senatorial Scholarships........................................................241
State Supervisory Services..............................................13,242
Transportation of Pupils .................................................... 243

MISCELLANEOUS

Ashmore, Harry S., “ The Negro and the Schools” .......34, 39
Garter, Hodding, Reader’s Digest, September 1954, p. 53.. 20
Clark, Kenneth B., “ Findings,”  Journal of Social Issues,
IX, No. 4 (1953), 50 .........................................................25,109
Dietrich, T. Stanton, Statistical Atlas, Florida’s popula­
tion; 1940 and 1950; Research Report No. 3, Florida State 
University, June, 1954 ..........................................................189
Emory University Law School, Journal of Public Law,
Vol. 3, Spring 1954, No. 1............................................ 37, 38, 89
Florida Facts, Florida State University, School of 
Public Administration....................................................32,124
Florida State Board of Health, Annual Report 1953, 
Supp. No. 1, Florida Vital Statistics................................  21
Florida State Board of Health, Annual Report 1953, 
Supp. No. 2, Florida Morbidity Statistics 1953, Table 
No. 5, p. 2 5 .............................................................................. 21
Katz, Daniel and Hadley Cantril, “ Public Opinion 
Polls,”  Sociometry, I  (1937), 155-179 ...............................116
Psychol. Bull., 1949, 46, 433-489 .........................................166
Semi-Weekly Floridan, Tallahassee, Florida, April 23, 
1867, page 2 ............................................................................ 95
State of Florida, Biennial Report, Superintendent of 
Public Instruction 1950-51 ..................................................  32
The Antioch Review, VTEI (Summer 1948), 193-210.......128
“ The Impending Crisis of the South,”  New South, VTTT,
No. 5, (May 1953) (Atlanta: Southern Regional Coun­
cil) 5 ..........................................................................................105
U. S. News & World Report, page 35, August 27, 1954..... 31

xx





Preliminary Statement

This amicus brief filed by the Attorney General of the 
State of Florida pursuant to permission granted by the 
Court in its decision of May 17,1954, in the above cases, con­
tends that the Court should resolve its implementation de­
cision in favor of the propositions stated in questions 4B 
and 5D.

The Court will find from a study of this brief that a sin­
cere and thorough effort has been made by the Attorney 
General of Florida to present reasonable and logical an­
swers to questions 4 and 5. These answers are respectfully 
submitted by way of assistance to the Court and are based 
upon a scientific survey of the factual situation in Florida, 
embracing practical, psychological, economic and socio­
logical effects, as well as an exhaustive research of legal 
principles.

However, in filing this brief in answer to the hypothetical 
questions propounded, the Attorney General is not inter­
vening in the cause nor is he authorized to submit the State 
of Florida as a direct party to the instant cases. Neither can 
his brief preclude the Florida legislature or the people 
of Florida from taking any legislative or constitutional ac­
tion dealing with the segregation problem.

1



.



Part One

A  discussion of the reasons for a period of 

gradual adjustment to desegregation to 

be permitted in Florida with broad pow­

ers of discretion vested in local school 

authorities to determine administrative 

procedures.

3





A . The Need For Time 
In Revising The State 

Legal Structure

There is a need for reasonable time and planning by 
State and local authorities in any revision of the existing 
legal structure of the State of Florida, (which now provides 
an administrative framework for the operation of a dual 
system of public schools) in order to provide a legal and 
administrative structure in which compliance with the 
Brown decision can be accomplished in an orderly manner.

Examples of Florida constitutional, statutory, and state 
school board regulatory provisions related directly or in­
directly to segregated public schools are set forth in Ap­
pendix B.

The basic change which must be made if Florida is to 
comply with the non-segregation decision is either a repeal 
or revision of Article XII, Section 12, of the Florida Con­
stitution, which provides:

“ White and colored; separate schools.—White and 
colored children shall not be taught in the same school, 
but impartial provision shall be made for both.”

This provision in the basic law of Florida has been in 
existence since 1885. During the past 69 years it has been 
rigidly observed and has provided the foundation for an in­
tricate segregated public school system, in accord with so­
cial customs which cannot be changed overnight without

5



completely upsetting established school administrative pro­
cedure in school planning, transportation, teacher employ­
ment, capital outlay, districting, scholastic standards, pub­
lic health, school discipline as well as many other facets of 
the tremendously complicated school structure in Florida.

Assuming that the basic law of Florida pertaining to a 
dual system of schools (Art. XII, Section 12, of the Florida 
Constitution) is rendered nugatory by the decision of this 
court in the Brown case, the Florida legislature must re­
vise the entire School Code of Florida to the extent that the 
present code is predicated upon a dual system of education, 
and all administrative procedures which have developed 
under said code are grounded on the fundamental principle 
of a segregated system. A  simple repeal of the various 
statutory and administrative procedures now provided for 
the operation of the school system (which may prove to be 
in conflict with the Brown decision) could only result in the 
creation of a vacuum in methods of school administration. 
The consequent immediate inrush of turbulent ideas into 
this vacuum without legal guidance or administrative regu­
lation might well cause a tornado which would devastate 
the entire school system.

This system has grown through the years since the es­
tablishment of the “ separate but equal”  doctrine by the 
Court in the Plessy v. Ferguson case (163 U.8. 537), into 
a mammoth and intricate system of public education in 
Florida involving the annual expenditure of $138,895,123.15 
and the welfare of 650,285 children. We do not believe that 
this system, which took over half a century to develop, can 
be transformed overnight.

The bare mechanical process of enacting legislation re­
quires reasonable time for study by legislative committees, 
the time depending upon the complexity of the problem, and 
must conform to the legally established time for convening 
the legislature. On a problem of the magnitude of the one at

6



issue, the study of legislative committees must be preceded 
by exhaustive study on the part of school officials and citi­
zens’ educational committees in order that the legislature 
may have the benefit of their recommendations.

I. EXAMPLES OF LEGISLATIVE PROBLEMS

(a) Scholarships

An example of the type of legislative problem which must 
be considered by school officials and the legislature is con­
tained in Section 239.41, Florida Statutes.1

This law at present provides for 1,050 scholarships of 
$400 each year for students desiring to train for the teach­
ing profession.1 2

According to the State Department of Education, award­
ing of the scholarships is done on a basis of county repre­
sentation, race, and competitive test scores of psychological 
and scholastic aptitude. A  compilation of the scores of the 
740 white twelfth grade applicants in the Spring of 1954 
yielded an average score of 340. Compilation of the 488 
Negro twelfth grade applicants yielded an average score 
of 237. In the previous year, 1953, 664 white applicants 
made an average score of 342 while the Negro applicants 
made an average score of 237. This difference is classified as 
very significant, and should be interpreted as meaning that 
factors other than chance explain the different results be­
tween white and Negro scores.

In view of the wide divergence in achievement levels be­
tween the white and Negro races, as demonstrated by the 
scholarship examinations, and desiring to make these schol­
arship opportunities available to students of both races, it

1. See page 218, Appendix B.
2. See page 235, Appendix B.

7



was recognized that provision would have to be made 
whereby Negro students would not have to compete against 
white students for these awards. Therefore, the legislature 
of Florida provided that the scholarships should be ap­
portioned to white and Negro applicants according to the 
ratio of white and Negro population in the counties. Only 
in this way can Negro students in this state be assured of 
receiving a proportionate share of state scholarships 
awarded on the basis of competitive examinations.

I f the Court’s decision in the Brown case is to be inter­
preted that no distinction can be made on the basis of race 
in the operation of Florida’s school system, it is apparent 
that Section 239.41, Florida Statutes, will have to be re­
vised if the state is to continue its policy of encouraging 
Negro as well as white students to enter the teaching field.

It is apparent that the overall problem of teacher short­
ages cannot be solved immediately by law. It can be solved 
eventually by provisions such as Section 239.41, Florida 
Statutes, which is calculated to encourage a larger number 
of people to qualify themselves as teachers. I f Section 
239.41, Florida Statutes, is revised, however, to preclude 
immediately any recognition of a difference in scholastic 
achievement between Negro and white applicants for teach­
er scholarships, such revision would make it virtually im­
possible for the great majority of Negro students in 
Florida to receive scholarships, and from an economic stand­
point they form the group of potential teachers who need 
such assistance most.

The problem can be solved, however, by time, without 
working an undue hardship on Negro students or creating 
an even greater shortage of teachers in Florida.

Dr. Gilbert Porter, Executive Secretary of Florida State 
Teachers Association had this to say on the subject in 
addressing a meeting of Negro teachers in Tallahassee on 
August 19, 1954:

8



“ It is of no avail to blind ourselves to the marked 
difference in scholastic achievement between white and 
Negro students. This difference is not our fault, but it 
is there and must be recognized. I f  the doors to the 
state white universities were thrown open to Negro 
students today, it would make little difference because 
a great majority of Negro students could not pass an 
impartial entrance examination. We, as Negro teach­
ers, can provide the only solution to this dilemma if 
given a reasonable amount of time, but it will mean an 
absolute dedication to his work on the part of every 
Negro teacher. Negro teachers can close the gap be­
tween Negro and white students if  they will work hard 
enough. We have come a long way already in closing 
that gap and it can be closed completely within the 
foreseeable future if we will work hard enough. Any 
Negro teacher who is not willing to dedicate himself to 
this purpose should step out of the way because he is 
standing in the way of the progress of our race. Either 
we must remove this difference in scholastic standing 
or admit that we are inferior— and I will die and go 
to the hot place before I will ever admit that I am 
inferior.”

Whatever is done by school officials and the Florida 
legislature to fit the Florida teacher scholarship act (Sec. 
239.41, Florida Statutes) into the framework of the new 
concept of a non-segregated school system enunciated by 
the Court, should take into consideration the human rights 
and legal equities of members of the Negro race who would 
like to enter the one professional field which is now open to 
them on a large scale, and which they are now not only 
invited but urged to enter on a basis of absolute economic 
and professional equality. A  strict legal application of the 
principle that no distinction can be made on the basis of 
race in public schools would necessarily have to ignore 
practical and human factors as they now exist which are 
of fundamental importance to the operation of a public 
school system in Florida. One thing is apparent. No equi­

9



table and workable solution can be found unless sufficient 
time is permitted by the Court in the application of its 
decree abolishing segregated schools, to allow for an abate­
ment of the problems involved and an equitable adjustment 
by the school system to so drastic a change in its basic 
structure.

(b) Powers and Duties of County School Boards

The problems which will necessarily confront the Florida 
legislature in revising the provision of Section 230.23, 
Florida Statutes,1 alone, are so involved and complicated 
if practical questions of school administration are to be 
considered, that no immediate solution is feasible.

Section 230.23, Florida Statutes, provides the powers and 
duties of county school boards and establishes a framework 
within which they may authorize schools to be located and 
maintained. It provides in part:

“ Authorize schools to be located and maintained in 
those communities in the county where they are needed 
to accommodate as far as practicable and without un­
necessary expense all the youth who should be entitled 
to the facilities of such schools, separate schools to 
be provided for white and Negro children; and approve 
the area from which children are to attend each such 
schools, such area to be known as the attendance area 
for that school . . . ”

Bearing in mind that this provision of the law has been 
followed throughout the development of the Florida school 
system and the location of schools decided in accord with its 
intent, a simple repeal of this provision would provide no 
systematic guide or formula for local school boards to fol­
low in attempting to redesign and reorganize the dual sys­

1. See page 217, Appendix B.

10



tem now in operation, which at present involves real estate 
estimated to be valued at $300,000,000 and a current build­
ing program now under way involving from $90,000,000 to 
$100,000,000/  into a single non-segregated system.

The conversion of this $300,000,000 school plant into a 
non-segregated system will clearly take a great deal of 
planning if the old primary factor of racial segregation is 
removed in school location, construction and operation.

The State Department of Education reports1 2 that:

“ Florida provides annually $400 per instruction unit 
for Capital Outlay needs which for the 67 counties 
totaled $9,451,600 in 1953-54 and has been computed 
at $10,199,448 for the 1954-55 estimate. This money is 
spent in each county according to the needs recom­
mended by a state-conducted school building survey. 
With the help of these individual county surveys it was 
estimated as of January, 1954 that $97,000,000 will be 
needed to provide facilities for white children and 
$50,000,000 will be needed to provide facilities for 
Negro children. Since the activation as of the effective 
date January 1, 1953 of a Constitutional Amendment 
providing for the issuance of revenue certificates by 
the State Board of Education against anticipated state 
Capital Outlay funds for the next thirty years more 
than $43,000,000 in state guaranteed bonds have been 
issued to provide additional facilities for both races. 
By the fall of 1954 there will have been a total of $70,- 
000,000 of these bonds issued and in the foreseeable 
future the total will be $90,000,000 to $100,000,000. At 
the present time 2182 classrooms are under construc­
tion as a result of the issuance of these bonds.”

The planning included in making necessary surveys, ac­
quisition of sites, financing and engineering involved in the 
present construction program, although performed at top 
speed under the compulsion of a critical shortage of school

1. See page 188, Appendix A.
2. See page 187, Appendix A .

11



buildings in Florida, is a continuing process and requires 
several years to carry out successfully.

Much of this school planning with regard to the allocation 
and use of existing structures as well as new construction 
will have to be re-evaluated and revised in accord with the 
entirely new and basic change to a non-segregated system.

These facts, when considered in the light of the over­
crowded conditions now prevailing in many Florida schools, 
must be studied by the legislature and school officials in any 
effort to provide adequate administrative means of comply­
ing with the Court’s decision. According to the State De­
partment of Education, during the school year 1953-54, 
eighty-one schools in 18 Florida counties were forced to 
operate double sessions because of the lack of classroom 
space and trained teachers. In many instances to integrate 
immediately in particular schools would mean overcrowd­
ing of school facilities resulting in serious administrative 
problems too numerous to detail.

When these problems are further complicated by the 
drastic change in the legal framework of segregated schools 
in Florida, it is apparent that such factors should be rec­
ognized by the Court and sufficient time allowed for their 
orderly solution.

(c) State Board of Education, and State Superintendent

A  third example of the complex problems which will con­
front school officials and the Florida legislature in re­
vising the framework of laws within which the school sys­
tem can operate efficiently in compliance with the Brown 
decision is found in Sections 229.07,1 229.08,1 2 Florida Sta­
tutes, relating to the authority and rule-making powers

1. See page 215, Appendix B.
2. See page 216, Appendix B.

12



and duties of the State Board of Education; and Sections 
229.163 and 229.174 relating to the duties of the State 
Superintendent of Public Instruction.

Although these provisions may not directly relate to seg­
regated schools, they have in each instance been enacted 
and administered in accord with the basic provision of 
Florida law requiring a dual school system, and some re­
vision will be necessary in the administrative powers 
granted therein in order to insure compliance with the 
Court’s decree.

Specific problems in this regard are found in State Board 
Regulations adopted April 27, 1954 (page 154, State Board 
Regulations, page 219, Appendix B) related to the calcu­
lation of instruction units and salary allocations from the 
Foundation Program; State Board Regulation adopted 
March 21, 1950 (page 164, State Board Regulations, page
220, Appendix B), related to Administrative and Special 
Instructional Service; State Board Regulation adopted 
March 21, 1950 (page 171, State Board Regulations, page
221, Appendix B ), related to units for supervisors of in­
struction; State Board Regulation adopted July 3, 1947 
(page 28, State Board Regulations, page 226, Appendix 
B), related to School Advisory Committees; State Board 
Regulation adopted March 21,1950 (page 148, State Board 
Regulations, page 228, Appendix B ), related to the quali­
fications, duties and procedure for employment of super­
visors of instruction; State Board Regulation adopted July 
3, 1947 (page 156, State Board Regulations, page 232, Ap­
pendix B ), related to isolated schools, State Board Regu­
lation adopted July 21, 1953 (page 225, State Board Regu­
lations, page 235, Appendix B ), related to the distribution 
of general scholarships; State Board Regulation adopted 
July 3, 1947 (page 229, State Board Regulations, page 242, 
Appendix B), related to State Supervisory Services.

3. See page 216, Appendix B.
4. See page 217, Appendix B.

13



n. DISCUSSION OF LEGISLATIVE ATTITUDES

In setting out these examples of legislative problems 
which will require reasonable time for solution, we do not 
intend to imply that the members of the Florida legislature 
are at present willing to accept a desegregated school sys­
tem. In fact, from such information as is now available on 
this point there is reason to believe that members of the 
Florida legislature are to a large extent unsympathetic 
to the Court’s decision in the Brown case. A  survey of 
leadership opinion regarding segregation in Florida con­
ducted by the Attorney General included the following 
statement in the survey report (page 126, Appendix A ) :

“ Although the 79 members of the state legislature who 
returned questionnaires constitute almost 45% of the 
176 legislators and legislative nominees, to whom the 
forms were sent, generalizations as to the entire mem­
bership of the legislature on the basis of their responses 
are entirely unwarranted. Any attempt to predict the 
action of the legislature at its next session would be 
even more presumptuous. The responses of these legis­
lators to two special questions asked of them are pre­
sented below as a matter of interest, however.

“ The legislators were asked to indicate which of five 
possible courses of action should be followed at the 
next session of the legislature. The percentage check­
ing each course, and the details of the five courses of 
action, are shown in Table 20 (Appendix A ). The legis­
lators were also asked whether they believed that there 
is any legal way to continue segregation in Florida 
schools indefinitely. Of the 79 respondents, 34.20% re­
plied ‘ yes’, 25.31% replied ‘ no ’ and 39.32% answered 
‘ Don’t know’ or gave no answer.”

Table 20, Appendix A, indicates that 40.5% of the mem­
bers of the legislature who responded to the questionnaire 
wanted to preserve segregation indefinitely by whatever 
means possible.

14



It is even more significant that the Florida legislature in 
its 1951 session amended the appropriations act for the 
State Universities to provide that in the event Section 12 
of Article 12 of the Florida Constitution shall be held un­
constitutional by any court of competent jurisdiction or in 
the event the segregation of races as required by Section 
12, Article 12 of the Florida Constitution should be dis­
regarded, that no funds under the appropriations act shall 
be released to the Universities (page 683, Journal of the 
Florida House of Representatives, May 10, 1951). This 
amendment contained in Chapter 26859, General Laws of 
Florida, 1951, was vetoed by the Governor.

On the other hand, it is not our purpose to imply that the 
Florida legislature will refuse to take any action to provide 
a framework of laws designed to implement the Court’s 
decision. Only the legislature itself under our form of gov­
ernment can determine what course of action it will pursue 
and we know of no way it can he coerced in making this 
determination except through the will of a majority of the 
people voiced through the ballot.

One thing seems apparent, however, under these cir­
cumstances. The Court upon equitable principles ought to 
extend to our legislature a reasonable period of forbearance 
during which the normal processes of legislative authority 
can he afforded time and opportunity to implement the 
Court’s decision. The great multitude of problems the de­
cision has created in the legal structure of our school system 
should warrant the Court in granting our legislature full 
opportunity to revise our school laws.

Such a period of forbearance is in keeping with the 
spirit of confidence which, under our system of democracy, 
is essential to maintain among the three branches of gov­
ernment. It is in keeping with the spirit of confidence 
which must be maintained between state governments and 
the Federation of States which has delegated to this Court

15



its judicial authority. A  fundamental precept in the prac­
tical workings of this spirit of confidence is the use of per­
suasion rather than coercion or compulsion. We believe 
that this Court will not attempt to use its powers of coer­
cion precipitately and prematurely against any state whose 
legislature has not had time to revise its basic school laws 
to meet the requirements of transition.

Our Florida legislature under our Constitution does not 
convene again until April, 1955 for its biennial 60-day ses­
sion.

Even at that session there may not be known the terms 
of the implementation pattern, since they are dependent 
upon whether the Court acts prior to April, 1955. Further­
more, whether the necessary spade-work and drafting of 
legislation to adequately provide for the transition can be 
accomplished within said session is largely a matter of 
conjecture, so multitudinous and complex are the problems.

We reiterate: the State, having so long relied on and lived 
under the Plessy doctrine, should have no unseemly haste 
visited upon its legislature in trying to meet the needs of 
transition, especially when it is considered by many to be, 
at best, a “ bitter pill”  for the legislature to swallow. 
Rather, the reasonable, considerate and tempered course 
would be to allow our legislature a requisite and ample 
period of time to study, debate and enact implementation 
legislation. This we believe the court from innate principles 
of equity will allow.

16



B. The Need For Time In 
Revising Administrative 

Procedures

In addition to the problem of statutory revision, the 
Court should consider the need for time in adjusting the 
literally thousands of administrative policies and regula­
tions of local school boards and school superintendents 
which have been formulated within the framework of law 
to meet local conditions in each of the 67’counties of Florida 
which will have to be revised and reorganized to conform 
to new legislative enactments resulting from the Brown 
decision. It is apparent that considerable time must be al­
lowed before workable administrative policies of this kind 
can be evolved. Speaking to a group of Negro leaders in 
Jacksonville on July 30, 1954, Florida State School Super­
intendent Thomas D. Bailey, said:

“ As I see it, the ultimate problem is to establish a 
policy and a program which will preserve the public 
school system by having the support of the people. No 
system of public education will endure for long without 
public support. No program of desegregation in our 
public schools can be effective, unless the people in 
each community are in agreement in attempting it. ’ ’

School board members, school trustees and school super­
intendents are elective officials in Florida. They are ob­
viously well aware that any administrative policies they 
adopt implementing state laws enacted pursuant to the 
Brown decision must meet with at least some degree of ac­
ceptance on the part of the people in the community if they 
are to prove workable.

17



I. EXAMPLES

(a) Transportation

Perhaps the best example of this type of problem is the 
practical difficulties which will be encountered in convert­
ing the present dual school bus transportation system into 
a single system.

During the school year 1953-54 Florida’s school system 
operated 2212 buses. These buses traveled 30,910,944 miles 
to transport 209,492 pupils at a cost of $4,506,667 (see page 
186, Appendix A ). These figures may be compared with 
Florida Greyhound Lines, the largest motor bus common 
carrier in Florida, which operates 175 buses in the state. 
A  court order merging Florida Greyhound Lines with a 
competing line would necessarily allow a considerable pe­
riod of time for revising routes and schedules to avoid dupli­
cation and insure maximum service to the public, but such 
a merger would be relatively uncomplicated compared to 
the problems involved in merging Florida’s dual school bus 
system.

The problems of merging what amounts to two bus sys­
tems into one system without regard to race are obviously 
complicated. Hundreds of bus routes and schedules will 
have to be revised in line with the school redistricting which 
must take place. In accomplishing such a drastic revision of 
bus routes and schedules the paramount factor in school 
bus transportation, i.e., safety, must be considered at all 
times in the light of the fact that discipline among the pas­
sengers is directly related to safety. Discipline on school 
buses is maintained by one person, the driver. The ability 
of the driver to maintain discipline and a reasonable degree 
of safety while transporting mixed racial groups which 
may be antagonistic must clearly be considered in re­
routing and re-scheduling school bus routes. Such consider­
ation on the part of local school boards will require degrees

18



of time in direct ratio to the complexity of the local situa­
tion in relation to the size and distribution of the Negro 
population and the intensity of opposition to desegregated 
schools on the part of the citizens.

(b) Redistricting

The redistricting of school attendance areas along normal 
geographic lines on the basis of a single school system 
rather than a dual system as it now exists is another prob­
lem which will require a great deal of time in proper plan­
ning and execution.

(c) Scholastic Standards

Perhaps an even greater problem which will confront 
school officials on both the state and county level is the 
maintenance of scholastic standards in the intermingling of 
two groups of students so widely divergent on the basis of 
achievement levels. According to the State Department of 
Education (see page 190, Appendix A ) :

“ A  comparison of the performance of white and 
Negro high school seniors on a uniform placement-test 
battery given each spring in the high schools through­
out the State of Florida is shown in Table 4, page 196, 
Appendix A. The number of participants corresponds 
with the total twelfth grade membership during the 
five-year period, 1949-1953. This table shows, for ex­
ample, that on all five tests 59% of the Negroes rank 
no higher than the lowest 10% of the whites. On the 
general ability scale, the fifty percentile or mid-point 
on the white scale corresponds with the ninety-five 
percentile of the Negro scale. In other words, only 5% 
of the Negroes are above the mid-point of the white 
general ability level. Studies of grades at the Univer­
sity of Florida indicate that white high school seniors 
with placement test percentile ranks below fifty have 
less than a 50% likelihood of making satisfactory 
grades in college. While factors such as size of high

19



school, adequacy of materials, economic level, and home 
environment are recognized as being contributing fac­
tors, no attempt is made here to analyze or measure 
the controlling factors.”

In some large schools it is possible to divide students in 
the same age groups into different classes, taking into con­
sideration their achievement level, but smaller schools do 
not have sufficient classroom space or teachers to make 
such a division possible. In the latter class of schools it is 
clear that an immediate and arbitrary intermingling of 
students falling into such widely divergent achievement 
level groups could only result in lowering the scholastic 
standards of the entire school and adding to the problems 
of discipline and instructional procedures. The Negro stu­
dents would suffer if compelled to compete against white 
students of the same age but whose achievement level was 
2 or 3 grades higher and the ^white students would be 
seriously retarded.

This problem is not insoluble and it is not advanced as a 
reason for permanent segregation in the schools. It is, how­
ever, a problem which must be taken into consideration by 
school officials in any attempt at integration of the races 
in the schools and it is a problem which will require careful 
planning, new techniques, and a great deal of time if it is 
to be solved without doing serious harm to both races and 
to the school system.

(d) Health and Moral Welfare

Still another example of school administrative problems 
in achieving an integrated school system is related to 
health and moral welfare. Writing in the Readers Digest, 
September, 1954, page 53, Mr. Hodding Carter, Editor and 
Publisher of the Delta Democrat Times, Greenville, Miss­
issippi, said:

20



“ If only because of economic inequalities, there is a 
wide cultural gap between Negro and white in the 
South, and especially in those states where dwell the 
most Negroes. These heavily Negro states are also 
largely agrarian. Among the rural and small-towm Ne­
groes, the rates of near-illiteracy, of communicable 
diseases, of minor and major crimes are far higher 
than among the whites. The rural Negro’s living stand­
ards, though rising are still low, and he is still easy­
going in his morals, as witness the five to ten times 
higher incidence of extramarital households and ille­
gitimacy among Negroes than among whites in the 
South. The Southern mother doesn’t see a vision of a 
clean scrubbed little Negro child about to embark on a 
great adventure. She sees a symbol of the cultural lags 
of which she is more than just statistically aware.”

Specifically, with regard to Florida, the State Board of 
Health reports that during the year 1953 there was a total 
of 58,262 white births in the state, of which 1,111 were ille­
gitimate. During this same period there was a total of 
21,825 Negro births of which 5,249 were illegitimate. Per­
centagewise, this means that 1.9% of white births in Florida 
during 1953 wTere illegitimate and 24% of Negro births 
were illegitimate1.

According to the State Board of Health there was a total 
of 11,459 cases of gonorrhea reported in Florida during 
1953 of which 10,206 were among the Negro population.1 2 
We feel that this cultural gap should be honestly recognized 
by both white and Negro leaders as a problem requiring 
time for solution rather than an arbitrary and blind refusal 
to admit that it exists or that it is related to public school 
administration.

1. Annual Report, Florida State Board of Health for 1953, Sup­
plement No. 1, Florida Vital Statistics.

2. Annual Report, Florida State Board of Health 1953, Supple­
ment No. 2, Florida Morbidity Statistics 1953, Table No. 5, 
page 25.

21





C. The Need For Time 
In Gaining Public Acceptance

There is a need for time in gaining public acceptance of 
desegregation because of the psychological and sociological 
effects of desegregation upon the community.

I. A SURVEY OF LEADERSHIP OPINION

A sincere and exhaustive effort has been made by the 
Attorney General of Florida to ascertain, as accurately as 
possible, the feelings of the people of Florida with regard 
to segregation in public schools. This survey was author­
ized by the Florida Cabinet which allocated $10,000 for the 
purpose. This effort was made primarily for the purpose 
of obtaining information which would be of use to the 
Court in formulating its final decree in the Brown case.

In making the survey and study, every possible precau­
tion was taken to insure its impartiality and scientific ac­
curacy. It was made with the advice and under the supervi­
sion of an interracial advisory committee composed of in­
dividuals chosen on the basis of their professional standing 
in the field of education; specialized knowledge which would 
be helpful in making such a study; reputation for civic­
mindedness and impartiality and because they were will­
ing to devote their time without pay in carrying out a task 
so enormous in scope in the brief time available. A  more 
detailed explanation of the scientific methods and tech­
niques employed in making this study is given with the

23



complete survey report itself, which is made a part of this 
brief and included as Appendix A. The General Conclusions 
of this report are as follows:

II. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

1. On the basis of data from all relevant sources in­
cluded in this study, it is evident that in Florida white lead­
ership opinion with reference to the Supreme Court’s de­
cision is far from being homogeneous. Approximately 
three-fourths of the white leaders polled disagree, in prin­
ciple, with the decision. There are approximately 30% who 
violently disagree with the decision to the extent that they 
would refuse to cooperate with any move to end segregation 
or would actively oppose it. While the majority of white 
persons answering opposed the decision, it is also true that 
a large majority indicated they were willing to do what 
the courts and school officials decided.

2. A  large majority of the Negro leaders acclaim the 
decision as being right.

3. Only a small minority of leaders of both races advocate 
immediate, complete desegregation. White leaders, if they 
accept the idea that segregation should be ended eventually, 
tend to advocate a very gradual, indefinite transition period, 
with a preparatory period of education. Negroes tend to ad­
vocate a gradual transition, but one beginning soon and last­
ing over a much shorter period of time.

4. There are definite variations between regions, coun­
ties, communities and sections of communities as to whether 
desegregation can be accomplished, even gradually, with­
out conflict and public disorder. The analysis of trends 
in Negro registration and voting in primary elections, 
shows similar variations in the extent to which Negroes 
have availed themselves of the right to register and vote. At 
least some of these variations in voting behavior must be ac-

24



counted for by white resistance to Negro political participa­
tion. This indicates that there are regional variations not 
only in racial attitudes but in overt action.

Regional, county and community variations in responses 
to questionnaires and interviews are sufficiently marked to 
suggest that in some communities desegregation could be 
undertaken now if local leaders so decided, but that in 
others widespread social disorder would result from im­
mediate steps to end segregation. There would be prob­
lems, of course, in any area of the state, but these would 
be vastly greater in some areas than in others.

5. While a minority of both white and Negro leaders 
expect serious violence to occur if desegregation is at­
tempted, there is a widespread lack of confidence in the 
ability of peace officers to maintain law and order if serious 
violence does start. This is especially true of the peace offi­
cers themselves, except in Dade County. This has im­
portant implications. While it is true that expressed 
attitudes are not necessarily predictive of actual behavior, 
there seems little doubt that there is a minority of whites 
who would actively and violently resist desegregation, 
especially immediate desegregation. It has been concluded 
from the analysis of experiences with desegregation in 
other areas, “ A  small minority may precipitate overt re­
sistance or violent opposition to desegregation in spite of 
general acceptance or accommodation by the majority.” 1

6. Opposition of peace officers to desegregation, lack of 
confidence in their ability to maintain law and order in the 
face of violent resistance, and the existence of a positive 
relationship between these two opinions indicates that less 
than firm, positive action to prevent public disorder might 
be expected from many of the police, especially in some 
communities. Elected officials, county and school, also show

1. Kenneth B. Clark, “ Findings,”  Journal of Social Issues, IX ,
No. 4 (1953), 50.

25



a high degree of opposition. Yet it has been pointed out, 
again on the basis of experience in other states, that the 
accomplishment of efficient desegregation with a minimum 
of social disturbance depends upon:

A. A  clear and unequivocal statement of policy by 
leaders with prestige and other authorities;

B. Firm enforcement of the changed policy by author­
ities and persistence in the execution of this policy 
in the face of initial resistance;

C. A  willingness to deal with violations, attempted 
violations, and incitement to violations by a resort 
to the law and strong enforcement action;

D. A refusal of the authorities to resort to, engage in 
or tolerate subterfuges, gerrymandering or other 
devices for evading the principles and the fact of 
desegregation ;

E. An appeal to the individuals concerned in terms of 
their religious principles of brotherhood and their 
acceptance of the American traditions of fair play 
and equal justice.

It may be concluded that the absence of a firm, enthusi­
astic public policy of making desegregation effective would 
create the type of situation in which attitudes would be 
most likely to be translated into action.1

7. In view of white feelings that immediate desegregation 
would not work and that to require it would constitute a 
negation of local autonomy, it may be postulated that the 
chances of developing firm official and, perhaps, public sup­
port for any program of desegregation would be maximized 
by a decree which would create the feeling that the Court 
recognizes local problems and will allow a gradual transi­
tion with some degree of local determination.

8. There is a strong likelihood that many white children 
would be withdrawn from public schools by their parents

1. Experience shows that where the steps listed above have been 
taken, predictions of serious social disturbances have not been 
borne out.

26



and sent to private schools. It seems logical, however, that 
this practice would be confined primarily to families in the 
higher income brackets. As a result, a form of socio­
economic class segregation might be substituted for racial 
segregation in education.

9. It is evident that a vast area of misunderstanding as 
to each other’s feelings about segregation exists between 
the races. White leaders believe Negroes to be much more 
satisfied with segregation than Negroes are and Negro 
leaders believe that whites are much more willing to accept 
desegregation gracefully than whites proved to be. Hence 
a logical first step towards implementing the principle set 
forth by the Court, and one suggested by both whites and 
Negroes, would seem to be the taking of positive, coopera­
tive steps to bridge this gap and establish better under­
standing between the two groups.

10. Although relatively few Negro leaders and teachers 
show concern about the problem, white answers indicate 
that Negro teachers would encounter great difficulty in 
obtaining employment in mixed schools. To the extent that 
desegregation might proceed without parallel changes in 
attitudes towards the employment of Negro teachers in 
mixed schools, economic and professional hardships would 
be worked on the many Negro teachers of Florida.

11. Since 1940, and particularly since 1947, the State of 
Florida has made rapid and steady progress toward the 
elimination of disparities between white and Negro edu­
cational facilities as measured by such tangible factors as 
teacher salaries, current expenditure per pupil, teacher 
qualifications, and capital outlay expenditure per pupil.

12. In spite of the current ambiguity as to the future of 
dual, “ separate but equal”  school facilities the State is pro­
ceeding with an extensive program of construction of new 
school facilities for both white and Negro pupils, with a

27



recommended capital outlay of $370 per Negro pupil and 
$210 per white pupil. Both this and the previous finding in­
dicate that, while these steps have been taken within the 
framework of a dual educational system, there is a sincere 
desire and willingness on the part of the elected officials 
and the people of Florida to furnish equal education for all 
children.

13. Available achievement test scores of white and Ne­
gro high school seniors in Florida indicate that, at least in 
the upper grades, many Negro pupils placed in classrooms 
with white pupils would find themselves set apart not only 
by color but by the quality of their work. It is not implied 
that these differences in scores have an innate racial basis, 
but it seems likely that they stem from differences in eco­
nomic and cultural background extending far beyond the 
walls of the segregated school, into areas of activity not 
covered by this decision.

14. Interracial meetings and cooperative activities al­
ready engaged in by teachers and school administrators in 
many counties demonstrate steps that can be, and are being 
taken voluntarily and through local choice to contribute to 
the development of greater harmony and understanding 
between whites and Negroes in Florida communities.

The specific findings of this survey regarding leadership 
opinion as expressed through mailed questionnaires are:

1. White groups differ greatly from each other in 
their attitudes towards the Court’s decision, ranging 
from nearly unanimous disagreement to a slight pre­
dominance of favorable attitudes. (See Table 2, page 
136, Appendix A )

2. White groups also differ from each other in will­
ingness to comply with whatever courts and school 
boards decide to do regardless of their personal feel­
ings. (See Table 4, page 139, Appendix A )

3. Peace officers are the white group most opposed 
to desegregation. (See Table 3, page 138, Appendix A )

28



4. Almost no whites believe that desegregation 
should be attempted immediately. (Table 2, page 136, 
Appendix A )

5. A  large majority of both Negro groups are in 
agreement with the Court’s decision declaring segre­
gation unconstitutional. (Table 3, page 138, Appendix 
A)

6. While only a small minority of both Negro groups 
believe that desegregation should be attempted imme­
diately, an even smaller minority would oppose at­
tempts to bring about desegregation or refuse to co­
operate. (Table 2, page 136, Appendix A)

7. Only a minority of whites in all groups believe 
that opponents of desegregation would resort to mob 
violence in trying to stop it. A  larger proportion, but 
still a minority, believe that serious violence would re­
sult if desegregation were attempted in their commu­
nity in the next few years. (Table 5, page 140, Ap­
pendix A)

8. A  yet smaller minority of both of the Negro 
groups anticipate mob violence or serious violence as 
a result of steps towards desegregation. (Table 5, 
page 140, Appendix A)

9. The majority of all white groups are not sure that 
peace officers could cope with serious violence if it 
did occur in their communities, replying either “ no”  
or “ don’t know”  to the question. (Table 6, page 141, 
Appendix A )

10. A  much smaller proportion of both Negro groups 
expresses doubt as to the ability of law enforcement 
officials to deal with serious violence. (Table 6, page 
141, Appendix A )

11. The majority of most of the white groups believe 
that peace officers could maintain law and order if 
minor violence occurred. (Table 7, Appendix A)

12. The Negro groups did not differ greatly from the 
white groups in the proportion believing that police 
could cope with minor violence. (Table 7, Appendix A )

29



13. Only 13.24 per cent of 1669 peace officers believe 
that most of the peace officers they know would en­
force attendance laws for mixed schools.

14. A majority of the members of all white groups 
except peace officers, (who were not asked): radio sta­
tion managers; and ministers, believe that most of the 
people of Florida and most of the white people in their 
communities disagree with the Court’s decision. (Table 
8, Appendix A)

15. In the five white groups asked, from one-fourth to 
one-half of the respondents believed that most of the 
Negroes in their community were opposed to the de­
segregation ruling. (Table 8, Appendix A)
16. A much smaller proportion of both Negro groups 

believe that most of the people of Florida, most of the 
whites in their community, and particularly the Negroes 
in their communities are in disagreement with the prin­
ciple of desegregation. (Table 8, Appendix A)

17. Only a small minority of all groups, white and 
Negro believe that immediate assignment of children 
to schools on the basis of geographical location rather 
than race would be the most effective way of ending 
public school segregation. (Table 9, Appendix A)

18. All groups think a gradual program of desegre­
gation would be most effective. Negroes, however, pre­
fer that the process start within the next year or two 
with immediate, limited integration much more fre­
quently than do whites. The whites prefer a very grad­
ual transition with no specified time for action to begin. 
(Table 9, Appendix A )

19. Whites who expressed an opinion believe that the 
primary grades and the colleges are the levels on which 
desegregation could be initiated most easily. On the 
other hand, almost as many Negroes believed that 
segregation should be ended on most or all grade levels 
simultaneously as believed it should be ended first at 
the lowest and highest grade levels.

20. The maintenance of discipline in mixed classes by 
Negro teachers is regarded as a potential problem by a

30



majority of white principals, supervisors and PTA 
leaders. A  much smaller proportion of Negroes re­
garded this as a problem, with a majority of Negro 
principals believing that colored teachers could main­
tain discipline in mixed classes. (Table 11, Appendix 
A)
21. A majority of all white groups believe that white 

people would resist desegregation by withdrawing 
their children from the public schools, but a much 
smaller proportion of Negroes, less than a majority 
believe that this would happen. (Table 11, Appendix A)

22. Almost two-thirds of white school officials—su­
perintendents, board members, and trustees—believe 
that application of Negroes to teach in mixed schools 
would he rejected. (Table 11, Appendix A)

It should be noted at this point that this opinion is sup­
ported by the experience of other states where desegrega­
tion of schools has already taken place. The August 27,1954, 
issue of U. S. News and World Report, page 35, states, 
“ In the north, protests from white parents tend to drive 
Negro teachers out of the schools to which their children go. 
The same thing is expected in the South when desegregation 
comes to the schools there. An illustration of what happens 
in the North is shown by the experience of Jeffersonville, 
Indiana. The town lies in the southern part of the State, 
just across the Ohio River from Kentucky. A great deal of 
Southern tradition and many Southern customs have 
reached across the river. Jeffersonville is just completing 
desegregation of its schools. There have been few un­
happy incidents. But there has been a greater problem with 
teachers than with children in the schools. There were 16 
Negro teachers in Jeffersonville when desegregation was 
started in 1948. By 1951 their number had dwindled to 
11 as school enrollments were consolidated. For the school 
year starting in autumn, 1951, only three Negro teachers 
were retained. They had achieved permanent tenure under 
State law, and could be discharged only for cause.”

31



Florida now employs 19,848 persons in instructional po­
sitions not including supervisors. 4,721 of these teachers 
are Negroes. (Biennial Report, Superintendent of Public 
Instruction, State of Florida, 1950-51)

23. Nearly three-fourths of school officials believe 
that it would be difficult to get white teachers for 
mixed schools. (Table 11, Appendix A )

24. Almost half of school officials and a little over 
40% of white PTA leaders believe that the people of 
their communities would not support taxes for desegre­
gated schools, but only about 20% of Negro PTA lead­
ers believe that such support would not he forthcoming. 
(Table 11, Appendix A )
25. In the case of all potential problems on which 

both Negroes and whites were questioned a smaller 
proportion of Negroes than of whites indicate belief 
that problems would arise as a result of desegregation. 
(Table 11, Appendix A)
26. In the case of peace officers there is a positive 

relationship between personal disagreement with the 
decision and lack of confidence in the ability of peace 
officers to cope with serious violence. There is an even 
higher positive relationship between belief that segre­
gation should be kept and belief that peace officers 
would not enforce school attendance laws for mixed 
schools. (Table 12, Appendix A)

Regional Variations. The responses to certain items of 
the two largest groups polled, the peace officers and the 
white school principals and supervisors, were analyzed by 
region of the state in which the respondents lived. The 67 
counties of Florida were grouped into 8 regions defined by 
social scientists at the Florida State University in “ Florida 
Facts”  (Tallahassee, Florida; School of Public Adminis­
tration, The Florida State University).

Clear-cut regional variations in attitudes and opin­
ions are found to exist, as is indicated by the following 
findings;

32



27. Although the majority of peace officers in all 
regions feel that segregation should be kept, the per­
centage feeling so varies from 83% in two regions to 
100% in one region. (Table 14, Appendix A)
28. The percentage of white principals and super­

visors who are in disagreement with the decision varies 
from 20% to 60% in different regions. (Table 15, Ap­
pendix A)

29. A  large majority of white principals and super­
visors in all regions indicate that they would comply 
with the decision regardless of personal feelings, but 
the percentage varies from 76% in Region Y II to ap­
proximately 94% in Regions V I and VIII. (Table 16, 
Appendix A)

30. The percentage of peace officers predicting mob 
violence as a method of resisting desegregation varies 
from 20% in Region V III to nearly 63% in Region 
V II (Table 17, Appendix A ).

31. Percentages of both peace officers and white 
principals and supervisors predicting serious violence 
in the event desegregation is attempted vary widely 
between some regions (Table 18, Appendix A ).

32. The majority of both peace officers and white 
principals and supervisors in all regions doubt that the 
police could maintain law and order if serious violence 
occurred, but there are some regional variations. 
(Table 19, Appendix A )

A Note on Responses of Legislators. Although the 79 
members of the state legislature and legislative nominees 
who returned questionnaires constitute almost 45 per cent 
of the 176 legislators to whom the forms were sent, general­
izations as to the entire membership of the legislature on 
the basis of their responses are entirely unwarranted. Any 
attempt to predict the action of the legislature at its next 
session would be even more presumptuous. The responses 
of these legislators to two special questions asked of them 
are presented below as a matter of interest, however.

33



The legislators were asked to indicate which of five pos­
sible courses of action should be followed at the next ses­
sion of the legislature. The percentage checking each course, 
and the details of the five courses of action, are shown in 
Table 20.

The legislators were also asked whether they believed 
that there is any legal way to continue segregation in 
Florida schools indefinitely. Of the 79 respondents, 34.20 
per cent replied “ Yes,”  25.31 per cent replied “ No,”  and 
39.32 per cent answered “ Don’t Know,”  or gave no answer.

m . THE DADE COUNTY REPORT

A separate intensive study was made by the Attorney 
General’s Advisory Committee under the immediate super­
vision and direction of a research team from the Depart­
ment of Government of the University of Miami. This study 
was made of the greater Miami area and some outlying 
sections in neighboring counties in the belief that this part 
of Florida might have different problems of integration 
from other parts of the state due to its geographic location 
and density of population. The results of this study are in­
cluded as a part of the overall project and set out in 
Appendix A.

IV. DISCUSSION

The implications found in the Florida survey are many 
and varied but it is significant that to a remarkable extent 
they verify and coincide with the conclusions and observa­
tions set forth in the book by Mr. Harry S. Ashmore, “ The 
Negro and the Schools” . The book is the result of an 
exhaustive research study sponsored by the Ford Foun­
dation for the Advancement of Education of the problem 
of segregation in the south as the title implies.

34



For example, Mr. Ashmore states (page 81, “ The Negro 
and the Schools) :

“ The most important factor in integration of the 
public schools in the non-South, finally, is community 
attitudes. It is axiomatic that separate schools can he 
merged only with great difficulty, if at all, when a great 
majority of the citizens who support them are actively 
opposed to the move. (Italics supplied) No other 
public activity is so closely identified with local mores. 
Interest in the schools is universal, and it is an interest 
that directly involves not only the tax-payer hut his 
family, and therefore his emotions. Those who are in­
different to all other community affairs tend to take a 
proprietary interest in the schools their children at­
tend, or will attend, or have attended. State influence 
in public education has grown in recent years in pro­
portion to the increase in state aid, but state policies 
rarely are so important as local forces in the shaping 
of public educational policies and practices. . . .

“ The most meticulous house-to-house poll in any 
American community with a sizeable Negro population 
would doubtless turn up a negative response to a pro­
posal to integrate the separate public schools. In the 
case of the whites this might reflect deep-seated race 
prejudice, or it might he no more than the normal, 
instinctive resistance to any marked change in the ac­
customed patterns of everyday living. In many cases 
the basis of objection might be the demonstrable fact 
that the great majority of American Negroes are still 
slum-dwellers; many a parent who proudly considers 
himself wholly tolerant in racial matters will object 
to having his child associate with classmates of inferior 
economic and social background. It is probable that 
some resistance to integration would even be recorded 
among Negroes, who might respond negatively out of 
simple fear of the unknown, or the desire to protect 
their children against possible overt discrimination by 
white classmates or teachers. The great problem for 
schoolmen who have been moved to consider integration 
by their own convictions, or by the prodding of higher 
authority, has been to determine whether the passive

35



resistance which they can readily sense will be trans­
lated into active resistance once the issue is drawn.

“ In any event the superintendent who is called to 
take his school system from segregation to integration 
must be prepared to function as a 1 social engineer’ 
(Italics supplied). He will deal on a mass scale with 
delicate problems of human relationships involving 
not only pupils and teachers but the community at 
large.

“ These case studies demonstrate that wherever there 
has been an active and well-planned program to ‘ sell’ 
integration to the community at large it has succeeded 
—but here again there is no way to measure just how 
difficult the selling job really was. The most notable 
examples are to he found in New Jersey, where a well- 
staffed state agency made it its business to work closely 
with those communities which had long practiced seg­
regation and appeared resistant to the change required 
by the new constitution. Although New Jersey’s Divi­
sion Against Discrimination was armed with the power 
to withhold state funds and even to bring misdemeanor 
charges against school officials who refused to comply, 
it accomplished the integration of 40 formerly segre­
gated school districts without invoking these powers 
in a single instance . . .

“ At the other end of the scale is Cairo, Illinois, 
where the effort of the NAACP to force a reluctant 
school board to accept the state ban on segregation 
led to violence. Cairo in almost every aspect of its 
community life, may be classified as a ‘ sick city,’ 
and there is no indication of anything approximating 
an orderly interracial approach to the problem either 
before or after integration became an explosive issue.

“ Between these two extremes lie most of the non- 
Southern cities. They are, for the most part, beyond the 
reach of any possible decision of the Supreme Court 
in the test cases, for segregation in the schools of the 
non-South is now rarely bolstered by law, and where 
it is it would hardly miss the legal prop if it were struck 
down. Desegregation is proceeding there at a rate 
determined by the willingness of individual communi-

36



ties to accept the change— or by the willingness of 
community leaders to put the issue to the test.”

The same recognition of the problems involved in de­
segregation and the obvious need for adequate time to give 
local school administrators an opportunity to devise plans 
and means of overcoming the problems is found in the 
thinking of almost all authorities who have made a study 
of the subject.

In discussing the Problems of Desegregation, Dr. Tru­
man M. Pierce, Professor of Education, George Peabody 
College for Teachers, and Director of the Cooperative Pro­
gram in Educational Administration (Southern Region) 
had this to say (see page 91 Journal of Public Law, Emory 
University Law School, Vol. 3, Spring 1954, Number 1).

“ People respond well, in general, to the opportunity 
of discussing with each other mutual concerns and in­
terests. Controversial subjects discussed in the public 
arena under skillful leadership can often be resolved 
with a minimum of conflict. Effective public forums on 
the community level provide experiences in self-govern­
ment which can hardly be surpassed in satisfactions 
which they bring and in progress they stimulate. How­
ever, questions tinged with a high degree of emotion­
alism offer ready-made opportunities for rabble rous- 
ers and self-seekers to do serious harm. Consequently, 
the calm, sane and relatively objective approach, which 
can be expected from most of the substantial citizens 
of the average community, is essential in the types of 
discussion suggested. It is hardly necessary to point 
out that such public forums should avoid emotional 
binges and concentrate on the study of facts. The third 
principle is that responsible and public spirited citizens 
of both races should discuss together the facts con­
cerning their school system and together make plans 
for its improvement. This does not imply that the board 
of education should be by-passed, for final policy must 
be determined by this legally constituted body.

37



“ Ill-advised and hasty action, determined without 
benefit of a period in which calm deliberation takes 
place (Italics supplied) can do more harm than good. 
Urgency need never take precedence over wisdom. 
Piecemeal and stopgap policies are likely to prove un­
sound and wasteful in the long run. Therefore, the 
final principle which is suggested is that extensive 
policy setting based on thorough study and careful 
thought should provide the framework for a thorough 
and comprehensive program of work extending as far 
into the future as is practical.”

Dr. Howard W. Odum,1 in discussing “ An approach to 
diagnosis and direction of the problem of Negro segregation 
in the public schools of the South”  says (Journal of Public 
Law, Emory University Law School, Yol. 3, Spring 1954, 
No. 1, page 34) :

“ Final assumptions must rest upon continuing ex­
ploration, education, testing grounds for federal and 
state programs, and for a working balance between 
voluntaristic and coercive action. For, from special 
studies, general observations, and recorded experi­
ences, it must he clear that all our exhibits of evidence 
appear as a sort of tug of war, now moving this way, 
now that. The real definition of the situation comes 
back again and again to inferences about issues, cul­
tural values that are characteristic of the region, and to 
exploration and survey, projection of trends and pre­
dictions, and potentials that Qan be identified with 
alternatives. In this dilemma it would seem that never 
have the old classical, ‘ On the one hand and on the 
other,’ and ‘ but also,’ appeared to carry such a multi­
tude of dichotomies, paired contradictions, major pre­
mises assumed, ‘ ands,’ ‘ ors,’ and ‘ huts,’ in the loom of 
interaction processes. And rarely ever have we run 
across so many generalizations based upon so little 
basic research or tested observations. All of this is

1. Professor of Sociology, University of North Carolina; past 
president of the American Sociological Society; editor, Social 
Forces; author, American Sociology (1951) and other books.

38



relevant not only to the elemental cataloguing of facts 
and the appraisal of causal factors, but to the orienta­
tion of value judgments and strategy priorities.”

Everyone concerned in the State of Florida with the 
problems inherent in any attempt to desegregate schools, 
whether he be a member of the legislature or a school official 
cannot help but be aware that any change which is under­
taken from the status quo must be made with at least the 
passive approval of the people in the community who will be 
affected by the change. Mr. Ashmore (The Negro and the 
Schools, page 135) states:

“ Finally, there is the hard fact that integration in a 
meaningful sense cannot be achieved by the mere phys­
ical presence of children of two races in a single class­
room. No public school is isolated from the community 
that supports it, and if the very composition of its clas­
ses is subject to deep-seated and sustained public dis­
approval, it is hardly likely to foster the spirit of united 
effort essential to learning. Even those who are dedi­
cated to the proposition that the common good demands 
the end of segregation in education cannot be unaware 
that if the transition produces martyrs they will be the 
young children who must bear the brunt of spiritual 
conflict.”

39





D. Intangibles 
In Education

This Court has recognized the validity and significance of 
certain intangibles in education. Quoting from the Brown 
decision it said “ In Sweatt v. Painter, supra, in finding that 
a segregated law school for Negroes could not provide 
them equal educational opportunities, this Court relied in 
large part on ‘ those qualities which are incapable of ob­
jective measurement but which make for greatness in a 
law school’ .

“ In McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, supra, the 
Court, in requiring that a Negro admitted to a white grad­
uate school be treated like all other students, again resorted 
to intangible considerations: ‘ . . . his ability to study, to 
engage in discussions and exchange views with other stu­
dents, and, in general, to learn his profession.’

“ Such considerations apply with added force to children 
in grade and high schools. To separate them from others 
of similar age and qualifications solely because of their 
race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in 
the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a 
way unlikely ever to be undone. ’ ’

The legislature of Florida was motivated by the same 
consideration of “ intangibles”  in education when it en­
acted Section 242.46, Florida Statutes. This law prohibits 
secret societies including fraternities and sororities in the 
public schools. The legislature and school officials recog­
nized that in some instances fraternities generated feelings

41



of snobbishness on the part of the members and feelings of 
inferiority on the part of those not invited to join. It was 
considered that these feelings might in the words of the 
court “ affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever 
to be undone.”

W e believe that this Court should recognize the validity 
and significance in education of other “ intangible consid­
erations”  which may result from a precipitate attempt to 
compel desegregated schools in all areas of Florida. It is 
obvious that children reflect in their attitudes much of the 
same deep-seated prejudices and antagonisms felt by their 
parents. In the many areas of Florida where these feelings 
are known to exist no school administrator could compel 
an immediate desegregation without the certain knowledge 
that he was placing the children in a situation which could 
only result in generating feelings of hatred, inferiority and 
bias which would ‘ ‘ affect their hearts and minds in a way 
unlikely ever to be undone.”

42



E. Reason for Hope

There is some reason to believe that segregated schools 
can be ended in Florida in an equitable manner without de­
stroying the school system itself. But there is no reason 
to believe that this can be accomplished hurriedly or through 
the legal coercion of school officials who would thus find 
themselves caught in the impossible dilemma of confronting 
on the one hand the irresistible force of a judicial edict 
which must be obeyed and on the other hand the immovable 
object of public opinion which cannot be altered. The 
only hope for a solution is for this Court to restrain the 
use of coercive measures where necessary until the hard 
core of public opinion has softened to the extent that there 
can be at least some measure of acceptance on the part of a 
majority of the people.

This recognition of the need for time and tact and wis­
dom in bringing about a true realization of the goal set 
by this Court, is shared by leaders of both the white and 
Negro races in Florida.

Dr. Mary McLeod Bethune, founder of Bethune-Cook- 
man College at Daytona Beach, Florida, and a recognized 
leader of the Negro people throughout the nation for many 
years, stated in a press release soon after the announcement 
of this Court’s decree in the Brown case:

“ . . .  The High Tribunal has put a legal foundation un­
der a belief many of us have long held and which is 
clearly and concisely stated in the most basic Ameri­
can ideal, ‘ AH men are created equal.’

43



“ In quietness and patience, people of culture receive 
this news, realizing the inevitable has at last come 
about. They also realize, however, that the absorption 
into our daily life of this new decision—the putting 
of it into practice—must represent an organic cul­
tural assimilation which, like all social processes, will 
take time. But eventually the wrongs and mistakes of 
history are righted and remedied and inhumanities are
rectified......... Let us enter into this integration calmly,
with good judgment. Let us give and take, working 
out together the best possible means we can put into 
action so that there may be peace and understanding, 
and, may I say, the spirit of brotherhood.
“ There is much for the Negro to do as well as the white. 
We must use tact and wisdom. It will take conferences, 
thinking and planning and working side by side. More 
largely than is realized, we are good, loyal, American 
citizens. And whether we be north, east, south or west, 
we shall put forth every effort to meet the requirements 
of our new status.”

There is reason to believe that given the opportunity for 
voluntary local action and sufficient time an effort will be 
made on the part of educational leaders of both races in 
Florida to work together to achieve the goal set by the 
Court.

United States Senator Spessard L. Holland of Florida, 
speaking of desegregation, said in a press interview (Tampa 
Tribune, August 28, 1954, page 1):

“ We cannot spend all our time in vain regrets, but 
rather time must be spent in trying, as apparently the 
State Cabinet has been doing along with officials and 
educators of both races at the local level, to learn how 
to bring it about.”

On July 15 and 16, 1954, the Continuing Educational 
Council of Florida met in Tallahassee to consider the prob­
lem of desegregation. This Council is composed of repre­
sentatives from virtually all civic, labor, veteran and edu-

44



eational organizations in the state. Seventy members of 
the Council were present at the Tallahassee meeting and 
the future course of Florida schools in the light of the 
Court’s decision in the Brown case was discussed for two 
days. At the end of its deliberations the Council adopted 
the following motion:

“ Based on information and reports at this time, the 
Council joins with the request of the State Cabinet, 
heretofore made, whereby the Attorney General of 
Florida take every step necessary to prepare and file 
a brief which Florida and several other states have 
been invited to submit when consideration is given this 
October to the ‘ when’ and ‘ how’ provisions of the 
Court’s judgment in the recent decision holding segre­
gation unconstitutional. It now appears that this brief 
should emphasize among other things the following:
1. The maximum time possible should be granted the 
states affected. 2. Compliance with regard to time 
should be on a local basis; the time requirement be­
cause of mores and conditions will vary within coun­
ties of each state. 3. Enforcement provisions of the 
judgment’s requirements should be left to the Courts 
of first instance.”

Additional agreements which were reached by a large 
majority of the Council in discussion of the Supreme Court 
decision on segregation were as follows:

1. “ The public school system of Florida should be 
maintained and improved. Nothing should be done 
which will destroy these schools or cause them to retro­
gress in any way.”
2. “ The citizens of Florida will wish to abide by the 
laws of our nation, but time for necessary adjustments 
is essential if serious problems are to be avoided.”
3. “ The problems of adjustment are different in each 
county and in various communities within each county. 
Responsibility for solution of these problems rests 
with the citizens and authorities within these local 
areas.”

45



4. “ A  committee from the Continuing Educational 
Council, with outside representation as well, is to be 
appointed. Its function is to suggest multiple plans 
by which desegregation may be implemented. Among 
the ideas developed would be the suggestion that local 
groups of white and Negro citizens make careful ap­
praisal of existing conditions with the idea of pro­
ceeding gradually and in an orderly manner toward 
compliance with our National Constitution.”
5. “ A  committee of nine representatives from the Con­
tinuing Educational Council is to meet with a repre­
sentative group of State Negro leaders for the purpose 
of developing a joint statement to serve as a guide to 
both races in working out the problems ahead.”

On July 30th, 1954, fifty representative Florida Negro 
leaders met at Edward Waters College in Jacksonville to 
study the problem of integration of Florida schools. As a 
result of this meeting a committee of nine was selected to 
meet with a similar committee of the Continuing Educa­
tional Council of Florida for the purpose of studying ways 
and means of implementing the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Florida.

On September 10, 1954, a committee representing the 
Continuing Educational Council, and a committee repre­
senting the Leadership Conference, a recently convened 
meeting of Negro leaders, met in Tallahassee to consider 
jointly some of the problems posed by the recent Supreme 
Court decision that segregation in the public schools is 
unconstitutional.

After lengthy consideration and frank discussions of the 
various viewpoints of both whites and Negroes, the joint 
committees agreed upon the following motion:

“ 1. THAT, in a democratic society, public education is 
of paramount importance;
THAT the State of Florida has made significant gains

46



in recent years in the quality of its educational pro­
gram and in the educational opportunities for all the 
youth of the State;
THAT the State of Florida cannot afford the educa­
tional or economic loss which would occur if we per­
mitted a disruption of this program;
THEREFORE, we believe that we must maintain and 
support a strong system of public education for all the 
youths of the State and that the citizens of Florida in 
their local contacts, through constant education and 
study, should work for the general education of all 
the people as prescribed by the laws of our State and 
Nation.
2. THAT we endorse the filing of the proposed brief by 
the Attorney General for the purpose of preserving the 
system of public education in the State of Florida when 
a final interpretation has been rendered by the Supreme 
Court.
3. THAT we urge this Committee to continue to work 
on the processes necessary for ultimate compliance with 
the law;
THAT we encourage the organization of similar groups 
at the local level, i.e., school community by school com­
munity, to work toward the same objectives.”

The motion was approved unanimously.

The Lakeland Ledger in an editorial August 29,1954 said:

“ In his annual speech to his home folk in Bartow on 
Friday, Senator Holland took occasion to talk about 
abolition of segregation in public schools. . .
‘ ‘ That attitude is the only one with which the problem 
now at hand can be solved, and it is the attitude of all 
clear thinking citizens in the South.
“ If the process is not rushed, there will be a good 
chance of making the adjustment harmoniously over 
a period of years.
“ If forces in the North that are unfamiliar with con-

47



ditions in the South insist upon rushing matters, there 
is certain to he harmful friction.
“ The level-headed view such as that expressed by 
Senator Holland must prevail.”

The Tampa Morning Tribune in an editorial August 26, 
1954, said:

“ In the brief which he is preparing to submit to the 
Supreme Court by October 1, Attorney General Ervin 
asks the court to go slow in ordering actual compliance 
with its edict of May 17 outlawing segregation. Mr. 
Ervin said:
‘My purpose in filing the brief is to try to show the 
court that Florida, from practical considerations, is 
not ready for desegregation immediately, but that if 
it must come eventually, it should come only after a 
reasonable period of time and then only on a county 
to county or local basis pursuant to administrative de­
terminations made by local school authorities. It is en­
tirely possible that if the court will authorize this course 
many of the situations will not be too difficult to solve, 
given time to work them out.’
“ That, in our view, is sound sense and should appeal 
to the judgment of the high court. It is apparent that 
a change in the existing order can be effected only 
through careful and patient effort, on a local basis. 
Also it may prove necessary to have action by the 
Florida Legislature to properly implement the change. 
The essential issue is the dividing line between federal 
and state authority.”

The St. Petersburg Times of August 27, 1954, reported 
a speech by County School Superintendent Floyd Christian 
of Pinellas County to a meeting of Negro school teachers, 
as follows:

“ Pinellas County Negro teachers were urged as leaders 
of the community ‘ to work patiently, calmly and sen­
sibly’ on the segregation problem so that all can con­

48



tinue working together for the growth of the com­
munity . . .
“ We live under the law and must follow the law. Riot­
ing, hatred and action would wreck our school system 
and is not the answer. Florida must never try to abolish 
public education. Turning the schools into private in­
stitutions is certainly not the answer. Any such action 
would prove disastrous to the quality of education and 
in the end would be judged by the Supreme Court as 
being an effort to circumvent the provisions of the 
Constitution of the United States.
“ What I am saying is in my opinion Florida should 
not try to circumvent the law. Any such action would 
encourage an attitude of general disregard for law 
and in the long run will only increase the difficulties 
without contributing anything toward the solution of 
the problem...
“ There is another reason why this problem will have 
to be approached with education and understanding. 
I don’t believe that here in the South, where you have 
had separate schools for nearly a hundred years, that 
an immediate court decision to stop it and integrate the 
students can be done successfully. I don’t believe you 
can legislate the people into doing this, they will have 
to be led by a systematic plan of education and this, of 
course, will take time.”

The Ft. Myers News-Press in an editorial August 28, 
1954, said:

“ A  number of Fort Myers citizens have received by 
mail this week circular letters purporting to come from 
the Ku Klux Klan which attempt to fan the flames of 
racial intolerance over the school segregation issue and 
make a bid for Klan recruits.
“ The letters enclose an application blank for mem­
bership in the Klan returnable to an Orlando post office 
box. Whether they represent a bona fide recruiting 
drive by the Klan or just an effort of some crackpot 
or promoter trying to cash in on the current anxiety 
over prospective desegregation in the schools, the re­

49



cipients have no way of knowing, although Orlando 
always has been a hotbed of Ku Kluxism and the appli­
cation blank probably is genuine.
“ There is nothing doubtful, however, about the hate 
literature enclosed with the KKK circulars. The fat 
envelopes—so bulky that most recipients had to pay an 
extra three cents postage due—were crammed with 
highly inflammatory articles against the Negro race 
and slanders against various public officials and indi­
viduals fit only for the sewer. In the delicate situation 
which now confronts both whites and Negroes arising 
from the Supreme Court anti-segregation ruling—a 
situation that calls for all the calmness and clear think­
ing that can be mustered— outpourings such as this are 
not only unhelpful but dangerous.”

The Orlando Sentinel in an editorial August 19, 1954, 
said:

“ As a result of a survey recently completed by an 
interracial committee appointed by the attorney gen­
eral, it has been made perfectly clear that even in Flor­
ida many people of both groups are not ready to send 
their children to the same school together, and that 
law enforcement agencies are not prepared to enforce 
such laws or to prevent the violence which would arise 
under such circumstances.
“ The problem varies from community to community 
just as it does from state to state and the difficulty in­
creases in direct ratio to the number of Negroes present. 
It would be a relatively simple matter to enforce de­
segregation in a community where there would be only 
one or two Negroes in a classroom, as would be the case 
in most northern cities. It is not so simple where the 
numbers of the two races are more nearly equal.
“ This happens to be the case in many of our smaller 
north and west Florida towns, as well as in most of the 
rural areas of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama and 
Mississippi. In some Florida cities, however, particu­
larly in South Florida, there are relatively few Negroes 
and the opposition to their admittance to white schools 
is not so prevalent.

50



“ Clearly it would be unfair to expect public officials 
to overcome the problems of integration all at the same 
time without regard to the difficulties involved. The 
Supreme Court should take cognizance of the inherent 
differences among individuals as among communities 
and leave the problem of when desegregation can safely 
be accomplished to local authorities.”

The Miami Herald in an editorial of May 24, 1954, said:

“ Anticipating that the United States Supreme court 
might end segregation in the schools, as it did last week, 
Florida leaders have been quietly taking stock of the 
state’s educational resources.
‘ ‘ They recognized that the change, when it came, would 
be the most momentous since the War Between the 
States, and no family would escape its effects.
“ What this study showed was that Florida has made 
more progress in Negro education, probably, than any 
other state with segregation, and is in a better posi­
tion to meet the challenge of the court ruling.”

These meetings and examples of editorial opinion may 
appear insignificant but when considered in relation to the 
fact that they took place in a State which still has three 
counties where no Negroes have registered to vote (see 
page 178, Appendix A ), and whose peace officers are over­
whelmingly opposed to desegregation in any form (see 
Table 3, page 138, Appendix A ), they should not be ignored. 
We believe that any attempt to compel cm immediate de­
segregation in Florida schools would constitute a shock 
treatment so drastic that any further efforts on the part 
of these and similar groups would be promptly nullified. 
Such efforts on the part of citizens’ committees of both 
races can only take place as voluntary manifestations of 
good citizenship. They cannot take place in an atmosphere 
of fear and coercion.

51





F. Regional 
Variations

One of the most important factors which has emerged 
from our study of the segregation problem in Florida is the 
clear indication of marked regional variations in the in­
tensity of the feelings of the people.

The State of Florida is unlike other Southern states in 
one significant respect. Geographically it is large and 
sprawled out over an area of a thousand miles extending 
from Pensacola in West Florida to Key West on the south­
ernmost tip.

Between these two extremes can be found startling dif­
ferences in the social customs and traditions of the people 
inhabiting the various counties.

Generally speaking, the influx of people from northern 
states has tended to settle in South Florida and this has 
altered to some extent the social pattern of South Florida 
counties, whereas North and West Florida counties have 
remained to a large extent populated by people of Florida 
or Southern ancestry who cling to Southern traditions and 
customs.

It must be emphasized, however, that this type of gen­
eralization is apt to be misleading because counties and 
communities may be found in South Florida where the de­
gree of racial differences in feeling may be even more pro­
nounced than in the northern part of the state.

These variations indicate that there may be communities

53



in Florida where conditions are such that local school offi­
cials would feel justified in proceeding within a relatively 
short time to integrate the white and Negro schools. On 
the other hand, there are many counties, notably those 
having a large Negro population, where it is apparent that 
any attempt to bring about immediate desegregation would 
result in violence and bring the school system to a complete 
standstill.

These variations in community attitudes and conditions 
preclude the practicability of any overall, statewide de­
tailed plan, time schedule or target date for desegregation 
which might he evolved. We believe that whatever plan 
and time schedule is adopted in each community must, if 
it is to be workable, have been produced through the efforts 
of the local school officials who understand the specific prob­
lems involved and who must be willing to undertake to 
make the plan work. We do not believe that the courts 
should undertake to perform the functions of local school 
boards and we do not believe that this Court should insist 
on a plan of action which, in its efforts to guard the rights 
of some, must necessarily forsake the rights of all others.

54



G. Discussion

In suggesting an affirmative answer to question 4B, we 
have attempted to take into consideration the wide range 
and com plexity o f the problem. W e know that from  its 
common-sense practical aspects a successful implementation 
requires the blending o f the best administrative and judicial 
techniques over a reasonable period o f time which w ill vary 
in each school district or county, dependent upon the cir­
cumstances. Adm itted that segregation has been held un­
constitutional as a class discrimination, that does not mean 
that transition to the actuality o f  non-segregated educa­
tion can be accomplished immediately or w ithout planning 
and preparation and adm inistrative actions.

The public welfare o f the segregated states is involved 
in the transition along with administrative details. It would 
be unwise not to permit the exercise o f reasonable regula­
tions under the police pow er during the transitional period 
in the interest o f  peace in the community and good order 
and safety in the schools. The white people o f the segregated 
states have too long relied upon the doctrines expressed in 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537,16 S. Ct. 1138, 41 L. Ed. 
256 (1896) to be expected to accept com placently the new 
order. Our survey am ply bears this out.

Therefore, we most earnestly and sincerely urge the 
Court to permit that degree of latitude necessary to the 
segregated states and the county school boards therein 
to bring about an effective gradual adjustment to inte­
gration so as to soften and ameliorate the transition 
and preserve peace and order in the communities and the

55



schools in the process and that these officials be accorded 
the discretion to make the transition successfully and 
effectively in good time and good order.

Even though it has been held the Negro child should not 
be discriminated against in his public education nor unduly 
postponed in his enjoyment of it, surely that right is not so 
absolute, so compelling in its nature, that reasonable admin­
istrative procedures necessary for the public welfare can­
not be asserted during the transition period. If there ever 
was a condition which needs elasticity in the application 
of constitutional guaranties to meet it, certainly it is the 
transition period from the segregated school system to the 
non-segregated school system in the various schools of the 
South.

By a concurrent application of prudent and sensible ad­
ministrative and judicial techniques the problem may even­
tually be solved. But the Court should always allow the 
states involved and their officials, both state and local, the 
opportunity to first work out the problem and accord to 
their determinations a wide degree of discretion and lati­
tude in the integration. The Court has said in Minersville 
School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586, 60 S. Ct. 1010, 84 
L. Ed. 1375, (1940), it would not make itself the school hoard 
of the country. That does not mean the Court, beginning 
with the court of first instance, would not always reserve 
the judicial authority to review and probe. It would ex­
ercise this authority where in proper cases duly brought 
it was alleged the county school board had not made the 
requisite effort in good faith to desegregate in line with 
appropriate criteria or factors which we believe the Court 
will outline in its implementation decision. Parenthetically 
and most earnestly, we urge the Court to accept the factors 
we have outlined, believing them to be essential to suc­
cessful implementation in the light of problems involved.

56



Part Two

Specific Suggestions 

to the Court in 

Formulating a Decree

57





Introductory Note

We do not suggest delay merely for the sake of delay 
itself. We do suggest that sufficient time be permitted for 
a gradual effective adjustment to desegregated schools to 
take place in each community.

The period of time required will vary in each community 
dependent upon its administrative problems and the attitude 
of its people. The length of this period of transition in each 
instance can only be determined by the local school authori­
ties subject to the review of the courts of first instance 
when called upon to consider specific suits brought because 
of a disagreement with the school authorities over admis­
sion policies.

We do not believe that any court should at any time 
attempt to peremptorily compel school officials to integrate 
schools in a community when it is apparent that such action 
will create hostility and resentment to such a degree that 
the schools cannot be operated in an orderly manner.

We believe that any attempt to establish an overall 
specific plan for desegregation by the United States Su­
preme Court as a result of recommendations of a special 
master would be totally unrealistic and would in effect place 
this Court in the position of attempting to function as the 
county school board of the counties affected.

We believe that the courts of first instance should also 
avoid any attempt to exercise administrative powers nor­
mally delegated to school officials. They should not be

59



required to spell out in specific detail tlie means by which 
they would require a school district to comply with the 
new requirements of the law. Rather, let them leave to 
responsible local school authorities the task of drafting 
plans for transition, and then apply to each such plan pre­
sented in the course of litigation the test of good faith.

Widespread white hostility to immediate, enforced inte­
gration of the public schools is a fact of life in Florida, and 
is just as real a factor in considering the future of public 
education as school finance, school construction or any other.

We ask only this; that school officials not be deprived of 
the right to recognize local factors related to the welfare of 
public schools and to exercise the same discretion in dealing 
with the feelings of the people regarding segregation that 
they would exercise in dealing with any other local condition 
or problem that directly affected the proper operation of the 
public schools.

We urge, therefore, that the Supreme Court remand 
these cases to the courts of first instance— in all but one 
of these cases federal district courts— and that it vest in 
the courts of first instance broad discretionary powers to 
determine as findings of fact (1) what should be a reason­
able time for transition in any given case, and (2) whether 
or not specific plans for compliance with the Court’s general 
directive prepared by responsible local school officials 
measure up to the broad test of good faith.

We offer the following specific suggestions for the con­
sideration of the Court in the formulation of its decree:

60



Specific Suggestions

I. It is suggested that the United States Supreme Court 
in its implementation decision or decree adopt the pro­
cedure contemplated in questions 4 (b) and 5 (d) as stated 
in the footnote in the Brown decision:

“ 4 (b) may this Court, in the exercise of its equity 
powers, permit an effective gradual adjustment to be 
brought about from existing segregated systems to a 
system not based on color distinctions?”
“ 5 (d) should this Court remand to the courts of 
first instance with directions to frame decrees in these 
cases, and if so, what general directions should the 
decrees of this Court include and what procedures 
should the courts of first instance follow in arriving 
at the specific terms of more detailed decrees?”  II.

II. It is suggested that the United States Supreme Court 
in its implementation decision in the Brown case direct that 
the courts of first instance consider all suits brought to gain 
admittance to a specific school and claiming discrimina­
tion because of color, in accord with the following general 
directions:

A. The petitioner must affirmatively show;
(1) That admission to the school in question was re­
quested by the petitioner within a reasonable time 
before the beginning of the school term.
(2) That the petitioner resides within the limits set 
by normal geographic school districting of the school 
he seeks to enter.

61



(3) That admission to said school was denied by 
the local school authorities and that all other admin­
istrative remedies such as appeal to the State Board 
of Education (where provided by law) have been 
exhausted.

B. It is suggested that the court of first instance con­
duct hearings, take testimony, determine the merits 
of the petition and the answer thereto and the equitable 
reasons which may exist which would justify the school 
authorities in refusing to approve the petitioner’s ap­
plication for admission to the school in question. In 
conducting such proceedings, the court should consider:

(1) Evidence as to whether the state school authori­
ties and legislature have had a reasonable amount 
of time to reorganize the legal provisions of the 
state school structure to comply with the Brown 
decision.
(2) Evidence of good faith on the part of the school 
authorities in seeking to comply with the Brown de­
cision and integrate the public schools. Such evi­
dence should include:

(a) Efforts previously made and in progress to 
overcome practical, administrative problems en­
countered in integrating schools as proclaimed by 
this Court.

(b) Efforts previously made and in progress to 
promote citizens’ educational committees and in­
terracial committees for the purpose of improving 
racial relations in the community and avoiding 
racial antagonisms in the schools. 3 4

(3) Evidence and recommendations submitted by in­
terracial citizens’ committees which may be organ­
ized pursuant to law for the purpose of assisting the 
local school authorities, or evidence and recommen­
dations submitted by impartial survey and fact­
finding teams which may be created by the State 
Board of Education pursuant to its administrative 
powers.
(4) Evidence of existing administrative problems

62



of integration which have not as yet been solved and 
which would jeopardize the efficient operation of the 
school system if the petitioner’s application for ad­
mission was granted immediately.
(5) Evidence of such a strong degree of sincere op­
position and sustained hostility on the part of the 
public to the granting of the petitioner’s applica­
tion, as to give the school authorities reasonable 
grounds to believe that immediate approval of the 
petitioner’s application would cause a disruption of 
the school system or create emotional responses 
among the children which would seriously interfere 
with their education. Such evidence should be care­
fully analyzed by the court to determine its validity 
and all evidence of this nature which might appear 
to be simulated or fabricated for the purpose of con­
tinuing segregated schools in the community should 
be rejected.

(  (6) Evidence that the petitioner’s application was 
made in good faith and not for capricious reasons. 
Such evidence should demonstrate:

(a) That the petitioner personally feels that he 
would be handicapped in his education, either be­
cause of lack of school plant facilities or psycho­
logical or sociological reasons if his application for 
admission is denied.
(b) That the petitioner is not motivated in his ap­
plication solely by a desire for the advancement 
of a racial group on economic, social or political 
grounds, as distinguished from his personal legal 
right to equality in public school education as 
guaranteed by the 14th Amendment. This distinc­
tion should be carefully drawn, {  This Court has 
ruled that segregated schools are forbidden by the 
14th Amendment because they may deprive the 
Negro of an equal opportunity in acquiring an edu­
cation. During the process of desegregating schools 
it should always be kept in mind that the sole legal 
purpose of public schools is to educate. The 
public school system has never been permitted 
under Florida law to extend its activities into the

63



field of public welfare or related purposes. It is 
not the purpose or within the legal authority of 
the Florida public school system to provide a di­
rect means of improving the social, political or 
economic status of any group or individual except 
as such improvement may in time result from edu­
cation itself. Public schools are not intended to 
provide experiments in race relations or to use 
children as sociological guinea pigs in the solution 
of problems in many walks of life which adults 
have not been able to solve by other means.

III. It is suggested that based upon the testimony and 
evidence submitted, the court of first instance may either:

(A) Order that the petitioner’s application for admis­
sion to the school in question be granted forthwith, if 
it appears that the petition was made in good faith 
and that there exist no reasonable grounds for delay 
on the part of the school board in approving the peti­
tioner’s application for admission.

(B) Dismiss the petition if it appears that it was not 
made in good faith and well founded in law according 
to the interpretation of the 14th Amendment by this 
court in the Brown case.

