Bossier Parish School Board v. Reno Appendices

    APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civ. A. No. 91-1191) (LHS (USCA), CRR, GK) 
Bossier Parish S chool B d., pl a in t if f

v.

J an e t  R eno , defendan t  

and

George P rice, et a l ., d e fe n d a n t -intervenors

Nov. 2, 1995

Before: SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge, RICHEY, 
and KESSLER, District Judges.

MEMORANDUM OPINION 
OF THREE-JUDGE COURT 

UNDER THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT

SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, Bossier Parish School Board, seeks pre­

clearance under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act,
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12 IJ.S.C. § 1 978c, fin- its proposed redistricting. We 
shall grant the requested preclearance.

I.
Bossier Parish is located in northwestern Louis­

iana, bordered on the north by Arkansas. As re­
ported by the I990 census, Bossier Parish’s popula­
tion is 8(1,088, of whom 20.1% are black. Blacks 
constitute 17.0';: of the voting age population of Bos­
sier Parish and 10.0'/; of its registered voters. Bos­
sier City, the Parish’s most populous city, is located 
in the central western portion of the Parish and has 
a population of 52,721, of whom 17.95% are black. 
The black population is also concentrated in Benton, 
Plain Dealing, Haughton, and in the unincorporated 
community of Princeton.

Bossier Parish is governed by a Police Jury, the 12 
members of which are elected from single-member 
districts for consecutive four-year terms. At no time 
in Parish history have the Police Jury electoral dis­
tricts included a district with a majority of black 
voters. Since 1988, however, a black police juror, 
Jerome Darby, has been elected three times from a 
majority-white district, the last time unopposed.1

The Police Jury undertook to redraw its electoral 
districts because of population shifts, as reflected in

’ The district from which Darby was elected in 1083 and 
1087 was unique in Bossier Parish. Many of the white resi­
dents of the district resided on or near Barksdale Air Force 
base and tended not to vote in Bossier Parish. This district, 
when the largely nonvoting military population is removed, 
was at least •!T>rI black for the 1083 and 1087 Police Jury 
elections. In the 1001 Police Jury redistricting, however, the 
Air Force base was removed from Darby’s district, after 
which he ran a successful, unopposed campaign.



3 a

the 1980 census, that resulted in widely divergent 
populations among the existing districts. In Novem­
ber 1990, the Police Jury hired a cartographer, Gary 
Joiner, to assist in the process. At a public hearing 
on the Police July redistricting, black residents in­
quired about the possibility of creating majority-black 
districts, and were told that the black population of 
Bossier Parish was too far-flung to create any such 
district. On April JO, 1991, the Police Jury unani­
mously adopted one of the plans prepared by their 
cartographer as the final plan. The plan served the 
police jurors’ incumbency concerns, and roughly pro­
vided for an even distribution of population among 
the districts. That same day, Concerned Citizens, a 
group of black residents of Bossier Parish, submitted 
a letter to the Police Jury complaining about the 
manner in which the redistricting plan was prepared 
and adopted. The plan was forwarded to the At­
torney General on May 28, 1991, and, on July 29, 
1991, the Attorney General precleared it. On Jan­
uary 11, 1994, the Police Jury unanimously voted to 
maintain the redistricting plan precleared by the At­
torney General.

The Bossier Parish School Board is constituted 
much like the Police Jury." The School Board has

1 At all relevant times, the Bossier Parish School Board 
has been the defendant in a lawsuit seeking the desegregation 
of the school district’s schools, l.cmon v. Mossier Parish Sch. 
lid., Civ.Act. No. 10,687 (W.I).La., filed Dec. 2, 1961). The 
School Board was found liable for intentionally segregating 
its public schools in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
in Lemon v. Mossier Parish Sch. Md., 2-10 F.Supp. 709 (W.D. 
La. 1966), ajj'd, 370 F.2d 8-17 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 388 
U.S. 911, 87 S.Ct. 2116, 18 L.Ed.2d 1350 (1967). In 1979, 
the School Board sought a declaration of unitary status and



4a

12 members elected from single-member districts to 
consecutive four-year terms. Both the Police Jury 
and School Board electoral districts have majority 
voting requirements: a candidate must receive a ma­
jority of the votes cast, not merely a plurality, to w in 
:m election. In the School Board's history, no black 
candidate lias been elected to membership on the 
Board, though, as is discussed infrn, one black School 
Board member was appointed to a vacant seat in U)!)2.

The Board, like the Police Jury, was also required 
to redraw its districts after the 1990 census. In fact, 
members of the Board had approached the Police 
Jury about the prospect of jointly redistricting, but 
were rebuffed by police jurors with incumlxmcy con­
cerns divergent from those of the School Board mem­
bers.' The next scheduled election for the School 
Board was not until November 1994, and the School 
Board did not undertake the task of redistricting with 
particular urgency. In May 1991, the Board hired 
the same cartographer who had assisted the Police 
Jury with its redistricting, Gary Joiner. When he 
was hired, Joiner informed the Board that one readily 
available option was the Police Jury plan which had 
already been precleared by the Attorney General and 
which, if adopted by the Board, was sure to be pre- 
clearcd again. When he was hired, Joiner estimated

release from continuinfr court supervision. Tlie Hoard's mo­
tion was denied and (lie school district has yet to he declared 
a unitary system. Of (lie 27 schools in the school district, 
five have predominately black student populations. [Stip 
II 242.| The student population of Bossier Parish’s schools is 
roufthly 20'l black.

•1 Throughout the I980s, the Police Jury and School Hoard 
maintained different electoral districts.



that the mlistricting would require 200 to 250 hours 
of his time.

At a Board meeting in September 1001, Board 
member Thomas Myrick suggested that the Board 
adopt the Police Jury plan. Myrick had participated 
in a number of meetings with Joiner and police jurors 
during their redistricting. No action was taken on 
Myrick’s proposal.

On March 25, 1992, George Price, president of 
the local chapter of the NAACP and a defendant- 
intervenor in this case, wrote to the Board to express 
the NAACP’s desire to be involved in every aspect 
of the redistricting process. Price received no re­
sponse to his letter and, on August 17, 1002, wrote 
again, this time to say that the NAACP would dis­
pute any plan that did not provide for majority-black 
districts. At an August 20, 1992 meeting of the 
School Board, Price presented a number of proposals 
concerning the management of the school district to 
the School Board, including the appointment of a 
black to fill the vacancy on the Board created hy a 
Board member’s departure. Sometime during Au­
gust 1992, Board members met individually with 
Joiner to review different options for redistricting.*

* Testimony was presented that, during the rodistrictjing 
process, members of the School Board made statements pos­
sibly indicating that the School Board was undertaking the 
redistricting with a discriminatory intent. S.P. Davis, attor­
ney for Bossier Citizenship Education, Inc., a plaintiff- 
intervenor in Lemon, and a witness for defendant, testified 
that Board member Henry Burns told Davis that “while he 
personally favors having black representation on the board, 
other school board members oppose the idea.” | tl.S.Exb. 10G, 
at 17.] George Price testified that Board member Barry 
Musgrove told Price that “while lie sympathized with the



During the summer of 1992, the NAACB Kedis- 
triding l’rojeet in Baltimore, Maryland prepared a 
redist lilting plan for the School Board tliat included 
two majority-hlaek districts. Brice presented the re­
sults of these efforts, a partial plan demonstrating 
the possibility of two majority-black districts, to a 
School Board official. Brice was told that the School 
Board would not consider a plan that did not set forth 
all 12 districts. Brice brought just such a plan to the 
September .'1, 1992 meeting of the School Board. At 
that meeting, both Joiner and Bossier Barish District 
Attorney, James Buller, dismissed the NAACB plan 
because the plan required splitting a number of voting 
precincts/'

Under Louisiana law, school board districts must 
contain whole voting precincts (i.e., they may not 
split voting precincts). See Louisiana Revised Stat­
utes, Title 17, § 71.3E.(1) (“The boundaries of any 
election district for a new apportionment plan from 
which members of a school board are elected shall con­
tain whole precincts established by the parish govern­
ing authority . . . While there has been dispute 
over the matter, the parties have stipulated that 
school boards redistricting around the time the Bos-

concerns of the black community, there was nothiujr more he 
could do for us on this issue because the Board was 'hostile' 
toward the idea of a black majority district.” [I)-I Exh. B 
at 1128.| Brice further testified that Board member Thomas 
My rick told Price and Thelma Harry, another intervenor and 
a member of the Benton City Council, that "he had worked 
too hard to get [his] seat and that lie would not stand by and 
‘lot us take his seat away from him.’ ” [Id. at 11 20; D-I Exh. 
E at H 19.]

8 Both the Police Jury plan and the NAACP plan appear 
in an appendix to this opinion.



sicr Parish School Board was redistricting were “free 
to request precinct changes from the Police Jury 
necessary to accomplish their redistriding plans.” 
[Stip 11 2d. | Defendant-intervenors’ witness, David 
Creed, testified that he himself had routinely drawn 
redistricting plans that split precincts. The largest 
number of precincts that Creed had ever split was 
eight—far fewer than the 46 precinct splits resulting 
under the NAACP plan that was presented to the 
Board or any other plan proffered since by defendant 
or defendant-intervenors. In any event, the School 
Board never approached the Police Jury to request 
precinct changes.

On September 10, 1992, the School Board inter­
viewed candidates for the one vacant seat on the 
School Board. By a six-to-five vote, the School Board 
appointed the only black candidate, Jerome Blunt. 
Defendant-intervenors contend that this appointment 
came despite “bitter opposition from white voters.” 
[D-I Br. at 15.] On September 17, 1992, Blunt was 
sworn in as a Board member. His term in office lasted 
six months, ending in a special-election defeat to a 
white candidate. The vacant seat to which Blunt was 
appointed represented a district with the population 
that was 11 % black.