(C) Order the school authorities to hold the petition­
er’s application in abeyance for a reasonable period of 
time to allow for further adjustment to a single school 
system if necessary, with directions to the school au­
thorities to proceed to overcome as soon as possible 
the practical or psychological and sociological factors 
which prevent an immediate approval of the peti­
tioner’s application.
If the latter alternative is found to be necessary by 
the court it should include in its order the following:

(1) Fix a time for rehearing of the petitioner’s appli­
cation by the court within a stated reasonable time 
at which hearing additional testimony and evidence 
will be received and the circumstances justifying 
delay in approving the petitioner’s application for

64



admission will be re-evaluated by tbe court in the 
light of altered conditions and a supplemental order 
entered in tbe case in accord with tbe findings of tbe 
court.
(2) Direct tbe school authorities to formulate and 
submit to tbe court within a reasonable time a plan 
designed to overcome the practical and psychological 
obstacles which tend to prevent an immediate inte­
gration of the schools under their jurisdiction. The 
effectiveness of the plan submitted and the efforts 
which the school authorities have made in good faith 
to carry it out should be considered by the court on 
subsequent rehearing of the case in determining 
whether additional delay is justified in granting the 
petitioner’s application for admission.

65





Part Three

Legal Authority of the Court to Per­

mit a Period of Gradual Adjustment 

and Broad Powers of Administrative 

Discretion on the Part of Local School 

Authorities.

67



'



A. Judicial Cases 
Permitting Time

Many decisions of the United States Supreme Court and 
the State Supreme Courts have recognized the necessity for 
granting a reasonable time in which to comply with the 
decree of the Court to avoid hardship or injury to public 
or private interests.

The present decision requires more consideration of the 
problem of time and adjustment than in the earlier cases 
since it is apparent that it involves a vast problem of human 
engineering, as contrasted to previous delays for adjust­
ment granted in anti-trust cases, nuisance cases, and similar 
cases where economic problems of great magnitude con­
fronted the courts.

I. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106, 
31 S. Ct. 632, 55 L. Ed. 663 (1911). Recognizing the need 
for adjustment to its remedies in dealing with the unlawful 
combinations under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, the Court, 
in order to avoid and mitigate possible injury to the interest 
of the general public, decreed the commercial combination 
to be illegal; and directed the Court below to hear the 
parties, ascertain, and determine a plan or method of dis­
solution, and to recreate a condition in harmony in law. 
To accomplish this, the Court granted a reasonable period 
(8 months) to effectuate its decree, while prohibiting any en­
largement of the corporation’s monopoly during this period.

Briefly stated, six months, with a possible extension of

69



sixty days, was granted in which to work out a plan for 
dissolving a combination found to control the tobacco in­
dustry in violation of the Anti-Trust Act of July 2, 1890 
(26 State at L. 209, Ch. 647, USC Title 15, si), and creating 
out of the elements composing it a condition which would 
not be repugnant to the prohibitions of the Act.

II. In Standard Oil Co. v. U. S., 221 U.S. 1 , 31 S. Ct. 
502, 55 L. Ed. 619 (1910), the Court again recognized the 
need for time in putting into effect its decision. In this 
case Chief Justice White stated that the magnitude of the 
interests involved and their complexity required that six 
months be given in which to execute a decree for the dis­
solution of a holding company controlling the oil industry 
in violation of the Anti-Trust Act of July 2, 1890, and for 
the transfer back to the stockholders of the subsidiary cor­
porations of the stock which had been turned over to the 
holding company in exchange for its own stock.

In the area of nuisance litigation, the Supreme Court has 
often recognized the need for a period of gradual transition 
in order to effectuate decisions. In the Case of New Jersey 
V. New York, 283 U. S. 473, 75 L. Ed. 1176, 51 S. Ct. 519, 
(1931), the State of New Jersey sued New York City in 
the United States Supreme Court for an injunction restrict­
ing the dumping of New York City’s garbage into the ocean 
off the New Jersey coast. Injunction was granted in the 
opinion by Butler, J., affirming a special master’s report. 
A  decree was entered, declaring that the plaintiff State of 
New Jersey was entitled to an injunction as sought in the 
complaint; but that before (italics supplied) an injunc­
tion was issued, a reasonable time would be accorded to the 
defendant, within which to carry into effect its proposed 
plan for the erection and operation of incinerators to 
destroy the waste materials which were being dumped off 
the New Jersey coast, or to provide other means to be 
approved by the decree for the disposal of such materials.

70



Reasonable time was a question of fact to be decided 
upon by the same special master, after hearing and evalu­
ating all witnesses ’ testimonies from each. party or witnes­
ses which the master may select to be heard. The master was 
then to report to the court his findings and a form of decree. 
On a rehearing of the case on December 7, 1931, (284 U. S. 
585, 75 L. Ed. 506, 52 S. Ct. 120) a decree was entered by 
the Supreme Court prohibiting any further dumping of 
refuse, etc., into the ocean off the coast of New Jersey. 
Said decree was to become effective on and after June 1, 
1933, and progress reports were to be filed with the clerk 
of the Supreme Court on April 1 and October 1 of each 
year beginning April 1, 1932, setting forth the progress 
made in the construction of incinerator plants, etc., for the 
final disposition of garbage and refuse, and also the amount 
of material dumped at sea during the periods covered by 
such reports.

Provision was also made in the decree that upon the re­
ceipt of said reports, and on due notice to the other party, 
either party to the suit could apply to the Court for such 
action or relief with respect to the time allowed for the con­
struction, or method of operation of the proposed incinera­
tor plants, or other means of final disposition of garbage, 
etc., as may be deemed appropriate. In other words, the 
flexibility of the decree permitted frequent re-evaluation to 
promote the greatest justice to all parties.

On May 29,1933 (289 U. S. 712) Mr. Chief Justice Hughes 
announced a new order, based on the failure of New York 
City to comply with the decree of December 7, 1931. The 
defendant asked that the time for taking effect of the in­
junction be extended from June 1, 1933 to April 1, 1934. 
It was ordered that these applications be heard on Novem­
ber 6,1933, that E. K. Cambell be appointed Special Master, 
empowered to hear witnesses, issue subpoenas, take evi­
dence offered by interested parties, and also such as he 
may deem necessary to show :

71



(A ) What shall have been done by defendant city, 
up to September 15, 1933, and the time reasonably re­
quired to enable it to comply with the decree.

(B) The amounts spent by the plaintiff New Jersey 
to prevent harm to its beaches, waters, etc., subsequent 
to June 1, 1933, and the damages sustained by them as 
a result of New York’s failure to comply with the de­
cree.

The Special Master’s findings were subject to considera­
tion, revision, or approval by the Court.

On December 9, 1935 (296 U.S. 259, 80 L. Ed. 214, 56 
8. Ct. 188), Mr. Justice Butler announced a new decree 
modifying in effect the decree of December 4, 1933. The 
latter decree enjoined New York City from dumping refuse 
off the New Jersey coast, stipulating a five thousand dollars 
($5,000.00) a day penalty for failure to comply. On October 
7,1935, New York City sought a modification of the decree, 
and asked for a petition to have New Jersey show cause 
why a ruling could not be made to the effect that ten miles 
(10) off shore dumping is satisfactory as to non-floating 
material, or, in the alternative, why the Court should not 
modify its decree so as to permit the defendant to dump 
non-floating sewage as aforesaid.

Defendant’s motion for leave to file was granted.

It should be noted that the original decree was handed 
down in 1931 and continued modification took place for some 
four (4) years in order to effectuate the original decree. 
Recognition for additional time was given each time the 
case reappeared before the Court.

•IEL The Supreme Court again recognized the need for a 
calm period of gradual transition to effectuate its decree, 
in the Gaseous Nuisance Cases in which it took some nine 
(9) years to implement its decrees.

72



The first ease was that of Georgia v. Tennessee Copper 
Co., 206 U.S. 230, 51 L. Ed. 1038, 27 S. Ct. 618 (1907). 
In this case the State of Georgia sought to enjoin the de­
fendant copper companies from discharging noxious gases 
from their works in Tennessee over the plaintiff’s territory. 
The State alleged that such discharges were destroying 
entire forest, orchard, and crop lauds, and that irreparable 
injuries were being done and threatened in five counties of 
Georgia. A  preliminary injunction was denied, but, as there 
were grounds to fear that great and irreparable damage 
might be done, an early day was fixed for the final hearing, 
and the parties were given leave, if so minded, to try the 
cases on affidavits. Mr. Justice Holmes held that if the 
State of Georgia adhered to its determination, there was 
no alternative to issuing an injunction, after allowing a 
reasonable time for the defendants to complete the struc­
tures then being built, and efforts the companies were mak­
ing to stop the flow of fumes and gases into Georgia. The 
plaintiff Georgia was permitted to submit a form of decree 
on the coming in of the Court in the following October.

Eight (8) years later, on May 10, 1915, the Supreme 
Court again heard the same case, in the State of Georgia 
v. Tennessee Copper Co. and Ducktown Sulphur, Copper, 
<& Iron Co., Ltd., 237 U.S. 474, 59 L. Ed. 1054, 35 S. Ct. 631 
(1915).

This case is a continuation of the earlier one, supra 
(1907), in regard to the nuisance of gaseous fumes harming 
the property within the State of Georgia. In the earlier case, 
hope was entertained that some practical method of sub­
duing the noxious fumes could be devised and by consent, 
the time for entering a final decree was enlarged. Both 
companies installed purifying devices. The original de­
fendant, Tennessee Copper and Georgia, entered into a 
stipulation whereby the former undertook annually to 
supply a fund to compensate those injured by fumes from

73



its works, to conduct its plant subject to inspection in speci­
fied ways, and between April 10 and October 1, not to 
“ operate more green ore furnaces than it finds necessary to 
permit of operating its sulphuric acid plant at its normal 
full capacity.”  The State of Georgia agreed to refrain 
from asking for an injunction prior to October, 1916, if 
the stipulation was fully observed. Ducktown Company and 
the State were unable to agree, and in February, 1914, 
the latter moved for a decree according a perpetual in­
junction. Consideration of the matter was postponed upon 
representation that conditions had materially changed since 
1907, and leave was granted to present additional testimony 
“ to relate solely to the changed conditions,”  if  any, which 
may have arisen since the case was then decided. A  decree 
was granted restraining the Ducktown Company from con­
tinuing to operate its plant other than upon the terms and 
conditions set out by the Court (Decree set forth in 237 U.S. 
678, 59 L. Ed. 1173, 35 8 . Ct. 752 (1915)).

A  new decree was issued April 3, 1916 in 240 TJ. 8. 650, 60 
L. Ed. 846, 36 8. Ct. 465, (1916). This decree modified the 
former decrees as to the escapement of fumes, as to records 
to be kept in regard thereto, and also as to expense of in­
spection and division of costs.

The three(3) cases, dealing with the problem of escaping 
nuisances, cover a span of nine (9) years (from 1907 to 
1916). It illustrates how long a period is required to adjust 
to incorporeal changes and strongly suggests that human 
changes obviously require greater periods, since human 
emotions are not as easily controlled as are gaseous mate­
rials from sulphur and copper plants. Recognition of the 
need of calm planning in good faith to reconcile difficult 
problems has often been illustrated by the Court in con­
texts of economic and social changes as a result of its 
decisions.

74



IV. In People of the State of New York v. State of New 
Jersey and Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners, 256 
U.S. 296, 65 L. Ed. 937, 41 S. Ct. 492 (1921), at page 313, 
Mr. Justice Clarke, in refusing to grant injunction relief 
against the operation of sewerage disposal by New Jersey 
into New York Harbor, wisely stated:

“ We cannot withhold the suggestion, inspired by the 
consideration of this case, that the grave problem of 
sewage disposal presented by the large and growing 
populations living on the shores of New York Bay is 
one more likely to be wisely solved by cooperative study 
and by conference and mutual concession on the part 
of Representatives of the States so vitally interested 
in it than by proceedings in any Court however con­
stituted. ’ ’

This quotation strongly suggests the need for time to 
work out these difficult intangible relations, in an atmos­
phere of cooperation and reason, rather than a tremendous 
disruption of social and economic conditions. V.

V. In the case of Martin Bldg. Co. v. Imperial Laundry 
Co., 220 Ala. 90,124 So. 82, the Supreme Court of Alabama 
recognized the need for time in the use of injunctive 
relief. In a suit by the owner of an office building to en­
join a laundry from emitting smoke over the complain­
ant’s premises, the basis of the suit was the discomfort to 
the building’s tenants, endangering of their health, and the 
resulting loss of tenants. The question of the abatement of 
the nuisance by improved technological laundry methods 
had to be further considered before the Court would grant 
or refuse injunctive relief, in view of suggested means of 
reducing amount of smoke by use of stokers. This acted to 
delay the force of the injunctive relief sought.

75





B. Administrative Discretion
Cases

The use of administrative discretion and its limits have 
often been spelled out by the Court in the areas of adminis­
trative agencies. The Court has consistently emphasized 
that supervision and discretion should lie with the adminis­
trative agencies in the conducting of their functons as 
economic and political governing boards. Such emphasis is 
closely related to the administrative discretion which should 
exist in school boards, also.

I. In United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131, 
92 L. Ed. 1260, 68 S. Ct. 915, (1948), Mr. Justice Douglas 
reviewed a decree in an injunction suit by the United States 
under the Sherman Act to eliminate or qualify certain busi­
ness practices in the motion picture industry. A  provision 
in the decree that films be licensed on a competitive bidding 
basis was eliminated by the Supreme Court as not likely to 
bring about the desired end as involving too much judicial 
supervision to make it effective. This elimination was held 
to require reconsideration by the district court of its pro­
hibition of the expansion of theatre holdings by distributors 
and provisions for divesting existing holdings. The pro­
priety of including in the decree a provision for voluntary 
arbitration of questions arising thereunder was indicated, 
and denial of applications for leave to intervene by persons 
challenging the eliminated provision for competitive bid­
ding was upheld.

77



Mr. Justice Douglas was strongly opposed to the judiciary 
administrating industry, and favored voluntary arbitration: 
At page 163 lie stated:

“ It would involve the judiciary in the administration 
of intricate and detailed rules governing priority, per­
iod of clearance, length of run, competitive areas, rea­
sonable return and the like. The system would be apt 
t© require as close a supervision as a continuous re­
ceivership, unless the defendants were to be entrusted 
with vast discretion. The judiciary is unsuited to af­
fairs of business management; and control through the 
power of contempt is crude and clumsy and lacking in 
the flexibility necessary to make continuous and de­
tailed supervision effective.”

The implications of Mr. Justice Douglas’s opposition to 
judicial administration of intricate and detailed rules in the 
economic field could readily apply to the social relationship 
and problems created by the recent holding in the Brown 
case.

II. Further evidence of the broad discretion that was 
permitted by the Supreme Court in administrative agencies 
is evidenced in the case of Alabama Public Service Commis­
sion v. Southern Railway Company, 341 U. S. 341, 95 L. Ed. 
1002, 71 S. Ct. 762, (1951). A  railroad, prohibited by state 
law from discontinuing trains without permission of the 
state public service commission was denied such permission 
on the ground that though the trains were being operated 
at a loss there was a public need for the service. Alleging 
that irreparable loss would result either from continued 
operation of the trains or from incurring the penalty im­
posed by state law for discontinuance without the commis­
sion’s permission, the railroad sought and obtained an in­
junction in a federal district court against the enforcement 
of the statute.

The U. S. Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Vinson,

78



reversed the district court, and held that the federal court’s 
exercise of such jurisdiction should, on considerations of 
comity, be withheld on the ground that the state law pro­
vided for review of the commission’s order in the state 
courts and for its stay pending such review.

Some persuasive language in support of state administra­
tive discretion appears at pages 347-348:

“ The Alabama Commission, after a hearing held in the 
area served, found a public need for the service. The 
court below, hearing evidence de novo, found that no 
public necessity exists in view of the increased use and 
availability of motor transportation. We do not at­
tempt to resolve these inconsistent findings of fact. 
We take note, however, of the fact that a federal court 
has been asked to intervene in resolving the essentially 
local problem of balancing the loss to the railroad from 
continued operation of trains . . . with public need for 
that service. . .  directly affected___”  (Italics sup­
plied).

More support to the finality of the discretion of the com­
mission is found on page 348:

“  . . . and whatever the scope of review of commission 
findings when an alleged denial of constitutional rights 
is in issue, it is now settled that a utility has no right 
to relitigate factual questions on the ground that con­
stitutional rights are involved. New York v. United 
States, 331 U.S. 284, 334-336 (1947)___ ”  (Italics sup­
plied)

More directly in point, at pages 349-350 is found the 
following:

“  . . .  as adequate state court review of an administra­
tive order based upon predominantly local factors is 
available to appellee intervention of a federal court is 
not necessary for the protection of federal rights. Equi­
table relief may be granted, only when the District 
Court, in its sound discretion exercised with the ‘ scru­
pulous regard for the rightful independence of state

79



governments which, should at all times actuate the fed ­
eral courts, ’ is convinced that the asserted federal right 
cannot be preserved except by granting the ‘ extraordi­
nary relief o f  an injunction in the federal courts. ’ Con­
sidering that ‘ few  public interests have a higher claim 
upon the discretion o f  a federal chancellor than the 
avoidance o f  needless friction  w ith state policies,’ the 
usual rule o f com ity must govern the exercise o f equi­
table jurisdiction by the D istrict Court in this case___ ”
(Italics supplied)

A nd again at page 351, “ It  is in the public interest 
that federal courts o f equity should exercise their 
discretionary power to grant or w ithhold relief so as to 
avoid needless obstruction o f the domestic policy  o f 
the states___ ”

III. Further evidence o f the broad discretion permitted 
by the Supreme Court to state adm inistrative agencies is 
found in the case o f Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315, 
87 L. Ed. 1424, 63 S. Ct. 1098 (1943). In this case the Sun Oil 
Co. attacked the validity o f an order o f the Texas Railroad 
Commission granting the petitioner B u rford  a perm it to 
drill oil wells on a small plot o f  land in the E ast Texas oil 
fields. The U. S. D istrict Court fo r  the western district of 
Texas dism issed the suit by the C om pany; the Circuit Court 
o f  A ppeals reversed the D istrict Court. The Supreme Court 
through Mr. Justice Black reversed the Circuit Court of 
Appeals, and affirm ed the D istrict Court.

The Supreme Court held that a federal equity court may 
properly  decline to exercise its jurisdiction  invoked because 
o f  diversity o f  citizenship o f the parties and alleged in­
fringem ent o f constitutional r ig h ts ; to determine the valid­
ity  o f  a state commission order, made under the authority 
o f  a conservation statute, granting a perm it to drill oil wells 
on certain property, adjacent to lands owned by the com­
plainant, where the state has provided a uniform  method 
fo r  the form ation o f policy  and determ ination o f cases by

80



the commission and the state courts; and where the judicial 
review of the commission’s decisions in the state courts is 
expeditious and adequate; and where intervention by the 
lower federal courts is likely to cause delay and conflicting 
interpretation of the state law, dangerous to the success of 
state domestic policies.

The Court, at page 320, explicitly states:

‘ ‘ The primary task of attempting adjustment of these 
diverse interests is delegated to the Railroad Commis­
sion, which Texas has vested with ‘ broad discretion’ 
in administering the law.”

The Court points out that the Texas courts have the 
power of thorough judicial review of the decisions of the 
Railroad Commisson; and that the Texas courts are work­
ing partners with the Commission in the business of creating 
a regulatory system for the oil industry. The Commission 
is charged with principal responsibility for fact finding and 
for policy making and the courts expressly disclaim the 
administrative responsibility. On the other hand, orders 
of the Commission are tested for “ reasonableness”  by trial 
de novo before the state court, and the Court may on oc­
casion make a careful analysis of all the facts of the case 
in reversing a Commission order. The state court may even 
formulate new standards for the Commission’s adminis­
trative practice, and suggest that the Commission adopt 
them.

The Supreme Court recognized that the existence of prob­
lems throughout the oil regulatory field creates a possibility 
of serious delay which can injure the conservation program; 
and that it may be necessary to stay federal action pending 
authoritative determination of difficult state questions. 
It recognized that questions of state regulation of the oil 
industry so clearly involve basic problems of Texas policy 
that equitable discretion should be exercised to give the 
Texas courts the first opportunity to consider them.

81



IV Concrete evidence of the Supreme Court’s adher­
ence to complete administrative discretion is found in the 
case of Far Eastern Conference, United States Lines Co., 
States Marine Corporation, et al. v. United States and Fed­
eral Maritime Board, 342, U. S. 570, 96 L. Ed. 576, 72 S. Ct. 
492 (1952). The suit was brought by the government to en­
join the dual rate system established by an association of 
steamship companies known as the Far East Conference. 
The companies never submitted the rates to the Federal 
Maritime Board for approval, as provided for in §15 of the 
Shipping Act (46 USC §814). The defense, that the issues 
involved were of such a technical nature calling for the 
application of administrative exercise as to make it im­
proper to bypass the Board, was upheld by the Court 
through Justice Frankfurter.

It was held that the administrative agencies should not 
be bypassed by the Courts in cases raising issues of fact 
not within the conventional experiences of judges or in 
cases requiring the exercise of administrative discretion, 
even though the facts, after they have been appraised by 
specialized competence, serve as a premise for legal conse­
quences to be judicially defined. V.

V. “ But the courtroom is not the arena for debating 
issues of educational policy. It is not our province to choose 
among competing considerations in the subtle process of 
securing effective loyalty to the traditional ideals of de­
mocracy, while respecting at the same time individual 
idiosyncrasies among a people so diversified in social 
origins and religious alliances. So to hold would in effect 
make us the school hoard for the country.”  Minersville 
School District v. Gohitis, 310 U. S. 586, 60 S. Ct. 1010, 84 
L. Ed. 1375 (1940), at 310 U. S. 598 (Italics supplied).

82



Parenthetically, the Court, in this case recognizes its 
limitations in the abstract sciences, with this language at 
page 597:

“ The precise issue, then, fo r  us to decide is whether 
the legislatures o f  the various states and the authori­
ties in a thousand counties and school districts o f this 
country are barred from  determining the appropriate­
ness o f  various means to evoke that unifying sentiment 
without which there can ultimately be no liberties, civil 
or religious. To stigmatize legislative judgm ent in p ro­
viding fo r  this universal gesture o f respect fo r  the sym­
bol o f our national life  in the setting o f the common 
school as a lawless inroad on that freedom  o f  conscience 
which the Constitution protects, would amount to no 
less than the pronouncement o f pedagogical and psy­
chological dogm a in a field where courts possess no 
marked and certainly no controlling com petence.”

Constitutional guarantees o f personal liberty are not 
always absolutes. Government has the right to maintain 
public safety and good order.

Keeping the control o f public education close to the local 
people is perhaps the strangest tradition in Am erican edu­
cation. One o f  the predominant characteristics o f Am erican 
education is the variation in local policies and procedures 
in terms o f unique local conditions. This is in sharp con­
trast to the highly centralized national system o f education 
of other countries. VI.

VI. “ Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, 
imply the existence o f  an organized society m aintaining 
public order without which liberty itself would be lost in 
the excesses o f unrestrained abuses.”  Cox v. New Hamp­
shire, 312 U. S. 569, 61 8. Ct. 762, 85 L. Ed. 1049
(1941) at 312 U.S. 574.

83



VII. Speaking of the 14th Amendment, the TJ. S. Su­
preme Court in Barbier v. Comiolly, 113 U. S. 27, 5 S. Ct. 
357, 28 L. Ed. 923 (1885), said at page 31:

“ But neither the amendment—broad and compre­
hensive as it is—nor any other amendment, was de­
signed to interfere with the power of the State, some­
times termed its police power, to prescribe regulations 
to promote the health, peace, morals, education and 
good order of the people . . (Italics supplied)

VIII. In Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 47 8. 
Ct. 114, 71 L. Ed. 303 (1926), it said at page 387:

“ Regulations, the wisdom, necessity, and validity of 
which, as applied to existing conditions, are so apparent 
that they are now uniformly sustained, a century ago, 
or even a half century ago, probably would have been 
rejected as arbitrary or oppressive . . .  while the mean­
ing of constitutional guaranties never varies, the scope 
of their application must expand or contract to meet 
new and different conditions which are constantly 
coming within the field of their operation . . . Laws and 
regulations must find their justification in some aspect 
of the police power, asserted for the public welfare.”

84



C. Remarks

The aforesaid summary shows the wise recognition by the 
Supreme Court in the past of the need for time in effecting 
certain economic changes in our society in order to allow a 
period of healthy adjustment in sensitive areas. The cases 
also show a recognition of the need for adequate local dis­
cretion in the same areas. This line of reasoning should be 
applied to the even more sensitive area of desegregation 
which presents a vast problem of human engineering to re­
solve the social changes sought.

Samuel Gompers, one of America’s greatest labor leaders 
recognized this fact some years ago when he stated:

“ One fact stands out in bold relief in history of 
men’s attempts for betterment. That is that when com­
pulsion is used, only resentment is aroused, and in the 
end nothing is gained. Only through moral suasion and 
appeal to men’s reason can a movement succeed.”

85





Part Four

Considerations Involved 

in Formulating Plans 

For Desegregation

87





A . Changes 
in the Law

Dr. Rupert B. Vance, Professor of Sociology, University 
of North Carolina, past president of the American Socio­
logical Society, writing in the Journal of Public Law, 
Emory University Law School, Vol. 3, Spring 1954, Number 
1, page 42, says:

“ National prohibition offers an example of a change 
in law which did not carry through to change in the 
collective behavior and attitudes of society. In spite of 
our respect for the Constitution, resistance increased 
and law enforcement was insufficient to bring about 
social change. This resistance assumed the form of 
violations, as well as evasions, of the law. Under this 
situation it can be said that the 18th Amendment was 
repealed in order to preserve respect for the law. This 
occurred in spite of the fact that the initial change 
had the support of public opinion as represented in 
the (1) affirmative vote of legislatures of the states, 
and was implemented both by (2) federal legislation, 
as in the Volstead Act, and (3) supporting legislation 
in many states. For students of social change, the con­
trast with a decision of the Supreme Court is impres­
sive.

‘ ‘ Thus, while students of law realize that social change 
can be and has been implemented by legal enactment 
and judicial decision, it is also realized that resistance 
to social change is of many types. Here we can say 
that jurisprudence, as a social science, has shared in 
the responsibility of determining the extent to which 
any desired social change is enforceable by law. Laws 
may be violated, and they may be evaded. Evasion

89



carries the implication of driving a course through 
gaps in the law, if not actually breaking it. Important 
to the courts, to public order, and to the profession is 
the whole field of conflict of laws. Oftentimes, the 
change ordered by legal enactment and judicial decision 
is so limited in scope that no actual evasion is drawn 
upon to block social change. Some times modes of ad­
justment may exist within the choice of individuals 
and groups—alternatives sanctioned in legal codes. It 
is in this borderline between public and private spheres 
of life that the doctrine of social change is of most im­
portance to students of jurisprudence. It must be re­
membered that issues will be decided, not on the basis 
of an assumed code of ethics, but on the basis of what 
is enforceable unthin the system of legality.”  (Italics 
supplied)

90



B. Plans for Integration

The problem involves, among other things, the collective 
conscience or mores of our white citizens regarding segre­
gation. That conscience simply stated, although of varying 
degrees of intensity, is that our people are not ready for 
desegregation. This was demonstrated conclusively by the 
survey which was made in Florida. This conscience is in­
grained because it was nurtured and cherished throughout 
many generations as a way of life. It is deep-seated and its 
roots rest in fears of inter-marriage of the races, racial dif­
ferences, superstitions, history, traditions and customs.

This community conscience until the Brown case had 
long years of legal sanction in the field of public education. 
Elimination of this legal sanction by no means eradicates 
the underlying collective conscience of the people in this 
field. This attribute of the problem simply cannot be suc­
cessfully solved overnight.

This the Court undoubtedly appreciated by not making 
its desegregation decision immediately effective. Its ques­
tions and its delay of implementation indicate that it is 
conscious of what may be termed the equities of transition. 
The Court, we believe, is imbued with the need for gravity 
and for prudent concern in dealing with this collective con­
science.

We think it realizes the need for social engineering, time, 
patience and community understanding. It senses the need 
for conditioning and education if implementation is ever 
to be a real success.

Free men are not automatons capable of being molded

91



and transformed forthwith by a new and revolutionary 
judicial concept which does not square with their collective 
conscience.

The enormity of the problem of compliance gives great 
pause. We do not deal with implementation of a decree 
against a single individual or even a minority. A  successful 
response to the judgment requires reconciliation to it of a 
great majority of our people. The Court on its part needs for 
the enforcement of its decree the amelioration of time which 
is said to be a great Healer. It needs the rallying of those 
who will stand by the law of the land because it is such 
whether they agree with it or not and the patience of wise 
administration which eschews haste, precipitate action and 
premature procedures.

The Court stands not in need of the whip and the scourge 
of compulsion to drive our people to obedience, but rather 
the rational solution of time in which the loyalty, patience 
and understanding of the law-abiding will come forward 
and lead the way to peaceful, reasonable and successful 
compliance.

Not only to be considered is the need of reconciling this 
collective conscience to desegregation but others of im­
portance to be considered include the safety of school chil­
dren, the peace of the community, the mutitudinous admin­
istrative problems affected, the impact upon teachers’ jobs, 
particularly Negro teachers’, the transportation of school 
children, the revisions of laws and regulations, the redis­
tricting of attendance areas, the reallocation of physical 
school plant facilities and others involved in the transition 
from a segregated school system to a non-segregated system. 
All require time, wise administration and patience for their 
solution.

Gradual effective adjustment to integration presupposes 
that there will be a plan. But because there is a wide variety 
of local conditions, no specific plan can be outlined which

92



would be acceptable under all conditions and in all com­
munities.

We think integration must proceed in Florida on a county 
by county basis because of the fundamental differences in 
various areas of the state which we have attempted to 
demonstrate in this brief.

A great many plans for integration have been developed 
in Florida and other states and all of them have their ad­
herents. A  plan of gradual integration starting with the 
first grade and working on up through high school over 
a 12 year period is believed by some advocates to be the 
answer for their community but it is rejected in other places.

Another plan for beginning the integration process at 
the college level and gradually working down to the first 
grade can be supported by valid arguments, but it too is 
rejected by many educational leaders as being unworkable 
in some communities.

Other plans which have been advanced include a gradual 
reorganization of school attendance areas; designated 
schools whose students will be composed of volunteers from 
both races during the transition period; a simultaneous in­
tegration of all school grades over a period of time based 
on the scholastic level of the students as determined by ex­
aminations. These and many other plans are being consid­
ered by school authorities whose job it will be in the final 
analysis to devise a plan which will be accepted and will 
work in their particular school districts.

The one factor which all of these plans share in common 
is the need for sufficient time to carry them out and the 
one point on which agreement can be reached by school 
authorities who are willing to undertake a program of in­
tegration is that the plan adopted for their specific area 
must be unique in that it will take into consideration the 
exact problems of that area and no other.

93



I f this planning and action is permitted by the Court, 
we believe that local school authorities should take into 
consideration two primary factors: first, the material 
aspects of integration which include the use of present 
school buildings, the construction of new buildings, trans­
portation, teachers’ jobs and assignments, school popula­
tions within attendance areas and the administration im­
practicabilities and inequities that would arise in these 
dislocations in any effort to effect a too hasty non-segrega­
tion; second, the intangible considerations including com­
munity thinking, customs, mores, overt acts that might 
result from the impact of premature integration, the schol­
astic standards of the schools and the feelings of children.

We realize that objection has been made to gradualism 
in seeking methods of integrating white and Negro schools, 
that delay might tend to create feelings of hostility and 
encourage organized opposition. The advocates of this 
theory apparently feel that the shock treatment is to be 
preferred and that if a difficult job has to be done, the 
quicker it is done, the better.

In this belief we are positive they are mistaken. Strong 
opposition already exists in the South to desegregation. 
It will be intensified in direct proportion to the amount 
of hasty precipitation and coercion that is applied.

Already there is springing up in our state opposition 
organizations, some of which through their literature en­
courage violence. Burning of crosses and circulation of 
hate literature are becoming more and more prevalent. 
But minimizing these manifestations of defiance are thou­
sands of law-abiding citizens of both races, many influential 
newspapers and loyal organizations who are trying to meet 
the situation calmly and patiently. But their attitudes have 
always been buttressed on the assumption of gradualism 
and local autonomy. I f that assumption is cut from under 
them by a decree of immediate desegregation or even a 
decree of a period of short delay which does not permit a

94



large degree of local determination, we frankly doubt 
whether we can save our public school system. This ob­
jection to gradualism may be valid in Northern states where 
segregation has been practiced but where the people as a 
whole do not share the intense feelings on racial differences 
which have become an ingrained part of the culture of the 
South.

There is no reason to think that sufficient delay in integra­
tion of the schools of Florida to allow for a period of gradual 
adjustment would create new problems or intensify those 
already existing.

The problems are already here and must be recognized 
realistically by anyone conscientiously seeking a solution. 
There is every logical reason to believe that any attempt 
to use the shoek treatment of immediate compulsory inte­
gration of schools in Florida would only result in translat­
ing the present passive intellectual differences in thought 
and emotional feelings to an active, positive and violent 
physical resistance.

When all is said and done, it may be that about the best 
advice on the subject was contained in a speech by Gover­
nor David S. Walker of Florida in 1867 to a meeting of 
Freedmen in Tallahassee1.

Governor Walker said:

‘ ‘ The great question now to be solved, is whether two 
different races can live in peace together under the 
same government with equal political rights. In my 
reading of history, I  do not remember any instance in 
which this has ever been done. But God has placed the 
work upon us and with His blessing we must try our 
best to accomplish it. In the first place, therefore, I 
say let each one of us of all colors resolve to cultivate 
kindly relations with one another and never allow our-

1. Semi-weekly Floridan, Tallahassee, Florida, April 23, 1867, 
page 2.

95



selves to be arrayed in hostility to each other—let us 
always speak kindly to and of one another. I have never 
known a man in my life who had the true principles of 
a Christian gentleman in him, who would wantonly 
wound the feelings of any human being, however 
humble.”

96



Part Five

CONCLUSION

There are two ways in which the Brown decision may be 
viewed by history. First, it may be considered as a seismic 
shock which struck without warning and engulfed a large 
part of the nation in a tidal wave of hate and inflamed 
emotions and carried away a public school system which 
took half a century and billions of dollars to build, or 

Second, it may be looked upon as a high goal which this 
Court has fixed for men of good will to strive to attain and 
which they may attain in due course if rational considera­
tion is given to human frailty and faith is maintained in 
the slow but sure upward movement of democracy.

Many think that our democracy is now face to face with 
the toughest job in practical government it has ever had 
to tackle without going to war. Some way must be found 
to protect the constitutional rights of a minority without 
ignoring the will of the majority. We think the only an­
swer is time and the patient efforts of those who value de­
mocracy more than their personal longings and private 
prejudices. We hope that this court will accept this answer.

R ichard W. E rvin 
Attorney General of 
the State of Florida

Ralph E. Odum 
Assistant Attorney General, 
State of Florida

97





(Appendix A)

Results of a Survey of Florida Leader­

ship Opinion on the Effects of the 

U. S. Supreme Court Decision of May 

17, 1954 Relating to Segregation in 

Florida Schools

99





Introduction

As a result of the decision of the United States Supreme 
Court of May 17, 1954, declaring unconstitutional racial 
segregation in public education, Florida and other southern 
states are confronted with problems of tremendous gravity 
and complexity.

While it enunciated a new principle of law, the Court 
did not prescribe the manner in which this principle 
should be translated into action in the states and com­
munities affected. Instead, it restored the cases to the 
docket for further argument as to the method of adjust­
ment which should be called for in subsequent decrees, 
inviting the Attorneys General of states requiring or 
permitting segregation in public education to appear as 
amici curiae.

In anticipation of the preparation of a brief for sub­
mission in response to this invitation, the Attorney General 
of the State of Florida requested the assistance of social 
scientists and other educators in compiling facts concerning 
the problems which the State of Florida would encounter 
in complying with the decision of the Court.

This is their report.

RICHARD W. ERVIN

Attorney General

101



ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 
RESEARCH ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
FOR THE STUDY OF PROBLEMS OF 

DESEGREGATION IN FLORIDA SCHOOLS

The committee was chosen by the Attorney General to 
assist him in conducting a survey to determine leadership 
opinion among Florida citizens regarding problems created 
by the U. S. Supreme Court’s decision of May 17, 1954, 
abolishing segregation in the public schools.

The individuals asked to serve on this committee were 
chosen on the basis of their professional standing in the 
field of education; their specialized knowledge and train­
ing which would be of value in conducting such a survey; 
and their reputation for civic-mindedness and impartiality. 
The committee selected Dr. Lewis Killian, Associate Pro­
fessor of Sociology at Florida State University, to act as 
director of research and coordinator for the project. While 
certain parts of this report were written by Dr. Killian 
and others, the entire report and all its findings have been 
reviewed and approved by the entire membership of the 
committee.

Mr. Richard W. Ervin Dr. Sarah Lou Hammond 
Attorney General School of Education

(Ex Officio) Florida State University

Mr. Thomas D. Bailey Mr. Robert D. Gates
State Superintendent of Department of Education-

Public Instruction 
(Ex Officio)

102



Mr. Ralph E. Odum
Assistant Attorney General

Dr. Ralph Eyman, Dean 
School of Education 
Florida State University

Dr. Gilbert Porter 
Executive Secretary 
Florida State Teachers 

Association

Dr. J. B. White, Dean 
School of Education 
University of Florida

Dr. Manning J. Dauer 
Department of Political 

Science
University of Florida

Dr. Don Larson 
Department of Political 

Science
University of Miami

Dr. George Gore, President 
Florida Agricultural and 

Mechanical University

Mr. Angus Laird, Director 
State Merit System

Dr. Robert E. Lee 
Department of Education

Mr. Ed Henderson 
Executive Secretary 
Florida Education 

Association

Dr. Richard Moore, 
President
Bethune-Cookman College

Dr. R. L. Johns 
School of Education 
University of Florida

Dr. Mode Stone 
School of Education 
Florida State University

Mr. D. E. Williams 
Department of Education

Dr. T. J. Wood 
Department of Political

Science
University of Miami

Dr. Lewis M. Killian
Department of Sociology 
Florida State University 
( Coordinator of Research)

103





The Report 
and the 

Conclusions*

Just as the effects of segregation, held by the Court to 
be discriminatory, are essentially psychological, the prob­
lems of desegregation are also social and psychological 
as much as they are legal.

An eminent student of race relations in the South, Guy 
B. Johnson, has said, “ Anyone who thinks that the transi­
tion from segregation to racial co-education ccm be made 
without problems, tensions, and even personal tragedies is 
a fool. Anyone who thinks that the transition means the end 
of civilization is also a fool.” * 1

The purpose of this study was to delineate as far as is 
possible the problems, the tensions and, perhaps, the trage­
dies, which might he expected to arise in the course of this 
transition in Florida communities. This was a fact finding, 
research study. There was no intent to predict whether 
this transition will take place nor to make value-judgments 
as to whether it should or should not occur.

Prediction of the problems which might arise if desegre­
gation of public schools were undertaken in the near future 
are based upon four types of data. These are:

* Prepared by Dr. Lewis Killian, Department of Sociology, Florida 
State University.
1. “ The Impending Crisis of the South,”  New South, VIII, 
No. 5 (May, 1953), (Atlanta: Southern Regional Council), 5.

105



1. The expressed attitudes of various groups of leaders, 
both white and Negro, toward the Court’s decision and 
toward the possible implementation of it in Florida.

2. An historical analysis of the way in which Negroes have 
availed themselves of a privilege from which state restric­
tions were removed by a similar federal court decision, 
the privilege of voting in primary elections.

3. An analysis of relevant information pertaining to school 
administration, instructional services, and the quality of 
education as they might be affected by desegregation.

4. The experience of other states and communities in which 
programs of desegregation have been undertaken.

In the study of human behavior it is impossible to ask 
all of the questions which are relevant to that behavior. 
The selection of questions always implies certain assump­
tions concerning the situation being studied, and these 
assumptions should be made explicit.

The basic assumptions of this study are:

1. That the Court will desire a minimum of intergroup 
conflict and public disorder in any program of desegre­
gation which might be undertaken. On this assumption, 
information indicative of the likelihood of conflict and 
widespread disorder in various situations becomes highly 
important.

2. That expressed attitudes are to some extent and in cer­
tain types of situations indicative of later behavior. This 
is particularly important when it is the attitudes of occu­
pants of key positions in the power structure of a group 
which are concerned. 3

3. That the attitudes of people in leadership, power, and 
prestige roles are of more importance as determinants of

106



social change than are the attitudes of larger numbers of 
people not occupying such roles.
4. That the behavior of people in one situation is to some 
extent indicative of the behavior of the same or different 
people in similar but not identical situations.

The conclusions of this study are based on the findings 
of several separate, but related, constituent studies which, 
together, constitute the general research project. Each study 
is presented in detail in a separate subsection of the report. 
The general conclusions, drawn from all of these studies, 
are found in the chapter preceding the detailed reports 
of the separate studies.

The sub-studies, in order of presentation, are:
1. An attitude-opinion poll, based on mailed questionnaires, 
of 9 white and 2 Negro groups of leaders throughout the 
state. (Page 113)

2. An attitude-opinion poll, based on personal inter­
views, of white leaders in 10 selected counties and Negro 
leaders in 8 of these counties. (Page 153)

3. An historical analysis of trends in Negro voter regis­
tration in Florida, 1940-1954. (Page 177)

4. An analysis of relevant information pertaining to school 
administration and instructional services as they might be 
affected by desegregation. (Page 185)

5. An intensive study, utilizing various methods, of lead­
ership attitudes and opinions in a metropolitan area and 
a rural area in southeastern Florida. (Page 201)

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
1. On the basis of data from all relevant sources included 
in this study, it is evident that in Florida white leadership 
opinion with reference to the Supreme Court’s decision is 
far from being homogeneous. Approximately three-fourths

107



of the white leaders polled disagree, in principle, with the 
decision. There are approximately 30 per cent who violently 
disagree with the decision to the extent that they would re­
fuse to cooperate with any move to end segregation or would 
actively oppose it. While the majority of white persons 
answering opposed the decision, it is also true that a large 
majority indicated they were willing to do what the courts 
and school officials decided.

2. A  large majority of the Negro leaders acclaim the de­
cision as being right.

3. Only a small minority of leaders of both races advocate 
immediate, complete desegregation. White leaders, if they 
accept the idea that segregation should be ended eventu­
ally, tend to advocate a very gradual, indefinite transition 
period, with a preparatory period of education. Negroes 
tend to advocate a gradual transition, but one beginning 
soon and lasting over a much shorter period of time.

4. There are definite variations between regions, coun­
ties, communities and sections of communities as to whether 
desegregation can be accomplished, even gradually, with­
out conflict and public disorder. The analysis of trends in 
Negro registration and voting in primary elections, shows 
similar variations in the extent to which Negroes have 
availed themselves of the right to register and vote. At 
least some of these variations in voting behavior must be 
accounted for by white resistance to Negro political par­
ticipation. This indicates that there are regional varia­
tions not only in racial attitudes but in overt action.

Regional, county and community variations in responses 
to questionnaires and interviews are sufficiently marked to 
suggest that in some communities desegregation could be 
undertaken now if local leaders so decided, but that in others 
widespread social disorder would result from immediate

108



steps to end segregation. There would be problems, of 
course, in any area of the state, but these would be vastly 
greater in some areas than in others.

5. While a minority of both white and Negro leaders ex­
pect serious violence to occur if desegregation is attempted, 
there is a widespread lack of confidence in the ability of 
peace officers to maintain law and order if serious violence 
does start. This is especially true of the peace officers them­
selves, except in Dade County. This has important impli­
cations. While it is true that expressed attitudes are not 
necessarily predictive of actual behavior, there seems little 
doubt that there is a minority of whites who would actively 
and violently resist desegregation, especially immediate 
desegregation. It has been concluded from the analysis of 
experiences with desegregation in other areas, “ A  small 
minority may precipitate overt resistance or violent oppo­
sition to desegregation in spite of general acceptance or 
accommodation by the majority.” 2

6. Opposition of peace officers to desegregation, lack of 
confidence in their ability to maintain law and order in 
the face of violent resistance, and the existence of a posi­
tive relationship between these two opinions indicates that 
less than firm, positive action to prevent public disorder 
might be expected from many of the police, especially in 
some communities. Elected officials, county and school, also 
show a high degree of opposition. Yet it has been pointed 
out, again on the basis of experience in other states, that 
the accomplishment of efficient desegregation with a mini­
mum of social disturbance depends upon.

A. A clear and unequivocal statement of policy by leaders 
with prestige and other authorities;

2. Kenneth B. Clark, “ Findings,”  Journal o f Social Issues, IX , 
No. 4 (1953), 50.

109



B. Firm enforcement of the changed policy by authorities 
and persistence in the execution of this policy in the 
face of initial resistance;

C. A  willingness to deal with violations, attempted viola­
tions, and incitement to violations by a resort to the 
law and strong enforcement action;

D. A refusal of the authorities to resort to, engage in or 
tolerate subterfuges, gerrymandering or other devices 
for evading the principles and the fact of desegregation;

E. An appeal to the individuals concerned in terms of their 
religious principles of brotherhood and their acceptance 
of the American traditions of fair play and equal justice.

It may be concluded that the absence of a firm, enthusi­
astic public policy of making desegregation effective would 
create the type of situation in which attitudes would be 
most likely to be translated into action.4

7. In view of white feelings that immediate desegregation 
would not work and that to require it would constitute a 
negation of local autonomy, it may be postulated that the 
chances of developing firm official and, perhaps, public sup­
port for any program of desegregation would be increased 
by a decree which would create the feeling that the Court 
recognizes local problems and will allow a gradual tran­
sition with some degree of local determination.

8. There is a strong likelihood that many white children 
would be withdrawn from public schools by their parents 
and sent to private schools. It seems logical, however, that 
this practice would be confined primarily to families in the 
higher income brackets. As a result, a form of socio-eco­
nomic class segregation might be substituted for racial 
segregation in education.

4. Experience shows that when the steps listed above have been 
taken, predictions of serious social disturbance have not been 
borne out.

110



9. It is evident that a vast area of misunderstanding as to
each other’s feelings about segregation exists between the 
races. White leaders believe Negroes to be much more satis­
fied with segregation than Negroes are and Negro leaders 
believe that whites are much more willing to accept desegre­
gation gracefully than whites proved to be. Hence a logical 
first step towards implementing the principle set forth by 
the Court, and one suggested by both whites and Negroes, 
would seem to be the taking of positive, cooperative steps 
to bridge this gap and establish better understanding be­
tween the two groups.

10. Although relatively few Negro leaders and teachers 
show concern about the problem, white answers indicate 
that Negro teachers would encounter great difficulty in ob­
taining employment in mixed schools. To the extent that 
desegregation might proceed without parallel changes in 
attitudes towards the employment of Negro teachers in 
mixed schools, economic and professional hardships would 
be worked on the many Negro teachers of Florida.

11. Since 1940, and particularly since 1947, the State of 
Florida has made rapid and steady progress toward the 
elimination of disparities between white and Negro edu­
cational facilities as measured by such tangible factors as 
teacher salaries, current expenditure per pupil, teacher 
qualifications, and capital outlay expenditure per pupil.

12. In spite of the current ambiguity as to the future of 
dual, “ separate but equal”  school facilities the State is 
proceeding with an extensive program of construction of 
new school facilities for both white and Negro pupils, with 
a recommended capital outlay of $370 per Negro pupil and 
$210 per white pupil. Both this and the previous finding 
indicate that, while these steps have been taken within the 
framework of a dual educational system, there is a sincere

111



desire and willingness on the part of the elected officials 
and the people of Florida to furnish equal education for all 
children.

13. Available achievement test scores of white and Negro 
high school seniors in Florida indicate that, at least in the 
upper grades, many Negro pupils placed in classrooms with 
white pupils would find themselves set apart not only by 
color but by the quality of their work. It is not implied 
that these differences in scores have an innate racial basis, 
but it seems likely that they stem from differences in eco­
nomic and cultural background extending far beyond the 
walls of the segregated school, into areas of activity not 
covered by this decision.

14. Interracial meetings and cooperative activities already 
engaged in by teachers and school administrators in many 
counties demonstrate steps that can be, and are being taken 
voluntarily and through local choice to contribute to the 
development of greater harmony and understanding be­
tween whites and Negroes in Florida communities.

112



Leadership
Opinion

By
Questionnaire 

. . .  and Conclusions*

Although all of the people of Florida would be affected, 
directly or indirectly, by any move to end racial segre­
gation in the public schools, some groups have a more 
direct and intense involvement in the situation than do 
others.

People connected with county school systems such as 
school board members, school trustees, superintendents, 
principals, teachers and supervisors would play key roles 
in putting any plan for desegregation into effect. Police 
officers, judges and county attorneys would be required 
to deal with cases of conflict and disorder which might 
arise. Parents are deeply involved not only as parents 
but as voters and taxpayers. As moulders of public opinion 
newspaper editors, radio station managers and ministers 
have an important relationship to any developing social 
change. Legislators and county commissioners would be 
faced with the task of formulating new state and county 
policies relating to this significant legal and social change.

* Prepared by Dr. Lewis Killian, Department of Sociology, Florida 
State University.

113



In an attempt to get at the attitudes and opinions of 
these important segments of the population, questionnaires 
were mailed to the following groups:
1. All members of the Florida Peace Officers Association.
2. School principals, white and Negro, and school super­
visors.
3. Negro PTA presidents, white PTA presidents, council 
chairmen and board members.
4. School board members and school trustees.
5. County judges, circuit judges, state attorneys, county 
solicitors and county commissioners.

6. Newspaper editors.

7. Radio station managers.

8. Members of the state legislature.

9. Ministers (a 10 per cent sample of certain denomina­
tions).

Practical considerations precluded polling certain other 
groups. The large number of teachers, white and colored, 
in the state and the fact that so many would be away 
from home at the time of the survey made a poll of their 
opinions impractical. It was practical, however, and per­
haps more important, to question principals and super­
visors, as school people who work intimately with the 
teachers in positions of leadership and authority. Simi­
larly, the parent group polled was limited to PTA officers 
because of the tremendous number of parents involved 
and the non-availability of any list from which a sample 
could be drawn.

The ministers presented a special problem. The size of 
the population of ministers, which could only be estimated, 
was obviously large. At the same time it was extremely 
difficult to obtain comprehensive mailing lists for even part 
of the multitude of denominations to which these ministers

114



might belong. Mailing lists were obtained for the follow­
ing denominations: Baptist, Methodist, Episcopal, Roman 
Catholic, Presbyterian, and Assembly of God. Question­
naires were mailed to a 10 per cent sample of the clergy­
men on each of these lists. Forms were also sent to a 
sample of Negro Methodist and Baptist ministers, but the 
returns were too small for use. In many cases they were 
returned marked “ Unclaimed”  or “ Moved, Left No 
Address. ’ ’

The Questionnaires.

Nine different questionnaires were used in this survey. 
Questions designed to elicit the following information were 
included on all of them:

1. The position held by the subject and the section of the 
state in which he lived and worked.
2. The subject’s personal feelings about the rightness of 
the Court’s decision and action which should be taken as 
a result of it.

3. The subject’s estimate of the likelihood of resistance 
to desegregation in his community, the forms this resist­
ance might take, and the ability of law enforcement officers 
to maintain law and order in the event of serious violence.

The questionnaire sent to the peace officers sought also 
an estimate of the likelihood that peace officers would 
enforce school attendance laws for mixed schools. All 
other questionnaires included questions concerning the 
following additional items:

4. The subject’s estimate of the feelings about the de­
cision and its implementation of other groups in the state 
and in his community.
5. The subject’s opinion as to the method which would 
be most effective in ending public school segregation. 6
6. Opinions as to the grades in which it would be easiest

115



to start admitting colored and white children to the same 
schools.

Finally, principals and supervisors, school officials, leg­
islators and PTA officers were asked whether certain 
things which might constitute either aids or obstacles to 
desegregation might happen in the event schools are de­
segregated in the next few years.

Questionnaire Returns and Method of Analysis.

A total of 7,749 questionnaires were mailed. Time did 
not permit a follow-up wave, but an effort was made to 
increase returns by prefacing each form with a personal 
appeal from the Attorney General and by enclosing a 
stamped, self-addressed envelope.

Useable questionnaires returned number 3,972, 51.26 per 
cent of the number mailed. The number and percentage 
of returns for each group are shown in Table 1. The 
lowest percentage of returns is seen to be that for the 
Negro PTA presidents, 21.5 per cent. The rate of return 
for all groups may be regarded as satisfactory since it 
has been found that in mail polls usually less than 20 
percent of the questionnaires are returned.3

Practical considerations, of which there are many in 
what is essentially “ action research,”  precluded the use 
of standard techniques for control of the sample by as­
certaining the characteristics of non-respondents. Hence 
extreme caution must be exercised in generalizing from 
these data to any population.

It is possible to speculate as to some of the reasons 
for non-returns. It is known that some forms did not 
reach the subject for one reason or another. Unfortunately

3. Katz, Daniel, and Hadley Cantril, “ Public Opinion Polls,”  
Sociom etry, I (1937), 155-179.

116



237 questionnaires were returned too late for tabulation. 
In the case of refusals other possible reasons must be 
considered. In some groups, a relatively low degree of 
education may have characterized persons who did not 
respond. It is known that in some cases public officials, 
particularly judges, failed to reply because they felt it 
was unethical for them to answer such an inquiry, even 
though anonymity was promised them. Some question­
naires were returned not completed but with a brief com­
ment. The nature of many of these comments suggests 
that many of the white subjects who refused to respond 
were violently opposed to desegregation.

On the basis of these speculations, it seems likely that 
the prevalent bias of white non-respondents is in the 
direction of opposition to the Supreme Court’s decision 
and to attempts to implement it. In the case of Negroes, 
it is more likely that distrust of the motives of the research 
and fear of expressing their opinions were the causes of 
failure to reply.

All questions were of the check-list type. Questionnaires 
were coded, punched on cards, and machine tabulated.4 
For purposes of analysis, the subjects were regarded as 
populations not necessarily representative of any larger 
populations. Hence percentages are presented but no tests 
of statistical significance have been made. Conclusions are 
based, therefore, only upon gross differences in responses.

Even though these respondents cannot be regarded as 
a representative sample, the nature of their selections 
makes them important as groups. In spite of its scientific 
limitations, this poll constitutes the most comprehensive

4. Statistical work was done by the Sociology Research Labora­
tory of the Florida State University, under the direction of Prof. 
Robert McGinnis and Dr. John M. Haer. All responsibility for 
interpretation of the results is assumed by the Research Advisory 
Committee, however.

117



and extensive assessment of public opinion in Florida 
through the use of scientifically devised instruments that 
is available. The fact that approximately one-half of such 
groups of leaders, in the case of whites, and approximately 
one-third, in the case of Negroes, expressed the opinions 
indicated below is of itself important.

Findings.

Bearing in mind the caution which should be used in 
generalizing to larger populations, the following conclu­
sions may be drawn from the responses of those subjects 
who did return questionnaires:

1. White groups differ greatly from each other in their 
attitudes towards the Court’s decision, ranging from nearly 
unanimous disagreement to a slight predominance of 
favorable attitudes.

In Table 2 there can be seen the percentages of re­
spondents in each group who selected each of the choices 
indicative of his personal feelings. Table 3 shows com­
binations of these choices into categories of “ Agreement,”  
“ Neutral,”  and “ Disagreement.”  From these tables it 
can be seen that peace officers are overwhelmingly opposed 
to the principle that segregation should be ended. On the 
other hand, a slight majority of white principals, super­
visors and ministers indicate agreement with the principle 
established by the court, although they vary in their opin­
ions as to when it should be implemented. Other groups 
ranking high in disagreement with the decision are county 
officials, school officials and white PTA leaders.

2. White groups also differ from each other in willing­
ness to comply with whatever courts and school boards 
decide to do regardless of their personal feelings.

118



In Table 4 combinations of choices shown in Table 2 
are presented to show willingness to comply with official 
policy or intention to resist or refuse to cooperate. In 
this case elected officials, including county officials, school 
officials, and legislators, rank high in intention to oppose 
action to bring about desegregation, as do white PTA 
leaders. White principals and supervisors rank very low 
in intention to oppose desegregation.

3. Peace officers are the white group most opposed to 
desegregation. (Table 3).

4. Almost no whites believe that desegregation should be 
attempted immediately. (Table 2).

5. A large majority of both Negro groups are in agree­
ment with the Court’s decision declaring segTegation 
unconstitutional. (Table 3).

6. While only a small minority of both Negro groups 
believe that desegregation should be attempted immedi­
ately, an even smaller minority would oppose attempts 
to bring about desegregation or refuse to cooperate. 
(Table 2).

7. Only a minority of whites in all groups believe that 
opponents of desegregation would resort to mob violence 
in trying to stop it. A  larger proportion, but still a 
minority, believe that serious violence would result if 
desegregation were attempted in their community in the 
next few years.

Table 5 shows the predictions of the occurrence of mob 
violence and serious violence by all groups. It is evident 
that “ mob violence”  and “ serious violence”  do not mean 
exactly the same thing to the subjects. It may be noted 
that the peace officer group ranks highest in percentage 
predicting both mob violence and serious violence.

8. A yet smaller minority of both of the Negro groups

119



anticipate mob violence or serious violence as a result of 
steps towards desegregation. (Table 5).

9. The majority of all white groups are not sure that peace 
officers could cope with serious violence if it did occur 
in their communities, replying either “ N o”  or “ Don’t 
Know”  to the question.

Table 6 shows the percentage of each group replying 
either “ No”  or “ Don’t Know”  to the question, “ Do you 
think the peace officers in your community would be able 
to maintain law and order if serious violence is started!”  
Again it may be noted that the peace officer group ranks 
highest in percentage showing doubt as to the ability to 
avoid or minimize violence.

10. A much smaller proportion of both Negro groups ex­
press doubts as to the ability of law enforcement officials 
to deal with serious violence. (Table 6).

11. The majority of most of the white groups believe 
that peace officers could maintain law and order if minor 
violence occurred.

Table 7 shows the percentage of respondents in each 
group who answered “ Yes”  to the question, “ Do you 
think the peace officers in your community would be able 
to maintain law and order if minor violence is started!”  
The white PTA leaders differed markedly from other 
groups, only 34.13 per cent answering “ Yes.”

12. The Negro groups did not differ greatly from the 
white groups in the proportion believing that police could 
cope with minor violence. (Table 7).

13. Only 13.24 per cent of 1669 peace officers believe that 
most of the peace officers they know would enforce at­
tendance laws for mixed schools.

14. A  majority of the members of all white groups except 
peace officers, who were not asked; radio station managers;

120



and ministers, believe that most of the people of Florida 
and most of the white people in their communities disagree 
with the Court’s decision.

Table 8 shows the percentage of the 10 groups asked 
to assess the feelings of other people who felt that most 
of the members of the groups about which they were asked 
disagreed with the decision.

15. In the five white groups asked, from one-fourth to 
one-half of the respondents believed that most of the 
Negroes in their community were opposed to the desegre­
gation ruling. (Table 8).

16. A  much smaller proportion of both Negro groups be­
lieve that most of the people of Florida, most of the whites 
in their community, and particularly the Negroes in their 
communities are in disagreement with the principle of 
desegregation. (Table 8).

It was seen earlier that only a small minority of the 
Negro respondents personally disagreed with the decision. 
It may be seen now that only a small minority of these 
Negroes think that other Negroes in their communities 
are in disagreement with the court. Furthermore, a much 
smaller proportion of Negroes than of whites think that 
most white people in Florida are in favor of segregation 
as a legal principle.

17. Only a small minority of all groups, white and Negro, 
believe that immediate assignment of children to schools 
on the basis of geographical location rather than race 
would be the most effective way of ending public school 
segregation.

Table 9 shows the percentage of each of 8 groups choos­
ing as the most effective method immediate desegrega­
tion, a very gradual transition, and either or both of 
two gradual but relatively early methods of ending seg­
regation. While the peace officers were not asked this

121



question, their answers to the question on “ personal 
feelings about the decision”  (Table 2) indicate almost 
unanimous opposition to immediate desegregation.

18. All groups think a gradual program of desegregation 
would be most effective. Negroes, however, prefer that 
the process start within the next year or two with imme­
diate, limited integration much more frequently than do 
whites. The whites prefer a very gradual transition with 
no specified time for action to begin. (Table 9).

19. Whites who expressed an opinion believe that the 
primary grades and the colleges are the levels on which 
desegregation could be initiated most easily. On the other 
hand, almost as many Negroes believed that segregation 
should be ended on most or all grade levels simultaneously 
as believed it should be ended first at the lowest and 
highest grade levels.

20. The maintenance of discipline in mixed classes by 
Negro teachers is regarded as a potential problem by a 
majority of white principals, supervisors and PTA leaders. 
A  much smaller proportion of Negroes regarded this as 
a problem, with a majority of Negro principals believing 
that colored teachers could maintain discipline in mixed 
classes.

Table 11 shows the percentage of each group queried 
as to possible problems who indicated definite belief that 
certain things would or would not happen, thereby creating 
problems for mixed schools.

21. A  majority of all white groups believe that white 
people would resist desegregation by withdrawing their 
children from the public schools, but a much smaller pro­
portion of Negroes, less than a majority, believe that this
would happen. (Table 11).

22. Almost two-thirds of white school officials— superin­
tendents, board members, and trustees—believe that ap­

122



plications of Negroes to teach in mixed schools would be 
rejected. (Table 11).

23. Nearly three-fourths of school officials believe that 
it would be difficult to get white teachers for mixed schools. 
(Table 11).

24. Almost half of school officials and a little over 40 
per cent of white PTA leaders believe that the people of 
their communities would not support taxes for desegre­
gated schools, but only about 20 per cent of Negro PTA 
leaders believe that such support would not be forthcoming. 
(Table 11).

25. In the case of all potential problems on which both 
Negroes and white were questioned a smaller proportion 
of Negroes than of whites indicate belief that problems 
would arise as a result of desegregation. (Table 11).

26. In the case of peace officers there is a positive rela­
tionship between personal disagreement with the decision 
and lack of confidence in the ability of peace officers to 
cope with serious violence. There is an even higher posi­
tive relationship between belief that segregation should 
be kept and belief that peace officers would not enforce 
school attendance laws for mixed schools.

Table 12 shows the number of peace officers who feel 
that the police could or could not maintain law and order 
if serious violence occurs, according to their attitude to­
wards the decision and its implementation. Table 13 shows 
belief as to whether peace officers would enforce school 
attendance laws by attitude towards the decision. The 
officers who answer “ Don’t know”  to these questions are 
omitted from these tables. While peace officers were asked 
what they thought other law enforcement officials could 
or would do and were not asked what they themselves 
would do, it is evident that these subjects are projecting 
their own feelings and, perhaps, their intentions into other 
peace officers.

123



Regional Variations.

The responses to certain items of the two largest groups 
polled, the peace officers and the white school principals 
and supervisors, were analyzed by region of the state in 
which the respondents lived. The 67 counties of Florida 
were grouped into 8 regions defined by social scientists 
at the Florida State University in Florida Facts.1 These 
regions and the counties each includes are:

Region Counties

I Bay, Escambia, Gulf, Okaloosa, Santa Rosa (Extreme 
northwest Florida).

II Baker, Calhoun, Citrus, Columbia, Dixie, Franklin, 
Gadsden, Gilchrist, Hamilton, Hernando, Holmes, 
Jackson, Jefferson, Lafayette, Leon, Levy, Liberty, 
Madison, Suwannee, Taylor, Wakulla, Walton, 
Washington. (Northwest and north central Florida).

i n  Alachua, Bradford, Clay, Putnam, Union. (North­
east Florida, inland).

IV  Lake, Marion, Orange, Osceola, Polk, Seminole, Sum­
ter. (Central Florida, inland, largely rural).

V  Brevard, Duval, Flagler, Indian River, Nassau, St. 
Johns, Volusia. (Northeast and Middle Florida 
coastal region, includes Jacksonville metropolitan 
area).

VI Charlotte, Collier, Hillsborough, Lee, Manatee, Pasco, 
Pinellas, Sarasota. (Southwest coastal, includes 
Tampa-St. Petersburg, Bradenton-Sarasota metro­
politan area).

VII DeSoto, Glades, Hardee, Hendry, Highlands, Okee­
chobee. (South central, inland, rural, many migrant 
farm laborers).

VTTT Broward, Dade, Martin, Monroe, Palm Beach, St.

1. Tallahassee, Florida: School of Public Administration, The 
Florida State University.

124



Lucie. (Southeast coastal, contains Miami metropoli­
tan area and some migratory labor areas).

Clear-cut regional variations in attitudes and opinions 
are found to exist, as is indicated by the following findings:

27. Although the majority of peace officers in all regions 
feel that segregation should be kept, the percentage feel­
ing so varies from 83 per cent in two regions to 100 per 
cent in one region.

Personal feelings, of peace officers about the decision are 
presented, by region, in Table 14. The variation in the 
number of respondents in the different regions seems to 
he explainable in terms of the number of counties in the 
different regions and the size of population. While it was 
impossible to ascertain the number of questionnaires mailed 
to each region, the distribution of returns of peace officer 
questionnaires approximates the distribution of population 
by region. It should be noted that Region VII ranks 
highest in percentage of peace officers who oppose de­
segregation, while Regions I and VIII rank lowest.

28. The percentage of white principals and supervisors 
who are in disagreement with the decision varies from 20 
per cent to 60 per cent in different regions.

The percentage of white principals and supervisors 
agreeing and disagreeing with the decision, by region, is 
shown in Table 15. Again Region VII ranks highest in 
amount of opposition and Region VIII ranks lowest.

29. A large majority of white principals and supervisors 
in all regions indicate that they would comply with the 
decision regardless of personal feelings, but the percent­
age varies from 76 per cent in Region VII to approximately 
94 per cent in Regions V I and VIII. (Table 16).

30. The percentage of peace officers predicting mob vio­
lence as a method of resisting desegregation varies from

125



20 per cent in Region VIII to nearly 63 per cent in Region 
VII. (Table 17).

31. Percentages of both peace officers and white principals 
and supervisors predicting serious violence in the event 
desegregation is attempted vary widely between some 
regions. (Table 18).

32. The majority of both peace officers and white princi­
pals and supervisors in all regions doubt that the police 
could maintain law and order if serious violence occurred, 
but there are some regional variations. (Table 19).

Responses of Legislators.

Although the 79 members of the state legislature who 
returned questionnaires constitute almost 15 per cent of 
the 176 legislators and legislative nominees to whom the 
forms were sent, generalizations to the entire membership 
of the legislature on the basis of their responses are en­
tirely unwarranted. Any attempt to predict the action of 
the legislature at its next session would be even more pre­
sumptuous. The responses of these legislators to tAvo spe­
cial questions asked of them are presented below as a 
matter of interest, however.

The legislators were asked to indicate which of five pos­
sible courses of action should be followed at the next ses-

\
sion of the legislature. The percentage checking each course, 
and the details of the five courses of action, are shown in 
Table 20.

The legislators were also asked Avhether they believed 
that there is any legal way to continue segregation in Flor­
ida Schools indefinitely. Of the 79 respondents, 34.20 per 
cent replied “ Yes” , 25.31 per cent replied “ N o” , and 39.32 
per cent answered “ Don’t KnoAv” , or gave no answer.

126



CONCLUSIONS

1. It is evident that white respondents drawn from differ­
ent areas of leadership vary sharply in their feelings about 
the rectitude of the Supreme Court’s decision of May 17, 
1954. At least this small, but not unimportant, segment of 
leaders in Florida is far from unanimous in allegiance to 
the principle of segregation in public education.

2. There are definite regional variations in attitudes to­
wards the decision, in predictions of the likelihood that 
serious violence may occur if desegregation is attempted, 
and in confidence in the ability of the police to maintain 
law and order if serious violence does occur.

3. A majority of all groups except Negro principals do 
not feel confident that the police in their communities could 
cope with serious violence. This is particularly true of the 
peace officers themselves. At the same time, serious violence 
is anticipated by only a minority of all groups, although 
by almost 50 per cent of the peace officers.

4. Withdrawal of white children from the public schools, 
the maintenance of discipline in mixed classes by Negro 
teachers, refusal to employ Negro teachers for mixed 
schools, and difficulty in obtaining white teachers are the 
outstanding potential problems found to be expected.

5. It is evident that the white and Negro groups view the 
decision and the problem which desegregation might cre­
ate quite differently, and that they do not understand each 
other’s attitudes. The majority of the whites are, in va­
rious degrees, opposed to the decision; the Negroes are in 
favor of it. Yet the whites believe that the Negroes are 
opposed to desegregation to a much greater extent than 
those Negro groups polled are found to be. Furthermore, 
the white and Negro groups assess Negro opinion differ-

127

j



ently, a much larger proportion of whites than Negroes 
believing that most Negroes prefer segregated schools.

The whites view the effecting of desegregation as a much 
more difficult and dangerous problem than do the Negroes, 
many more of them foreseeing serious problems and even 
violence. On the other hand, the Negroes have more con­
fidence in the ability and the willingness of the whites to 
adapt to desegregation than do the whites themselves.

6. The majority of all groups, white and Negro, believe 
that desegregation should be put into effect gradually rather 
than abruptly and immediately. More Negroes than whites, 
however, are in favor of early integration on a limited 
scale and beginning in the next year or two. The whites 
favor a more indefinite and remote form of gradualism, if 
they will countenance the idea of desegregation at all.

7. The existence of a positive relationship between the 
attitudes of peace officers towards the decision and their 
predictions of the inability of police to control serious vio­
lence suggests the existence of a tendency to project their 
own feelings into situations which might arise and into 
other persons involved. Such highly subjective predictions 
are very likely to be indications of what the respondent 
himself would do, or feels he could do, in the situation. Such 
predictions might very well take on the character of “ self- 
fulfilling prophecies. ’ ,2 I f police officers do not believe that 
they or others would be able to maintain law and order if 
serious violence occurs, the likelihood that they will attempt 
wholeheartedly to do so is accordingly reduced.

2. An outstanding American sociologist, Robert K. Merton, has 
defined the “ self-fulfilling prophecy”  as a “ false definition of the 
situation evolving a new behavior which makes the originally false 
conception come true.”  See his article, “ The Self-Fulfilling 
Prophecy,”  The A ntioch Review , V III (Summer, 1948), 193-210.

128



SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE

COUNTY SUPERINTENDENTS, SCHOOL 
BOARD MEMBERS, SCHOOL TRUSTEES:
 ̂ 1. In what county do you serve?..........................................

2. How long have you served in public school work? 
(Check one)
1)—less than 2 years; 2)— 3-4 years; 3)— 5-8 years; 
4)—9-12 years; 5) over 12 years.

3. Check the sentence that most nearly describes your 
feelings toward the Supreme Court decision declaring 
segregation in public schools unconstitutional:
1) —Firmly in favor of the decision, and believe that

schools should be immediately opened to both races 
, throughout Florida.
2) —Firmly in favor of the decision; feel schools should

be gradually combined, taking into consideration 
places which need more preparation.

3) —Feel that such a decision should have been made
eventually, but believe we are not ready for it. 
Feel we must move very slowly and cautiously.

4) —Neither in favor of nor against the decision; will
agree with whatever the courts and the school of­
ficials do.

5) Against the decision, but will agree with whatever 
the courts and school officials do.

6) —Firmly against the decision; will not cooperate in
ending public school segregation.

7) —Firmly against the decision; will actively oppose
any attempt to end segregation in Florida schools.

4 ...............Which one of the above statements do you
think describes the feelings of most of the people in 
Florida? (Write the answer in the blank) 5 6

5 ........Which describes the feelings of most of the
school teachers and administrators in your county?

6 ........Which describes the feelings of most of the
white parents in your county?

129



7...................Which describes the feelings of most of the
colored parents in your county?

Suppose that in the next few years the court ordered 
school officials to admit colored and white children to the 
same schools.
8. Do you think anyone in your community would try to

stop this? Yes........... No...........

9. I f they did, what would they do? (Check your answers)
1) —Petition to stop combining schools
2) —Hold protest meetings
3) —Keep their children home from school
4) — Start individual violence
5) — Take part in mob violence

10. Would you resign rather than carry out such court
order? Yes........... No........... Don’t know...........

11. Do you think there would be violence in your commun­
ity if colored and white children are admitted to the 
same schools in the next few years? (Check one)
1) — Serious violence 3)—No violence
2) —Minor violence 4)—Do not know

Do you think your peace officers would be able to maintain 
law and order if : (Check yes, no, or don’t know)

12. Serious violence is started? 1 )...........Yes 2 )........... No
3 ) ....Don’t know

13. Minor violence is started? 1 ).......Yes 2 )....... No 3 ).......
Don’t know

14. Check the method you believe would be most effective 
in ending public school segregation:

1) —Immediate action to assign all children to school
on basis of geographical location rather than race.

2) —Keeping existing school boundaries for the time
being, but immediately letting children who want 
to, go to the closest school regardless of race.

130



3) —A one or two year period of preparation before any
schools are integrated.

4) —A very gradual transition over a period of years.
15. In what grades do you think it would be easiest to 

start admitting colored and white to the same schools? 
(Check your answer)
1) — Grades 1, 2 and 3 4)—All grades 1 through 12
2) —Grades 1 through 6 5)— College and university
3) —High school 6)—Don’t know

Suppose in the next few years a few colored children wanted 
to go to the nearest school, a white school. What do you 
think would happen: (Check yes, no, or don’t know)

16. Would the School Board admit them 
readily ?

17. Would the School Board admit them 
only to certain schools?

18. Would the School Board admit them 
if a court ordered it?

19. Would the School Board try to fight 
a court order?

Yes No
Don’t
Know

Suppose schools are integrated in the next few years. WTiat 
do you think would happen? (Check yes, no or don’t know)

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

Would it be harder to get white 
teachers ?
Would it be harder to get colored 
teachers ?
Would applications of colored teachers 

to teach in mixed schools be accepted? 
Would many white teachers treat 
colored children unfairly?
Would many colored teachers treat 
white children unfairly?
Would colored teachers be able to 
discipline white children?
Would higher school taxes be needed 
for the integrated schools at first?

Yes No
Don’t
Know

131



27. Would your community support taxes
for integrated schools? ...........................

28. Would school bus drivers treat colored
children fairly ? ...........................

29. Would school bus drivers encourage
white students to treat colored chil­
dren fairly? ...........................

30. Are there any accredited private
schools in your community other than 
kindergartens ? ...........................

31. Would people try to start private
schools ? ...........................

32. I f you like, comment on the problems the Supreme 
Court decision brings, and make any suggestions, using 
hack of this sheet.

SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE

FLORIDA PEACE OFFICERS:
1. Check the position you hold:

—Deputy Sheriff — Constable
— State Highway Patrolman — Town Marshal 
— City Chief of Police -—Other
— City Policeman

2. In what county do you serve?..............................
3. The U. S. Supreme Court recently declared segrega­

tion in public schools unconstitutional. Which do you 
think: (Check one) 1
1) — That segregation in schools should be kept
2) — That schools should be gradually opened to both

races over a period of years?
3) — That colored children who want to go to white

schools should be admitted immediately?
4. Suppose that in the next year or two the Court ordered 

school officials to admit colored and white children to 
the same schools.

132



a. Would anyone in your community try to stop this?
Yes.......  No.......

b. I f  they did, what would they do ? (Check your answer)
1) —Petition to stop combining schools
2) —Hold protest meetings
3) —Keep their children home from school
4) — Start individual violence
5) — Take part in mob violence

5. Would there be violence in your community if colored 
and white children are admitted to the same schools? 
(Check one)

1) — Serious violence
2) —Minor violence
3) — No violence
4) —Do not know

a. Would your existing law enforcement staff be able 
to maintain law and order if
1) serious violence is started 2) minor violence is

6. Would most of the peace officers you know enforce school 
attendance laws for mixed schools? (Check one)

1) —Yes
2) — No
3) —Do not know

7. If you want to say more or make suggestions about law 
enforcement and segregation, please use the back of 
this sheet.

started
a) —Yes
b) —No
c) —Do not know

a) —Yes
b ) —  No
c) —Do not know

133





TABLE 1

QUESTIONNAIRES SENT AND RETURNED, BY GROUPS

Group
Number

Sent
Number Per Cent 

Returned Returned

Peace Officers 3200 1669 52.16
Principals and Supervisors (white) 1216 771 63.40
PTA Leaders (white) 751 375 49.93
Newspaper Editors 219 118 53.88
Radio Station Managers 78 54 69.23
County Officials 533 230 43.15
School Officials 500 309 61.80
Legislators 176 79 44.89
Ministers 191 101 52.89
Negro Principals 485 180 37.11
PTA Leaders (Negro) 400 86 21.50

TOTAL 7749 3972 51.26

135



TABLE 2

PER CENT EXPRESSING VARIOUS

Groups and 
Number 1 2 3 4

Peace Officers 
(N-1669)

.5 9.2

Principals and 
Supervisors (W ) 
(N-762)
PTA (W ) 
(N-375)

.4 13.2 38.4 4.9

Editors
(N-54)

.8 14.4 33.9 4.2

Radio Station Managers 
(N-54)

1.8 14.8 24.0 7.4

County Officials 
(N-224)

2.7 18.3 .9

School Officials 
(N-309)

2.9 20.0 .6

Legislators
(N-79)

7.5 22.8 2.5

Ministers
(N-101)

1.0 34.6 26.7 4.0

Principals, (N) 
(N-177)

11.9 55.4 11.3 8.5

PTA Negro 
(N-86)

12.8 44.2 8.1 5.8

* The attitudes indicated by number are as follows:
1. Firmly in favor of the decision; believe that schools should be 
immediately opened to both races. (For peace officers, “ Colored 
children who want to go to white schools should be admitted 
immediately.” )
2. Firmly in favor; feel schools should be gradually combined, 
taking into consideration places which need more preparation. 
(For peace officers, “ Schools should be gradually opened to both 
races over a period of years.” )
3. Feel that such a decision should have been made eventually, 
but believe we are not ready for it. Feel we must move very 
slowly and cautiously.
4. Neither in favor of nor against the decision; will agree with 
whatever courts and school officials do.

136



ATTITUDES TOWARDS DECISION, BY GROUPS

Attitude*
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Total

89.3 1.0 100.0

26.8 4.9 7.9 .8 .9 1.4 .4 100.0

20.0 14.4 29.3 .8 2.4 1.1 1.6 100.0

16.1 6.8 16.1 .8 3.4 2.5 .8 99.8

20.4 11.1 11.1 1.8 1.8 5.6 99.8

22.8 12.0 30.4 5.8 3.1 4.0 100.0

21.7 9.7 34.6 4.9 2.9 2.6 99.9

16.4 5.1 38.0 1.3 5.1 1.3 100.0

8.0 10.0 11.9 2.0 1.0 99.2

1.1 1.1 5.6 1.7 2.2 1.1 99.9

2.3 4.6 4.6 5.8 1.2 5.8 4.6 99.8

5. Against the decision, but will agree with whatever courts and 
school officials do.
6. Firmly against; will not cooperate in ending segregation.
7. Firmly against; will actively oppose any attempt to end 
segregation.
8. Any combination of 1, 2, or 3 indicating agreement with 
decision.
9. Any combination of 5, 6, or 7 indicating disagreement with 
decision. (For peace officers, “ Segregation in schools should he 
kept.” )
10. Any other combination.
11. No information.