At the same meeting during which Blunt took the 
oath of office, the School Board passed a motion of 
intent to adopt the Police Jury plan. The School 
Board announced that a public meeting would be held 
on Septembmer 24, 1992, with final action to he taken 
on the plan on October 1, 1992.

At the September 24, 1992 meeting, the School 
Board meeting room was filled to overflowing. Price 
presented the Board with a petition signed by more 
than 500 residents of the Parish asking that the



8a

Board consider alternative redistricting plans. Addi­
tionally, a number of black residents addressed the 
Board to express their opposition to the proposed 
Police Jury plan. No one spoke in support of the 
plan. On October 1, 1992, the School Board unani­
mously adopted the Police Jury plan. Although he 
had taken office in time to vote on the plan, Jerome 
Blunt abstained. One other School Board member, 
Barbara W. dray, was absent and did not vote.

The plan adopted hy the School Board pits two 
pairs of incumbents against each other, leaving two 
districts with no incumbents. The plan does not dis­
tribute the school district’s schools evenly among the 
electoral districts: some have several schools, others 
have none.

On January 4, 1993, the School Board submitted 
its proposed redistricting plan to the Attorney Gen- 
eral. On March 5, 1993, the Attorney General re- 
(piested more information on the redistricting plan, 
which the School Board provided. On August 30, 
1993, the Attorney General interposed a formal ob­
jection to the School Board’s plan. The Attorney 
General's letter indicated that, while the identical 
Police Jury plan had been precleared, the Attorney 
General objected on the basis of “new information.” 
The Attorney General noted that an alternative plan 
which showed “that black residents are sufficiently 
numerous and geographically compact so as to con­
stitute a majority in two single-member districts” 
and which was preferred by members of the black 
community had been presented to and rejected hy the 
School Board. The Attorney General further cited 
the School Board’s failure to “accommodate the re­
quests of the black community.”



9a

The Attorney General’s objection letter stated that, 
while the School Board was not required to “adopt 
any particular plan, it is not free to adopt a plan 
that unnecessarily limits the opportunity for minority 
votei-s to elect their candidates of choice.” The Attor­
ney General rejected the School Board’s argument 
that the Louisiana statute concerning splitting pre­
cincts was sufficient reason not to create majority- 
black districts.

On September 3, 1993, the School Board unani­
mously voted to seek reconsideration of the objection 
from the Attorney General. On December 20, 1993, 
the Attorney General denied the Board’s request for 
reconsideration. The School Board filed this action 
on July 8, 1994. On April 10 and 11, 1995, this mat­
ter was tried before a single judge of this panel, 
pursuant to an agreement of the parties. The record 
of those proceedings has been provided to the other 
two judges on the panel and closing argument was 
conducted before the entire panel on July 27, 11)95.

In the course of this litigation, defendant- 
intervenors have prepared two more plans that pro­
vide for two majority-black districts. Both plans 
were prepared by def'endant-intervenor’s witness, 
William Cooper. The first plan (Cooper 1) provides 
for one majority-black district in the northwestern 
corner of the parish and one in Bossier City. The 
second plan (Cooper II) is not materially different. 
Neither of these plans was before the School Board 
when it adopted the Police Jury plan."

0 Because we hold, as is discussed below, that section 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1973, has no place in this 
section 5 action, much of the evidence relevant only to the 
section 2 inquiry is not discussed in this opinion. We, of



l()a

II.
I'ol- n political subdivision subject to section 5 to 

obtain preclearance of a voting change, it must prove 
that the proposed change "does not have the purpose 
and will not have the effect of denying or abridging 
tbe right to vote on account of race or color.” 12 
U.S.C. S; 1973c. All parties agree that the “effect" 
prong of section 5 requires a showing of retrogres­
sion. See liccr r. United States, 425 U.S. 139, 141, 
PC, S.Ct. 1357, 1354, 47 L.Ed.2d 629 (1970). And, 
all parties agree that the School Hoard’s proposed re- 
districting will not have a retrogressive effect. The 
case, then, turns on whether plaintiff can by a pre­
ponderance of the evidence demonstrate that the 
redistricting plan was enacted without discriminatory 
purpose.

The School Hoard claims to have proved that a 
variety of nondiscriminatory purposes animated the 
School Hoard when they adopted the Police Jury plan. 
The School Hoard adopted the Police Jury plan be­
cause it had been precleared by the Attorney General 
and would provide an easy way to avoid the contro­
versy that increasingly surrounded the redistricting 
process. Further, the Police Jury plan required that 
no precincts be split, avoiding the difficulty and ex­
pense that would have accompanied any other plan, 
and particularly the only other plan the School Hoard 
bad seen: the NAACP plan. The School Hoard have 
throughout the litigation proffered a series of other 
purposes said to have motivated the decision to adopt 
the Police Jury plan. Among these were a desire to

course, express no opinion on the merits of any case that 
may he filed under section 2.



1 hi

adhere to traditional districting principles and to 
avoid racial gerrymandering.

Defendant asserts that preclearance should be 
denied for at least one of several reasons. Defendant 
argues that we should deny preclearance because the 
School Hoard's redistricting plan violates section 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act. If we conclude that we may 
not engage in the section 2 inquiry in this section 5 
ease, defendant contends that we may nonetheless 
consider the School Hoard’s violation of section 2 as 
evidence of its discriminatory purpose. Defendant 
and defondant-intervenors further argue that we 
should deny preclearance based on “direct” and "in­
direct” evidence that the School Board acted with a 
discriminatory purpose.

III.

A.
Defendant and defehdant-intervenors maintain that 

preclearance must be denied if the School Hoard’s 
plan runs afoul of section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act.7 We hold, as has cveiy court that has considered

7 Plaintiffs “stipulated” that "fs]ection T> proclournnce of 
the Bossier Parish School Board’s redistricting plan also 
must be denied if the plan violates Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act, as amended, -12 U.S.C.1973.” [Slip 11 257.] Why 
plaintilfs would stipulate to a legal conclusion that no court 
considering the question has ever agreed to is beyond us. 
That plaintiffs did so stipulate does not, however, put the 
question beyond us. See Kornev v. Kemper Fin. Seres., 500 
tl.S. 90, 99, 111 S.Ct. 1711. 1718, 114 L.Ed.2d 152 (1991) 
(“When an issue or claim is properly before the court, the 
court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced 
by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to 
identify and apply the proper construction of governing



the question, that a political sulidivision that docs not 
violate either the “elFeet" or the “purpose" prong of 
section T> cannot he denied preclearance because of an 
alleged sect ion 2 violation.

Defendant puts before us many arguments for the 
inclusion of section 2 in this section 5 action. Defend­
ant contends that the statutory language of section 2 
and section 5 are in significant part so indistinguish­
able as to rei|uire the importation of section 2 into 
section f>. It is also argued that the legislative his­
tory of section 2 makes clear that Congress, in amend­
ing section 2, intended that voting practices he de­
nied section 5 preclearance where those voting prac­
tices violate section 2. Defendant finally contends 
that this court should defer to defendant’s own reg­
ulations, which interpret section 5 as requiring de­
nial of preclearance where a proposed change violates 
section 2.

Defendant has presented many, if not all, of these 
arguments to other courts and to other panels of this 
court without any success. Defendant acknowledges 
these prior cases, hut claims that they are distin­
guishable from the one before us. We, like our pred­
ecessors, reject defendant’s latest—and by now rather 
shopworn—effort to squeeze section 2 into section 5.

We are unconvinced by defendant’s casual effort 
to equate the standards of section 2 and section 5. 
In its brief, defendant asserts that “there is no mean­
ingful distinction between the plain meaning of the 
term [.sue] ‘effect’ and ‘result.’ ” [Def.Br. at 28.] To

law.”). In any event, plaintiff's strenuous aiynuuent that
Miller r. Johnson.------I I.S.------- , 115 S.Ct. 2475, 132 I,.Ed.2d
7(12 (1995), is dispositive of this case is apparently incon­
sistent with its stipulation.



reach this facile conclusion, one must willfully blind 
oneself to the fact that the term “results” in subsec­
tion (a) of section 2 is defined by reference to the 
language set forth in subsection (b) of section 2. 
42 U.S.C. § 1973. None of the language that modi­
fies “results” in section 2 appears in section f>.

Not only are the two sections drafted with differ­
ent language, even a cursory review of the case law 
applying the two statutory sections as written and 
as applied over the years makes clear that the two 
sections serve very different functions.

Section f> of the Voting Rights Act establishes an 
extraordinary procedure in our federal system. Be­
fore a “covered jurisdiction”—i.e., a State or one of 
its political subdivisions which is subject to section 5 
—may change a “voting qualification or prerequisite 
to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with 
respect to voting,” it must have the change precleared 
by either this court or the Attorney General.* Id.

8 A “covered jurisdiction” is a “State or political subdi­
vision with respect to which the prohibitions set forth in sec­
tion 1073b(a) of flille 42| based upon detenui nations made 
under the first sentence of section 1973b(b) of ftitle 12] 
are in effect.” The prohibitions apply to any State or politi­
cal subdivision which (i) the Attorney General determines 
maintained on November 1, 1964, any test or device, and 
with respect to which (ii) the Plaintiff’s Director of the 
Census determines that less than 50 per centum of the persons 
of voting afro residing therein were registered on November 1, 
1964, or that less than 50 per centum of such persons voted 
in the presidential election of November 1964. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1973b(b). A “test or device” is any requirement that a 
person as a prerequisite for voting or registration for voting 
(1) demonstrate the ability to read, write, understand, or 
interpret any matter, (2) demonstrate any educational 
achievement or his knowledge of any particular subject, (3)



$ 1973c. I’rcclearance in this court comes in the form 
of “u ileclarntory judgment that such qualification, 
l>rerei|uisite, standard, practice, or procedure does 
not have the purpose and will not have the effect 
of denying or abridging the right to vote on account 
of race or color, or in contravention of the guaran­
tees set forth in . . . this title.” Id. § 1973c.