137



TABLE 3

PER CENT AGREEING OR DISAGREEING WITH THE 
DECISION. BY GROUPS

No
Group and 
Number Agree Neutral

Dis­
agree

Infor­
mation Total

Peace Officers 9.7 89.3 1.0 100.0
(N-1669)
Principals and Sup. (W ) 52.9 4.9 40.4 1.8 100.0
(N-762) 
PTA (W ) 29.6 1.6 66.1 2.7 100.0
(N-375)
Editors 50.0 4.2 42.4 3.4 100.0
(N-118)
Radio Station Mgrs 42.6 7.4 42.6 7.4 100.0
(N-54)
County Officials 21.0 .9 70.9 7.1 99.9
(N-224)
School Officials 23.0 .6 70.9 5.5 100.0
(N-309)
Legislators 31.6 2.5 64.6 1.3 100.0
(N-79)
Ministers 62.3 4.0 31.9 2.0 100.2
(N-101)
Negro Principals 84.2 8.5 3.9 3.4 100.0
(N-177)
PTA (Negro) 70.9 5.8 12.7 10.4 99.8
(N-86)

138



TABLE 4

PER CENT WILLING OR UNWILLING TO COMPLY WITH 
COURTS AND SCHOOL OFFICIALS. BY GROUPS

Group and 
Number*

Would Would Not 
Comply Comply

No
Information Total

Principals and Sup. (W ) 
(N-762)

84.5 13.6 1.8 99.9

PTA (W ) 
(N-375)

51.2 46.1 2.7 100.0

Editors
(N-118)

70.3 26.3 3.4 100.0

Radio Station Mgrs. 
(N-54)

70.4 22.2 7.4 100.0

County Officials 
(N-224)

44.6 48.2 7.1 99.9

School Officials 
(N-309)

45.3 49.2 5.5 100.0

Legislators
(N-79)

50.6 48.1 1.3 100.0

Ministers
(N-101)

74.3 23.9 2.0 100.2

Negro Principals 
(N-177)

93.7 2.8 3.4 99.9

PTA (Negro) 
(N-86)

79.0 10.4 10.4 99.8

* These combinations could not be made for peace officers.

139



TABLE 5

PER CENT OF EACH GROUP PREDICTING MOB VIOLENCE
AND SERIOUS VIOLENCE

Group and 
Number

Predict 
Mob Violence

Predict
Serious Violence

Peace Officers 
(N-1669)

29.2 46.6

Principals and Sup. (W ) 
(N-771)

8.9 22.81

PTA (W ) 
(N-375)

17.3 33.72

Editors
(N-118)

8.5 20.3

Radio Station Managers 
(N-54)

11.1 18.5

County Officials 
(N-230)

23.0 35.3s

School Officials 
(N-303)

31.0 44.9

Legislators
(N-79)

27.8 39.2

Ministers
(N-101)

10.9 13.9

Negro Principals 
(N-180)

4.4 4.54

PTA (Negro) 
(N-86)

5.8 8.1

1. N-762.
2. N-371.
3. N-224.
4. N-174.

140



TABLE 6

PER CENT OF EACH GROUP DOUBTING ABILITY OF PEACE
OFFICERS TO COPE W ITH  SERIOUS VIOLENCE

Group and 
Number

Answered 
“ No”  “

Answered 
Don’t Know”

Answered 
“ No”  or 

“ Don’t Know”
Peace Officers 
(N-1669)

55.7 26.8 81.0

Principals and Sup. (W ) 34.7 
(N-762)

40.7 72.4

PTA (W ) 
(N-375)

42.1 36.0 78.1

Editors
(N-118)

35.6 24.6 60.2

Eadio Station Man. 
(N-54)

33.3 22.2 55.5

County Officials 
(N-224)

41.1 25.4 66.5

School Officials 
(N-303)

49.2 27.4 76.6

Legislators
(N-79)

49.4 21.5 70.9

Ministers
(N-101)

23.8 40.7 64.5

Negro Principals 
(N-177)

11.3 31.6 42.9

PTA (Negro) 
(N-86)

18.6 33.7 52.3

141



TABLE 7

PER CENT OF EACH GROUP W H O  BELIEVE PEACE OFFICERS
COULD COPE W ITH  M IN O R  VIOLENCE

Group and Answered
Number “ Yes”

Peace Officers 50.9
(N-1669)
Principals and Sup. (W ) 52.1
(N-362)
P.T.A. (W ) 34.1
(N-375)
Editors 74.6
(N-118)
Radio Station Man. 59.3
(N-54)
County Officials 51.3
(N-224)
School Officials 41.6
(N-303)
Legislators 60.8
(N-79)
Ministers 64.4
(N-101)
Negro Principals 61.0
(N-177)
P.T.A. (Negro) 46.5
(N-86)

142



TABLE 8

PER CENT OF GROUPS POLLED W HO BELIEVE MOST OF 
OTHER SPECIFIED GROUPS DISAGREE WITH THE DECISION

Specified Group
Group and Most People Whites in Negroes in
Number* ** in Florida Community Community

Principals and Sup. (W ) 65.61 
(N-756)

73.0 25.1

P.T.A. (W ) 
(N-375)

61.6 87.5 42.5

Editors
(N-118)

59.3 69.5 *#

Radio Station Man. 
(N-54)

42.6 72.3 #*

County Officials 
(N-224)

74.82 80.8 47.8

School Officials 
(N-303)

75.73 85.5 52.5

Legislators
(N-79)

69.1 78.6 39.1

Ministers
(N-101)

48.6* 48.6 ##

Negro Principals 
(N-180)

7.8 26.7 8.9

P.T.A. (Negro) 
(N-86)

16.3 37.2 15.1

1. N-770.
2. N-230.
3. N-309.
*For ministers, this question asked how most of the members of 
their congregation felt.
**This group not asked how Negroes as a separate group felt.

143



TABLE 9

PER CENT OF EACH GROUP DESIGNATING VARIOUS 
METHODS OF ENDING SEGREGATION AS 

MOST EFFECTIVE
METHOD

—  -

Group and Immedi- Very Other Infor-
Number ate Gradual Gradual* mation Total

Peace Officers .5 9.2 90.31 100.0
(N-1669)
Principals and 

Sup. (W ) 3.1 71.7 19.5 5.4 99.7
(N-771)
P.T.A. (W ) 4.3 65.1 13.7 17.0 100.1
(N-375)
Editors 5.1 60.2 19.5 15.3 100.1
(N-118)
Radio Station 

Man. 14.8 46.3 25.9 12.9 99.9
(N-54)
County Officials 5.2 49.1 16.0 29.6 99.9
(N-230)
School Officials 4.9 62.8 9.7 22.6 100.0
(N-309)
Legislators 11.4 49.4 17.7 21.5 100.0
(N-79)
Ministers 5.9 47.5 33.7 12.9 100.0
(N-101)

Negro Principals 9.8 31.6 55.7 2.9 100.0
(N-174)
P.T.A. (Negro) 13.9 26.7 46.5 12.8 99.9
(N-86)
* “ Other gradual”  includes “ Keeping existing school boundaries 
for the time being, hut immediately letting children who want to 
do so go to the closest school regardless of race,”  and “ A one or 
two year period of preparation before any schools are integrated. ’ ’ 
1. These peace officers gave no information or answered “ Segre­
gation should be kept.”

144



TABLE 10
PER CENT OF EACH GROUP DESIGNATING SPECIFIED GRADE LEVELS 

AS EASIEST PLACE TO START DESEGREGATION

Group and 
Number*

Grades
1-3 College

GRADE 
1-3 and 
College

LEVEL
All

Other
Don’t Know 

or No Inf. Total
Principals and Sup. (W ) 
(N-771)

34.2 33.6 12.1 10.0 10.0 99.9

P.T.A. (W )
(N-375)

36.5 23.5 4.5 5.3 30.1 99.9

Editors
(N-78)

37.3 16.9 7.6 15.2 22.9 99.9

County Officials 
(N-230)

26.1 18.3 3.5 10.0 42.2 100.1

School Officials 
(N-309)

30.4 23.3 4.2 7.4 34.6 99.9

Legislators
(N-79)

22.8 34.2 5.1 10.1 28.0 100.2

Ministers
(N-101)

29.7 19.8 8.9 18.9 22.9 100.2

Negro Principals 
(N-180)

23.3 13.9 11.1 43.9 7.8 100.0

P.T.A. (Negro) 
(N-86)

23.3 16.3 1.2 40.7 18.6 100.1

* These combinations could not be made for peace officers.



PER CENT OF EACH GROUP DESIGNATING VARIOUS PROBLEMS AS BEING LIKELY TO ARISE

TABLE 11

Principals &
Problem Area Sup. (W) (771)

PTA
(W) (375)

School
Officials (303)

Principals 
(N )(180)

PTA 
(N) (86)

Discipline by White Teachers 16.7 3.9
Discipline by Negro Teachers 55.2 65.9 66.2 6.7 20.9
Lowering of Academic Standards 48.6 11.7
Unfairness by White Teachers 17.0 31.2 22.3 6.7 19.8
Unfairness by Negro Teachers 15.8 26.3 16.6 10.6 11.7
Unfairness to Negroes by Bus Drivers 22.6 25.3 14.4
Development of Private Schools 61.1 70.4 64.3 12.2 18.6
Withdrawal of Whites from Public Schools 55.4 57.6 63.4 12.2 18.6
School Officials Resigning 32.3
Difficulty in Hiring White Teachers 72.2
Rejection of Negro Teacher Applications 62.8
Lack of Tax Support for Mixed Schools 41.3 - 49.4 19.8



TABLE 12

CONFIDENCE OF PEACE OFFICERS IN ABILITY TO COPE 
WITH SERIOUS VIOLENCE. BY ATTITUDE 

TOWARDS DESEGREGATION*

Attitude
Belief that Police 

If Serious
Could Maintain 

Violence Started
Order

They Could They Couldn’t Total

Segregation should
be kept 193 836 1029

Segregation should be
ended, gradually
or immediately 54 64 118

r =-{-.45 t
•Peace officers who answered “ Don’t Know’ ’ have been omitted 
from this table.

TABLE 13

CONFIDENCE OF PEACE OFFICERS THAT POLICE WOULD 
ENFORCE SCHOOL ATTENDANCE LAW S FOR MIXED 

SCHOOLS. BY ATTITUDE TOWARDS DESEGREGATION*

Attitude
Judgment of Willingness of Police to 

Enforce Attendance Laws

They Would They Wouldn’t Total

Segregation should
be kept 151 796 947

Segregation should be
ended, gradually
or immediately 67 36 103

r = + .6 5t 1
Peace officers who answered “ Don’t Know’ ’ have been omitted 

from this table.

147



TABLE 14

PER CENT OF PEACE OFFICERS EXPRESSING VARIOUS 
ATTITUDES, BY REGION

Attitude Expressed
Region Keep

Segregation
Desegregate
Gradually

Desegregate
Immediately

No
Inf. Total

I 83.5 15.0 1.5 100.0
(N-133)
II 93.1 4.6 .8 1.5 100.0
(N-130)
III 86.7 12.0 1.2 99.9
(N-83)
W 92.9 6.3 .7 99.9
(N-269)
V 94.8 3.3 .7 1.1 99.9
(N-269)
V I 90.1 9.2 .6 99.9
(N-335)
V II 100.0 100.0
(N-27)
V III 83.4 14.2 .9 1.4 99.9
(N-423)

148



TABLE 15

PER CENT OF WHITE PRINCIPALS AND SUPERVISORS 
AGREEING OR DISAGREEING WITH THE 

DECISION, BY REGION

Region Agree Disagree Neutral
No

Inf. Total
I (N-71) 53.5 42.2 1.4 2.8 99.9
n  (N-151) 38.4 54.3 6.6 .7 100.0
i n  (N-38) 60.5 36.8 2.6 99.9
IV (N-135) 47.4 46.7 3.7 2.2 100.0
V (N-99) 47.5 40.4 8.1 4.0 100.0
VI (N-117) 65.0 30.8 3.4 .8 100.0
V n  (N-30) 33.3 60.0 6.7 100.0
V in  (N-121) 71.9 20.7 5.0 2.5 100.1

TABLE 16

PER CENT OF WHITE PRINCIPALS AND SUPERVISORS 
WILLING OR UNWILLING TO COMPLY, BY REGION

Region
Would
Comply

Would Not 
Comply

No
Inf. Total

I (N-71) 81.7 15.5 2.8 100.0
II (N-151) 78.1 21.2 .7 100.0
m  (N-38) 78.9 21.1 . . . . 100.0
IV (N-135) 80.0 17.8 2.2 100.0
V (N-99) 84.8 11.1 4.0 99.9
VI (N-117) 94.0 5.1 .8 99.9
V n  (N-30) 76.7 23.3 100.0
VIII (N-121) 93.4 4.1 2.5 100.0

149



TABLE 17

PER CENT OF PEACE OFFICERS PREDICTING MOB 
VIOLENCE. BY REGION

Region
Per Cent Predicting 

Mob Violence
I (N-133) 33.8
n  (N-130) 36.1
H I (N-83) 26.5
IV  (N-269) 39.9
V  (N-269) 31.2
V I (N-335) 27.5
V H  (N-27) 63.0
V i n  (N-423) 20.6

TABLE 18

NUMBER AND PER CENT OF PEACE OFFICERS AND WHITE 
PRINCIPALS AND SUPERVISORS PREDICTING 

SERIOUS VIOLENCE. BY REGION

Region
Peace

GROUP

Officers
Principals and 

Supervisors

No. Per Cent No. Per Cent
I 75 56.4 20 28.2
n 81 62.3 55 36.4
m 39 47.0 10 26.3
IV 144 53.5 28 20.7
V 129 48.0 20 20.2
V I 159 47.5 16 13.7
v n 16 59.3 13 43.3
v m 135 31.9 12 9.9

150



TABLE 19

NUMBER AND PER CENT OF PEACE OFFICERS AND WHITE 
PRINCIPALS AND SUPERVISORS DOUBTING THAT 

PEACE OFFICERS COULD COPE WITH SERIOUS 
VIOLENCE, BY REGION*

Region Peace Officers 
Number Per Cent

Principals and 
Supervisors 

Number Per Cent

I 105 78.9 53 74.6
n 109 83.8 111 73.5
m 74 89.2 27 71.1
IV 223 82.9 110 81.5
V 230 85.5 73 73.7
VI 265 79.1 76 65.0
v n 24 88.9 22 73.3
v m 314 74.2 80 66.1

* Based on total of respondents who answered “ No”  or “ Don’t 
Know”  to question, “ Do yon think the peace officers in your 
community would be able to maintain law and order if serious 
violence is started?”

151



TABLE 20

NUMBER AND PER CENT OF LEGISLATORS FAVORING EACH 
OF FIVE POSSIBLE COURSES OF LEGISLATIVE ACTION

Course of Action Number Per Cent

Legislation to preserve segregation in­
definitely by whatever means possible 32 40.5

Legislation to preserve segregation for 
a few more years, contemplating even­
tual integration but permitting time 
for development of public acceptance 8 10.1

Legislation permitting voluntary com­
pliance with Court’s decision by local 
school officials, after consultation with 
patrons 4 5.1

Setting up legal machinery to permit 
gradual adjustment on a local option 
basis with provision for interracial 
committees, group discussions by 
school patrons and other means to 
bring about harmonious and peaceful 
compliance over a requisite period of
time 18 22.8

No legislative action 10 12.7
No information given 7 8.8

Total 79 100.0

152



Leadership
Opinion

By
Personal Interview 

. . .  and Conclusions*

While the mail questionnaire method may produce a large 
volume of data in a short time, this method has many dis­
advantages. One of the most important is the difficulty en­
countered in analyzing the answers to open-ended questions, 
questions which the subject may answer in his own words. 
Another limitation is the difficulty encountered in reaching 
subjects who are not included on some mailing list, such as 
informal, non-official leaders in a community power struc­
ture. Hence the mail questionnaire study of leadership 
opinion in the state was supplemented by a study of leader­
ship opinion in 10 selected counties by the use of personal 
interviews.

Selection of Counties.

The 10 counties selected by the Research Advisory Com­
mittee for intensive study included: Charlotte, Hillsborough 
and Pinellas, in the southwest coastal region; Orange and 
Lake, in the central, so-called “ Ridge Section”  of the

* Prepared by Dr. Lewis Killian, Department of Sociology, Flor­
ida State University.

153



peninsula; Duval, in the northeast coastal region; Lafayette, 
a rural, inland county in the the north central portion; 
Gadsden, a rural county in the northwest part of the 
state; and Washington, a rural county, and Escambia, an 
urban county, in the extreme northwest portion of the pan­
handle of Florida.

In the selection of these counties, the following factors 
were considered:

1. Representation of the different sections of the state. 
(The southeast section was not included because an inten­
sive study was made in Dade County and nearby areas by 
the University of Miami).

2. Inclusion of both rural and urban counties.
3. Inclusion of counties with less than 10 per cent Negro 
population (2) or more than 50 per cent (1). The state has 
5 counties in the former category and 2 counties in the 
latter.
4. Inclusion of certain counties which, on the basis of pre­
liminary evidence, appeared to be areas of relatively high 
or relatively low resistance to desegregation.

Method of Study.

Interviews were conducted by 16 public school employ­
ees from various counties, 12 white and 4 Negro principals 
or supervisors. No interviewer was assigned to work in his 
home county. For unavoidable practical reasons, no inter­
views with Negro subjects were obtained in two counties, 
and in three other counties only a limited number were ob­
tained, these by white interviewers.

The interviewers, all carefully chosen for the task, were 
given one day of intensive training in the selection of sub­
jects for interview, interviewing techniques, and interview 
recording. A  schedule consisting of thirteen open-ended 
questions, similar to the structured questions used on the

154



mail questionnaire and supplemented by suggested probing 
questions, was furnished. The interviewers were also given 
a list of community leaders, official and non-official, whom 
they should attempt to interview. It should be noted that 
the field workers were instructed to follow the advice of 
local informants in selecting subjects, both white and Ne­
gro, considered to be important figures in the power struc­
ture of the community.

Each interviewer wrote, at the completion of his field 
work, an independent analysis of the situation in the county 
he studied. In addition, a content analysis was made of all 
interviews by a team of eight analysts, four white and four 
Negro, from the State Department of Education, the 
Florida A. and M. University, and the Florida State Uni­
versity. In this analysis the interviews were coded for 
IBM tabulation.1 After analysis and coding were com­
pleted, approximately one-half of the interviews were coded 
for two items a second time by another member of the 
team, white and Negro members exchanging interviews. A  
reliability check on these items revealed a high degree of 
reliability between ratings by separate analysts, indicating 
that personal and racial biases in the interpretation of the 
interview protocols were slight.

Findings.

Interviews were obtained from a total of 460 white sub­
jects and 195 Negro subjects. Of the white subjects, 263 
were official leaders (County, city and school officials, 
judges, peace officers, and school employees) and 197 were 
non-official leaders (business, professional, civic club, re­

1. Statistical analysis of the interview data was done in the 
Sociology Research Laboratory of the Florida State University, 
under the direction of Prof. Robert McGinnis and Dr. John M. 
Haer. Responsibility for the interpretation of the results is as­
sumed by the Research Advisory Committee.

155



ligious, labor, youth). There were 42 Negro subjects who 
were school employees, and 153 non-official Negro leaders, 
including a large number of insurance men, undertakers, 
and independent business men.

Distribution of the interviews by counties, for Negro and
white, are shown below:

County White Negro
Charlotte 34 None
Duval 47 31
Escambia 40 64
Gadsden 27 7
Hillsborough 79 43
Lafayette 20 None
Lake 43 7
Orange 47 21
Pinellas 90 13
Washington 33 9

On the basis of statistical analysis of the interviews and 
the impressions reported by the field staff, the findings 
indicated below were reached. Although a different method 
of study was used, these findings do not differ significantly 
from those of the questionnaire study.

These findings are:

1. The majority of white subjects (67.7 per cent) are in 
disagreement with the decision, but only 4.1 per cent of the 
Negroes interviewed disagreed.

Even white subjects who thought the decision was right 
expressed, for the most part, fear that violence would occur 
if desegregation were not worked out gradually or if, in 
the words of some, “ it is crammed down our throats.”  
Some whites violently opposed to the decision made such 
statements as, ‘ ‘ The decision is an outrage; it is wrong and 
will never work,”  and “ These colored children should be 
treated in such a way that they would not want to come 
back to school.”

156



On the other hand, a Negro interviewer summarized the 
opinions of Negroes in one county in the words, “ God is 
behind the court’s decision. He will see that it is carried 
out, but he doesn’t want us to hasten,’ ’ and in another coun­
ty in the words, “ This problem should have been met 
squarely years ago. There is no need attempting to cir­
cumvent, but settle the problem once and for all instead of 
passing it into the laps of our children.”

2. Slightly less than half (45.7) per cent of the whites 
indicated that they would not cooperate with the decision 
of the courts or local school officials as to how to effect 
desegregation, only 16 per cent indicating that they would 
actively oppose attempts to end segregation.

Caution must be exercised in inferring that a major seg­
ment of the white leadership represented here would “ go 
along”  with any plan for desegregation, regardless of 
its nature. It must be considered that many informants may 
have been indicating willingness to comply with what they 
thought the courts and, particularly, the school officials 
would do, but not with anything that they might possibly 
decide.

3. One reason given by white subjects for disagreement 
with the decision was that it is a violation of “ states’ 
rights”  and, in effect, a negation of local autonomy.

4. White leaders are almost unanimously opposed to any 
immediate steps to end segregation in their communities, 
only 4 out of 460 favoring such steps.

5. Of the Negro leaders, only 28.2 per cent favor immediate 
ending of all segregation in public education in their com­
munities, but 58.9 per cent believe that the transition should 
begin within the next three years. 6

6. Whites and Negroes differ sharply in their assessment 
of white community opinion on the decision, 77 per cent of 
the white leaders believing most of the white people in their

157



communities disagree with the decision, but only 25.1 per 
cent of the Negroes believing this.

7. Whites and Negroes differ sharply in their assessment 
of Negro opinion in their communities, 54.3 per cent of the 
white leaders believing that most Negroes disagree with the 
decision, but only 6.1 per cent of the Negro leaders believ­
ing so.

8. While only 30 per cent of the whites believe that even 
a few Negro children could be admitted now to a previously 
all white school without resulting violence, 76.4 per cent of 
the Negroes believe that this could be done without causing 
violence.

9. Of the subjects answering the question (210 white, 82 
Negro), a majority of Negroes (89 per cent) believe that 
peace officers could and would maintain law and order if 
violence started, hut only 46.7 per cent of the whites believe 
this. A  great many subjects in both groups did not answer 
this question.

10. While many white leaders seem to expect trouble and 
even violence to occur if desegregation is attempted, there 
was no definite group or category of people which was 
specified by more than 10 per cent of the respondents as 
being likely to cause this trouble.

11. White leaders designated the primary grades and the 
colleges and universities most frequently as the best place 
to start desegregation if it were undertaken (primary— 
31.7 per cent; college—13.3 per cent; both— 8.5 per cent) 
but Negro leaders designated all grades from primary 
through high school most often (32.3 per cent).

12. Specific problems other than violence which might arise 
from desegregation were identified by a greater proportion 
of whites than of Negroes, although only a minority of each 
group designated any given eventuality as a likely prob­
lem. The problems most often designated by whites were: 
getting white teachers to teach in mixed schools; using 
Negro teachers in mixed schools; maintaining discipline 
on school busses and in classes; getting white parents to

158



send their children to mixed public schools; keeping pres­
ent academic standards; and getting tax support for mixed 
schools.

13. In no county does it appear that more than a small 
segment of whites is ready to accept immediate and 
abrupt desegregation. In two counties, however, a majority 
of the white leadership interviewed (in one, 59.5 per cent, 
in the other, 72.4 per cent) believe that desegregation can 
be accomplished peacefully and effectively if it is done over 
a period of years, with a preparatory program of educa­
tion, and at a rate determined by the local citizens.

14. In one county, the high frequency of belief among white 
leaders that segregation should be kept, that violence would 
result from desegregation, and that peace officers could 
not cope with such violence, makes it appear very likely 
that conflict and disorder would result if an attempt to 
start desegregation by any means was undertaken even 
within from five to ten years from the present.

15. Inspection of the interview protocols and the reports 
of the field staff reveal that even within counties there is 
wide variation in readiness by whites of different commun­
ities to accept desegregation.

In one county there is one community in which both Ne­
gro and white leaders fear serious violence, in which or­
ganized, violent opposition to desegregation is anticipated, 
and in which, indeed, organized but peaceful opposition has 
already appeared. In the same county is a community in 
which, in the judgment of both white and Negro interview­
ers, gradual but effective desegregation could be accom­
plished in the next few years. Similar situations exist in 
all but two of the counties, both predominantly rural but 
differing in region and proportion of Negroes in the 
population.

16. Concrete suggestions for effective first steps towards 
gradual desegregation offered by subjects include a period 
of education preparatory to the first steps, and the work­
ing together in interracial committees of adults who would 
study together the problems confronting their community.

159



THE PERSONAL INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Position:
How Selected:

1. Just what do you understand the Supreme Court de­
cision to mean!

2. How do you feel about the decision ?
Probing:

Feel it was right?
Feel it was wrong?
Feel it was neither right nor wrong—just not sure ? 
I f  right,

Not at this time?
We need time?
We should try to end segregation immediately?

I f  wrong,
Should cooperate because it is the law?
Will not cooperate in ending segregation?
Will actively oppose the action?

I f neutral,
Will do whatever the courts and school officials 

say?
3. How do you think most of the people of Florida feel 

about it?
4. How do you think most of the people of this commun­

ity feel about it?
Probing:

How do white people feel about it?
How do colored people feel about it ? 5

5. Do you think there are any people in this community 
who feel differently about this?
I f  yes, probing:

How do they feel about it?
What kind of people are they? (General descriptive 

terms)
Are they organized in any way?

16 0



What kinds of things do yon think they would do to 
put across their viewpoint?

6. Now, suppose the local school board decided in the next 
few years that it had to let a few colored children who 
lived in a mostly white attendance area go to the near­
est school. What do you think would happen?
Probing:

What would people in this community do?
Would anyone try to keep them from attending the 

school?
If so, who would they be? (Not by name—just a gen­

eral description) What kinds of things would 
they do ?

Wlio would be the leaders?
Who would participate?
Would the existing law enforcement staff of this 

community be able to prevent violence from occur­
ring?

Under what conditions would they be able to prevent 
violence, and under what conditions would they 
not be able to ?

7. Now, suppose that in the next few years a few colored 
persons in your county applied for admittance to a 
white school and a court ordered that they be admitted. 
What do you think would happen?
Probing:

What would people in this community do ?
What would the school board do? (Admit them im­

mediately? Try to fight the court order? Besign?)
If they decided to admit them, would anyone try to 

keep them from attending school?
(Continue as in question 6)

8. Suppose the local school board decided that it had to 
let all children go to the school nearest their home. 
What do you think would happen?
Probing: (Same as for question 6)

9. I f segregation in the schools were done away with in 
the next few years, what problems do you think would 
come up?

161



Probing:
In the employment of white teachers?
In the employment of colored teachers ?
In transportation of children to school?
In getting public support for school finance pro­

grams ?
In keeping order among the children in the classroom 

and on the playground?
In getting parents, white and colored, to send their 

children to mixed schools?
In getting fair treatment by teachers of all children 

regardless of race?
In keeping high teaching standards in the schools?

10. What ways can you suggest for handling any of the 
problems you have mentioned?

11. Suppose public school segregation had to be ended 
sooner or later. What do you think would be the best 
way to do it ?
Probing:

There just isn’t any way?
Assign all children to school on the basis of geo­

graphical location immediately?
Keep present school boundaries at first and let chil­

dren who want to do so go to the closest school?
Have a one or two year period of preparation before 

any steps are taken to end segregation?
Try to work it out over a period of years ?

12. I f  it had to be done in the next few years, in what grades 
do you think it would be easiest to start admitting col­
ored and white to the same schools?

13. Is there anything I haven’t touched on in my questions 
which you would like to comment on?

Personnel Interviewed

A. Leaders (Officials)
County Commissioners, Chairman 
Mayor or City Manager 
Sheriff
Chief of Police

162



County Judge 
County Solicitors 
Superintendent of Schools 
County Health Officer
County Board of Public Instruction, Chairman
County School Trustees, Chairman
County Commissioners
City Commissioners
Deputies
Police Officers
Circuit Judge
State Attorney
Judge, Court of Criminal Record
County Board of Public Instruction, Members
County School Trustees, Members

B. Leaders (Non-officials)
School principals
School supervisors
Teachers
PTA leaders
Women’s Club leaders
Chamber of Commerce president
Civic and Veterans’ organizations leaders
Newspaper editor or publisher
Bankers
Lawyers
Doctors
Realtors
Labor union leaders
Undertakers
Insurance men
Leading business men
Directors, housing projects
Other leaders designated by respondents as:

(1) Being in a position to know what people in the com­
munity are thinking and doing.

(2) Being important in influencing what people in the 
community think and do.

163



RELIABILITY OF JUDGMENTS IN THE 
ANALYSIS OF RECORDED INTERVIEWS 

ON THE SUBJECT OF THE 
SUPREME COURT’S SEGREGATION DECISION*

Eight trained social scientists—four Negro, four white—  
made the analysis of 657 interviews recorded on the sub­
ject of the Supreme Court decision declaring segregation 
unconstitutional. Each judge analyzed approximately 80, 
using a scale devised for the specific case at hand.

To indicate the reliability of ratings by the judges, two 
items were arbitrarily selected for analysis. The two items 
selected were thought to offer representative difficulties to 
the judges. The judges were paired— one white and one Ne­
gro—and each judge independently re-rated half of his 
partner’s interviews on the two items.

The first item concerned a judgment of the personal feel­
ing of the respondent on the following scale:

1. Firmly in favor of the decision, and believe that schools 
should he immediately opened to both races throughout 
Florida.
2. Firmly in favor of the decision and feel schools should 
be gradually combined, taking into consideration places 
which need more preparation.
3. Feel that such a decision should have been made even­
tually, but believe we are not ready for it. Feel we must 
move very slowly and cautiously.
4. Neither in favor of or against the decision; will agree 
with whatever the courts and school officials do.
5. Against the decision, but will agree with whatever the 
courts and school officials do.

* Prepared by Fay-Tyler M. Norton, graduate psychologist.

164



6. Firmly against the decision; will not cooperate in end­
ing public school segregation.
7. Firmly against the decision; will actively oppose any 
attempt to end segregation in Florida schools.
8. Other; Pro-segregation
9. Other; anti-segregation
0. Don’t know
x. No information

The second item concerned a judgement on the “ general 
tone of the interview.”  The scale consisted of the following:

(1. Will oppose.
(2. It won’t work.
(3. Indecisive.
(4. Can be worked out, but wall take time.
(5. Integration can take place soon.
The plan for statistical analysis included percent of 

agreement between judges, Chi square, and the contingency 
coefficient for each of the eight sets of paired judgements.

For purposes of reporting and analysis, it was deemed 
more meaningful to combine categories in both items to 
form a directional scale. A  preliminary check revealed that 
the categories were probably too finely drawn to be highly 
reliable as specific categories. In the first item, categories
1, 2, 3, and 9, and categories 5, 6, 7, 8, were used to indicate 
“ in favor”  or “ against”  the decision, respectively. In the 
second item, categories 1 and 2, and categories 4 and 5 
were used to indicate “ unfavorable”  and “ favorable” , re­
spectively. There were no interviews rated as 0 or x.

Table 1 shows (1) the percent of agreement between the 
pairs of judges on both items and (2) the total number of 
paired judgments made by each pair. The consistency of 
the judges is evident.* It is especially important that con­

* Note that the probability for agreement on only one interview 
is 1/9.

165



sistency of judgment was found between white and Negro 
judges.

Tables 2-5 indicate the ratings given the personal atti­
tude of the interviewees by the four pairs of judges.

Each of the extremely high values of Chi square would 
occur much less than .001 times by chance alone. Inspection 
of the tables will show the positive relationship of the 
judges’ ratings. The contingency coefficients indicate the 
degree of association.

Tables 6-9 indicate the classifications of the interviews 
according to “ general tone.”  Here again each of the ex­
tremely high values of Chi square would occur much less 
than .001 times by chance alone. The relationship of the 
judges ’ classifications is also a positive one, the contingency 
coefficients indicating the degree of association.

Note must be made of violation of an assumption basic 
to the use of the Chi square statistic. Several of the theo­
retical cell frequencies in each table are less than 5. In this 
case the violation is not as serious as it might be, because 
the values of Chi square are extremely high. Reference is 
made to the article on the Chi-square test by Lewis and 
Burke.1

The four independent indicators of reliability for each 
of these items are acceptably high. The extension of accept­
able reliability to other items of the interview analysis must 
be made on logical grounds alone.

1. Lewis, Don, and Burke, C. J. The use and mis-use of the 
Chi-square test. Psychol. Bull., 1949, 46, 433-489.

166



PER CENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN JUDGES

TABLE 1

I. RATINGS OF INTERVIEWEE FEELING

Judges* Per Cent Total No.
I & II 94 89
III &IV 93 86
V & VI 92 60
VII & V III 89 82

II. RATINGS OF INTERVIEW S AS A  WHOLE

Judges* Per Cent Total No.
I & II 85 85
III & IV  80 84
V & V I 66 61
VII & V III 80 80

#Judges I, III, V, V II—Negro 
Judges n , IV, VI, VIH—White

167



TABLE 2

FREQUENCIES OF RATINGS OF INTERVIEWEE
FEELING BY JUDGES I  & I I

Judge I

In favor of Against the Total
Supreme Court Neutral Supreme Court No. of

decision decision cases
In favor of 
Supreme Court 
decision

37 1 2

Judge II Neutral 0 5 0
Against the 
Supreme Court 1 1 42
decision 

Total No.
of cases 89
Chi square=75.9711; P less than .001 
C— .68



TABLE 3

Judge IV

FREQUENCIES OF RATINGS OF INTERVIEWEE
FEELING BY JUDGES H I & IV

In favor of

Judge III 

Against the Total
Supreme Court 

decision
Neutral Supreme Court 

decision
No. of 
cases

In favor of
Supreme Court 
decision

50 0 1

Neutral 
Against the

1 0 1

Supreme Court 
decision

2 1 30

Total No.
of cases 86
Chi square=79.368; P less than .001
C=.69



TABLE 4

Judge VI

Judge V

FREQUENCIES OF RATINGS OF INTERVIEWEE
FEELING BY JUDGES V  & V I

In favor of Against the Total
Supreme Court 

decision
Neutral Supreme Court 

decision
No. of
cases

In favor of
Supreme Court 
decision

17 0 1

Neutral 
Against the

1 1 2

Supreme Court 
decision

1 0 37

Total No.
of cases 60
Chi square=44.436; P less than .001
C=.65



TABLE 5

FREQUENCIES OF RATINGS OF INTERVIEWEE
FEELING BY JUDGES VII & VIII

In favor of

Judge VII

Against the Total

In favor of

Supreme Court 
decision

Neutral Supreme Court 
decision

No. of 
cases

Supreme Court 
decision

55 1 7

Judge V III Neutral
Against the

0 1 0

Supreme Court 
decision

1 0 17

Total No. 
of eases
Chi square=50.5192; P less than .001 
C=.62



TABLE 6

FREQUENCIES OF CLASSIFICATIO N OF
INTERVIEW S BY JUDGES I  & H

Judge I

M
to

Judge II
Unfavorable
Neutral
Favorable

Unfavorable

24
0
4

Neutral

1
0
1

Favorable

6
1

48

Total 
No. of
cases

Total No. 
of cases
Chi square=51.067; P less than .001 
C=.61

85



TABLE 7

Judge III

FREQUENCIES OF CLASSIFICATIO N OF
INTERVIEW S BY JUDGES ID  &  IV

Unfavorable Neutral Favorable

Total 
No. of 
cases

Unfavorable 16 1 3
Judge IV  Neutral 4 1 4

Favorable 2 3 50

Total No.
of cases 84
Chi square=48.511; P less than .001
C=.50



TABLE 8

Judge VI

Judge V

FREQUENCIES OF CLASSIFICATIO N OF
INTERVIEW S BY JUDGES V  & V I

Unfavorable Neutral Favorable

Total 
No. of 
cases

Unfavorable 24 1 8
Neutral 4 0 7
Favorable 0 1 16

Total No.
of cases 61
Chi square=21.395; P less than .001
C=.41



TABLE 9

FREQUENCIES OF CLASSIFICATIO N OF
INTERVIEW S BY JUDGES V II & V III

Unfavorable

Unfavorable 3
Judge V III Neutral 5

Favorable 7

Judge V II
Total
No. of

Neutral Favorable eases

0 0
3 3
1 58

Total No.
of cases 80
Chi square=25.4613; P less than .001
C=.47





Analysis 
of Negro Registration 

and Voting 
in Florida 
1940-1954*

This is a study of the trend of Negro registration for 
voting for the years 1940-1954, an example of the way 
Negroes have begun to take advantage of a privilege from 
which State restrictions were removed by a federal court 
decision.

The reliability of figures on registrations is questionable. 
In many instances supervisors have failed to keep accurate 
and up-to-date records, and in several instances the report 
made to the Secretary of State differs from that made to 
the Attorney General. It is impossible to compare the per­
cent of negroes over 21 registered with the percent of whites 
over 21 registered; many counties report more white reg­
istrants than there are adults over 21 according to the 1950 
census.

Immediately evident from graphs of the number of Ne­
groes registered is the tremendous increase in registration 
following 1944 when the decision in Smith v. Allwright 
(321 U.S. 649) was made applicable to Florida through 
further litigation.

* Prepared by Dr. Malcolm B. Parsons and Dr. J. A. Norton, 
School of Public Administration, Florida State University.

177



Evident from a county-by-county report is the great vari­
ation among counties in the percentage of non-whites over 
21 who are registered.

There is also a variation in the time when Negro regis­
trants increased. The following table shows the time pat­
tern for counties with no Negroes registered.

Number of Counties with No Negro Registrants
1940— 51
1944—36
1946—  4— Madison, Liberty, Lafayette, Union, Hendry (2) 
1948— 4—Madison, Liberty, Lafayette, Union (1), Hendry 
1950—  5—Madison, Liberty, Lafayette, Union, Calhoun 
1952—- 4— Madison, Liberty, Lafayette, Union 
1954— 3— Liberty, Lafayette, Union

The counties which have had no Negroes registered since 
1946 have all been in north Florida, except for Hendry 
which left this group in 1950.

Madison county is a good example both of how rapidly 
situations can change and the techniques necessary to pro­
duce a change. Madison County had no Negro registrants 
until just before the 1954 primaries. At this time 586 Ne­
groes went to the courthouse en masse and were registered. 
According to the supervisor of registration most of the 
registrants exercised their franchise.

In 1952, the counties in North Central Florida (the planta- 
tion-South culture) showed a generally uniform pattern 
of a low percentage of Negro registrants. All 4 counties 
with no Negroes registered are in this bloc.

Very interesting are the Florida counties, especially in 
North Florida, showing a high percentage of Negroes reg­
istered. These reports would bear close examination in light 
of participation reports and other studies. "Where urban 
machines are known to operate the pattern is not surprising. 
In other counties the explanations do not come easily.

178



Graphs showing absolute numbers of Negro registrants 
from 1940 through 1954, and the percent of adult Negroes 
registered for those years, are attached for each of the 12 
counties under interview scrutiny.

“ We don’t mind for our niggers to register, but we don’t 
let ’em vote” , a north Florida official is quoted as saying. 
The questionnaire sent to supervisors furnishes the only 
information on the number of Negroes who actually vote. 
Many of these figures were plainly labelled “ estimates” , 
others probably are.

Many reports must be interpreted in one of two ways:

(1) They are either poor guesses, or
(2) Any Negro who dares register is determined to exer­

cise his right to vote.

This evaluation is made because the percentage of reg­
istered Negroes who vote is much higher than one would 
estimate on the basis of the social-economic levels which 
correlate with voting interest. The evaluation applies with 
somewhat less force to the counties under interview scru­
tiny, but it is not clear why.

179



SUM M ARY SHEET OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S QUESTIONNAIRE, JULY 15 1954

County
Non-white 

Registrations 
reported by 

Secretary of State

Non-white 
Registrations 
reported by 

County Supt. of 
Registration

1954, 1st Primary 
Negro vote as 
estimated by 

County Supt. of 
Registration

1954, 2nd Primary 
Negro vote as 
estimated by 

County Supt. of 
Registration

Non-white
Population

1950

Alachua 2,740 2,726 817 914 16,551
Baker 184 187 164 148 1,546
Bay 2,414 2,396 1,026 1,071 7,165
Bradford 684 636 367 413 2,800
Brevard 1,780 1,780 f ? 6,001
Broward 4,337 4,348 1,839 1,656 21,359
Calhoun 136 147 62 58 1,119
Charlotte 237 239 140 119 672
Citrus 486 486 283 248 1,555
Clay 946 968 796 742 2,105
Collier 526 526 319 306 1,986
Columbia 956 986 496 378 6,124
Dade 20,179 20,108 ? ? 65,392
DeSoto 739 739 272 345 2,002



SUM M ARY SHEET OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S QUESTIONNAIRE. JULY 15. 1954 (Continued)

County
Non-white 

Registrations 
reported by 

Secretary of State

Non-white 
Registrations 
reported by 

County Supt. of 
Registration

1954, 1st Primary 
Negro vote as 
estimated by 

County Supt. of 
Registration

1954, 2nd Primary 
Negro vote as 
estimated by 

County Supt. of 
Registration

Non-white 
Population 

1950

Dixie 91 91 85 85 562
Duval 25,774 25,817 11,876 10,585 81,840
Escambia 6,545 6,553 1,834 2,096 25,123
Flagler 4 4 2 0 1,534
Franklin 309 309 244 193 1,496
Gadsden 8 8 3 ? 20,468
Gilchrist 10 10 4 4 346
Glades 342 247 107 118 898
Gulf 426 414 284 226 2,007
Hamilton 212 238 150 100 3,790
Hardee 282 282 155 157 750
Hendry 550 551 300 237 1,580
Hernando 420 420 252 252 1,539
Highlands 1,276 1,270 557 613 3,466



182

SUM M ARY SHEET OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S QUESTIONNAIRE, JULY 15, 1954 (Continued)

County
Non-white 

Registrations 
reported by 

Secretary of State

Non-white 
Registrations 
reported by 

County Supt. of 
Registration

1954, 1st Primary 
Negro vote as 
estimated by 

County Supt. of 
Registration

1954, 2nd Primary 
Negro vote as 
estimated by 

County Supt. of 
Registration

Non-white 
Population 

1950

Hillsborough. 4,003 4,003 2,400 2,800 38,315
H olm es 145 127 49 58 609
Indian R iver 289 289 112 153 2,962
J  ackson 2,310 2,313 1,375 1,375 11,574
Jefferson 141 225 125 75 6,513
Lafayette 0 0 0 0 325
Lake 1,404 1,404 350 200 8,542
Lee 1,430 1,475 313 216 4,694
Leon 4,150 4,013 2,840 2,459 20,381
L evy 358 358 119 119 3,603
Liberty 0 0 0 0 581
M adison 586 585 1 1 6,477
Manatee 1,290 1,250 500 400 7,916
M arion 4,040 4,043 1,474 1,581 14,594



SUM M ARY SHEET OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S QUESTIONNAIRE, JULY 15. 1954 (Continued)

County
Non-white 

Registrations 
reported by 

Secretary of State

Non-white 
Registrations 
reported by 

County Supt. of 
Registration

1954, 1st Primary 
Negro vote as 
estimated by 

County Supt. of 
Registration

1954, 2nd Primary 
Negro vote as 
estimated by 

County Supt. of 
Registration

Non-white 
Population 

1950

Martin 516 516 345 310 2,203
Monroe 1,214 1,214 925 596 3,221
Nassau 1,032 4,007
Okaloosa 363 375 187 185 2,198
Okeechobee 291 641
Orange 2,687 2,695 1,139 787 22,766
Osceola 239 239 171 150 1,492
Palm Beach 5,198 5,179 2,043 2,244 34,797
Pasco 633 700 100 75 2,776
Pinellas 3,408 3,426 939 975 18,712
Polk 3,685 3,716 ? ? 25,577
Putnam 1,433 1,433 409 536 8,608
St. Johns 2,515 2,515 785 618 8,327
St. Lucie 1,464 1,476 545 566 6,394



SUM M ARY SHEET OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S QUESTIONNAIRE, JULY 15, 1954 (Continued)

County
Non-white 

Registrations 
reported by 

Secretary of State

Non-white 
Registrations 
reported by 

County Supt. of 
Registration

1954, 1st Primary 
Negro vote as 
estimated by 

County Supt. of 
Registration

1954, 2nd Primary 
Negro vote as 
estimated by 

County Supt. of 
Registration

Non-white
Population

1950

Santa Rosa 613 613 547 511 1,584
Sarasota 707 639 132 164 4,611
Seminole 1,581 1,624 978 993 11,940
Sumter 520 619 464 464 3,052
Suwannee 438 4,985
Taylor 99 109 0 0 3,181
Union 0 0 0 0 3,231
Volusia 4,537 4,637 2,376 2,358 16,385
Wakulla 139 145 15 22 1,627
Walton 1,721 1,958
Washington 570 581 340 325 2,119



Existing 

Public School Facilities 
in Florida 

...and Factors 
of School Administration 

and Instructional Services 

Affecting Segregation*

The 1950 census revealed that Florida had grown in 
population since 1940 more than any state east of the 
Eocky Mountains. This rapid growth has probably been 
most sharply observable in the public schools. The present 
rate of growth in school population from year to year is 
about 8 per cent. Present school population for the year 
ended June 30, 1954 was 650,285 (507,276 white; 143,009 
Negro) up from 603,665 the year before (467,762 white; 
135,903 Negro).

There were 81 schools in 18 counties forced to run double 
sessions during 1953-54 as against 66 schools in 15 counties 
the year previous.

The classroom situation is acute. Although 671 class­
rooms were constructed between July 1, 1953 and July 1,

* Prepared by Dr. Robert E. Lee, Florida State Department of 
Education, assisted by Thomas N. Morgan, Florida State Depart­
ment of Education.

185



1954, bringing existing classrooms up to about 18,000, it 
would require 5000 new classrooms this year to eliminate 
double sessions, relieve congested classrooms, take care of 
expanding enrollment and replace obsolete classrooms 
which should be abandoned.

The need for teachers is equally critical. Conservative 
estimates place the teacher need for the year 1953-54 at 
a figure between 4500 and 5000.

During 1953-54 Florida’s 2212 school buses manned 
by 2038 drivers (including 359 Negro drivers) traveled 
30,910,944 miles to transport 209,492 pupils at a cost of 
$4,506,667. The magnitude of this operation can be more 
readily appreciated by comparing it with that of com­
mercial bus passenger lines which reveals that in miles 
traveled school buses probably equaled or exceeded the 
total mileage of all commercial passenger bus lines in the 
state in the latest recorded corresponding year.

The total cost of operating Florida’s public schools for 
the year 1952-53 is given in Table 1, classified by major 
items of expenditure.

The level of support of public education in Florida 
underwent a substantial advance with the establishment 
of the 1947 Minimum Foundation Program Law. Prior 
to that year, the assessed value of property within a 
county was the primary determinant of financial support; 
since then the extensive tax resources of the entire state 
have made possible adequate financial support for the 
education of all the children, regardless of location or 
color. This structure of school finance can be described 
as a partnership between each county and the state, 
whereby the county levies taxes according to its financial 
ability and the state contributes to each county primarily 
on the basis of need. Since 1947 the gaps of inequality 
between the races and between rural and metropolitan 
areas have been steadily narrowed.

186



Table 2 shows that the pronounced discrepancies be­
tween white and Negro salaries existing in 1930 and 1940 
were reduced to a difference of 21% in 1947 and only 
7.0% in 1952-53. In like manner the percentage of dis­
crepancy between Current Expenditure Per Negro Pupil 
and Current Expenditure Per White Pupil in 1930-31 was 
71%, but by 1952-53 this per pupil dollar expenditure for 
Negroes had risen almost tenfold to where the per cent 
difference was only 16% less than the corresponding 
expenditure for whites.

During the fourth and fifth decade, the majority of 
Negro teachers had less than four years college training. 
By 1952-53, 94.7% of all Negro teachers compared to 
95.6% of all white teachers had at least four years college 
training.

Capital Outlay Expenditures have reflected not only the 
inflation of enrollment, but the inflation of new residents 
and the inflation of construction costs. From 1937 to 
1953 Capital Outlay Expenditure for Negroes amounted to 
$28,975,000, and for white schools the amount was $129,- 
246,000. The total value of public school property in 
Florida has been estimated at $300,000,000. Capital Outlay 
Expenditures Per Negro Pupil were greater than for whites 
in 1952-53 because of greater needs. During the two decades 
up to 1947 a limited State Aid Program provided some 
financial support without specification as to race. Start­
ing in 1947, State Aid under the Minimum Foundation 
Program was allocated to the counties in such a way 
that no shifting of salary funds from one race to another 
could take place. In some counties of Florida, the Expen­
ditures Per Negro Pupil are greater than the Expenditures 
Per White Pupil. This often happens when the Negro 
teachers as a group have either greater training or longer 
service than the white teachers.

Florida provides annually $400 per instruction unit for

187



Capital Outlay needs which for the 67 counties totaled 
$9,451,600 in 1953-54 and has been computed at $10,199,448 
for the 1954-55 estimate. This money is spent in each county 
according to the needs recommended by a state conducted 
school building survey. With the help of these individual 
county surveys it was estimated as of January, 1954 that 
$97,000,000 will be needed to provide facilities for white 
children and $50,000,000 will be needed to provide facilities 
for Negro children. Since the activation as of the effective 
date January 1, 1953 of a Constitutional Amendment pro­
viding for the issuance of revenue certificates by the State 
Board of Education against anticipated state Capital Out­
lay funds for the next thirty years more than $43,000,000 in 
state guaranteed bonds have been issued to provide addi­
tional facilities for both races. By the fall of 1954 there will 
have been a total of $70,000,000 of these bonds issued and 
in the foreseeable future the total will be $90,000,000 to 
$100,000,000. At the present time 2182 classrooms are under 
construction as a result of the issuance of these bonds.

The growth of Florida’s school population in the past 
five years has far exceeded all expectations and predictions. 
The combination of a large birth rate during the latter 
forties and a steadily increasing migration rate is reflected 
in Table 3.

It is significant that Florida was the only one of the 
thirteen southern states to show an increase in the age 10-14 
Negro population during the last decade. While the general 
pattern in the South during 1940-50 was a migration of 
Negroes to the North and West, Florida registered a 2.5% 
net migration increase and a natural increase of 14.9%. The 
corresponding rate for the white population for this decade 
was a net migration increase of 40.6% and a natural in­
crease of 16.1%. It is clear then, that Florida’s Negro popu­
lation, though increasing in both measures, is actually be­
coming a smaller and smaller minority. The per cent of

188



non-white population decreased from 27.2% in 1940 to 
21.8% in 1950. As in the other states, a wide range of 
concentration is found among the 67 counties of Florida. 
The accompanying two maps of Florida counties show the 
amount and per cent of non-white population in 1950 and 
the distribution of Negro enrollment in 1952-53, and illus­
trate the diversity of Florida’s pattern. In only two counties 
of North and West Florida do the Negroes outnumber the 
whites. In only one county do the Negroes comprise less 
than 5% of the county’s population. With the exception of 
Jacksonville, the major metropolitan areas are inhabited 
by a much smaller proportion of Negroes than the state 
average.1

The shifting of Negro population into the southern coastal 
counties and into Northeast Florida is contrasted with the 
out-migration of Negroes from the West Florida non-urban 
counties. Statewide, twenty-seven counties (or 40%) reg­
istered actual losses in Negro population from 1940 to 1950; 
and the heaviest losers were Dixie (82%), Gilchrist (46%), 
and Liberty (37%).

Achievement Test Scores

If a significant difference in preparation and achievement 
level exists between white and Negro students, additional 
academic problems can be expected in the process of de­
segregation. It is not inferred that these differences are 
explained by racial differences.

In Florida, the statutes provide 1,050 scholarships of 
$400 each for students desiring to train for the teaching 
profession. Awarding of the scholarships is done on a basis

1. Dietrich, T. Stanton, Statistical Atlas. Florida’s Population: 
1940 and 1950: Research Report No. 3. Fla. State University, June, 
1954.

189



of county representation, race, and competitive test scores 
of psychological and scholastic aptitude. A  compilation of 
the scores of the 740 white twelfth grade applicants in the 
spring of 1954 yielded an average score of 340. Compilation 
of the 488 Negro twelfth grade applicants yielded an aver­
age score of 237. In the previous year, 1953, 664 white ap­
plicants made a mean score of 342 while the 503 Negro 
applicants made an average score of 237. This difference 
is classified as very significant and should be interpreted as 
meaning that factors other than chance explain the different 
results between white and Negro scores.

In addition, a comparison of the performance of white 
and Negro high school seniors on a uniform placement-test 
battery given each spring in the high schools throughout 
the State of Florida is shown in Table 4. The number of 
participants corresponds with the total twelfth grade mem­
bership during the five-year period, 1949-1953. This table 
shows, for example, that on all five tests 59% of the Negroes 
rank no higher than the lowest 10% of the whites. On the 
general ability scale, the fifty percentile or mid-point on the 
white scale corresponds with the ninety-five percentile of 
the Negro scale. In other words, only 5% of the Negroes 
are above the mid-point of the white general ability level.

Studies of grades at the University of Florida indicate 
that white high school seniors with placement test per­
centile ranks below fifty have less than a 50% likelihood of 
making satisfactory grades in college. While factors such 
as size of high school, adequacy of materials, economic level, 
and home environment are recognized as being contributing 
factors, no attempt is made here to analyze or measure the 
controlling factors.

190



Counties With No Negro High Schools

An examination of facilities provided by the sixty-seven 
counties reveals that no senior high schooling was offered 
for Negroes in eight counties in 1953. Transportation to an 
adjacent county high school is provided in each county. In 
six of these eight counties the membership available for a 
7-12 grade high school is less than seventy-five.

Table 5 shows the estimated number of Negroes eligible 
for grades 7-12, the number and organization of white high 
schools, the white average daily membership, the full ca­
pacity of the high schools, and the possible space available. 
If the ban on Negro pupils were lifted, space would be 
available in six of these eight counties.

Examples of Inter-Racial Cooperation

The tradition of separate schools for Negro children has 
in effect separated the Negro teachers from association with 
white teachers. Until recent years, duplicate meetings of 
teachers during prp-school conferences were held in every 
county. When specialists and consultants were brought into 
the county to improve instruction, two presentations instead 
of one had to be made. Considering the growing demands 
for efficiency and effective administration that were pro­
mulgated by the 1947 Minimum Foundation Program, the 
administrations in several counties have found it advan­
tageous to schedule a single program of activities during 
the two week pre-school conference period for instruction 
personnel. Collier, Monroe, Sarasota, Hardee, and Dixie are 
counties that have already combined the races for pre­
school conferences. This action, it might be noted, has 
been carried out as a result of voluntary local level initia­
tive without any directive or suggestion from the state 
administration.

191



There are other examples of inter-racial cooperation at 
the county level. In Dade and Duval Counties, Negro super­
visory personnel have offices in the same building as their 
fellow professional staff members. In a number of counties, 
including Santa Rosa, Leon, Sarasota, Pinellas, Hillsbor­
ough, and Hernando, regular principals’ meetings are held 
without regard to race. Negro representatives have partici­
pated in the County PTA Council in Hillsborough County. 
In many counties the development of a Parent Teacher As­
sociation in Negro schools has been possible as a result of 
the personal interest and sponsorship of white PTA leaders. 
Invitations to be guests and speakers at PTA meetings have 
not been entirely unilateral.

The State Department of Education has Negro consult­
ants, and staff and division meetings are held at regular 
intervals in the Capitol with no distinction as to race.

The members of the Florida Resource Use Education 
Committee are appointed by the Governor and include both 
races. The purpose of the committee is to promote instruc­
tion in the wide use and development of the natural re­
sources in our community, state, and nation.

The Florida Council on Elementary Education and the 
Florida Council on Secondary Education are each composed 
of professional educators in Florida and have representa­
tion from both races. Membership is by appointment of the 
State Superintendent of Public Instruction and the purpose 
of each Council is to conduct studies which will make pos­
sible the continued improvement of the school’s product.

For the past two years, a week-long Negro Principal’s 
Work Conference has taken place at Bethune-Cookman 
College with a participation of more than half of all Negro 
Principals. Speakers, consultants, and specialists were 
largely drawn from white educators in Florida.

The examples of normal association between the races

192



cited herewith are confined largely to professional edu- 
-ators and those citizens deeply concerned about public 
education.

TABLE 1

SUMMARY OF EXPENDITURES— ALL 
BOTH RACES, 1952-53

General Control 
Instruction 
Operation of Plant 
Maintenance 
Auxiliary Agencies 
Fixed Charges

Current Expenses (Day Schools)
Other Schools

Total Current Expenses (All Schools) 
Capital Outlay 
Debt Service

Total Expenditures (All Funds)

FUNDS—

$ 2,367,825.41 
78,233,563.93 

6,540,853.16 
4,031,471.75 
6,585,529.70 
2,810,762.18

100,570,006.13
1,527,768.39

102,097,774.52
28,013,835.59
8,783,513.04

$138,895,123.15

193



TABLE 2

SIGNIFICANT TRENDS IN THE GROWTH OF FLORIDA 
SCHOOLS UNDER DUAL SYSTEM OF EDUCATION 

1930 TO 1953

1930-31 1940-41 1947-48 1952-53

Average Daily 
Attendance: 

White 203,002 240,388 272,084 380,800
Negro 74,785 87,570. 96,503 118,162

Average Annual 
Salary:

White $907 $1,202 $2,770 $3,457
Negro 403 605 2,191 3,215

Teacher Preparation 
(Per Cent Pour 
Years or M ore): 

White 38.81% 61.48% 76.72% 95.62 %
Negro 15.18 31.90 62.53 94.74

Current Expenses 
Per Pupil in 
ADA (All Funds): 

White $61.26 $72.40 $175.14 $209.42
Negro 17.91 28.80 110.39 176.24

Capital Outlay Per 
Pupil in ADA 
(All Funds):

White $3.12 $7.36 $42.60 $54.92
Negro 0.35 0.57 10.65 60.09

State Aid Per 
Pupil in ADA: 

Both Races $15.28 $39.60 $106.70 $123.39

194



TABLE 3 

ENROLLMENT
(Includes Kindergarten and Junior Colleges)

Year White Negro Total
1953-54 507,276 143,009 650,285
1952-53 467,762 135,903 603,665
1951-52 428,405 129,695 558,100
1950-51 401,083 126,091 527,174
1949-50 375,295 120,368 495,663

The over-all rate of growth during the past two years has been 
more than 8 % ; (9%  for white pupils; 5%  for Negro pupils.)

195



hite
;ile

7 ) 1

05
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
95

TABLE 4

OF PERCENTILE RANKS FOR WHITE AND NEGRO EXAMINEES IN THE FLORIDA 
E TWELFTH-GRADE TESTING PROGRAM SPRING 1949 THROUGH SPRING 1953

Corresponding Percentile Rank for Negroes

Psychological 
(General Ability)

English Social
Studies

Natural
Science

Mathe­
matics

All Five 
Tests

31.4 18.8 15.6 11.2 09.8 17.36
57.4 50.4 44.8 32.4 33.0 43.60
70.8 67.4 60.4 50.0 46.8 59.08
82.8 81.6 78.4 69.8 67.2 75.96
88.6 88.6 86.4 80.2 79.2 84.60
92.6 93.0 91.4 87.8 86.2 90.20
95.4 95.6 94.4 92.4 90.6 93.68
97.2 97.0 96.4 95.0 94.4 96.00
98.2 98.0 97.6 97.0 96.4 97.44
98.75 99.0 98.6 98.4 97.25 98.40
99.0 99.0 98.5 98.5 98.75

99.0 99.0 99.0

Tested: White— 69,909 
Negro—10,675



TABLE 5

COUNTIES W ITH  NO NEGRO HIG H SCHOOL — 1952-53

County N E G R O

Elem. ADM 
(1-6)

Est. 7-12 
ADM Based on 

Ratio of .50
1. Baker 288 144
2. Charlotte 70 35
3. Dixie 68 34
4. Glades 102 51
5. Hardee 136 68
6. Holmes 104 52
7. Lafayette 42 21
8. Union Co. Hi. 230 115

No. and 
Grade of 

Hi School

W H I T

ADM
(7-12)

E

Capacity
Space

Available
3(1-12) 499 6601 161
1(1-12) 234 3001 66
1(7-12) 300 3301 2 30
1(1-12) 119 180 61
1(9-12) 803 890 87
4(1-12) 1222 1080 • •••

1(7-12) 283 C
O

C
O o 47

1(1-12) 255 280 25

1. Allows 60 additional capacity for Homemaking, Science, Agriculture, and Physical Education facilities.
2. Allows 90 additional capacity for Agriculture, Science, Homemaking and Gymnasium facilities.



TABLE 6

STATUS OF ELEMENTARY PRINCIPALS* 1953-54
(Percentage)
Male

W N
Female

W N
Training 
Rank I 9.60 6.19
Rank II 68.80 46.15 55.75 46.90
Rank III 20.00 51.30 36.28 53.12
No Information 1.60 2.60 1.76
Number 125 39 226 32

Years as 
Principal 
0 1.60 .90 t

1 - 5 45.60 30.80 31.85 25.00
6 -10 17.60 33.33 22.12 21.90
11-15 12.80 15.40 16.81 18.80
16-20 8.00 15.40 8.84 15.62
21-25 4.80 2.60 8.84 3.12
26-Over 9.60 2.60 9.73 15.62
No Information .90
Number 125 39 226 32

Salary 
10 Months
(Dollars)
2500-2999 1.60 2.60
3000-3499 .80 17.94 1.32
3500-3999 9.60 17.94 3.53 12.50
4000-4499 19.20 15.40 18.60 18.80
4500-4999 12.80 10.25 22.12 25.00
5000-5499 20.80 17.94 28.80 12.50
5500-5999 16.80 10.25 11.06 12.50
*Not Applicable 

(12 mos.) 16.80 5.12 10.61 18.80
No Information 1.60 2.60 4.00
Number 125 39 226 32

* Compiled by Sara DeKeni, School of Education, Florida State 
University.

198



toomit of Population 
Non-white: 1950

o-k, 91.9 L * .* .* 'J
■i,950-9,9>*9

9,950-19 , 91*9 f c l S x f l

COPYRIGHT, 1954 
T. STANTON DIETRICH

A M O U N T  ar 

of N O N W H IT E  PC 

State 605,2

199



PROPORTION OF NEGRO 
ENROLLMENT TO TOTAL 

ENROLLMENT BY COUNTIES 
1 9 5 2 - 5 3

40 .0%-65.5% 
25 .0%-39 .9% 
15.0% - 24 .9% 
3 .5 % - 14.9 %

20 0



An Intensive 
Study 

in Dade County 
and Nearby 

Agricultural Areas 
...and Conclusions*

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

A majority of those polled believed that most of the 
white population of Dade County are opposed to the Court’s 
decision as a matter of principle. There seems to be rea­
son to believe, however, because of the relative lack of dis­
cussion about the decision and its attendant problems and 
of the calm acceptance of the decision itself that the atti­
tude on the part of many is not a deep-seated, emotionally 
formed one. I f the process of integration is handled grad­
ually (after a few years of preparation) and wisely and 
with firm leadership, a very large majority of this group 
will abide by the decision. The distinct possibility remains 
that many of this group with loosely formed convictions 
can be driven into active opposition by early and abrupt 
transition.

Some reluctance has been noted on the part of the School 
Board and other public officials to plan and lead, and on the

* Prepared by Dr. D. R. Larson, Dr. Edward Sofen, and Dr. T. J. 
Wood, Government Department, University of Miami.

201



part of the newspapers to encourage the same. The problem 
of obtaining leadership outside official circles for the tran­
sitional steps will be made more difficult by the tendency or 
perhaps organized campaign of the more violent pro-seg­
regationists to identify such leadership with the Communist 
Party. On the other hand, a number of ministers have in­
dicated that they will advise their congregations to follow 
the Court’s decision.

Virtually complete agreement exists among those polled 
as to the most explosive area— the northwest section of the 
county which is low in the white socio-economic strata and 
which contains the greatest percentage of southern-born 
whites. The elected officials foresaw the next greatest 
amount of trouble (although not violent in nature) from 
those communities such as Coral Gables and Miami Shores 
which are high on the socio-economic scale. Community 
leaders, the teachers, newsmen, police and labor leaders 
failed to mention this in any significant numbers; this fail­
ure may be explained in part by disposition to think of 
difficulties only in terms of violence.

Almost all elected officials, journalists, police chiefs and 
labor leaders agreed that serious violence in several areas 
was inevitable if large-scale integration were to be at­
tempted within the next year or two; such violence would 
be perpetrated by a small segment of the population and 
would take the form of the bombing of homes, hit-and-run 
shooting and individual beatings rather than lynchings 
and other more openly organized activities. Among the 
community leaders there was less unanimity, although a 
majority expects violence in some form in the most difficult 
areas.

Roughly half of the above categories of interviewees be­
lieved that some scattered violence was inevitable no mat­
ter how slowly the integration was accomplished. Only

202



33% of the teachers expect violence under such circum­
stances.

These same categories thought that boycotts in all parts 
of the County were inevitable whenever integration was 
undertaken but few estimates were made of their dimen­
sions. A  substantial move toward private schools among 
the well-to-do was agreed upon. There was a marked ab­
sence of mention of the Byrnes-Talmadge Plan of removing 
the state’s direct connection with education; only a few 
of those who expressed personal opposition to the decision 
thought that this was a practical solution.

The consensus of the various categories of whites polled 
with regard to the attitude of the Negro population on the 
timing of integration is that a gradual approach over a 
period of several years is desired. Although Negro school 
teachers are not a representative cross-section of the Ne­
gro population, it should be noted that by an extremely 
large majority they wanted speedier integration and that 
they reported, although by a smaller majority, that their 
students agreed.

The small sampling of Negro leaders indicates that most 
of the hitherto effective Negro leaders are prepared not to 
demand, by means of suits or otherwise, immediate action 
if there is indication on the part of the state and local of­
ficials that they are planning in good faith and with rea­
sonable promptitude the method of implementation decreed 
by the Supreme Court.

Although no such specific question was posed, significant 
numbers in all categories minimized the difficulties that 
might arise among the younger children; but it was rec­
ognized that violent parental attitudes might change the 
situation radically. At the same time the belief was widely 
expressed that social activities in junior and senior high 
schools would give rise to considerably more trouble, if

203



not among the students, then certainly among the parents. 
Any consideration of a scheme to initiate integration in the 
first grade would be forced to take into account the fact 
that among the white teachers polled the first grade teach­
ers were most resistant to the idea of integration.

The two special agricultural areas checked must be con­
sidered a problem of an entirely different order owing to 
the high concentration of Negroes, the Negroes ’ low socio­
economic status, and the relative absence of whites drawn 
from northern metropolitan areas. The feeling against the 
Negro, particularly in one of these areas is more intense 
and more structured than that in the Greater Miami area.

Factors Indicating a Gradual Approach 
as the Solution to this Problem

1. Despite the fact that a majority of the white population 
of Dade County is opposed to the Court decision as a mat­
ter of principle, they nevertheless indicate that they will 
abide by the decision if integration is handled gradually, 
with an adequate period of preparation.

2. The present reluctance to assume positive leadership 
on the part of public officials and of any substantial num­
ber of groups outside official circles indicates great diffi­
culty if an attempt is made to move too quickly.
3. A  general belief exists that serious violence will occur 
if the decision is pushed by any minority group, white or 
colored.

4. A  similar belief that some violence is inevitable no mat­
ter how gradual the transition, but with a firm belief that 
the more gradual the transition the more moderate and less 
frequent would be the outbreaks of violence.

5. In spite of some interracial activity among school per­
sonnel, it is a fact that Negro and white teachers have

204



never met together in Dade County—not even for ‘ ‘ Fellow­
ship Day.”  Interracial cooperation through joint activity 
would seem to be a must before school integration could 
be put into operation.

6. Many leaders interviewed agreed that if the NAACP, 
or any other organized groups, should seek to push the de­
cision by test cases this fall immeasurable harm would be 
done to the entire cause of the integration of the schools.

7. With a majority of white population disagreeing with 
the Supreme Court’s decision in principle, a state legislator 
was, without question, correct when he said that what is 
needed is a “ mental change”  in the community. Such 
changes obviously require time.

8. A  small minority in the Negro community, without ques­
tion, opposes integration in the schools. Others who strong­
ly favor the decision in principle are concerned about the 
practical problems of the decision as it affects Negroes. A  
gradual solution would thus ease the tension experienced 
by both these groups of Negroes.

9. A  sizeable percentage of the Negro leadership group 
checked stated that they believe a gradual approach is best. 
They would accept this gradual approach as long as the 
white community acts in good faith and with reasonable 
speed toward a solution.

10. Research indicates that in the two special South Florida 
agricultural areas checked the problems of community ac­
ceptance and general leadership make the problem of inte­
gration even more difficult than in the metropolitan area, 
and thus these two sections must be granted an opportunity 
to proceed more slowly and perhaps in an entirely different 
manner. 11

11. The greatest difficulty in integration would probably 
be caused at the junior and senior high school levels due to

205



social activities and athletic and other extracurricular 
events. Time allowed for preparation for integration would 
permit the gradual use of non-social, extracurricular ac­
tivities as a way of preparing students for eventual school 
integration.

12. Up to 60% of the white teachers polled favored a long 
transitional period, and another 20-30% favor at least a one 
or two year period of adjustment.

13. The School Board and top school administrative per­
sonnel in the school system have given little attention to 
the problems raised by the decision and would require time 
to simply handle the mechanical problems involved in the 
transition. It would also give these groups time to develop 
positive leadership which will be required for a peaceful 
and smooth transition.

14. The need for careful preparation in the process of 
integration was urged again and again by all groups polled. 
It is agreed that leadership and proper educational prep­
aration will be all-important in a transition of this nature. 
Both require time for full development.

206



Acknowledgments

To complete a survey of the scope of this Study of the Prob­
lems of School Desegregation in Florida in less than three months 
was a task demanding the utmost effort on the part of many 
people. The time-table during the entire period of the research 
was such that a delay or a mistake in even the simplest task could 
prove disastrous. It is a tribute to the untiring diligence of 
everyone connected with the project that no such disaster oc­
curred, and acknowledgment of their separate contributions is 
highly appropriate.

At all stages of the research, the members of the Research 
Advisory Committee, all of them busy with important duties, 
contributed of their time and their best thinking to make this 
a sound piece of research. The committee included:

Mr. Richard W. Ervin, Attorney General (Ex Officio)
Mr. Thos. D. Bailey, State Superintendent of Public Instruc­

tion (Ex Officio)
Mr. Ralph E. Odum, Assistant Attorney General
Dr. Ralph Eyman, Dean, School of Education, Florida State 

University
Dr. Sara Lou Hammond, School of Education, Florida State 

University
Mr. Robert Gates, Department of Education
Dr. Robert E. Lee, Department of Education
Mr. Ed Henderson, Executive Secretary, Florida Education 

Association
Dr. Gilbert Porter, Executive Secretary, Florida State Teach­

ers Association
Dr. J. B. White, Dean, School of Education, University of 

Florida
Dr. Manning J. Dauer, Department of Political Science, Uni­

versity of Florida
Dr. Don Larson, Department of Political Science, University 

of Miami
Dr. George Gore, President, Florida Agricultural and Me­

chanical University
Mr. Angus Laird, Director, State Merit System
Dr. Richard Moore, President, Bethune-Cookman College
Dr. R. L. Johns, School of Education, University of Florida

207



Dr. Mode Stone, School of Education, Florida State University 
Mr. D. E. Williams, Department of Education 
Dr. T. J. Wood, Department of Political Science, Univer­

sity of Miami
Dr. Lewis M. Killian, Department of Sociology, Florida State 

University (Coordinator of Research)
Some members of the committee made further contributions to 

the study. Dr. Larson and Dr. Lee prepared reports which con­
stitute important subsections of the study, and Dr. Dauer prepared 
an independent report on the experience of other states with 
desegregation. Dean Eyman, Dean White and President Gore, as 
well as President Doak S. Campbell, of The Florida State Uni­
versity, released much-needed members of their staffs to assist 
in the research at various times. Dr. Robert Gates was a constant 
source of advice and support to the Coordinator.

A special debt is owed to Mrs. Fay-Tyler M. Norton, who 
served as Assistant Coordinator and Statistical Consultant for 
the entire period of the research. Her contribution was far greater 
than the tasks called for in her contract with the Committee, and 
without her the study could not have been completed.

Dr. J. A. Norton and Dr. Malcolm Parsons, of the School of 
Public Administration, the Florida State University, conducted 
the study of Negro voting registration while carrying full teach­
ing loads at the University, but with no additional compensation.

Voluntarily making a vital contribution, as a public service, 
were Prof. Robert McGinnis and Dr. John Haer of the Sociology 
Research Laboratory, the Florida State University. Under their 
direction the laborious task of punching both the questionnaire 
and the interview data on IBM cards and tabulating these data 
was carried out.

The field interviewers who worked in ten selected counties, all 
public school workers drawn away from other important duties 
and asked to work without personal compensation, revealed a fine 
sense of duty. The manner in which they carried out their 
important part of the study indicates that they were well chosen. 
These interviewers are:

Edwin G. Artest, Tampa 
Henry W. Bishop, Gainesville 
Mrs. Patricia Carter, Gainesville 
John B. Cox, Tampa 
Paul F. Davis, Bradenton 
Thomas J. Hill, Gainesville 
Leroy G. Hooks, Clearwater

208



Elton L. Jones, Ocala 
R. LeEoy Lastinger, Bartow 
Mills Lord, Orlando 
Julian E. Markham, Sebring 
Thord Marshall, Tallahassee 
William J. McEntee, Gainesville 
Erby Nixon, Panama City 
Willie J. Reid, Pensacola 
C. C. Washington, Panama City

At a critical point in the study, a small team of workers was 
called upon to put forth an almost impossible effort in coding 
a large mass of interview data just received from the field. At 
great personal sacrifice, they rose to this demand, completing the 
task in an incredibly short time. One member of this team, Dr.
C. U. Smith, of Florida A. and M. University, had already made 
an important contribution in helping to brief the interviewers 
before they went into the field. The team of analysts included, 
in addition to Dr. Smith, the Coordinator of Research, and Mrs. 
Norton, the following people:

Mr. Robert Gates, State Department of Education 
Dr. Robert E. Lee, State Department of Education 
Mr. James Condell, Florida A. and M. University 
Dr. Henry Cobb, Florida A. and M. University 
Mr. Henry Warner, Florida A. and M. University

Mrs. Lillian Walker and Miss Winifred Hitching, of the Office 
of the Attorney General, shouldered without complaint the addi­
tional burden of the major part of the clerical and accounting 
work incidental to such a comprehensive study. Their contribu­
tions were just as vital as those of any of the professional research 
staff.

Working far harder than they may have expected to when 
they accepted summer employment, the following young ladies 
in the Office of the Attorney General did a vast amount of 
detailed and often dull clerical work for which the research staff 
is indebted. It is entirely fitting that the youth of Florida should 
have played a significant part in this public service. These young 
ladies, all high school or college students, are:

Miss Kathleen Kirk 
Miss Maribelle Garris 
Miss Pat Gunn 
Miss Sonya Fletcher 
Miss Bessie Carol Johnson 
Miss Barbara Curtis 
Miss June Lasseter

209



A key figure in this project from the moment of its inception 
has been Mr. Ralph Odum, Assistant to the Attorney General. 
In addition to expediting the work of the professional research 
staff, he has contributed his sound thinking to every phase of 
the study.

Finally, the Committee is deeply indebted to Attorney General 
Ervin, Superintendent Bailey, and their colleagues of the State 
Cabinet for making it possible for us to apply our knowledge and 
skills, as educators and scientists, to the study of this momentous 
problem.

Lewis M. Killian 
Coordinator of Research

210



(Appendix B)

Examples of Florida’s Constitutional, 

Statutory and State School Board 

Regulatory Provisions Relating to 

Segregation

211





Florida Constitution

Article XII, Section 1:

Uniform, system, of public free schools.—The Legislature 
shall provide for a uniform system of public free schools, 
and shall provide for the liberal maintenance of the same.

Article XII, Section 12:

White and colored; separate schools.—White and colored 
children shall not be taught in the same school, but im­
partial provision shall be made for both.

213





Florida Statutes

228.09 Separate schools for white and negro children re- 
quired.—The schools for white children and the schools 
for negro children shall be conducted separately. No in­
dividual, body of individuals, corporation, or association 
shall conduct within this state any school of any grade 
(public, private, or parochial) wherein white persons and 
negroes are instructed or boarded in the same building 
or taught in the same classes or at the same time by the 
same teachers.

229.07 General powers of state board.—Except as limited 
in the school code, the state board shall have the authority, 
and when necessary for the more efficient and adequate op­
eration of the state system of public education in carrying 
out the purposes and objectives of the school code, the state 
board shall exercise the following general powers:

(1) DETERMINE POLICIES.— The state board shall de­
termine and adopt such policies as are required by law and 
as in the opinion of the state board are necessary for the 
more efficient operation of any phase of public education.

* # # #
(3) PRESCRIBE MINIMUM STANDARDS.—Whenever 
the establishment of minimum standards will aid in provid­
ing adequate educational opportunities and facilities, the 
state board shall adopt such minimum standards for any 
phase of education as are considered desirable by it in 
carrying out the provisions of the school code.

215



229.08 Duties and responsibilities of state board.—It shall 
be the responsibility of the state board to exercise all powers 
and perform all duties prescribed below:

#  #  *  #

(20) PRESCRIBE MINIMUM STANDARDS AND 
RULES AND REGULATIONS.—To prescribe such mini­
mum standards and rules and regulations as are required by 
law or as are recommended by the state superintendent in 
accordance with the provisions of subsection (20), §229.17, 
and as it may find desirable to aid in carrying out the 
purposes and objectives of the school code.

# # # #

(23) OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES. — To assume such 
other responsibilities and to exercise such other powers and 
perform such other duties as may be assigned to it by law 
or as it may find necessary to aid in carrying out the 
purposes and objectives of the school code.

229.16 General powers of state superintendent.—The state 
superintendent shall have the authority, and when necessary 
for the more efficient and adequate operation of the state 
system of public education in carrying out the purposes and 
objectives of the school code, the state superintendent shall 
exercise the following general powers:

# * # *
(5) RECOMMEND AND PUT INTO EFFECT MINI­
MUM STANDARDS.—From time to time to prepare, or­
ganize by subjects, and submit to the state board for adop­
tion such minimum standards relating to the operation of 
any phase of the state system of public education as, in his 
opinion, will aid in assuring more adequate educational op­
portunities for all, and to see, insofar as practicable, that 
such minimum standards as are adopted by the state hoard 
are put into effect and are properly observed.

216



229.17 Duties and responsibilities of state superintendent.
—It shall be the responsibility of the state superintendent 
to exercise all powers and perform all duties prescribed 
below; provided, that in those fields in which policies are 
required by law to be approved by the state board the state 
superintendent shall act as the advisor and executive officer 
of the state board.