The Supreme Court has read the “effect" prong of 
section f> to require that “no voting-procedure changes 
would be made that would lead to a retrogression in 
the position of racial minorities with respect to their 
effective exercise of the electoral franchise.” Herr v. 
Unit'd Stale*, 425 IJ.S. 130, 141, 96 S.Ct. 1357, 1361, 
17 L.Fd.2d 629 (1976). This “nonretrogression” in­
terpretation has repeatedly been reasserted by the 
Supreme Court, most recently in Miller v. Johnson,
------ U.S. ------, ------, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 2493, 132
1 Fd.2d 762 (1995).

This formulation relates directly to section 5’s func­
tion. Section 5 was enacted in response to the ef­
forts of jurisdictions to avoid compliance with the 
Voting Rights Act by adopting new, violative schemes 
as quickly as the old ones could be struck down. Sec 
Herr, 425 U.S. at 140, 96 S.Ct. at 1363. “ ‘Ry freez­
ing election procedures in the covered areas unless 
the changes can be shown to be nondiscriminatory,’ 
section 5 ensures that a plaintiff seeking to challenge 
an existing voting scheme in federal court under sec­
tion 2 will have a stationary target to attack.” New 
York r. United Stoles, 871 F. Supp. 391, 400 (I).D.C.

possess rood mot at ( leu actor, or (4) prove his (pialiflcations 
hy the voucher of registered voters or members of any other 
( lass. hi. § m .U tc ) .  The Mossier Parish School Board is 
indisputably a "covered jurisdiction.”



1994) ((|noting Beer, 125 U.S. at 110, 90 S.Ct. at 
1262 (internal citations omitted)).

Section 2 of tlic Voting Rights Act uses plainly 
different language and serves a different function 
from that of section 5. Under section 2, a “voting 
qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, 
practice, or procedure” in any political subdivision 
(not just a covered jurisdiction) may he challenged 
when' it "results in a denial or abridgement of the 
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on 
account of race or color.” 12 U.S.C. § 1972(a). Sub­
section (b) of section 2 provides that a voting pro­
cedure has the prohibited result where

based on the totality of circumstances, it is 
shown that the political processes leading to nom­
ination or election in the State or political sub- 
divison are not equally open to participation by 
members of a class of citizens protected by sub­
section (a) of this section in that its members 
have less opportunity than other members of the 
electorate to participate in the political process 
and to elect representatives of their choice.

Id. § 1972(h). Subsection (b) contains a different 
standard from the retrogression standard found by 
the Supreme Court in section 5; as courts have since 
recognized, section 2 can he violated without any dis­
criminatory purpose and irrespective of whether the 
disputed voting practice is better or worse than what­
ever it is meant to replace. See Thornburg r. Gingles, 
478 U.S. 30, 42-47, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 2761-64, 92 L.Ed. 
2d 25 (1986). Sections 2 and 5 are substantially dif­
ferent, both on their face and in the manner in which 
they have been interpreted and applied. See Holder 
v. Hall, -----  U.S. ——, ----- ,  114 S.Ct. 2581, 2587,



16a

129 L.Ed.2d 687 (1901) (“To be sure, if the struc­
ture and purpose of section 2 mirrored that of section 
f>, then the case for interpreting sections 2 and f> to 
have the same application in all cast's would he con­
vincing. lint the two sections differ in structure, 
purpose, and application." ( footnote omitted ) ).

Moreover, the two sections differ as to the alloca­
tion of tlir burden of proof. In an action under sec­
tion 5, the burden of proof is on the political sub­
division seeking to enact a voting change. In a sec­
tion 2 action, on the other hand, the burden of proof 
is on the party challenging a voting practice. See, 
(■.</., Hall v. Holder, 955 F.2d 1562, 1572-74 (11th
Cir. 1992), rer’r/ on other grounds, -----  U.S. ----- ,
111 S.Ct. 2581, 129 L.Ed.2d 687 (1994); Solomon v. 
I. i he rig Count g, 899 F.2d 1012, 1026 (11th Cir. 
1990) (cn banc) (Tjoflat, J., specially concurring); 
cert, denied, 498 U.S. 1022, 111 S.Ct. 670, 112 L.Ed. 
2d 662 (1991 ); see also Burton v. Sheheev, 792 F. 
Supp. 1229, 1251-52 (IJ.S.C.1992) (declining to im­
port section 2 into section 5 because, inter alia, of 
the differing burdens of proof), vacated on other 
grounds sub nom.. Statewide Reapportionment Ad-
risorg Comm. r. Theodore, ——  U.S. ----- , 112 S.Ct.
2954, 125 L.Ed.2d 656 (1992); City of Curt Arthur 
r. United States, 517 F.Supp. 987, 1005 n. 119 
(D.D.C.1981) (rejecting claim that section 2 action 
can collaterally estop section 5 action because, inter 
alia, burdens of proof in each case are different), 
aff'd, 459 U.S. 159, 102 S.Ct. 520, 74 L.Ed.2d 224 
(1992). That crucial procedural difference strongly 
suggests the inappropriateness of importing section 
2 standards into section 5.

Defendant's reliance on the legislative history of 
the amendments to section 2 is similarly unavailing.



17 ii

Where the language of a statutory regime is unam­
biguous, as it is here, we need not resort to that 
regime’s legislative history. See Connecticut Nnt’l 
Hank v. tin-main, 503 U.S. 219, 252-51, 112 S.Ct. 
IMG, 1119, 117 E.Ed.2d 991 (1992). Even if the 
language of sections 2 and 5 did not plainly contem­
plate two different and independent inquiries, we 
would not he persuaded that what little legislative 
history defendant has discovered is sudicient to jus­
tify the radical expansion of an already significant 
encroachment on the prerogatives of States and their 
subdivisions. Defendant bases its recourse to legisla­
tive history in a footnote from the Senate Report 
that accompanied the 1982 amendments to section 
2: “ In light of the amendment to Section 2, it is in­
tended that a Section 5 objection also follow if a new 
voting procedure itself so discriminates as to violate 
Section 2.” S.Rep. No. 97-417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 
at 12 n. 21 (1982) U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News 
1982 pp. 177, 189. Defendant also provides quotes to 
this effect from two sponsors of the 1982 amendments. 
The footnote appeal’s in a report that accompanied 
the 1982 overhaul of section 2 that was precipitated 
by and intended to repudiate Mobile v. Bolden, 446 
U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 64 U.Ed.2d 47 (1980). Geor­
gia v. Reno, 881 F.Supp. 7, 13 (D.D.C.1995). In 
Mobile, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that 
proof of discriminatory purpose was required for a 
section 2 violation. “The [footnote] cited by the de­
fendants was intended merely to emphasize that proof 
of the requisite unlawful effect is in itself sufficient 
under either section, regardless of motive.” Id. At 
that time, section 2 was wholly rewritten to provide 
that no proof of discriminatory purpose is required 
in actions brought under it; section 5 remained—and



remains today—as it had been written in 1975. In 
the face of the palpably different standards plainly 
embodied in sections '_! and 5, we think it not plaus­
ible that Congress would indicate its desire to raise 
the Imrdle to preclearance bv adding the require­
ments of section 2 to section b in a Senate Report 
footnote. Annul Arizona v. Reno, 887 F.Supp. 818 
(D.I).(’. 1!)!).")). Had Congress plainly expressed this 
intention, we would be bound to follow. It did not 
and we are not.

The Department argues in its brief—although it 
appeared to retreat from this contention at closing 
argument—that an additional reason for the court to 
import section 2 into section 5 is that the Department 
of Justice has promulgated regulations stating that 
preclearance under section 5 ought to be denied where 
the proposed voting change violates section 2. See 28 
C.F.R. § 51.55(h) (2) (“In those instances in which 
the Attorney Ceneral concludes that, as proposed, the 
submitted change is free of discriminatory purpose 
and retrogressive effect, but also concludes that a bar 
to implementation of the change is necessary to pre­
vent a clear violation of amended section 2, the At­
torney (leneral shall withhold section 5 preclear- 
ance.” ). The Department asserts that “the Attorney 
(ieneral’s interpretations of the Act are entitled to 
great deference.” [Def. Br. at 31.] Wherever else 
the Attorney (leneral’s interpretation of section f> of 
the Voting Rights Act may be entitled to deference, 
it certainly is not in this court. We will not defer to 
the Attorney (leneral where, under the statute, an 
action seeking preclearance may be brought here in 
the first instance. See Litton Fin. Printiiir/ Div. v. 
NLRB, r.Ol 1J.S. ion, 203, 111 S.Ct. 2215, 2223, 115 
L.Ed.2d 177 (1991) (citing Local Union 1395, lnt’l



19a

Brotherhood of Idler. Workers v. NLRB, 707 F.2d 
1027, 1030-81 (D.O.Cir. 1986)); Kelley v. EPA, 15 
F.3d 1100, 1108 (D.C.Cir.1994) ( “Even if an agency 
enjoys authority to determine such a legal issue ad­
ministratively, deference is withheld if a private 
party can bring the issue independently to federal 
court under a private right of action.” ), ccrl. denied
sub nom., American Bankers Ass’n v. Kelley, -----
U.S. -----, 115 S.Ct. 900, 130 L.Ed.2d 781 (1095);
cf. Michigan Citizens for an Indcp. Press r. Thorn- 
buryh, 80S F.2d 1285, 1293 (D.C.Cir.), aff'd, 493 
U.S. 38, 110 S.C't. 398, 107 L.Ed.2d 277 (1989).

As we have noted, all courts to have considered 
the question have decided that section 2 may not be 
imported in section 5. Sec Texas v. United States, 
Civ. Act. No. 94-1529, Mem. Op. at 1-3 (I).D.C. July 
10, 1995); Arizona r. Reno, 887 F.Supp. at 320-21; 
Georyia r. Reno, 881 F.Supp. at 13-14; New York 
v. United States, 874 F.Supp. 394 (D.D.C.1994); see 
also Burton r. Shchrcn, 793 F.Supp. at 1350-53. De­
fendant would distinguish these cases, insisting that 
the other panels refused to import section 2 into sec­
tion 5 cases because the only alleged section 2 viola­
tion was the addition of judgeships to an already 
existing, already violative system for the election of 
judges.” See Texas-, Arizona- Georyia; New York.

8 Defendant also argues that these cases are wrongly de­
cided and that as “the decisions of co-equal panels of this 
Court do not constitute binding precedent on this Court.” 
[Def. Hr. at 33.] Although we need not be bound by the de­
cisions of co-equal panels, sec In re Korean M r Lines Disaster, 
829 F.2d 1171, 1170 (D.C.Cir.l 987), aff’d sub none Chan v. 
Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 190 U.S. 122, 109 S.Ct. I<>7(>, 104 
L.Ed.2d 113 (1989), we certainly can be persuaded by them, 
particularly given the three-judge constitution of these panels



20a

| Dcf.Hr. at III.] In this case, defendant contends 
that the proposed voting change is itself a violation 
of section ‘2 and that preclearance must therefore he 
denied. We are not persuaded. The reasoning used 
by the prior courts is just as applicable here, regard­
less of whether a given voting change is styled as an 
addition to a system that allegedly violates section 2 
or a violation of section 2 itself. The statute does 
not provide for importation of section 2 into section 
r>, and the particular circumstances of a given sec­
tion ,r> preclearaneo action can make no difference 
whatsoever.

In its discussion of the importation of section 2 
into section !>, defendant makes no mention of Miller 
r. .IoIiiikoii. In Miller, the Attorney General denied 
preclearance for the Georgia General Assembly’s con­
gressional redistricting plan until it provided for
three majority-black districts. -----  U.S. a t ------, 115
S.t't. at 218!). In finding that the General Assembly 
had made race the “predominant factor” in its re­
districting and thereby violated the Equal Protection 
Clause, the Court held that the manner in which the 
Attorney General had employed section 5 of the Vot­
ing Rights Act was “insupportable,” and that the 
Attorney General’s incorrect interpretation of section 
r> could not be a compelling state interest sufficient to
survive strict scrutiny. Id. -----  U.S. at ----- , lib
S.Ot. at 2192. Although much of the discussion in 
Miller concerns the Equal Protection clause. Miller is 
very much a statutory interpretation case. The Su­
preme Court, rather than decide the constitutional

and tlie fact that, in this curious corner of the law, the only 
entity Resides co-equal panels of this court that can ever 
consider these questions is the Supreme Court.



21a

question of whether compliance with the Voting 
Rights Act could serve as a compelling interest, ex­
pressly repudiated the Department’s interpretation of
section 5. Id. -----  U.S. at ----- --------- 115 S.Ct. at
2490-91. The Co.mt noted that the purpose of section 
5 is to avoid retrogression in the position of minority 
voters, and stated that the “Justice Department’s 
maximization policy seems quite far removed from
this purpose.” Id. -----  U.S. at ------, 115 S.Ct. at
24915. “ In utilizing §5 to require States to create 
majority-minority districts wherever possible, the 
Department of Justice expanded its authority under 
the statute beyond what Congress intended and we 
have upheld.” Id. The Supreme Court further ob­
served that it had upheld section 5 in Smith Carolina 
v. Katzenbach, 1589 U.S. 301, 8G S.Ct. 803, 15 U.Ed.2d 
7(59 (1960), as a

necessary and constitutional response to some 
states’ “extraordinary stratagem[s] of contriv­
ing new rules of various kinds for the sole pur­
pose of perpetuating voting discrimination in the 
face of adverse federal court decrees.” . . . Rut 
[its] belief in Katzenbach that the federalism 
costs exacted by .tj 5 preclearance could he justi­
fied by those extraordinary circumstances does 
not mean they can he justified in the circum­
stances of this case.'"

10 Tlie federalism costs of section 5 (even without the im­
portation of section 2) have been noted throughout its history. 
See Georrjin v. United States, 411 U.S. 520, 515, 93 S.Ct. 
1702, 1713, 30 L.Ed.2d 172 (1973) (Powell, .1., dissenting) 
(“It is indeed a serious intrusion, incompatible with the basic 
structure of our system, for federal authorities to compel a 
State to submit its legislation for advance review.” ); South



22a

Id ( i/ iiiiI in 1/ luttznibacli, 38.'! U.S. at 385, 80 S.Ct. 
at 822).

Although Miller makes no explicit reference to tin* 
injection of section 2 into section 5, the import of the 
opinion on this issue is clear. So long as the standard 
for the "effect" prong of section 5 remains “nonretro­
gression,’’ the only way for defendant to require the 
creation of additional majority-black districts before 
preclearance will lie granted is to import the* stand­
ards of section 2 into the section 5 preclearance proc­
ess. The very language with which the Attorney 
General objected to the School Board’s redistricting 
plan makes plain that section 2’s standards informed 
the Attorney General’s objection to the School Board’s 
plan. Miller,” however, makes crystalline what was

Carolina r. Katzcnbach, 383 U.S. at 359-60, 86 S.Ct. at 831 
(Black, .1., dissenting in part) (“ [section] 5 which gives 
federal officials power to veto state laws they do not like is 
in direct conflict with the clear command of our Constitution 
that ‘The United States shall guarantee to every State in 
this Union a Republican Form of Government’ ”); Georyia 
v. Rena, 881 F.Supp. at 13 n. 8 (noting that the “extraordinary 
nature of section 5” argued against importing section 2 into 
section 5).

" Compare the Attorney General’s August 30, 1993 letter 
(“ fT|he proposed plan, adopted by the parish police jury 
and recommended hy the school board’s consultant, would 
appear In provide no oji]>ortunity for black voters to elert a 
candidate of their rlioire to the school board.” (emphasis 
added)) with section 2 (a violation of section 2 is proved 
where “it is shown that the political processes leading to 
nomination or election in the State or political subdivision 
are not equally open to participation by [minority citizens] 
in that [they] have less opportunity than other members of 
the electorate to participate in the political process and to 
c i r r i  icpresrntatires of their choice" (emphasis added)).



23a

already clear: section 2 and its standards have no 
place in a section 5 preclearance action. See also 
Texas v. United States, Civ.Act. No. 91-1.r>29, Mem. 
Op. at 2-:!.

In what may by now he a conditioned response, 
defendant argues that even if we decide that a section 
2 action cannot be brought in a section 5 preclearance 
proceeding, we must still consider evidence of a sec­
tion 2 violation as evidence of discriminatory purpose 
under section f>. We again disagree. As we have said, 
the statutory language sets forth differing standards 
for the two sections. The line cannot be blurred by 
allowing a defendant to'do indirectly what it cannot 
do directly. The federalism costs already exacted by 
section 5 are seriously increased if, under the guise 
of “purpose” evidence, alleged section 2 violations 
must he countered by the political subdivision when­
ever it seeks preclearance. Sec New York r. United 
States, 871 F.Supp. at 899 (“Were we to accept de­
fendant’s theory that discriminatory intent may al­
ways be inferred from the existence of an allegedly 
discriminatory system, nearly every section 5 pre­
clearance proceeding could potentially be transformed 
into full-blown section 2 litigation. We think a rule 
creating such a state of affairs both unwarranted and 
unwise.” ). And, Miller forecloses the permitting of 
section 2 evidence in a section 5 case. As a panel 
of this court recently noted,

the Court [in Miller] reaffirmed that the “pur­
pose” prong of section 5 must be analyzed within 
the context of section b’s purpose, which “has al­
ways been to insure that no voting-procedure 
changes would he made that would lead to a 
retrogression in the position of racial minorities



24a

with respect to their effective exercise of the elec­
toral franchise."

Texas r. Vailed Slates, Civ.Act. No. 94-1529, Mem.
Op. at 2 (July 10, 191)f») (quoting Miller, -----  U.S.
a t ----- , 1 l.r> S.Ct. at 2 192). (liven the variety of good
reasons not to import section 2 into section 5, we will 
not permit section 2 evidence to prove discriminatory 
pm pose under sect ion f).1'

B.
'I’he parties agree that the proposed redistricting 

will not result in retrogression of minority voting 
strength in Bossier Parish, and thus, that the “effect” 
prong of Section 5 is not in issue. The statute re­
quires a covered political subdivision seeking a decla- 
tory judgment to prove that the proposed voting 
change “does not have the purpose and will not have 
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote.” 
42 IJ.S.C. § 1972c (emphasis added).

Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that it did 
not adopt the Police Jury plan with a discriminatory 
purpose. Runic r. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 182,

At ('losing argument, defendant's counsel was presented 
with the question of whether a school board that affirmatively 
decides not to take race into account in any way could be 
found to have violated section 5. Counsel stated that a school 
board with the history and context of the Bossier Parish 
School Board declined to take race into account would indeed 
violate section 5. This strikes us as double counting. The 
reason the Bossier Parish School Board is subject to section 
5 at all is, at least in part, because of its history' and context. 
Now that it is subject to section B, defendant would again 
cite the School Board’s history as a reason to saddle it with 
the additional burden of affirmatively taking race into account 
in order to prove that it did not have the proscribed purpose.