* # # *
(20) MINIMUM STANDARDS AND RULES AND REG­
ULATIONS.— To prepare, organize, and recommend to the 
state board such minimum standards and rules and regula­
tions in the following fields as are required by law or as he 
may find necessary to aid in carrying out the purposes and 
objectives of the school code; and to execute such standards 
and rules and regulations as are adopted by the state board 
in the following fields: (1) establishment, organization, and 
operation of schools, agencies, services, and institutions, in­
cluding the classification or accreditation of parochial, de­
nominational, and private schools; (2) personnel; (3) child 
welfare; (4) courses of study and instructional aids; (5) 
transportation; (6) school plant; (7) finance; (8) records 
and reports.

# # # #
(28) OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES. — To assume such 
other responsibilities and to perform such other duties as 
may be assigned to him by law or as may be deemed by him 
to be necessary to aid in the more efficient operation of the 
state system of public education in carrying out the purposes 
and objectives of the school code.

230.23 Powers and duties of county boaxd.—The county 
board acting as a board shall exercise all powers and per­
form all duties listed below:

* # # #
(6) ESTABLISHMENT, ORGANIZATION, AND OP­
ERATION OF SCHOOLS.—Adopt and provide for the ex­

217



ecution of plans for the establishment, organization, and 
operation of the schools of the county, as follows:

(a) Schools and attendance areas.—Authorize schools to 
be located and maintained in those communities in the 
county where they are needed to accommodate as far as 
practicable and without unnecessary expense all the youth 
who should be entitled to the facilities of such schools, 
separate schools to be provided for white and negro chil­
dren; and approve the area from which children are to 
attend each such school, such area to be known as the at­
tendance area for that school; provided, that only under 
exceptional circumstances as defined under regulations of 
the state hoard may an elementary school be located within 
four miles of another elementary school and a high school 
within ten miles of another high school in rural areas for 
children of the same race.

239.41 Value of general scholarships.—Each scholarship 
for the preparation of teachers shall have a value of four 
hundred ($400.00) dollars each year and shall be awarded 
in the following manner:

# * # *
(2) In accordance with these requirements, the princi­

pals and county superintendents of each county shall select 
and recommend, on the basis of merit, a number of high 
school graduates who are bona fide residents of the State 
of Florida, as defined in section 97.041, Florida Statutes, 
which shall be proportionate to the white or Negro popula­
tion in the county and who are interested in teaching and 
whose work and qualifications are such as to indicate that 
they possess the qualities which should be possessed by 
a successful teacher; provided that each county shall have 
at least one scholarship for a Negro student.

218



State School Board Regulations

Adopted April 27, 1954 
Section 236.04 (10)

State Board Regulation, 
relating to

THE CALCULATION OF INSTRUCTION UNITS AND 
SALARY ALLOCATIONS FROM THE 

FOUNDATION PROGRAM
(Repealing regulation adopted June 16, 1953)

Instruction units and salary allotments from the Founda­
tion Program will be calculated separately for white and 
Negro schools.

No county will receive a greater allotment for salaries 
for either race than the salaries actually paid the teachers 
of that race or the calculated amount for that race based on 
instruction units and training, whichever amount is smaller.

In applying the provisions of Section 236.04 (10), provid­
ing that 95% of instructional units allocated to a county 
must be filled, the units calculated for each race will he 
considered separately, and 95% of the instructional units 
for each race must he filled.

219



Adopted March 21, 1950 
Section 236.04 (7)

State Board Regulation 
relating to

ADMINISTRATIVE AND SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONAL
SERVICE

(Adopted in accordance with the provisions of Section
236.04 (7), Chapter 23726, Laws of Florida,

Acts of 1947)

1. Eleventh and Twelfth Month Personnel.

Each county superintendent shall file with the State Super­
intendent on or before May 15 of each year Form A  for 
the use of its administrative and special instructional serv­
ice personnel. In addition, the county superintendent shall 
file a plan for the 11th and 12th month program which in­
cludes for each race the title and duties assigned for each 
such unit. Any revision in the plan submitted must he 
approved by the State Department of Education.

On or before October 1, each county superintendent shall 
file with the State Superintendent a complete description 
of the program which operated during the 11th and 12th 
months, including for each race the title, name, certificate 
number, rank and duties of each person employed through 
the use of administrative and special instructional service 
units.

Ten Months Personnel.

On or before August 15 of each year the county superin­
tendent shall file with the State Superintendent a plan for 
use of ten months personnel service units (Form C) which 
includes for each race the title and duties assigned for each 
such unit together with name, certificate number, and rank 
of the individual filling the position. Any proposed revision

220



in plans for use of ten months personnel shall be submitted 
by January 15 of each year.

2. Any administrative and special instructional service 
units to which a county is entitled under Section 236.04 (7), 
Chapter 23726, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1947, which is not 
used in accordance with regulations prescribed by the State 
Board of Education shall be deducted either in the current 
or the succeeding fiscal year as provided in Section 236.07 
(9-e), Chapter 23726, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1947.

Adopted March 21, 1950 
Section 236.04 (8)

State Board Regulation 
relating to

UNITS FOR SUPERVISORS OF INSTRUCTION

(Adopted in accordance with the provisions of Section
236.04 (8), Florida Statutes as amended by Section 29 of 

Chapter 23726, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1947) 1

1. Application for Instruction Units for Supervisors.
a. Each County Board shall file through the County Super­
intendent an application for using instruction units for 
supervision. This application shall be filed on forms pro­
vided by the State Superintendent on or before May 15 of 
each year.
b. Approval of any application for instruction units for 
supervision may be given by the State Superintendent when 
a satisfactory administrative plan for the use of such units 
(or desirable modification of the initial plan submitted) 
shall have been developed and approved jointly by the 
County Superintendent and the State Superintendent which 
will insure the most effective and economical expenditure 
of funds. Application for use of state funds for supervisory

221



services must include: first, provision for general super­
vision over the common branches of study in all the ele­
mentary and secondary grades. Included as a part of the 
administrative plan for supervision prescribed above, the 
County Superintendent shall file brief statements outlining
(1) the duties to be performed by the supervisor(s ) ; (2) 
the total annual salary and number of months of employ­
ment (in case of a general supervisor(s) this must be 
twelve months and of special supervisor(s) at least ten 
months; (3) the amount to be paid for travel; (4) the 
qualifications of the supervisor who is to he employed.
c. Instruction units for supervisory purposes may be tenta­
tively allocated if the administrative plan for the use of 
such units required in the preceding section is satisfactory, 
even though the nomination of the person(s) to fill the 
supervisory position(s) is pending.

2. Administrative Plan for Employment of Supervisory 
Personnel.

In arriving at a satisfactory plan for supervision in any 
county, the County Superintendent and the State Super­
intendent shall select one of the following plans which best 
fits the needs of the county involved:
a. Single-County Plan
(1) For General Supervision
(a) The instruction unit to which each county is entitled 
for the employment of a general supervisor may be used 
for the employment of one person who will have general 
supervision of white and Negro schools.
(b) The additional instruction units available for super­
vision, if any, may be used for the employment of separate 
general supervisors for white and Negro schools, or for 
some area or special supervisors.

(c) In counties earning fifty teacher units or less, one

222



person may be employed to perform the functions of both 
supervisor of instruction and supervising principal of a 
school center.
Any  person employed as combined general supervisor and 
supervising principal must be properly certificated for both 
positions, i.e., bold a Rank II or higher certificate covering 
both elementary and secondary administration and super­
vision.

(2) For Special Subject or Field Supervision
(a) Counties entitled to supervisory units in addition to 
the one reserved for general supervision may use such 
extra units for employment of additional supervisors, pro­
vided, one supervisor shall be employed for each of the 
units used and provided further that not more than one 
supervisor in any special subject field may be employed in 
a county.
b. Joint-County Plan

(1) For Counties Having Not More Than One Supervisory 
Unit:
Any two or three contiguous counties entitled to not more 
than one unit each for supervision may submit a coopera­
tive proposal for the joint employment of a supervisor or 
supervisors in accordance with one or more of the following 
plans:
(a) Cooperative Plan for General Supervision
Such counties may employ jointly one general supervisor 
for work with both white and Negro schools; or may employ 
separate general supervisors for white and Negro schools, 
provided the cooperative arrangement would not result in 
any general supervisor’s carrying a total load of over 75 
teachers.
(b) Cooperative Plan for Special Subject or Field Super­
vision

223



After providing for general supervisors, counties may use 
the remaining supervisory units to which they may be en­
titled for the purpose of cooperatively employing super­
visors in special area or subject fields, provided that not 
more than one unit from any individual county may be 
so used for employment of any one supervisor.

(c) Cooperative Plan for School Lunch Supervision

In counties having less than ten school lunch programs, the 
plan for supervision may be as follows:

Two or three counties may employ a school lunch supervisor 
on a joint county plan provided that no school lunch super­
visor may be responsible for more than thirty school lunch 
programs.

(2) For Counties Having More Than One Supervisory Unit

After providing independently for general supervision, such 
counties may use supervisory units beyond the first unit for 
cooperative employment of special supervisors in accord­
ance with section 2 -b -(l)-(b ) above.

3. Salaries and Travel Expense of Supervisors.

a. Supervisors shall be paid the basic salary schedule of 
the county for teachers based upon training, experience, and 
employment on either a ten or twelve months basis plus an 
appropriate supplement in keeping with the duties and 
responsibilities of the position.

b. The amount to be paid to the supervisor for travel must 
be adequate in tqrms of the territory and number of schools 
to be served and shall be fixed by the County Board of 
Public Instruction in accordance with the joint recom­
mendation of the County Superintendent and the State 
Superintendent.

224



Adopted May 29, 1951 
Section 230.23 (6)

State Board Regulation 
relating to

ESTABLISHMENT, ORGANIZATION AND 
OPERATION OF SMALL SCHOOLS

(Repealing Regulation adopted March 21, 1950, page 24)

!• No school with an average daily attendance of less than 
ten pupils in the elementary, junior or senior high school 
grades may be continued in operation through the use of 
Minimum Foundation Program funds except when such 
school is so isolated that transportation of the pupils to an­
other school would not be feasible because of distance, road 
conditions, or excessive expense, or except when pupils 
cannot be provided with equivalent or better educational 
facilities in another school. I f a school is to be operated 
as an isolated school, an application for such operation must 
be filed with the State Superintendent at least one month 
before any Minimum Foundation Program funds may be 
used for the school, giving all facts which may be required 
as a basis for approval. Approval for the operation of an 
isolated school will be granted by the State Superintendent 
of Public Instruction only after consideration of all the 
facts.

225



Adopted July 3, 1947 
Section 230.34 (8) 

State Board Regulation 
relating to

SCHOOL ADVISORY COMMITTEES

(Adopted in accordance with the provisions of section 
230.34 (8), Chapter 23726, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1947)

If the county board of a county exercises its discretion and 
determines to set up School Advisory Committees, the 
following regulations shall apply:

1. The county may be divided into school community areas 
for each race in accordance with the attendance areas for 
each school community for each race, or the Board may 
divide the county into school community areas which areas 
encompass the schools for both races.

2. Members of the School Advisory Committee may be 
selected for any school community area by either of the 
following methods as may be determined by the county 
hoard:

a. The Board may provide for the selection of members of 
the School Advisory Committee at a community meeting 
called in each school community area at the place desig­
nated by the Board of Public Instruction; the hour, the date 
and place of such meeting to be advertised at least once, at 
least one week before the meeting in a paper published in 
the county or in some paper of general circulation in the 
county.

b. The School Advisory Committee may be appointed by 
the school board either from lists submitted by a community 
meeting or directly by the board.

3. I f  the Board determines that the School Advisory Corn-

226



mittee shall be selected at a community meeting called in 
the school community area as prescribed above, parents or 
guardians of children attending school in the school 
community area and adult residents of such area shall 
be entitled to vote for members of the School Advisory 
Committee.

4. Any adult residing in a school community area is 
eligible to he selected as a member of the School Advisory 
Committee.

5. If the Board determines to select School Advisory Com­
mittees by the community meeting method, the Board shall 
determine the time, place, and hour of the meeting but the 
date selected must be between September 1 and December 
31 preceding the January 1 on which School Advisory 
Committees take office.

6. The members of the School Advisory Committee shall 
exercise and perform such duties as are prescribed in 
Section 230.34 (8) of Chapter 23726, Laws of Florida, 
Acts of 1947.

7. The supervising principal or principal shall serve as 
secretary of the School Advisory Committee.

227



Adopted March 21, 1950 
Section 236.02 (4)

State Board Regulation 
relating to

QUALIFICATIONS, DUTIES AND PROCEDURE FOR 
EMPLOYMENT OF SUPERVISORS OF INSTRUCTION

(Adopted in accordance with the provisions of Section 
236.02 (4), Chapter 23726, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1947)

1. Types and Qualifications of Supervisors

In addition to the objective standards set forth below, all 
persons employed as supervisors should possess the many 
intangible qualifications necessary to success in supervisory 
work.
a. General Qualifications
(1) Age— To be eligible for initial appointment the super­
visor shall be between the ages of 25 and 55 years.
(2) Physical Fitness—To be eligible for initial appoint­
ment the supervisor must have passed satisfactorily a 
physical examination given by a regular practicing physi­
cian and must have filed a report of such examination on 
the form now adopted by the State Board of Health; at the 
discretion of the State Superintendent the applicant may be 
required to take a special examination given by a physician 
designated by the State Board of Education.
(3) Leadership and Personal Characteristics—Each ap­
plicant for a supervisory position must file with the County 
Superintendent and the State Superintendent a completed 
application form setting forth experience, leadership activ­
ities, personal characteristics, and other items as may be 
included on a form prescribed and adopted by the State 
Board of Education.

228



b. Special Qualifications* (see note)

(1) Qualifications of General Supervisors
General Supervisors shall meet the following requirements:

(a) Hold a valid teaching certificate, graduate or above, 
having on face thereof, “ Administration and Supervision,”  
covering both elementary and secondary levels.

Temporary approval may be given for a general supervisor 
who does not meet certification requirements in full, pro­
vided, a plan for securing full certification within two years 
is filed and carried out.

(b) Have five years successful experience including teach­
ing and/or administrative and supervisory responsibility, 
at least two years of which experience shall have been 
completed within the five years immediately preceding 
appointment to a supervisory position.
(c) Beginning supervisors shall hold a certificate of Rank 
H or above in accordance with Section 236.07 (1), Chapter 
23726, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1947.
(2) Qualifications of Supervisors at the Elementary or 
Secondary School Levels.
Supervisors whose duties are limited to the elementary or 
secondary school levels shall meet the following require­
ments :
(a) Hold a valid teaching certificate, graduate or above, 
having on the face thereof “ Administration and Supervi­
sion”  covering the level to be supervised.
(b) Have five years successful experience including teach-

# Requirements here set forth are to he considered a minimum and 
every effort shall he made to secure the services of persons with 
much higher types of qualifications and experience. When a super­
visor is appointed who meets only minimum requirements he shall 
be required to make every effort to improve his qualifications con­
sistent with the proper performance of the duties to which assigned.

229



ing and/or administrative and supervisory responsibility, 
at least two years of which experience shall have been com­
pleted within the five years immediately preceding appoint­
ment to a supervisory position. At least three years of the 
experience shall have been in the level to be supervised and 
the degree upon which certificate is issued shall have in­
cluded the special level to be supervised as a major field of 
training.

(c) Beginning supervisors shall hold a certificate of Bank 
II, or above.

(3) Qualifications of Supervisors of Special Subjects or 
Special Programs.

(a) Hold a valid teaching certificate, graduate or above, 
or its equivalent, in the field for which responsibility is 
given.

(b) Five years successful experience as a teacher, admin­
istrator, or supervisor in the field for which responsibility 
is given, at least two years of which shall have been com­
pleted within the five years immediately preceding appoint­
ment to the supervisory position.

(c) Academic specialization shall have included the field 
to be supervised and the field of education including at least 
six semester hours in curriculum and supervision.

2. Duties of Supervisors.

a. Persons employed through the use of supervisory units 
shall give full time to working with teachers, principals, 
and other school personnel in the field of instruction. Under 
no circumstances will administrators or administrative 
assistants be certified from supervisory units.

b. In counties not employing a supervisor of Negro schools 
the general supervisor shall have his services equitably ap­
portioned among the schools (white and/or Negro) in the 
one or more counties by whom he is employed.

230



c. General supervisors shall be paid and subject to duty on 
a twelve months basis, and special supervisors on not less 
than a ten months basis. Supervisors shall attend all con­
ferences called by the State Superintendent of Public In­
struction which are related to the satisfactory performance 
of supervisory duties.

d. Supervisors shall make such periodic reports relative to 
their plans and accomplishments as may be required by 
the Division of Instruction of the State Department of 
Education.

3. Procedure for Employment of Supervisors

a. The employment of persons to fill supervisory positions 
in a county shall follow the procedure prescribed by law 
and by State Board Regulations for other instructional per­
sonnel up through the point where the County Board of 
Public Instruction has approved the nomination of the in­
dividual concerned. The County Superintendent shall then 
certify the action to the State Superintendent of Public 
Instruction, furnishing all information necessary to enable 
the State Superintendent to present the matter to the State 
Board of Education for approval or disapproval. The action 
of the State Board of Education shall then be certified by 
the State Superintendent to the County Superintendent. In 
the event the State Board concurs in the action of the Coun­
ty Board, the County Board may then proceed with contract­
ing for the services of the supervisor. In the event the State 
Board finds the individual not qualified or for other reasons 
rejects the nomination of the individual concerned, the 
County Superintendent shall initiate action to secure 
the nomination of some other individual qualified for the 
position.

b. The dismissal of persons in supervisory positions in a 
county shall follow the procedure prescribed by law and 
by State Board Regulations for other instructional per­

231



sonnel with the additional requirement that approval of the 
State Board of Education shall be necessary before the 
dismissal of any supervisor may he effectuated.

Adopted July 3, 1947 
Section 236.04 (1) (2)

State Board Regulation 
relating to

ISOLATED SCHOOLS

(Adopted in accordance with the provisions of Section
236.04 (1) and (2), Chapter 23726, Laws of Florida, Acts

of 1947)

1. Instruction units for all non-isolated schools with less 
than 120 pupils in average daily attendance will be calcu­
lated by dividing the average daily attendance of such 
schools by 27.
2. ISOLATED SCHOOLS. Any school having less than 
120 pupils in average daily attendance shall be considered 
an isolated school for the purpose of computing instruction 
units when any of the following conditions are found to 
exist:
a. Elementary Schools

(1 ) School with 90 to 119 pupils inclusive in average daily 
attendance: If it is more than six miles by the nearest 
passable road from another elementary school for the same 
race in which satisfactory facilities could be provided.
(2) School with from 60 to 89 pupils inclusive in average 
daily attendance: If it is more than eight miles by the 
nearest passable road from another elementary school for 
the same race in which satisfactory facilities could be 
provided.

232



(3) School with 59 pupils or less in average daily attend­
ance: I f it is more than ten miles by the nearest passable 
road from another elementary school for the same race in 
which satisfactory facilities could be provided.

(4) I f more than 15% of the pupils to be transported 
would have to be on the bus for an average of more than 
one hour each morning or evening.

(5) Not more than one instruction unit shall be allowed 
for any one-teacher elementary school regardless of whether 
it is considered an isolated school; Provided, however, that 
an instruction unit will not be allotted for a school with 
an average daily attendance of less than nine, unless evi­
dence is presented to the State Superintendent showing that 
consolidation of this school is impossible.

b. Junior High Schools

(1) School with 90 to 119 pupils inclusive in average daily 
attendance: I f it is more than seven miles by the nearest 
passable road from another junior high school for the same 
race in which satisfactory facilities could be provided.

(2) School with from 60 to 89 pupils inclusive in average 
daily attendance: I f it is more than nine miles by the 
nearest passable road from another junior high school for 
the same race in which satisfactory facilities could be 
provided.

(3) School with 59 pupils or less in average daily attend­
ance: If it is more than eleven miles by the nearest passable 
road from another junior high school for the same race in 
which satisfactory facilities could be provided.

(4) If more than 25% of the pupils to be transported 
would have to be on the bus for an average of more than one 
hour each morning or evening.

(5) Unless a center has a ninth grade or is definitely 
organized as part of a high school it is to be considered

233



an elementary school for purposes of computing instruction 
units and determining isolation.

c. Senior High Schools

(1 ) School with 90 to 119 pupils inclusive in average daily 
attendance: If it is more than eight miles hy the nearest 
passable road from another senior high school for the same 
race in which satisfactory facilities could be provided.

(2) School with 60 to 89 pupils inclusive in average 
daily attendance: I f it is more than ten miles by the 
nearest passable road from another senior high school for 
the same race in which satisfactory facilities could be 
provided.

(3) School with less than 59 pupils in average daily attend­
ance: If it is more than twelve miles by the nearest passable 
road from another senior high school for the same race in 
which satisfactory facilities could be provided.

(4) I f more than 25% of the pupils to be transported 
would have to be on the bus for an average of more than 
one hour each morning or evening.

(5) Unless a center has a twelfth grade it is to be con­
sidered as a junior high school for purposes of computing 
instruction units and determining isolation.

3. TEMPORARY ISOLATED SCHOOLS. Any school 
having less than 12Q pupils in average daily attendance 
shall be considered a temporarily isolated school for the 
purpose of computing instruction units when satisfactory 
facilities cannot be provided at another appropriate center 
within the distances prescribed above, or when the pupils 
cannot be transported because of road conditions; provided, 
however, no school will be considered as temporarily iso­
lated because of lack of building facilities after July 1, 
1948.

234



Adopted July 21, 1953 
Section 239.38

239.41
239.42

State Board Regulation 
relating to

THE DISTRIBUTION OF GENERAL SCHOLARSHIPS

1. In accordance with provisions of Sections 239.38, 239.41 
and 239.42, Florida Statutes as amended by the 1953 
Legislature, the following distribution of scholarships is 
established:

White Negro Total
Alachua 16 7 23
Baker 7 1 8
Bay 17 4 21
Bradford 8 2 10
Brevard 13 3 16
Broward 21 7 28
Calhoun 7 1 8
Charlotte 5 1 6
Citrus 6 2 8
Clay 10 2 12
Collier 6 2 8
Columbia 11 2 13
Dade 54 10 64
DeSoto 8 1 9
Dixie 5 1 6
Duval 40 12 52
Escambia 27 6 33
Flagler 4 1 5
Franklin 6 1 7
Gadsden 10 9 19
Gilchrist 4 1 5

235



The Distribution of General Scholarships (Continued)

White Negro Total

Glades 3 1 4
Gulf 7 1 8
Hamilton 7 2 9
Hardee 9 1 10
Hendry 6 1 7
Hernando 7 1 8
Highlands 9 2 11
Hillsborough 42 6 48
Holmes 11 1 12
Indian River 9 2 11
Jackson 12 6 18
J etf erson 6 4 10
Lafayette 4 1 5
Lake 15 4 19
Lee 13 2 15
Leon 15 8 23
Levy 8 2 10
Liberty 3 1 4
Madison 8 4 12
Manatee 15 3 18
Marion 13 6 19
Martin 6 2 8
Monroe 15 2 17
Nassau 9 2 11
Okaloosa 15 1 16
Okeechobee 4 1 5
Orange 28 5 33
Osceola 9 1 10
Palm Beach 24 9 33
Pasco 12 2 14
Pinellas 34 4 38
Polk 29 5 34
Putnam 12 3 15

236



The Distribution of General Scholarships (Continued)

White Negro Total

St. Johns 12 4 16
St. Lucie 11 3 14
Santa Rosa 12 1 13
Sarasota 15 2 17
Seminole 11 5 16
Sumter 8 2 10
Suwannee 11 2 13
Taylor 8 2 10
Union 7 2 9
Volusia 20 6 26
Wakulla 5 2 7
Walton 9 3 12
Washington 10 1 11

Total 843
80.3%

207
19.7%

1050
100%

If any county shall receive more scholarships under this 
distribution than the total of its General, Representative, 
and Senatorial scholarship holders on the 1953-54 scholar­
ship roll, the additional scholarships shall not be activated 
until it is ascertained that the appropriation for scholar­
ships is sufficient for this purpose.

2. Within the allocation tentatively allotted each county, 
vacancies shall be declared in such a manner as to insure 
having, whenever possible, not less than twenty-five per 
cent of the total number of awards open to white and to 
Negro students respectively who would enter an approved 
Florida institution as freshmen during each and every year. 
Where there are sufficient vacancies in any county to allow 
such distribution, twenty-five per cent of the total number

237



shall also be made available to persons falling in each of 
the following levels: sophomore, junior, senior.
3. A  scholarship holder must register in the school, college, 
or department of education of an institution of higher 
learning located in Florida and approved by the State 
Board of Education for teacher education and certification.

4. The State Superintendent shall have authority to declare 
in which teaching fields applicants must train to be eligible 
for a scholarship.

5. A  General Scholarship for the Preparation of Teachers 
may be renewed annually for a period of four years, but 
may not be used for work beyond the four-year degree level 
nor after the holder has received $1600.00 in scholarship 
funds.

6. Examinations to fill vacancies for General Scholarships 
are to be held twice a year, in the fall and in the spring. 
The State Superintendent of Public Instruction shall make 
all arrangements for these examinations and shall supervise 
the selection of winners, etc.

7. I f for any reason, illness included, a scholarship holder 
must remain out of college for longer than one semester, he 
will forfeit his scholarship. I f later he returns to college 
and desires scholarship aid, he must re-apply by submitting 
a new application for a declared vacancy. An exception may 
be made in the case of a scholarship holder called into the 
Armed Services. If the veteran desires scholarship rein­
statement upon his return from service, his scholarship may 
be restored to him if a vacancy exists in his county.

8. I f on July 1 of any year, quotas for white or Negro stu­
dents with respect to General Scholarships for the Prepara­
tion of Teachers remain unfilled in any county, and if upon 
investigation by the State Superintendent it is found that 
such conditions exist because of (1) a dearth of persons 
interested in making application or (2) the failure of ap-

238



plicants to make the required minimum score, the State 
Superintendent may declare such vacancies to exist on a 
state-wide basis. The state-wide vacancies declared should 
then be awarded in the following manner:

a. A  roster shall be compiled containing the names of eligi­
ble persons making the minimum passing score who failed 
to receive an award on the latest examination.

b. From such roster, in order of rank of excellence and in 
keeping with the college-year level for which the vacancies 
placed in the state-wide pool exist, awards are to he made.

c. Persons receiving such awards will be permitted to con­
tinue them from year to year, as provided by law, until the 
termination of the scholarship; at the end of this period, 
such vacancies shall be again restored to the counties to 
which they were originally allocated.

9. This repeals paragraph 2, pages 225-26 of State Board 
Begulation relating to Summer School Scholarships and 
Scholarships for Preparation of Teachers, pages 224-26, 
adopted July 6, 1949.

239



Adopted July 21, 1953 
Sections: 239.19

239.38-239.44
State Board Regulation 

relating to

SCHOLARSHIP COMMITTEE

The State Scholarship Committee shall be composed of 
eight members appointed by the State Superintendent of 
Public Instruction. The membership shall be the dean of 
education of each of four colleges or universities approved 
for teacher education for white teachers, the president or 
dean of education of one college or university approved for 
teacher education for Negro teachers, the dean or the direc­
tor of one approved junior college, and two members of the 
State Department of Education.
Two members shall be appointed for a one year term, two 
for two years, two for three years, and two for four years. 
Thereafter each member shall be appointed for a term of 
four years.
Any vacancy shall be filled for the unexpired term by 
appointment by the State Superintendent of Public 
Instruction.
The committee shall elect its chairman and recorder for 
terms not to exceed two years.
The duties of the committee shall be to formulate policies 
and make recommendations that will add to the effective­
ness of the scholarship program.
The committee shall meet at least twice a year and at 
such other times as the chairman shall consider necessary.
The committee may invite other officials concerned with 
the administration of the scholarship program to meet 
with the committee at any meeting.

240



Adopted November 16, 1948 
Sections 239.41 thru 

239.44 
239.19 thru 
239.24

State Board Regulation 
relating to

SCHOLARSHIPS FOR PREPARATION OF TEACHERS 
AND HOUSE AND SENATORIAL SCHOLARSHIPS

(Adopted in accordance with the provisions of Sections 
239.41 thru 239.44 and Sections 239.19 thru 239.24, Florida 
Statutes, as amended by Chapter 23726, Laws of Florida,

Acts of 1947)

The method and manner of handling and collecting schol­
arship notes which may become in default shall be as 
follows:

The President of each institution of higher learning where 
the scholarship was held shall give such assistance as may 
be reasonably requested by the State Treasurer in the col­
lection of scholarship notes which have become payable by 
reason of the scholarship holder failing to perform services 
in satisfaction of his scholarship note.

241



Adopted July 3, 1947 
Section 242.05 (1)

State Board Regulation, 
relating to

STATE SUPERVISORY SERVICES

(Adopted in accordance with the provisions of Section 
242.05(1), Florida Statutes, 1941, as amended by Chapter 

23726, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1947)

1. The use of State Supervisory Funds shall be in accord­
ance with a budget for a program planned as a part of 
the State Department of Education services for supervision 
of white and Negro schools as recommended by the State 
Superintendent of Public Instruction.

2. Recommendations for nomination of persons to fill State 
Supervisory positions shall be submitted to the State Board 
of Education by the State Superintendent of Public Instruc­
tion. In no case may any individual be certified, nominated, 
or paid any salary from State Supervisory Funds who does 
not meet the qualifications prescribed by the State Board 
of Education for holding supervisory positions of the type 
being filled.

3. Approval by the State Board of Education shall be 
necessary before any State Supervisory Funds may be paid 
to any person recommended and employed in accordance 
with the preceding section; approval of both the State Su­
perintendent of Public Instruction and the State Board of 
Education shall be necessary before the dismissal of any 
supervisor employed through use of State Supervisory 
Funds may be effectuated. 4

4. Included as a part of the administrative plan for super­
vision the State Superintendent shall file with the recom­
mendation a brief statement outlining (1) the duty to be

242



performed by the supervisor; (2) tbe total annual salary;
(3) tbe amount to be paid for travel; and, (4) qualifications 
of supervisor to be employed.

5. The qualifications and duties of State Supervisors shall 
be in accordance with the types of qualifications and 
the duties as listed for County Supervisors as would be 
applicable to work on the State level.

Adopted February 14, 1950 
Sections 234.01 thru 234.25 
and related sections.

State Board Regulation 
relating to

TRANSPORTATION OF PUPILS

(Adopted in accordance with Chapter 234 and related sec­
tions of Florida Statutes)

*  *  *  *

(8) The land sections shall be computed separately for 
white and Negro races.

243





I N THE

Supreme Court of the United States
O c t o b e r  T e r m ,  A. D. 1953.

No. 1

OLIVER BROWN, et al.,

vs.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 
TOPEKA, KANSAS, etc., et al.

Appellants,

Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE  
DISTRICT OF KANSAS.

ADDITIONAL BRIEF OF THE AMERICAN FEDERA­
TION OF TEACHERS AS AMICUS CURIAE.

JOHN LIGTENBERG,
134 N. La Salle Street,
Chicago 2, Illinois,
Counsel for American Federation of 

Teachers, Amicus Curiae.
Selma M. B orchardt,

Homer Building,
Washington, D. C.,

Of Counsel.

C H A M P L I N 'S H C A L V  C O M P A N Y , C H I C A O O  c ^ ^ > 3 6 8





I N D E X .

PAGE
Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amicus C uriae......... 1
Brief of American Federation of Teachers as Amicus

Curiae ..............................................................................  3
Summary of Argument ..................................................... 3
Argument ............................................................................  4
Introduction: Need to consider issues in broad aspects 4

I. The strengthening and preservation of a 
democratic society demands an educated cit­
izenry ................................................................. 6

II. The intent of the 14th amendment was to 
make the Negro a citizen and protect his 
voting rights .....................................................  10

III. To exercise his right of choice effectively a
voter must not only be educated but educated 
among all those who make up the total com­
munity .................................................................  16

IV. An integrated school system will add tre­
mendously in developing harmonious rela­
tions among the people of the south and 
thereby throughout the coun try ..................  19

Conclusion: A  decision in favor of integrating school­
ing on every level is necessary, not only to give sub­
stance to our declared principles but to win over the 
peoples of Asia and Africa to a belief in the sincer­
ity of the United S tates.................................................  25

TABLE OF CASES.
See Appellants’ Briefs.

STATUTES.
See Appellants’ Briefs.



m
m



I N  T H E

Supreme Court of the United States
O c t o b e r  T e r m , A. D. 1953.

No. 1
OLIVER BROWN, et al.,

vs.
Appellants,

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 
TOPEKA, KANSAS, etc., et al.

Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE  

DISTRICT OF KANSAS.

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AS 
AMICUS CURIAE.

To the Honorable the Chief Justice and Associate Justices 
of the Supreme Court of the United States:

The undersigned as counsel for and on behalf of the 
American Federation of Teachers, respectfully moves this 
Honorable Court for leave to file the accompanying brief 
as Amicus Curiae. In October, 1952, we filed upon leave 
of Court our Brief Amicus Curiae in the case of Brown 
et al vs. Board of Education of Topeka, etc. (No. 8) and 
in December, 1952, in the case of Bolling et al v. Sharpe, 
et al (No. 413). Consent of Counsel for filing those briefs 
was given by counsel for appellants and appellees.

The American Federation of Teachers, whose 60,000 
classroom teacher members represent the group which



2

does the actual work of teaching the children of the 
nation, is committed to a practice of complete equality 
between teachers and children of every race. This principle 
is written indelibly in its constitution and by-laws.

It desires to lay before the court the results of its study 
of the legal and historical questions raised by this Honor­
able Court in asking for a reargument of the “ school segre­
gation cases” . The accompanying brief, largely the Avork 
of its Committee on Democratic Human Relations, is sub­
mitted as a contribution to the solution of the important 
issues involved.

John L igtenberg,

Counsel for the American Federation 
of Teachers.

Selma M. B orchardt,
Of Counsel.



I N  T H E

Supreme Court of the United States
O c t o b e r  T e r m ,  A. D. 1953.

No. 1

OLIVER BROWN, et al.,

vs.
Appellants,

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 
TOPEKA, KANSAS, etc ., e t  a l .

Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE  

DISTRICT OF KANSAS.

BRIEF OF AMERICAN FEDERATION OF 
TEACHERS AS AMICUS CURIAE.

As a contribution to the solution of the important issues 
involved in the “ segregated school cases” the American 
Federation of Teachers submits this brief upon some of the 
historical and legal questions raised by this Honorable 
Court in proposing a re-argument.

The Opinions Below, Questions Presented, Statutes and 
Constitutions Involved, and Statements of Pacts have been 
stated in previous briefs filed in these causes.

Summary of Argument.
The arguments presented in our previous briefs Amicus 

Curiae and those presented herewith are summarized in 
the Introduction to the Argument.



4

A R G U M E N T .

Introduction:
Need to consider cases in broad aspects.
The American Federation of Teachers which is dedicated 

to “ education for democracy and democracy in education”  
is deeply interested in the cases before the Supreme Court 
challenging the constitutionality of segregation in public 
elementary and secondary schools. The arguments the 
Federation submitted in October 1952 against segregated 
public education are equally valid in 1953 and we urge 
their favorable re-consideration.

We have studied carefully the historical and legal ques­
tions raised by the court in asking for a re-argument of 
the cases this year. While it is essential to have accurate 
and clear cut answers to these questions, the American 
Federation of Teachers believes that the interests of the 
United States, both national and international, demand 
the consideration of other factors as well as those raised 
by the Court.

In addition to the arguments presented in our brief 
October, 1952, namely:

1. The Constitutions and Statutes of states provid­
ing for segregation of students in the public schools, 
violate the requirements of the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The doctrine 
of “ separate but equal”  facilities is fallacious . . .

2. Segregation in public schools inevitably results 
in inferior educational opportunities for Negroes . . .

3. Segregation in public schools deprives the Negro 
student of an important element of the education 
process and he is thereby denied the equal educational 
opportunities mandated by the Fourteenth Amend­
ment . . .



5

the Federation urges the abolition of segregated schooling 
on the elementary and secondary levels for the following 
reasons:

I. The strengthening and preservation of a demo­
cratic society demands an educated citizenry.

II. The intent of the 14th amendment was to make 
the Negro a citizen and protect his voting rights.

III. To exercise his right of choice effectively a 
voter must not only be educated but educated among 
all those who make up the total community.

IV. An integrated school system will aid tremend­
ously in developing harmonious relations among the 
people of the South and thereby throughout the 
country.

Conclusion.

A decision in favor of integrated schooling on every 
level is necessary, not only to give substance to our de­
clared principles but to win over the peoples of Asia and 
Africa to a belief in the sincerity of the United States.



6

THE STRENGTHENING AND PRESERVATION OF A
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY DEMANDS AN EDUCATED
CITIZENRY.

A democratic society is founded on the belief that all 
men are equal and capable of governing themselves. It 
holds further that men create the institutions of govern­
ment for the purpose of safeguarding their rights of “ life, 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness.”  To govern wisely, 
as well as to use effective checks upon governmental author­
ity to prevent abuses, requires an alert, well-educated 
citizenry.

The early founders of this country were well aware of 
this need for the maintenance of popular government. 
They gave many evidences of their concern for public edu­
cation in their writings and in their activities.

President George Washington in his first inaugural 
address stated:

“ Knowledge is in every country the surest basis of 
public happiness. In one in which the measures of 
government receive their impressions so immediately 
from the sense of the community7, as in ours, it is 
proportionably essential. To the security7 of a free 
constitution it contributes in various ways, by con­
vincing those who are intrusted with the public ad­
ministration that every valuable end of government 
is best answered by the enlightened confidence of the 
people and by teaching the people themselves to know 
and value their own rights, to discern and provide 
against invasions of them; to distinguish between 
oppression and the necessary exercise of lawful author­
ity; between burdens proceeding from a disregard to 
their convenience and those resulting from the exigen-

I .



7

cies of society; to discriminate the spirit of liberty 
from that of licentiousness, cherishing the first, avoid­
ing the last and uniting a speedy but temperate 
‘ vigilance against encroachments with an inviolable 
respect to the laws ’ 1

Washington not only urged the establishment of a na­
tional university but, in his will, left 50 shares in the 
Potomac Company for such an institution to which the 
youth of fortune and talents from all parts thereof (of the 
U. S.) might be sent for the completion of their education 
in all branches of polite literature; in arts and sciences; 
and in acquiring knowledge in the principles of politics and 
good governments.2

In his Farewell Address, Washington left this final ad­
monition; “ Promote then, as an object of primary im­
portance, institutions for the general diffusion of knowl­
edge. In proportion as the structure of government gives 
force to public opinion, it is essential that public opinion 
should be enlightened. 3

John Adams in his D issertation on the Canon 
Feudal L a w : “ But the fact is certain; and whenever a
general knowledge and sensibility have prevailed among the 
people, arbitrary government and every kind of oppression 
have lessened and disappeared in proportion. ”  4 Fie stated 
later in another essay: “ Thoughts on Government”—“ . . . 
Laws for the liberal education of youth, especially of the 
lower classes of people, are so extremely wise and useful,

1 Maxims of Washing-ton, pp. 184-85, John Frederick Shroeder Mt. 
Vernon Ladies Association— Mt. Vernon, Va., 1942.

■ Writings of Washington— Vol. 37, p. 280, U. S. Government Printing 
Office, 1940.

* Farewell Address, p. 179, Maxims of Washington, John Frederick 
Schroeder, Mt. Vernon Ladies Association. Mt. Vernon, Va., 1942.

1 Selected Writings of John Adams and John Quincy Adams, Adrienne 
Koch and William Peden, Alfred A . Knopf, 1940.



8

that to a humane and generous mind, no expense for this 
purpose would be thought extravagant.” 5

Thomas Jefferson’s career was filled with activities in 
behalf of public education because he was convinced an in­
formed public opinion was essential to maintaining freedom. 
As a member of the Virginia legislature he introduced bills 
for providing the state with a system of free public schools. 
He wanted especially written on his grave marker that he 
established the University of Virginia. His authorship of 
the Land Act of 1784, established the precedent followed 
in the Northwestern Ordinance of 1787 of granting land 
by the national government for the support of education.

Like Washington, he called attention, in his first inaug­
ural address to the importance of education and the need 
for the national government to be concerned about it. “  . . . 
The diffusion of information I deem (one) of the essential 
principles of our government and consequently (one) which 
ought to shape its administration ’ ’ 6

In a letter to James Madison he stated:
“ Above all things I hope the education of the com­

mon people will be attended to; convinced that on their 
good sense we may rely with the_utmost security for 
the preservation of a due degree of liberty. ’ ’ 7

The working man too realized the importance of educa­
tion and a generation later, became quite vocal in his unions 
and political groups in demanding free public schools. He 
urged this not only for the self improvement of the worker 
but also for his more effective functioning as a citizen. 
At a New York State convention of the Workingman’s 
Party in 1830 one address stated in part:

“ The right of suffrage which we enjoy cannot be 
understanding^ exercised by those whose want of edu-

5 Ibid., p. 56.
6 The Jeffersonian Encyclopedia, John P. Foley, Editor, Funk and 

Wagnalls, 1900.
1 Ibid., p. 277.



9

cation deprives them of the means of acquiring such 
information as is necessary for a proper and correct 
discharge of this duty.”8

In a circular to the workingmen of Philadelphia (1830) 
by the Workingmen’s Republican Association of the North­
ern Liberties, the organization made this appeal: “ Let
the productive classes then unite for the preservation of 
their free institutions and, by providing for all the children 
in the Commonwealth republican education preserve our 
liberties from the dangers of foreign invasion or domestic 
infringement. ’ ’ 9

A trade union of Newark demanded education for their 
children as “ a matter of right and duty” . Its members 
argued: “ Education alone, and that generally diffused is 
the only prop that will support the fabric of Democracy 
from being crushed beneath the weight of monopolized 
and moneyed artistocracy. ”  10

And the workers of the First Congressional District of 
Pennsylvania (1830) supported the candidacy of Stephen 
Simpson because “ he is a friend and indefatigable defender 
of a system of general education which will place citizens 
of this extensive republic on an equality: a system that 
will lit the poor as well as the rich to become our future 
legislators; a system that will bring the children of the 
poor and the rich to mix together as a band of republican 
brethren; united in youth in acquisition of knowledge they 
will grow up together jealous of naught but the republican

“History of Labor in the United States, Vol. 1, p. 283, J. R. Com­
mons, MacMillan, 1918.

'Ibid., p. 227.
“ Pioneers of Labor, p. 11, Pamphlet of Amalgamated Meat Cutters 

and Butcher Workmen of North America, Mayer and Muller Co., 
Chicago, 1949.



10

character of their country and present to the world the 
sublime spectacle of a truly republican government in prac­
tice as well as in theory. ’ ’ 11

As a result of the concern of the founders of this coun­
try and the persistent demands of labor unions, the free 
public school has become an integral part of American life. 
No other institution gives as tangible an evidence of 
American faith in the democratic way of life as the free 
public school and none is so generally supported by the 
great mass of people. It is ironic that this American insti­
tution is permitted by Southern State laws to violate and 
desecrate this faith so flagrantly and constantly.

I I .
THE INTENT OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT WAS TO 

MAKE THE NEGRO A CITIZEN AND PROTECT HIS 
VOTING RIGHTS.

The 14th amendment, by stating specifically that “ all 
persons born or naturalized in the United States and sub­
ject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United 
States and of the state wherein they reside”  12 intended to 
make the Negro a citizen. It also intended to make the 
Negro a voter and protect his voting rights by placing a 
penalty upon the states that disfi'anchised him—namely, 
cutting down the state’s representation in Congress. Sec­
tion 2 of the amendment states; “ . . . But when the right 
to vote at any election for the choice of electors for presi­
dent and vice president of the United States, representa­
tives to Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a 
state, or the members of the legislature thereof, is denied 
to any of the male inhabitants of such state . . . the basis

11 History of Labor in the U. S., J. R. Commons, Vol. 1, p. 228, Mac­
Millan, 1918.

1214th Amendment, U.S. Constitution, Section 1.



11

of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens twenty-one years 
of age in such state.”  13

The debates in the 39th and the 41st Congresses and the 
state conventions and in the state legislatures which ratified 
the 14th amendment clearly indicate that both the pro­
ponents and opponents of the amendment realized that it 
protected the citizenship and voting rights of the Negro. 
Moreover, they show that the debaters were conscious of 
the issue of segregation in education. The Congressional 
Globe reports on February 19, 1866 that Senator Yates of 
Illinois while making a speech in the Senate for the pro­
posed 14th Amendment said:

“  . . . the senate at this session have passed the bill 
(S. 61) to protect all persons . . .  in their civil rights 
. . . here, sir, I contend, we have fully established the 
principle . . . protecting the inhabitants, of every race 
and color, without regard to any previous condition 
of slavery in all their civil and political rights. . . ” 14

A week later in the House Representative Rogers of 
New Jersey while arguing against the 14th Amendment 
stated that:

“ In the State of Pennsylvania there are laws which 
make a distinction with regard to the schooling of 
white children and the schooling of black children. 
It is provided that certain schools shall be designated 
and set apart for white children, and certain other 
schools designated and set apart for black children. 
Under this amendment, Congress would have power 
to compel the state to provide for white children and 
black children to attend the same school, upon the 
principle that all the people . . . shall have equal pro-

“ 14th Amendment, Section 2.
11 Toward a Non-Segregated South, Edwin R. Brook, Christian Century, 

September, 1933.
“a Congressional Globe, 39th Congress, First Session, February 19,



12

tection in the rights of life, liberty, and property, and 
all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the 
several States. ’ ’ 15

For a short period after the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment there was no segregation at the University of 
South Carolina. Indeed it was not until the Tillman Consti­
tutional Convention of 1895 that separate schools were 
provided for Negro and white children. Yet in 1868, Gov­
ernor Orr voiced the opinion that the new amendment 
would bring immediate dire results. He addressed the 
Assembly as follows:

‘ ‘ . . . The Constitution provides that there shall be 
kept open, at least six months in each year, one or 
more schools in each school district. . . . Another 
Section, however, declares that all the public schools, 
colleges and universities of the State, supported in 
whole or in part by public funds, shall be free and 
open to all the children, and youths of the State, with­
out regard to race or color.

If it shall be attempted to establish schools where 
both races are to be taught, no provision being made 
for their separation, the whole system will result in a 
disastrous failure. The prejudices of race, whether 
just or unjust, exists in full force not more in South 
Carolina than in New England and the West. In the 
last named localities, separate schools are provided 
for white and colored children, and in a community 
where these prejudices prevail in so strong a degree, 
how unreasonable is it to attempt the organization of 
mixed schools. It cannot but result in constant feuds 
and collisions between the children, in which the par­
ents respectively, will necessarily take up the quarrels

16 Congressional Globe, 39th Congress, First Session, March 1, 1866.



13

and the entire community thus be involved in continual 
tumult; the consequence of misguided efforts of unwise 
persons.”  16

In 1868 under the spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the people of Louisiana ratified a constitution by a vote of 
66,152 to 48,739. This constitution provided:

“ The general assembly shall establish at least one 
free public school in every parish throughout the State, 
and shall provide for its support by taxation or other­
wise. All children of this State between the years of 
six and twenty-one shall be admitted to the public 
schools or other institutions of learning sustained or 
established by the State in common, without distinc­
tion of race, color, or previous condition. There shall 
be no separate schools or institutions of learning es­
tablished exclusively for any race by the State of 
Louisiana. ’ ’ 17

By 1898 the political climate had so changed that the new 
constitution decreed separate schools based on race in this 
fashion:

‘ ‘ There shall be free public schools for the white and 
colored races separately established by the General As­
sembly, throughout the State, for the education of all 
the children of the State between the ages of six and 
eighteen years; provided, that where kindergarten 
schools exist, children between the ages of four and 
six may be admitted into said schools.’ ’ 18

Virginia’s Constitutional Convention of 1867-68 brought 
into prominence one James W. Hunnicutt who summarized

» Journal of the Assembly of South Carolina, Special Session, 1868, 
p. 44.

17 Constitution of Louisiana, 1868, Title VII, Article 135.
18 Constitution of Louisiana, 1898, Article 248.



14

the position of his caucus of the Republican Party in a 
speech on January 9,1869 this way:

. . Our banner is thrown to the breeze, and upon 
it is written ‘ the unconditional preservation of the 
Union.’ That is the first plank. The second is, ‘ a re­
publican form of government,’ The third is, ‘ the 
equal rights of all men, civil and political, before the 
law, without regard to race, caste or color.’ The last 
is, ‘ the establishment of systems of general education 
for all the children in the land without regard to race, 
caste or color.’ these are the objects of the members 
on this side of the House. ’ ’ 19 

Even clearer language is that used by the Fredericks­
burg’s convention which besides electing delegates to the 
constitutional convention adopted this resolution:

“ that our candidates must pledge themselves to 
sustain the principles of the Republican Party, espe­
cially the equal political rights of all men in all re­
spects; a system of common schools in which no dis­
tinctions shall be made on account of color and race, a 
general provision for the poor and a just and equitable 
system of taxation.”  20

It is apparent in our opinion, that the delegates to the 
convention of 1868 were conscious of the problem of segre­
gated public schools. Many of them thought that the Four­
teenth Amendment covered this point adequately and con­
sequently specific reference to it in the State Constitution 
was not necessary. During the debates, a resolution by 
Dr. Thomas Bayne, a delegate from Norfolk, which spelled 
out non-segregation in public schools, met defeat as did

19 Debates and Proceedings of Constitutional Convention of Virginia, 
1867-1868, p. 337.

29 Political History of the Reconstruction in Virginia, H. J. Eckenrode.



15

likewise a provision to establish separate schools by Eus­
tace Gibson.

The first State Legislature which was dominated by con­
servatives made segregated public schools legitimate. The 
importance of this move in creating a segregated society 
is obvious in the letter of W. H. Ruffner, the first superin­
tendent of public instruction, who in answering the assump­
tion of Reverend R. L. Dabney that education will lead in­
evitably to “ amalgamation”  observes:

“ . . . But if under the ordinary associations of life 
there would be any tendencies in the direction of amal­
gamation, the school system would oppose a powerful 
barrier to such tendency. In fact, of all the public 
arrangements of Southern society, the school system 
alone renders a bold, emphatic testimony to the im- 
miscibility of the races. We find Negroes in our 
churches, our theatres, our courthouses, our rail-cars, 
our halls of legislation; but there is one place where 
no Negro enters, and that is a W HITE PUBLIC 
SCHOOL HOUSE. The law separates the races in 
education, and in nothing else. The effect of this sepa­
ration enters into the educational thought and training 
of the young, and establishes the habits and etiquette 
of society with a firmness that nothing else is doing, 
or could do. . . . ” 21

Thirty years passed before the “ plans”  of the superin­
tendent bore fruit as a fait accompli. The General Assem­
bly of Virginia extended the segregated principle to other 
fields according to this time schedule:

1900, Chapter 226, Segregation in Railroads.
1900, Chapter 312, Segregation in Steamboats.

!1 Collected Papers of William H. Ruffner, (letter in answer to R. L. 
Dabney) 6-11.



16

1901, Chapter 198, Segregation in Street-cars.
1912, Chapter 157, Segregation in Residential 

areas.
1918, Chapter 301, Segregation in Penitentiaries.
1926, Chapter 569, Segregation in places of public 

amusement.22

A consideration of ALL of the historical evidence on the 
question of segregation in public education in the southern 
states will confirm our findings in Virginia, South Carolina, 
and Louisiana. These affirm that the political leaders dur­
ing the late eighteen sixties possessed an understanding of 
the effect of segregation on our public institutions and that 
Negroes enjoyed a fair measure of freedom. They also 
demonstrate that the Negro gradually lost full citizenship 
privileges by the turn of the century, if provisions on seg­
regation in state constitutions and statutes or actual prac­
tices are our criteria. In a sense then, this brief constitutes 
an argument to restore the rights of the Negro guaranteed 
him originally in the Fourteenth Amendment.

I I I .

TO EXERCISE HIS RIGHT OF CHOICE EFFECTIVELY 
A VOTER MUST NOT ONLY BE EDUCATED AMONG 
ALL THOSE WHO MAKE UP THE TOTAL COM­
MUNITY.

So necessary is education to a wise use of the ballot that 
most states have laws that voters must be able to read and 
write as a minimum requirement for voting. The reading 
requirement, whether on the elementary or the more ad­
vanced level has a content suited for adults who are to help

22 Statutes of the General Assembly of Virginia.



17

vote the kind of laws and the type of leadership their com­
munities will have.

In South Carolina it is the state constitution that is con­
sidered appropriate:

“ Any person who shall apply for registration after 
January 1, 1898, if otherwise qualified, shall be regis­
tered : provided, that he or she can both read and write 
any section of this constitution submitted to him or her 
by the registration officer.. . . ”

In New York on the other hand, it is a literacy test that is 
required:

“ ‘new voter,’ within the meaning of this article, is a 
person who, if he is entitled to vote in this state, should 
have become so entitled on or after January first, 
nineteen hundred twenty-two, and has not already 
voted in a general election in the State of New York 
after making proof of ability to read and write Eng­
lish, in the manner provided in section one hundred 
sixty-eight. ’ ’

The New York Board of Regents provides each appli­
cant with one of a possible twelve examinations on sub­
jects such as: The Hoover Dam, Thomas Edison, The 
Ausable Chasm, Samuel Adams, polio, Charles Lindbergh, 
Washington at Newburgh. He is required to answer cor­
rectly six out of eight questions on the topic in writing. 
Thus not only must the new voter read and write, he must 
also comprehend.

But it is not considered sufficient for a voter just to be 
able to read about issues and candidates. He is expected 
to have a more intimate knowledge of the individuals run­
ning for office and be able to weigh and judge in choosing



18

among them. The necessity for the voter to know the 
merits and demerits of candidates is further attested by the 
“ short ballot”  movement. This aims to present to the 
voter only a few candidates so that he may know each more 
thoroughly.

Candidates too, are required to live in the districts from 
which they are elected, not only that they may serve the 
people more effectively, but that the people may be repre­
sented by one whom they know well. Richard S. Childs in 
his article The Short Ballot, makes this point when he 
asserts:

“ . . . That the candidates should be conspicuous is 
vital. The people must be able to see what they are 
doing; they must know the candidate, otherwise they 
are not in control of the situation, but are only going 
through the motions of controlling. ’ ’2S

Childs goes on to show how important this is to the de­
velopment of democratic government by this comment:

“ . . . I f the government is to be brought within the 
sure control of the people, the ballot must be brought 
within the sure control of the individual voter. We 
must get on a basis where the real intentions of the 
average voter finds intelligent expression on the en­
tire ballot so as to produce normally the kind of gov­
ernment the voters want whether that kind be good 
or bad. ’ ’24

It is here that the public school plays a significant role, 
for it is in their learning together that prospective voters 
get to know and understand each other, learn the problems 
of their respective communities and discover those who 
may provide desirable leadership. More and more schools 
are being used not only as training ground for political 
aspirants, but also for forums where these aspirants meet

23 The Short Ballot, Richard S. Childs, National Municipal League, 
1930, p. 15.

M Ibid., p. 20.



19

representatives of the entire community and discuss issues 
with them face to face.

The public schools then of the South must be integrated 
to serve the needs of all citizens, both white and black, in 
the effective exercise of their ballot—one of the main props 
of a democratic society.

I V .
AN INTEGRATED SCHOOL SYSTEM WILL AID TRE­

MENDOUSLY IN DEVELOPING HARMONIOUS RE­
LATIONS AMONG ALL GROUPS IN THE UNITED 
STATES.
The tensions and conflicts between races in the United 

States has resulted not from integrations but from the seg­
regation and discrimination in custom and in law which 
have been inflicted upon the Negro. In no institution has 
this discrimination been so glaring as in the public school 
system of the South where the inequalities in facilities for 
white and Negro children daily incite contempt on one hand 
and bitterness on the other. A  graphic picture of this in­
equality is presented by Edwin L. Brook in his article: 
“ Toward a Non-Segregated South.” 14

‘ ‘ Consider, for example, my own community, a small 
town in Northern Louisiana. It has a fine brick school 
plant for whites, with grammar and high school de­
partments well equipped for an enrollment of about 
250 pupils. It has gymnasium, lunch room, home eco­
nomics building and agricultural building. On the out­
skirts of town there is a Negro school consisting of 
wood-frame buildings which are over-crowded and in­
adequately equipped. There is no gymnasium and the 
facilities on all levels cannot compare with those of 
the white school. Yet even as it is, the Negro school 
represents a tremendous advance over previous condi-

14 Toward a Non-Segregated South, Edwin R. Brook, Christian 
Century, September, 1953.



20

tions. It was not many years ago that the students 
were meeting in a tent in a near-by Negro churchyard. 
Now a number of small rural schools have been con­
solidated and the present building erected. ’ ’

Contrast this with areas where integration has been the 
practice. Here there are no humiliating distinctions. The 
Negro student is accepted and is recognized for what he is 
—one of the many varieties of an American.

After the Siveatt-McLaurin decision, 339 U. S. 629, 637 
which made integration possible in state colleges and uni­
versities in the South, Negro students were accepted with­
out any difficulty. Today between 1000 and 2000 of them 
are studying on over 80 campuses as irrefutable testimony 
to this fact. On the elementary and secondary level inte­
gration has followed suit in areas like Arizona, New Mexico, 
Southern Illinois, Ohio, and New Jersey. Even the private 
preparatory schools of New England States have joined 
this democratic development. The Yale Law Journal sum­
marizes the trend:

“ . . . As a result of the recent Supreme Court cases, 
over a thousand Negroes have been peacefully inte­
grated into southern graduate and professional schools. 
Social ostracism has not been as great as was ex­
pected. Furthermore, in Illinois, Indiana, and New 
Jersey, state legislatures have forced reluctant com­
munities to eliminate segregation in their grade 
schools. Despite local resentment and protest, the in­
tegration of Negro and white children has generally 
proceeded peacefully.

“ Other forms of desegration have recently occurred 
in the South and despite sporadic racial violence the 
transition has in general been peaceful. In some in­
stances the desegration has occurred in activities where 
southern insistence on segregation has been most 
adamant. Thus, in St. Louis and Washington, D. C., in 
spite of strong public protest, segregation m munici­
pal swimming pools has been successfully prohibited. 
Experience in the elimination of segregation in public



21

parks, sporting events, theatres and movies has been 
the same. Likewise, in the armed forces, where re­
sistance to racial integration has been traditional, seg­
regation is fast disappearing at the command of the 
President. In the allied fields of racial discrimination, 
such as white primaries, all-white juries and segre­
gated interstate travel, court orders have partially 
overcome deeply rooted patterns of discrimination. 
All of this progress has been made in the face of con­
tinuous threats of violence and non-conformance by 
southern leaders.

“  These instances of southern adjustment to enforced 
desegregation strongly suggest that the normal reac­
tion of the South to Supreme Court decisions is not vio­
lent. Generally, the only resistance takes the form of 
attempted circumvention. Tighter decrees and per­
sistent enforcement ultimately overcome even this 
type of resistance. Thus, there is little reason for the 
courts to allow threats of violence and civil strife to 
delay desegregation.

“ In the long run it is well established that segrega­
tion intensifies rather than eases racial tension. In­
stead of encouraging racial cooperation, segregation 
fosters mutual fear and suspicion which is the basis 
of racial violence. Thus, every inroad in racial segre­
gation which the courts can effect maximizes the op­
portunity for eventual racial reconciliation.” 25

THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS 
feels that desegregation on the American scene is suc­
cessfully proceeding in various ways—by voluntary com­
munity action, by legislative acts, by judicial review, by 
military and religious authority and by individual initi­
ative.

In all of these cases the question of appropriate method, 
timing and who should take the initiative, arises. We be­
lieve that the public school being one of the molders for 
our citizens of tomorrow should take the lead; we believe

“ Yale Law Journal, Volume 61 No. 5, May 1952.



22

the time is now—we believe we have the ‘ know-how’—we 
believe the most logical authority is the Supreme Court.

The experience of the United States Department of De­
fense can be of service to us in this connection. The armed 
forces, once completely segregated has in three years, 
almost become totally desegregated. Listen to John A. 
Hannah, Assistant Secretary of Defense, in an interview 
on ending segregation:

Q : Have you solved the problem of segregation in 
the Army?

A : I think remarkable progress has been made. 
The Air Force and the Navy are completely integrated. 
The Army is about 95 per cent integrated.

Q : What does that mean ?
A : That means that there are no colored men in 

the Navy or the Air Force who are serving in “ col­
ored”  units. They are all serving in integrated units. 
And that is true of 95 per cent of the colored men in 
the Army. We still have a few colored units, but they 
are being done away with rapidly. In eight months 
there will be no non-integrated units in the Army. Uni­
versally the answer from our commanders is that it 
is desirable and works out very well in spite of all 
contrary predictions— it works very well.

Q: There has been no resistance, no violence or
demonstrations about it?

A : No. The colored men are very effective mem­
bers of the armed forces. Some of them are more ef­
fective than others, of course, depending upon their 
background and training.

Q: Are they adept for any particular types of 
jobs?

A : We don’t know that yet.
Q: How many colored officers are there in com­

mand positions in these integrated setups?
A : There are a goodly number. There are not as

many colored officers proportionately as there are 
white officers.

Q : Are they commanding white troops ?



23

A : Yes, and there are a great many more than there 
used to be because, as the colored officers begin to 
demonstrate ability, they begin to move up.

Q: Is there a quota system?
A : None.
Q : How many Negroes are there in the Army?
A : I do not recall the exact number, but about 13 

per cent of the Army is colored.
Q : Are you thinking about lowering physical stand­

ards at all ?
A : No. There have been requests from the serv­

ices for the raising of the mental qualification at the 
minimum level. At the present time, we require each 
of the services to take a certain percentage of the 
four mental categories. Whether a man enlists or 
comes in in the draft, they are all given examinations 
at the examining stations and are put into one of four 
categories, and then we require each of the services to 
take the same percentage of each of the categories. 
The services think they are very definitely hindered 
by being required to take too many Category 4 people— 
the people in the lowest mental category.26

New Jersey, like Illinois and Ohio, is contiguous with 
states that have a segregated pattern. New Jersey’s ex­
perience in desegregation in the southern part of the state 
is brought out by Joseph L. Bustard, Assistant Commis­
sioner of Education in a speech delivered at Howard Uni­
versity, April 16, 1952 when he reported:

“ . . .  A  very recent survey in New Jersey shows that 
at the present time, forty of the forty-three school dis­
tricts involved were completely integrated as of Sep­
tember 1951. The remaining three districts all have 
taken some steps toward integration, but in all three 
of these districts, building programs are underway, 
that when finished, will make integration complete.

“ Sometimes the question arises should integration 
in the public schools follow or lead movements for in­
tegration in other areas of community life. The New 
Jersey experience would seem to indicate that the

” U.S. News and World Reports: October 16, 1953— Interview with 
John A. Hannah, Assistant Secretary of Defense, pp. 99, 100.



24

schools can and should lead. Practically all of the 
segregated schools had segregated parent-teacher as­
sociations. Today, in almost all of the districts af­
fected, there are strong integrated P T A ’s with Negroes 
serving as officers and executive committee menders. 
In . several communities, Y.M.C.A.’s that were segre­
gated have become integrated. In a few communities, 
Negroes are serving as members of boards of educa­
tion and in some others, policemen have been appointed 
and handle the same type of assignment as any other 
officer on the force. In fact, even a few of the 
North Jersey cities have restudied old school zones, 
that at one time or another had been jerrymandered, 
and as a result have announced new school district 
lines.

“ While New Jersey cannot furnish any one formula, 
it can testify that complete integration in the public 
schools can and will work. It may even be safe to 
say once more, that the way to learn to do a thing is 
to do it, and in this respect, New Jersey has proven 
again that the best way to integrate is to do it. ’ ’27

In most instances of successful integration in public 
school the first step seems to be the establishment of legal 
authority. William W. Barnes in a review of the methods 
used by a local board of education in solving this problem 
writes:

“ . . . In conclusion, therefore, it is safe to say that 
the following policies and attitudes must be a part of 
any desegregation program undertaken in any com­
munity, whether it be large or small. First, there 
must be some legal authority giving initial impetus to 
an integration program. Second, an objective survey 
of all installations, faculties, pupil compositions and 
community attitudes should be made. Third, and per­
haps most important, once the decision to desegregate 
is made, the carrying out of the plans made must be 
done in a positive manner with no deviation, apology, 
exception or vacillation whatsoever. I f these three

27The New Jersey Story: Concerning the Development of Racially 
integrated Public Schools, pp. 9, 17, April 1953, New Jersey Depart­
ment of Education.



25

major suggestions are carried out, the successful ex­
periences of over forty school districts in the State of 
New Jersey indicate that the integration of white and 
colored school systems can be accomplished to the 
satisfaction of all the people affected.” 28

The majority of the people in the south will accept a 
Supreme Court decision outlawing segregation on the ele­
mentary and secondary level as they accepted the decision 
outlawing the white primary. Especially will they do so, 
if the law-enforcement agencies on the national, state and 
local levels all indicate publicly that they will not counte­
nance anything but orderly acceptance of a Supreme Court 
decision in favor of an integrated school system.

Conclusion.

The United States, in the cold war with Soviet Russia and 
its satellites is disturbed by the “ neutralism”  of India and 
other sections of the darker world. The factor of color has 
as dominant a part in this neutralism as the unwillingness 
to be drawn into a conflict between these powers. Con­
stantly in the U. N. and in the press of these countries there 
is pointed out the gap between our professions of democ­
racy and our practice in so far as people of color are con­
cerned. The western world is still too unaware of the up­
heavals taking place among the darker people of the world 
and too indifferent to the significance of these upheavals for 
the white world.

In so far as we eliminate among our citizens barriers 
based on race and color, to that degree we are helping to

“ Eliminating Segregation in New Jersey Public Schools, William W . 
Barnes, Field Supervisor, Division Against Discrimination, New Jersey 
Department of Education, p. 7, October 15, 1953.



26

create a “ more perfect union here”  and a reservoir of good 
will for us in the vast world of color.

A  decision outlawing segregation in education on the 
elementary and secondary level will not only advance the 
educational opportunities of both whites and Negroes in the 
South, but it will also give convincing evidence to millions 
in Asia and Africa that the United States is willing to give 
more than lip service to the principles on which it is 
founded.

Respectfully submitted,

John L igtenberg,
134 N. La Salle Street,
Chicago 2, Illinois,

Counsel for American 
Federation of Teachers, 
Amicus Curiae.

Selma M. B orchardt,
Homer Building,
Washington, D. C.

Of Counsel.







IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1952

No. 8

O L IV E R  B R O W N , M R S . R IC H A R D  L A W T O N . 
M R S. S A D IE  E M M A N U E L , et al„

Appellants,
VS.

B O A R D  O F  E D U C A T IO N  O F  T O P E K A , S H A W N E E  
C O U N T Y , K A N S A S , et al.

On A p p ea l from  the U nited States D istrict Court 
fo r  the D istrict o f  Kansas

BRIEF OF AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS 
AS AMICUS CURIAE

Herman L. W eisman,
Shad Polier,
W ill Maslow,
Joseph B. Robison,

Attorneys for
A merican Jewish Congress,

15 East 84th Street, 
New Y ork 28, N . Y .

< ^ ^ > 3 0 7  BAB PRESS IN C ., 5 4  LAFAYETTE ST., N E W  YO BK  1 3  ---- W A . 5  - 3 4 3 2  - 3 .





SU BJECT IN D EX

PAGE

Statement of I nterest.......................................................... 1

Statement of the Case ........................................................ 3

The Question to W hich T his Brief Is A ddressed.....  4

Summary of A rgument ........................................................ 4

Argument :

When a state establishes racially segregated 
public grade schools, it thereby perpetuates in­
equality between the races and discriminates 
against the Negro race in violation of the “ equal 
protection”  clause of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment ,...t........................................................................  5

A. The Pre-Existing Inequality of Negroes and
Whites .................................................................. 6

B. The Constitutional Significance of State-Im­
posed Racial Segregation on the Lines of a 
Pre-Existing Social Inequality........................  7

C. The Effect of Racial Segregation in Public
Grade Schools ....................................................  11

(1) Enforced segregation in public grade 
schools stamps the Negro with a badge 
of inferiority and thereby renders in­
ferior the facilities allocated to bim by
the state ......................................................  11

(2) Enforced separation does oppress the
Negro community ....................................  16

Conclusion 20



11 Index

T A B LE  OF A U TH O R ITIE S

D e c is io n s

Atlanta Journal Co. v. Farmer, 48 Ga. App. 273
(1934) .............................................................................  12

Axton Fisher Tobacco Co. v. Evening Post, 169 Ky.
64 (1916) ...................................................................  14

Chicago, R. I. and P. Ry. Co. v. Allison, 120 Ark. 54
(1915) .............................................................................  12

Collins v. Oklahoma State Hospital, 76 Okla. 229
(1919) .............................................................................  12

Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U. S. (19 How.) 393 
(1857) .........................................................................  6

Flood v. News and Courier Co., 71 S. C. 112 (1905).. 12

Hargrove v. Okla. Press. Pub. Co., 130 Okla. 76
(1928) .........................................................................  12

Jones v. Polk & Co., 190 Ala. 243 (1913) .......................  12

Louisville and N. R. R. Co. v. Ritchel, 148 Ky. 701
(1912) .............................................................................  12

McLaurin v. Oklahoma, 339 U. S. 637 (1949) .................  18

M. K. T. Railway Co. of Texas v. Ball, 25 Tex. Civ.
App. 500 (1901) ...........................................................  12

O’Connor v. Dallas Cotton Exchange, 153 S. W. 2d 
266 (Tex., 1941) ........................................................  12

PAGE

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896) 3,10,11,16



PAGE

Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948) ......................  9, 20
Slaughter House Cases, 83 U. S. 36 (1872) ................  7
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1879)....... 6, 9
Stultz v. Cousins, 242 F. 794 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917) ..... 12
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629 (1949) ...............11,16,18

Upton v. Times-Democrat Pub. Co., 104 La. 141
(1900) .........................................................................  12

Williams v. Riddle, 145 Ky. 459 (1911) ......................  12
Wright v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 281 111. App. 495

(1935) .........................................................................  12

Statutes

Florida Statutes (1941), sec. 352.03 ............................  13

Georgia Code Ann. (1935), sec. 18-209 ......................  13

Kansas Gen. Stat. (1949), ch. 72-1724 ........................  3

No. Car. Gen. Stat. (1943), sec. 60-94 ........................  13

M iscella n eo u s

Berger, Morroe, Equality by Statute (1952) ............... 8
Bond, Education of the Negro in the American Social

Order (1934) .............................................................. 17

Davis and Dollard, Children of Bondage (1940) .....15,16
Deutscher and Chein, The Psychological Effect of 

Enforced Segregation: A  Survey of Social Sci­
ence Opinion, 26 The Journal of Psychology, 259
(1948) ..........................................................................17,19

Dollard, Caste and Class in a Southern Town (1937) 13
Doyle, The Etiquette of Race Relations (1937)............ 14

Index iii



IV Index

Frazier, The Negro in the United States (1949)....... 6

Gallagher, American Caste and the Negro College
(1938) ................. .......................................................  16

Johnson, Patterns of Negro Segregation (1943).......12, 14

Mangum, The Legal Status of the Negro (1940).......12, 13
Maslow, Will, Prejudice, Discrimination and the

Law, The Annals, May, 1951 ................................  8
McGovney, Eacial Eesidential Segregation by State 

Court Enforcement of Eestrictive Agreements, 
Covenants or Conditions in Deeds Is Unconsti­
tutional, 33 Calif. Law Eev. 5 (1945)..................  15

McWilliams, Eace Discrimination and the Law,
Science and Society, Yol. IX, No. 1 (1945) ....... 14

Moton, What the Negro Thinks (1929)........................  15
Myrdal, An American Dilemma (1944)....................... 14

Pound, The Task of the Law (1944)............................  8

Segregation in the Public Schools—A  Violation of 
“ Equal Protection,”  50 Yale Law Journal 1059
(1947)   16

Stephenson, Eace Distinctions in American Law
(1910)   6

Stouffer, Studies in Social Psychology in World War
II, Volume I (1949) ..................................................  15

Woofter, The Basis of Eacial Adjustment (1925)......  16

PAGE



IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1952

No. 8

O L IV E R  B R O W N , M R S . R IC H A R D  L A W T O N , 
M R S . S A D IE  E M M A N U E L , et al„

Appellants,
VS.

B O A R D  O F  E D U C A T IO N  O F  T O P E K A , S H A W N E E  
C O U N T Y , K A N S A S , et al.

On A p p ea l from  the U nited States D istrict Court 
fo r  the D istrict o f  Kansas

BRIEF OF AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS 
AS AMICUS CURIAE

S T A T E M E N T  OF IN TEREST

This brief amicus curiae is submitted with the consent 
of the parties.

The American Jewish Congress is an organization com­
mitted to the principle that the destinies of all Americans 
are indissolubly linked and that any act which unjustly 
injures one group necessarily injures all. Out of this 
firmly held belief, the American Jewish Congress created 
its Commission on Law and Social Action in 1945, in 
part “ to fight every manifestation of racism and to pro­
mote the civil and political equality of all minorities in 
America. ’ ’



2

Believing as we do that Jewish interests are insep­
arable from the interests of justice, the American Jewish 
Congress cannot remain impassive or disinterested when 
persecution, discrimination or humiliation is inflicted upon 
any human being because of his race, religion, color, 
national origin or ancestry. Through the thousands of 
years of our tragic history we have learned one lesson 
well: the persecution at any time of any minority portends 
the shape and intensity of persecution of all minorities.

There is, however, an additional reason for our inter­
est. The special concern of the Jewish people in human 
rights derives from an immemorial tradition which pro­
claims the common origin and end of all mankind and 
affirms, under the highest sanction of faith and human 
aspirations, the common and inalienable rights of all men. 
The struggle for human dignity and liberty is thus of 
the very substance of the Jewish tradition.

We submit this brief amicus because we are convinced 
that the policy of segregation has had a blighting effect 
upon Americans and consequently upon American demo­
cratic institutions. We believe that the doctrine of 
“ separate but equal”  has engendered hatred, fear and 
ignorance. We recognize in this triumvirate our greatest 
enemy in the struggle for human freedom. But our con­
cern must not be construed as limited to minorities alone. 
The treatment of minorities in a community is indicative 
of its political and moral standards and ultimately de­
terminative of the happiness of all its members. Our 
immediate objective here is to secure unconditional equality 
for Americans of Negro ancestry. Our ultimate objec­
tive in this case, as in all others, is to preserve the 
dignity of all men so that we may achieve full equality 
in a free society.



3

STA TE M E N T OF TH E CASE

The City of Topeka, pursuant to authority granted it 
by the General Statutes of Kansas of 1949 (Ch. 72-1724), 
maintains a segregated system of schools for the first 
six grades. The appellants, adult and infant Negroes, filed 
a class suit in the U. S. District Court against the Topeka 
School Board seeking a declaration of unconstitutionality 
and an injunction restraining the enforcement of the 
Kansas statutes and the segregation instituted thereunder, 
on the ground that such segregation violated the Four­
teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution in 
that (1) Negro schools were inferior in facilities and (2) 
segregation, in and of itself, constituted an inequality in 
educational advantage. The State of Kansas intervened 
as a defendant.

A three-judge Court rejected appellant’s first conten­
tion finding that the Negro schools were substantially 
equal to those allotted to whites (R. 245), a finding which 
appellants here do not challenge. Although the court 
found that segregation of white and colored children in 
public schools had “ a detrimental effect upon the colored 
children”  (R. 245), it considered itself bound by this 
Court’s opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 
and therefore also rejected appellant’s second contention 
(R. 243-244). Appellants on direct appeal are now seek­
ing a review of that decision. The decision below is un­
reported.



4

TH E QU ESTION  T O  W H IC H  TH IS BRIEF IS ADDRESSED

This brief is addressed solely to whether the require­
ment of equality contained in the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution is satisfied by affording 
“ separate but equal”  public grade school facilities to 
Negro and white children.

SU M M A R Y  O F A R G U M E N T

When a state establishes racially segregated public 
grade schools, it thereby perpetuates inequality between 
the races and discriminates against the Negro race in 
violation of the “ equal protection”  clause of the Four­
teenth Amendment.

A. State imposed segregation stems from a theory of 
superiority of the white race over the Negro race inherited 
as a remnant of the institution of slavery.

B. The social inequality which was one of the results 
of slavery changes in both degree and nature when it is 
incorporated in the laws of a state. Such incorporation 
places the power of the state behind the inequality, freezes 
the unequal status and impedes its gradual change. The 
inequality, which thus receives the imprimatur of the 
state, causes a denial of the equal protection of the laws 
if it results in an inequality of values in the facilities 
provided by the state or causes oppression of a race.

C. (1) Segregated public grade schools do adopt a 
pre-existing inequality and place a badge of inferiority



5

on the Negro race. Since the value of facilities is deter­
mined in part by the standing in the community of those 
who use them, the result is an inequality of value in the 
public school facilities provided for the separate races.

(2) In addition, because of the adoption of the pre­
existing inequality, the Negro race suffers psychic injury 
in the segregated school system.

A R G U M E N T

When a state establishes racially segregated 
public grade schools, it thereby perpetuates inequality 
between the races and discriminates against the 
Negro race in violation of the “equal protection” 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The segregated public school system of Topeka, Kan­
sas, was found constitutional by the court below under 
what is known as the “ separate but equal”  doctrine. That 
doctrine holds that the “ equal protection”  clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is not violated when a state agency 
provides separate facilities for its white and Negro citi­
zens as long as the facilities are equal (R. 240-244). We 
believe that that doctrine is erroneous on several counts. 
Here, however, we shall focus attention on only one of 
its aspects. It is our position that state-imposed racial 
segregation in public grade schools violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment because it adopts a classification based on 
concepts and practices of inequality and, by that adoption, 
contributes to, extends and deepens the discrimination 
resulting from the inequality and incorporates that dis­
crimination in the schooling which it provides.



6

A . T he Pre-Existing Inequality o f  N egroes and W hites

State-imposed segregation stems directly from a ves­
tigial theory of the superiority and inferiority of races 
inherited as a remnant of the institution of slavery. With 
the freeing of slaves, attempts were made by the dominant 
white group to preserve its position of ascendancy by the 
enactment of discriminatory legislation. Immediately after 
the Civil War the southern states adopted laws limiting 
the rights of Negroes to own property, to institute law 
suits and to testify in judicial proceedings. They imposed 
different penalties on Negroes and whites for the same 
offenses and otherwise placed the freedmen under legal 
restraints. Stephenson, G. T., Race Distinctions in Ameri­
can Law (1910), pp. 35-66; Frazier, E. F., The Negro in the 
United States (1949), pp. 126-127. These “ Black Codes,”  
as they were called, were a plain reflection of the earlier 
attitude that Negro slaves, and those descended from them, 
“ had no rights which the white man was bound to re­
spect.”  Dred Scott v. ISand ford, 60 U. S. (19 How.) 393, 
407 (1857). “ It required little knowledge of human nature 
to anticipate that those who had long been regarded as 
an inferior and subject race would, when suddenly raised 
to the rank of citizenship, be looked upon with jealousy 
and positive dislike, and that State laws might he enacted 
or enforced to perpetuate the distinctions that had before 
existed.”  Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 306 
(1879).

We shall show in the following sections, first, that the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state action which incor­
porates, and thereby strengthens and entrenches, this pre­
existing inequality and, second, that state-imposed racial 
segregation in public grade schools has that effect.



7

B. The Constitutional Significance o f  State - Im posed 
Racial Segregation  on the Lines o f  a Pre-Existing 
Social Inequality

Tlie Fourteenth Amendment was intended to and did 
invalidate the gross discrimination of the Black Codes. 
Slaughter House Cases, 83 U. S. 36, 70 (1872). It may he 
assumed, at least for the purposes of this case, that it did 
not lay upon the states the affirmative obligation to undo 
all the results of slavery. Thus, the Amendment did not 
reach whatever social inequality remained. Private indi­
viduals and institutions were free to discriminate as they 
chose.

Specifically, no question would have arisen under the 
Amendment in the area of education if the states had 
simply refrained from providing public schools. But if 
they did provide public schools, they were required to do 
so in a manner which did not cause unequal treatment.

We pass over the question whether the Amendment 
would have been violated if the creation of public, racially- 
segregated schools had had no effect on the existing racial 
inequality. It is unnecessary to consider that question 
because, we submit, when government gives official sanc­
tion to pre-existing social inequality, its action causes a 
change in both the degree and the nature of the inequality 
and incorporates it into its own activities.

This change takes place because once a social classifi­
cation based on group inferiority is formally adopted by 
the state, the ensuing official inferiority in turn intensifies 
and deepens the social inequality from which it stems. 
As long as law is not called into play to shape conduct, 
gradual changes in attitude can bring about corresponding 
changes in conduct patterns. These changes, in turn,



8

further the attitude changes. Once the law intervenes, 
however, gradual spontaneous change becomes impossible.*

Suppose, for example, that Kansas did not maintain a 
public school system and had no laws requiring segrega­
tion in education. As already noted, privately operated 
schools would be free to segregate and even to exclude 
racial groups entirely. Those private groups, however, 
who rejected racial inequality would also he free to act 
according to their principles. Most important, those who 
opposed segregation would be able to change the situation 
gradually by persuading one school authority at a time 
to change its policy. Each success they achieved would 
demonstrate the feasibility of non-segregated schools 
and thereby increase their chances of success with other 
schools.

On the other hand, when the state places the policy 
of segregation in its laws, it freezes the social inequality 
in whose mold the laws are cast. More than that, the 
laws eliminate the free play of individualism and force 
all, without exception, to conform their conduct to the 
caste system. It is then no longer possible to urge gradual 
change or to attempt step-by-step improvement. The stat­
ute becomes a bulwark against dissentient opinion, per­
suasion and even economic pressure.

An additional result of segregation laws is to give 
the otherwise inarticulate social feeling of racial superi­
ority the sanction of official regulation. The feeling ae-

*  The manner in which the law “ maintains one set o f values against 
another”  (Pound, Roscoe, The Task of the Law  (1 9 4 4 ) ,  p. 25 ) has 
been intensively studied in recent years. For summaries o f the findings, see 
Berger, Morroe, Equality by Statute (1 9 5 2 ) ,  pp. 170 -193 ; Maslow, 
W ill, Prejudice, Discrimination, and the Law, The Annals, May 1951, 
pp. 9-17.



9

quires a concreteness and assertiveness which it would not 
otherwise possess. The stricter the regulation, the stronger 
and more articulate the feeling of social distance becomes. 
This Court itself took note of that fact when it character­
ized a law excluding Negroes from juries as a “ stimulant 
to . . .  race prejudice.”  Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 
U. S. 303, 308 (1879).

The distinction between private and public schools just 
discussed finds a close parallel in Shelley v. Kraemer, 
334 U. S. 1 (1948). This Court there noted that the Con­
stitution is not violated where “ the States have merely 
abstained from action, leaving private individuals free to 
impose such discriminations as they see fit.”  334 U. S., at 
19. Where, however, the “ imprimatur of the State”  is 
placed on the discrimination, the Fourteenth Amendment 
becomes applicable and it makes no difference that “ the 
particular pattern of discrimination, which the State has 
enforced, was defined initially by the terms of a private 
agreement.”  334 U. S., at 20.

So here the “ full panoply of state power”  (334 U. S., 
at 19) has been placed behind the inequality inherent in 
segregation. The state power is brought to hear in two 
ways. It enforces and extends the pre-existing social 
inequality {supra, pp. 7-9), and, at the same time, pro­
vides facilities which, because of that social inequality, 
are unequal in value {infra, pp. 11-12).

The barrier to change set up by segregation laws is the 
same in nature as that created by the state-enforced re­
strictive covenants condemned in the Shelley case. The 
Court there found beyond the reach of the Constitution 
mere “ gentlemen’s agreements”  which derived no strength 
from the state. The discrimination adopted in those



10

agreements, like that adopted by privately operated 
schools, can be whittled away gradually. Institutions may 
be persuaded, by argument or pressure, to depart from 
established patterns. The vice of judicial enforcement of 
restrictive covenants lay in the fact that it froze patterns 
of discrimination and placed them beyond the reach of 
erosion; “ but for the active intervention of the state 
courts”  (334 IT. S., at 19), change would have been pos­
sible. In the same way, segregation statutes use the 
authority of the state to preserve the inequality and dis­
crimination which they incorporate.

This Court recognized in the Plessy case that the stat­
ute there considered did conform to existing social atti­
tudes. It noted that the statute was enacted “ with refer­
ence to the established usages, customs and traditions of 
the people . . . ”  163 U. S., at 550. Where the Court erred, 
we submit, was in holding in effect that the state could 
ignore the status of inferiority in which those “ usages”  
placed the Negro and could also ignore the reenforcing 
effect which its legislation had on that status.

In any event, where as here, the state does more and 
provides facilities to which the state-reenforced inequality 
attaches, the violation of the Constitution is plain. As 
we shall now show, segregation in public grade schools, 
by imposing a badge of inferiority on the Negro race, 
causes inequality in the facilities made available to it 
and results in oppression of that race within the public 
school system. We submit that the Fourteenth Amend­
ment prohibits such use of the state’s power to maintain 
inequality in public facilities.



11

C. The E ffect o f  R acial Segregation  in 
Public G rade Schools

( 1 )  E n f o r c e d  s e g r e g a tio n  in p u b lic  g r a d e  sch o o ls  
s ta m p s  th e  N e g r o  w ith  a b a d g e  o f  in fe r io r ity  
a n d  t h e r e b y  r e n d e r s  in fer io r  th e  fa c ilit ie s  
a llo c a te d  to  h im  b y  th e  s ta te .

It can hardly be disputed that an official regulation 
declaring that a group is inferior and consequently con­
fining it to separate schools would be discriminatory. That 
much was virtually conceded in the Plessy decision when 
the Court characterized as a “ fallacy . . . the assumption 
that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the 
colored race with a badge of inferiority.”  163 U. S., at 551. 
It thereby implied that a different result would have been 
reached if the contrary were true.

An official declaration that the Negro race is inferior 
to the white and must therefore be confined to separate 
schools would necessarily depreciate the value of the Negro 
schools in the eyes of the community. This is because 
the value and desirability of property depends not only 
upon its intrinsic qualities but also upon its association 
with persons enjoying* a certain reputation. The desir­
ability of a beautiful resort may be lessened by its being 
visited by people deemed of “ low”  social standing. Dif­
ferences in value of this nature are significant under the 
Fourteenth Amendment as this Court recognized when it 
condemned segregation in state law schools because of 
differences in “ those qualities which are incapable of 
objective measurement but which make for greatness in 
a law school,”  including “ standing in the community, 
traditions and prestige.”  Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 
629, 634 (1950).



12

We do not have here, of course, an express declaration 
by the State of Kansas that Negroes are inferior to 
whites.* Yet the same effect is achieved if a state estab­
lishes public school segregation along the lines of a pre­
existing social inequality. It is plain that that is what 
public school segregation does.

Examination of the pattern of segregation laws reveals 
plainly that they are designed not to prevent all contact 
between the races but to prevent contact on the basis 
of equality. It is the social definition of the situation that 
determines its treatment in both law and custom. Merely 
“ shaking a black hand may be very repulsive to a white 
man if he surmises that a colored man conceives of the 
situation as implying equality.”  Johnson, Patterns of 
Negro Segregation (1943), p. 208. Those who insist upon 
the caste system in our society freely and unstintingly 
agree to the ritual of equal physical facilities so long as 
somehow there is also an accompanying communication 
that the Negro is inferior and is to remain so.

¥Other states having segregation laws have given express recognition 
to racial inequality in decisions holding that it is libelous per se to write 
that a white man is a Negro ( Upton V. Times-Democrat Pub. Co., 104 
La. 141 ( 1 9 0 0 ) ;  Collins V. Oklahoma Slate Hospital, 76 Okla. 229 
( 1 9 1 9 ) ;  Hargrove V. Okla. Press Pub. Co., 130 Okla. 76 (1928); 
Flood  V. N ew s and Courier Co., 71 S. C. 112 (1 9 0 5 )  ; Stultz V. Cous­
ins, 242  Fed. 794 (C .C .A . 6, 1 9 1 7 ) ;  see also Jones V. Polk & Co., 
190 A la. 243  ( 1 9 1 3 ) ;  Atlanta Journal Co. V. Farmer, 48  Ga. App. 
273  ( 1 9 3 4 ) ;  Wright v . F . W . Woolworlh Co., 281 111. App. 495 
( 1 9 3 5 ) ;  Williams v. Riddle, 145 Ky. 459  ( 1 9 1 1 ) ;  O'Connor V. 
Dallas Colton Exchange, 153 S. W . ( 2 )  2 6 6  (T ex ., 1 9 4 1 ) ;  Mangum, 
The Legal Status of the Negro, 1940, at p. 18) and in cases awarding 
damages to white passengers who are forced to ride in Jim Crow cars 
( M .K .T . Railway Co. o f Texas V. Ball, 25 Tex. Civil App. 500 
( 1 9 0 1 ) ;  Louisville and N .R . Co. V. Ritchel, 148 Ky. 701 (1912); 
Chicago R . I. and P . R y. Co. v. Allison, 120 Ark. 54  ( 1 9 1 5 ) ) .



13

Segregation laws provide the ready vocabulary for 
that communication. In at least one respect, this can be 
seen in the segregation laws themselves. Ten Southern 
states expressly exempt nurses or other attendants from 
the laws requiring segregation on railroads (Mangum, 
The Legal Status of the Negro (1940), pp. 188-189) and 
three of these disclose the intent of this exception by 
limiting it to “ colored”  attendants. Florida Statutes 
(1941), sec. 352.03; Georgia Code Ann. (1935), sec. 18-209; 
No. Car. Gen. Stat. (1943), sec. 60-94.

Even where the statutes are not so disingenuous the 
purpose is clear. By segregation “ racial and cultural 
differences between southern whites and slaves were 
translated into terms of unquestionable superiority and 
inferiority.”  Johnson, op. cit., p. 158. According to Dol­
lard, Caste and Class in a Southern Town (1937), p. 98, 
the sole importance of segregation is to give whites, no 
matter how low in the social scale, a sense of power and 
importance. Negroes correspondingly must receive a 
position and a sense of inferiority. This primary role of 
segiegation statutes is reflected in the candid admission 
of a Kentucky court:

“ It is also beyond dispute that the sentiment reflected 
in this legislation and in these opinions does not find 
the end or the perfection of its purpose in mere race 
separation alone. It goes much further in that, as is 
shown in the general feeling everywhere prevailing, 
the Negro, while respected and protected in his place, 
is not and cannot be a fit associate for white girls 
or the social equal of the white race. To conditions 
like these that are everywhere about them as a part 
of the social order and domestic economy of the 
state, courts cannot shut their eyes. They must



14

. . . notice . . . the position of the races and the 
attitude of the white race toward the Negro.”  Axton 
Fisher Tobacco Go. v. The Evening Post, 169 Ky. 64 
(1916).

That the vocabulary of segregation is effectively under­
stood by the entire community cannot be disputed at this 
date. Segregation provides a graphic and literal solu­
tion to the demand of the white world that Negroes he 
kept “ in their place.”  To the whites in the community the 
enforced separation of races, as we have shown, is clearly 
understood as a symbolic affirmation of white dominance, 
dominance which, to keep itself alive, demands as tribute 
the continuous performance of the racial etiquette. See 
Doyle, The Etiquette of Race Relations (1937); Johnson, 
Patterns of Negro Segregation (1943), p. 158; McWilliams, 
Race Discrimination and the Law, Science and Society, 
Yol. IX, No. 1 (1945). “ In this magical sphere of the 
white man’s mind, the Negro is inferior, totally independ­
ent of rational proofs or disproofs. And he is inferior 
in a deep and mystical sense. The ‘ reality’ of his inferi­
ority is the white man’s own indubitable sensing of it and 
that feeling applies to every single Negro . . . the Negro 
is believed to be stupid, immoral, diseased, lazy, incom­
petent, and dangerous— dangerous to the white man’s 
virtue and social order.”  Myrdal, An American Dilemma 
(1944), p. 100. Under these conditions “ it is fallacious to 
say . . . that the intention and effect [of segregation] is 
not to impose any badge of inferiority . . . When a Negro 
working-man or woman is seated in the third seat of a 
street car on St. Charles Avenue in New Orleans and 
when a white man and woman is seated on the fourth seat, 
separated only by a bit of wire mesh ten inches high on



15

the back of the third seat this is a ‘ separation’ that is 
merely a symbolic assertion of social superiority, a ‘ cere­
monial’ celebration.”  McGovney, Racial Residential Seg­
regation by State Court Enforcement of Restrictive Agree­
ments, Covenants or Conditions in Deeds is Unconstitu­
tional, 33 Calif. L. Rev. 5, 27 (1945).

Similarly, Negroes appreciate the implication of segre­
gation (Stouffer, Studies in Social Psychology in World 
War 11, Vol. 1, p. 566), resent its slur (Moton, What the 
Negro Thinks (1929), pp. 238-239), and resist it as a none 
too subtle mechanism for anchoring them in inferiority 
(Davis and Dollard, Children of Pondage (1940), p. 245).

These effects in the field of segregated education are 
well shown by the record in this case. Dr. Louisa Holt, 
a social psychologist, testified as follows on the impact of 
school segregation on the personality of the Negro child 
(R. 169-170):

“ The fact that it is enforced, that it is legal, I think, 
has more importance than the mere fact of segrega­
tion by itself does because this gives legal and official 
sanction to a policy which inevitably is interpreted 
both by white people and by negroes as denoting the 
inferiority of the negro group. Were it not for the 
sense that one group is inferior to the other, there 
would be no basis, and I am not granting that this 
is a rational basis, for such segregation.”

The result of segregation has been the infusion of rigid, 
caste stratifications into our laws, our institutions, our 
conduct and our habits of perception until “ the Negro 
is segregated in public thought as well as public carriers. ’ ’ 
Moton, What the Negro Thinks (1929), p. 55. Since both 
white and Negro view segregation as a method of assert-



16

ing and reenforcing the inferiority of the latter and since 
in fact segregation statutes have that effect, this Court 
should not continue to maintain the erroneous proposition 
enunciated in Plessy V. Ferguson that laws requiring sepa­
ration “ do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either 
race to the other.”  163 U. S., at 544. Rather it should 
find that the schools for Negroes in a segregated system 
cannot he regarded as the equal of those for whites in 
respect to their “ standing in the community, traditions 
and prestige.”  Sweatt case, supra. The Fourteenth 
Amendment plainly condemns the allocation to separate 
races of such unequal facilities.

( 2 )  E n f o r c e d  sep a ra tio n  d o e s  o p p r e s s  th e  
N e g r o  c o m m u n ity .

Since segregation laws are based on a concept of 
inequality, place a badge of inferiority on the segregated 
race, and intensify and extend the existing stratification, 
it is not surprising that, in addition to depreciating the 
value of the separate facilities for Negroes, they have 
harmful results for the segregated group. Contrary to 
the assumption made in the Plessy case, segregation does 
cause “ oppression of a particular class.”  163 U. S., at 550. 
I f proof of this were necessary, it has been supplied by 
the developed techniques of the social scientists, all of 
whom are agreed that segregation has profoundly adverse 
effects on the Negro community. This is particularly true 
of segregation in the public schools. Segregation in Pub­
lic Schools—A Violation of “ Equal Protection,”  50 Yale 
L. J. 1059, 1061; Gallagher, American Caste and the 
Negro College (1938); Davis and Dollard, Children of 
Bondage (1940); Woofter, The Basis of Racial Adjustment



17

(1925); Bond, The Education of the Negro in the Ameri­
can Social Order (1934).

A survey of professional sociological, anthropological 
and psychological opinion on this subject has been con­
ducted by Drs. Max Deutscher and Isidor Chein of the 
Commission on Community Interrelations of the American 
Jewish Congress. Eight hundred and forty-nine social 
scientists were polled, including the entire membership of 
the American Ethnological Society, the Division of Per­
sonality and Social Psychology of the American Psycho­
logical Association, and all of the members of the Amer­
ican Sociological Society who listed race relations or 
social psychology as their major field o f interest. Returns 
were received from 517, or 61% of the number sent. 
90% of the respondents indicated their opinion that en­
forced segregation has detrimental psychological effects 
on segregated groups even though equal facilities are pro­
vided. 4% failed to answer the item and only 2% indi­
cated that segregation is free of such detrimental effects. 
Deutscher and Chein, The Psychological Effects of En­
forced Segregation: A Survey of Social Science Opinion, 
26 The Journal of Psychology 259 (1948).

On the basis of what they have seen and know, these so­
cial scientists united in rejecting the “ separate but equal”  
doctrine as a serviceable formula. In responding, many 
of them amplified their answers with additional comment. 
Those who conducted the survey remark that “ the gist 
of these comments was the emphasis on the essential irrele­
vance of the physical attributes of the facilities fur­
nished.”  Deutscher and Chein, op. cit., supra, at p. 280. 
The comments are quoted extensively in the article.

The professional opinions expressed in the Deutscher- 
Chein study are reiterated in the expert testimony given



18

in the case at bar which formed the basis of the trial 
court’s conclusion that “ segregation has a detrimental 
effect upon the colored children”  (R. 245-246). For ex­
ample, Dr. Hugh W. Speer, Chairman of the Department 
of Education at the University of Kansas, testified that 
regardless of the physical facilities apportioned to the 
Negro and white children, the colored child always received 
an inferior education in a segregated school since he lacked 
the opportunity “ to learn his personal adjustments, his 
social adjustments and his citizenship skills in the pres­
ence of a cross-section of the population”  (R. 126).

Dr. Speer was here taking note of the very point 
stressed by this Court in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629, 
634 (1949) and McLaurin v. Oklahoma, 339 U. S. 637, 641 
(1949). It was there held that the absence of the oppor­
tunity for contact with a group of persons representa­
tive of those among whom the student will eventually 
practice his profession constitutes, in the case of educa­
tion on the professional level, an inequality in violation 
of the equal protection clause. Clearly in the case at 
bar the absence of the opportunity to associate with those 
with whom the Negro child must live and work in the 
future constitutes a deprivation of equal or greater mag­
nitude. Many of these students will not go on to pro­
fessional school and thus receive there the opportunity 
for such association which this Court has recently assured 
them.

The testimony in the instant case contains other evi­
dence of the adverse effects of segregation on the Negro 
child. Both Dr. Louisa Holt (R. 170) and Dr. Horace 
B. English (R. 156) described the adverse effects of the 
feeling of inferiority engendered by segregation. Dr.



1 9

Wilbur B. Brookover, a professor of sociology at Micliigan 
State College, pointed out the deep resentment induced by 
the discrepancy between the vaunted American creed that 
all are created equal and the bitter fact of subordination 
through segregation (R. 164-165). These conclusions find 
support in the Deutscher-Chein study, in which one psy­
chologist noted:

“ The effects of this enforced status on the level of 
self-esteem, on feelings of inferiority and personal 
insecurity, the gnawing doubts and the compensatory 
mechanisms, the blind and helpless and hard to handle 
more or less suppressed retaliatory rage, the displaced 
aggression and ambivalence toward their own kind 
with a consequent sense of isolation and of not be­
longing anywhere— all of these and much more are 
bad enough, but the ambiguity of status created by 
a society which insists on the fact that all men are 
born free and equal, and then turns about and acts 
as if they were not is even worse. The constant re­
minder—and even boasting— of this equality acts like 
salt upon a raw wound and, more basically, places 
them in a profoundly ambiguous and unstructured 
situation. Human beings simply cannot function effi­
ciently in such situations if they have strong feelings 
and are strongly motivated— as many, if not most 
or all, members of discriminated against minority 
groups are—with regard to these situations.”  Deutsch- 
er and Chein, op. cit., supra, at p. 272.

Psychic injury always accompanies segregation. We 
think it patent that as between a system which imposes 
such penalties and one which does not, there can be no 
talk of equality.



2 0

CONCLUSION

Equality is impossible in a racially segregated grade 
school system. The inferior status in which it freezes the 
Negroes and the harmful effects which it has on them are 
the direct results of the fact that the state lends its power, 
resources and authority to the caste system. Under the 
principles of the Shelley case, supra, such use, or abuse, 
of state power is a violation of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment. Regardless of where the doctrine of “ white su­
premacy”  originated, regardless of whether its tenets 
find explicit expression in state acts, and regardless of 
the avowed purpose of state-imposed racial segregation, 
that segregation is unconstitutional because, invoking “ the 
full coercive power of government”  (Shelley case, 334 
U. S., at 19), it acts as no other force can to extend in­
equality, impede its elimination and incorporate it in the 
facilities which it provides for its citizens.

Respectfully submitted,

A merican Jewish Congress,
Amicus Curiae,

H erman L. W eisman,
Shad Polier,
W ill Maslow,
Joseph B. Robison,

Attorneys.

October 9, 1952







Supreme Court of tfje ®triteii States
OCTOBER TERM, 1952

No. 8

OLIVER BROWN, et at., Appellants, 
vs.

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, SHAWNEE 
COUNTY, KANSAS, et al., Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
District of Kansas

BRIEF OF
AMERICAN VETERANS COMMITTEE, INC. (AVC)

Amicus Curiae

P hineas I ndritz 
National Counsel 
American Veterans Committee

October 9, 1952 
Washinirton, D. C.

P ress o r  B yron  S. A d a m s , W ashington , D . C.



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IN D EX

Page
The issue in this ease ............................................................................. 1

The interest of the American Veterans Committee.................... 1

The facts in this case ............................................................................. 2

Argument ................................................................................... 3
I. Psychological discrimination imposed by Government on 

account of race violates the Constitutional guarantee 
of equal protection of the la w s..............................................  3

II. This case is governed by this Court’s decisions in the 
Sweatt and McLaurin cases, not the Plessy and G o n g . . . .
Lum  cases ...................................................................................  9

III. The segregation in this case cannot be supported under 
any proper test. And even if the Plessy rule of “ rea­
sonable”  segregation has any vitality, the segregation
here is unreasonable and should be enjoined....................  12

IV. The road ahead ...................................................................... 15

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Anon., II Mod. 99, 88 Eng. Repr. 921 (1707) ............................................  5
Asbury H osp ita l v. Cass C ou n ty, 326 U. 8. 207 (1945) ............................ 12
Atkinson v. H a rtley , 1 McCord 203 (8. Car. 1821) ....................................  6
Austin v. Culpepper, 2 Show. K. B. 313. 89 Eng. Repr. 960, Skin. 123,

90 Eng. Repr. 57 (1682) ..............................................................................  5
Beanharnais v. Illin ois, 343 U. S. 250 (1952) ............................................. 5
Brown v. B oa rd  o f  E d u ca tion  o f  T opeka , 98 F. Snpp. 797 (D. C., D.

Kans. 1951) ........................................................................................................  3
Buchanan v. TVarley, 245 U. S. 60 (1917) .....................................................  13
Chicago, B . I .  P . B y . Co. v. A llison , 120 Ark. 54, 178 S. W. 401 (1915) 5
City o f  Birm ingham  v. M on k , 185 F. (2d) 859 (C.A. 5th, 1950), cert, 

den. 341 U.S. 940 (1951) ............................................................................... 13
Collins v. Olcla. S ta te H o sp ., 76 Okl. 229, 184 Pac. 946 (1919) .
Cropp v. T iln ey, 3 Salk. 225, 91 Eng. Repr. 791 (1699) .............
Bred S cott v. S an dford , 60 U. S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) .............
Du B ost v. B eresfo rd , 2 Camp. 511, 170 Eng. Repr. 1235 (1810)
Eden v. L ega re, 1 Bay 171 (S. Car. 1791) ..................................
Ex Parte V irginia , 100 U. S. 339 (1880) ......................................
Ferguson v. G ies, 82 Mich. 358, 46 N. W. 718 (1890) ............................ 13
Flood v. N ew s $  Courier Co., 71 S. Car. 112, 50 S. E. 637 (1905) ........... 6
Gong L um  v. B ice, 275 U. S. 78 (1927) .................................................3, 10, 11
Hargrove v. Okla. P ress  P u l l . C o., 130 Okl. 76, 265 Pac. 635 (1928) ___  6
Henderson v. U n ited  S ta tes, 339 U. S. 816 (1950) ................................9 ; 1 4
Hirabayashi v. U n ited  S ta tes, 320 U. S. 81 (1943) ................................  4

ZD
 lO

 ZD
 tO

 ZD
 t>-



11 Index Continued

Page
J efferies  v. D uncom be, 11 East 226, 103 Eng. Kepr. 991; 2 Camp. 3,

170 Eng. Eepr. 1061 (1809) ...................................................................... 5
Jones v. It. L . P o lk  $  Co., 190 Ala. 243, 67 So. 577 (1915) .......................  6
K in g  v. W oo d , 1 Nott & McC. 184 (S. Car. 1818) .................................... 6
K orem a tsu  v. U n ited  S ta tes, 323 U. S. 214 (1944) .................................... 12
L ane v. W ilson , 307 U. S. 268 (1939) ......................................................... 9
L ouisville 4- N . B . Co. v. B itchel, 148 Ky. 701, 147 S. W. 411 (1 9 1 2 )___  5
M ason  v. Jennings, S ir T . B a ym . 401, 83 Eng. Eepr. 209 (1680) . . . .  a 
M cL tm rin  v. Oklahoma S ta te  B eg en ts , 339 U. S. 637 (1950) . . .  .3, 9,10,13 
M etrop olita n  Casualty In s . Co. v. B row nell, 294 U. S. 580 (1935) . . . .  12
M innesota  v. B a rber, 136 U. S. 313 (1890) ............................................  12
M issou ri, K .  4~ T . B y . Co. v. Ball, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 500, 61 S. W.

327 (1901) ............................................................................................................  a
M itchell v. U nited  S ta tes, 313 U. S. 80 (1941) ........................................  13
M organ  v. V irginia , 328 U. S. 373 (1946) ................................................  13
N ectow  v. Cam bridge, 277 U. S. 183 (1928) ................................................  12
N ixon  v. H ern don , 273 U. S. 536 (1927) ....................................................  12
O ’Connor v. Dallas C otton  E xch ., 153 S. W. (2d) 266 (Civ. App. Tex.

1941)   6
P lessy  v. F erg u son , 163 U. S. 537 (1896) ................................... 3,8,10,14,15
Bailroad C om pany v. B row n , 84 U. S. (17 Wall.) 445 (1873) ..............  7
B a y  v. B lair, 343 U. S. 214, ftnt. 14 (1952) ..........................................  12
S age S tores Co. v. K a n sa s ex  rel. M itchell, 323 U. S. 32 (1944) ..............  12
Schneider v. S ta te , 308 U. S. 147 (1939) ..................................................  12
Shelley v. K ra em er, 334 XT. S. 1 (1948) .......................................................  13
S ir W illiam  B olton  v. D ean e, cited in A u stin  v. Culpepper, 2 Show. K. B.

313, 89 Eng. Eepr. 960 (1682) ................................................................  5
S m ith  v. T exa s, 311 XT. S. 128 (1940) .......................................................  5
Spencer v. L oo n ey , 116 Ya. 767, 82 S. E. 745 (1914) ...........................  6
Spotorno  v. F ourichon , 40 La. Ann. 423, 4 So. 71 (1888) .......................  6
Steele  v. L ouisville $  N ashville B . Co., 323 U. S. 192 (1944) ............... 5
Strauder v. W e s t  V irginia , 100 XJ. S. 303 (1880) .................................... 6
S w ea tt v. P a in ter , 339 XT. S. 629 (1950) ............................................ 3,9,10
Takahashi v. F ish  Sr Game Com m ission, 334 XT. S. 410 (1948) .............. 9,12
Thornhill v. A la ba m a , 310 U. S. 88 (1940) .............................................  12
U p ton  v. T im es-D em o. P u bl. Co., 104 La. 141, 28 So. 970 (1900) ............  6
Virginia  v. B iv es , 100 XT. S. 313 (1880) ..................................................... 6
W o lfe  v. G eorgia B y . Sr E lec . Co., 2 Ga. App. 499, 58 S. E. 899 (1907) ..  6
T ick  W o . v. H op k in s, 118 XT. S. 356 (1886) ................................................9,14
Y u  Cong E n g  v. Trinidad, 271 XT. S. 500 (1926) .................................... 9

Miscellaneous :

B r ie f  of American Veterans Committee in No. 25, Oct. Term, 1949 .. 14
B r ie f  of the United States in No. 25, Oct. Term, 1949 ...........................  14
Ch. 72-1724, Gen. Stats, of Kans., Ann. (1949) ........................................  2
Comment, Facial V iolence and Civil B ig h ts  L aw  E n forcem en t, 18

Univ. Chi. L. Eev. 769 (1951) ...................................................................... 14
Cooper, The F ru stration s o f  B ein g  a M em b er  o f  a M in o rity  G roup: 

W h a t D oes I t  D o to  the Individual and to  H is  B elationships W ith
O ther P eo p le ? , 29 Mental Hygiene 189 (1945) ...............................  4

Deutcher and Chein, The P sych ological E ffe c t  o f  E n fo rced  S egrega tion :
A  S u rvey  o f  Social Science O pinion, 26 Journ. of Psych. 259 (1948) 4

Frank, Can C ourts E ra se the Color L in e ? , 21 Journ. of Negro Educ.
304 (1952) .......................................................................................................... 14

Goff, P rob lem s and E m otion al Difficulties o f  N eg ro  Children Due to 
F a ce , 19 Journ. of Negro Educ. 152 (1950) ........................................ 4



Index Continued iii

Page
McLean, P sych od yn a m ic F a ctors  in Facial R elations, 244 Annals of

the Amer. Aead. of Pol. and Soc. Sei. 159 (Mar. 1946) .......................  4
Myrdal, A n  A m erica n  D ilem m a, T he N eg ro  P roblem  and M od ern

D em ocracy, p. 581 (1944) ..........................................................................  8
National Committee on Segregation in the Nation’s Capital, Report of,

Segregation  in  W ash in gton , (Dec. 10, 1948) ............................................  8
Newell, The L a w  o f  Slander and L ib el, p. 2 (4th ed. 1924) ...................  5
N ote, Grade School S e g re g a tio n : The L a te st A tta ck  on Racial D is­

crim ination, 61 Yale L. J. 730 (1952) ..................................................... 1 4
Odgers, L ib el and Slander, p. 16 (4th ed. 1905) ....................................  5

President’s Commission on Higher Education, Report of, H ig h er E du ca­
tion f o r  A m erican  D em ocra cy, vol. II (Dee. 1947) ............................ 8

President’s Committee on Civil Rights, Report of, T o Secure These
R igh ts, (Oct. 29, 1947) ..................................................................................  8

President’s Message to Congress, Nov. 2, 1951, disapproving H. R. 5411,
82nd Cong. (97 Cong. Ree. 13787) .........................................................  1 3

W ashington P o s t, p. 3-B (Oct. 14, 1951) ............................................ "  1 3





Supreme Court of tlje ®ntteii States

OCTOBER TERM, 1952

No. 8

OLIVER BROWN, et al., Appellants, 
vs.

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, SHAWNEE 
COUNTY, KANSAS, et al, Appellees.

BRIEF OF
AMERICAN VETERANS COMMITTEE, INC. (AVC)

Amicus Curiae

The issue in this case. This case raises the issue whether 
a State may require the separation, by race or color, of 
pupils in the public elementary schools, where such sepa­
ration retards the educational and mental development of 
the Negro pupils and admittedly deprives them of educa­
tional benefits available to the white pupils, even though 
the physical facilities provided “ are comparable.”

The Interest of the American Veterans Committee.

The American Veterans Committee (AVC) is a nation­
wide organization of veterans who served honorably in the 
Armed Forces of the United States during World Wars I 
and II, and the Korean conflict. We are associated to pro­
mote the democratic principles for which we fought, 
including the elimination of racial discrimination. Most



2

of us served overseas. There was no “ community pattern” 
of racial discrimination and segregation when the chips 
were down and there was only the mud, the foxholes, and 
the dangers of the ocean and of mortal battle in the fight 
to preserve our Nation’s democratic ideals. We believe 
that the segregation here involved is of the same cloth as 
the racism against which we fought in World War II, and 
that its continuance is detrimental to our national welfare, 
both at home and abroad.

The Facts in This Case.

Chapter 72-1724, General Statutes of Kansas, Ann. 
(1949), authorizes the maintenance of “ separate schools 
for the education of white and colored children, including 
the high schools in Kansas City, Kan.; no discrimination 
on account of color shall be made in high schools, except 
as provided herein. . . ”  Pursuant to this statute, the City 
of Topeka, Kansas, provides public elementary education 
through the sixth grade in 18 schools for white children 
and 4 schools for colored children. The City does not seg­
regate white and colored children in the junior high schools 
(beginning with the 7th grade) or in the high schools 
(R. 12). The appellants, Negro parents and pupils, seek 
to enjoin the appellees from denying to Negro pupils the 
privilege of attending public schools within the school ter­
ritory where they live, without racial segregation 
(R, 7, 11).

The court below “ found as a fact”  that the white and 
colored elementary schools “ are comparable”  insofar as 
concerns “ the physical facilities, the curricula, courses of 
study, qualification of and quality of teachers, as well as 
other educational facilities in the two sets of schools”  and 
that “ in the maintenance and operation of the schools 
there is no willful, intentional or substantial discrimina­
tion in the matters referred to above between the colored 
and white schools”  (R. 239, 240). But the court further 
found (Finding V II; R. 245-246) that:



3

“ Segregation of white and colored children in pub­
lic schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored 
children. The impact is greater when it has the sanc­
tion of the law; for the policy of separating the races 
is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of 
the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the 
motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the 
sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to retain 
[retard] the educational and mental development of 
negro children and to deprive them of some of the 
benefits they would receive in a racial integrated 
school system.”

Notwithstanding the latter finding, however, the court 
below refused to enjoin the segregation of white and col­
ored children in the public elementary schools, solely be­
cause the court felt that the decisions of this Court in 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896) and in Gong Lum 
v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78 (1927) support the constitutionality 
of a segregated school system in the lower grades, and 
that this Court’s decisions in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 
629 (1950) and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 
U. S. 637 (1950), which dealt with racial distinctions in 
professional and graduate education, have not affected the 
authority of Plessy and Gong Lum insofar as elementary 
school education is concerned. Brown v. Board of Edu­
cation of Topeka, 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. C., D. Kans. 1951).

ARGUMENT

I. Psychological Discrimination Imposed By Government 
On Account of Race Violates the Constitutional Guar­
antee of Equal Protection of the Laws.

Although the court below recognized that compulsory 
racial segregation in public elementary schools is uncon­
stitutional where the physical facilities (such as school 
buildings, teachers, books, courses of study, etc.) are pro­
vided unequally for white and colored pupils, it held, in 
effect, that the government may constitutionally retard



4

“ the educational and mental development of Negro 
children and . . .  deprive them of educational benefits avail­
able to white children”  by imposing psychological feelings 
of inferiority. The finding by the court below that com­
pulsory separation by race denotes the colored child as of 
an inferior group and that a “ sense of inferiority affects 
the motivation of a child to learn”  is supported by the 
uncontradicted evidence in this case (R. 118, 155-156, 165, 
169-172, 176-177), and is in accord with the scientific find­
ings of many eminent psychologists and sociologists. 
Deutcher and Chein, The Psychological Effect of Enforced 
Segregation: A Survey of Social Science Opinion, 26 
Journ. of Psych. 259 (1948); Cooper, The Frustrations of 
Being a Member of a Minority Group: What Does It Do 
to the Individual and to His Relationships With Other 
People?, 29 Mental Hygiene 189 (1945); McLean, Psycho­
dynamic Factors in Racial Relations, 244 Annals of the 
Amer. Acad, of Pol. and Soc. Sci 159, 161 (Mar. 1946); 
Goff, Problems and Emotional Difficulties of Negro 
Children Due to Race, 19 Journ. of Negro Ed. 152 (1950); 
see also authorities cited in Appendix to Appellants’ Brief 
in this case. A person, whether adult or child, who is beset 
by such psychological tension “ simply cannot function 
efficiently”  (Deutcher and Chein, supra, 272), and where 
it is imposed simply because of his race he is not being 
treated equally, no matter how “ equal”  may be the physi­
cal facilities afforded to him. Even such experts in physi­
cal discrimination as Hitler’s Nazis did not disdain osten­
tatious ostracism as a device to impose psychological 
discrimination.

Under our Constitution and the decisions of this Court, 
racism is no justification for any governmentally imposed 
discrimination. This Court has consistently held that 
“ Distinctions between citizens solely because of their 
ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people 
whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of 
equality”  [Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 
(1943)]; that “ discriminations based on race alone are



5

obviously irrelevant and invidious”  [Steele v. Louisville 
& Nashville R. Co., 323 U. S. 192, 203 (1944)]; and that 
“ racial discrimination . . . . i s  at war with our basic con­
cepts of a democratic society”  [Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 
128, 130 (1940)].

The fact that the discrimination here imposed on colored 
elementary school children of Topeka, Kansas, is partially 
psychological and relates to community attitudes and indi­
vidual feelings does not make it any less cognizable in law. 
Anglo-American law has long granted judicial protection 
against defamations which tend to “ disgrace”  a person 
or “ lower him in or exclude him from society or bring him 
into contempt or ridicule.” 1 The essence of the injury is 
psychological—the imposition of public obloquy and 
odium, whether done with or without writing or words,
e.g., “ riding skimmington”  to ridicule a henpecked hus­
band publicly;- portraying a person as the Beast in a 
painting of Beauty and the Beast;3 painting a man “ play­
ing at cudgels with his w ife” ;4 making a drawing of a 
person in a pillory;5 or setting a lamp in front of a per­
son’s dwelling where the popular significance, in the social 
setting and circumstances of the place and time, was to 
impute reproach, odium and ignominy.6

Moreover, the numerous decisions of Southern courts 
awarding damages for “ humiliation”  to a white person who 
lias been compelled to ride in the Negro section of a train,7 
or who is excluded from an office-building elevator set

1 Newell, The L aw  o f  Slander and L ib e l, p. 2 (4th ed. 1924) ; Odgers, L ib el  
and Slander, p. 16 (4th ed. 1905) ; Cropp  v. T iln ey, 3 Salk. 225, 226, 91 Eng. 
Repr. 791 (1699); B ea u h a m a is  v. Illin ois, 343 U. S. 250, 254-257 (1952).

2 Mason v. Jen n in gs, Sir T. Raym. 401, 83 Eng. Repr. 209 (1680); Sir 
William B olton  v. D ean e, cited in A u stin  v. C ulpepper, 2 Show. K. B 313 89 
Eng. Repr. 960 (1682).

3 0ii B ost  v. B er es fo rd , 2 Camp. 511, 170 Eng. Repr. 1235 (1810).
4 Anon., 11 Mod. 99, 88 Eng. Repr. 921, 922 (1707).
5 Austin  v. C ulpepper, supra, ftnt. 2 ; Skin. 123, 90 Eng. Repr. 57 (1682).
6 Jefferies v. D u n com be, 11 East 226, 103 Eng. Repr. 991; 2 Camp. 3, 170 

Eng. Repr. 1061 (1809).
7 Louisville $  N . B . Co. v. B itch el, 148 Ky. 701, 147 S. W. 411 (1912); 

Missouri, K . $  T . B y . Co. v. B all, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 500, 61 S. W. 327 (1901) ; 
Chicago, B . I .  $  P . B y . Co. v. A llison , 120 Ark. 54, 178 S. W. 401 (1915)



6

apart for whites and is compelled to ride in an elevator set 
apart for Negroes,8 or who has been called “ colored”  or 
“ mulatto” ,9 are all based on the proposition that strong 
feelings of contempt and scorn are directly associated with 
the view that Negroes have an inferior caste status and 
that the compulsory segregation of Negroes is intended to 
reflect such inferior caste status.

The Fourteenth Amendment was adopted precisely to 
abrogate the disadvantages resulting from an inferior 
caste status imposed by law. Chief Justice Taney, in the 
historic decision in Dred Scott v. Scmdford, 60 IT. S. (19 
How.) 393, 407 (1857), had described Negroes as having 
“ for more than a century before been regarded as beings 
of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with 
the white race, either in social or political relations; and 
so far inferior that they had no rights which the white 
man was bound to respect.”  The Fourteenth Amendment 
was particularly intended to repudiate that view, and 
therefore reached beyond the Thirteenth Amendment 
(which abolished slavery and involuntary servitude) to 
elevate the Negro to full citizenship and complete equality 
before the law. It did not provide for “ second-class citi­
zenship”  or prescribe “ separate hut equal”  treatment; 
instead, it “ made the rights and responsibilities, civil and 
criminal, of the two races exactly the same.”  Virginia v. 
Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 318 (1880) (emphasis supplied).

The contemporaneous decisions of this Court fully re­
flected this understanding. In Strauder v. West Virginia, 
100 IT. S. 303 (1880), this Court pointed out that the Four-

8 O ’Connor v. Dallas C otton  E xch ., 153 S. W. (2d) 266 (Civ. App. Tex. 
1941).

9 F lo od  v. N ew s 4" Courier C o., 71 S. Car. 112, 50 S. E. 637 (1905); W olfe  
y . G eorgia R y . fy F le e . C o., 2 G-a. App. 499, 58 S. E. 899 (1907); Collins v. 
Okla. S ta te  H o sp ., 76 Okla. 229, 184 Pac. 946 (1919); U p ton  v. Tim es-D em o. 
P u ll . Co., 104 La. 141, 28 So. 970 (1900) (“ outrageous wrong’ ’ ) ;  Spotorno  
y . Fourichon, 40 La. Ann. 423, 4 So. 71 (1888) ; S pen cer v. L oo n ey , il6  Va. 
767, 82 S. E. 745 (1914) ; H a rg ro ve  v. OTcla. P ress  P u l l . Co., 130 Okla. 76, 
265 Pae. 635 (1928) ; J on es  v. R . L . P o lk  #  Co., 190 Ala. 243, 67 So. 577 
(1915). C f. K in g  v. W o o d , 1 Nott. & MeC. 184 (S. Car. 1818); A tk inson  v. 
H a rtley , 1 McCord 203 (S. Oar. 1821) ; E d e n  v. L eg a re, 1 Bay 171 (S. Car. 
1791).'



7

teentli Amendment was framed and adopted to protect the 
colored people, who “ had long been regarded as an 
Inferior and subject race” , against State action designed 
“ to perpetuate the distinctions that had before existed”  
(at p. 306). The Fourteenth Amendment granted “ a posi­
tive immunity, or right, most valuable to the colored 
race,—the right to exemption from unfriendly legislation 
against them distinctively as colored,— exemption from 
legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society, 
lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights 
which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps 
toward reducing them to the condition of a subject race.. . .  
The very fact that colored people are singled out . . .  is 
practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, cm asser­
tion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race 
prejudice which is an impediment to securing to individ­
uals of the race that equal justice which the law aims to 
secure to all others.”  (pp. 307-308) (emphasis supplied).

In Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 344-345 (1880), this 
Court said: “ One great purpose of these amendments was 
to raise the colored race from that condition of inferiority 
and servitude in which most of them had previously stood, 
into perfect equality of civil rights with all other persons 
within the jurisdiction of the States. They were intended 
to take away all possibility of oppression by law because 
of race or color.”  (Emphasis supplied).

Equally perceptive of the true meaning of the Four­
teenth Amendment was the contemporaneous decision by 
this Court in Railroad Company v. Brown, 84 U. S. (17 
Wall.) 445 (1873). There, a railroad company which fur­
nished a car for colored people “ equal in comfort to the 
cars reserved for white people”  contended that it was not 
discriminating against colored people by refusing them ad­
mittance to the cars reserved for white people. This Court 
unanimously rejected that early manifestation of the “ sep­
arate but equal”  theory as “ an ingenious attempt to evade 
a compliance with the obvious meaning of the requirement



8

. . .  this discrimination must cease, and the colored and 
white race, in the use of the cars, he placed on an 
equality.”  (at pp. 452-453).

Even Plessy v. Ferguson, supra, relied on by the court 
below, recognized the impact of the Constitution against a 
State-imposed inferior caste status. By asserting, as an 
assumed fact, that segregation laws “ do not necessarily 
imply the inferiority of either race to the other”  (163 
U. S. 537, 544, 551), Plessy indicated that segregation laws 
would he unconstitutional where they in fact implied that 
one race is inferior to another race. And in this case, on 
the basis of full and uncontradicted evidence, the court be­
low expressly found that segregation in the Topeka 
elementary schools denotes the inferiority of the Negro 
pupils and thereby tends to retard their educational and 
mental development.

Mr. Justice Harlan’s prophetic dissent in Plessy against 
“ state enactments, wdiich, in fact, proceed on the ground 
that colored citizens are so inferior and degraded that they 
cannot he allowed to sit”  with white people (at p. 560), has 
been underscored by more than 56 years of experience. 
Every survey of racial segregation and every scientific 
study of its effects have confirmed “ this basic fact: a law 
which forbids a. group of American citizens to associate 
with other citizens in the ordinary course of daily living 
creates inequality by imposing a caste status on the 
minority group.”  To Secure These Rights, Report of the 
President’s Committee on Civil Rights, p. 82 (Oct. 29, 
1947). See also Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma, 
The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy, p. 581 (1944); 
Higher Education for American Democracy, Report of the 
President’s Commission on Higher Education, Vol. II, 
p. 31 (Dec. 11, 1947); Segregation in Washington, Report 
of the National Committee on Segregation in the Nation’s 
Capital (Dec. 10, 1948).

By segregating colored children from other children in 
its elementary public schools, the City of Topeka, Kansas,



9

is using governmental power to impose an inferior caste 
status on the colored children. The Fourteenth Amend­
ment to the Constitution “ nullifies sophisticated as well as 
simple-minded modes of discrimination.”  Lane v. Wilson, 
307 U. S. 268, 275 (1939); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 
356 (1886); Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U. S. 500, 525- 
527 (1926); Takahashi v. Fish £  Game Commission, 334 
U. S. 410, 420 (1948); Henderson v. United States, 339 
U. S. 816, 825 (1950).

II. This Case is Governed by This Court’s Decisions in the 
SWEATT and McLAURIN Cases, Not the PLESSY 
and GONG LUM Cases.

In Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629 (1950), this Court 
ruled that the refusal to admit a qualified Negro to the 
University of Texas Law School was unconstitutional even 
though the State provided law school education for him 
at a separate school for Negroes. This Court did not 
simply compare the physical facilities of the two schools. 
“ What is more important,”  said this Court, are “ quali­
ties which are incapable of objective measurement,”  in­
cluding, among others, “ standing in the community, tra­
ditions and prestige,”  and factors of “ isolation”  from, 
and “ academic vacuum, removed from the interplay of 
ideas and the exchange of views”  with, the dominant 
majority (p. 634).

In McLa/urin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U. S. 637 
(1950) there was no question as to the equality of the phys­
ical facilities provided for white and colored students. Mc- 
Laurin used “ the same classroom, library and cafeteria 
as students of other races,”  but was assigned to a seat or 
table designated for colored students (p. 640). This Court 
ruled that restrictions setting the colored student “ apart
from the other students----- impair and inhibit his ability
to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with 
other students, and”  (p. 641) “ -----under these circum­



10

stances the Fourteenth Amendment precludes differences 
in treatment by the state based upon race”  (p. 642).

The logic and thrust of the Sweatt and McLaurin deci­
sions cannot justifiably be restricted to professional and 
graduate schools or to any other level of public education. 
Any restriction in public institutions of learning, based on 
race, which retards educational and mental development 
of a student is as unconstitutional in an elementary school 
as at any other level of public education. Indeed, the con­
stitutional right to freedom from such restrictions is even 
more important at the elementary level where the growing 
twig is being shaped. If racial restrictions are permitted 
to deform the student’s mind and personality in his early 
stages of education, he cannot in later life hope to compete 
on an equal basis, either at the unrestricted graduate level 
or elsewhere, with those not so retarded. (Cf. R. 172). The 
Sweatt and McLaurin decisions therefore require the 
elimination in this case of that factor— racial segregation— 
which produces educational handicaps for the colored 
pupil vis-a-vis the white pupil.

This case is not governed by Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 
U. S. 537 (1896) or Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78 (1927).

If, as held by the court below, the decisions in Sweatt 
and McLaurin are not applicable to racial segregation at 
the elementary school level (as here), simply because the 
racial segregation in those cases was in professional and 
graduate education, then Plessy is wholly irrelevant to this 
ease. First, the “ only issue made”  in that case was as to 
segregation in transportation, not in schools (p. 549). 
Second, Plessy did not sanction a general standard of 
racial segregation as such. The Plessy standard was that 
only reasonable distinctions based on race are constitu­
tional. It regarded as unreasonable, and therefore uncon­
stitutional, any law “ requiring colored people to walk 
upon one side of the street, and white people upon the 
other, or requiring white men’s houses to he painted white, 
and colored men’s black, or their vehicles or business signs



11

to be of different colors, upon the theory that one side of 
the street is as good as the other, or that a house or vehicle 
of one color is as good as one of another color”  (pp. 549- 
550). Third, the dicta as to schools were intended only 
to show that segregation in transportation was less “ ob­
noxious”  than segregated schools “ the constitutionality 
of which does not seem to have been questioned”  (p. 551) 
and that segregated schools had not then been outlawed by 
State court action (pp. 544, 545). The insubstantiality of 
that dicta is emphasized by the absence of any evidence in 
that case as to either (a) the reasonableness of the dis­
tinction or (b) the inequalities resulting therefrom. In 
this case, however, the evidence shows both the unreason­
ableness of the distinction and the resultant inequalities.

Gong Turn, involved only the question whether the word 
“ colored”  in the Mississippi constitution requiring sepa­
rate schools for “ white and colored”  children applied to 
children of Chinese ancestry as well as to Negro children. 
The plaintiff there expressly agreed with the desirability 
and legality of segregating Negro and white children, and 
claimed only that a Chinese child should be classified as 
“ white”  in order to protect the Chinese child from the 
“ risks and dangers”  of association with Negro children 
(pp. 10, 14, 16, Brief of Plaintiff in Error, No. 29, Oct. 
Term, 1927; 275 U.S. 78-79). The Court assumed that the 
schools for Negro children were equal to those for white 
children and ruled only that the question of classification 
of a person was not one meriting “ full argument and con­
sideration”  (pp. 85-86). Gong Lum did not involve the 
constitutionality of separating children by race in the pub­
lic schools where such separation is shown, as here, to 
retard the educational and mental development of children 
of the minority group.



12

III. The Segregation in This Case Cannot Be Supported 
Under Any Proper Test. And Even if the PLESSY 
Rule of “Reasonable” Segregation Has Any Vitality, 
the Segregation Here is Unreasonable and Should Be 
Enjoined.

This Court has consistently ruled that the “ ultimate test 
of validity”  of most statutes is whether they are pertinent 
and have a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative 
objective. Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, 326 U. S. 207, 
214 (1945); Sage Stores Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Mitchell, 323 
U. S. 32 (1944); Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brown­
ell, 294 U. S. 580, 583 (1935). Where the statute restricts 
personal rights and liberties, more is required—this Court 
will “ weigh the circumstances and . . . appraise the sub­
stantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the”  re­
striction. Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 161 (1939); 
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 96 (1940); cf. Minne­
sota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313, 320 (1890); Nectow v. Cam­
bridge, 277 U. S. 183, 188 (1928). The requirements be­
come even greater with respect to “ legal restrictions which 
curtail the civil rights of a single racial group; ’ ’ such re­
strictions “ are immediately suspect”  and are subjected to 
“ the most rigid scrutiny.”  Korematsu v. United States, 
323 IT. S. 214, 216 (1944); Tahahashi v. Fish & Game 
Comm., 334 U. S. 410, 420 (1948). Indeed, this Court has 
said: “ States may do a good deal of classifying that it is 
difficult to believe rational, but there are limits, and it is 
too clear for extended argument that color cannot he made 
the basis for a statutory classification affecting the right 
set up in this case.”  Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536, 541 
(1927). And at the last Term, this Court emphasized that 
‘ ‘ a requirement of color, as we have pointed out before, is 
not reasonably related to any legitimate legislative objec­
tive.”  Ray v. Blair, 343 IT. S. 214, 226, ftnt. 14 (1952).

Under none of these tests can the racial restriction in 
this case he sustained. There is no evidence that segrega­
tion in the first six grades is pertinent to or has a rational



1 3

relationship to any legitimate legislative objective. Nor 
are there substantial reasons shown to support this segre­
gation as a necessary measure to prevent any important 
and substantial harm, either to the community, to efficient 
public education, to the white children, or to anyone else.

Prejudice and private social views are obviously insuf­
ficient legal justification for the racial restriction. No one 
has the right to demand that the government discriminate, 
by exclusion or segregation or otherwise, against other 
citizens in the use of a public facility, simply on account of 
their race or color, merely because he does not wish to as­
sociate with them. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 
339 U. S. 637, 641 (1950); Ferguson v. Gies, 82 Mich. 358, 
367-368, 46 N. W. 718, 721 (1890); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 
U. S. 1, 19 (1948).

There is not even a serious assertion of possible race 
conflict if integration occurs, an assertion which usually 
accompanies the “ convenient apologetics of the police 
power”  evoked in race litigation. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 
U. S. 373, 380 (1946); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 21 
(1948). The fear of race conflict is, of course, an insuffi­
cient legal basis for depriving a person of his constitu­
tional rights by racial segregation. Buchanan v. Warley, 
245 U. S. 60, 81 (1917); City of Birmingham v. Monk, 185
F. (2d) 859 (C.A. 5th, 1950), cert. den. 341 U. S. 940 (1951); 
Mitchell v. United States, 313 U. S. 80, 97 (1941). The 
problem of potential race conflict, if any, should instead be 
solved by education and by enforcing without racial dis­
crimination the laws against violence and disorderly con­
duct. But any uneasiness on this score is wholly dissipated 
when we observe the success of integration in the Topeka 
public schools beyond the sixth grade, the happy experience 
of the integrated elementary schools on Federal areas 
throughout the South,10 and the current experience in many

10See W ash in gton  P o s t , p. 3-B (Oct. 14, 1951); c f. President Truman’s 
pocket veto of Enrolled Bill H. R. 5411, 82nd Cong, because it would have re­
quired segregation in these now integrated public elementary schools in the 
South. Message to Congress, Nov. 2, 1951, 97 Cong. Bee. 13787-13788.





IN THE

Olmtrt nf tty States
OCTOBER TERM, 1954 

Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4

OLIVER BROWN, ET A L „
Appellants,

v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, SHAWNEE 

COUNTY, KANSAS, ET AL.,
On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Kansas

H ARRY BRIGGS, JR., ET AL.,
Appellants,

v.
R. W. ELLIOTT, ET AL.

On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of South Carolina

DOROTHY E. DAVIS, ET AL.,
Appellants,

v.
COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD OF PRINCE EDW ARD 

COUNTY, VIRGINIA, ET AL.
On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Virginia

FRANCIS B. GEBHART, ET AL.,
Petitioners,

v.
ETH EL LOUISE BELTON, ET AL.

On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Delaware

BRIEF OF JOHN BEN SHEPPERD, 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS, AMICUS CURIAE

JOHN BEN SHEPPERD 
Attorney General o f Texas 

BURNELL W ALDREP 
BILLY E. LEE
J. A. AMIS, JR.
L. P. LOLLAR 
J. FRED JONES 
JOHN DAVENPORT 
JOHN REEVES 
W ILL DAVIS 

Assistants 
Amicus Curiae





TABLE OF CONTENTS!

Page
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT____________________  2

Variance of Degree in Which Different Areas 
Would be Affected_____________________________  6

Texas Public School System______________________  9

QUESTION FOUR__________________________________  12

Argument_________________________________________  12

QUESTION FIVE____________________________________ 24

A rgum ent____________________________________   25

CONCLUSION ______________________________________  28

APPENDICES 

APPENDIX I
Map showing concentration of Negro population 
by counties as shown by the 1950 Federal census.

APPENDIX II
Map showing the number and percentage of 
Negro scholastics in each county as shown by the 
1954-1955 scholastic census.

APPENDIX III
Map showing the concentration of Negro scholas­
tics in general areas, as shown by the 1954-1955 
scholastic census.

APPENDIX IV
Questionnaire and evaluated answers relating to 
views of public school administrators on the prob­
lems involved in integration.

APPENDIX V
Alphabetical listing of counties, showing relation­
ship of Negro to white scholastics as based on 
the 1954-1955 scholastic census.

l.



TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES: Page
Addison v. Holly Hill Co., 322 U.S. 607 (1944)--------  27
Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern Rail­

way Company, 341 U.S. 341 (1951)---------------------- 22
Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885)-----------------  23
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1942) 26
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943)-----------  22
Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education,

175 U.S. 528 (1899)_____________________________  3
Far Eastern Conference, United States Lines Co.,

States Marine Corporation, et al. v. United States 
and Federal Maritime Board, 342 U.S. 570 (1952) 22

Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 240 U.S. 650 (1916) 21
Hatcher v. State, 125 Tex. 84, 81 S.W. 2d 499 (1935) 14
International Salt Company v. United States, 332 

U.S. 392 (1947)__________________________________ 27
Love v. City of Dallas, 120 Tex. 351, 40 S.W. 2d 20 

(1931) __________________________________________ 14
Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 

(1940) __________________________________________ 26
New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931) 21
Northern Securities Company v. United States, 193 

U.S. 197 (1904) __________________________________ 21
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)-------------------- 3
Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Company,

312 U.S. 496 (1941)_____________________________  21
Southwestern Broadcasting Company v. Oil Center 

Broadcasting Company, 210 S.W. 2d 230 (Tex. Civ.
App., 1947, error ref. N.R.E.)___________________  13

Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) 21
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 

(1911) __________________________________________ 20
li.



A uthorities

Page
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876)___ 5
United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 

(1 9 4 8 )___________________________________________ 22
University Interscholastic League v. Midwestern Uni­

versity, ___Tex____ , 255 S.W. 2d 177 (1953)_____13

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTION:
Texas Constitution (Vernon 1948) Art. VII, Sec. 1  25
Texas Constitution (Vernon 1948) Art. VII, Sec. 7  2
Texas Civil Statutes (Vernon 1948) Articles 2745,

2749, 2775, 2780____________________________________ 13
Texas Civil Statutes (Vernon 1948) Articles 2750a,

2781 __________________________________________  14
Texas Civil Statutes (Vernon 1948) Article 2784e__ 13
Texas Civil Statutes (Vernon 1948) Article 2786_ 13
Texas Civil Statutes (Vernon Supp. 1950) Article 

2922-11 et seq._______ _________________________9

MISCELLANEOUS:
Texas Poll, September 12, 1954____________________  16
Texas State Board of Education Resolution, July 5,

1954 __________________________________________  19
The Dallas Morning News, June 9, 1954___________  14
U. S. News and World Report, August 27, 1954_____  10



i m WBmi ■ •

-



IN THE

&npvtm? (Emtrl o f tijr Httitpft
OCTOBER TERM, 1954

Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4

OLIVER BROWN, ET AL.,
Appellants,

v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, SHAWNEE 

COUNTY, KANSAS, ET AL.,
On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Kansas

HARRY BRIGGS, JR., ET AL.,
Appellants,

v.
R. W. ELLIOTT, ET AL.

On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of South Carolina

DOROTHY E. DAVIS, ET AL.,
Appellants,

v.
COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD OF PRINCE EDWARD 

COUNTY, VIRGINIA, ET AL.
On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Virginia

FRANCIS B. GEBHART, ET AL.,
Petitioners,

v.
ETHEL LOUISE BELTON, ET AL.

On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Delaware

BRIEF OF JOHN BEN SHEPPERD, 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS, AMICUS CURIAE



— 2—

TO THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES:

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

John Ben Shepperd, Attorney General of Texas, 
pursuant to request for leave to appear amicus curiae 
and file a brief, submits this amicus curiae brief to 
the Court upon the condition that such appearance 
will not have the effect of making the State of Texas 
or any of its officers or agencies parties to this litiga­
tion.

In compiling data for this brief a sincere effort 
has been made to obtain a correct cross section of 
views of educators, legislators and others with knowl­
edge of the subject matter under consideration. Sur­
veys have been made, public opinion has been sam­
pled, and composite views of groups best acquainted 
with the segregation problem have been obtained. 
The Texas Education Agency has been most helpful 
in furnishing pertinent materials which have been 
used in this brief. We will attempt to present the 
true Texas picture as reflected from this research.

The public school system in Texas from its incep­
tion has been operated and maintained on a segre­
gated basis, and has existed for more than eighty- 
years under the authority of Section 7 of Article VII 
of the Texas Constitution (1876)1 and statutes en­
acted pursuant thereto. This constitutional and stat­
utory authority creating separate but equal facilities

1 Section 7 of Article VII of the Texas Constitution pro­
vides : “ Separate schools shall be provided for the white and 
colored children, and impartial provision shall be made for 
both.”



in the public school system of Texas was the direct 
and continuing result of the expressed will of the 
people of Texas. This Honorable Court in many of 
its decisions has held that the states may provide 
education at their own expense for the white and 
Negro students in separate schools so long as equal 
facilities and advantages are offered both groups. 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), and related 
cases. Stability and harmony in the law, particularly 
in the constitutional law, is a primary requirement 
in an effective and efficient government. When the 
courts have announced, for the guidance and govern­
ment of individuals and the public, certain con­
trolling principles of law, they should not be changed, 
because the law by which men are governed should be 
fixed, definite and known, particularly when millions 
of dollars have been spent in reliance thereon. At­
tending a public free school is a privilege extended 
by the state. It is not a right of a citizen of the United 
States. Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Edu­
cation, 175 U.S. 528, 545 (1899). So long as the 
privileges extended to all groups are equal no one 
is deprived of the equal protection of the law. The 
decisions of this Honorable Court have recognized 
that, where necessity exists, the teaching of white 
and Negro students in separate classrooms is a rea­
sonable exercise of the state’s police power. To pre­
serve the public peace, harmony and the general wel­
fare, the people of Texas in their Constitution, and 
the Legislature by statutes have declared that such 
a necessity exists in Texas. There is no discrimina­
tion on the part of the State of Texas in administer­
ing its public school system, only separation of the



Variance of Degree in Which Different Areas 
Would Be Affected

In order that this Honorable Court have the full 
assistance of all parties and amici curiae in formu­
lating decrees, these cases were restored to the docket 
for the presentation of further argument upon the 
following questions:

“ 4. Assuming it is decided that segregation 
in public schools violates the Fourteenth Amend­
ment

(a) would a decree necessarily follow pro­
viding that, within the limits set by normal 
geographic school districting, Negro children 
should forthwith be admitted to schools of their 
choice, or

(b) may this Court, in the exercise of its 
equity powers, permit an effective gradual ad­
justment to be brought about from existing seg­
regated systems to a system not based on color 
distinctions?

5. On the assumption on which questions 4
(a) and (b) are based, and assuming further 
that this Court will exercise its equity powers 
to the end described in question 4 (b ),

(a) should this Court formulate detailed de­
crees in these cases;

(b) if so, what specific issues should the de­
crees reach;

(c) should this Court appoint a special mas­
ter to hear evidence with a view to recommend­
ing specific terms for such decrees;

(d) should this Court remand to the courts 
of first instance with directions to frame de­



crees in these cases, and if so, what general di­
rections should the decrees of this Court include 
and what procedures should the courts of first 
instance follow in arriving at the specific terms 
of more detailed decrees?”

The following factual information is submitted 
which we believe to be pertinent insofar as the State 
of Texas is concerned.

The State of Texas has a total population of seven 
million, seven hundred eleven thousand, one hundred 
ninety-four (7,711,194), of whom nine hundred 
seventy-seven thousand, four hundred fifty-eight 
(977,458), or 12.7%, are colored.2 The concentration 
of the Negro population is shown by counties on the 
map designated “Appendix I.” There are one million, 
seven hundred eighty-six thousand, nine hundred 
eighteen (1,786,918) persons of scholastic age enum­
erated in the scholastic census for the 1954-1955 
school year, of whom two hundred thirty thousand, 
five hundred forty-six (230,546), or 13%, are col­
ored. The concentration of the Negro scholastic popu­
lation is shown by counties on the map designated 
“Appendix II.” Texas has two hundred fifty-four 
(254) counties. There are located in the northeastern 
forty-five counties of this State 50% of the colored 
scholastics of Texas, and in four of these counties the 
Negro scholastics comprise a majority of the coun­
ty’s scholastics. In the forty-three counties adjacent 
to and immediately west of the northeastern block of 
counties above referred to, another 40% of the col­
ored scholastics reside. Thus, in Texas today ap­

2 This population is based on the 1950 Federal Census.



— 8—

proximately 90% of the total Negro scholastics are 
located in the eighty-eight counties comprising the 
northeastern quadrant of the State. Forty-one Texas 
counties do not list a single Negro scholastic. There­
fore the remaining 10% of the colored scholastics of 
Texas are scattered throughout the remaining one 
hundred and twenty-five counties. A map evidencing 
this factual information is attached and designated 
“Appendix III” , to which particular reference is 
made. A study of this map reveals that the segrega­
tion problem in Texas is not state-wide, but is of 
serious import and of vital concern to our local school 
districts.

Of the two hundred and thirteen Texas counties 
listing Negro scholastics, one hundred forty-six coun­
ties offer a complete Negro high school, twenty-one 
counties offer some Negro high school, but not twelve 
grades, and thirty-six counties offer only Negro 
elementary school. Ten counties operate no school for 
Negroes; however, these counties have ten or fewer 
Negro scholastics. Negro scholastics in counties not 
having a complete twelve grades are transported at 
State expense to other schools. Texas in 1953-54 had 
a total of one thousand, nine hundred fifty-three 
(1,953) active school districts, two hundred ninety- 
two (292) of which offered a full twelve grade school 
for both white and Negro. One hundred twenty-five 
(125) districts maintained a Negro school but did 
not have a white school. A total of nine hundred fifty- 
six (956) districts provided Negro schools. The dis­
tricts that did not maintain a school for Negroes 
were primarily in areas that did not contain Negro 
scholastics.



— 9—

Texas Public School System

Pursuant to the constitutional authority, the Texas 
public school system is administered under what is 
commonly called “ The Minimum Foundation School 
Program.” 3 Under this very effective program, edu­
cation of the Texas school child is provided on an 
equal but separate basis, with millions of dollars be­
ing spent each year. Under the Minimum Foundation 
Program, as administered by Texas’ twenty-one- 
member elective State Board of Education, all pos­
sible control and responsibility are left to local school 
administrators and local school boards to provide 
school programs to meet the needs of the children 
in their communities. As the name implies, the Mini­
mum Foundation Program guarantees to every 
school-age child in Texas, regardless of race, creed, 
color, economic status or place of residence, at least 
a minimum of a full nine months of schooling each 
year, thereby spreading the State’s financial re­
sources available for public education as equally as 
possible among all the people. The Program has been 
in effect for five years, and during that time the aver­
age daily attendance of school-age children actually 
attending school has risen from 73.77% in 1948-49 
to 80.85% during 1953-54. 79.31% of the Negro 
school-age children were in average daily attendance 
in 1953-54.

The Minimum Foundation Program provides a 
system of financing which guarantees to local school 
districts that State funds will be available to pay the

3 Art. 2922-11, et seq., Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon’s, 1948).



1 0 -

cost of a minimum school program when local funds 
are insufficient.

A number of the Texas school districts do not need 
a supplemental appropriation from the Legislature. 
A majority of the Texas schools have surplus money 
derived from local taxation with which to enrich the 
local school program beyond the minimum program 
prescribed by the State. Expenditures from surplus 
funds provide adult and kindergarten classes for 
students not included in the scholastic census age 
brackets, classes for exceptional children, supple­
mental expenditures on salaries, maintenance and 
capital costs, and any other authorized school costs. 
The State funds are provided in proportionate equal­
ity to all school districts, for the benefit of all scholas­
tics, irrespective of race, creed or color. If a school 
program superior to the minimum requirements is 
desired in any district, it may be paid for by the 
taxes voted, levied and collected from the taxpayers 
of the district.

As a result of the Minimum Foundation Program, 
teachers’ and school administrators’ salaries have 
risen from twenty-ninth in the nation to sixteenth. 
97.1% of the Texas teachers now have college de­
grees. Only the State of Arizona exceeds this mark. 
There are approximately eight thousand, five hun­
dred (8,500) Negro teachers and school administra­
tors in Texas. This number is nearly equal to the 
total number of Negro educators in the thirty-one 
Northern and Western States which practice non­
segregation. According to the U. S. News and World 
Report, August 27, 1954, only one out of every 
seventy-three teachers in those thirty-one states



— 11—

maintaining an integrated system is a Negro, while 
in Texas, one out of every five is a Negro. These posi­
tions are believed to be the most secure and best paid 
employment the Negro has today. The effect of this 
decision upon the teaching profession is speculative, 
and any decree which would disrupt the stability and 
security of teachers should be avoided.4

Under the Minimum Foundation Program, the 
public school system of Texas has greatly raised its 
standards, teachers have been benefited by salary in­
creases and retirement plans, and every school-age 
child in Texas, without regard to his race, creed or 
color, has been offered the opportunity of education. 
The State has not discriminated in its appropria­
tions, such being provided equally to all races and 
persons, with the privilege and authority in each 
local district to go further if it is so desired. But the 
program does provide for separate schools, segregat­
ing the races and contemplating an equalization of 
facilities for all scholastics. Integration would re­
quire alteration of the Minimum Foundation Pro­
gram.

The establishment of an integrated system is not 
a problem which would apply equally to West or 
South Texas, where there is only a small percentage 
of the Negro population, and to Northeast Texas, 
where the concentration of the Negro population is 
the heaviest. No equitable general decree could ever 
be formulated for the entire State of Texas. Specific 
decrees could be made only after a particular school

4 Texas at the present time has no tenure statute for 
teachers in the public free schools. Employment is through 
the local school boards.



- 1 2 -

district was before this Court and the facts relevant 
to that district were presented. It would be impos­
sible to get enough facts before the Court in one 
isolated case upon which the Court could enter a 
general decree which would apply equally to all parts 
of this State or to all the states practicing segrega­
tion. Since we do not know the various fact situa­
tions as they exist in these cases, we are in no posi­
tion to advise the Court as to the type of decree that 
should be entered.

QUESTION FOUR

4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in 
public schools violates the Fourteenth Amendment

(a) Would a decree necessarily follow 
providing that, within the limits set by 
normal geographic school districting, Negro 
children should forthwith be admitted to 
schools of their choice, or

(b) May this Court, in the exercise of its 
equity powers, permit an effective gradual 
adjustment to be brought about from exist­
ing segregated systems to a system not 
based on color distinctions?

Argument

This Court has recognized the complexities in­
volved in the formulation of a decree in these cases 
because problems of different characteristics are pre­
sented. Evidently all states were invited to appear



— 13—

because each should have an opportunity to demon­
strate the obstacles to adjustment in compliance with 
any decision that might be rendered in the future 
affecting the individual states.

It is respectfully submitted that this Court is au­
thorized to permit an effective gradual adjustment 
toward integration and, unquestionably, if the oc­
casion arises, the administration of this program in 
Texas must be left to the local school districts. The 
education system in Texas is predicated upon a num­
ber of local, self-governing school districts, with full 
authority to administer the school system. The basic 
and historic concept of public free schools is based 
upon the democratic and salutary principle of local 
self-government. The schools in Texas are operated, 
maintained and controlled by local school boards 
elected by the people of the individual school district.5 6 
Operational and maintenance costs are provided by 
local taxation voted by the taxpayers of the district0 
and supplemented by the Legislature under the Mini­
mum Foundation Program.7 Capital expenditures 
are made through bond issues voted by the taxpayers 
of the district.8 All personnel of the school, with the 
exception of the elected officials, are employed by local

5 Southwestern Broadcasting Company v. Oil Center 
Broadcasting Company, 210 S.W. 2d 230 (Tex. Civ. App., 
1947, error ref. N.R.E.) ; University Interscholastic League
v. Midwestern University, ___ Tex. ___, 255 S.W. 2d 177
(1953) ; Arts. 2745, 2749, 2775 et seq., and 2780, Tex. Civ. 
Stat. (Vernon’s, 1948).

6 Art. 2784e, Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon’s, 1948).
7 See discussion of the Texas Public School System in this 

brief.
8 Art. 2784e and Art. 2786, Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon’s,



14-

officials and work under such officials’ supervision.9 
It is thus seen that the schools in Texas constitute 
almost a complete local autonomy controlled by the 
taxpayers of the individual school districts and their 
locally elected school board. In fact, the courts of 
Texas have repeatedly held that these school districts 
are local public corporations of the same general 
character as municipal corporations.10 Any decree of 
the Court that might affect Texas must leave this 
administration in the local school districts unham­
pered. The problems with which we are confronted 
can best be resolved at the local level in this manner.

As a basic premise for showing the need for a tran­
sition period, the following is typical of the feeling 
of Texas citizens and school administrators on the 
vital subject now before this Court.

In an article appearing in The Dallas Morning 
News on June 9, 1954, Dr. J. W. Edgar, Texas Com­
missioner of Education, stated:

“ Texas has 2,000 problems as a result of the 
Supreme Court’s decision. We have 2,000 school 
districts, and they vary from totally white to 
totally Negro.

“ The final decree by the Court ought to per­
mit continued management of local districts by 
local boards. Schools must be run on a commun­
ity basis. They can’t be run successfully from 
Washington or even from Austin (Texas).

“ Experience in separating children on a lan­
guage basis has proved to us that where the re­

9 Art. 2750a and Art. 2781, Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon’s, 
1948).

10 Hatcher v. State, 125 Tex. 84, 81 S.W. 2d 499 (1935) ; 
Love v. City of Dallas, 120 Tex. 351, 40 S.W. 2d 20 (1931).



— 15—

sponsibility is put upon the local community, 
they work honestly to resolve differences.

“Anything which schools do effectively must 
be done with local support. We don’t care to tell 
others how to run their schools, but we certainly 
believe that our 2,000 problems can be resolved 
best if the Supreme Court leaves control in local 
districts.”

In a statement made to the Texas Commission on 
Higher Education, Dr. R. O’Hara Lanier, Negro 
president of Texas Southern University, stated:

“ In spite of the U. S. Supreme Court’s anti­
segregation ruling, Negro schools will be needed 
more than ever in the future. It would be a nar­
row position for the state to get rid of Negro 
schools for if the Negroes are given equal fa­
cilities there is nothing to worry about from seg­
regation.

“ For many years to come there will be shown 
a great desire and preference on the part of the 
Negro student to attend an institution equal in 
every respect, where there will exist many op­
portunities for development for qualities of 
leadership and where full participation in every 
phase of college life will be assured.

“ Because of human behavior and social back­
grounds and patterns long existent, the large 
majority of such students will come to us (the 
Negro schools) because they prefer to do so.

“ Such students very likely will prefer to con­
tinue to study with homogeneous groups and 
will feel strongly that more sympathetic atten­
tion will be given to them in our institutions 
than in some other schools.”

Dr. E. B. Evans, Negro president of Prairie View 
A. & M. College, expressed similar views to the Com­
mission.



— 1 6 —

The latest state-wide survey of the Texas Poll11 
on September 12, 1954, indicates:

“ 1. 71% of the Texas people are definitely op­
posed to the Supreme Court’s decision. The 
breakdown on the decision is like this:

Approve Disapprove Undecided
Negroes 60% 33% 7%
Latins 49% 37% 14%
Other Whites 15% 80% 5%
Entire Public 23% 71% 6%

“2. What should be done about the problem? 
7% favor putting the Court’s ruling into effect 
immediately, and another 23% believe plans 
should be made to bring the races together in 
the schools within the next few years. A ma­
jority of 65% goes on record in favor of con­
tinued segregation notwithstanding the Court’s 
decision. The breakdown on this problem is:

Go Few Keep Un­
Now Years Apart decided

Negroes 27% 40% 26% 7%
Latins 20% 37% 33% 10%
Other Whites 3% 19% 74% 4%
Entire Public 7% 23% 65% 5%
In the entire public, Negroes account for about 
12% of the population; Latins, about 11%; and 
other whites, about 77%.”

In a recent questionnaire forwarded by the At­
torney General of Texas to approximately one hun­

11 A long-established Texas organization operated by Joe 
Belden who periodically and systematically conducts a scien­
tific sampling, or polling, and reporting thereon, of public 
opinion in Texas on current events.



— 17—

dred fifty-two Texas school administrative officials, 
seventy-seven reported that 85% or more students 
would continue attending the same school if they 
had free choice. Of this number, fourteen answers 
were from Negro administrators. Only three an­
swered that students in their districts would prefer 
attending integrated schools, and all three reports 
were from Negro administrators. The questions pro­
pounded and the answers received by the Attorney 
General are compiled in a report which is attached as 
“Appendix IV.”

Many plans have been advanced to alter the public 
school system of Texas as a result of the May 17th 
decision. Some go so far as to suggest the complete 
abolition of the free public school system, while 
others advocate turning the State schools into pri­
vate schools. The decision of the United States Su­
preme Court is to the effect that segregation in public 
schools maintained by compulsion of law is uncon­
stitutional as being in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Many suggest that it does not neces­
sarily follow that integration of the white race with 
the colored race in the field of education is compelled 
by the Constitution. If, under the Fourteenth Amend­
ment, all citizens are entitled to equal protection of 
the law, which was the premise for the Supreme 
Court’s decision, then integration can no more be 
compelled than can segregation. Provision for do­
mestic tranquility in the exercise of the police pow­
ers of the State premised the original laws requiring 
segregation. To maintain public peace, good order 
and the domestic tranquility, these same police pow­



— 18—

ers of the State could be exercised, calling for another 
and different provision relating to public education.

Realizing this, and that the need for compulsion no 
longer exists, another plan suggests that the section 
of the law which provides for compulsory education 
should be repealed and the laws providing that the 
State furnish free education to all should be left 
undisturbed. Then the present laws should be 
amended to allow the parent or guardian of the child 
desiring to take advantage of free education to ex­
press his own desires and preferences as to the type 
of school the child should attend. The parent or 
guardian could select a school in which the majority 
of the other pupils are of the same race as the child, 
or he could select a school in which the other pupils 
are of both races, thereby providing equality of op­
portunity and freedom of individual choice.

This change would remove the unconstitutional 
“ compulsion” of segregation, and at the same time 
the State would be in a position of honoring the in­
dividual preferences of its people.

Another plan advanced is that of allowing volun­
tary transfers between school districts, and it is 
based upon the same principle as the foregoing.