25a

100 S.Ct. 15-18, 1565, 64 L.Ed.2d 119 ( 1980) 
(“Under [section] 5, the city bears the burden of 
proving lack of discriminatory purpose and effect.”). 
All courts agree that the entity seeking preclearance 
has the burden of proving that the proposed change 
has neither a discriminatory effect nor a discrimina­
tory purpose. How this plays itself out in litigation 
has been left largely unexplored. But it must be 
recognized that placing a burden of proving non­
discrimination on the plaintiff is anomalous under our 
law; the plaintiff is put in the position of proving a 
negative.1:1

Courts have devised complex burden-shifting re­
gimes for litigation under Title VII and section 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act. In an action under Title VII, 
a plaintiff complaining of discrimination in the em­
ployment context must set forth a prima facie case of 
discrimination. At that point, the burden shifts to 
the employer to prove that the complained-of employ­
ment action was undertaken for other, nondiscrimi- 
natory reasons. The burden then shifts back to the 
plaintiff to prove that the employer’s offered reasons 
are pretextual. See, e.g., Jolnismi v. Transportation 
Agency, 180 U.S. 616, 628, 107 S.Ct. I I 12. 1150, 94 
L.Ed.2(1 (i 15 (1987); McDonnell Douglas ('orp. v. 
Green, 111 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 
L.Ed.2d 668 (197.3). Similarly, courts in section'2 
cases have held that once the plaintiff establishes a 
prima facie case of vote dilution, the burden shifts 
to the political subdivision to prove that the voting

13 It is particularly anomalous where the voting change lias 
no retrogressive effect and the political subdivision thus bears 
the burden of proving that when it did nothing had, it did 
so with a non-had motive.



26a

regime does not result in, or have as its purpose, dis­
crimination. See, ('■<!■, Ilnll v. Holder, 956 I' 2d 1563, 
1573-71 (11th Cir.1992), rev’d on other (/rounds,
___ U.S. --- ----, 111 S.Ct. 2581, 129 I-.Kd.2d 6.87
(1991); Solomon r. I.Un ity County, 899 K.2d 1012, 
1036 (11th Cir. 1990) (cn bone) (Tjoflat, specially 
concurring). In actions under both Title VII and 
section 2, the burden-shifting regimes were enacted 
in order to alleviate the difliculty for plaintitfs of 
proving that defendants acted with discriminatory 
intent. These procedural services thus do not appeal- 
appropriate to a section 5 case.

To be sure, something like a burden shifting must 
occur in this, as in every other, civil case. Once the 
Hoard makes out its prima facie case, it is entitled to 
preclearance unless its prima facie case is rebutted. 
Sec Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Vro-
yrmns, Dept, of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries, -----
U.S. ___ , ------, IM S.Ct. 2251, 2259, 129 L.Ed.2d
221 (1991) (“ [ WJhen the party with the burden of 
persuasion establishes a prima facie case supported 
by ‘credible and credited evidence,’ it must either be 
rebutted or accepted as true” ). If it is rebutted, then 
we must weigh the School Board’s evidence against 
that proffered on the other side. If the evidence is 
equally convincing on either side, the School Board— 
bearing the risk of nonpersuasion—must lose. See 
McCain v. Lybrand, 165 U.S. 236, 257, 101 S.Ct. 
1037, 1050, 79 1-.Kd.2d 271 (1981) (in the preclear­
ance process, “the burden of proof (the risk of non­
persuasion) is placed upon the covered jurisdiction” ). 
If, however, the School Board’s evidence is more per­
suasive than the evidence proffered against it, the 
School Board is entitled to preclearance. To make out 
a /irima facie case for preclearance, the School Board



must demonstrate that the proposed change will have 
no retrogressive cited, and that the change was un­
dertaken without a discriminatory purpose. Proof 
of nondiscriminatory purpose must include “legiti­
mate reasons" for settling on the given change. Rich­
mond r. United Staten, 122 IJ.S. 358, 375, !>5 S.Ct. 
22%, 23%, 15 Ii.Kd.2d 215 (1975). When the prima 
facie case lias been made by the School Board, de­
fendant must offer evidence in rebuttal in order to 
prevent preclearance."

The School Board has offered a host of nondiscrim­
inatory reasons for adopting the Police Jury plan. 
We are satisfied that at least two of these arc “legiti­
mate, nondiscriminatory motives,” New York, 874 
F.Supp. at 400.,r'

14 A panel nf this ccnirt recently stated that, in order to 
prove that it lias not acted with the prohibited intent, the 
section 5 plaintiff, “ fa]s a practical matter,” must come 
forward with evidence of legitimate, nondiscriminatory mo­
tives for the proposed changes to the voting laws. In addition, 
the ptaintilf must furnish some affirmative evidence that the 
proposed changes were not motivated by a discriminatory 
purpose. Once the section 5 plaintiff has made such a show­
ing, the burden shifts to the Attorney General, as the party 
resisting preclearance, to provide some evidence of a dis­
criminatory purpose on the part of the legislators who seek 
to make the change. In the absence of such a showing, the 
section 5 plaintiff will bn found to have carried its burden 
of establishing a lack of discriminatory purpose. New York 
v. United States, 871 F.Supp. at 400. That opinion, unfor­
tunately, did not cite any authority for this division of the 
burden of proof.

,r' In the course of litigation, the School Hoard has offered 
several reasons for its adoption of the Police .fury plan that 
clearly were not real reasons. At one point, the School Board 
maintained that it adopted the plan (on October 1, 1992)



28a

The Police liny | >l;i n olfered the twin at t rad inns 
of guaranteed preclearnnee and easy implementation 
(because no precinct lines would need redrawing). 
The School Hoard did not like the Police .Jury plan 
when it was lirst presented to them, and there wore 
certainly reasons not to. The Police Jury plan 
wreaked havoc with the incumtiencies of four of the 
School Hoard members and was not drawn with 
school locations in mind. When, however, the redis­
tricting process began to cause agitation within the 
black community, and when it became obvious that 
any plan adopted by the School Hoard would give rise 
to eontrovei-sy and division (and we find that by the 
time the NAACP’s redistricting plan had been pre­
sented to the School Hoard, the Board could very 
reasonably foresee this), the Police Jury plan became, 
as Hoard member Myrick described it, “expedient.” 
Any port will do in a storm, and when the clouds over 
the School Hoard’s redistricting process began to glow 
ominous, the onhj  close port was the already pre­
cleared Police Jury plan.

Defendant, and defendant-intervenors contend that 
the Police Jury plan itself was precleared by the At­
torney (leneral only because relevant information was 
withheld from the Attorney General. In order for 
this to he evidence that the School Board adopted the 
Police Jury plan with an impermissible purpose, the 
School Hoard would have to have known that such 
information had been withheld from the Attorney 
General, and that hut for that withholding, the At­
torney General would not have precleared the Police 
Jury plan. We know of no evidence even suggesting

In avoid rumiim:  afoul  of Shan- r. R e n o , ----- U S . ------, 113
S (’t 28Hi. 123 I, I'd.2d r. 11 (IH93) (decided tune 28. 1993).



the School Hoard had any knowledge that the Police 
Jury plan had been precleared illegitimately if in fact 
it had been.

Further, the Police Jury plan would require no 
splitting of precincts. While the evidence on the effect 
of a school hoard's efforts to redistrict in a way that 
splits precincts is confused, what is uncontroverted is 
that changing precincts is neither guaranteed nor 
free. The NAACP plan presented to the School Board 
—the only other plan available to the school hoard at 
the time—split at least 46 precincts. Defendants 
interveners’ witness, David Creed, who testified that 
precinct-splitting was quite common and that he him­
self had drawn several redistricting plans that split 
precincts, [ D-I Exh. F at 2-!5], had never drawn a 
plan that split more than eight precincts. [Tr. II, at
119.] Splitting precincts would have required assist­
ance from the Police Jury—a body that had rebuffed 
the School Board’s earlier overtures for coordinated 
effoils. And, the splitting of precincts would have 
cost money. Evidence was presented that each pre­
cinct split would cost $850, and even if this number 
was substantially overstated, no one suggests that 
precincts can be split for free. When the School 
Board began the redistricting process, it likely antici­
pated the necessity of splitting some precincts. It 
hired the Police Jury’s cartographer with the expec­
tation that he would spend a substantial amount of 
time on the project, and it was given maps of the 
then-existing precincts and told it would have to work 
with the Police Jury with respect to the precincts. 
Nonetheless, the School Board entirely reasonably 
could have, when faced with the NAACP’s plan, ar­
rived quickly at the conclusion that zero precinct 
splits was significantly more desirable than 46.



Moreover, iii tlu- midst of the controversy, at the 
hidii st of the black rnmmunity, and over the "hitter 
i>|■ I•• isit ion" of some white constituents, the School 
Hoard itself a|i|iointed a black member to its only 
vacant scat in time to participate in and vote on the 
adopt inn of tho Police .Inry plan. Defendant tries to 
miiiimizi this fact by noting that the vote was only 
six to live, that Jerome lilunt was appointed to a dis­
trict that was Ml', white, and that Blunt promptly 
lost in a special election six months later. That Blunt 
was appointed by a hare majority tells us nothing 
more than that at least a majority of the white Board 
members were responsive to the black community and 
were not opposed to black representation on the 
School Board. That Blunt lost his next election can­
not, we think, be fairly laid at the School Board’s 
door, particularly given that the district to which he 
was appointed—again, at the behest of George Price 
and others—was the only one with a vacancy. This 
appointment, particularly when its timing and con­
text are considered, indicates that a majority of the 
white Board members not only were not opposed to 
black representation on the School Board, but affirma­
tively brought it about for the first time in Parish 
history.