In complying with the mandatory duties placed 
upon the Legislature of the State of Texas by the 
Constitution of the State of Texas, the Legislature 
has by general law established, supported and main­
tained a segregated public free school system. These 
laws of the State of Texas are not before the Court 
in these causes, and the State Board of Education has 
ruled that the schools of Texas should continue to 
be operated in the same manner until otherwise di-



— 19—

reefed.12 Since the end of World War II, Texas, to­
gether with many of our states, has been confronted 
with the enormous task of providing adequate school 
housing for a shifting and rapidly increasing popu­
lation. In areas predominantly populated by white 
students schools have been built to house these stu­
dents. In areas predominantly populated by colored 
students schools have also been built to house them. 
Utilization of all present school housing to the fullest 
extent in this State will be an absolute necessity. 
Texas is also confronted with the difficult problem 
of providing adequate facilities for the anticipated 
increase in its scholastics in the interim between now 
and 1960. Statistics reveal that at the close of the 
1958-1959 school year, eight hundred forty-nine mil­
lion, three hundred forty-four thousand, nine hun­
dred twenty-two dollars ($849,344,922) will be 
needed over and above the present needs to care for 
the increase in population and replacement costs on 
existing facilities. Of this amount, only three hun­
dred ninety-four million, eight hundred fifty-eight 
thousand, fifty-two dollars ($394,858,052) can be 
anticipated from local funds, leaving a balance of 
four hundred fifty million, four hundred eighty-six

12 On July 5, 1954, the State Board of Education passed 
the following resolution: “Since the recent United States 
Supreme Court’s decisions on segregation in public schools 
are not final, the State Board of Education of Texas is of 
the unanimous opinion that it is obligated to adhere to and 
comply with all of our present state laws and policies provid­
ing for segregation in our public school system and to con­
tinue to follow these present laws and policies until such 
time as they may be changed by a duly constituted authority 
of this State. If in the future, the Texas laws should be 
changed then each local district should have sufficient time 
to work the problem out. . . .”



■ 2 0 -

thousand, eight hundred seventy dollars ($450,486,- 
870) which must be derived from another source to 
care for the needs of the school children for the school 
year of 1960. The school system is presently over­
crowded with certain school-age groups being sep­
arated into morning and afternoon classes to offset 
this condition. It can readily be seen that if Texas 
attempted an immediate integration, the perplexi­
ties confronted in accomplishing the same would be 
overwhelmingly multiplied. Additional facilities are 
needed and will have to be supplied by local bond 
issues. It is highly speculative as to whether such 
bond issues would be voted to house an integrated 
school system which an overwhelming majority of 
the people oppose. The election calls for freedom of 
choice and no mandamus action could be maintained 
to force an affirmative vote. At this time it would be 
highly impracticable to eliminate any of the present 
school housing, and great consideration must be given 
to the natural and presently existing boundary lines 
which, of course, is the prime consideration for the 
Legislature or the local school board.

A gradual transition to an integrated public school 
system is not a denial of relief or of the constitu­
tional rights enunciated by the Court. The Court has 
previously permitted a transition period in analogous 
situations, particularly in the antitrust and nuisance 
cases. In United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 
U.S. 106 (1911), the Supreme Court determined that 
the defendant had violated the Sherman Anti-Trust 
Act. Recognizing the need for adjustment to its de­
cree, the Court, in order to avoid and mitigate any 
possible injury to the interest of the general public,



— 21—

remanded the case to the lower court to hear the par­
ties and to ascertain and determine a plan for dis­
solution of the combination. To accomplish this end, 
the Court allowed sufficient time (eight months) to 
carry out its decree. In Georgia v. Tennessee Copper 
Co., 240 U.S. 650 (1916), the Court entered a final 
decree in a case in which the State of Georgia had 
sued the Tennessee Copper Company to restrain the 
discharge of irritating gases into Georgia. The case 
had involved three lawsuits and covered a span of 
nine years in which the Court allowed considerable 
time and discretion to devise ways and means of 
subduing and preventing the escape of the noxious 
fumes. In Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman 
Company, 312 U.S. 496 (1941), the Pullman Com­
pany brought suit in the Federal Court against the 
Railroad Commission of Texas attacking a regula­
tion of the Commission as being in violation of the 
Federal Constitution and unauthorized by the Texas 
statutes. The Court remanded the case to the lower 
court, with directions to retain the bill pending a 
determination of proceedings, to be brought within 
a reasonable time in the state court to determine a 
definite construction of the state statute.13

The use of administrative discretion and its limits 
has been spelled out often by the Court in the areas 
of administrative agencies. The Court has empha­
sized consistently that supervision and discretion 
should lie with the administrative agencies in con­
ducting their functions as economic and political gov­

13 See also: New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 
(1931) ; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 
(1911); Northern Securities Company v. United States, 193 
U.S. 197 (1904).



— 22—

erning boards.14 Such emphasis is closely related also 
to the administrative discretion which exists in 
school boards. In United States v. Paramount Pic­
tures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948), Mr. Justice Douglas re­
viewed a decree in an injunction suit by the United 
States under the Sherman Act to eliminate or qualify 
certain business practices in the motion picture in­
dustry. A provision in the decree that films be li­
censed on a competitive bidding basis was eliminated 
by the Supreme Court as not likely to bring about the 
desired end and as involving too much judicial super­
vision to make it effective. This elimination was held 
to require reconsideration by the district court of 
its prohibition of the expansion of theatre holdings 
by distributors and provisions for divesting exist­
ing holdings.

The Court at page 163 stated:

“ It would involve the judiciary in the admin­
istration of intricate and detailed rules govern­
ing priority, period of clearance, length of run, 
competitive areas, reasonable return and the 
like. The system would be apt to require as close 
a supervision as a continuous receivership, un­
less the defendants were to be entrusted with 
vast discretion. The judiciary is unsuited to 
affairs of business management; and control 
through the power of contempt is crude and

14 See Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern 
Railway Company, 341 U.S. 341 (1951) ; Bur ford v. 
Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); and Far Eastern Con­
ference, United States Lines Co., States Marine Corpora­
tion, et al. v. United States and Federal Maritime Board, 
342 U.S. 570 (1952).



— 2 3 —

clumsy and lacking in the flexibility necessary 
to make continuous and detailed supervision ef­
fective.”

The implications in the Court’s opposition to ju­
dicial administration of intricate and detailed rules 
in the economic field apply with greater force to the 
social relationship and problems created by these 
cases in the field of public education. Furthermore, 
the amount of capital involved in the Paramount 
case is minute when compared with the wealth in­
vested in the public school systems of the South.

The Court, in Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 
(1885), speaking of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
stated at page 31:

“ But neither the amendment— broad and 
comprehensive as it is— nor any other amend­
ment, was designed to interfere with the power 
of the State, sometimes termed its police power, 
to prescribe regulations to promote the health, 
peace, morals, education arid good order of the 
people. . . (Emphasis supplied.)

A tremendous portion of the wealth of these states 
has been invested in capital expenditures for their 
public schools. The only practical method of estab­
lishing an integrated system calls for a period of 
implementation in our present dual system. This 
Court in the exercise of its equity powers has ample 
authority to permit the parties to adjust gradually 
from their existing segregated systems to an inte­
grated one. The instant cases affect millions of indi­
viduals and the entire public in some seventeen states. 
By reason of the great number of people affected by



— 24—

the decree and by reason of the vast amount of 
money invested in capital expenditures, and because 
of the necessity to make use of all present buildings 
in the operation of an efficient system of public edu­
cation, this Court should permit the states to adjust 
their dual systems gradually into an integrated sys­
tem. It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that this 
Honorable Court has sufficient authority to permit 
a gradual adjustment to an integrated school system 
with sufficient time given for local school officials 
to accomplish this purpose by the exercise of their 
administrative authority.

QUESTION FIVE

5. On the assumption on which Questions 4 (a) 
and (b) are based, and assuming further that this 
Court will exercise its equity powers to the end de­
scribed in Question 4 (b),

(a) Should this Court formulate detailed 
decrees in these cases;

(b) If so, what specific issues should the 
decrees reach;

(c) Should this Court appoint a special 
Master to hear evidence with a view to 
recommending specific terms for such de­
crees ;

(d) Should this Court remand to the 
courts of first instance with directions to 
frame decrees in these cases, and if so, what 
general directions should the decrees of this



• 2 5 -

Court include and what procedures should 
the courts of first instance follow in arriving 
at the specific terms of more detailed de­
crees?

Argument

The information contained in the introductory 
statements and in Appendix III clearly demonstrates 
that the problem of establishing a public school sys­
tem not based on race is a localized problem in 
Texas, not a state-wide problem. This is further evi­
denced in Appendix V, which is a compilation of 
scholastic population by counties. It is not a problem 
in which the remedy voluntarily adopted in West 
Texas or South Texas would be equally applicable 
and effective in Northeast Texas. For that reason 
no equitable general decree could be formulated 
which would be appropriate for every part of the 
State of Texas. Specific decrees would have to be 
provided for each case, based on the facts and con­
ditions then presented to the Court which are shown 
to exist in the locality involved in a proper case.

Section 1 of Article VII of the Constitution of 
Texas imposes the duty on the Legislature to estab­
lish, support and maintain our system of public free 
schools.15 This Court announced on May 17, 1954, 
that segregation in public education is a denial of the

15 Section 1 of Article VII of the Constitution of Texas 
provides: “A general diffusion of knowledge being essential 
to the preservation of the liberties and rights of the people, 
it shall be the duty of the Legislature of the State to estab­
lish and make suitable provision for the support and main­
tenance of an efficient system of public free schools.”



■ 2 6 -

equal protection of the laws. Since that time the 
Texas Legislature has not met in session, and it is 
not known at this time what action the Legislature 
will take, if any.

In Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 
586 (1940), this Court stated that it did not want to 
become the school board for the entire country. At 
page 598 the Court stated:

“ But the courtroom is not the arena for de­
bating issues of educational policy. It is not our 
province to choose among competing considera­
tions in the subtle process of securing effective 
loyalty to the traditional ideals of democracy, 
while respecting at the same time individual 
idiosyncrasies among a people so diversified in 
social origins and religious alliances. So to hold 
would in effect make us the school board for the 
country. That authority has not been given to 
this Court, nor should we assume it.”  (Emphasis 
supplied.)

Keeping the control of public education close to the 
local people is perhaps the strongest tradition in 
American education. One of the predominant char­
acteristics of American education is the variation in 
local policies and procedures in terms of unique local 
conditions. The Texas Legislature has the right and 
duty to maintain public safety and good order. This 
Court, in the Gobitis case,16 supra, recognized its

16 That portion of the Gobitis case dealing with the valid­
ity of a statute requiring a compulsory flag salute was over­
ruled in Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1942).



- 2 7 -

limitations and the authority of the state legisla­
tures when it said at page 597:

‘The precise issue, then, for us to decide is 
whether the legislatures of the various states 
and the authorities in a thousand counties and 
school districts of this country are barred from 
determining the appropriateness of various 
means to evoke that unifying sentiment without 
which there can ultimately be no liberties, civil 
or religious. To stigmatize legislative judgment 
in providing for this universal gesture of re­
spect for the symbol of our national life in the 
setting of the common school as a lawless inroad 
on that freedom of conscience which the Con­
stitution protects, would amount to no less than 
the pronouncement of pedagogical and psycho­
logical dogma in a field where courts possess no 
marked and certainly no controlling compe­
tence.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Other decrees have been held in abeyance until an 
appropriate action could be taken by the proper 
agency. See Addison v. Holly Hill Co., 322 U.S. 607 
(1944), and Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pull­
man Company, 312 U.S. 496 (1940).

This Court has the authority to remand these cases 
to the courts of first instance, instructing them to 
enter decrees implementing the principles enunciated 
in the Court’s opinion of May 17, 1954. See Inter­
national Salt Company v. United States, 332 U.S. 
392 (1947). If this decision stands, then on remand 
the courts of first instance would be familiar with 
local conditions and could provide a continuing su­
pervision over the program of non-discrimination.



— 28—

They could recognize and adjust the equities between 
the parties, bringing individual rights into equality 
without unduly hindering the public school program.

CONCLUSION

Since our position before the Court is that of 
amicus curiae only and not that of a party, ordinarily 
we would not assume to state specifically the scope 
of the decrees to be entered by the Court in these 
cases. If the Court attempted to formulate a general 
decree applicable to all school districts and States, it 
would be prejudging a multitude of cases not before 
the Court. However, in entering appropriate decrees 
the Court should consider the following suggestions 
which are respectfully submitted at the request of 
the Court:

(1) In formulating a decree or decrees, the Court 
should recognize the long established traditions and 
usages which have prevailed in those States main­
taining a segregated school system, such as Texas, 
under the separate but equal doctrine as predicated 
upon the principles announced in Plessy v. Ferguson, 
supra. These traditions and usages should not be 
suddenly and abruptly destroyed. A period of orderly 
transition will insure that a decree will meet with 
no more than passive resistance by the public.

(2) In formulating a decree or decrees, this Court 
must preserve the democratic and salutary principle 
of local self government inherent in our public school 
systems. Any decree or decrees entered by the Court 
should protect this principle. In this manner the de­
crees could appropriately be implemented by the local



- 2 9 -

school authorities as a legislative and administrative 
matter.

(3) The Court, in formulating a decree or de­
crees, should preserve the right of free selection and 
choice by the patrons of public schools in selecting 
the school which will be patronized.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN BEN SHEPPERD 
Attorney General of Texas

BURNELL WALDREP
BILLY E. LEE
J. A. AMIS, JR.
L. P. LOLLAR
J. FRED JONES
JOHN DAVENPORT
JOHN REEVES
WILL DAVIS 

Assistants
Amicus Curiae



■



APPENDICES



TOTAL POPULATION
TOTAL 1950 NON-WHITES 

977,458
Source. Reports of U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1950

OAU-KM

0.5

S H E * * * *  j MANSrORO jOtHH-TRCC

o.i ! at i o.i
i

UPSCOMB

a»
M AR TLC Y * 0 O * £ HUTCHWSON | R O B E R T S M CM OM lt |

0 . 6 1 , 6 1 - 6  j o o

1

OLDHAM j P O r r c R C A R S O N  j O R A V WMCCV.P* j

O .I + . 0
- ! I I 2 9

;

M O  H iv tl* I
\ f lO W C  I

---1

B i i

PERCENT OF NON-WHITE POPULATION, 1950
LEGEND

50% and over 
Less than 1 %
40%  -49%
3 0 % -3 9 %
20% -29%
1 0 % - 1 9 %
5 % - 9 %
1 % -4%
None



1954-55 SCHOLASTIC
(Children between 6-17 inclusive as of September 1,1954, Residence as of February 1,1954)

O W X A M

I f

. 7

S H E R M A N

°

•

H A N S P O R D

O

o

O C H IL TR C E  j
O

o

LIP S CO M B

O

o

H A R T L E Y

o

o

M O O R E  jHUTC HIN S O N  

O  j  116

O  j

R O 0 C R T S

o

°

1
MCMRMILW j 

°

O L D H A M
r  1 

P O T T C R C A R S O N G R A Y I W HCCLCR 1

o t o  I O
°

I S O
1 “

° 4 . 9 O f . 7 5 . 0  1

1 D L A T  S M I T H 1 R A N D A L L A R M S T R O N G ! D O N L E Y <OLUNG5*OStJ

7 1 O
*

1 7 5

O O 1 6 . 4
• *L L

FHRM CR. j C A S T R O S W IS H E R  j B R lb C O C H A L L jcHiLORESS

2 7  | I I 47 1 6 4
2  2 6

!  " *
. . .  i . 7 - 2 0 j 8 . r 1 I I .  4 !  * . l

L . i L  . . . J ____

B A IL E V  1 LA M B H A L E | F L O Y D 1

i

M O T L E Y  J  C O T T L t

6 0  i 4 0 3 4 T 6
-

6 ft !  3 <S

1
2 . 0  j 7 . 7

1 6 *
i 9 . 4

' ' 8

C O C H R A N  | m OC h l L Y l o B B O L * j C R O S B Y D iC k C N S  |  M N O

6 9  j 2 B I 2001 j 4 3 6 6 4 1 11
* .4 -  ! 5 .0 a . j j 4 . 4 i

! v o a v S U M  J  T L R R Y L Y N N { G A R Z A K E N T • S TO N E  WALi

i  '  i > 0 4 j 4 -5 - 6 J 6

-i i 4 .4- i y . i 2 . S 5 : 0
1 i .  . . 1

--- ---- ----  ------ ' T“”  S 1

Number of Negro Children 
in County and Percent of Negro 

Children of all Scholastic 
Census Enumerations

Official Scholastic Census Rolls 
and Reports for 1954-55 on file In 
,he Texas Education Agency.

o



2 5 4 C O U N T I E S
13 % of Population Ages 6-17 inclusive is Negro

230,546 Negroes, 1,556,372 Whites —  1,786,918 Total Population

-------------- 0 A 1 X A M -------- — S H E R M A N M AN S PO R 0 ! 0 C H IL T R C C LiP S C O M B

H A R T i x Y M O O R C O U JCIU K S O M . R O B C R T S H C M P H Itk

O L D H A M

— r ------------------------

166 COUNTIES
88 COUNTIES

90%  of Total Negro Population, age 6-17 inclusive 
209,076 Negroes 
902,173 Whites

19% of Population, age 6-17 is Negro
---.654,199 Whites

43 COUNTIES
40% of Negro Population 

Counttes. no Negroes U  l T i r  92,969 Negroes
-------- -------------------T -  ; 520,920 Whites

ijjh ere  oreimore^Negtoes, 15% of Population, Negro
t- High Percent: Freestone

County, 51.1
--------------- — ----- r~^cr---- .--------- n r iT lT i r i r i r i r :  Low Percent: Burleson

County, 2.7
zr^ r_r_ :_  ■ County over 50%

45 COUNTIES
50%  of Negro Population 

116,107 Negroes 
381,244 Whites 

23%  of Population, Negro
High Percent: Marion County, 59.5 
Low Percent Brazoria County, 10.1 

Counties over 50%

DATA
from

OFFICIAL SCHOLASTIC CENSUS REPORTS
for school year 1954-55 on file in the Tews 
Education Agency. Enumeration includes chil­
dren ages 6-17 inclusive as of September 1, 
1954. Residence is as of February 1, 1?54. 
Possible errors due to duplicate enunera- 
tions: 4 .6% .





- 3 1 -

APPENDIX IV

Educators’ Views on Integration

On July 30, 1954, the Attorney General of Texas 
directed a questionnaire to one hundred and fifty- 
two Texas school administrative officials. One hun­
dred two questionnaires were mailed to white ad­
ministrators and fifty questionnaires were mailed to 
Negro administrators. Twelve of the questionnaires 
were directed to county superintendents, fifty were 
directed to school principals and ninety were directed 
to district superintendents. Responses were received 
in eighty-two instances, eighteen of which were from 
Negro educators.

The questionnaire and evaluated responses are:
“We are in the process of compiling data to deter­

mine the feasibility of filing an amicus curiae brief 
in the United States Supreme Court relative to the 
recent segregation decisions which affects our pub­
lic school system. Our school system operates under 
legislative authorization, and the Legislature will 
not convene in Regular Session until January to con­
sider the problem arising by reason of the .Supreme 
Court decision. Consequently, if any brief is filed, it 
should contain a cross-section of the views of educa­
tors and the public generally in Texas in an effort to 
see what impact the decision has made on our public 
school system and customs.

“ By reason of your long familiarity with the field 
of education throughout the State we would like to 
have an expression of your views on the following 
questions:



— 32—

“ 1. In the event of legislative or Supreme Court 
direction, what, in your opinion, would be a reason­
able minimum period of time for working out an in­
tegrated system in your district?”

In evaluating responses, a period of five years was 
arbitrarily set as a division. Thirty-six replied that 
a period of five years or less would be sufficient. 
Forty-two replied that a longer time than five years 
was necessary. Nineteen answers volunteered replies 
favoring a twelve year plan of integration (begin­
ning with the first grade and adding a new grade 
each year). Ten of the Negro replies favored a five 
year or less program, while five thought a longer 
program was necessary. Two Negroes volunteered 
that they favored the twelve year plan.

“2. Do you consider the local problem more acute 
than the problem on a state-wide basis?”

Thirty-nine answered that the local problem was 
not more acute, as compared to forty-one replies that 
the local problem was more acute. The Negro replies 
were eleven affirmative, seven negative.

“ 3. Do you think that the established precedent 
of separate schools would seriously handicap the op­
eration of integrated schools in your area?”

Sixteen responses did not believe the operation of 
integrated schools would be handicapped by the pre­
cedent of separate schools, but sixty-four did believe 
a handicap would exist. Eleven Negroes replied there 
would be no handicap, and seven replied there would 
be difficulty with an integrated system.



— 33—

“4. (a) In the event of an integrated system, 
could all school buildings be utilized?”

Forty-eight responses believed all present school 
buildings could be used in an integrated program. 
Thirty-three thought that there would be a loss of 
use in an integrated system. Ten Negroes replied 
that all buildings could be used and seven thought 
that all buildings could not be used in an integrated 
system.

“4. (b) To what extent are present school build­
ings situated so that natural zones could be estab­
lished that would continue to serve substantially the 
same student body in attendance at the same schools 
as under present operations?”

Forty replies stated that natural boundaries sep­
arated the two races and the schools for each race. 
Thirty-eight responded that no natural boundaries 
existed in their locality. Of the Negro educators, 
eleven replied that natural boundaries existed, while 
five answered that natural boundaries did not exist 
in their locality.

“4. (c) If any existing buildings would be un­
usable in an integrated program, estimate the pres­
ent value of such buildings.”

Forty answered that there would be no loss of 
buildings in operating an integrated school system. 
Thirty-eight answered that there would be some loss 
within their district. Of the Negro educators nine re­
plied there would be no loss, while six answered that 
there would be some loss.



—34—

“ 5. How will an integrated public school system 
affect the school teachers in your area?”

Fifteen responded that there would be no affect 
on school teachers in their districts. Fifty-six an­
swers believed the Negro teachers would be adversely 
affected by an integrated school program. Some re­
plies thought white teachers in their districts would 
refuse to teach in an integrated school. The Negro 
replies seeing no affect within their districts num­
bered seven, while three feared an adverse affect.

“ 6. If the patrons of your district, both negro 
and white, were given free choice, what per cent 
would send their children to the same school now at­
tended?”

Seventy-seven replied that 85% or more would 
continue attending the same school if they had free 
choice. Of this number fourteen answers were from 
Negro administrators. Only three answered that stu­
dents in their districts would prefer attending inte­
grated schools, and all three replies were by Negro 
administrators.



3 5 -

APPENDIX y

County

Whites on 
1954-1955 
Scholastic

Negroes on 
1954-1955 
Scholastic

% of 
Negroes

1 . Anderson
Census

4,127
Census

2,473 34.5
2. Andrews 1,885 30 1.6
3. Angelina 6,645 1,398 17.4
4. Aransas 1,154 14 1.2
5. Archer 1,541 0
6. Armstrong 381 0
7. Atascosa 5,266 66 1.2
8. Austin 1,977 789 28.5
9. Bailey 1,994 60 2.9

10. Bandera 725 0
11. Bastrop 2551 1,477 36.7
12. Baylor 1,297 60 4.4
13. Bee 4,831 134 2.7
14. Bell 11,788 1,760 13.0
15. Bexar 109,453 5,997 5.2
16. Blanco 806 22 2.7
17. Borden 176 0
18. Bosque 2,263 103 4.3
19. Bowie 10,895 3,805 25.9
20. Brazoria 13,514 1,523 10.1
21. Brazos 5,437 2,132 28.17
22. Brewster 1,460 9 .6
23. Briscoe 688 64 8.5
24. Brooks 2,336 3 .1
25. Brown 4,994 140 2.7
26. Burleson 1,791 1,063 37.6
27. Burnet 1,794 34 1.9
28. Caldwell 3,743 686 15.5
29. Calhoun 2,933 151 4.9



— S6—

County

Whites on 
1954-1955
Scholastic

Negroes on 
1954-1955 
Scholastic

30. Callahan
Census

1,690
Census

0
31. Cameron 34,957 117
32. Camp 1,153 822
33. Carson 1,613 0
34. Cass 4,018 2,400
35. Castro 1,458 11
36. Chambers 1,649 447
37. Cherokee 4,905 1,980
38. Childress 1,649 113
39. Clay 1,861 14
40. Cochran 1,503 69
41. Coke 826 0
42. Coleman 2,761 94
43. Collin 7,950 1,062
44. Collingsworth 1,692 172
45. Colorado 2,827 1,134
46. Comal 3,916 83
47. Comanche 2,408 0
48. Concho 940 2
49. Cooke 4,783 186
50. Coryell 3,518 179
51. Cottle 919 36
52. Crane 994 66
53. Crockett 893 12
54. Crosby 2,168 236
55. Culberson 606 0
56. Dallam 1,638 12
57. Dallas 119,280 18,943
58. Dawson 3,695 224
59. Deaf Smith 2,456 7
60. Delta 1,416 219

% of 
Negroes

.3
41.6

37.4
.7

21.3
28.8
6.1
.7

4.4

3.3
11.8
9.2

28.6
2.1

.2
3.7
4.8
3.8 
6.2 
1.3
9.8

.7
13.7
5.7

.3
13.4



- 3 7 -

County

Whites on 
1954-1955 
Scholastic

Negroes on 
1954-1955 
Scholastic

% of 
Negroes

61. Denton
Census

7,220
Census

567 7.3
62. De Witt 4,901 798 14.0
63. Dickens 1,380 64 4.4
64. Dimmit 3,505 13 .4
65. Donley 1,087 75 6.4
66. Duval 4,533 0
67. Eastland 4,110 64 1.5
68. Ector 12,923 562 4.2
69. Edwards 541 1 .2
70. Ellis 6,570 2,875 30.4
71. El Paso 45,775 719 1.6
72. Erath 2,927 20 .7
73. Falls 3,191 1,978 38.3
74. Fannin 4,900 708 12.6
75. Fayette 3,492 982 21.9
76. Fisher 1,777 113 6.0
77. Floyd 2,291 166 6.8
78. Foard 742 90 10.8
79. Fort Bend 6,304 1,803 22.2
80. Franklin 783 126 13.9
81. Freestone 1,675 1,749 51.1
82. Frio 2,785 23 .8
83. Gaines 2,796 46 1.6
84. Galveston 21,504 5,036 19.0
85. Garza 1,397 45 3.1
86. Gillespie 2,137 0
87. Glasscock 255 5 1.9
88. Goliad 1,302 151 10.4
89. Gonzales 3,357 960 22.2
90. Gray 5,727 159 2.7
91. Grayson 12,366 1,303 9.5



— 38—

County

Whites on 
1954-1955 
Scholastic

Negroes on 
1954-1955 
Scholastic

% of 
Negroes

92. Gregg
Census

10,895
Census

3,739 25.5
83. Grimes 1,911 1,563 45.0
94. Guadalupe 5,228 814 13.5
95. Hale 7,618 456 5.7
96. Hall 1,770 228 11.4
97. Hamilton 1,790 0
98. Hansford 989 0
99. Hardeman 1,769 181 9.3

100. Hardin 4,268 791 15.6
101. Harris 156,638 32,559 17.2
102. Harrison 5,059 6,042 54.4
103. Hartley 233 0
104. Haskell 2,892 161 5.3
105. Hays 4,332 234 5.12
106. Hemphill 803 0
107. Henderson 3,657 1,280 25.9
108. Hidalgo 4,511 84 .2
109. Hill 4,792 1,308 21.4
110. Hockley 5,391 281 5.0
111. Hood 1,054 18 1.2
112. Hopkins 3,595 666 15.6
113. Houston 2,511 2,110 45.7
114. Howard 6,423 285 4.2
115. Hudspeth 868 0
116. Hunt 6,188 1,436 18.8
117. Hutchinson 7,511 116 1.5
118. Irion 355 0
119. Jack 1,534 23 1.5
120. Jackson 3,221 418 11.5
121. Jasper 3,834 1,540 28.7
122. Jeff Davis 415 0



— 3 9

County

Whites on 
1954-1955 
Scholastic

Negroes on 
1954-1955 
Scholastic

% of 
Negroes

123. Jefferson
Census

34,353
Census

11,297 24.7
124. Jim Hogg 1,340 0
125. Jim Wells 7,757 55 .7
126. Johnson 6,595 397 5.7
127. Jones 4,137 325 7.3
128. Karnes 3,724 143 3.7
129. Kaufman 4,288 2,222 34.1
130. Kendall 1,311 11 .8
131. Kenedy 142 0
132. Kent 236 6 2.5
133. Kerr 2,602 104 3.8
134. Kimble 868 0
135. King 169 12 6.6
136. Kinney 471 60 11.3
137. Kleberg 5,443 172 3.1
138. Knox 2,069 157 7.0
139. Lamar 6,644 1,692 20.3
140. Lamb 4,855 403 7.7
141. Lampasas 1,852 30 1.6
142. La Salle 2,800 0
143. Lavaca 3,484 561 13.9
144. Lee 1,582 776 32.9
145. Leon 1,517 1,310 46.3
146. Liberty 5,368 1,591 22.9
147. Limestone 2,822 1,654 36.9
148. Lipscomb 725 0
149. Liveoak 2,334 4 .8
150. Llano 904 2 .2
151. Loving 20 0
152. Lubbock 22,164 2,001 8.3
153. Lynn 2,240 104 4.4



— 40—

County

Whites on 
1954-1953 
Scholastic

Negroes on 
1954-1955 
Scholastic

% of 
Negroes

154. Madison
Census

978
Census

622 38.9
155. Marion 896 1,314 59.5
156. Martin 1,160 78 6.3
157. Mason 893 10 1.1
158. Matagorda 4,537 1,149 20.2
159. Maverick 3,430 0
160. McCulloch 2,184 84 3.7
161. McLennan 21,888 5,260 19.4
162. McMullen 200 0
163. Medina 4,730 31 .6
164. Menard 685 12 1.7
165. Midland 9,143 897 8.9
166. Milam 4,249 1,199 22.0
167. Mills 1,024 0
168. Mitchell 2,570 192 6.9
169. Montague 3,515 0
170. Montgomery 4,680 1,541 24.8
171. Moore 3,562 0
172. Morris 1,816 1,018 35.9
173. Motley 633 66 9.4
174. Nacogdoches 4,218 3,278 36.0
175. Navarro 6,076 2,475 28.9
176. Newton 1,604 996 38.3
177. Nolan 4,083 170 4.0
178. Nueces 45,914 1,748 3.7
179. Ochiltree 1,114 0
180. Oldham 653 0
181. Orange 10,179 1,209 10.6
182. Palo Pinto 3,694 125 3.3
183. Panola 2,542 1,809 41.6
184. Parker 4,768 89 1 .8



— 41—

County

Whites on 
1954-1955 
Scholastic

Negroes on 
1954-1955 
Scholastic

% of 
Negroes

185. Parmer
Census

1,867
Census

27 1.4
186. Pecos 2,699 35 1.3
187. Polk 2,568 1 ,1 1 2 30.2
188. Potter 19,370 1 ,0 1 0 4.9
189. Presidio 1,536 0
190. Rains 729 114 13.5
191. Randall 1,316 0
192. Reagan 780 41 5.0
193. Real 480 0
194. Red River 3,155 1,173 27.1
195. Reeves 3,842 133 3.3
196. Refugio 2,522 275 9.8
197. Roberts 197 0
198. Robertson 2,439 2,141 46.7
199. Rockwall 938 539 36.5
2 0 0 . Runnels 3,437 106 3.0
2 0 1 . Rusk 5,439 3,154 36.7
2 0 2 . Sabine 1,336 518 27.9
203. San Augustine 1 ,2 2 2 844 40.8
204. San Jacinto 666 967 59.2
205. San Patricio 12,143 190 1.5
206. San Saba 1,599 9 .6
207. Schleicher 654 40 5.8
208. Scurry 4,236 93 2 .1
209. Shackelford 840 16 1.9
2 1 0 . Shelby 3,623 1,622 30.9
2 1 1 . Sherman 574 0
2 1 2 . Smith 11,385 5,558 32.8
213. Somervell 493 0
214. Starr 5,053 0
215. Stephens 1,646 60 3.5



County

Whites on 
1954-1955 
Scholastic

Negroes on 
1954-1955 
Scholastic

% of 
Negroes

216. Sterling
Census

308
Census

2 .6
217. Stonewall 681 36 5.0
218. Sutton 895 15 1.6
219. Swisher 2,318 47 2.0
220. Tarrant 74,977 8,904 10.6
221. Taylor 13,248 594 4.3
222. Terrell 656 0
223. Terry 3,122 81 2.5
224. Throckmorton 634 0
225. Titus 3,207 733 18.6
226. Tom Green 11,538 621 5.1
227. Travis 27,111 4,761 14.9
228. Trinity 1,524 658 30.1
229. Tyler 2,121 705 24.9
230. Upshur 2,965 1,533 34.1
231. Upton 1,598 74 4.4
232. Uvalde 4,307 44 1.0
233. Val Verde 4,440 80 1.8
234. Van Zandt 4,086 451 9.9
235. Victoria 8,502 733 7.9
236. Walker 1,786 1,865 51.1
237. Waller 1,367 1,178 46.29
238. Ward 2,870 39 1.3
239. Washington 2,333 1,778 45.2
240. Webb 16,089 5 .1
241. Wharton 7,504 2,087 21.8
242. Wheeler 2,104 66 3.0
243. Wichita 17,203 1,219 6.6
244. Wilbarger 3,490 382 9.9
245. Willacy 5,490 21 .4
246. Williamson 6,851 1,357 16.5



4 3 -

County

Whites on 
1954-1955 
Scholastic

Negroes on 
1954-1955 
Scholastic

% of 
Negroes

247. Wilson
Census

3,634
Census

95 2.5
248. Winkler 2,415 49 2.0
249. Wise 3,096 34 1.1
250. Wood 3,932 744 15.9
251. Yoakum 1,465 1 .1
252. Young 3,405 24 .7
253. Zapata 1,035 0 —

254. Zavala 3,293 26 .8

TOTALS 1,556,372 230,546 12.9



1



"1

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1954

No...

OLIVER BROWN, ET AL., DOROTHY E. DAVIS, ET AL.,

Appellants, Appellants,
V. V.

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD OF

TOPEKA, SHAWNEE COUNTY, PRINCE EDWARD COUNTY,

KANSAS, ET AL. VIRGINIA, ET AL.

HARRY BRIGGS, JR., ET AL., FRANCES B. GEBHART, ET AL.,

Appellants, Petitioners,
V. V.

R. W . ELLIOTT, ET AL. ETHEL LOUISE BELTON, ET AL.

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ARKANSAS

T om Gentry

Attorney General 
State of Arkansas 
State Capitol 
Little Rock, Arkansas 

James L. Sloan

Assistant Attorney General 
State of Arkansas 
State Capitol 
Little Rock, Arkansas 

R ichard B. M cCulloch

Special Asst. Attorney General 
State of Arkansas 
Forrest City, Arkansas

PARAGON PRINTING CO., LITTLE ROCK





I N D E X

Page
Preliminary Statement ------------------------------7--------------------  1

Arkansas Constitutional and
Statutory Provisions _________________________________ 3

Factual Background---------------------------------------------------------  5

Argument:

1. This Court Should Not Order
Immediate Integration ---------     7

2. Cases Should Be Remanded to
Permit Gradual Integration _________________    10

3. Congressional Action for
Integration _______________________________________  13

Conclusion ______________________________________________  21



IN D E X — (Continued)

Cases Cited

Page
Brown et al v. Board of Education of

Topeka, Shawnee County, Kansas, et al,
347 U. S. 483 ________________________________________ 1

Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3 ---------------------------------14, 16, 17

Colegrove v. Green, 328 U. S. 549 ------ -----------------------------  20

Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433 -------------------------------------  19

Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U. S. 651 ---------------------- ------ ---  14

Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321---------------------------------10, 11

International Salt Co. v. United States,
332 U. S. 392 -------- ---------------------------------------------------  10

Meredith v. City of Winter Haven,
320 U. S. 228 ------ --------------- --------------------------------------  10

Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis,
310 U. S. 586 ...--------------- ----------------------------------------  18

McCollum v. Board of Education of School
Dist. No. 71, 333 U. S. 203 ------------------- ------------ ...--------  17

Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 --- -----------------------------------  20



INDEX— (Continued)

Page
Pitts v. Board of Trustees of DeWitt Special

School Dist. No. 1, 84 F. Supp. 975 _______________ 11, 18

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 _______________________ 11, 15

Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis,
301 U. S. 549 _____________________________________...... 20

Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461___________________________  13

United States v. Fisher, 6 U. S. 358 _______________________  17

United States v. Gilman, 347 U. S. 507 ___________________  20

Arkansas Constitution and Statutes

Constitution of Arkansas (1874),
Article 14, Section 1 _______________________________ 3

Constitution of Arkansas (1874),
Article 14, Section 4 _______ ___________ ____________  3

Act 52, Arkansas Acts of 1868 __________________________ 4

Act 130, Arkansas Acts of 1873, Section 108 _____________  4

Appendix "A "

Arkansas School Enrollment
1933-1954 Session With Receipts and Disbursements__  25





SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1954

No.........

OLIVER BROWN, ET AL., DOROTHY E. DAVIS, ET AL.,

Appellants, Appellants,
V. V.

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD OF

TOPEKA, SHAWNEE COUNTY, PRINCE EDWARD COUNTY,

KANSAS, ET AL. VIRGINIA, ET AL.

HARRY BRIGGS, JR., ET AL., FRANCES B. GEBHART, ET AL.,

Appellants, Petitioners,
V. V.

R. W . ELLIOTT, ET AL. ETHEL LOUISE BELTON, ET AL.

(
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

This brief is filed by the Attorney General of the State 
of Arkansas as amicus curiae at the invitation of this 
Court in the four cases shown in the caption. For brevity 
and convenience, the four cases are referred to collectively 
as “ the Brown Case” . Brown v. Board of Education of 
Topeka, Shawnee County, Kansas, 347 U. S. 483.

In the Brown Case, the Chief Justice, speaking for the 
unanimous Court, stated the issue presented to the Court 
in the four cases as follows, 347 U. S. at 493:

“ Does segregation of children in public schools 
solely on the basis of race, even though the physical 
facilities and other ‘ tangible’ factors may be equal, 
deprive the children of the minority group of equal 
educational opportunities I ’ ’



2

The Court decided that issue in the following language, 
347 U. S. at 495 :

“ We conclude that in the field of public educa­
tion the doctrine of ‘ separate but equal’ has no place. 
Separate educational facilities are inherently un­
equal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and 
others similarly situated for whom the actions have 
been brought are, by reason of the segregation com­
plained of, deprived of the equal protection of the 
laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.”

Let it be said at the outset that nothing contained in 
this brief is intended to bring into question the correctness 
of the ruling of this Court or its reasons for reaching that 
conclusion.

The full force and effect of the decision in the Brown 
Case was recognized by a ‘ ‘policy statement”  issued by the 
State Board of Education of Arkansas following a meeting 
of the Board on June 14, 1954. The policy statement of 
the Board is as follows:

“ Under our present law the State Board of 
Education acts only in an advisory capacity to local 
school boards. The local board itself is the govern­
ing body of the school district and its decisions are 
final. Therefore, decisions must be made by the 
local school board, but within the limitations and 
restrictions provided by law. Our present state law 
provides for segregation in the public schools and 
any decision by a local board providing for integra­
tion of the races is premature, as the Supreme Court 
in its opinion stated that further arguments would 
be heard and a decree entered. We do not know 
when the decree will be entered or what it will pro­
vide. In the meantime, members of both races at 
the community level should continue as they have 
in the past in working cooperatively and effectively 
in a friendly effort to achieve better and substan­
tially equal schools for all children, without regard 
to race.



3

“ It is important to keep in mind that policy 
decisions are made by local school boards. The 
public school system in America calls for local con­
trol of schools and the state functions in the area of 
leadership only in such vital statewide matters as 
the one involving segregation of the races.”

The General Assembly of Arkansas (the constitutional 
legislative branch of Arkansas’ government) has not been 
in session since March of 1953 and will not convene in reg­
ular session until January of 1955. Without anticipating 
what action, if any, the General Assembly of Arkansas will 
take in its 1955 session, it is probably safe to say at this 
time that some further words of advice and direction from 
this Court will go a long way toward charting the course 
of future action or inaction by the Arkansas General As­
sembly. One of the purposes of this brief is to solicit most 
earnestly from this Court such words of clarification and 
advice as to the course to be pursued by the people of Ar­
kansas in carrying out the final mandate of the Court as 
may be proper.

PERTINENT ARKANSAS CONSTITUTIONAL 

AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Ark. Const. (1874) Art. 14, §1, provides:

“ Intelligence and virtue being the safeguards 
of liberty and the bulwark of a free and good gov­
ernment, the State shall ever maintain a general, 
suitable and efficient system of free schools whereby 
all persons in the State between the ages of six and 
twenty-one years may receive gratuitous instruc­
tion.”

Ark. Const. (1874) Art. 14, §4, provides:

“ The supervision of public schools and the 
execution of the laws regulating the same shall be 
vested in and confided to such officers as may be 
provided for by the General Assembly.”



4

The first general law providing for the separation of 
white and negro children in the public schools of Arkansas 
was enacted on July 23, 1868 — the year of adoption of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu­
tion. The act provided that school boards in Arkansas 
shall “ make the necessary provisions for establishing sep­
arate schools for white and colored children and youths 

Act 52, Ark. Acts of 1868.

In 1873 the Arkansas school law of 1868 was re-enacted 
and Act 130, Ark. Acts of 1873, §108, provided for “ estab­
lishing separate schools for white and colored children and 
youths.”  According to a contemporary newspaper, there 
were twenty negro members in the 1873 session of the 
Legislature and it was reported that “ that one-fifth part 
is a complete master of the two houses, as if the number 
that composed the group were three times as great.”  Edi­
torial, “ The Colored Legislators,”  Arkansas Gazette, Feb­
ruary 1, 1873, p. 2.

It is also interesting to note that on January 6, 1873 
(the year during which the Arkansas school laws were be­
ing formulated), J. C. Corbin became State Superintendent 
of Public Instruction for Arkansas. He was a negro edu­
cator who came to Arkansas during the War between the 
States. See Weeks, “ School History of Arkansas.”  (U.
S. Bureau of Education Bui. No. 27, 1912) pp. 59, 117.

The only statutory law in Arkansas today on the sep­
aration of white and negro children in the Arkansas public 
school system provides:

“ The board of school directors of each district 
in the State shall be charged with the following 
powers and perform the following duties . . .  (c)
Establish separate schools for white and colored 
persons.”  Ark. Stats. (1947) §80-509.



5

The existing school segregation law in Arkansas, there­
fore, apparently had its origin at a time when the negroes 
in Arkansas greatly influenced, if not dominated, legisla­
tive action on the school question.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Attached hereto as Appendix “ A ”  appears a tabula­
tion which shows pertinent information as to the various 
school districts of Arkansas. The purpose of this tabula­
tion is to demonstrate the proposition that the wide variety 
of circumstances which exist in the various counties of 
Arkansas requires a wide variety of remedies and plans in 
bringing about the ultimate result demanded by the decision 
of this Court, that is, the abolition of the dual school system 
in Arkansas.

There are 75 counties in Arkansas. The tabulation 
shows there are 422 separate school districts in the State 
or an average of about five separate districts for each 
county. Each school district has its separate board of 
directors which is the immediate governing authority of 
the district. The members of the board are elected by 
the qualified electors of the district and they are directly 
responsible to the people for their actions.

It is of interest to note that there are 14 counties out 
of the total 75 counties which had no negroes enrolled in 
the public schools of the county. Ten of the counties 
without negro population are located in the north and 
northwest (mountain) section of the State. Two of the 
non-negro counties (Polk and Scott) are in the south­
western section of the state. The remaining two non- 
negro counties (Clay and Greene) are contiguous to Mis­
sissippi County to the east which had a negro enrollment 
of 4,789 or about 20% of the total enrollment for Mississippi 
County.



6

By way of contrast, it will be seen from Appendix 
“ A ”  that in six counties in Arkansas the negro enrollment 
exceeded the white enrollment. Five of these predomi­
nately negro counties (Lee, St. Francis, Crittenden, Chicot 
and Phillips) are in the eastern section of the State and 
border the Mississippi River. The other predominately 
negro county (Lincoln) is in South-central Arkansas.

The tabulation shows that the negro enrollment for 
the State was about 23% of the total enrollment of the 
State.

As further evidence of the variety of conditions and 
circumstances in Arkansas, it should be noted that two 
districts in Arkansas have already integrated the white 
and negro children in the schools.

The Charleston School District in Western Arkansas 
(Franklin County) has integrated pupils during the 1954- 
1955 session from the first grade through the twelfth grade. 
The Fayetteville School District in Northwest Arkansas 
(Washington County) has an enrollment of 3,096 white 
pupils and 64 negro pupils. This district has integrated 
the negro and white pupils at the high school level. Negro 
children in the Fayetteville School District attend a seg­
regated school from the first grade through the ninth 
grade. For the 1954-1955 session, 11 negro high school 
pupils are attending the same high school with approxi­
mately 500 white children.

It is a matter of general information that integration 
has been accomplished so far in the Charleston and Fay­
etteville School Districts without any unusual incidents. 
However, from a comparison of the factual situations of 
the Charleston and Fayetteville School Districts with, for 
example, districts in St. Francis and Phillips Counties, 
it would certainly seem to follow as a matter of necessity 
that the process of integration must be applied as the cir­
cumstances in each district may require.



7

ARGUMENT

1. This Court should not order “ forthwith integra­
tion”  in the public schools.

2. This Court should enter a decree in the pending 
cases which will permit gradual adjustments.

3. The Court should leave the problem of integra­
tion of the races in public schools to Congress for appro­
priate legislation.

P oint 1

This Court Should Not Order Immediate Integration

This Court in its opinion in the Brown Case clearly- 
recognized that the procedure for integration of the races 
in the public schools “ presents probllems of considerable 
complexity.”  Thus the Court has indicated that it is not 
unmindful of the possibility of widespread hostility in at 
least some school districts if immediate integration of the 
races in the public schools is required by this Court. This 
hostility is commonly known to exist in varying degrees 
in a majority of the school districts of Arkansas although 
there have been, so far as is known, no overt acts by any 
particular group or groups indicating open defiance of the 
law as declared by this Court.

But even unwilling or hostile compliance can, and 
probably would, have a most undesirable effect upon the 
whole system of public education in Arkansas. It will be 
conceded, presumably, that the bulk of the financial sup­
port for the public school system of Arkansas flows from 
the white population. This fact will continue to be true for 
many years to come unless a large portion of those per­
sons who now pay taxes in support of public schools man­
age, by some means not now forseeable, to withdraw their



8

support as a result of legislative enactments of some kind 
or other.

Without the leadership of those who carry the large 
portion of the burden of supporting the school system, the 
system as a whole is hound to pass through a period of 
deterioration which might last for many, many years. If 
the public school system is permitted to deteriorate, it 
necessarily follows that both the negro children and the 
white children will be the unfortunate victims. The negro 
children in all probability will suffer to a greater degree 
than the white children in such circumstances.

The Arkansas public school system today ranks far 
down the list in many respects in comparison with the 
systems of other states. There is a long way to go before 
Arkansans can point with pride to their school system as a 
whole. But no well-informed person will seriously contend 
that Arkansas has not. made measurable progress during 
the past few years. Every well-informed person in Ar­
kansas agrees with this Court when it said that “ today, 
education is perhaps the most important function of state 
and local governments”  and education “ is the very foun­
dation of good citizenship.”  Brown Case, supra.

The executive, legislative and judicial branches of the 
State government have for years pointed up the school 
problem as the most important problem confronting the 
people of this State. It is well within the realm of possi­
bility that any decree of this Court at this time which 
would have the legal effect of ordering immediate integra­
tion of the races in all the school districts of Arkansas 
would disrupt the financing, management and control of 
the school system for many years.

A  recognized authority on the sociological aspects of 
school segregation has said:



9

“ Finally, there is the hard fact that integra­
tion in a meaningful sense cannot be achieved by the 
mere physical presence of children of two races in 
a single classroom. No public school is isolated 
from the community that supports it, and if the 
very composition of its classes is subject to deep- 
seated and sustained public disapproval it is hardly 
likely to foster the spirit of united effort essential 
to learning. Even those who are dedicated to the 
proposition that the common good demands the 
end of segregation in education cannot be unaware 
that if the transition produces martyrs they will be 
the young children who must bear the brunt of 
spiritual conflict.”  Ashmore, “ The Negro and the 
Public Schools,”  (Chapel Hill 1954) p. 135.

It would unduly extend this discussion to take up the 
problems of grade requirements, transportation problems, 
revision of school area distribution and the many other 
complex management problems which will ultimately have 
to be solved in bringing about complete integration in Ar­
kansas. This Court has already indicated by the opinion 
in the Brown Case and by the study which the Court has 
obviously given to these cases that it is fully aware of the 
complexity of the problem. This Court has not asked for 
a statement of the problem, but rather for a solution.

What has been said is, of course, addressed to the 
discretion of this Court in the exercise of its equity pow­
ers in the four cases now pending before it. It is believed 
that this complex problem can be solved most effectively 
and most satisfactorily in the interest of both the negro 
children and the white children by a gradual, rather than 
an immediate, adjustment or transition from segregation 
to integration of the races in the public schools.

There are, of course, many decisions of this Court 
pointing out the peculiar nature of equity practice. In 
the interest of brevity, it is appropriate to point to the



10

opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 
U. S. 321, 329, where the Court said:

“ We are dealing here with the requirements 
of equity practice with a background of several 
hundred years of history. Only the other day we 
stated that ‘ An appeal to the equity jurisdiction 
conferred on federal district courts is an appeal to 
the sound discretion which guides the determina­
tion of courts of equity’, Meredith v. Winter Haven, 
320 U. S. 228, 235. The historic injunctive process 
was designed to deter, not to punish. The essence 
of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the 
Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree of 
the necessities of the particular case. Flexibility 
rather than rigidity has distinguished it. The quali­
ties of mercy and practicality have made equity the 
instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation 
between public interest and private needs as well 
as between competing private claims.”

This Court also held in International Salt Co. v. United 
States, 332 U. S. 392, that district courts are invested with 
large discretion in modeling their judgments to fit the 
exigencies of the particular case, and the framing of de­
crees should take place in the district rather than appel­
late courts.

Point 2

The Court Should Enter a Decree in the Pending 
Cases Which Will Permit Gradual Adjustments

The pending cases have been designated as class actions 
by the Court. The principal matter about which the peo­
ple of Arkansas are concerned is the binding effect of the 
impending decrees on prospective or pending litigation of 
similar nature in the federal courts of Arkansas.

It is believed that the decree of this Court in the Briggs 
Case, for example, would not have the effect of an adjudi­



11

cation of pending or prospective similar actions in tlie 
federal courts of Arkansas. That decree would be a pre­
cedent to be followed by the federal courts in Arkansas 
only to the extent that the Briggs decree would permit the 
federal court in Arkansas in equity to follow the proced­
ural scheme provided for in the Briggs decree.

The ultimate solution of the complex problem of tran­
sition is undoubtedly one which calls for “ flexibility rather 
than rigidity.”  Iieclit Co. v. Boivlcs, supra.

In framing its decrees in the pending cases, it is 
deemed proper for this Court to consider the opinion of 
•Judge Harry J. Lemley in Pitts v. Board of Trustees of 
DeWitt Special School District No. 1, 84 F. Supp. 975 
(E. JD. Ark.). That case asserted the rights of negro 
plaintiffs to equal public school facilities under the Four­
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The 
Court followed the “ separate but equal doctrine”  of 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, and held that the negro 
children were entitled under the Amendment to school 
facilities substantially equal to the school facilities af­
forded white children. Judge Lemley was there con­
fronted, as the Court is here, with the terms and the scope 
of the decree to be entered under his findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. In solving this perplexing problem, 
Judge Lemley said, 84 F. Supp. at 983:

“ The instant suit is one in equity, and the bill 
is addressed to the court sitting as a court of equity. 
Hence the court has a wide discretion in determin­
ing what relief is proper and prescribing the time 
within which such relief must become effective. 
The case at bar is not the only one of this nature 
upon the court’s docket and, in connection with our 
discussions and holdings herein, it should be borne 
in mind that each of these cases stands on its own 
peculiar facts; relief which might be proper in one



12

case might not be sufficient in another, and the 
length of time allowed to a district within which to 
bring about an equalization of educational facili­
ties which might be reasonable in one case could be 
unreasonable in another.”

In the same opinion, Judge Lemley further said, 84
F. Supp. at 988:

“ We are not going to attempt to say what a 
‘ reasonable time’ in this case will be; that is a mat­
ter properly left, for the time being, to the good 
faith and discretion of the Board. If the Board is 
dilatory, the plaintiffs are not without their rem­
edy in the Courts.”

The problem before Judge Lemley was, in effect, the 
same as now confronts this Court in the framing of its 
decrees. Judge Lemley decided that the negro children 
were entitled to separate but equal facilities. This Court 
has decided that the negro children in tire instant cases are 
entitled to identical facilities, subject only to classification 
not based on race. Judge Lemley was confronted with a 
transition from unequal to equal facilities. This Court is 
confronted with a transition from separate to identical 
facilities.

It seems obvious that Judge Lemley adopted the logi­
cal and equitable solution of the problem before him. It 
appears also that this Court could find no better solution 
of its problem in the instant cases than remanding the four 
cases to the courts of first instance for adoption, in sub­
stance, of the language of Judge Lemley in the Pitts Case, 
supra.

It is contended, therefore, that the Court should enter 
a decree in each of the pending cases which will read sub­
stantially as follows:



13

‘ ‘ The case is remanded to the court of first in­
stance with directions to enter such orders and de­
crees as are necessary and proper and not incon­
sistent with the opinion of this Court in this case. 
In exercising its jurisdiction upon remand, the court 
of first instance is left free to hold hearings, through 
a Special Master of the court if deemed necessary 
or appropriate, to consider and determine what pro­
visions are essential, proper and appropriate to af­
ford appellants and those similarly situated full pro­
tection against segregation of negro children in the 
public schools solely on the basis of race in violation 
of their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution.”  Terry v. Adams, 
345 U.S. 461, 470.

Point 3

The Court Should Leave the Problem of Integration 
of the Races in Public Schools to Congress for 

Appropriate Legislation

Even if the Court remands the pending cases with di­
rections as suggested, there still remains the uncertainty 
of the immediate effect which those decrees may have on 
prospective cases in the federal courts in Arkansas. The 
Court must of necessity make some disposition of the 
pending cases by way of appropriate decrees. In this con­
nection it is most respectfully urged that the Court take 
some action by way of a supplemental opinion, in addition 
to the specific decrees, which will have the effect of pre­
cluding what might well turn out to be a flood of cases in 
the federal courts of Arkansas and other so-called “ seg­
regated states.”

The point here is that this Court can and should deal 
with the problem by way of supplemental opinion in such 
a way that the whole problem of solving the method of 
integration should fall squarely where the Fourteenth



14

Amendment says it should fall; that is, on Congress for 
appropriate enactment.

In its opinion of May 17, this Court has definitely 
and finally decided that the separation of the races in 
public schools pursuant to state laws on a basis of race vio­
lates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The law having thus been interpreted and 
declared by this Court for the first time, it now becomes 
the function and the constitutional duty of Congress to 
exercise the power granted by Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.

Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is as follows:
“ The congress shall have power to enforce, by 

appropriate legislation, the provisions of this 
article. ’ ’

It might be well to mention at the outset that it is fully 
recognized that “ it is not for this Court to compete with 
Congress or attempt to replace it as the Nation’s law­
making body,’ ’ Collins v. Hardymnn, 341 It. S. 651, 663, 
and that “ the judiciary may not, with safety to our insti­
tutions, enter the domain of legislative discretion and dic­
tate the means which Congress shall employ in the exer­
cise of its granted power. That would be sheer usurpation 
of the functions of a coordinate department, which, if 
often repeated, and permanently acquiesced in, would work 
a radical change in our system of government.”  Mr. 
Justice Harlan dissenting in The Civil Rights Cases, 109 
IT. S. 3, 51.

Nevertheless, it would certainly not be entirely with­
out precedent for this Court to point out to Congress, as 
urged here, the necessity for “ appropriate legislation” ; 
especially in view of the known fact that the prolonged in­
action by Congress has now resulted in a condition which 
has some aspects at least of a national emergency.



15

As a matter of pertinent history, it is very significant 
that the legislative records of Congress in promulgating 
the Fourteenth Amendment and of state legislatures in 
ratifying it have very little to say about racial segregation 
in public schools. It is, however, a matter of record that 
Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts appears to have 
strenuously but unsuccessfully advocated implementing 
legislation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
which would have been a specific and far-reaching pro­
scription of racial segregation in the public schools. Cong. 
Globe, 42 Cong., 2d Sess. 383-84 (3872).

By way of contrast, it is quite obvious from a reading 
of the Court’s opinion in the Broivn Case that, in arriving 
at its decision, the Court took full cognizance of contem­
porary conditions in the field of public education as com­
pared with conditions existing at the time of and for many 
years subsequent to 1868. This Court said, 347 U. S. 492:

“ In approaching this problem, we cannot turn 
the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was 
adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson 
was written. We must consider public education in 
the light of its full development and its present 
place in American life throughout the Nation . . . .

“ Today, education is perhaps the most import­
ant function of state and local governments . . . . 
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may rea­
sonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied 
the opportunity of education.”

The Court having pointed out so forcibly the evolving 
concept of the Fourteenth Amendment, it would seem to 
follow as a necessary conclusion that the Court should now 
(by way of an additional opinion) not only nudge but 
even exhort Congress to enact appropriate legislation un­
der the power of Section 5 of the Amendment.



16

This Court could with complete propriety point out 
to Congress that legislative action is a necessity and that 
such necessity is a result of extending inaction by Congress. 
If Congress responds to the urgent invitation of the Court 
(and there are many reasons for believing that it will), 
then it will be performing the mandate of the people which 
is incorporated in Section 5 of the Amendment.

This Court in The Civil Bights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 11, 
said that, under Section 5 of the Amendment, Congress 
is empowered

“ To adopt appropriate legislation for correct­
ing the effects of such prohibited State laws and 
State acts, and thus to render them effectually null, 
void, and innocuous.”

And in the same cases this Court said, 109 IT. S. 14:

“ It is not necessary for us to state, if we could, 
what legislation would be proper for Congress to 
adopt. It is sufficient for us to examine whether 
the law in question is of that character.”

In his very forceful dissenting opinion in The Civil 
Bights Cases, Mr. Justice Harlan said,

“ The legislation which Congress may enact, in 
execution of its power to enforce the provision of 
the amendment, is such as may be appropriate to 
protect the right granted. The word appropriate 
was undoubtedly used with reference to its meaning, 
as established by repeated decisions of this court. 
Under given circumstances, that which the court 
characterizes as corrective legislation might be 
deemed by Congress appropriate and entirely suffi­
cient. Under other circumstances, primary direct 
legislation may be required. But it is for Congress, 
not the judiciary, to say that legislation is appro­
priate— that is—best adapted to the end to be at­
tained. ’ ’



17

The conclusion to be drawn from the decision in The 
Civil Rights Cases is that the “ appropriate legislation”  
contemplated by Section 5 is co-extensive with and just as 
important a part of the Fourteenth Amendment as is Sec­
tion 1 which declares the rights of all persons to equal pro­
tection under the laws. Therefore, whatever action Con­
gress sees fit to take in the light of this Court’s decision 
would rest upon the judgment of Congress; provided, of 
course, that such legislation is directed against state ac­
tion. As Mr. Chief Justice Marshall said in United States 
v. Fisher, 6 U.S. 358:

“ Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the 
scope of the Constitution, and all means which are 
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, 
which are not prohibited, but consistent with the 
letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitu­
tional.”

Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in McCollum v. 
Board of Education, 333 XL S. 203, 212, said that the case

“ . . . demonstrates anew that the mere formulation 
of a relevant Constitutional principle is the begin­
ning of the solution of a problem, not its answer.”  
And in the same case, Mr. Justice Jackson, concur­
ring, said, 33 U.S. at 237: ‘ It is idle to pretend that 
said, 333 IT. S. at 237: ‘ It is idle to pretend that 
this task is one for which we can find in the Consti­
tution one word to help us as judges to decide where 
the secular ends and the sectarian begins in educa­
tion. Nor can we find guidance in any other legal 
source. It is a matter on which we can find no law 
but our own prepossessions. If with no surer legal 
guidance we are to take up and decide every varia­
tion of this controversy, raised by persons not sub­
ject to penalty or tax but who are dissatisfied with 
the way schools are dealing with the problem, we 
are likely . . .  to make the legal “ wall of separa­
tion between church and state”  as winding as the



18

famous serpentine wall designed by Mr. Jefferson 
for the University he founded.’ ”

This Court in the Brown Case arrived merely at the 
“ formulation of a relevant Constitutional principle.”  This 
Court should invoke immediate action by Congress to de­
clare and solve the variations of the controversy which are 
prevalent in the so-called “ segregated states”  — parti­
cularly in Arkansas.

Again it is appropriate to refer to the opinion of Judge 
Lemley in his “ separate but equal”  decision, Pitts v. Board 
of Trustees, where he said, 84 F. Supp. at 988:

“ In the last analysis, this case and others like 
it present problems which are more than judicial 
and which involve elements of public finance, school 
administration, politics and sociology . . . .  The 
federal courts are not school boards; they are not 
prepared to take over the administration of the pub­
lic schools of the several states; nor can they place 
themselves in the position of censors over the ad­
ministration of the schools by the duly appointed 
and qualified officials thereof, to whose judgment 
and good faith much must be left.”  See also Min­
er sville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586.

In the Pitts Case and other “ equal facilities”  cases 
like it, the Court had before it, insofar as enforcement is 
concerned, a much less complicated problem than the pres­
ent problem of integration of races. The magnitude and 
complexity of the integration problem dictates a legislative 
solution.

In the enactment of appropriate legislation under 
Section 5 of the Amendment, Congress could, and probably 
would, recognize the necessity of allowing school officials 
wide latitude of administrative discretion under the su­
pervision of a federal agency which would guarantee ulti­
mate integration. Congress could make adequate provi­



19

sions for variations in such matters as geographical peculi­
arities, increasing or decreasing enrollment in particular 
districts, ratios of enrollment as between white and negro 
children, population shifts and any other factors which 
Congress might consider to be relevant.

Under Section 5, Congress would undoubtedly have 
power to fix a definite future date for complete integra­
tion in the several districts which have heretofore operated 
under the segregated system; or Congress might provide 
that integration must be completed in all districts within 
a reasonable time — such reasonable time to be deter­
mined in the manner prescribed by Congress.

As said by Mr. Chief Justice Stone in Coleman v. 
Miller, 307 U. S. 433, 453,

“ The question of a reasonable time in many 
cases would involve, as in this case it does involve, 
an appraisal of a great variety of relevant condi­
tions, political, social and economic, which can hardly 
be said to be within the appropriate range of evi­
dence receivable in a court of justice and as to which 
it would be an extravagant extension of judicial au­
thority to assert judicial notice as the basis of de­
ciding a controversy with respect to the validity 
of an amendment actually ratified. On the other 
hand, these conditions are appropriate for the con­
sideration of the political departments of the Gov­
ernment. The questions they involve are essentially 
political and not justiciable. They can be decided 
by Congress with the full knowledge and apprecia­
tion ascribed to the national legislature of the po­
litical, social and economic conditions which have 
prevailed during the period since the submission of 
the amendment.”

It is submitted that so long as Congress confines its 
“ corrective”  legislation to state action which infringes 
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the



2 0

Fourteenth Amendment, Congress would be the “ guardian 
of its own conscience”  as to what legislation on the school 
integration subject is more or less “ appropriate.”  In fact, 
it has been noted that in other fields it has not been un­
common for Congress to leave detailed administration to 
state control and discretion so long as such control and 
discretion are kept within the framework dictated by fed­
eral law. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548, 
and Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341.

The Constitution has conferred upon Congress the 
power to secure equal educational opportunities in the 
public schools for all children regardless of race. If Con­
gress has failed and should continue to fail in exercising 
its powers whereby equal educational opportunity is denied 
by reason of state laws “ the remedy will ultimately be 
with the people.”  “ The Constitution has left the perform­
ance of many duties in our governmental scheme to depend 
on the fidelity of the executive and legislative action and, 
ultimately, on the vigilance of the people in exercising their 
political rights.”  Cole.grove v. Green, 328 U. S. 549, 556.

It is a. matter of particular interest here that on the 
very same day this Court decided the school segregation 
cases (May 17,1954) the Court also decided a very import­
ant case arising under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 60 
Stat. 842. The case was United States v. Gilman, 347 U. S. 
507. In construing the act, the unanimous Court, through 
Mr. Justice Douglas said, 347 U. S. at 511.

“ Here a complex of relations between fed­
eral agencies and their staffs is involved. More­
over, the claim now asserted, though the product of 
a law Congress passed, is a matter on which Congress 
has not taken a position. It presents questions of 
policy on which Congress has not spoken. The selec­
tion of that policy, which is most advantageous to 
the whole, involves a host of considerations that must



21

be weighed and appraised. That function is more 
appropriately for those who write the laws, rather 
than those who interpret them.”

In the instant cases the Court is most certainly deal­
ing with ‘ ‘ a complex of relations”  between the federal gov­
ernment on the one hand and the state governments on the 
other. The specific problem of implementing Section 1 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted by this Court is 
a matter on which Congress has not taken a position over 
a period of eighty-six years and presents serious “ ques­
tions of policy.”  The selection of policy relating to the 
integration of the races in public schools “ involves a host 
of considerations that must be weighed and appraised.”  
This Court should, in some appropriate manner, leave the 
details of the solution of the problem “ to those who write 
the laws.”

CONCLUSION

The point which is urged here with most emphasis is 
that a decree of this Court ordering immediate integration 
of the white and negro children would have a most dis­
astrous effect upon the public school system of Arkansas. 
Likewise, it would most seriously disrupt the efforts of 
the leaders of both races in solving the racial problem in 
Arkansas in all its various aspects. No person or court can 
predict at this time what the consequences would ultimately 
be. There is no need for immediate integration in the pub­
lic schools. It is not required by the Constitution.

The problem of integration of races in the public 
schools is of such magnitude that it can be solved effec­
tively only by a gradual process which would vary from 
locality to locality. It is probably safe to assert at this 
time that no person or group of persons — not even any 
court — has formulated any definite plan of integration



2 2

which would operate successfully in the school districts of 
Arkansas. As to the four cases now before the Court, 
the plan for integration in the districts which would be 
directly affected by those cases must, for the time being 
at least, be formulated, developed and finally concluded 
under the supervision and control of the courts of first 
instance. The decrees of this Court should accord to the 
lower courts the very widest range of discretion in bring­
ing about integration in a manner which will promote, 
rather than retard the ultimate solution of the whole 
problem.

Finally and most earnestly, it is urged that this Court, 
by a supplemental opinion, point out in no uncertain terms 
that the integration problem is one which should be solved 
hv Congress under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment. The American system of government being what it 
is, this Court cannot compel Congress to act. But cer­
tainly this Court can, by some appropriate suggestion, 
bring about prompt and appropriate action by that branch 
of the government in which the people themselves, by 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, lodged the power 
to adopt the appropriate plan to correct the conditions 
which, so this Court has said, the states have brought 
about in violation of the Amendment.

If the powers of this Court were not limited by the 
Constitution, the proper decrees of this Court in the pend­
ing cases would be to “ remand the cases”  to Congress 
with directions to take appropriate action. Lacking the 
power to command Congress, the next best tiling would be 
a most urgent invitation to Congress from this Court. It 
is such a course which this Court is asked to adopt to the 
very limit of its power. If the Court complies with this 
request, then the solution of the problem will rest where it



2 3

was intended by the Constitution that it should rest— 
with the Congress.

November 15,1954.

Respectfully submitted,

T om Gentry

Attorney General 
State of Arkansas 
State Capitol 
Little Rock, Arkansas

James L. Sloan

Assistant Attorney General 
State of Arkansas 
State Capitol 
Little Rock, Arkansas

R ichard B. M cCulloch

Special Asst. Attorney General 
State of Arkansas 
Forrest City, Arkansas



.

■

\



25

APPENDIX

ARKAN SAS SCHOOL ENROLLMENT 
1953-54 SESSION

Enrollment Annual Annual
COUNTY White Negro Total Receipts Disb'mls

Arkansas . . . 3,630 1,360 4,990 $ 891,277 $ 732,917
Ashley . . . . 3,963 2,367 6,330 1,018,902 895,782
Baxter . . . . 2,148 XXX 2,148 326,545 286,029
Benton . . . . 7,443 1 7,444 1,199,694 1,046,447
Boone ............ 3,516 XXX 3,516 488,271 483,435
Bradley . . . . 2,064 932 2,996 479,622 454,240
Calhoun . . . . 1,056 592 1,648 286,115 263,004
Carroll . . . . 2,240 XXX 2,240 330,165 315,957
Chicot............ 2,461 3,053 5,514 837,044 666,743
C la rk ............. 3,430 1,569 4,999 719,768 644,724
C la y ............... 5,899 XXX 5,899 712,092 695,944
Cleburne . . . 2,466 XXX 2,466 273,697 257,370
Cleveland . . . 1,546 526 2,072 353,646 333,275
Columbia . . . 3,679 2,807 6,486 1,010,188 927,011
Conway . . . . 2,721 1,211 3,932 535,174 489,141
Craighead . . . 11,264 295 11,559 1,502,603 1,389,577
Crawford . . . 5,147 87 5,234 647,874 635,714
Crittenden . . 4,012 6,909 10,921 1,254,324 1,052,578
C ross............. 4,106 1,985 6,091 797,101 731,553
Dallas . . . . 1,659 1,221 2,880 467,792 430,774
D esh a............ 3,426 3,078 6,504 824,451 730,117
D r e w ............. 2,237 1,366 3,603 544,724 463,941
Faulkner . . . 3,981 612 4,593 633,314 620,258
Franklin . . . 3,033 38 3,071 408,118 376,237
Fulton . . . . 1,728 XXX 1,728 243,406 232,057
Garland . . . . 8,045 910 8,955 1,449,747 1,392,016
Grant ............. 2,121 203 2,324 381,496 364,546
Greene . . . . 6,608 XXX 6,608 856,064 781,482



26

ARK AN SAS SCHOOL ENROLLMENT 

1953-54 SESSION

Enrollment Annual Annual
COUNTY White Negro Total Receipts Disb'mts

Hempstead . . 2,965 2,355 5,320 783,593 707,316
Hot Spring . . 4,860 744 5,604 1,020,340 877,411

Howard . . . . 2,333 809 3,142 511,605 449,967
Ind’p’nd’nce . 4,723 77 4,800 637,999 593,318
Izard .............. 2,093 14 2,107 240,407 224,549

Jackson . . . . 5,005 904 5,909 824,448 766,556
Jefferson . . . 8,869 8,025 16,894 2,353,543 2,038,288
Johnson . . . . 3,159 41 3,200 450,995 434,097

Lafayette . . . 1,629 1,614 3,243 560,538 480,749

Lawrence . . . 4,857 55 4,912 732,762 670,184

L e e ................. 2,316 3,552 5,868 626,368 537,960
Lincoln . . . . 1,744 1,887 3,631 544,104 470,376

Little River . 1,799 964 2,763 438,760 393,134

Logan ............ 3,230 169 3,399 558,614 482,709
Lonoke . . . . 4,518 1,428 5,946 829,476 723,716

Madison . . . . 2,640 XXX 2,640 277,237 266,346
Marion . . . . 1,516 XXX 1,516 254,566 232,608
M ille r ............ 5,927 2,106 8,033 1,143,452 1,027,337
Mississippi . . 13,218 4,789 18,007 2,366,353 2,302,446

Monroe . . . . 2,394 2,176 4,570 526,483 483,524

Montgomery 1,416 3 1,419 284,030 232,634

Nevada . . . . 1,893 1,498 3,391 588,702 494,588
Newton . . . . 1,946 XXX 1,946 220,148 212,226
Ouachita . . . 4,781 3,637 8,418 1,336,720 1,095,448
P e r r y ............. 1,297 48 1,345 221,272 190,383
Phillips . . . . 4,294 6,409 10,703 1,132,056 1,036,507

P ik e ............... 2,003 74 2,077 348,979 304,222
Poinsett . . . . 8,022 694 8,716 1,035,175 972,903
P o lk ............... 2,931 XXX 2,931 534,865 439,619
P o p e ............... 4,270 123 4,393 608,356 589,653



27

ARK AN SAS SCHOOL ENROLLMENT 

1953-54 SESSION

COUNTY
Enrollment

White Negro Total
Annual
Receipts

Annual
Disb'mts

Prairie . . . . 2,296 575 2,871 433,500 413,484
Pulaski . . . . 27,695 9,088 36,783 6,413,057 5,871,522
Randolph . . . 2,808 31 2,839 374,322 337,164
Saline . . . . . 4,800 88 4,888 791,254 729,381
Scott . . . . . 1,564 XXX 1,564 295,193 254,689
Searcy . . . . 2,200 XXX 2,200 278,123 266,129
Sebastian . . . 12,400 903 13,303 2,138,442 2,023,826
Sevier . . . . . 2,264 264 2,528 479,528 376,536
Sharp . . . . . 2,345 XXX 2,345 328,387 308,232
St. Francis . . 3,740 5,300 9,040 948,998 886,075
Stone . . . . . 1,590 XXX 1,590 194,428 182,477
Union . . . . . 7,524 4,325 11,849 2,264,543 1,892,648
Van Buren . 1,960 17 1,977 268,505 256,415
Washington . 9,299 64 9,363 1,262,843 1,213,977
White . . . . . 7,817 302 8,119 1,230,306 1,160,193
Woodruff . . . 2,552 1,946 4,498 553,958 544,544
Y e l l ............. . 2,910 90 3,000 539,774 477,755

TOTAL . . . . 314,041 98,310 412,351 $60,261,321 $54,618,690





Nos. 1, 8 , 10

Supreme Court of tfje Untteb States
OCTOBER TERM, 1953

BROWN, et al., A p p ella n ts

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, 
SHAWNEE COUNTY, KANSAS, et al..

A p p e llees

No. 1

BOLLING, et al.. P etition ers

V .
SHARPE, et al.. R esp on d en ts

No. 8

GEBHART, et al.. P etition ers

V.
BELTON, et al.. R esp on d en ts

No. 10

ON RE-ARGUMENT

BRIEF OF
AMERICAN VETERANS COMMITTEE, INC. (A. V. C.)

Amicus Curiae

Phineas I ndritz 
National Counsel 
Am erican Veterans Committee

November 30, 1953 
Washington, D. C.

P ress o r  B yron S. A d a m s . W ashington , D . C.





Preliminary statement.....................................................................  1

QUESTION 4 ........................................ 4

I. The nature of the r ig h t ...........................................................  4

II. When the children named as complainants should be ad­
mitted into nonsegregated schools.........................................  5

III. The elimination of racially segregated schools.................  5
A. Normal geographic school districting and choice of

schools....................................................................................  5
B. When is “ forthwith” .........................................................  7
C. Integration of these schools can and will be successfully

achieved ................................................................................  7
D. The law versus lawlessness...............................................  11

QUESTION 5 ...................................  11

I. What this Court’s decree should contain ............................. 12
II. The principles which should govern any “ gradualism”  

p o licy ............................................................................................ 13
III. The “ voluntary”  method of gradual adjustm ent............. 14
IY. “ Gradualism”  by the judiciary is unnecessary..............  15

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Qa s e s  :

Avery v. Georgia, 345 IT. S. 559 (1953) ................................................  16
Barrows v. Jaclcson, 346 U. S. 249 (1953) ...........................................  16
Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U. S. 28 (1948) ......................  16
Brotherhood o f Bailroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U. S. 768 (1952) .. 16
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60 (1917) .......................................4,11,16
Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 282 (1950) ..................................................  16
City o f Richmond v. Deans, 281 IT. S. 704 (1930) ................................. 16
District o f Columbia v. John B. Thompson Co., Inc., 346 U. S. 100

(1953)............................................................................................... 9,16
Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339 (1880) ..............................................  16
Farrington v. Tolcushige, 273 IT. S. 284 (1927) ....................................  6
Graham v. Brotherhood o f Locomotive Firemen 4  Enginemen, 338 U. S.

232 (1949) ........................................................................................ 16
Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U. 8. 668 (1927) .............................................  16
Henderson v. United States, 339 U. S. 816 (1950) ............................. 2,4,16

IN D EX
Page



ii Index Continued

Page

B ill  v. T exa s, 316 U. S. 400 (1942) .................................................................  16
H urd  v. H od g e, 334 U. S. 24 (1948) ............................................................. 16
L ane v. W ilson , 307 U. 8. 268 (1939) .............................................................  16
M cC a be v. A tch ison , T . #  S . F . B y . Co., 235 U. S. 151 (1914) ................. 4
M cLaurin  v. Oklahoma S ta te B eg sn ts , 339 IT. S. 637 (1950) ..................2,16
M issou ri ex  rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337 (1938) . . ....................... 4,16
M itchell v. U nited States, 313 U. S. 80 (1941) ............................................4,11
M orga n  v. Virginia, 328 U. S. 373 (1946) ....................................................  16
Oyam a  v. California, 332 U. S. 633 (1948) ..................................................  16
F ierce  v. S ociety o f  Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925) ........................................  6
F le ssy  v. F ergu son , 163 U. 8. 537 (1896) ......................................................  2,3
B ailw ay M ail A s s ’n. v. Corsi, 326 U. S. 88 (1945) ........................................  16
B ice v. E lm ore, 165 P. (2d) 387 (C. A. 4, 1947), cert. den. 333 U. 8.

875 (1 948)............................................................................................................ 16
Schnell v. D avis, 336 U. S. 933 (1949) ............................................................. 16
Shelley v. K ra em er, 334 TJ. S. 1 (1948) ................................................ 3, 4,11,16
Sipuel v. Board o f  B eg en ts , 332 IJ. S. 631 (1948) ........................................4,16
Sm ith  v. A llw righ t, 321 U. S. 649 (1944) ....................................................  16
S w ea tt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629 (1950) .................................................... 2,5,16
Takahaslii v. F ish  Game Com m ., 334 U. 8. 410 (1948) .......................  16
T erry  v. A da m s, 345 U. S. 461 (1953) .............................................................  16
U nited  S ta tes  v. Appalachian E lec. P ow er Co., 311 U. S. 377 (1940) . . . .  15
Virginia  v. B ives, 100 U. 8. 313 (1880) ......................................................... 16
Y ick  W o  v. H opkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886) ..................................................... 16

M iscellaneous :
Bustard, Joseph L., The N ew  J ersey  S to r y : T he D evelopm ent o f  Bacially  

In teg ra ted  Public Schools, 21 J. of Neg. Ed. 275 (Summer 1952) . . . .  17
D. C. Superintendent of Schools, B ep ort o f , to the B oard  o f  Education,

1952-1953  ..............................................................................................................  10
Prank, Can Courts Erase the Color L in e ? , 21 Journ. of Neg. Ed. 304

(1 9 5 2 )...................................................................................................................  11
Hearings, 1954 D. C. Appro. Bill (H.R. 5471), Senate Comm, on Appro.,

83rd Cong., 1st sess.............................................................................................. 9
Indritz, Phineas, Facial B am parts in the N a tio n ’s  Capital, 41 George­

town Law Journ. 297 (March 1953) .............................................................  8
Jans, Ralph T., Facial In tegra tion  at B erea  College, 195 0 -1 95 3 , 22 J. of

Neg. Edue. 26 (Winter 1953) .......................................................................... 16
Facial Violence and Civil B ig h ts  L aw  E n forcem en t, 18 U. of Chi. L.