The School Board thus has presented a fninui facie 
case for preclearance. Defendant seeks to rebut this 
case by presenting what it styles as “direct” and “in­
direct” evidence of discriminatory purpose.

The “direct” evidence presented by defendant and 
defendant-intervenors consists of the alleged state­
ments of three School Board members. We conclude 
that none of the statements attributed to these Board 
members, if they were in fact made, show that the 
Board acted with a discriminatory motivation. The



first statement offered by defendant is perhaps the 
most troubling. S.P. Davis, an attorney representing 
a plaintiff-intervenor in the Lemon suit, testified that 
Board member Henry Burns told him that, while 
Burns himself had no opposition to the idea, other 
members of the Board were “hostile to black repre­
sentation on the School Board.” "1 Plaintiffs did not 
cross-examine Davis on this point, so we do not know 
more specifically what Davis understood Burns to 
mean by “black representation.” The phrase is sub­
ject to at least two interpretations. We would be 
troubled indeed if Burns was referring to hostility 
on the part of other Board members to the presence of 
black persons as members of the School Board. But, 
because at least six of the School Board members 
proved their lack of hostility to this sort of black 
representation by appointing a black Board member, 
we do not believe that Burns meant this. If Burns 
meant, by “black representation,” that other members 
of the School Board were opposed to the intentional 
drawing of majority-black districts in order to ensure 
black representation on the Board, that is hardly an 
indication of discriminatory purpose unless section 5 
imposes an affirmative obligation to draw additional 
majority-black districts. There are a host of entirely 
legitimate reasons to oppose this sort of district­
drawing. A Board member could, for example,'be 
opposed to districts that split numerous precincts or 
that violated traditional districting principles.

Board member Barry Musgrove’s alleged statement 
to George Price that, while Musgrove was not per-

1,1 We note the difficulty involved in giving weight to testi­
mony as to an out-of-court statement by a third party con­
cerning the mental state of other, unnamed third parties.



sonally opposed, other Hoard members were hostile 
to drawing majority-black districts is also relied upon 
by defendant. Musgrovp denies making this state­
ment, [Tr. I, at Mi.], hut we will assume for this 
analysis that he said what Price says he said. Hut 
again, this statement is not evidence of discriminatory 
purpose. A Hoard member could have any number 
of perfectly legitimate reasons to oppose the drawing 
of majority-black districts, particularly in the manner 
of the NAACP plan Without more than Price’s testi­
mony, we will not assume the worst and credit the 
unnamed School Hoard members with an untoward 
motivation when the statement lends itself just as 
easily to a nondiscriminatory interpretation.

The last Hoard-member statement emphasized by 
defendant is that of Thomas Myrick, as testified to 
by intervenors (leorge Price and Thelma Harry, that 
Myrick would not let his seat be taken. But, we do 
not attribute a racist motivation to the perfectly 
understandable expression by an incumbent of the 
strong desire not to have his district so changed that 
his constituency is obliterated. Even if Myrick’s 
statement was an indication of a discriminatory pur­
pose on Myrick’s part—which we do not think it was 
—on this record it would be inappropriate to attribute 
such a purpose to the other nine members of the 
Hoard who voted to adopt the Police Jury plan.17

17 When asked at oral argument for the best evidence of 
discriminatory purpose, counsel for defendant-inlervenors 
pointed to the remarks of the school board members. Our 
dissenting colleague thinks little of this evidence: “These 
statements standing alone would certainly be insullicient to 
show discriminatory purpose.” Dissent at 4,SO fApp., infra, 
S3 a I.



The “indirect” evidence defendant most heavily 
relies upon is the the “sequence of events leading to 
the school hoard’s adoption of the police jury plan.” 
[ Def. Hr. at 15.] Defendant argues that these events 
raise an inference that the plan was adopted with a 
discriminatory purpose. Defendant notes that when 
the Police Jury plan was first presented to the Hoard, 
the Hoard declined to adopt it, in part because it 
pitted two pairs of incumbents against each other. 
Defendant also emphasizes the Board's unwillingness 
to permit participation in the redistricting' process by 
(leorge Price and the NAACP; most of the redistrict­
ing work done by the Hoard was not done publicly. 
And, defendant argues, and regards as the nail in 
the School Hoard’s coffin, that the Board “rushed to 
adopt the police jury plan” only after it “was con­
fronted with the NAACP's plan.” | Def. Hr. at 18. ] 
If the only evidence before us were that summarized 
here and relied on so heavily by the defendant, we 
would still have difficulty following its inferential 
leap. We think that assuming that the quick rejec­
tion of the NAACP plan is probative of a discrim­
inatory purpose requires at least that the Hoard 
have regarded the NAACP plan as a plausible plan. 
We have no evidence that the plan was, as an objec­
tive matter, plausible (after all, it split 40 precincts 
and is no longer seriously put forward by either 
defendant or defendant-intervenors). And, we have 
no indication that the School Hoard itself thought the 
plan plausible. The existence of the NAACP plan 
demonstrated to the Board that its efforts to redistrict 
would he subject to exacting review and vociferous 
criticism. The swift selection of the only plan around 
that bore the imprimatur of the Attorney General



14; i

iesemhles not a Iirii7.cn stroke in the name of racist 
rnlistrictinn but an understandable, if not necessarily 
laudable, retreat from a protracted and highly charged 
public battle. In Iiu 111 of this, and mindful of the 
Hoard's demonstrable willingness to o i s i m  black 
representation on the Hoard (the creation of a 
majority-black district would not necessarily lead to 
the election of a black Hoard member, while the ap­
pointment of a black Hoard member unavoidably 
would), we think defendant and defendant-inter- 
venors' inference is unjustified.'"

At the bottom, defendant’s argument that the 
School Hoard’s adoption of the Police Jury plan rather 
than something like the NAACP plan runs afoul of 
section ,r> is indistinguishable from an argument re­
jected by the Court in Miller v. Johnson. Here, 
defendant argues that the School Board has failed 
to provide an adequate reason explaining why it de­
clined to act on a proposal featuring two majority- 
black districts. In Miller, the “key to the Govern­
ment’s position . . .  is and always has been that 
Georgia failed to proffer a nondiscriminatory purpose 
for its refusal in the first two submissions to take 
the steps necessary to create a third majority-minority
district.” -----  IJ.S. a t ----- , 115 S. Ct. at 2192. The
Supreme Court described this position as “insupport­
able” and stated that Georgia’s adherence to “other

Defendant mentions the continuing duty of (lie School 
I’.oanl to "remedy any remaining vestiges of the dual [school] 
system” under the order in I.intern v. Housin' Parish School 
lion til, 240 F.Sitpp. 709 (VV.I).I<a.l965), citing in particular 
the School Board's failure to maintain a biraci.al committee. 
We fail to see how this can be in any way related to the School 
Board’s purpose in adopting the Police Jury plan.



districting principles instead of creating as many 
majority-minority districts as possible does nut sup­
port an inference that the plan ‘so discriminates on 
the basis of race or color as to violate the Consti­
tution,' and thus cannot provide any basis under § 5
for the dustin' Department’s objection.” Id. -----
U.S. at ----- , Ilf) S.Ct. at 2492 (citations omitted).
We note that, in Milky, the Department of Justice 
denied preclearance until the Georgia Assembly had 
drawn three of 11 (or 27', ) black majority districts 
in a State with a population that is 2 7 black. The 
Supreme Court agreed with the district court that the 
Department id' Justice was engaged improperly in 
“black-maximization" on a theory of section 5 that 
the Supreme Court rejected. Id. lien,  defendant 
denied preclearance noting that the Board had 
adopted the Police Jury plan when it had before it a 
plan that provided for two of 12  (or 18' i ) majority- 
black districts in a parish with a voting-age popula­
tion that is 17.(5'. black. The key to defendant’s 
position in this case, similarly, is that the School 
Board has not provided an adequate explanation for 
adopting the precleared Police Jury plan when it had 
before it the NAACP plan. As Miller makes clear, 
the adoption of one nonretrogressive plan rather than 
another nonretrogressive plan that contains .more; 
majority-black districts cannot by itself give rise to 
the inference of discriminatory purpose. Defendant 
here, as it did in Milk y, pursues a theory the result 
of which is that no political subdivision presented 
with a plan that provides for x number of majority- 
black districts can ever adequately explain its reasons 
for adopting a plan that provides for x minus



1 6 a

a majority-black districts. The Miller Court rejected 
this theory of section f>, and we will not resuscitate 
it here.

Accordingly, we grant plaintiff Bossier Parish 
School Board the reipiested declaratory judgment.

| Maps included as an appendix to the opinion, hut 
omitted from this appendix, are reproduced at 907 
l'.Supp. at 161-152; the originals are U.S. Exhs. 7(>A 
and 77K.]



37a
KESSLER, District Judge, concurring in part and 

dissenting in [tart.
I concur in the holding of section 111 (A ) of the 

majority opinion, namely, that section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act may not he imported into section 5, 42 
U.S.C. § 1973c. The statute does not compel such a 
reading, and all three-judge panels which have ad­
dressed the issue have concluded that, section 2  re­
quirements are not part of section 5. Sec Texas v. 
United States, Civ. No. 94-1529, Slip. Op. at 2 (D.D.C. 
Apr. 21, 1995); Arizona v. Reno, 887 F.Supp. 818, 
321-22 ( D.D.C.1995) ; Georgia v. Reno,  881 E. Supp. 
7, 13-14 ( D.D.C.1995); New York r. United States, 
874 F.Supp. 394, 400 (D.D.C.1994). Sections 2 and 
5 are undoubtedly “designed to complement and re­
inforce each other,” Arizona, 887 F.Supp. at 321, but 
because they “differ in structure, purpose and appli­
cation,” Holder r. H all,----- U .S .------- , ------, 114
S.Ct. 2581, 2587, 129 L.Ed.2d 687 (1994) (opinion 
of Kennedy, ,).), the inquiries into each section are 
independent. Our colleagues in Arizona, recently con­
sidered the identical issue, and our holding today 
with respect to sections 2 and 5 is consistent with that 
opinion: The School Board may receive clearance 
under section 5 without demonstrating that its re­
districting decision complies with section 2 , and the 
Department may not withhold preclearance merely 
by establishing a section 2 violation. See Arizona, 887 
F.Supp. at 323-24.