Rev. 769 (1 9 5 1 )..................................................................................................  11
T im e Magazine, W h en  the B arriers F all, p. 40 (Aug. 31, 1953) ...............  16
W ashington  P o st, p. 1 (Nov. 26, 1953) .............................................................  8
Wertham, Frederic, P sych iatric O bservations on A bolition  o f  School 

Segregation , 26 J. of Educ. Soc. 333 (March 1953) ................................ 16



feupreme Court of tlje ^Hntteb States
OCTOBER TERM. 1953

BROWN, et al.. A p p ella n ts
V .

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, 
SHAWNEE COUNTY, KAN SAS, ei al..

A p p e llees

* No. 1

BOLLING, et al.. P etition ers
V .

SHARPE, et al.. R esp on d en ts
No. 8

GEBHART, et al.. P etition ers
V .

BELTON, et al„ R esp on d en ts
No. 10

ON RE-ARGUMENT

BRIEF OF
AMERICAN VETERANS COMMITTEE. INC. (A. V. C.)

Amicus Curiae

PRELIM INARY STATEMENT

The American Veterans Committee, Inc., is a nation­
wide organization of veterans who served honorably in the 
Armed Forces of the United States during World Wars I 
and II, and the Korean Conflict. During the 1952 Term,



we filed briefs, with consent of the parties, in two of the 
five school segregation cases now on reargument before 
this Court pursuant to the Court’s order of June 8, 1953 
(345 U. S. 972). Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 
No. 8, and Bolling v. Sharpe, No. 413, both in October Term, 
1952. In those briefs we urged the following points:

(a) That racial segregation imposed by State law in 
public schools violates the equal protection guarantee of 
the Fourteenth Amendment even where the discriminatory 
effect of the segregation can be described as solely 
psychological.

(b) That compulsory racial segregation in public schools 
cannot be supported under any proper test.

(c) That even if the Plessy postulate of “ reasonable”
racial segregation were applicable to public schooling and 
had any vitality at present,1 the segregation in these cases 
is unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional under the 
Plessy rule itself.

(d) That the right guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to be free from racial discrimination by 
governmental authority is so basic to our free society as 
to have become a right constitutionally accorded to free 
men under the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment 
to be free from arbitrary racial discrimination by the 
Federal Government or agencies acting under its authority, 
including the District of Columbia government.

(e) That this Court’s 1950 decisions in the Sweatt and 
McLaurin cases, dealing with racial segregation in educa­
tion at the graduate school level, require the elimination 
of racial segregation in public schools at the levels of

1 Our Brief in the Brown  case last term (No. 8 then, No. 1 now) 
reminded this Court that analyses dissecting the unsound founda­
tions of the majority opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 
(1896) are contained in the Briefs of the American Veterans Com­
mittee and the United States filed in the case of Henderson  v. 
United States, 339 U. S. 816 (1950), No. 25, Oct. Term, 1949.



3

education involved in the present cases (elementary, junior 
high, and senior high, school), inasmuch as the racial 
segregation at any of these levels produces educational 
handicaps for the colored students.

(f) That equality of educational opportunity cannot he
achieved within a racially segregated system.

(g) That the people are ready for and will accept racial 
integration in the public school systems.

In this brief on the reargument, we shall seek to present 
answers only on questions 4 and 5.

We have conducted researches on questions 1 and 2 
(relating to the history of the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment) which convince us that it was intended to 
forbid in every portion of our United States every distinc­
tion and difference in treatment by or under governmental 
authority which is based on race or color, and to make our 
Constitution, as Mr. Justice Harlan memorably described 
it, a Constitution which “ is color-blind, and neither knows 
nor tolerates classes among citizens.”  Plessy v. Ferguson, 
163 U. S. 537, 559 (1896).2 But we do not here recite the 
evidence or spell out the history—other briefs proffered 
to this Court will undoubtedly do so profusely.

As to question 3, we believe that our previous briefs in 
these cases adequately present our argument that this 
Court has the judicial power, and the duty, in construing 
the Fourteenth Amendment and its application to these 
cases, either directly or through the Due Process clause

2 The late Mr. Chief Justice Vinson stated this understanding 
for a unanimous Court as follows in Shelley v. Eraemer, 334 U. S. 
1, 23 (1948) :

“ The historical context in which the Fourteenth Amend­
ment became a part of the Constitution should not be forgot­
ten. Whatever else the framers sought to achieve, it is clear 
that the matter of primary concern was the establishment 
of equality in the enjoyment of basic civil and political rights 
and the preservation of those rights from discriminatory ac­
tion on the part of the States based on considerations of race 
or color.”



4

of the Fifth Amendment, to abolish racial segregation in 
public schools.

QUESTION 4
"4. Assuming ii is decided that segregation in public 

schools violates the Fourteenth Amendment
(a) would a decree necessarily fo llow  providing that, 

within the limits set by  normal geographic school dis­
tricting, Negro children should forthwith be admitted to 
schools of their choice, or

(b) may this Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, 
permit an effective gradual adjustment to be brought about 
from  existing segregated systems to a system not based on 
color distinctions?"

The assumption on which question 4 is based is that this 
Court has ruled that racial segregation in public schools 
violates the Constitution and that the Negro children in 
these cases are entitled to education in nonsegregated 
schools.

I. THE NATURE OF THE RIGHT

This Court has repeatedly held, in cases involving racial 
discrimination, that the constitutional rights asserted by 
an individual against whom the racial discrimination has 
been imposed by governmental authority are “ personal”  
rights, not group rights to be merged and averaged with 
the rights of all others of his race and then balanced 
against the rights of all white persons averaged as a group. 
Henderson v. United States, 339 U. S. 816, 825-826 (1950); 
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 22 (1948); Mitchell v. 
United States, 313 U. S. 80, 97 (1941); Buchanan v. Warley, 
245 U. S. 60, 80 (1917); McCabe v. Atchison, T. d  S. F. By. 
Co., 235 U. S. 151, 161-162 (1914); Missouri ex rel. Gaines 
v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337, 351 (1938). This Court has also 
ruled that the education which a State must provide for 
a Negro “ in conformity with the equal protection clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment”  must be provided for him 
“ as soon as”  it is provided for any white person. Sipuel 
v. Board of Regents, 332 U. S. 631 (1948). These rulings



5

were epitomized when this Court unanimously characterized 
the right to secure public education without uncon­
stitutional racial discrimination as “ personal and present.”  
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629, 635 (1950).

II. WHEN THE CHILDREN NAMED AS COM PLAINANTS 
SHOULD BE ADMITTED INTO NONSEGREGATED 

SCHOOLS.

In view of the rulings mentioned above, when this Court 
holds that racial segregation is unconstitutional, the Negro 
children who are complainants in these cases have a 
constitutional right to enter the schools which, on the basis 
of their age, educational level, residence, and other proper 
scholastic criteria, they could and would enter if they were 
labeled “ white”  instead of “ colored.”  I f the decision 
comes after the beginning of a school term, their right to 
equal (unsegregated) education “ as soon as”  others may 
have it becomes a right to enter that school not later than 
the beginning of the school term immediately following the 
entry of this Court’s mandate. Therefore, the minor 
Negro complainants in these cases should be allowed to 
enter the schools, and at the time, mentioned in this 
section.

III. THE ELIMINATION OF RACIALLY 
SEGREGATED SCHOOLS.

In the light of the answer in the preceding section, and 
since all the cases here involved are class actions, we 
interpret questions 4 and 5 as being directed, not to the 
admission of the Negro children whose names appear in 
the pleadings in these cases, but to the general matter of 
eliminating racially segregated public schools.

A. Normal geographic school districting and choice of
schools.

Question 4(a) seems to imply that a decree ordering 
admission of Negro children into schools heretofore 
attended solely by white children must necessarily refer



6

to normal geographic school districting and/or to 
admission of the children into “ schools of their choice.”

The administration of public school systems is not, and 
need not by this Court be, thus limited. These cases do not 
involve modes of administering the public schools, except 
at one point: that the governmental authorities make no 
racial distinctions between children in the operation of the 
public school system.

The easiest way to operate a normal public school system 
without racial distinctions is by assigning children to 
schools according to their residence within normal geo­
graphic school zones. It is a factual, impersonal, and tra­
ditional criterion in administering public schools. It tends to 
reflect the normal neighborhood pattern, it permits easier 
programming of school and community needs, and it avoids 
the imbalance between schools which results from unre­
strained migration of pupils. Nevertheless, we do not con­
tend that the Constitutional guarantee of equal protection 
of the laws requires that hoards of education he compelled 
to admit children into schools solely on geographic bases, or 
that the boards he compelled to permit, or he enjoined from 
permitting, each child to “ choose”  which of several public 
schools he will attend. Cf. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 
268 U. S. 510 (1925); Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U. S. 
284, 298 (1927). These are matters of public school 
administration which are committed to the sound judgment 
of school officials; they are not matters to he regulated by 
judicial decree.

We say only that the public school authorities, no matter 
what distinctions they draw based on educational factors, 
community residence, local circumstances, or other 
grounds, may not distinguish between children on the basis 
of their racial ancestry. Accordingly, we recommend that 
this Court’s decree, issued upon the holding that racial 
segregation in the public schools is unconstitutional, 
(a) simply forbid the school authorities from making 
racial distinctions or differences in treatment on the basis 
of race or color, by way of segregation or otherwise, in the



7

administration of the public school system, and (b) make 
no requirements, one way or the other, with respect to 
geographic school zones or choice by children as to which 
school they will attend.

B. When is “forthwith.”

Question 4(a) refers to the “ forthwith”  admission of 
Negro children into public schools (presumably schools 
previously attended solely by white children). We do not 
understand the word “ forthwith”  as meaning the day after 
this Court’s decree is issued. Even the best run school 
system will require some time to adjust its records, 
facilities and other administrative affairs from the 
artificial patterns imposed by the segregated system to an 
integrated system which deals with children as children 
rather than as colors ranging from Caucasoid pink to 
ebony. Presumably, however, this Court will announce 
its decisions in these cases during Term time which 
generally has been between October and June. We would 
suppose that the school authorities in these cases could 
make the necessary adjustments during the months pre­
ceding the opening of schools in September.

We have no doubt, if an additional school term is re­
quired to enable the school authorities to change from the 
segregated to an integrated system, that the equity power 
of our judicial system is sufficiently comprehensive and 
flexible to permit such an adjustment. But we urge that 
if this Court frames its decree to permit the court of first 
instance to allow such additional time, the decree 
specifically impose upon the school authorities the burden 
of proving, by substantial and probative evidence pre­
sented to that court, the need for such additional time.

C. Integration of these schools can and will be successfully
achieved

We cannot visualize what unusual circumstances may 
require delay in integration beyond the opening of the 
school term following this Court’s announcement of its



8

decisions that segregation in public school education is 
unconstitutional. The Delaware schools involved in 
No. 10 (Gebhart v. Belton) are now integrated and operate 
without difficulty; and the Attorney General of Delaware 
candidly concedes that the Delaware authorities “ do not 
anticipate any serious problems of adjustment”  (Brief for 
Petitioners on Reargument in Gebhart v. Belton, No. 10, 
p. 44). The Kansas schools involved in No. 1 (Brown v. 
Board of Education of Topeka) can admittedly be in­
tegrated without difficulty; not only did the Assistant 
Attorney General of Kansas say so last Term at the Bar 
of this Court, but the Board of Education of Topeka has 
already integrated some of the schools here involved.

The District of Columbia picture is equally clear. We 
are confident, on the basis of close and considerable 
analysis of, and experience with, the District of Columbia 
milieu, that integration of its dual school system could, 
when the legal bars are removed, proceed rapidly, peace­
fully, and successfully. Indeed, so rapidly has integration 
advanced in the District that public school segregation is 
quite out of tune with the rest of the community.3

Intimations that violence beyond the control of the 
District of Columbia authorities would result from de­
segregation of its schools, such as were contained in the 
brief filed last Term by the respondents in the Bolling 
case referring (at p. 23) to “ attitudes which are 
antipathetical to the co-mingling of the races in schools 
or otherwise”  and stating that “ racial tensions exist and 
racial clashes have occurred considerably further north,”  
are simply without substance.

It is significant that this Court’s recent decision ending 
racial segregation in the public restaurants of the District

3 Phineas Indritz, Racial Ramparts in the Nation’s Capital, 41 
Georgetown Law Journ. 297 (March 1953). Just yesterday (Nov. 
25, 1953) the District Commissioners issued an Order forbidding 
racial distinctions, in practically all agencies under their direct 
control, concerning employees and use of public facilities and 
services. Washington Post, p. 1 (Nov. 26, 1953).



9

of Columbia was followed by complete acceptance of non­
segregation without any disturbances or friction. 
District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., Inc., 346 
U. S. 100 (June 8, 1953).

The District’s peaceful acceptance of integration in other 
equally “ sensitive”  areas such as swimming pools, 
theatres, private and parochial schools, parks, play areas, 
department stores, etc., in all public buildings, and in many 
other areas of daily living, demonstrates how flimsy is any 
intimation of possible violence. See article cited in foot­
note 3.

Indeed, the school officials of the District of Columbia 
have already devoted considerable study to the “ plans, 
procedures and techniques of transition from ”  the 
segregated to a nonsegregated system if and when this 
Court decides that racial segregation in public schools is 
unconstitutional.4 The Superintendent of D. C. schools

4 In our previous Brief (pp. 7-8, in Bolling v. Sharpe, No. 413, 
Oct. Term, 1952) we suggested that the District of Columbia 
Board of Education “ is striving to mitigate the many racial in­
equalities in the school system.”

We now confess error as to this statement. We had relied on 
the accuracy of the self-serving statements by the Superintendent 
of Schools that all possible efforts were being made to eliminate the 
shortages of teachers and other inequalities in Division 2 (colored). 
Events during the past year make it appear that the Board’s 
efforts are simply to relieve the extraordinary pressures of the 
most glaring deficiencies in that Division. They are not intended 
to “ equalize”  the facilities between Division 1 and Division 2. This 
has been admitted by the Superintendent of Schools. See Hearings 
on 1954 D. C. Appropriation bill (H.R. 5471), Subcom. of Senate 
Comm, on Appro., 83rd Cong., 1st sess., p. 172. Even if they would, 
the District authorities cannot follow in the footsteps of those 
State authorities who seek to avoid the legal repudiation of the 
Plessy doctrine by promising to spend millions of dollars to pro­
vide “ separate and equal”  facilities. A  charitable view, perhaps, 
is that the District Board of Education realizes that equalization 
is impossible within the segregated system and therefore is simply 
marking time until this Court removes the legal bar to integration. 
The result, however, is that the Board has sloughed onto this 
Court the burden and responsibility for establishing moral treat­
ment of the District’s school children which the Board itself ought 
to carry.



10

characterized as “ very helpful”  and “ thoughtful”  the 
160 written statements submitted by “ the organized 
citizenry of Washington”  when the Board of Education 
invited “ statements expressing their ideas on the 
mechanics of integration of the schools should the present 
system of segregation be abolished by the Supreme Court’s 
decision, and also on the methods to be employed to 
educate the public for any change which may be required.”  
“ The Superintendent and the officers will not be 
unprepared in the event that major changes in the organ­
ization are required.”  Public Schools of the District of 
Columbia, Report of the Superintendent of Schools to the 
Board of Education, 1952-1953, pp. iii-iv (emphasis 
supplied).

The other two cases here involved, which arise from 
Virginia and South Carolina, do not require different 
treatment by this Court. Significantly, although the 
appellees in the Virginia case (Davis v. County School 
Board of Prince Edward County, No. 4) stated that 
segregation was designed to prevent violence and reduce 
resentment, they frankly admitted that “ The passage of 
time has removed violence and substantially removed 
resentment in Virginia.”  Brief for Appellees, No. 191, 
Oct. Term, 1952, p. 17. In South Carolina, integration 
of the public schools will involve a greater emotional ad­
justment than in the other cases. But we believe the 
people of South Carolina can and will make that adjust­
ment. The events of World War II and its aftermaths 
have in the past several years brought about a vast 
reorientation of the community attitudes which formerly 
buttressed racial segregation. More and more, the people 
of the South are striving to discard the discriminations 
which grew from previous prejudices.43 In ever growing

4a A  notable example was the election, in the spring of 1953, of a 
Negro (Dr. Rufus E. Clement, President of Atlanta University) 
to the Board of Education of Atlanta, Georgia. He carried 8 "of 
the City’s 9 wards, in an election where the white voters outnum­
bered the colored voters, 92,000 to 18,000.



11

degree it is apparent that they would travel even faster 
toward that objective were it not for the lag of the law.

South Carolinians respect the Constitution. They will, 
under a positive ruling hy the highest Court of the land 
that racial segregation is unconstitutional, comply with 
that ruling in their public schools. The more positive the 
ruling, the greater will be its acceptance.

D. The law versus lawlessness.

In any event, the possibility of local incident due to 
racial friction, would provide, as this Court has time and 
again reiterated, no relevant legal basis for depriving law 
abiding persons of their legal rights. Buchanan v. Warley, 
245 U. S. 60, 80-81 (1917); Mitchell v. United States, 313 
U. S. 80, 97 (1941); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 21 
(1948). The Constitution does not surrender to 
hooliganism; and there is no need to do so. Racial Violence 
and Civil Rights Law Enforcement, 18 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 
769 (1951); Frank, Can Courts Erase the Color Line?, 21 
Journ. of Negro Educ. 304, 309-310 (1952).

QUESTION 5
"5. On the assumption on which questions 4(a) and (b) 

are based, and assuming further that this Court w ill exer­
cise its equity powers to the end described in question 4(b).

(a) should this Court formulate detailed decrees in 
these cases;

(b) if so, what specific issues should the decrees reach;
(c) should this Court appoint a special master to hear 

evidence with a view  to recommending specific terms for 
such decrees;

(d) should this Court remand to the courts of first in­
stance with directions to frame decrees in these cases, 
and if so what general directions should the decrees of 
this Court include and what procedures should the 
courts of first instance follow  in arriving at the specific 
terms of more detailed decrees?"



12

I. W HAT THIS COURT'S DECREE SHOULD CONTAIN
This Court should not undertake, either itself or 

vicariously through a special master, a detailed study of 
local conditions and educational problems such as would 
be necessary to formulate the specific terms of decrees 
which will foresee and meet every possible contingency 
concerning the many individuals and circumstances 
involved in the readjustment of school districts, educational 
methods, patterns of pupil attendance, etc., to meet the 
over-riding requirements of the Constitution. Such 
problems, if submitted to the judicial ken at all, are 
properly the initial concern of courts of first instance 
which, whatever their lack concerning great constitutional 
issues, are more appropriate tribunals for dealing with 
local problems. But even the courts of first instance can­
not meet all problems in an identical way. Differences in 
facts and unforeseen circumstances may compel variations 
in approach, both in substance and procedure. We there­
fore think this Court should remand these cases to the 
courts of first instance with only the following directions:

(a) That the courts of first instance order and enjoin 
the respective boards of education:

(1) to admit and educate the named minor com­
plainants in these cases, if then qualified in all respects 
that a white child would he qualified, and without 
regard to his race or color, in such school as a white 
child similarly situated would he admitted and 
educated; the admission to be made at the beginning 
of the school term immediately following the issuance 
of this Court’s decision.®

(2) to refrain, in the administration of their 
respective school systems, from making any dis- 5

5 Such a provision would apparently be moot in No. 1 (Brown 
v. Board of Education o f Topeka) and No. 10 ( Gebhart v. Belton), 
to the extent that the complainants in those cases have already been 
admitted to unsegregated education.



1 3

tinction, or providing any difference in treatment or 
education, solely on the basis of race or color, with 
respect to any pupil or any child who seeks admission 
in any school as a pupil; this injunction to become 
effective immediately prior to the beginning of the 
school term next following the issuance of this Court’s 
decision.

(b) That the court of first instance retain jurisdiction 
of the cases, at least during the period of transition, to 
deal, upon motion by either side, with any special 
problems which may arise in complying with the provisions 
mentioned above.

II. THE PRINCIPLES WHICH SHOULD GOVERN 
AN Y "G RAD U ALISM " POLICY.

The suggestions and recommendations we have just 
made are based on the thesis that effective adjustment to 
a nonsegregated system does not require detailed 
administrative supervision by this Court or any special 
limitations to slow down the normal functioning of its 
decree. But if this Court determines that “ an effective 
gradual adjustment . . .  to a system not based on color 
distinctions”  requires slower implementation of its 
decision holding racial segregation in public schools 
unconstitutional,6 we urge that this Court apply such 
“ gradualism”  policy in a manner (a) that would not 
deprive any individual child of its personal and present 
rights under our fundamental Charter of Liberties, and 
(b) that would not serve local bodies with an, excuse for 
interminably dragging their heels.

6 As indicated above, we assume that Questions 4 and 5 were 
intended to apply to the admission, not of the named complainants, 
but only of those members of the class not named as parties in 
these cases. In any event, we think that the principles mentioned 
in the text of this section require granting to the named com­
plainants the relief urged in section II of our answers to Question
4. To delay the complainants’ enjoyment of their rights after this 
Court has announced their rights would be to deny them their 
rights.



14

III. THE "V O LU N TA R Y" METHOD OF 
GRADU AL ADJUSTMENT.

One method which may slow down the process of 
integration without violating the rights of individual 
children, or operating on a 1000 years schedule, is to 
permit school boards to operate without readjustment 
until such time as children desiring integrated education 
apply for admission to schools hitherto attended by 
children of another race. In many areas, there may be a 
diffidence to voluntary mixing of school children hereto­
fore separately educated which may result in slower 
integration than would occur where the compulsory school 
attendance laws are invoked to aid integration. When a 
child applies for admission to a school theretofore 
attended by children of other races, the process of re­
adjustment to integration will and should begin. What­
ever problems may arise can and should he dealt with 
then. The duty of the school authorities is to maintain 
orderly school programs without regard to race or color, 
and to refrain from denying admission to any child in any 
school, and from treating any child differently, at any 
time, on the basis of race or color.

One advantage of this “ voluntary”  method of achieving 
gradual adjustment is that it would lean heavily on the 
state of readiness each local community may have for 
integration. One of its disadvantages would be the 
tendency to substitute the irresponsibility and uncertainty 
of “ mores”  for orderly application of the compulsory 
school laws in the context of constitutional requirements.

All other methods of gradual adjustment to racial in­
tegration of the public schools which we have considered 
either violate one or both of the principles mentioned in 
the preceding section, or are, we think, appropriate only 
for administrative or community action. Thus, procedures 
such as integrating only a limited and specific number of 
schools, or grades, per year, would wholly disregard the 
rights and needs of individual children seeking non-



15

segregated education. Moreover, authorizing such 
arbitrary methods would encourage evasiveness and 
procrastination in conforming to the requirements of the 
Constitution. The techniques of intercultural education, 
use of media of mass communication, training of police, 
teachers and administrators, etc., are obviously not 
appropriate for utilization in judicial decrees.

We repeat and stand firm on our recommendations (a) 
that this Court refrain from formulating detailed decrees 
in these cases either sua sponte or upon recommendations 
by a special master, and (b) that the task of monitoring 
“ gradual adjustment” , if it is to he undertaken by the 
judiciary, be delegated to courts of first instance with their 
larger familiarity with local conditions, subject to appellate 
review of any error committed.

This Court’s decrees should, wTe urge, follow the 
principles discussed above, but not attempt beyond that 
to circumscribe narrowly either the terms of the lower 
courts’ decrees or their procedures in arriving at specific 
terms. We concur with the Attorney General of Delaware 
that “ the details”  of gradual adjustment “ cannot be 
worked out in a vacuum; and if this Court, or any lower 
Court, should attempt at this time to work out a general 
scheme, it would probably create more problems than it 
would solve.”  Brief for Petitioners on Reargument in 
Gebhart v. Belton, No. 10, p. 44. The dynamics of integra­
tion require much flexibility; and it is elementary that 
“ courts deal with concrete legal issues, presented in actual 
cases, not abstractions.”  United States v. Appalachian 
Elec. Power Go., 311 U. S. 377, 423 (1940). IV.

IV. "G R A D U A LISM " BY THE JUDICIARY 
IS UNNECESSARY.

We desire to emphasize that the above suggestions con­
cerning “ gradual adjustment” , sincerely made by us to 
aid this Court if it chooses to follow such a policy, are not, 
in our opinion, indispensable for effective adjustment to



16

integrated education. We think it is unnecessary for this 
Court to espouse a formal policy of “ gradualism”  now. 
It was not deemed necessary, and its absence produced 
no difficulties, when this Court decreed the end of racial 
discrimination, whether by segregation or otherwise, 
in voting,7 interstate travel,8 land ownership,9 D. C. 
restaurants,10 employment,11 graduate education,12 jury 
service,13 etc.

Experience shows that “ wherever segregation has been 
abolished, no blood has flowed.” 14 The experience of 
public school integration in New Jersey following the 
adoption in 1947 of a constitutional provision forbidding 
segregated schools is particularly instructive. Desegrega­
tion was by constitutional command. Of many different 
methods used in the various communities to integrate the

7 Sm ith  v. Allw right, 321 U. S. 649 (1944); Schnell v. D avis, 336 U. S. 933 
(1949); T erry  v. A da m s, 345 XT. S. 461 (1953) ; L an e v . W ilson , 307 U. S. 268 
(1939); B ice v. E lm ore, 165 F. (2d) 387 (C.A. 4, 1947), cert. den. 333 IT. S. 
875 (1948).

8 H en derson  v. U nited  S ta tes, 339 U. S. 816 (1950); M organ  v. Virginia, 
328 U. S. 373 (1946) ; B o b -L o  E xcu rsion  Co. v. M ichigan, 333 U. S. 28 (1948).

» Shelley v. K ra em er, 334 IT. S. 1 (1948); H urd  v. H o d g e , 334 IT. S. 24
(1948) ; Buchanan v. W a rley , 245 U. S. 60 (1917); H arm on  v. T yler , 273 
IT. S. 668 (1927); C ity  o f  Richm ond  v. D eans, 281 IT. S. 704 (1930) ; Barrows 
v. Jackson, 346 IT. S. 249 (1953); O yam a  v. California, 332 U. S. 633 (1948).

10 D istrict o f  Columbia v. John B . Thom pson Co., In c ., 346 IT. S. 100 (1953).
11 B ailw ay M ail A s s ’n. v. Corsi, 326 IT. S. 88 (1945); T ick  W o  v. H opkins, 

118 IT. S. 356 (1886) ; Takahashi v. F ish  $  Game C om m ., 334 U. S. 410 (1948); 
Graham  v. B rotherhood o f  L ocom otive F irem en  E nginem en, 338 IT. S. 232
(1949) ; Brotherhood o f  Railroad Trainm en  v. H ow ard , 343 U. S. 768 (1952).

12 S w ea tt v. Painter, 339 IT. S. 629 (1950); M cL a u rin  v. Oklahoma State 
R egen ts, 339 IT. S. 637 (1950); Sipuel v. B oard  o f  R egen ts, 332 IT. S. 631 
(1948); M issouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 IT. S. 337 (1938).

is  E x  parte Virginia , 100 IT. S. 339 (1880); Virginia  v. R ives, 100 IT. S. 
313 (1880); H ill v. T exas, 316 IT. S. 400 (1942); Cassell v. T exas, 339 IT. S. 
282 (1950); A v e r y  v. Georgia, 345 IT. S. 559 (1953).

li T im e magazine, W h en  the B arriers F all, p. 40 (Aug. 31, 1953) ; Frederic 
Wertham, Psychiatric O bservations on A bolition  o f  School Segregation , 26 J. 
of Educ. Soc. 333 (March 1953); Balph T. Jans, Racial In tegra tion  at Berea  
College, 1950 -1953, 22 J. of Neg. Ed. 26 (Winter 1953).



17

public schools, no single formula outranked the others in 
effectiveness. What the New Jersey experience proved 
was “ that the best way to integrate is to do it.” 15

Respectfully submitted,

A merican V eterans Committee, I nc.
Amicus Curiae

By P hineas I ndritz 
National Counsel 
American Veterans Committee

November 30, 1953 
Washington, D. C.

15 Joseph L. Bustard, The N ew  J ersey  S to r y : The D evelopm en t o f  Racially 
Integrated Public Schools, 21 J. of Neg. Ed. 275, 285 (Summer 1952).





O f f i c e  -Suprem e Court, 
F - I L U D

OCT 13 1952

:?.E cr.c-rL£Y

m  THE

(Enurt at tfje BtnUa
October T erm, A. D. 1952.

No. 8

OLIVER BROWN, MRS. RICHARD LAWTON, 
MRS. SADIE EMMANUEL, et al.,

Appellants,
vs.

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, 
SHAWNEE COUNTY, KANSAS, et al,

Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Kansas.

BRIEF OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF 
TEACHERS AS AMICUS CURIAE.

JOHN LIGTENBERG,
Counsel for

American Federation of Teachers.
Selma M. B orchardt,

Of Counsel.

C H A M P U N -S H E A L Y  C O M P A N Y , C H I C A « 0 < a«o





I N D E X .

PAGE

Motion for Leave to File Brief as amicus curiae.......... 1

Brief of the American Federation of Teachers as
amicus curiae ................................................................ 3

Opinions Below ........................................................  4
Statutes Involved......................................................  4
Question Presented ..................................................  4
Statement.................................................................... 4

Summary of A rgum ent:..................................................  4

Argument:
I. The Statutes of Kansas, Providing for segrega­

tion of students in the public schools, violates 
the requirements of the equal protection clause 
of the 14th Amendment. The doctrine of “ sepa­
rate but equal facilities” is fallacious............... 5

II. Segregation in public schools inevitably results 
in inferior educational opportunities for the 
Negro ...................................................................... 9

III. Segregation in public schools of learning de­
prives the Negro student of an important ele­
ment of the education process and he is thereby 
denied the equal educational opportunities man­
dated by the Fourteenth Amendment..................  11

Conclusion ............................................................................  15



Table of Cases.

Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, registrar, 305 U. S.
337, 344 ........................... ...............................................  6

Oyaraa v. California, 332 U. S. 633, 640, 646 ................ 6
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 550 ......................... 5, 6,7
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 .....................................  6, 8
Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the University of Okla­

homa, 332 U. S. 631........................................................  6
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, 332 U. S. 410 6
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629 .......................................  7
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U. S. 637... 7, 8

Statutes.

See Appellants’ Briefs.

M iscellaneous.

Deutscher, Max, and Isidor Chain, The Psychological 
Effects of Enforced Segregation: A Survey of Social 
Science Opinion, Journal of Psychology, 1948-26, pp. 
259-287 ............................................................................ 13

Hartmann, George W., Educational Psychology, Fore­
word, p. VI, American Book Co., 1940 .......................  12

Journal of Negro Education, Summer 1947.................. 10
Judd, Charles H., Educational Psychology, p. 3, Hough­

ton Mifflin, 1939 ..............................................................  12
Lewin Kurt, “ Resolving Social Conflicts,” pp. 174 and 

214, Harper & Bros., 1948 ............................................. 13
National Survey of the Higher Education of Negroes,

Vol. 1 ................................................................................ 10
Negro Year Book, Tuskegee Institute, 1947. “ The Ne­

gro and Education,” p. 56. W. Harden Hughes.......... 9
Public School Expenditures, Dr. John Norton and Dr. 

Eugene S. Lawler, American Council on Education,
1944 ...................................................................... 10



111

Socio-Economic Approach to Educational Problems, 
Misc. No. 6, Vol. 1, p. 1, Federal Security Agency,
U. S. Office of Education, Wash., 1942 .......................  11

The Black & White of Rejections for Military Service, 
American Teachers Assn. Studies, ATA Montgom­
ery, Ala., 1944 ................................................................  10

The Legal Status of the Negro (p. 134), Charles S. 
Mangum, Jr., Chapel Hill University of N. C. Press,
1940 ..................................................................................... 9

Vocational Education and Guidance of Negroes, Bulle­
tin No. 38,1937, U. S. Dept, of Interior, Office of Edu­
cation, p. 1 3 .......................................................................  9





1ST THE

§uprmT (Umirl 0! tlfp Mnitrb States
October T erm, A. D. 1952.

No. 8

OLIVER BROWN, MRS. RICHARD LAWTON, 
MRS. SADIE EMMANUEL, et al.,

Appellants,
vs.

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, 
SHAWNEE COUNTY, KANSAS, et al,

Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Kansas.

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF 
AMICUS CURIAE.

To the Honorable Chief Justice and Associate 
Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States. 
The undersigned as counsel for and on behalf of Amer­

ican Federation of Teachers, respectfully moves this Hon­
orable Court for leave to file the accompanying brief as 
Amicus Curiae. Consent has been given by counsel for ap­
pellants and appellees. The letters giving such consent 
accompany this brief.



2

The American Federation of Teachers is an organiza­
tion of more than 350 locals of 60,000 teachers throughout 
the country, committed to a policy of “Democracy in Educa­
tion—Education for Democracy” . Its membership consists 
chiefly of classroom teachers who do the actual work of 
teaching the children in the nation’s schools.

In its own affairs it is committed to a practice of com­
plete equality and non-segregation between teachers of 
every race. Its Constitution provides:

“ Section 11 (of Article III). No discrimination shall 
ever be shown toward individual members, or appli­
cants for membership because of race * *

It has worked unceasingly throughout its history, and 
with greater intensity in recent years, for the abolition of 
all forms of discrimination and segregation in education 
based on racial differences.

Its members, as shown by the proceedings of its national 
conventions, have repeatedly asserted a fixed opinion that 
segregated school systems are a basic violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

John L igtenberg,

Counsel for the American Federation 
of Teachers.

Selma M. B orchardt,
Of Counsel.



IN THE

(Hmtrt nf tl?r Mnttr5 States
October T erm, A. D. 1952.

No. 8

OLIVER BROWN, MRS. RICHARD LAWTON, 
MRS. SADIE EMMANUEL, et al.,

vs.
Appellants,

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, 
SHAWNEE COUNTY, KANSAS, et al,

Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Kansas.

BRIEF OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF 
TEACHERS AS AMICUS CURIAE.

The American Federation of Teachers submits this brief 
as amicus curiae in view of the great importance to de­
mocracy and the cause of education of the constitutional 
issue involved in these cases.

Opinions Below.

Statutes Involved.

The opinions below and the statutes involved are set out 
in the brief of the appellants.



4

Question Presented.

The general question presented by this appeal is whether 
the State of Kansas is violating the mandates of the 
Fourteenth Amendment by its practice of maintaining 
separate schools for the education of white and colored 
children.

Statement.

This is a class action in which plaintiffs seek a decree 
declaring Section 72-1724 of the General Statutes of Kan­
sas, 1949 to be unconstitutional insofar as it empowers 
the Board of Education of the City of Topeka “ to organize 
and maintain separate schools for the education of white 
and colored children.”

Pursuant to this statute, the City of Topeka, Kansas, has 
established and maintains a segregated system of schools 
for the first six grades. The City of Topeka is one school 
district. The district maintains eighteen schools for white 
children and four for colored children.

The case was heard by a three judge statutory court. 
The court found as a fact that the facilities in the schools 
for colored children were substantially equal. Hence the 
issue here is whether segregation of children in the grade 
schools is per se a denial of equal protection of the laws.

Summary of Argument.

In this brief amicus curiae the American Federation of 
Teachers will argue that segregation in the schools violates 
basic principles of the educational process; that Negroes 
forced by state law to attend segregated schools are, by 
virtue of such segregation denied the equal protection of 
the laws, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,



5

A R G U M E N T .

I .

The Statute of Kansas, providing for segregation of stu­
dents in the Public Schools, violates the requirements of 
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment. The doctrine of “ Separate but Equal” facilities 
is fallacious.

The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, in Sec­
tion 1, provides:

“ All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are cit­
izens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State de­
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

The Fourteenth Amendment made Negroes citizens of 
the United States and was intended further to protect them 
fully in the exercise of their rights and privileges. To 
make sure that this intent was fully known, Congress re­
fused to readmit Southern States or seat their representa­
tives until the states accepted the Fourteenth Amendment.

Its adoption, however, did not stop the practice of segre­
gation in the Southern States, and when that issue was pre­
sented to this Court in 1896, in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 
537, 550 (1896), involving a Louisiana statute which re­
quired separation of Negro and white passengers, this 
Court said:

“ . . . We cannot say that a law which authorizes or 
even requires the separation of the two races in public



6
conveyances is unreasonable, or more obnoxious to 
the Fourteenth Amendment than the acts of Congress 
requiring separate schools for colored children in the 
District of Columbia, the constitutionality of which 
does not seem to have been qustioned, or the corre­
sponding acts of state legislatures.”

In Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, registrar, 305 U. S. 
337, 349, this Court said:

“ The admissibility of laws separating the races in 
the enjoyment of privileges afforded by the State rests 
wholly upon the equality of the privileges which the 
laws give to the separated groups within the State.”

Recently, the doctrine of “ separate by equal” facilities 
expressed in the Plessy and Gaines cases was held to be a 
menace to American democracy and indefensible by the 
President’s Committee on Civil Rights which unequivocally 
advocated that it be eliminated. In its report, the Commit­
tee said:

“ The separate but equal doctrine has failed in three 
important respects. First, it is inconsistent with the 
fundamental equalitarianism of the American way of 
life in that it marks groups with the brand of inferior 
status. Secondly, where it has been followed, the re­
sults have been separate and unequal facilities for mi­
nority peoples. Finally it has kept people apart de­
spite incontrovertible evidence that an environment 
favorable to civil rights is fostered whenever groups 
are permitted to live and work together. There is no 
adequate defense of segregation.” *

Furthermore, recent decisions of this Court enunciate 
principles in conflict with the rationale of the Plessy and 
Gaines cases. These include: Takahashi v. Fish <& Game 
Commission, 332 U. S. 410; Oyarna v. California; 332 U. S. 
633, 640, 646 (1948); Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the Uni­
versity of Oklahoma, 332 U. S. 631 (1948); Shelley v. 
Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948).



7

In the Shelley case, this court, in considering private 
agreements to exclude persons of designated race or color 
from the use or occupancy of real estate for residential pur­
poses and holding that it was violative of the equal protec­
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for state courts 
to enforce them said (at p. 23):

“ The historical context in which the Fourteenth 
Amendment became a part of the Constitution should 
not be forgotten. Whatever else the framers sought to 
achieve, it is clear that the matter of primary concern 
was the establishment of equality in the enjoyment of 
basic civil and political rights and the preservation of 
those rights from discriminatory action on the part of 
the States based on considerations of race or color.”

These principles cast doubt on the soundness of the rule 
laid down in the Plessy and Gaines cases. We submit that 
it should no longer be followed.

Nowhere has the fallacy of the doctrine of “ separate but 
equal” facilities been more apparent than in the grade and 
high schools of the country. Elsewhere, in this brief we 
shall point out the sociological effects of this practice.

In Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629, 70 S. Ct. Rep. 848, the 
court held that a separate law school established by Texas 
for Negro students could not be the equal of the University 
of Texas Law School.

In McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U. S. 637, 
70 S. Ct. Rep. 851, the court held that the requirements of 
state law that the instruction of a Negro graduate student 
in the University of Oklahoma be “ upon a segregated basis” 
deprived the appellant in that case of his personal and 
present right to the equal protection of the laws.

There is no reason in experience for applying a different 
logic to children in grade and high schools. As the court



8

there said, our society grows increasingly complex and our 
need for trained leaders increases correspondingly.

We cannot give separate training to two segments of so­
ciety and then expect that some magic will merge the indi­
vidual from these segments into equal citizens having equal 
opportunities.

It is a mockery to say that those who aspire to teach 
and lead must have equal opportunity regardless of race, 
and still condemn to inequality those they are to teach 
and lead.

Ninety years of segregated schools demand the historical 
judgment that separate facilities are inevitably unequal 
and are not the way to equal opportunity.

In the segregated school system the growing citizen 
never has the chance to show his equal ability; he never 
has the

“ opportunity to secure acceptance by his fellow stu­
dents on his own merits.” McLaurin v. Oklahoma 
State Regents, 339 U. S. 637, 641.

He must wait until he has finished what schooling he gets 
before he enters the competition. For him “ the personal 
and present right to the equal protection of the laws”  is 
of as great practical importance as for the graduate 
student.

The Fourteenth Amendment is not for law students and 
postgraduates alone. It is meaningless if it does not apply 
to all children from the first day they enter the public 
schools.

To paraphrase the decision in the Shelley case, it seems 
to us that the segregation of students in public education 
as required by the Kansas Statute, violates the primary ob­
ject of the Fourteenth Amendment : “ . . . the establishment 
of equality in the enjoyment of basic civil and political



9

rights and the preservation of those rights from discrim­
inatory action on the part of the States based on consid­
erations of race or color.”

I I .

Segregation in public schools inevitably results in inferior 
educational opportunities for the Negro.

Commenting on the study of Dr. John Norton and Dr. 
Eugene Lawler—Public School Expenditures (1944) W. 
Harden Hughes states:

“ The contrasts in support of white and Negro schools 
are appalling . . . the median expenditure per standard 
classroom unit in schools for white children is $1,160 
as compared with $476 for Negro children. Only 
2.56% of class rooms in the white schools fall below the 
$500 cost level while 52.59% of the class rooms for 
Negro children are below this level.”1

“ The state supported institutions of higher learning 
for Negroes are far inferior” states Charles S. 
Mangum, Jr., “ to their sister institutions for whites. 
Most of the inequalities which have been noted herein 
with respect to the public schools for whites and 
Negroes are also present in the Negro normal and 
technical schools. . . . There is hardly one among them 
that could compare with any good white college in the 
same area.” 1 2

Statistics on vocational education in the land grant 
schools and colleges among Negroes show:

“ that of the federal funds allotted for vocational train­
ing in 1934-35 white schools received 88.2% and Negro 
schools 11.8%.”3

1 Negro Year Book, Tuskegee Institute 1947. “ The Negro and Edu­
cation.” W . Harden Hughes, p. 56.

2 The Legal Status of the Negro (p. 134), Charles S. Mangum, Jr., 
Chapel Hill University of N. C. Press, 1940.

3 Vocational Education and Guidance of Negroes, Bulletin No. 38, 
1937, U. S. Dept, of Interior, Office of Education, p. 13.



10

A recommendation of this report (1934-35) was:
“ that individuals and groups interested in the improve­
ment of educational facilities continue and increase 
their efforts to promote equitability of educational op­
portunity and equitability in the distribution of funds 
without regard to race or color.” 4

In Texas, the expenditure for public schools was $1400 
for whites per classroom unit and $700 for Negroes.4 
There is a corresponding discrimination in school trans­
portation, salaries of teachers, library service and provi­
sion for training beyond the secondary school.

Several recent studies,5 as well as many previous ones, 
all indicate the great disparity between the educational op­
portunities afforded white youth and those offered to Negro 
youth in the states where a segregated and discriminatory 
system of education prevails.

So obvious are the inequalities that in Vol. 1 of the Na­
tional Survey of the Higher Education of Negroes we find 
this statement: “ No one with a knowledge of the facts 
believes that Negroes enjoy all the privileges which Amer­
ican democracy expressly provides for the citizens of the 
U. S. and even for those aliens of the white race who reside 
among us. The question goes much deeper than the Negro 
citizens’ legal right to equal educational opportunity. The 
question is whether American democracy and what we like 
to call the American way of life, can stand the strain of 
perpetuating an undemocratic situation; and whether the 
nation can bear the social cost of utilizing only a fraction

‘ Public School Expenditures, Dr. John Norton and Dr. Eugene S. 
Lawler, American Council on Education, 1944.

' The Black & White of Rejections for Military Service, American 
Teachers Assn. Studies, A T A  Montgomery, Ala., 1944; Public School 
Expenditures ;in the U. S., Dr. John K. Norton and Dr. Eugene S. 
Lawler; American Council on Education, Wash., D. C., 1944; Journal 
of Negro Education, Summer 1947.



11

of the potential contribution of so large a portion of the 
American population. ’ ’ 6

The Constitution is a living instrument, and a “ separate 
but equal” doctrine based upon antiquated considerations, 
should not, at this time, and in this advanced era, be per­
mitted to perpetuate a situation which denies full equality 
to Negroes in the pursuit of education.

I I I .

Segregation in public schools deprives the Negro student of 
an important element of the education process and he is 
thereby denied the equal educational opportunities man­
dated by the Fourteenth Amendment-

The practice of segregation in the field of education is a 
denial of education itself. Education means more than 
the physical school room and the books it contains, and the 
teacher who instructs. It includes the learning that comes 
from free and full association with other students in the 
school. To restrict that association is to deny full and 
equal opportunities in the learning process. To restrict 
that association is to deny the constitutional guarantee.

Psychologists show us that learning is an emotional as 
well as an intellectual process: that it is social as well as 
individual, and is best secured in an environment which 
encourages and stimulates the best effort of the individual 
and holds out the hope that this best effort will be accepted 
and used by society.

From infancy to adulthood the most satisfactory person­
ality development occurs when the individual:

a. feels he is accepted and wanted by his community

* Socio-Economic Approach to Educational Problems, Misc. No. 6, 
Vol. 1, p. 1, Federal Security Agency, U. S. Office of Education, Wash., 
1942.



12

b. secures aid and encouragement in his activities
c. has the satisfaction of contributing to the group 

without too many frustrating experiences
d. receives the approval of the group or some evi­

dence of recognition.
“Another obvious fact about human development is 

that it is greatly facilitated by social contacts. . . . 
Social contacts make possible the enlargement of per­
sonal experience by fusing into it the accumulated ex­
periences of the race.”7 (Here human race is in­
tended.)

“ More recently psychologists and other students of 
education have gained a livelier appreciation of the 
fact that learning does not take place merely because 
there exists an intelligence or mind. The physical con­
dition of boys and girls, their emotional responses 
both in school and out, all the environmental factors 
which impinge upon them have influence upon their 
growth and development.”8

“ The security needs of children (and adults too) 
are more numerous and complicated than the elimina­
tion of gross fears suggests. They seem to be related 
to a larger but more subtle need which may be here 
labeled as the need for orientation. A person finds it 
desirable to know where he is in the world and how 
he stands with his fellows. To be ‘lost’ in either re­
spect is to be in an uncomfortable frame of mind. Not 
to be spatially, temporally and socially oriented is to 
be deprived of the prime conditions for effective learn­
ing and growth.” 9

In every situation there is the inter-relation of the indi­
vidual to his group—which is one that increases with his 
maturity. First it is the family, then the local community, 
then the state, the nation, and finally the entire world. At

'Judd, Charles H., Educational Psychology, p. 3, Houghton Mifflin, 
1939.

8 Hartmann, George W., Educational Psychology, Foreword, p. VI, 
American Book Co., 1940.

8 Hartmann, George W., Educational Psychology, p. 240, American 
Book Co., 1940.



13

no stage of development should any barriers be erected to 
prevent the individual from moving from a narrower group 
to a larger one, particularly barriers on race. As Lewin 
states:

“ The group to which an individual belongs is the 
ground on which he stands, which gives or denies him 
social status, gives or denies him security and help. 
The firmness or weakness of this ground might not be 
consciously perceived, just as the firmness of the physi­
cal ground on which we tread is not always thought 
of. Dynamically, however, the firmness and clearness 
of this ground determine what the individual wishes 
to do, wliat he can do, and how he will do it. This is 
equally true of the social ground as of the physical.”10 11

Again he states:
“ It should be clear to the social scientist that it is 

hopeless to cope with this problem (discrimination) by 
providing sufficient self esteem for members of minor­
ity groups as individuals. The discrimination which 
these individuals experience is not directed against 
them as individuals, but as group members and only 
by raising their self esteem as group members to the 
normal level can a remedy be produced.” 11

An interesting survey of the opinion of social scientists 
on the effects of enforced segregation was made by Drs. 
Max Deutscher and Isidor Chein through a questionnaire12 
to 849 social scientists in all parts of the country. The 
questionnaire was answered by 571.

“ Ninety per cent of the total sample express the 
opinion that enforced segregation has detrimental 
effects on the segregated groups.” 13

10 Kurt Lewin, “ Resolving Social Conflicts,”  p. 174, Harper & Bros., 
1948.

11 Ibid, p. 214.
12 Max Deutscher and Isidor Chein, The Psychological Effects of En­

forced Segregation: A Survey of Social Science Opinion, Journal of 
Psychology, 1948-26, pp. 259-287.

“  Page 265— above survey.



14

“ Eighty-three per cent of the respondents believe 
that enforced segregation has detrimental psychologi­
cal effects on the group which enforces segregation.”14

A few quotations from the social scientists make clear 
their views: “ Feelings of not being wanted, of being classi­
fied as inferiors, of being assigned to low places are de­
structive to personality and development and injurious 
alike to slave and master.” 15

“ Clinical experience and experimental evidence point 
unmistakably to the conclusion that segregation implies 
a value judgment which in turn arouses hostility in the 
segregated and guilt feelings in the segregator. The 
effect is to set up a vicious circle making for group 
conflict.” 16

“ I don’t see how anyone could question the state­
ment that power over others—to segregate or any 
other power—has a psychological effect on both par­
ties or that this effect is bad in any sense for the less 
powerful groups. The more powerful group may 
like the effect it has on itself in short term values, 
but hatred, rebellion, or dispair are attitudes they 
have aroused toward themselves and they will always 
have to cope with these results sooner or later unless 
they can practically eradicate the whole minority as 
Europeans did with the American Indian.” 17

If education can be made available to all so that each may 
develop to the fullest and give his contribution to society, 
we will find a peaceful way—rather than one of human de­
struction and tragedy—to bring freedom and justice to 
peoples.

The American Federation of Teachers believes that seg­
regated and discriminatory education is undemocratic and 
contrary both to sound educational development as well as

14 (See Footnote 12), p. 265.
“ (See Footnote 12), p. 274.
M (See Footnote 12), p. 275.
”  (See Footnote 12), p. 279.



15

to the basic law of the land—the United States Constitu­
tion. We subscribe to the principle that democratic educa­
tion provides a total environment which will enable the 
individual to develop to his capacity, physically, emotion­
ally, intellectually and spiritually.

For such training to be fully effective, it is essential 
that each individual participate, without barriers of race, 
creed, or national origin, as a full fledged member in the 
home, the community, the state and the nation.

Accordingly, any restriction, particularly in the form of 
segregated and discriminatory schooling, which prevents 
the interplay of ideas, personalities, information and atti­
tudes, impedes a democratic education and ultimately pre­
vents a working democracy.

Conclusion.
Segregation of Negroes in public schools in any of our 

States inevitably results in depriving Negroes of educa­
tional opportunities provided by those States for white 
citizens. Negroes in such States are thereby denied the 
equal protection of the laws mandated by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. This Court should end these violations of the 
constitutional mandate by reversing the judgment in this 
case and granting the appellants the relief they pray for.

ec^ullv/submitted,
E N B E j

ja Sail 
Chicago 2, Illinois.

Counsel for American Federation 
of TeacherSj Amicus Curiae.

Selma M. B orchardt, 
Homer Building, 
Washington, D. C., 

Of Counsel.





IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1952 

No. 8

OLIVER BROW N, MRS. RICHARD L A W TO N , 
MRS. SADIE EM M ANUEL, e t  a l .

Appellants,
vs.

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, SH AW N EE  
COUNTY, K ANSAS, e t  a l .,

Appellees.

BRIEF ON BEH ALF OF 
A M E R IC A N  CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 

A M E R IC A N  ETH ICAL UNION 
A M E R IC A N  JEW ISH  COM M ITTEE 

A N T I-D E F A M A T IO N  LEAGU E OF B’ NAI B’RITH 
JAPAN ESE A M E R IC A N  CITIZEN S LEAGU E

A N D
U N ITA R IA N  FELLOW SH IP FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 

AS A M I C I  C U R I A E

Edwin J. Lukas,
A rnold Forster,
A rthur Garfield Hays, 
Frank E. Karelsen,

of the New York Bar,
Leonard Haas,

of the Georgia Bar,
Saburo Kido,

of the California Bar,
W aldo B. W etmore, 

of the Kansas Bar,
Attorneys for Amici Curiae.

T heodore Leskes,
Sol Rabkin,

of the New York Bar, 
of Counsel.

BAR PRESS IN C ., 5 4  LAFAYETTE S T ., NEW  YORK 13  ---- W A. 5  - 3 4 3 2  - 3 .





TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Interest of the A mici ......................................................... 1

Statement of the Case ..................................  3

The Statute Involved ...................................  4

The Question Presented 4

Summary of A rgument ....................................................... 5

Argument

I. The validity under the equal protection of 
the laws clause of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment of racial segregation in public educa­
tional facilities has never been decided by 
this Court ...................................................  6

II. Racial segregation in public educational 
institutions is an unconstitutional classifi­
cation under the equal protection of the 
laws clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 12

III. The finding of the court below, that Negro 
children are disadvantaged by the segre­
gated public school system of Topeka, re­
quires this Court to disavow the “ separate 
but equal”  doctrine as it has been applied 
to public educational institutions .................... 16

Conclusion ..................................................................................  28

Appendix ....................................................................................... 33



11 Index

Table of Cases

PAGE

Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219 (1911) ...................  13
Banks v. San Francisco Housing Authority, decided 

by tlie Superior Court of San Francisco, Cal.,
Oct. 1, 1952 ............................................................... 19

Belton v. Gebliart, decided by the Supreme Court of
Delaware, Aug. 28, 1952 ......................................... 19

Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U. S. 45 (1908)......  8
Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529 (1951)....................  19
Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Howard, — U. S.

—, 72 S. Ct. 1022 (1952) .......................................... 13
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 98 F. Supp.

797 (1951) ................................................................. 18,19
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936) ..............  13
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60 (1917) .................. 13,14

Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227 (1940)................  13
Gumming v. County Board of Education, 175 U. S.

528 "(1899) ................................................................. 7

Fisher v. Hurst, 333 U. S. 147 (1948) ........................10,18

Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78 (1927).......... 5, 9,10,11,18
Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U. S. 45 (1935)....................  19
Guinn v. U. S., 238 IT. S. 347 (1915).............................. 14

Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485 (1878) ............................  6, 7
Henderson v. U. S., 339 U. S. 816 (1950)....................  13
Hirabayashi v. U. S., 320 U. S. 81 (1943)............12,15,16

Jones v. Opelika, 316 U. S. 584 (1942)........................  19

Korematsu v. U. S., 323 U. S. 214 (1944) .................. 12,15



Index

Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61
(1911) ........................................................................  12

McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S. F. B. Co., 235 U. S. 151
(1914) .......................................................................  10

McGee v. Mississippi, — Miss. —, 40 So. 2nd 160
(1949) ........................................................................  28

McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Board of Begents, 339
II. S. 637 (1950) ....................................... 8,10,11,18, 20

Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586
(1940) ........................................................................  19

Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337
(1938) .....................................................................9,10,18

Mitchell v. U. S., 313 U. S. 80 (1941).......................... 13
Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U. S. 373 (1946)..................  13
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 IT. S. 105 (1943) 19

Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536 (1927)...................... 14

Ovama v. California, 332 U. S. 633 (1948) 12

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896)
5, 7, 8,10,11,18,19, 20

Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948) .....................  13,14
Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U. S. 50 (1951)..................  13
Sipuel v. Board of Begents of the University of

Oklahoma, 332 U. S. 631 (1948) ............................10,18
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1944).....................  14, 19
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Bailroad Co., 323

U. S. 192 (1944) .......................................................  13
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880)......  13
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629 (1950) .......... 8,10,18,20

Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, 334 U. S.
410 (1948)

PAGE

14



IV Index

Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323
U. S. 210 (1944) .......................................................  13

U. S. v. Reynolds, 235 U. S. 133 (1914)........................ 13

West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,
319 17. S. 624 (1943) ...............................................  19

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886) ...............  14
Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U. S. 500 (1926) 14

Other A uthorities Cited

Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford,
The Authoritarian Personality (1950) 18

52 American Jewish Yearbook (1951)..........................  20
Antwerp Le Matin, May 1951 ........................................ 31
The Austin Statesman, November 14, 1950 21

Biennial Report, 1949-1951, State of New Jersey, 
Dep’t. of Education, Division Against Dis­
crimination ...............................................................25, 26

Bond, Education of the Negro in the American Social
Order (1934) ............................................................. 17,27

Chicago Sun-Times, September 26, 1950 ......................  24
Cologne Welt Der Arbeit, April 7, 1950 30

Dallas Times Herald, October 2, 1951 20
Dawkins, Kentucky Outgrows Segregation, The Sur­

vey, July 1950 ...........................................................  21
Dayton Journal Herald, June 23, 1950 25

Frenkel-Brunswik, A  Study of Prejudice in Children,
1 Human Relations 295 (1948)...............................  18

PAGE



Index v

Gallagher, American Caste and the Negro College
(1938) ..................................................................... 17

Goodman, Race Awareness in Young Children (1952) 18

Heinrich, The Psychology of a Suppressed People
(1937) .......................  17

The Houston Chronicle, Sept. 10, 1952 20
The Houston Informer, December 5, 1951 20
The Houston Post, January 9, 1951 ............  20

Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, July 1, 1951 21
Long, The Intelligence of Colored Elementary Pupils 

in Washington, D. C., 3 J. of Negro Ed. 205
(1934) ........................................................................  17

Long, Some Psychogenic Hazards of Segregated
Education of Negroes, 4 J. of Negro Ed. 336
(1935) .................................................. .....................  17

Marseilles Semailles, May 18, 1951 .............................. 29
Miami Herald, May 6, 1951 21
46 Michigan L. Rev. (1948) ...........................................  7
Morisey, A New Trend in Private Colleges, New

South, Aug.-Sept. 1951 22
Myrdal, An American Dilemma (1944) ...................... 6,18

New York Herald Tribune, June 23, 1949.................... 21
New York Herald Tribune, Sept. 28, 1951..................  22
New York Post, Aug. 24, 1948 .....................................  21
The New York Times, January 30, 1950 24

The Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, June 7, 1951 20

Paris L ’Aube, May 9, 1951 ............................................29,30
Pittsburgh Courier, December 1, 1951............................ 24

PAGE



VI Index

PAGE

President’s Commission on Higher Education, Higher
Education for American Democracy (1947)......  17

President’s Committee on Civil Eights, To Secure
These Rights (1947) ............................................  27

Richmond News Leader, September 25, 1952.............. 22, 23

Santa Fe New Mexican, September 2, 1951................  23
Saveth, The Supreme Court and Segregation, The

Survey, July 1951 ...................................................  23
Segregation in Public Schools—A Violation of 

“ Equal Protection of the Laws’ ’, 56 Yale L. J.
1059 (1947) ...............................................................  17

St. Louis Globe-Democrat, April 17, 1952....................  22
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 7, 1950; May 11, 1952.. 22

Thompson, C. H., Letter to the Editor, The New
York Times, April 6, 1952 ...................................... 27

Vienna Arbeiter-Zeitung, February 4, 1951..................  29

Washington Times-Herald, July 17, 1951.......................  22



IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1952

No. 8

OLIVER BROW N, MRS. RICHARD L A W TO N , 
MRS. SADIE EM M ANUEL, et  a l „

Appellants,
vs.

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, SH AW N EE  
COUNTY, K ANSAS, et  a l .,

Appellees.

BRIEF ON BEH ALF OF 
A M E R IC A N  CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 

A M E R IC A N  ETH ICAL UNION 
A M E R IC A N  JEW ISH  COM M ITTEE 

A N T I-D E F A M A T IO N  LEAGU E OF B’ NAI B’RITH 
JAPAN ESE A M E R IC A N  CITIZEN S LEAGUE

A N D
U N ITA R IA N  FELLOW SH IP FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 

AS A M I C I  C U R I A E

Interest of the Amici

This brief is filed, with the consent of both parties, on 
behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union, the American 
Ethical Union, American Jewish Committee, the Anti-



2

Defamation League of B ’nai B ’rith, the Japanese Ameri­
can Citizens League and the Unitarian Fellowship for 
Social Justice. The Appendix contains a description of 
each of these organizations.

The present case and the companion cases, all involv­
ing the constitutionality of racial segregation in public 
elementary and secondary schools, present an issue with 
which all six organizations are deeply concerned because 
such segregation deprives millions of persons of rights 
that are freely enjoyed by others and adversely affects 
the entire democratic structure of our society.

We have read the briefs of the appellants, with the 
appendix thereto, and we unequivocally endorse the argu­
ments, legal, educational and sociological, therein advanced. 
In this amici brief we are urging arguments which have 
not been made in the appellants’ briefs and which we 
believe should be presented to this Court.



3

Statement of the Case

The adult appellants are Negro citizens of the United 
States and of the State of Kansas (R. 3-4) while the 
infant appellants are their children eligible to attend and 
now attending elementary schools in Topeka, Kansas, a 
city of the first class within the meaning of Section 13-101, 
General Statutes of Kansas, 1949. Appellees are State 
officers empowered by State law to maintain and operate 
the public schools of Topeka, Kansas.

On March 22, 1951, appellants instituted this action 
seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction to com­
pel the State to admit Negro children to the elementary 
public schools of Topeka on an unsegregated basis on the 
ground that segregation deprived them of equal educa­
tional opportunities within the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment (R. 2-7). In their answer, appellees admitted 
that they acted pursuant to the statute, that infant ap­
pellants were not eligible to attend any of the eighteen 
“ white”  elementary schools solely because of their race 
and color (R. 12, 24), but that they were eligible to 
attend the equivalent public schools maintained for Negro 
children in the City of Topeka (R. 11, 12). The Attorney 
General of the State of Kansas filed a separate answer 
defending the validity of the statute in question (R. 14).

The court below was convened in accordance with Title 
28, United States Code, §2284 and on June 25-26 a trial 
on the merits took place (R. 63 et seq.). On August 3, 
1951, the court below filed its opinion, 98 F. Supp. 797 (R. 
238-244), its findings of fact (R, 244-246), and conclusions 
of law (R. 246-247), and entered a final judgment and de­
cree in appellees’ favor denying the relief sought (R. 247).

Appellants filed a petition for appeal on October 1, 
1951 (R. 248), and an order allowing the appeal was duly 
entered (R. 250). Probable jurisdiction was noted on 
June 9, 1952 (R. 254). Jurisdiction of this Court rests on 
Title 28, United States Code, §§1253 and 2201 (b).



4

The Statute Involved

Segregated elementary schools in Topeka, Kansas, are 
maintained solely pursuant to the authority of Section 
72-1724 of the General Statutes of Kansas (1949) which 
reads as follows:

Powers of hoard; separate schools for white and 
colored children; manual training. The hoard of edu­
cation shall have power to elect their own officers, 
make all necessary rules for the government of the 
schools of such city under its charge and control and 
of the board, subject to the provisions of this act and 
the laws of this state; to organize and maintain sep­
arate schools for the education of white and colored 
children, including the high schools in Kansas City, 
Kans.; no discrimination on account of color shall be 
made in high schools except as provided herein; to 
exercise the sole control over the public schools and 
school property of such city; and shall have the power 
to establish a high school or high schools in connec­
tion with manual training and instruction or other­
wise, and to maintain the same as a part of the public- 
school system of said city. (G. S. 1868, Ch. 18, §75; 
L. 1879, Ch. 81, §1; L. 1905, Ch. 414, §1; Feb. 28; 
R. S. 1923, §72-1724.)

The Question Presented

The question presented by this appeal is whether the 
State of Kansas, or indeed any State, by establishing 
racial segregation in its public elementary school system, 
has violated the equal protection of the laws clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.



5

SU M M A R Y  OF A R G U M EN T

This Court has never ruled directly on the constitu­
tionality of racial segregation in public elementary schools. 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896) and Gong Lum 
v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78 (1927), relied upon by the court 
below, are not controlling here.

Segregation in State-supported educational institutions 
violates the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment in that it is an inadmissible 
classification. This Court has consistently rejected dif­
ferential treatment by State authority predicated upon 
racial classifications or distinctions.

The finding of the lower court that Negro children are 
disadvantaged by the segregated public school system 
necessitates granting the relief requested. That which is 
unequal in fact cannot be equal in law and, therefore, 
segregation and equality cannot co-exist in public educa­
tion.



6

P O I N T  I

The validity under the equal protection of the 
laws clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of racial 
segregation in public educational facilities has never 
been decided by this Court.

Tlie issue now squarely before this Court is whether 
the State of Kansas, pursuant to statute, may maintain 
and operate racially segregated public elementary schools, 
without heed to the damage inflicted by segregation upon 
its Negro victims. Despite the transcendent importance of 
the question, this Court has never ruled directly on the 
constitutionality of racial segregation in public education. 
The Court has ruled on related problems, such as the 
validity of racial segregation in transportation and in 
housing. Regretfully, it has, but always in dictum, ap­
peared to accept racial segregation where the validity of 
segregation was not actually before the Court. Historically, 
these dicta reflect the fact that prior to World War I, the 
status of the American Negro was such that he could make 
no realistic demand for equality of treatment in those sec­
tions of the country in which he lived in substantial num­
bers. Because of his depressed economic condition and 
concentration in agriculture, his children could not even 
obtain the most elementary education. Myrdal, An Ameri­
can Dilemma, Ch. 8-9 (1944).

Following the adoption in 1868 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the earliest case in which some reference was 
made by this Court to racial segregation in education was 
Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485 (1878). That case involved 
the validity of a State statute prohibiting segregation in



7

public carriers. The statute was declared unconstitutional 
as an improper regulation of foreign and interstate com­
merce. In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Clifford re­
viewed with approval the conclusions of a number of 
State cases which had upheld the reasonableness of racial 
segregation in education and stated in dictum that segre­
gation in the public schools did not violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment if physically equal facilities for Negroes were 
provided. It is probably unnecessary for us to note that 
no evidence was offered in that case, because it would have 
been irrelevant, that school segregation must in fact in­
volve inequality.

In 1896 this Court decided Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 
U. S. 537 (1896), which sustained the constitutionality of 
a Louisiana statute requiring public carriers to furnish 
separate but equal coach accommodations for whites and 
Negroes. The Court as before, in dictum, cited with ap­
proval several old State cases which had held that a State 
could require the segregation of racial groups in its edu­
cational system.

The constitutionality of “ separate but equal’ ’ facili­
ties in education was concededly not before the Court in 
either the Hall or the Plessy cases. Yet, although there 
was no evidentiary or psycho-sociological basis for a dis­
cussion of equal facilities in education, and in spite of the 
fact that the statements of the Court were cleai'ly dicta, 
the Plessy case has been cited to this date by State and 
lower Federal courts to sustain the constitutionality of 
segregation in public educational institutions. See cases 
cited, 46 Mich. L. Rev. 639, 643 (1948).

Three years later, this Court decided Cumming v. 
County Board of Education, 175 U. S. 528 (1899). There 
an injunction was sought to restrain a board of education



8

in Georgia from maintaining a high school for white chil­
dren where none was maintained for Negro children. The 
State court had upheld the board, saying that its alloca­
tion of funds did not involve bad faith or abuse of dis­
cretion. In affirming the decision of the State court, this 
Court speaking through Mr. Justice Harlan, the lone dis­
senter in Plessy, stated expressly that racial segregation 
in the school system was not in issue. (542, 546)

The next case before this Court which involved com­
pulsory educational segregation was Berea College v. 
Kentucky, 211 U. S. 45 (1908), wherein the validity of a 
State statute which prohibited domestic corporations from 
teaching white and Negro pupils in the same private edu­
cational institution was attacked. While the scope of the 
statute was broad enough to include individuals as well 
as corporations, this Court said:

. . .  it is unnecessary for us to consider anything 
more than the question of its validity as applied to 
corporations. . . . Even if it were conceded that its 
assertions of power over individuals cannot be sus­
tained, still it must be upheld so far as it restrains 
corporations. (54)

This Court agreed with the reasoning of the State 
court that the statute could be upheld as coming within 
the power of a State over one of its own corporate crea­
tures. The statute was not deemed to have worked a dep­
rivation of property rights. The rights of individuals were 
not considered.1

1 Interestingly, since the decisions o f this Court in Sw eatt v. 
Painter, 339 U . S. 629 (1 9 5 0 ) and in M cLaurin  v. Oklahoma, 
339 U . S. 637 (1 9 5 0 ), Berea College accepts N egro students.



9

Not until 1927 did racial classification in educational 
institutions again become the subject of controversy be­
fore this Court. In Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78 (1927), 
a Chinese girl contested the right of the State of Missis­
sippi to assign her to a Negro school under the State’s 
segregated school system. Mississippi contended that 
under its statute requiring separate schools to be main­
tained for children of the white and colored races, the 
plaintiff could not insist on being classed with the whites 
and that the legislature was not compelled to provide 
separate schools for each of the non-white races.

The issue of segregation was not presented in that 
case. The plaintiff accepted the system of segregation in 
the public schools of the State but contested her classifi­
cation within that system.

Nor was the validity of segregation before the Court 
in the case of Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 
337 (1938). There the petitioner was refused admission 
to the University of Missouri Law School, a State-sup­
ported institution, solely because he was a Negro. He 
brought mandamus to compel the University to admit him. 
The State, having no law school for Negroes, sought to 
fulfill its obligation to provide equal educational facilities 
by offering to pay the petitioner’s tuition for a legal edu­
cation in another State. This the Court held did not sat­
isfy the constitutional requirement. It said that the peti­
tioner Avas entitled to be admitted to the University of 
Missouri Law School in the absence of other and proper 
provision for his legal training Avithin the State of Mis­
souri. The issue Avas whether an otherAvise qualified Negro 
applicant for law training could be excluded from the 
only State-supported laAV school. This Court assumed that



10

the validity of equal facilities in racially separate schools 
was settled by earlier decisions and cited the Plessy case, 
McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 235 U. S. 151 
(1914), both of which involved segregation in public car­
riers, and the Gong Lum case. But the constitutional 
validity of segregation was not decided.

The next consideration of a related problem was in 
1948 in Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the University of 
Oklahoma, 332 U. S. 631. This Court, in a per curiam 
decision, said that the State must provide law school fa­
cilities for the Negro petitioner “ in conformity with the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
provide it as soon as it does for applicants of any other 
group”  (633). The facts in the Sipuel case were similar 
to those in the Gaines case, in that no law school facilities 
were afforded Negroes by the State of Oklahoma.

Segregation was not at issue in the Sipuel case. This 
Court stated in Fisher v. Hurst, 333 U. S. 147 (1948), that:

The petition for certiorari in Sipuel v. University 
of Oklahoma did not present the issue whether a state 
might not satisfy the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment by establishing a separate 
law school for Negroes. On submission, we were 
clear it was not an issue here. (150)

The most recent cases involving segregation in public 
institutions of learning were Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 
629 (1950) and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Board of 
Regents, 339 U. S. 637 (1950). Although the petitioners 
and numerous amici in those cases urged this Court to rule 
expressly that discrimination inevitably results from en­
forced segregation in educational institutions, the Court did 
not reach that question. In Sweatt, Mr. Chief Justice Yin- 
son, speaking for a unanimous Court, said, “ Nor need we



11

reach petitioner’s contention that Plessy v. Ferguson 
should be reexamined in the light of contemporary knowl­
edge respecting the purposes of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment and the effects of racial segregation”  (636). The 
judgment of the court below was reversed and the Uni­
versity of Texas Law School was ordered to admit the 
petitioner because equivalent educational opportunity was 
not afforded by the hastily organized Negro law school.

In McLaurin, again speaking for a unanimous bench, 
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson expressly limited the decision:

In this case, we are faced with the question whether 
a state may, after admitting a student to graduate 
instruction in its state university, afford him different 
treatment from other students solely because of his 
race. We decide only this issue . . . (638)

Thus in no case previously before this Court, in which 
racial segregation in public education has been the subject 
of comment in an opinion, has the Court felt called upon 
to rule squarely on the issue: Does segregation in public 
educational institutions meet the requirements of the equal 
protection of the laws clause of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment ?

We emphasize that absence of a specific ruling at the 
outset of this brief because of the thread of urgency 
running through the fabric of much previous argument 
on the crucial issue in this case, namely, that the “ sepa­
rate but equal”  doctrine, as it has been thought to apply 
to public educational institutions, should he “ overruled” . 
Indeed, in that framework, there is nothing to overrule. 
But there are dicta which must be disavowed. The con­
stitutionality of segregation in educational institutions 
was clearly not involved in Plessy or Gong Lum, the two 
cases relied upon by the court below.



12

P O I N T  II

Racial segregation in public educational institu­
tions is an unconstitutional classification under the 
equal protection of the laws clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.

This Court’s decisions in cases involving the constitu­
tionality of governmental action reveal a special scrutiny 
and constant vigilance in those instances where such ac­
tion was predicated upon alleged racial distinctions or 
where racial classifications were involved. Except in 
times of overriding peril or crisis, this Court has rejected 
all obvious or devious efforts to establish racial or reli­
gious lines of demarcation for the enjoyment of civil 
rights.

Whereas in cases involving other types of legislative 
classifications, the “ one who assails the classification . . . 
must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest 
upon any reasonable basis” , Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic 
Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 79 (1911), “ all legal restrictions 
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are 
immediately suspect” . Korematsu v. U. S., 323 U. S. 214, 
216 (1944).

Again, “ only the most exceptional circumstances can 
excuse discrimination on that basis in the face of the 
equal protection clause.”  Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 
633, 646 (1948). In Hirabayashi v. U. 8., 320 U. S. 81
(1943), this Court said:

Distinctions between citizens solely because of their 
ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free 
people whose institutions are founded upon the doc­



13

trine of equality. For that reason, legislative classi- 
cation or discrimination based on race alone has 
often been held to be a denial of equal protection. 
( 100)

In the application of these principles, the Court has, 
with one exception (discussed infra), always declared gov­
ernmental classification based on race or color to be con­
stitutionally invalid.

This Court has ruled that Negroes must be treated the 
same as whites with respect to the privilege and duty of 
jury service. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 
(1880). It has stricken down state statutes aimed at keep­
ing the Negro “ in his place.”  Bailey v. Alabama, 219 
U. S. 219 (1911); U. 8. v. Reynolds, 235 U. S. 133 (1914). 
Common carriers engaged in interstate travel have been 
prevented from segregating and discriminating on the 
basis of race or color. Mitchell v. U. S., 313 U. S. 80 
(1941); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U. S. 373 (1946); Hen­
derson v. U. S., 339 U. S. 816 (1950). Repeated instances 
of prejudice in criminal cases evidenced by brutal treat­
ment of Negroes have been condemned. Brown v. Mis­
sissippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936); Chambers v. Florida, 
309 U. S. 227 (1940); Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U. S. 50 
(1951). Racial segregation through zoning and attempts 
to institutionalize ghettos by restrictive covenants have 
been outlawed. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60 (1917) ; 
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948). Discrimination 
has been forbidden in labor unions that receive their col­
lective bargaining and representation powers by virtue 
of statute. Steele v. Louisville d Nashville Railroad Co., 
323 U. S. 192 (1944); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomo­
tive Firemen, 323 U. S. 210 (1944); Brotherhood of R. R. 
Trainmen v. Howard, — U. S. — , 72 S. Ct. 1022 (1952).



14

From time to time, this Court has stricken down all the 
various devices used to prevent or limit Negroes from 
participating in elections. Guinn v. U. S., 238 U. S. 347 
(1915); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536 (1927); Smith v. 
Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1944). So, too, laws which in 
their administration have effected a limitation or denial 
of the right to carry on a business or calling because of 
race or ancestry, have been declared unconstitutional. 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886); Yu Cong Eng 
v. Trinidad, 271 U. S. 500 (1926) ; Takahashi v. Fish and 
Game Commission, 334 U. S. 410 (1948).

In Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, which involved a 
racial residential zoning ordinance, the State invoked its 
authority to pass laws in the exercise of its police power, 
and urged that this compulsory separation of the races 
in habitation be sustained because it would “ promote the 
public peace by preventing race conflicts”  (81). This 
Court rejected that contention, saying:

The authority of the state to pass laws in the exercise 
of the police power . . .  is very broad . . . [and] the 
exercise of this power is not to be interfered with by 
the courts where it is within the scope of legislative 
authority and the means adopted reasonably tend to 
accomplish a lawful purpose. But it is equally well 
established that the police power . . . cannot justify 
the passage of a law or ordinance which runs counter 
to the limitations of the Federal Constitution . . . (74).

The police power of the State, broad as it is, does not 
justify a racial classification where rights created or pro­
tected by the Constitution are involved.

In Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, this Court, by 
unanimous decision, held that the enforcement of racial 
restrictive covenants by State courts is State action,



15

prohibited by the equal protection clause of the Four­
teenth Amendment. In the course of its decision, the 
Court measurably strengthened the equal protection clause 
as a formidable barrier to restrictions having the effect 
of racial segregation. The contention was there pressed 
that since the State courts stand ready to enforce racial 
covenants excluding white persons from occupancy or 
ownership, enforcement of covenants excluding Negroes 
is not a denial of equal protection. This Court rejected 
the equality of application argument, decisively dismissing 
it in the following language:

This contention does not bear scruitiny. . . . The 
rights created by the first section of the Fourteenth 
Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the 
individual. The rights established are personal rights. 
It is, therefore, no answer to these petitioners to say 
that the courts may also be induced to deny white 
persons rights of ownership and occupancy on grounds 
of race or color. Equal protection of the laws is not 
achieved through indiscriminate imposition of in­
equalities. (21, 22)

There has been but one recent departure from this rule. 
This Court stated that “ in the crisis of war and of 
threatened invasion”  when the national safety might 
appear to be imperilled, it will permit a racial classifica­
tion by the Federal Government. Hirabayashi v. U. 8., 
320 U. S. 81, 101. That case involved a prosecution for 
failure to obey a curfew order directed against citizens 
of Japanese ancestry. Korematsu v. U. S., 323 U. S. 214, 
arising out of the same war emergency, involved the 
validity of a governmental order excluding all persons of 
Japanese ancestry from the West Coast military area. 
The Court, on the grounds of overriding pressing public 
urgency in time of war, sustained the racial classification



16

in these cases, but it emphasized that this was an ex­
traordinary exception. “  [Legislative classification or dis­
crimination based on race alone has often been held to 
be a denial of equal protection. . . .  We may assume” , 
continued the Court, “ that these considerations would be 
controlling here were it not for the fact that the danger 
of espionage and sabotage, in time of war and of threat­
ened invasion”  has made necessary this racial classi­
fication, which “ is not to be condemned merely because 
in other and in most circumstances racial distinctions are 
irrelevant.”  Hirabayashi v. U. S., supra, 101.

Clearly, State laws providing for racial segregation in 
public educational facilities are not accompanied by any 
“ pressing public necessity” . The record here is barren 
of any such showing, as indeed it would have to be. Rather, 
there is a pressing public necessity to give all American 
citizens their due—equality of opportunity to use educa­
tional facilities established by the State for its inhabitants.

P O I N T  I I I

The finding of the court below, that Negro chil­
dren are disadvantaged by the segregated public 
school system of Topeka, requires this Court to dis­
avow the “separate but equal” doctrine as it has 
been applied to public educational institutions.

In one vital respect, the problem posed by this record 
is sharpened to the point of unique narrowness. The un­
challenged finding that segregation irreparably damages 
the child lifts this case out of the murky realm of specu­
lation on the issue of “ equality”  of facilities, into the



17

area of certainty that segregation and equality cannot 
co-exist. That which is unequal in fact cannot be equal in 
law.