As to section 111(B) of the majority opinion, how­
ever, I cannot in good conscience agree with the 
result reached by my two colleagues. The extensive 
record demonstrates that the Bossier Parish School 
Board did not act with “legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
motives.” New York, 874 F.Supp. at 400. Rather,



in light uf tlic impact the School Hoard's decision will 
have on the hlack community, the long history of dis­
crimination and segregation in the Bossier Parish
........1 system, the perpetuation of the exclusion of
Macks from full participation in the electoral process, 
the significant timing of events that led up to the 
School Hoard's decision, and the noticeable departures 
from normal procedure, I am convinced that the 
School Hoard acted with “the purpose . . . [of] 
abridging the right to vote on account of race or 
color" in violation of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1073c. Accordingly, I would deny preclearance, and 
I respectfully dissent.

I.
Under section f» of the Voting Rights Act, the 

burden of proving that the adopted plan does not 
have a discriminatory purpose rests squarely with 
the Bossier Parish School Board. Rome v. United 
Stales. 4 Hi U.S. 15(5, 183 n. 18, 100 S.Ct. 1518, 1565 
n. 18, 01  I,.Ed.2d 110  (1080); Georgia v. United 
Slides, 111 U.S. 520, 558, 03 S.Ct. 1702, 1700, 30 
L.Ed.2d 172 (1073). As stated succinctly by the 
majority, if the evidence is equally convincing on 
either side, the School Hoard—bearing the risk of 
nonperstiasion—must lose. Maj. Of). 446 [App., 
supra, 20a ]; see McCain r. Lijbrand, 405 U.S. 230, 
257, 10 1 S.Ct. 1037, 1050, 70 L.Ed.2d 271 (1081) 
(in the preclearance process, “the burden of proof 
(the risk of nonpersuasion) is placed upon the cov­
ered jurisdiction").' In this case, the evidence is far

'While it may he true that this burden-shifting scheme is 
‘‘aiiimialmis under our law," Maj.Op. at 445-446 (App., supra, 
25a|, that should have no inlluence on our decision. Congress 
decides how to write the country’s statutes, and Congress



from being equally convincing on either side. Not 
only does tho evidence fail to prove absence of dis­
criminatory purpose, it shows that racial purpose 
fueled the School Hoard’s decision.

II.

The Supreme Court has told us that “ fdjetermining 
whether invidious purpose was a motivating factor 
demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial 
and direct evidence of intent as may be available.” 
Village of Arlington Heights r. Metropolitan Housing 
Development Corp., -42!) U.S. 252, 2(»G, 97 S.Ct. 555, 
504, 50 L.Kd.2d 150 (1977). Such evidence, the 
Court stated, includes the impact the state’s action 
has on protected minority groups; the historical back­
ground of the challenged decision; the specific sequence 
of events leading up to that decision; any substantive 
departure from the normal process; and the legisla­
tive or administrative history of the decision. Id. 
at 266-268, 97 S.Ct. at 564-565. See oho Iiusbee 
v. Smith. 549 F.Supp. 494, 516-517 (1982), nff'd 459 
U.S. 1166, 10.2 S.Ct. 809, 74 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1983). 
Applying this legal standard to the record before us, 
I find that the evidence demonstrates conclusively that 
the Bossier School Board acted with discriminatory 
purpose."

clearly believed that the states’ open defiance of the Equal 
Protection (danse—what the Supreme Court called an “insidi­
ous and pervasive evil,”—South Carolina v. Kutr.cnbach, 383 
U.S. 301, 309, 86 S.Ct. 803, 808, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966), was 
serious enough to warrant the "federalism costs,” Maj.Op. at 
4-14 n.O [App., supra, 21a n. 10|, of the Voting Rights Act.

2 It is telling that the majority never once refers to Arling­
ton Heights when they evaluate the evidence submitted by



40a

A.
In At tin ill on Heights, the Court said that when 

analyzing the government’s purpose, “an important 
starting point . . . [ is the] impact of an official 
action—whether it hears more heavily on one race 
than another.'" Arlington Heights, 429 II.S. at 266, 
97 S Ct. at (quoting M’ashington v. Paris, 420 
(I S. 229, 242, 90 S.Ct. 2040, 2049, 48 L.Fd.2d 597 
( 1970)). The Hoard’s adoption of a redistricting plan 
with no majority-black districts undoubtedly “hears 
more heavily” on the black community in Bossier 
Parish than on the white community, because it effec­
tively prevents black voters from electing candidates 
of their choice to the School Board.

In Bossier Parish, voting is racially polarized, Stips 
1111 181-190. No black person has ever been elected 
to the Bossier Parish School Board, Stip 11 153, de­
spite the fact that 20.1 C of the population of Bossier 
Parish is black, Stip 1) 5, and almost 30% of its public 
schools are black. Stips U1[ 5, 134. Given this context, 
black voters may well require a majority-black dis­
trict in order to have a fair chance of electing candi­
dates of their choice. Further, “ [b]ecause it is sensi­
ble to expect that at least some blacks would have 
been elected [to the Board], the fact that none have 
ever been elected is important evidence of purposeful 
exclusion.” Rogers r. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 623-24, 
102 S.Ct. 3272, 3279, 73 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1982). As

the Department ami Intervenors. See Maj.Op. at 117-119 
|App., supra, 29a-36u|. Indeed, the majority articulates no 
standard by which it decides whether "the School Hoard’s 
evidence is more persuasive than the evidence proffered 
atrainst it.” Maj.Op at 44(5 |A pp, supra, 26a],



one federal court of appeals noted, “nothing is as 
emphatic as zero." United States r. Hinds County 
School Hoard, 117 I .2d 8T.2, 858 (5th Cir.1969). The 
fact is, the Board's plan presents the black minority 
of Bossier Parish with no realistic opportunity to 
elect any candidates of its choice to any of the board 
seats.

Moreover, as Defendants-Intervenors demonstrated, 
it was clearly possible to draw a redistricting plan 
for the Bossier Parish Schools with one or two 
majority-black districts, and still respect traditional 
districting principles.' The School Board admits that 
it is “obvious that a reasonably compact black-major­
ity district could l>e drawn in Bossier City.” Stip 
11 36. But rather than consider either of the alter­
native proposals brought before it or direct their own 
cartographer to draft one, the School Board adopted 
a plan “which guaranteed that blacks would remain 
underrepresented on the [School Board] by compari­
son to their numerical strength in the enlarged com­
munity.” City of Port Arthur v. United States, 517 
F.Supp. 1)87, 1022 (I).I).G.1981), a f d ,  15!) U.S. 159, 
103 S.Ct. 530, 74 L.Ed.2d 334 (1082). This con­
scious decision to adopt a plan that effectively ex­
cludes minority voters from the political process is 
probative of discriminatory intent.

3 In addition to the plan presented to the School Board on 
September 3, 1992, Defendant-Intervenors have presented two 
other plans that show it is possible to draw majority-black 
districts in Bossier Parish which are fully consistent with 
traditional districting principles.



42a

H.
The Supreme Court has held specifically that “the 

historical background of the challenged decision" is 
properly part of the put pose inquiry under the Vot­
ing Hights Act. \iinu)lnii Hcii/lits, -129 U.S. at 12<i7, 
97 St't. at r>(')|. Here, the history of discrimination 
and racism in and out of the school system demon­
strates that the School Hoard's vote was yet another 
chapter in its long-standing refusal to address the 
concerns of the black community of Bossier Parish. 
Evidence of historical discrimination “is relevant to 
drawing an inference of purposeful discrimination, 
particularly in cases such as this one where the evi­
dence shows that discriminatory practices were com­
monly utilized . . . and that they were replaced by 
laws and practices which, though neutral on their 
face, serve to maintain the status quo.” Ror/cru, 458 
U.S. at (525, 102 S.Ct. at :?279U

' The majority excludes evidence of historical discrimina­
tion in the Mossier Public Schools and Mossier Parish because 
it believes I tint such "evidence | is] relevant only to the sect ion 
2 inquiry." Maj.Op. at 110a, n. 5 [App., supra, 9a n.fi]. In 
my view, the majority wrongly believes that once we decide 
that sections 2 and 5 are analytically distinct, we may not use 
evidence of historical discrimination (which is central to a 
section 2 inquiry) to decide the "purpose” prong of section 5. 
I’.ut as the panel recently explained in Arizona v. liino, 8H7 
K.Supp. at .'tgti, nothing in the statute or case law leads to that 
conclusion. "Although the inquiry required under the purpose 
prong of section 5 extends into areas that would also be rele­
vant in a section 2 proceeding," that does not mean that con­
sidering evidence of historical discrimination is "tantamount 
to launching a section 2 proceeding . . . under the guise of 
section r>.” hi. at 322. More importantly, excluding evi­
dence of historical discrimination contravenes the Supreme



It. is mi(lis|mti'(l Hint Louisiana and the Dossier 
school system have a history of segregation and racial 
discrimination predating-the Civil War. Following 
the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, Louisiana 
began what the Supreme Court has called “unremit­
ting and ingenious" defiance of the Constitution, 
South ( <imlimi r. I\(il.:aihit<li. .‘581? U.S. 301, 1109, 86  
S.Ct. 803, 808, la L.Fd.2d 769 (1966), by passing 
laws designed to disenfranchise black voters. Slip 
11 216. One law prohibited elected officials from help­
ing illiterates. Another statute required all voters 
to use complex application forms, prohibited explana­
tion of application questions, and facilitated whole­
sale purges by party officials of voters who managed 
to register successfully, hi. The new laws reduced 
black registration by 90 percent in the state, leaving 
only 10 percent of adult black males eligible to vote. 
Stip 1| 216. Two years later, in 1889, Louisiana’s 
Constitutional Convention imposed a “grandfather” 
clause and educational and property qualifications 
for voter registration, l.oth provisions were designed 
to limit black political participation, Stip 1| 217, and 
both succeeded: black males constituted just -1 per­
cent of the state’s population. See United Slates v. 
State of Louisiana, 225 F.Supp. 358, 373 (E.D.La. 
1963).