It is respectfully submitted that the finding of the court 
below, that Negro children were disadvantaged by the 
segregation of white and colored students in the public 
elementary schools, requires this Court to reverse the 
lower court’s refusal to grant the requested relief. The 
lower court found as a fact that the segregation of white 
and Negro children in the public schools “ has a detri­
mental effect upon the colored children” ; that such segre­
gation creates in Negro children a “ sense of inferiority”  
which “ affects the motivation of a child to learn” ; that 
legally sanctioned segregation “ therefore has a tendency 
to retard the educational and mental development of 
[Njegro children and to deprive them of some of the 
benefits they would receive in a racially integrated school 
system. ’ ’

Educators and social scientists have long proclaimed 
that these and other social evils necessarily flow from 
racially segregated education. Segregation in Public 
Schools—A Violation of “ Equal Protection of the Laics’ ’, 
56 Yale L. J. 1059, 1061 (1947). See also Long, Some 
Psychogenic Hazards of Segregated Education of Negroes, 
4 J. of Negro Ed. 336, 343 (1935); Long, The Intelligence 
of Colored Elementary Pupils in Washington, I). C., 3 J. 
of Negro Ed. 205-222 (1934); Gallagher, American Caste 
and the Negro College, 109, 184, 321-2 (1938); Bond, Edu­
cation of the Negro in the American Social Order, 385 
(1934); President’s Commission on Higher Education, 
2 Higher Education for American Democracy 35 (1947); 
Heinrich, The Psychology of a Suppressed People, 52, 57-



1 8

61 (1937); Myrdal, An American Dilemma, 54-5, 97-101, 
577-8, 758; Frenkel-Brunswik, A Study of Prejudice in 
Children, 1 Human Relations 295, 305 (1948); Goodman, 
Race Awareness in Young Children (1952); Adorno, 
Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford, The Authori­
tarian Personality, Ch. IV, V (1950).

Whenever this Court has been presented with a record 
that established inequality in fact as between educational 
opportunities offered by the State to its white and Negro 
inhabitants, it has ordered the immediate termination of 
the inequality. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 
337; Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U. S. 631; Fisher v. 
Hurst, 333 U. S. 147; Sweatt v. Painter, 339 IT. S. 629. 
In McLaurin v. Oklahoma, 339 IT. S. 637, this Court went 
even further to hold that officially imposed racial segre­
gation within a State-maintained school violated the equal 
protection clause. It is noteworthy that the court below 
said in its opinion, where “ segregation within a school 
as in the McLaurin case is a denial of due process, it is 
difficult to see why segregation in separate schools would 
not result in the same denial.”  Brown v. Board of Edu­
cation of Topeka, 98 F. Supp. 797, 800 (Emphasis added).

We respectfully urge this Court to follow the prin­
ciples it recently enunciated in Sweatt and McLaurin, 
rather than the unsound ones of Plessy and Gong Lum, 
and to hold unequivocally that racial segregation per se 
in all State educational institutions, is a violation of the 
equal protection of the laws clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.

The Need to D isavow  P l e s s y

As we explained in Point I, we believe that Plessy is 
not controlling. Assuming, arguendo, that the court below 
was justified by Plessy in refusing to hold that segregation



19

in public elementary schools is per se discrimination under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, this Court should now ex­
pressly overrule Plessy and reverse the court below. This 
Court has not hesitated in the past to overrule or recon­
sider and reverse earlier decisions where the nature and 
consequences of discrimination became fully disclosed or 
apparent upon later consideration. Murdoch v. Pennsyl­
vania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943), reversing Jones v. Opelika, 
316 U. S. 584 (1942); West Virginia State Board of Edu­
cation v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943), overruling Miners- 
ville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586 (1940); Smith 
v. Allivright, 321 U. S. 649, overruling Grovey v. Townsend, 
295 U. S. 45 (1935). “ In constitutional questions, where 
correction depends upon amendment and not upon legis­
lative action this Court through its history has freely 
exercised its power to reexamine the basis of its constitu­
tional decisions.”  Smith v. Allivright, supra, 655 and cases 
cited in footnote 10 thereto.

Lower courts, State and federal, have indicated clearly 
that they believe a break with the “ separate but equal”  
doctrine in education is “ in the wind” , but they insist 
that they must await such a holding by this Court. Belton 
v. Gebhart, decided by the Delaware Court of Chancery, 
April 1, 1952, affirmed by the Supreme Court of that State 
on August 28, 1952; Banks v. San Francisco Housing 
Authority, decided October 1, 1952, by the Superior Court 
of San Francisco; Brown v. Board of Education of To­
peka, 98 F. Supp. 797, 798; Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 
529, 535 (1951).

It is not surprising that American courts are ques­
tioning the validity of Plessy in view of the tremendous 
changes which have taken place since the turn of the cen­
tury in the understanding of the nature of the individual



20

and his relationships to racial groupings and to society. 
Scientific research in the fields of anthropology, sociology, 
biology and education has demonstrated the fallaciousness 
of the racial and blood strain concepts which are basic 
to the majority opinion in Plessy.

P eacefu l Integration W ill F ollow

The defenders of racial segregation have frequently 
expressed the fear that compulsory destruction of the bar­
riers in the public schools would increase racial tensions 
and even cause strife. Such results, obviously, should be 
avoided if possible, without yielding constitutional prin­
ciples. Experience, however, has clearly’ demonstrated 
that these dire predictions are unfounded.

Following this Court’s decision in McLaurin v. Okla­
homa, 339 U. S. 637, Negro students applied for admission 
and were admitted in large numbers to that State’s col­
leges and universities. By June 1951, approximately 400 
Negroes were enrolled at the University of Oklahoma and 
at Oklahoma A & M, all without the slightest increase in 
racial tension, but rather with every sign of increased 
mutual understanding and respect. The Oklahoma City 
Daily Oklahoman, June 7, 1951.

In Texas, after the decision in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 
U. S. 629, two Negroes were admitted to the University 
of Texas Law School and two others were admitted to the 
Dental School. 52 American Jewish Yearbook 42 (1951); 
The Houston Chronicle, Sept. 10, 1952. Negroes have also 
been admitted to private institutions of higher learning 
in Texas following Sweatt. Southern Methodist Univer­
sity (The Houston Post, January 9, 1951), Amarillo Col­
lege (Dallas Times Herald, October 2, 1951) and several 
other junior colleges (The Houston Informer, December 
5, 1951) have all found that the admission of Negroes was



21

possible without any adverse effect upon interracial rela­
tions. Quite the contrary. The Austin Statesman of No­
vember 14, 1950, reported the white students at Southern 
Methodist University advised the president that “ SMU 
student opinion favors admitting Negroes to the school.”

The University of Arkansas has accepted Negroes for 
LL.B. and M.D. degrees. Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, 
July 1, 1951; New York Post, August 24, 1948. Notwith­
standing the fact that the University of Florida has thus 
far refused to admit Negroes, the Florida Student Gov­
ernment Association, an organization of student leaders 
representing all colleges and universities in the State, 
unanimously passed a resolution calling for an immediate 
end to racial segregation in the State’s institutions of 
higher learning. Miami Herald, May 6, 1951. The Uni­
versity of Kentucky since 1949 has enrolled Negro stu­
dents. New York Herald Tribune, June 23, 1949. By 
July 1950, twelve Negroes were attending classes at the 
University and “  [t]hey took their places quietly in the 
student body without any open hostility.”  Dawkins, Ken­
tucky Outgrows Segregation, The Survey, July 1950. Pri­
vate educational institutions have followed the lead of the 
University of Kentucky. Berea College led the way. Three 
Roman Catholic colleges in Louisville, Nazareth, Ursuline 
and Bellarmine Colleges, immediately followed suit. Next 
to fall in line was the University of Louisville with a stu­
dent body of seven thousand. Southern Baptist Theologi­
cal Seminary and Louisville Theological Seminary now 
also admit Negroes on an unsegregated basis.

In July 1950, the first Negroes were admitted to the 
University of Missouri and less than two years later a 
Negro was appointed to the faculty. St. Louis Post-



22

Dispatch, July 7, 1950; St. Louis Globe-Democrat, April 
17, 1952. St. Louis University has admitted Negroes to 
all its facilities for the past few years. They have been 
fully integrated into the University program with no 
unhappy results. During the academic year 1950-51, a 
total of 351 Negro students was enrolled and there were 
five Negro faculty members. The experience of institu­
tions like St. Louis University has demonstrated that the 
admission of Negro students poses no problem of accept­
ance by white students. Morisey, A New Trend in Private 
Colleges, New South, Aug.-Sept. 1951. Another private 
university in St. Louis, Washington University, admits 
Negroes to all its branches and schools. St. Louis Post- 
Dispatch, May 11, 1952. Its experience has been identical 
with that of St. Louis University.

In July 1951, the University of North Carolina ad­
mitted its first Negro student. Washington Times-Herald, 
July 17, 1951. The following September, six additional 
Negro students attending the University, were excluded 
from the regular student cheering section at a football 
game. When the entire student body protested this action 
by the University authorities, it was quickly reversed. 
New York Herald Tribune, September 28, 1951.

Since 1951, the University of Virginia has been ad­
mitting Negro students and “ the formerly ‘ all-white’ 
schools which have accepted Negro students have found 
that their presence creates no special problem” . Rich­
mond News Leader, September 25, 1952.

The College of William and Mary, which next to Har­
vard University is the oldest of the country’s colleges, 
has admitted two Negro students, both of whom are 
attending regular day classes. According to President



2 3

Chandler, “ [t]he presence of these two Negro graduate 
students has not created any special problems on the 
campus.”  Ibid.

By July 1951, there were approximately one thousand 
Negro students in previously “ all-white”  institutions of 
higher education in the South. “ They have encountered 
virtually no open objection to their presence.”  Saveth, 
The Supreme Court and Segregation, The Survey, July 
1951.

Just as the admission of Negroes to formerly “ all- 
white”  colleges and universities has created no friction 
or other difficulties, so too experience has proved that in­
tegration of white and Negro children at the elementary 
and high school levels can be acieved without incident.

In the State of New Mexico where segregation is al­
lowed, though not required, in the public schools, the town 
of Carlsbad maintained separate schools for the two races 
until 1951. Following the refusal of the State School 
Board to accredit the inferior Negro high school, the local 
school authorities voted to admit Negroes to the “ white”  
school. “ Carlsbad white students approved the move. The 
1951 graduating class and the high school senior council 
voted unanimously to welcome the Negro students. The 
junior and senior class and faculty members were 95 per 
cent in favor of it.”  Santa Fe New Mexican, September 2, 
1951. The integration has not caused a single untoward 
incident to date. Furthermore, racial segregation was 
abolished in Alamagordo’s public schools in August of 
this year and the first Negro teacher was hired to teach 
in that New Mexico city’s integrated public schools. There 
has been no disharmony as a result of either action.



26

consisting of all colored children, have been employed 
to teach classes of mixed races. While many indi­
vidual examples could be cited, one in particular bears 
mentioning. The one in question contained the only 
junior high school operated on a segregated basis. 
This junior high school was a fairly large institution 
and naturally existed in a good sized city. Today, the 
student body of this school is approximately one-third 
Negro and two-thirds white. The teachers who for­
merly were teaching all-Negro junior high school 
classes have been completely integrated into the new 
setup and include teachers of all regular and special 
subjects. The morale of both the student body and 
faculty is excellent. B ien n ia l R e p o r t  f o r  th e Y ea rs  
J u ly  1, 1949, to  J u n e  30, 1951, State of New Jersey, 
Department of Education, Division Against Discrimi­
nation 12, 13.

On the basis of the accumulated experience, instances 
of which we have described above, we are convinced that 
integration can and will be accomplished in the public 
schools of the South without “ bloodshed and violence’ ’ 
if the law enforcement agencies, federal or local, demon­
strate that they will not tolerate breaches of the peace or 
incitement. Americans are law abiding people and abhor 
klanism and violence.

Segregation Is A n  E conom ic W aste

There is another cogent reason that this Court should 
speak out clearly and definitively now. Since the ‘ ‘ separate 
but equal’ ’ doctrine in public education will have to be 
abandoned ultimately, it should be abandoned sooner 
rather than later, to forestall the wasteful expenditure by 
many States of huge sums of money to build segregated 
schools when that money could be used more economically 
and enduringly to build and improve public schools where 
they will provide the greatest good for the greatest num­
ber. This we believe is a necessary consequence of the 
constitutional requirement that the State must grant each 
person equal protection of its laws.



27

The President’s Committee on Civil Rights, in its his­
toric report, To Secure These Rights (1947), states:

The South is one of the poorer sections of the country 
and has at best only limited funds to spend on its 
schools. With 34.5 percent of the country’s popula­
tion, 17 southern states and the District of Columbia 
have 39.4 percent of our school children. Yet the 
South has only one-fifth of the taxpaying wealth of 
the nation. Actually, on a percentage basis, the South 
spends a greater share of its income on education than 
do the wealthier states in other parts of the country. 
(63)

The South has been struggling under a heavy financial 
burden to support its educational system, with the Negro 
schools admittedly inferior to the white. The southern 
States would have to expend over one and one-half billion 
dollars to bring the Negro schools to the level of the 
“ white”  schools and, in addition, approximately eighty-one 
million dollars annually just to maintain parity. Charles 
H. Thompson, Dean, Graduate School of Howard Univer­
sity, Letter to the Editor, The New York Times, April 6, 
1952. This additional burden is beyond the capacity of 
the South to bear. Bond, in Education of the Negro in the 
American Social Order (1934) sums this up:

If the South had an entirely homogeneous population, 
it would not be able to maintain schools of high 
quality for the children unless its states and local 
communities resorted to heavy, almost crushing rates 
of taxation. The situation is further complicated 
by the fact that a dual system is maintained. Con­
sidering the expenditures made for Negro schools, it 
is clear that the plaint frequently made that this dual 
system is a burden is hardly true; hut it is also clear 
that if an honest attempt were made to maintain 
“ equal, though separate schools” , the burden would 
be impossible even beyond the limitation of existing 
poverty. (231)



2 8

Public schools should be planned and erected as part 
of the development of the total community. They should 
be built in those areas that have expanding populations 
and needs for such facilities, rather than in opportunistic 
response to random law suits or threats of law suits, as is 
now the case in many southern States.

Conclusion

The United States is now engaged in an ideological 
world conflict in which the practices of our democracy are 
the subject of close scrutiny abroad. We cannot afford, 
nor will the Avorld permit us, to rest upon democratic 
pretensions unrelated to reality.

The people of other lands listen not only to our Voice 
of America which quite properly extols the virtues of 
democracy; they listen to broadcasts from Communist 
sources as well. We know that our enemies seize eagerly 
upon the weaknesses of our democracy and, for propa­
ganda purposes, magnify, exaggerate and distort hap­
penings in the United States. Not so well known, although 
possibly more significant, is that the liberal and conserva­
tive press abroad is constantly comparing our declara­
tions and statements about democracy with our actual 
practices at home. Domestic incidents are noted and com­
mented upon. Our discriminatory practices in education, 
in employment, in housing, have all been the subject of 
much adverse press comment in those foreign countries 
which we are trying to keep in the democratic camp.

While McGee v. Mississippi, 40 So. 2nd 160 (1949), was 
the subject of some considerable comment in Communist 
circles here and elsewhere, the Paris office of the American



29

Jewish Committee assembled characteristic press comment 
from liberal, conservative and Catholic European news­
papers :

Semailles, a liberal Marseilles newspaper, said on May 
18, 1951:

In associating ourselves with the United States in the 
defense of liberty, we have included in the notion of 
liberty, a respect for all human beings, the notion of 
the common fraternity of all men. And it appears 
that in this association, we, too, have much to bring. 
What the world awaits from us is not cannons and 
atomic bombs, but the permanent and vigilant affirma­
tion of the inalienable right of all men to be judged 
according to their acts and not according to the color 
of their skin or the latitude in which they were born. 
Otherwise, where is the difference between our enemies 
and ourselves?

An editorial, entitled “ An American Tragedy” , in the 
Vienna Arbeiter-Zeitung, one of the staunchest anti-Com- 
inunist publications in Europe, said on February 4, 1951:

The Communist reply to accusations made about the 
injustices and cruelties of their dictatorship, of forced 
labor, of the arbitrariness of their courts and their 
violation of human dignity, by pointing to the in­
sincerity of American democracy which permits racial 
persecution and deprives millions of human beings of 
their equal rights on the basis of the color of their 
skin.

One cannot appear before the world as a fighter for 
freedom and right when one is unable to eliminate 
injustice in one’s own house.

L ’Aube, Paris organ of the Popular Republican Move­
ment (MRP), the second largest political party in France, 
led by Georges Bidault and Foreign Minister Robert Schu- 
man. in its May 9, 1951, issue said:



3 0

How much does a Negro weigh in a world where 
people of all colors are struggling with the hitter 
forces of nature and societies! Why is there so much 
noise about a trial which after all is an internal affair, 
not only of the United States of America, but of one 
of its states! He weighs exactly that of all those 
whose lot it is to protest an injustice. And the in­
justice in this instance has as its name, racism. Our 
reaction to injustice does not depend on the region of 
the world where the wrong was committed. It is the 
more bitter to know that it took place in a continent 
which gave for liberty enough of its sons not to 
deliver up to hatred of a poor Negro; that is what 
weighs heavily.

On April 7, 1950, the Cologne Welt Der Arbeit, official 
publication of the anti-Communist German trade unions, 
carried an article entitled, “ The Negro Question in the 
U. S .”  That article contained the following significant 
language:

In recent Aveeks, one found in the German press the 
folloAving item s: In Frankfurt-am-Main the proprietor 
of a cafe Avas fined 600 DM by American Occupation 
Authorities because he had ejected tA\To colored Ameri­
can soldiers from his establishment. In Washington, 
the Capital of the U. S. A., Doctor Bundle, Avho made 
a name for himself as the UN intermediary in Pales­
tine, Avas refused admittance to a movie house because 
he Avas colored. He then Avent to another movie house 
where he spoke French and Avas admitted because it 
Avas believed he Avas a foreigner. In the one case, the 
American authorities want foreigners to treat every 
colored soldier AArith dignity as an American citizen 
and punish any transgression of this principle. On 
the other hand, world-famous leaders of the colored 
population are deprived of their full equality. H oav 
are these tAvo attitudes to be reconciled! It is only 
too natural that the average European can make no 
sense of such contradictions. The racial attitudes in 
the U. S. have no parallel in the entire world.



31

And finally, we have the following quotation from the 
liberal Le Matin of Antwerp, Belgium, in May 1951:

The crime of racism is odious. And, without doubt, 
the world will never know true peace while there exist 
nations, peoples or races that believe themselves su­
perior to other nations, peoples or races. It is a pain­
ful declaration to make at the moment when our 
American friends are presenting themselves in the 
United Nations as the sturdy defenders of the free 
world.

Legally imposed segregation in our country, in any 
shape, manner or form, weakens our program to build 
and strengthen world democracy and combat totalitarian­
ism. In education, at the lower levels, it indelibly fixes 
anti-social attitudes and behavior patterns by building 
inter-group antagonisms. It forces a sense of limitation 
upon the child and destroys incentive. It produces feel­
ings of inferiority and discourages racial self-appreciation.



3 2

For all of the reasons urged herein, State-imposed racial 
segregation in public schools, denies to the appellants 
herein, and to all similarly situated Negro children, equal 
protection of the laws in every meaningful sense of those 
words.

The judgment of the court below should be reversed.

Kespectfully submitted,

Edwin J. Lukas,
A rnold Forster,
A rthur Garfield Hays, 
Frank E. Karelsen, 

of the New York Bar,

Leonard Haas,
of the Georgia Bar,

Saburo Kido,
of the California Bar,

W aldo B. W etmore, 
of the Kansas Bar,

Attorneys for Amici Curiae.

T heodore Leskes,
Sol Rabkin,

of the New York Bar, 
of Counsel.

November 15, 1952



3 3

APPENDIX

American Civil Liberties Union

The American Civil Liberties Union is a private or­
ganization composed of individual citizens. It is devoted 
to supporting the Bill of Rights—for everybody. Founded 
in 1920, it has, day in and day out, actively championed 
the three-fold cause of civil liberties, the heart and core 
of democratic government, as set forth in the Constitution 
and the Declaration of Independence: (1) Government
by the people, grounded on freedom of inquiry and ex­
pression— speech, press, assembly and religion—for every­
body; (2) specific rights guaranteed to the people, such 
as due process and fair trial—for everybody; and (3) 
equality of the people before the law—for everybody, 
regardless of race, color, place of birth, position, income, 
political opinions, or religious belief.

The Union has no cause to serve other than civil liber­
ties. It is dedicated simply and solely to furthering the 
actual practice of democracy. It defends the civil liberties 
of everybody, including those whose anti-democratic opin­
ions it abhors and opposes, like Communists, Nazis, Fas­
cists and Ku Klux Klanners.



3 4

The American Ethical Union is a national association 
of Societies for Ethical Culture. Its purpose is to bring 
into close fellowship of thought and action existing Ethical 
Societies and to promote the establishment of new socie­
ties. It is thus devoted, on a national scale, as is each 
society in its local setting, to the promotion of the knowl­
edge, the love and the practice of the right in all the rela­
tionships of life. It asserts the supreme importance of the 
ethical factor in all the relations of life and affirms the 
belief that the greatest spiritual values are to be found in 
man’s relationship to man. Through its religious and edu­
cational programs it seeks to make the individual more 
adequate in his personal relationships and better able to 
contribute to the life of his community. The Ethical So­
ciety has as one of its objectives the inspiring words of 
St. Paul: “ He has made of one blood all nations of men to 
dwell on the earth.”

American Ethical Union



35

The American Jewish Committee is a corporation cre­
ated by an Act of the Legislature of the State of New 
York in 1906. Its charter states:

The object of this corporation shall be to prevent the 
infraction of the civil and religious rights of Jews, in 
any part of the world; to render all lawful assistance 
and to take appropriate remedial action in the event 
of threatened or actual invasion or restriction of such 
rights, or of unfavorable discrimination with respect 
thereto . . .

During the forty-six years of its existence it has been 
one of the fundamental tenets of the organization that the 
welfare and security of Jews in America depend upon the 
preservation of constitutional guarantees. An invasion of 
the civil rights of any group is a threat to the safety of all 
groups.

For this reason the American Jewish Committee has 
on many occasions fought in defense of civil liberties 
even though Jewish interests did not appear to be spe­
cifically involved.

American Jewish Committee



3 6

Anti-Defamation League 
of

B’nai B’rith

B ’nai B ’rith, founded in 1843, is the oldest civic or­
ganization of American Jews. It represents a member­
ship of over 350,000 men and women and their families. 
The Anti-Defamation League was organized in 1913, as a 
section of the parent organization, in order to cope with 
racial and religious prejudice in the United States. The 
program developed by the League is designed to achieve 
the following objectives: to eliminate and counteract
defamation and discrimination against the various racial, 
religious and ethnic groups which comprise our American 
people; to counteract un-American and anti-democratic ac­
tivity; to advance goodwill and mutual understanding 
among American groups; and to encourage and translate 
into greater effectiveness the ideals of American democ­
racy.



37

The Japanese American Citizens League is the national 
organization of Americans of Japanese ancestry. Estab­
lished in 1930, its story is an account of a group of young 
Americans treasuring their birthright of American citizen­
ship, defending it and seeking to be worthy of it. Although 
its membership is composed primarily of Americans of 
Japanese ancestry, membership is open to all Americans 
who believe in its principles.

The purpose of the organization is to promote good 
citizenship, protect the rights of Americans of Japanese 
ancestry, and acquaint the public in general with this group 
of citizens toward their full acceptance into American life. 
The twin mottoes of “ For Better Americans in a Greater 
America”  and “ Security Through Unity”  express this 
purpose.

Japanese American Citizens League



38

Unitarian Fellowship for Social Justice

The Rev. Dr. John Haynes Holmes and a group of other 
Unitarian clergymen established the Unitarian Fellowship 
for Social Justice in 1908. They sought “ to sustain one 
another in united action against social injustice and in the 
realization of religious ideals in present-day society.”  Dr. 
Holmes served for three years as the Fellowship’s first 
president.

The Fellowship concerns itself especially with freedom 
of conscience, the rights of minorities, the defense of public 
education, and substantial efforts to strengthen the United 
Nations and to plan for peace.

The Fellowship participates in the United Unitarian 
Appeal for its funds, and it is affiliated with the American 
Unitarian Association through the Association’s Depart­
ment of Adult Education and Social Relations. The society 
has individual members, organizational affiliates, and chap­
ters throughout the United States and Canada in Unitarian 
and liberal community churches.



f



[ 3434- 3478— 500— 12- 52 ]



IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1952

No. 8

OLIVER BROW N, MRS. RICHARD L A W TO N , 
MRS. SADIE EM M ANUEL, et  a l „

Appellants,
vs.

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, SH AW N EE  
COUNTY, K ANSAS, e t  a l .

Appellees.

BRIEF ON BEH ALF OF 
A M E R IC A N  CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 

A M E R IC A N  ETH ICAL UNION 
A M ERICAN  JEW ISH  COM M ITTEE 

A N T I-D E F A M A T IO N  LEAGU E OF B’ NAI B’RITH 
JAPAN ESE A M E R IC A N  CITIZENS LEAGUE

AN D
U N ITA R IA N  FELLOW SH IP FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 

AS A M I C I  C U R I A E

Edwin J. Lukas,
A rnold Forster, 
A rthur Garfield Hays, 
Frank E. Karelsen,

of the New York Bar,
Leonard Haas,

of the Georgia Bar,
Saburo Kido,

of the California Bar,
W aldo B. W etmore, 

o f the Kansas Bar,

T heodore Leskes,
Sol Rabkin,

of the New York Bar, 
of Counsel.

Attorneys for Amici Curiae.

r-^H^D307 B A B  P K E S S  INC., 54 L A F A Y E T T E  S T .,  N E W  Y O R K  1 3 ----- W A . 5 - 3432 -3 .



#



TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Interest of the A mici ......................................................... 1

Statement of the Case ......................................................  3

T he Statute Involved 4

T he Question Presented .......................  4

Summary of A rgument ......................................................  5

Argument

I. The validity under the equal protection of 
the laws clause of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment of racial segregation in public educa­
tional facilities has never been decided by 
this Court ............................. 6

II. Racial segregation in public educational 
institutions is an unconstitutional classifi­
cation under the equal protection of the 
laws clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 12 III.

III. The finding of the court below, that Negro 
children are disadvantaged by the segre­
gated public school system of Topeka, re­
quires this Court to disavow the “ separate 
but equal”  doctrine as it has been applied 
to public educational institutions .................... 16

Conclusion ..................................................................................  28

Appendix ......................................................................................  33



11 Index

T able o f  Cases

PAGE

Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219 (1911) 19
Banks v. San Francisco Housing Authority, decided 

by the Superior Court of San Francisco, Cal.,
Oct. 1, 1952 ............................................................... 19

Belton v. Gebliart, decided by the Supreme Court of
Delaware, Aug. 28, 1952 ..........................................  19

Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U. S. 45 (1908)
Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529 (1951) 19
Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Howard, — U. S.

—, 72 S. Ct. 1022 (1952) .......................................  13
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 98 F. Supp.

797 (1951) .................................................................18,19
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936) 13
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60 (1917) .................. 13,14

Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227 (1940) 13
Cumming v. County Board of Education, 175 U. S.

528 (1899) ................................................................. 7

Fisher v. Hurst, 333 U. S. 147 (1948) ........................10,18

Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78 (1927).......... 5, 9,10,11,18
Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U. S. 45 (1935)....................  19
Guinn v. U. S., 238 U. S. 347 (1915).............................. 14

Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485 (1878) ............................ 6, 7
Henderson v. U. S., 339 U. S. 816 (1950)....................  13
Hirabayashi v. U. S., 320 U. S. 81 (1943)........... 12,15,16

Jones v. Opelika, 316 U. S. 584 (1942)........................  19

Korematsu v. U. S., 323 U. S. 214 (1944) .................. 12,15



Index m

Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61
PAGE

(1911) ........................................................................  12

McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 235 U. S. 151
(1914) ........................................................................  10

McGee v. Mississippi, — Miss. —, 40 So. 2nd 160
(1949) ........................................................................  28

McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Board of Regents, 339
U. S. 637 (1950) .................................. 8,10,11,18,20

Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586
(1940) .....................................................................  19

Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337
(1938) .....................................................................9,10,18

Mitchell v. U. S., 313 IT. S. 80 (1941).......................... 13
Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U. S. 373 (1946)..................  13
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943).........  19

Nixon v. Hefndon, 273 U. S. 536 (1927)...................... 14

Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 633 (1948)...................  12

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896)
5, 7, 8,10,11,18,19, 20

Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948) ......................13,14
Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U. S. 50 (1951)....................  13
Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the University of

Oklahoma, 332 U. S. 631 (1948) ............................. 10,18
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1944)......................14,19
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 323

U. S. 192 (1944) .................................................. 13
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880)......  13
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629 (1950) .......... 8,10,18, 20

Takahashi v. Fish .& Game Commission, 334 U. S.
410 (1948) ................................................................. 14



IV Index

PAGE

Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323
U. S. 210 (1944) ....................................................... 13

U. S. v. Reynolds, 235 U. S. 133 (1914)........................ 13

West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,
319 IT. S. 624 (1943) ...............................................  19

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886) ...............  14
Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U. S. 500 (1926)........  14

Other A uthorities Cited

Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford,
The Authoritarian Personality (1950) ................  18

52 American Jewish Yearbook (1951).......................... 20
Antwerp Le Matin, May 1951 .......................................  31
The Austin Statesman, November 14, 1950................  21

Biennial Report, 1949-1951, State of New Jersey, 
Dep’t. of Education, Division Against Dis­
crimination ...............................................................25, 26

Bond, Education of the Negro in the American Social
Order (1934) ............................................................. 17,27

Chicago Sun-Times, September 26, 1950 ......................  24
Cologne Welt Der Arbeit, April 7, 1950 ......................  30

Dallas Times Herald, October 2, 1951 .......................... 20
Dawkins, Kentucky Outgrows Segregation, The Sur­

vey, July 1950 ...........................................................  21
Dayton Journal Herald, June 23, 1950 ........................  25

Frenkel-Brunswik, A  Study of Prejudice in Children,
1 Human Relations 295 (1948)..............................  18



Index v

Gallagher, American Caste and the Negro College
(1938) .................................................................... . 17

Goodman, Race Awareness in Young Children (1952) 18

Heinrich, The Psychology of a Suppressed People
(1937) .....................................................................  17

The Houston Chronicle, Sept. 10, 1952 20
The Houston Informer, December 5, 1951 20
The Houston Post, January 9, 1951 .............  20

Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, July 1, 1951...............  21
Long, The Intelligence of Colored Elementary Pupils 

in Washington, D. C., 3 J. of Negro Ed. 205
(1934) ..................................................   17

Long, Some Psychogenic Hazards of Segregated
Education of Negroes, 4 J. of Negro Ed. 336
(1935) ..................................................1....................  17

Marseilles Semailles, May 18, 1951 .............................. 29
Miami Herald, May 6, 1951 ...........................................  21
46 Michigan L. Rev. (1948) ...........................................  7
Morisey, A New Trend in Private Colleges, New

South, Aug.-Sept. 1951 ...........................................  22
Myrdal, An American Dilemma (1944) ......................  6,18

New York Herald Tribune, June 23, 1949....................  21
New York Herald Tribune, Sept. 28, 1951..................  22
New York Post, Aug. 24, 1948 .....................................  21
The New York Times, January 30, 1950 24

The Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, June 7, 1951 20

Paris IVAube, May 9, 1951 ........................................... 29,30
Pittsburgh Courier, December 1, 1951 24

PAGE



VI Index

President’s Commission on Higher Education, Higher
Education for American Democracy (1947)....... 17

President’s Committee on Civil Eights, To Secure
These Eights (1947) ...............................................  27

Eichmond News Leader, September 25, 1952.............. 22, 23

Santa Fe New Mexican, September 2, 1951................  23
Saveth, The Supreme Court and Segregation, The

Survey, July 1951 ...................................................  23
Segregation in Public Schools—A Violation of 

“ Equal Protection of the Laws’ ’, 56 Yale L. J.
1059 (1947) ............................................................... 17

St. Louis Globe-Democrat, April 17, 1952....................  22
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 7, 1950; May 11, 1952.. 22

Thompson, C. H., Letter to the Editor, The New
York Times, April 6, 1952 .....................................  27

Vienna Arbeiter-Zeitung, February 4, 1951.................. 29

Washington Times-Herald, July 17, 1951....................... 22

PAGE



IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1952

No. 8

OLIVER BROWN, MRS. RICHARD LAWTON, 
MRS. SADIE EMMANUEL, et  a l „

Appellants,
vs.

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, SHAWNEE 
COUNTY, KANSAS, et  a l .,

Appellees.

BRIEF ON BEH ALF OF 
A M E R IC A N  CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 

A M E R IC A N  ETH ICAL UNION 
A M E R IC A N  JEW ISH  COM M ITTEE 

A N T I-D E F A M A T IO N  LEAGU E OF B’ NAI B’RITH 
JAPAN ESE A M E R IC A N  CITIZEN S LEAGU E

AN D
U N ITA R IA N  FELLOW SH IP FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 

AS A M I C I  C U R I A E

Interest of the Amici

This brief is filed, with the consent of both parties, on 
behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union, the American 
Ethical Union, American Jewish Committee, the Anti-



2

Defamation League of B ’nai B ’rith, the Japanese Ameri­
can Citizens League and the Unitarian Fellowship for 
Social Justice. The Appendix contains a description of 
each of these organizations.

The present case and the companion cases, all involv­
ing the constitutionality of racial segregation in public 
elementary and secondary schools, present an issue with 
which all six organizations are deeply concerned because 
such segregation deprives millions of persons of rights 
that are freely enjoyed by others and adversely affects 
the entire democratic structure of our society.

We have read the briefs of the appellants, with the 
appendix thereto, and we unequivocally endorse the argu­
ments, legal, educational and sociological, therein advanced. 
In this amici brief we are urging arguments which have 
not been made in the appellants’ briefs and which we 
believe should be presented to this Court.



3

Statement of the Case

The adult appellants are Negro citizens of the United 
States and of the State of Kansas (R. 3-4) while the 
infant appellants are their children eligible to attend and 
now attending elementary schools in Topeka, Kansas, a 
city of the first class within the meaning of Section 13-101, 
General Statutes of Kansas, 1949. Appellees are State 
officers empowered by State law to maintain and operate 
the public schools of Topeka, Kansas.

On March 22, 1951, appellants instituted this action 
seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction to com­
pel the State to admit Negro children to the elementary 
public schools of Topeka on an unsegregated basis on the 
ground that segregation deprived them of equal educa­
tional opportunities within the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment (R. 2-7). In their answer, appellees admitted 
that they acted pursuant to the statute, that infant ap­
pellants were not eligible to attend any of the eighteen 
“ white”  elementary schools solely because of their race 
and color (R. 12, 24), but that they were eligible to 
attend the equivalent public schools maintained for Negro 
children in the City of Topeka (R. 11, 12). The Attorney 
General of the State of Kansas filed a separate answer 
defending the validity of the statute in question (R. 14).

The court below was convened in accordance with Title 
28, United States Code, §2284 and on June 25-26 a trial 
on the merits took place (R. 63 et seq.). On August 3, 
1951, the court below filed its opinion, 98 F. Supp. 797 (R. 
238-244), its findings of fact (R. 244-246), and conclusions 
of law (R. 246-247), and entered a final judgment and de­
cree in appellees’ favor denying the relief sought (R. 247).

Appellants filed a petition for appeal on October 1, 
1951 (R. 248), and an order allowing the appeal was duly 
entered (R. 250). Probable jurisdiction was noted on 
June 9, 1952 (R. 254). Jurisdiction of this Court rests on 
Title 28, United States Code, §§1253 and 2201 (b).



4

The Statute Involved

Segregated elementary schools in Topeka, Kansas, are 
maintained solely pursuant to the authority of Section 
72-1724 of the General Statutes of Kansas (1949) which 
reads as follows:

Powers of board; sepax-ate schools for white and 
colored children; manual training. The board of edu­
cation shall have power to elect their own officers, 
make all necessai'y rules for the government of the 
schools of such city under its charge and control and 
of the board, subject to the provisions of this act and 
the laws of this state; to organize and maintain sep­
arate schools for the education of white and colored 
children, including the high schools in Kansas City, 
Kans.; no discrimination on account of color shall be 
made in high schools except as provided herein; to 
exercise the sole control over the public schools and 
school property of such city; and shall have the power 
to establish a high school or high schools in connec- 
tion with manual training and instruction or other­
wise, and to maintain the same as a part of the public- 
school svstem of said city. (G. S. 1868, Ch. 18, §75; 
L. 1879,* Ch. 81, §1; L. 1905, Ch. 414, §1; Feb. 28;
K. S. 1923, §72-1724.)

The Question Presented

The question presented by this appeal is whether the 
State of Kansas, or indeed any State, by establishing 
racial segregation in its public elementary school system, 
has violated the equal protection of the laws clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.



5

SU M M A R Y  OF A RG U M EN T

This Court has never ruled directly on the constitu­
tionality of racial segregation in public elementary schools. 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896) and Gong Lum 
v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78 (1927), relied upon by the court 
below, are not controlling here.

Segregation in State-supported educational institutions 
violates the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment in that it is an inadmissible 
classification. This Court has consistently rejected dif­
ferential treatment by State authority predicated upon 
racial classifications or distinctions.

The finding of the lower court that Negro children are 
disadvantaged by the segregated public school system 
necessitates granting the relief requested. That which is 
unequal in fact cannot be equal in law and, therefore, 
segregation and equality cannot co-exist in public educa­
tion.



6

P O I N T  I

The validity under the equal protection of the 
laws clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of racial 
segregation in public educational facilities has never 
been decided by this Court.

The issue now squarely before this Court is whether 
the State of Kansas, pursuant to statute, may maintain 
and operate racially segregated public elementary schools, 
without heed to the damage inflicted by segregation upon 
its Negro victims. Despite the transcendent importance of 
the question, this Court has never ruled directly on the 
constitutionality of racial segregation in public education. 
The Court has ruled on related problems, such as the 
validity of racial segregation in transportation and in 
housing. Regretfully, it has, but always in dictum, ap­
peared to accept racial segregation where the validity of 
segregation was not actually before the Court. Historically, 
these dicta reflect the fact that prior to World War I, the 
status of the American Negro was such that he could make 
no realistic demand for equality of treatment in those sec­
tions of the country in which he lived in substantial num­
bers. Because of his depressed economic condition and 
concentration in agriculture, his children could not even 
obtain the most elementary education. Myrdal, An Ameri­
can Dilemma, Ch. 8-9 (1944).

Following the adoption in 1868 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the earliest case in which some reference was 
made by this Court to racial segregation in education was 
Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485 (1878). That case involved 
the validity of a State statute prohibiting segregation in



7

public carriers. The statute was declared unconstitutional 
as an improper regulation of foreign and interstate com­
merce. In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Clifford re­
viewed with approval the conclusions of a number of 
State cases which had upheld the reasonableness of racial 
segregation in education and stated in dictum that segre­
gation in the public schools did not violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment if physically equal facilities for Negroes were 
provided. It is probably unnecessary for us to note that 
no evidence was offered in that case, because it would have 
been irrelevant, that school segregation must in fact in­
volve inequality.

In 1896 this Court decided Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 
U. S. 537 (1896), which sustained the constitutionality of 
a Louisiana statute requiring public carriers to furnish 
separate but equal coach accommodations for whites and 
Negroes. The Court as before, in dictum, cited with ap­
proval several old State cases which had held that a State 
could require the segregation of racial groups in its edu­
cational system.

The constitutionality of “ separate but equal”  facili­
ties in education was concededly not before the Court in 
either the Hall or the Plessy cases. Yet, although there 
was no evidentiary or psycho-sociological basis for a dis­
cussion of equal facilities in education, and in spite of the 
fact that the statements of the Court were clearly dicta, 
the Plessy case has been cited to this date by State and 
lower Federal courts to sustain the constitutionality of 
segregation in public educational institutions. See cases 
cited, 46 Mich. L. Rev. 639, 643 (1948).

Three years later, this Court decided Gumming v. 
County Board of Education, 175 U. S. 528 (1899). There 
an injunction was sought to restrain a board of education



8

in Georgia from maintaining a high school for white chil­
dren where none was maintained for Negro children. The 
State court had upheld the board, saying that its alloca­
tion of funds did not involve bad faith or abuse of dis­
cretion. In affirming the decision of the State court, this 
Court speaking through Mr. Justice Harlan, the lone dis­
senter in Plessy, stated expressly that racial segregation 
in the school system was not in issue. (542, 546)

The next case before this Court which involved com- 
pulsoi-y educational segregation was Berea College v. 
Kentucky, 211 U. S. 45 (1908), wherein the validity of a 
State statute which prohibited domestic corporations from 
teaching white and Negro pupils in the same private edu­
cational institution was attacked. While the scope of the 
statute was broad enough to include individuals as well 
as corporations, this Court said:

. . .  it is unnecessary for us to consider anything 
more than the question of its validity as applied to 
corporations. . . . Even if it were conceded that its 
assertions of power over individuals cannot be sus­
tained, still it must be upheld so far as it restrains 
corporations. (54)

This Court agreed with the reasoning of the State 
court that the statute could be upheld as coming within 
the power of a State over one of its own corporate crea­
tures. The statute was not deemed to have worked a dep­
rivation of property rights. The rights of individuals were 
not considered.1

1 Interestingly, since the decisions of this Court in Sweatt v. 
Painter, 339 U. S. 629 (1950) and in McLaurin v. Oklahoma, 
339 U. S. 637 (1950), Berea College accepts Negro students.



9

Not until 1927 did racial classification in educational 
institutions again become the subject of controversy be­
fore this Court. In Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78 (1927), 
a Chinese girl contested the right of the State of Missis­
sippi to assign her to a Negro school under the State’s 
segregated school system. Mississippi contended that 
under its statute requiring separate schools to be main­
tained for children of the white and colored races, the 
plaintiff could not insist on being classed with the whites 
and that the legislature 'was not compelled to provide 
separate schools for each of the non-white races.

The issue of segregation was not presented in that 
case. The plaintiff accepted the system of segregation in 
the public schools of the State but contested her classifi­
cation within that system.

Nor -was the validity of segregation before the Court 
in the case of Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 
337 (1938). There the petitioner wras refused admission 
to the University of Missouri Law School, a State-sup­
ported institution, solely because he Avas a Negro. He 
brought mandamus to compel the University to admit him. 
The State, having no law school for Negroes, sought to 
fulfill its obligation to provide equal educational facilities 
by offering to pay the petitioner’s tuition for a legal edu­
cation in another State. This the Court held did not sat­
isfy the constitutional requirement. It said that the peti­
tioner Avas entitled to be admitted to the University of 
Missouri Law School in the absence of other and proper 
provision for his legal training within the State of Mis­
souri. The issue Avas Avhether an othenvise qualified Negro 
applicant for Iuav training could be excluded from the 
only State-supported laAv school. This Court assumed that



10

the validity of equal facilities in racially separate schools 
was settled by earlier decisions and cited the Plessy case, 
McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 235 U. S. 151 
(1914), both of which involved segregation in public car­
riers, and the Gong Lum case. But the constitutional 
validity of segregation was not decided.

The next consideration of a related problem was in 
1948 in Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the University of 
Oklahoma, 332 U. S. 631. This Court, in a per curiam 
decision, said that the State must provide laAv school fa­
cilities for the Negro petitioner “ in conformity with the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
provide it as soon as it does for applicants of any other 
group”  (633). The facts in the Sipuel case were similar 
to those in the Gaines case, in that no law school facilities 
were afforded Negroes by the State of Oklahoma.

Segregation was not at issue in the Sipuel case. This 
Court stated in Fisher v. Hurst, 333 U. S. 147 (1948), that:

The petition for certiorari in Sipuel v. University 
of Oklahoma did not present the issue whether a state 
might not satisfy the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment by establishing a separate 
law school for Negroes. On submission, we were 
clear it was not an issue here. (150)

The most recent cases involving segregation in public 
institutions of learning were Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 
629 (1950) and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Board, of 
Regents, 339 U. S. 637 (1950). Although the petitioners 
and numerous amici in those cases urged this Court to rule 
expressly that discrimination inevitably results from en­
forced segregation in educational institutions, the Court did 
not reach that question. In Sweatt, Mr. Chief Justice Vin­
son, speaking for a unanimous Court, said, “ Nor need we



11

reach petitioner’s contention that Plessy v. Ferguson 
should be reexamined in the light of contemporary knowl­
edge respecting the purposes of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment and the effects of racial segregation”  (636). The 
judgment of the court below was reversed and the Uni­
versity of Texas Law School was ordered to admit the 
petitioner because equivalent educational opportunity was 
not afforded by the hastily organized Negro law school.

In McLaurin, again speaking for a unanimous bench, 
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson expressly limited the decision:

In this case, we are faced with the question whether 
a state may, after admitting a student to graduate 
instruction in its state university, afford him different 
treatment from other students solely because of his 
race. We decide only this issue . . . (638)

Thus in no case previously before this Court, in which 
racial segregation in public education has been the subject 
of comment in an opinion, has the Court felt called upon 
to rule squarely on the issue: Does segregation in public 
educational institutions meet the requirements of the equal 
protection of the laws clause of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment ?

We emphasize that absence of a specific ruling at the 
outset of this brief because of the thread of urgency 
running through the fabric of much previous argument 
on the crucial issue in this case, namely, that the “ sepa­
rate but equal”  doctrine, as it has been thought to apply 
to public educational institutions, should be “ overruled” . 
Indeed, in that framework, there is nothing to overrule. 
But there are dicta which must be disavowed. The con­
stitutionality of segregation in educational institutions 
was clearly not involved in Plessy or Gong Lum, the two 
cases relied upon by the court below.



1 2

P O I N T  II

Racial segregation in public educational institu­
tions is an unconstitutional classification under the 
equal protection of the laws clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.

This Court’s decisions in cases involving the constitu­
tionality of governmental action reveal a special scrutiny 
and constant vigilance in those instances where such ac­
tion was predicated upon alleged racial distinctions or 
where racial classifications were involved. Except in 
times of overriding peril or crisis, this Court has rejected 
all obvious or devious efforts to establish racial or reli­
gious lines of demarcation for the enjoyment of civil 
rights.

Whereas in cases involving other types of legislative 
classifications, the “ one who assails the classification . . . 
must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest 
upon any reasonable basis” , Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic 
Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 79 (1911), “ all legal restrictions 
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are 
immediately suspect” . Korematsu v. U. 8., 323 U. S. 214, 
216 (1944).

Again, “ only the most exceptional circumstances can 
excuse discrimination on that basis in the face of the 
equal protection clause.”  Oyania v. California, 332 U. S. 
633, 646 (1948). In HirabayasJii v. U. S., 320 U. S. 81 
(1943), this Court said:

Distinctions between citizens solely because of their 
ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free 
people whose institutions are founded upon the doc­



13

trine of equality. For that reason, legislative classi- 
cation or discrimination based on race alone has 
often been held to be a denial of equal protection. 
( 100)

In the application of these principles, the Court has, 
with one exception (discussed -infra), always declared gov­
ernmental classification based on race or color to be con­
stitutionally invalid.

This Court has ruled that Negroes must be treated the 
same as whites with respect to the privilege and duty of 
jury service. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 
(1880). It has stricken down state statutes aimed at keep­
ing the Negro “ in his place.”  Bailey v. Alabama, 219 
U. S. 219 (1911); U. S. v. Reynolds, 235 U. S. 133 (1914). 
Common carriers engaged in interstate travel have been 
prevented from segregating and discriminating on the 
basis of race or color. Mitchell v. U. S., 313 U. S. 80 
(1941); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U. S. 373 (1946); Hen­
derson v. V. S., 339 U. S. 816 (1950). Repeated instances 
of prejudice in criminal cases evidenced by brutal treat­
ment of Negroes have been condemned. Brown v. Mis­
sissippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936); Chambers v. Florida, 
309 U. S. 227 (1940); Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U. S. 50 
(1951). Racial segregation through zoning and attempts 
to institutionalize ghettos by restrictive covenants have 
been outlawed. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60 (1917); 
Shelley v. Kraemcr, 334 U. S. 1 (1948). Discrimination 
has been forbidden in labor unions that receive their col­
lective bargaining and representation powers by virtue 
of statute. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 
323 U. S. 192 (1944); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomo­
tive Firemen, 323 U. S. 210 (1944); Brotherhood of R. R. 
Trainmen v. Howard, — U. S. — , 72 S. Ct, 1022 (1952).



14

From time to time, this Court has stricken down all the 
various devices used to prevent or limit Negroes from 
participating in elections. Guinn v. U. S., 238 U. S. 347 
(1915); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536 (1927) ; Smith v. 
Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1944). So, too, laws which in 
their administration have effected a limitation or denial 
of the right to carry on a business or calling because of 
race or ancestry, have been declared unconstitutional. 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886); Yu Cong Eng 
v. Trinidad, 271 IT. S. 500 (1926); Takahaslii v. Fish and 
Game Commission, 334 U. S. 410 (1948).

In Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, which involved a 
racial residential zoning ordinance, the State invoked its 
authority to pass laws in the exercise of its police power, 
and urged that this compulsory separation of the races 
in habitation be sustained because it would “ promote the 
public peace by preventing race conflicts”  (81). This 
Court rejected that contention, saying:

The authority of the state to pass laws in the exercise 
of the police power . . .  is very broad . . . [and] the 
exercise of this power is not to be interfered with by 
the courts where it is within the scope of legislative 
authority and the means adopted reasonably tend to 
accomplish a lawful purpose. But it is equally well 
established that the police power . . . cannot justify 
the passage of a law or ordinance which runs counter 
to the limitations of the Federal Constitution . . . (74).

The police power of the State, broad as it is, does not 
justify a racial classification where rights created or pro­
tected by the Constitution are involved.

In Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 IT. S. 1, this Court, by 
unanimous decision, held that the enforcement of racial 
restrictive covenants by State courts is State action,



15

prohibited by the equal protection clause of the Four­
teenth Amendment. In the course of its decision, the 
Court measurably strengthened the equal protection clause 
as a formidable barrier to restrictions having the effect 
of racial segregation. The contention was there pressed 
that since the State courts stand ready to enforce racial 
covenants excluding white persons from occupancy or 
ownership, enforcement of covenants excluding Negroes 
is not a denial of equal protection. This Court rejected 
the equality of application argument, decisively dismissing 
it in the following language:

This contention does not bear scruitiny. . . . The 
rights created by the first section of the Fourteenth 
Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the 
individual. The rights established are personal rights. 
It is, therefore, no answer to these petitioners to say 
that the courts may also be induced to deny white 
persons rights of ownership and occupancy on grounds 
of race or color. Equal protection of the laws is not 
achieved through indiscriminate imposition of in­
equalities. (21, 22)

There has been but one recent departure from this rule. 
This Court stated that “ in the crisis of war and of 
threatened invasion”  when the national safety might 
appear to be imperilled, it will permit a racial classifica­
tion by the Federal Government. Hirabayashi v. U. 8., 
320 U. S. 81, 101. That case involved a prosecution for 
failure to obey a curfew order directed against citizens 
of Japanese ancestry. Korematsu v. U. S., 323 U. S. 214, 
arising out of the same war emergency, involved the 
validity of a governmental oi’der excluding all persons of 
Japanese ancestry from the West Coast military area. 
The Court, on the grounds of overriding pressing public 
urgency in time of war, sustained the racial classification



16

in these cases, but it emphasized that this was an ex­
traordinary exception. “  [Legislative classification or dis­
crimination based on race alone has often been held to 
be a denial of equal protection. . . . We may assume” , 
continued the Court, ‘ ‘ that these considerations would be 
controlling here were it not for the fact that the danger 
of espionage and sabotage, in time of war and of threat­
ened invasion”  has made necessai’y this racial classi­
fication, which ‘ ‘ is not to be condemned merely because 
in other and in most circumstances racial distinctions are 
irrelevant.”  Hirabayashi v. U. S., supra, 101.

Clearly, State laws providing for racial segregation in 
public educational facilities are not accompanied by any 
“ pressing public necessity” . The record here is barren 
of any such showing, as indeed it would have to be. Rather, 
there is a pressing public necessity to give all American 
citizens their due— equality of opportunity to use educa­
tional facilities established by the State for its inhabitants.

P O I N T  I I I

The finding of the court below, that Negro chil­
dren are disadvantaged by the segregated public 
school system of Topeka, requires this Court to dis­
avow the “separate but equal” doctrine as it has 
been applied to public educational institutions.

In one vital respect, the problem posed by this record 
is sharpened to the point of unique narrowness. The un­
challenged finding that segregation irreparably damages 
the child lifts this case out of the murky realm of specu­
lation on the issue of “ equality”  of facilities, into the



17

area of certainty that segregation and equality cannot 
co-exist. That which is unequal in fact cannot be equal in 
law.

It is respectfully submitted that the finding of the court 
below, that Negro children were disadvantaged by the 
segregation of white and colored students in the public 
elementary schools, requires this Court to reverse the 
lower court’s refusal to grant the requested relief. The 
lower court found as a fact that the segregation of white 
and Negro children in the public schools “ has a detri­
mental effect upon the colored children’ ’ ; that such segre­
gation creates in Negro children a “ sense of inferiority”  
which “ affects the motivation of a child to learn” ; that 
legally sanctioned segregation “ therefore has a tendency 
to retard the educational and mental development of 
[N]egro children and to deprive them of some of the 
benefits they would receive in a racially integrated school 
system. ’ ’

Educators and social scientists have long proclaimed 
that these and other social evils necessarily flow from 
racially segregated education. Segregation in Public 
Schools—A Violation of “ Equal Protection of the Laws” , 
56 Yale L. J. 1059, 1061 (1947). See also Long, Some 
Psychogenic Hazards of Segregated Education of Negroes, 
4 J. of Negro Ed. 336, 343 (1935); Long, The Intelligence 
of Colored Elementary Pupils in Washington, D. C., 3 J. 
of Negro Ed. 205-222 (1934); Gallagher, American Caste 
and the Negro College, 109, 184, 321-2 (1938); Bond, Edu­
cation of the Negro in the American Social Order, 385 
(1934); President’s Commission on Higher Education, 
2 Higher Education for American Democracy 35 (1947); 
Heinrich, The Psychology of a Suppressed People, 52, 57-



18

61 (1937); Myrdal, An American Dilemma, 54-5, 97-101, 
577-8, 758; Frenkel-Brunswik, A Study of Prejudice in 
Children, 1 Human Relations 295, 305 (1948); Goodman, 
Race Awareness in Young Children (1952); Adorno, 
Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford, The Authori­
tarian Personality, Ch. IV, V (1950).

Whenever this Court has been presented with a record 
that established inequality in fact as between educational 
opportunities offered by the State to its white and Negro 
inhabitants, it has ordered the immediate termination of 
the inequality. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 
337; Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 IT. S. 631; Fisher v. 
Hurst, 333 U. S. 147; Sweatt v. Painter, 339 IT. S. 629. 
In McLaurin v. Oklahoma, 339 IT. S. 637, this Court went 
even further to hold that officially imposed racial segre­
gation within a State-maintained school violated the equal 
protection clause. It is noteworthy that the court below 
said in its opinion, where “ segregation within a school 
as in the McLaurin case is a denial of due process, it is 
difficult to see why segregation in separate schools would 
not result in the same denial.”  Brown v. Board of Edu­
cation of Topeka, 98 F. Supp. 797, 800 (Emphasis added).

We respectfully urge this Court to follow the prin­
ciples it recently enunciated in Sweatt and McLaurin, 
rather than the unsound ones of Plessy and Gong Lum, 
and to hold unequivocally that racial segregation per se 
in all State educational institutions, is a violation of the 
equal protection of the laws clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.

The Need to D isavow  P l e s s y

As we explained in Point I, we believe that Plessy is 
not controlling. Assuming, arguendo, that the court below 
was justified by Plessy in refusing to hold that segregation



19

in public elementary schools is per se discrimination under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, this Court should now ex­
pressly overrule Plessy and reverse the court below. This 
Court has not hesitated in the past to overrule or recon­
sider and reverse earlier decisions where the nature and 
consequences of discrimination became fully disclosed or 
apparent upon later consideration. Murdock v. Pennsyl­
vania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943), reversing Jones v. Opelika, 
316 U. S. 584 (1942); West Virginia State Board of Edu­
cation v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943), overruling Miners- 
ville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586 (1940); Smith 
v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, overruling Grovey v. Toivnsend, 
295 U. S. 45 (1935). “ In constitutional questions, where 
correction depends upon amendment and not upon legis­
lative action this Court through its history has freely 
exercised its power to reexamine the basis of its constitu­
tional decisions.”  Smith v. Allwright, supra, 655 and cases 
cited in footnote 10 thereto.

Lower courts, State and federal, have indicated clearly 
that they believe a break with the “ separate but equal”  
doctrine in education is “ in the wind” , but they insist 
that they must await such a holding by this Court. Belton 
v. Gebhart, decided by the Delaware Court of Chancery, 
April 1, 1952, affirmed by the Supreme Court of that State 
on August 28, 1952; Banks v. San Francisco Housing 
Axithority, decided October 1, 1952, by the Superior Court 
of San Francisco; Brown v. Board of Education of To­
peka, 98 F. Supp. 797, 798; Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 
529, 535 (1951).

It is not surprising that American courts are ques­
tioning the validity of Plessy in view of the tremendous 
changes which have taken place since the turn of the cen­
tury in the understanding of the nature of the individual



2 0

and his relationships to racial groupings and to society. 
Scientific research in the fields of anthropology, sociology, 
biology and education has demonstrated the fallaciousness 
of the racial and blood strain concepts which are basic 
to the majority opinion in Plessy.

P eacefu l Integration W ill F ollow

The defenders of racial segregation have frequently 
expressed the fear that compulsory destruction of the bar­
riers in the public schools would increase racial tensions 
and even cause strife. Such results, obviously, should be 
avoided if possible, without yielding constitutional prin­
ciples. Experience, however, has clearly demonstrated 
that these dire predictions are unfounded.

Following this Court’s decision in McLaurin v. Okla­
homa, 339 U. S. 637, Negro students applied for admission 
and were admitted in large numbers to that State’s col­
leges and universities. By June 1951, approximately 400 
Negroes were enrolled at the University of Oklahoma and 
at Oklahoma A & M, all without the slightest increase in 
racial tension, but rather with every sign of increased 
mutual understanding and respect. The Oklahoma City 
Daily Oklahoman, June 7, 1951.

In Texas, after the decision in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 
U. S. 629, two Negroes were admitted to the University 
of Texas Law School and two others were admitted to the 
Dental School. 52 American Jewish Yearbook 42 (1951); 
The Houston Chronicle, Sept. 10, 1952. Negroes have also 
been admitted to private institutions of higher learning 
in Texas following Sweatt. Southern Methodist Univer­
sity (The Houston Post, January 9, 1951), Amarillo Col­
lege (Dallas Times Herald, October 2, 1951) and several 
other junior colleges (The Houston Informer, December 
5, 1951) have all found that the admission of Negroes was



2 1

possible without any adverse effect upon interracial rela­
tions. Quite the contrary. The Austin Statesman of No­
vember 14, 1950, reported the white students at Southern 
Methodist University advised the president that “ SMU 
student opinion favors admitting Negroes to the school.”

The University of Arkansas has accepted Negroes for 
LL.B. and M.D. degrees. Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, 
July 1, 1951; New York Post, August 24, 1948. Notwith­
standing the fact that the University of Florida has thus 
far refused to admit Negroes, the Florida Student Gov­
ernment Association, an organization of student leaders 
representing all colleges and universities in the State, 
unanimously passed a resolution calling for an immediate 
end to racial segregation in the State’s institutions of 
higher learning. Miami Herald, May 6, 1951. The Uni­
versity of Kentucky since 1949 has enrolled Negro stu­
dents. New York Herald Tribune, June 23, 1949. By 
July 1950, twelve Negroes were attending classes at the 
University and “ [t]hey took their places quietly in the 
student body without any open hostility.”  Dawkins, Ken­
tucky Outgrows Segregation, The Survey, July 1950. Pri­
vate educational institutions have followed the lead of the 
University of Kentucky. Berea College led the way. Three 
Roman Catholic colleges in Louisville, Nazareth, Ursuline 
and Bellarmine Colleges, immediately followed suit. Next 
to fall in line was the University of Louisville with a stu­
dent body of seven thousand. Southern Baptist Theologi­
cal Seminary and Louisville Theological Seminary now 
also admit Negroes on an unsegregated basis.

In July 1950, the first Negroes were admitted to the 
University of Missouri and less than two years later a 
Negro was appointed to the faculty. St, Louis Post-



22

Dispatch, July 7, 1950; St. Louis Globe-Democrat, April 
17, 1952. St. Louis University has admitted Negroes to 
all its facilities for the past few years. They have been 
fully integrated into the University program with no 
unhappy results. During the academic year 1950-51, a 
total of 351 Negro students was enrolled and there were 
five Negro faculty members. The experience of institu­
tions like St. Louis University has demonstrated that the 
admission of Negro students poses no problem of accept­
ance by white students. Morisey, A Neiv Trend in Private 
Colleges, New South, Aug.-Sept. 1951. Another private 
university in St. Louis, Washington University, admits 
Negroes to all its branches and schools. St. Louis Post- 
Dispatch, May 11, 1952. Its experience has been identical 
with that of St. Louis University.

In July 1951, the University of North Carolina ad­
mitted its first Negro student. Washington Times-Herald, 
July 17, 1951. The following September, six additional 
Negro students attending the University, were excluded 
from the regular student cheering section at a football 
game. When the entire student body protested this action 
by the University authorities, it was quickly reversed. 
NeAv York Herald Tribune, September 28, 1951.

Since 1951, the University of Virginia has been ad­
mitting Negro students and “ the formerly ‘ all-white’ 
schools which have accepted Negro students have found 
that their presence creates no special problem” . Rich­
mond News Leader, September 25, 1952.

The College of William and Mary, which next to Har­
vard University is the oldest of the country’s colleges, 
has admitted two Negro students, both of whom are 
attending regular day classes. According to President



23

Chandler, “ [t]he presence of these two Negro graduate 
students has not created any special problems on the 
campus.”  Ibid.

By July 1951, there were approximately one thousand 
Negro students in previously “ all-white”  institutions of 
higher education in the South. “ They have encountered 
virtually no open objection to their presence.”  Saveth, 
The Supreme Court and Segregation, The Survey, July 
1951.

Just as the admission of Negroes to formerly “ all- 
white”  colleges and universities has created no friction 
or other difficulties, so too experience has proved that in­
tegration of white and Negro children at the elementary 
and high school levels can be acieved without incident.

In the State of New Mexico where segregation is al­
lowed, though not required, in the public schools, the town 
of Carlsbad maintained separate schools for the two races 
until 1951. Following the refusal of the State School 
Board to accredit the inferior Negro high school, the local 
school authorities voted to admit Negroes to the “ white”  
school. “ Carlsbad white students approved the move. The 
1951 graduating class and the high school senior council 
voted unanimously to welcome the Negro students. The 
junior and senior class and faculty members were 95 per 
cent in favor of it.”  Santa Fe New Mexican, September 2, 
1951. The integration has not caused a single untoward 
incident to date. Furthermore, racial segregation was 
abolished in Alamagordo’s public schools in August of 
this year and the first Negro teacher was hired to teach 
in that New Mexico city’s integrated public schools. There 
has been no disharmony as a result of either action.



2 4

Racial segregation in public schools is not required in 
Arizona. Local school boards are free to determine 
whether or not they will maintain a dual educational 
system. Under this local option provision, segregation has 
been abandoned in the public schools of every city and 
town in the State except Phoenix. The transition from 
segregation to integration was made in all these communi­
ties without any difficulty.

Despite the fact that segregation in public schools has 
been banned in Illinois for many years, segregation was 
the practice in most of the southern counties. A 1949 
State statute provided that no State funds should be made 
available to any school district where racial segregation 
of students is practiced. This statute led to a movement 
to abolish segregation in the southern communities of 
Illinois. Notwithstanding an 85-year-old policy of racial 
segregation in the public schools of East St. Louis, the 
local board of education abandoned segregation and 
adopted a policy of integration. There was “ no indication 
of any organized resistance to the change”  which was 
effected without incident. The New York Times, January 
30, 1950. Segregation in public schools was also abandoned 
in Harrisburg (Chicago Sun-Times, September 26, 1950), 
in Alton, a stronghold of racial discrimination even dur­
ing World War II (Pittsburgh Courier, December 1, 1951), 
and in Cairo at the southernmost tip of the State.

A similar process of uneventful integration is under­
way in southern Ohio. In Glendale, a town about fifteen 
miles from the Kentucky border, segregation in the public 
schools was ended in October of this year when the local 
board of education was advised that exclusion of Negro 
pupils from a formerly “ all-white”  school violated the



25

Constitution. In Dayton, the school board abolished segre­
gation in the use of two swimming pools at Roosevelt 
High School on June 22, 1950. Dayton Journal Herald, 
June 23, 1950.

New Jersey is another State which, while normally 
considered a Northern State, has a long-standing tradition 
of racial segregation in its southern regions. In Novem­
ber 1947, the people of New Jersey adopted a new State 
Constitution which prohibited any person from being 
“ segregated in the militia or in the public schools, because 
of religious principles, race, color, ancestry or national 
origin” . When this Constitution was adopted, cynics re­
marked that the clause against racial segregation was an 
excellent statement of principle but they predicted that 
segregation would not be eliminated for at least a genera­
tion. In 1948, the New Jersey Department of Education 
made a survey of the 52 school districts in the State which 
were reported to practice segregation in one form or an­
other. It found that in 43 districts, segregation was im­
posed by the school authorities. These districts ranged in 
size from rural areas with one-room schools to large cities 
with many schools. The end of the school year 1950-51 
saw the complete elimination of segregation in 39 of the 
43 school districts involved. In the other 4 districts, steps 
had by that time been taken and building proposals were 
underway which would bring about complete integration 
in the near future. The report of the New Jersey Depart­
ment of Education states:

A most significant factor in this transition is that 
it has been done with a minimum of friction and a 
maximum of good will.
Another important factor has been the success with 
which colored teachers, who formerly taught classes



26

consisting of all colored children, have been employed 
to teach classes of mixed races. While many indi­
vidual examples could be cited, one in particular bears 
mentioning. The one in question contained the only 
junior high school operated on a segregated basis. 
This junior high school was a fairly large institution 
and naturally existed in a good sized city. Today, the 
student body of this school is approximately one-third 
Negro and two-thirds white. The teachers who for­
merly were teaching all-Negro junior high school 
classes have been completely integrated into the new 
setup and include teachers of all regular and special 
subjects. The morale of both the student body and 
faculty is excellent. Biennial Report for the Years 
July 1 , 1949, to June 30, 1951, State of New Jersey, 
Department of Education, Division Against Discrimi­
nation 12, 13.

On the basis of the accumulated experience, instances 
of which we have described above, we are convinced that 
integration can and will be accomplished in the public 
schools of the South without “ bloodshed and violence”  
if the law enforcement agencies, federal or local, demon­
strate that they will not tolerate breaches of the peace or 
incitement. Americans are law abiding people and abhor 
klanism and violence.

Segregation Is A n  E conom ic W aste

There is another cogent reason that this Court should 
speak out clearly and definitively now. Since the “ separate 
but equal”  doctrine in public education will have to be 
abandoned ultimately, it should be abandoned sooner 
rather than later, to forestall the wasteful expenditure by 
many States of huge sums of money to build segregated 
schools when that money could be used more economically 
and enduringly to build and improve public schools where 
they will provide the greatest good for the greatest num­
ber. This we believe is a necessary consequence of the 
constitutional requirement that the State must grant each 
person equal protection of its laws.



27

The President’s Committee on Civil Rights, in its his­
toric report, To Secure These Rights (1947), states:

The South is one of the poorer sections of the country 
and has at best only limited funds to spend on its 
schools. With 34.5 percent of the country’s popula­
tion, 17 southern states and the District of Columbia 
have 39.4 percent of our school children. Yet the 
South has only one-fifth of the taxpaying wealth of 
the nation. Actually, on a percentage basis, the South 
spends a greater share of its income on education than 
do the wealthier states in other parts of the country. 
(63)

The South has been struggling under a heavy financial 
burden to support its educational system, with the Negro 
schools admittedly inferior to the white. The southern 
States would have to expend over one and one-half billion 
dollars to bring the Negro schools to the level of the 
“ white”  schools and, in addition, approximately eighty-one 
million dollars annually just to maintain parity. Charles 
H. Thompson, Dean, Graduate School of Howard Univer­
sity, Letter to the Editor, The New York Times, April 6, 
1952. This additional burden is beyond the capacity of 
the South to bear. Bond, in Education of the Negro in the 
American Social Order (1934) sums this up:

If the South had an entirely homogeneous population, 
it would not be able to maintain schools of high 
quality for the children unless its states and local 
communities resorted to heavy, almost crushing rates 
of taxation. The situation is further complicated 
by the fact that a dual system is maintained. Con­
sidering the expenditures made for Negro schools, it 
is clear that the plaint frequently made that this dual 
system is a burden is hardly true; but it is also clear 
that if an honest attempt were made to maintain 
“ equal, though separate schools” , the burden would 
be impossible even beyond the limitation of existing 
poverty. (231)



2 8

Public schools should be planned and erected as part 
of the development of the total community. They should 
be built in those areas that have expanding populations 
and needs for such facilities, rather than in opportunistic 
response to random law suits or threats of law suits, as is 
now the case in many southern States.

Conclusion

The United States is now engaged in an ideological 
world conflict in which the practices of our democracy are 
the subject of close scrutiny abroad. We cannot afford, 
nor will the world permit us, to rest upon democratic 
pretensions unrelated to reality.

The people of other lands listen not only to our Voice 
of America which quite properly extols the virtues of 
democracy; they listen to broadcasts from Communist 
sources as well. We know that our enemies seize eagerly 
upon the weaknesses of our democracy and, for propa­
ganda purposes, magnify, exaggerate and distort hap­
penings in the United States. Not so well known, although 
possibly more significant, is that the liberal and conserva­
tive press abroad is constantly comparing our declara­
tions and statements about democracy with our actual 
practices at home. Domestic incidents are noted and com­
mented upon. Our discriminatory practices in education, 
in employment, in housing, have all been the subject of 
much adverse press comment in those foreign countries 
which we are trying to keep in the democratic camp.

While McGee v. Mississippi, 40 So. 2nd 160 (1949), was 
the subject of some considerable comment in Communist 
circles here and elsewhere, the Paris office of the American



2 9

Jewish Committee assembled characteristic press comment 
from liberal, conservative and Catholic European news­
papers :

Semailles, a liberal Marseilles newspaper, said on May 
18, 1951:

In associating ourselves with the United States in the 
defense of liberty, we have included in the notion of 
liberty, a respect for all human beings, the notion of 
the common fraternity of all men. And it appears 
that in this association, we, too, have much to bring. 
"W hat the world awaits from us is not cannons and 
atomic bombs, but the permanent and vigilant affirma­
tion of the inalienable right of all men to be judged 
according to their acts and not according to the color 
of their skin or the latitude in which they were born. 
Otherwise, where is the difference between our enemies 
and ourselves?

An editorial, entitled “ An American Tragedy” , in the 
Vienna Arbeiter-Zeitung, one of the staunchest anti-Com- 
munist publications in Europe, said on February 4, 1951:

The Communist reply to accusations made about the 
injustices and cruelties of their dictatorship, of forced 
labor, of the arbitrariness of their courts and their 
violation of human dignity, by pointing to the in­
sincerity of American democracy which permits racial 
persecution and deprives millions of human beings of 
their equal rights on the basis of the color of their 
skin.

One cannot appear before the world as a fighter for 
freedom and right when one is unable to eliminate 
injustice in one’s own house.

L ’Aube, Paris organ of the Popular Republican Move­
ment (MRP), the second largest political party in France, 
led by Georges Bidault and Foreign Minister Robert Schu- 
man. in its May 9, 1951, issue said:



3 0

How much does a Negro weigh in a world where 
people of all colors are struggling with the hitter 
forces of nature and societies? Why is there so much 
noise about a trial which after all is an internal affair, 
not only of the United States of America, but of one 
of its states? He weighs exactly that of all those 
whose lot it is to protest an injustice. And the in­
justice in this instance has as its name, racism. Our 
reaction to injustice does not depend on the region of 
the world where the wrong was committed. It is the 
more bitter to know that it took place in a continent 
which gave for liberty enough of its sons not to 
deliver up to hatred of a poor Negro; that is what 
weighs heavily.

On April 7, 1950, the Cologne Welt Der Arbeit, official 
publication of the anti-Connnunist German trade unions, 
carried an article entitled, “ The Negro Question in the 
U. S .”  That article contained the following significant 
language :

In recent weeks, one found in the German press the 
following items: In Frankfurt-am-Main the proprietor 
of a cafe was fined 600 DM by American Occupation 
Authorities because he had ejected two colored Ameri­
can soldiers from his establishment. In Washington, 
the Capital of the U. S. A., Doctor Bunche, who made 
a name for himself as the UN intermediary in Pales­
tine, was refused admittance to a movie house because 
he was colored. He then went to another movie house 
where he spoke French and was admitted because it 
was believed he was a foreigner. In the one case, the 
American authorities want foreigners to treat every 
colored soldier with dignity as an American citizen 
and punish any transgression of this principle. On 
the other hand, world-famous leaders of the colored 
population are deprived of their full equality. How 
are these two attitudes to be reconciled? It is only 
too natural that the average European can make no 
sense of such contradictions. The racial attitudes in 
the U. S. have no parallel in the entire world.



31

And finally, we have the following quotation from the 
liberal Le Matin of Antwerp, Belgium, in May 1951:

The crime of racism is odious. And, without doubt, 
the world will never know true peace while there exist 
nations, peoples or races that believe themselves su­
perior to other nations, peoples or races. It is a pain­
ful declaration to make at the moment when our 
American friends are presenting themselves in the 
United Nations as the sturdy defenders of the free 
world.

Legally imposed segregation in our country, in any 
shape, manner or form, weakens our program to build 
and strengthen world democracy and combat totalitarian­
ism. In education, at the lower levels, it indelibly fixes 
anti-social attitudes and behavior patterns by building 
inter-group antagonisms. It forces a sense of limitation 
upon the child and destroys incentive. It produces feel­
ings of inferiority and discourages racial self-appreciation.



3 2

For all of the reasons urged herein, State-imposed racial 
segregation in public schools, denies to the appellants 
herein, and to all similarly situated Negro children, equal 
protection of the laws in every meaningful sense of those 
words.

The judgment of the court below should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

Edwin J. Lukas,
A rnold Forster,
A rthur Garfield Hays, 
Frank E. Karelsen,

of the New York Bar,

Leonard Haas,
of the Georgia Bar,

Saburo Kido,
o f the California Bar,

W aldo B. W etmore, 
of the Kansas Bar,

Attorneys for Amici Curiae.

T heodore Leskes,
Sol Rabkin,

of the New York Bar, 
of Counsel.

November 15, 1952



33

APPENDIX

American Civil Liberties Union

The American Civil Liberties Union is a private or­
ganization composed of individual citizens. It is devoted 
to supporting the Bill of Rights—for everybody. Founded 
in 1920, it has, day in and day out, actively championed 
the three-fold cause of civil liberties, the heart and core 
of democratic government, as set forth in the Constitution 
and the Declaration of Independence: (1) Government
by the people, grounded on freedom of inquiry and ex­
pression— speech, press, assembly and religion—for every­
body; (2) specific rights guaranteed to the people, such 
as due process and fair tidal—for everybody; and (3) 
equality of the people before the law—for everybody, 
regardless of race, color, place of birth, position, income, 
political opinions, or religious belief.

The Union has no cause to serve other than civil liber­
ties. It is dedicated simply and solely to furthering the 
actual practice of democracy. It defends the civil liberties 
of everybody, including those whose anti-democratic opin­
ions it abhors and opposes, like Communists, Nazis, Fas­
cists and Ku Klux Klanners.



3 4

The American Ethical Union is a national association 
of Societies for Ethical Culture. Its purpose is to bring 
into close fellowship of thought and action existing Ethical 
Societies and to promote the establishment of new socie­
ties. It is thus devoted, on a national scale, as is each 
society in its local setting, to the promotion of the knowl­
edge, the love and the practice of the right in all the rela­
tionships of life. It asserts the supreme importance of the 
ethical factor in all the relations of life and affirms the 
belief that the greatest spiritual values are to be found in 
man’s relationship to man. Through its religious and edu­
cational programs it seeks to make the individual more 
adequate in his personal relationships and better able to 
contribute to the life of his community. The Ethical So­
ciety has as one of its objectives the inspiring words of 
St. Paul: ‘ ‘ He has made of one blood all nations of men to 
dwell on the earth.”

American Ethical Union



35

The American Jewish Committee is a corporation cre­
ated by an Act of the Legislature of the State of New 
York in 1906. Its charter states:

The object of this corporation shall be to prevent the 
infraction of the civil and religious rights of Jews, in 
any part of the world; to render all lawful assistance 
and to take appropriate remedial action in the event 
of threatened or actual invasion or restriction of such 
rights, or of unfavorable discrimination with respect 
thereto . . .

During the forty-six years of its existence it has been 
one of the fundamental tenets of the organization that the 
welfare and security of Jews in America depend upon the 
preservation of constitutional guarantees. An invasion of 
the civil rights of any group is a threat to the safety of all 
groups.

For this reason the American Jewish Committee has 
on many occasions fought in defense of civil liberties 
even though Jewish interests did not appear to be spe­
cifically involved.

American Jewish Committee



36

Anti-Defamation League 
of

B’nai B’rith

B ’nai B ’rith, founded in 1843, is the oldest civic or­
ganization of American Jews. It represents a member­
ship of over 350,000 men and women and their families. 
The Anti-Defamation League was organized in 1913, as a 
section of the parent organization, in order to cope with 
racial and religious prejudice in the United States. The 
program developed hy the League is designed to achieve 
the following objectives: to eliminate and counteract
defamation and discrimination against the various racial, 
religious and ethnic groups which comprise our American 
people; to counteract un-American and anti-democratic ac­
tivity ; to advance goodwill and mutual understanding 
among American groups; and to encourage and translate 
into greater effectiveness the ideals of American democ­
racy.



37

The Japanese American Citizens League is the national 
organization of Americans of Japanese ancestry. Estab­
lished in 1930, its story is an account of a group of young 
Americans treasuring their birthright of American citizen­
ship, defending it and seeking to be worthy of it. Although 
its membership is composed primarily of Americans of 
Japanese ancestry, membership is open to all Americans 
who believe in its principles.

The purpose of the organization is to promote good 
citizenship, protect the rights of Americans of Japanese 
ancestry, and acquaint the public in general with this group 
of citizens toward their full acceptance into American life. 
The twin mottoes of “ For Better Americans in a Greater 
America”  and “ Security Through Unity”  express this 
purpose.

Japanese American Citizens League



38

Unitarian Fellowship for Social Justice

The Rev. Dr. John Haynes Holmes and a group of other 
Unitarian clergymen established the Unitarian Fellowship 
for Social Justice in 1908. They sought “ to sustain one 
another in united action against social injustice and in the 
realization of religious ideals in present-day society. ’ ’ Dr. 
Holmes served for three years as the Fellowship’s first 
president.

The Fellowship concerns itself especially with freedom 
of conscience, the rights of minorities, the defense of public 
education, and substantial efforts to strengthen the United 
Nations and to plan for peace.

The Fellowship participates in the United Unitarian 
Appeal for its funds, and it is affiliated with the American 
Unitarian Association through the Association’s Depart­
ment of Adult Education and Social Relations. The society 
has individual members, organizational affiliates, and chap­
ters throughout the United States and Canada in Unitarian 
and liberal community churches.

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