In 1921, pursuant to state law, the state Demo­
cratic party established an all-white primary, Stip

Court’s explicit direction in Arlinpton Itcights. whore the 
Court stated that among the factors to consider in the “pur­
pose" inquiry is the “historical background of the decision . . . 
particularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken for 
invidious purposes.” 129 IJ.S. at 268, 97 S.Ct. at 561. In short, 
the majority ignores the standard the Supreme Court estab­
lished to govern precisely the type of inquiry we must make in 
this case.



I ' l l  229, 222. That same year, the legislature replaced 
tlie grandfather clause with a requirement that an 
a11111i<• a111 "give a reasonable interpretation" of any 
section ol the federal or state constitution in order 
to vote. Stip 1| 221. After the all-white primary was 
struck down by a federal court, the Democratic party 
adopted an anti-single-shot law, and a majority vote 
rei|uii einent for party oUicers. Major r. Turn, fiT I 
I'.Supp. 32f>, I! II ( ikl). La. 1983). The “reasonable 
interpretation” rei|iiirement was finally held uncon­
stitutional by the United States Supreme Court in 
1 ibid. Louisiana r. 1'iiilal States, 380 U.S. 110, 80 
S.Ct. 817, 13 L.IAI.2d 700 (1960).

In the Bossier school system it was much of the 
same. Despite the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown 
r. Hon id ni Education, 317 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 6 8 6 , 
08 L.Hd. 873 (1001), dc jure segregation was the 
rule in Louisiana public schools, and federal courts 
were forced to order school districts to comply with 
lederal law. Stip 1| 230. Since 1960, the Bossier 
Parish School Hoard has been the defendant in Lemon 
r. Hossier Parish School Hoard, Civ.Act. No. 10,687 
(W’.D.La., filed Dec. 2, 1964) in which it was found 
liable for intentionally segregating the public schools 
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Lemon 
r. Bossier Parish Srh. Bd„ 210 F.Supp. 709 (YV.D.La. 
I960), atVd, 370 F.2d 817 (0 th Cir.1967), cert, de­
nied 388 U.S. till, 87 S.Ct. 2116, 18 L.Ed.2d 1300 
(1967).

Throughout the late 1960’s and early 1970's, the 
school board sought to limit or evade its desegregation 
obligations. At one point, the School Hoard sought 
to assign black children of Barksdale Air Force Base 
personnel to black schools without a right to transfer 
to white schools, claiming that they were “federal



children” and not within the “jurisdiction” of the 
school district. Stip j| 237. Circuit Judge Wisdom 
rejected the School Hoard’s “new and bizarre ex­
cuse” for rationalizing its denial of the constitutional 
right of black school children to equal educational 
opportunities. Mossier Parish School Hoard r. Lemon, 
370 F.2d 8  17, 810 (5th Cir. 10(57).

In 10(50, the Fifth Circuit rejected the school 
hoard’s “freedom of choice” plan in Hall r. SI. Helena 
Parish Sell. Mil., 117 F.2d 801 (5th Cir.10(50), and 
in 1070, after “protracted litigation,” rejected an­
other inadequate remedial plan proposed by the dis­
trict in Lemon r. Mossier Parish Seh. Mil., 121 F.2d 
121 (5th Cir. 1060).

In 1071, tlu> court held unconstitutional the School 
Board’s plan to assign students to one of two schools 
in Plain Dealing based on their test scores. Lemon v. 
Mossier Parish Seh. ILL, 141 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 
1071). In 1070, the School Board filed a motion seek­
ing a declaration of unitary status and a release 
from further court supervision. The motion was 
denied, and the school district has yet to be declared 
a unitary system. Stip (| 230. Since 1080, despite 
the School Board’s continuing duty to desegregate, 
the number of elementary schools with predominately 
black enrollments has increased from one to four. 
To this day, the School Board remains under direct 
federal court order to remedy any remaining vestiges 
of segregation in its schools.

The Board has also failed to honor the Lemon 
court’s order to maintain a Biracial Committee to 
“recommend to the School Board ways to attain and 
maintain a unitary system and to improve education 
in the parish.” Stip 1| 111. The committee met only 
2 or 3 times, and only the black members attended.



Fur decades following thi‘ court’s order, the Hoard 
ignored this rei|uiremont altogether. Sti|) || 11 li. In 
111!).'!, the Hoard linally established a similar com­
mittee,  hut disbanded it after three months Ixcause, 
according to School Hoard Member Harry Musgrove, 
"the tone of the committee made up of the minority 
members of the committee quickly turned toward be­
coming involved in policy." Stip j| 110. What exactly 
the Committee was supposed to become involved in, 
if not policy, is unclear. What is clear is that the 
Hoard’s unilateral dismantling of the Committee was 
in direct violation of a federal court order to address 
the concerns of the black community.

The School Hoard's adoption of the Police Jury plan 
must he evaluated in the framework of this long 
history of official discrimination. It may seem unduly 
harsh to consider racism and discrimination dating 
hack to the Civil War, but this history reveals an 
insidious pattern which cannot be ignored, and must 
inform our decision today. Like the school boards 
and legislatures before it, the Bossier Parish School 
Hoard’s actions effectively eliminate the black com­
munity from the political process. So long as black 
voters have no electoral power, they have no voice, 
and the School Hoard can safely ignore their concerns.

C.

The Supreme Court has told us that “the specific 
sequence of events leading up to the challenged deci­
sion may shed some light on the decisionmaker’s pur­
pose.” Arlhintoii Heights, 12f) U.S. at 207, !)7 S.Ct. 
at fit! 1. Here, the sequence of events leading up to 
the adoption of the Police Jury plan supplies further 
proof of discriminatory purpose.



I7.i

The i'f'(list 1‘ictiiijr process liegan in May, 11)1)1, when 
the Board decided to develop its own plan rather than 
adopt the one accepted by the Police Jury. (liven the 
fact that the next School Hoard election was not 
scheduled until October, 101)1, there was no need for 
hasty Board action. The Board hired Gary Joiner, a 
cartographer, who had drawn the Police Jury plan. 
He was hired to perform 200-260 hours of work, far 
more time than would be needed simply to recreate 
the Police Jury plan. Stip 1| 8 6 . On July 29, 1991, 
the Police Jury plan was precleared by the Justice 
Department. On September 5, 1991, however, the 
School Board decided not to adopt the Police Jury 
plan, largely because it would pit incumbents against 
each other. Over the course of the next year, School 
Board members considered a number of redistricting 
options. Mr. Joiner met privately with School Board 
members and demonstrated different possibilities to 
them on his computer. Stip |f 96. These meetings 
were not open to the public nor were there any re­
corded minutes or published notice of the meetings.

While the School Board was meeting and planning 
in private, the black community was trying, unsuc­
cessfully, to participate in public. In March of 1992, 
George Price, on behalf of a coalition o f  black com­
munity groups, wrote the School Hoard asking to 
participate in its rodistricling process. Stip jf'9 3 . 
Neither the Board nor the Superintendent responded 
to this request. Id. In August of 1992, Mr. Price 
sent another letter asking specifically to be involved 
in every aspect of the redistricting process. Again, 
no response. Stip ]\ 91.

Frustrated by the School Hoard’s unresponsiveness, 
Price contacted the NAACP Redistricting Project in 
Baltimore. The Project developed a partial plan for



•18. i

I’ritv In present to the School Hoard that consisted 
of two majority-black districts. Rtip j| 98. The plan 
did not show the other ten districts that made up the 
Parish. When Price showed this plan to a school dis­
trict official, lie w.as told that the plan was unaccept­
able because it only showed two districts. Price went 
back to the NAACP and a new plan was drawn up.

Then, on September It, 19912, when Price appeared 
on behalf of the black community at a public hearing 
and presented a new plan showing all twelve districts, 
including two majority-black districts, the Hoard dis­
missed it summarily, claiming—incorrectly—that 
they could not consider any plan that split precinct 
lines.'1 Stij> 102.

At its next meeting, on September 17, 1992, with­
out any further consultation with its cartographer 
or attempt to address the concerns of the black com­
munity, the School Hoard passed a motion of intent 
to adopt the Police .11117 plan, which had no majority- 
black districts. At that meeting, Mr. Price again 
presented the NAACP proposal. Stip j| 100. Instead 
of discussing the plan with Mr. Joiner, or asking him 
to further analyze the possibility of drawing black- 
majority districts without splitting precincts (the 
School Hoard’s purported reason for rejecting the 
plan), the Board simply passed the motion of intent 
to adopt the Policy .liny plan at the next School 
Hoard meeting, hi.

One week later, on September 24, 1992, an over­
flow crowd attended a public hearing on the redis­
tricting plan. Fifteen people spoke against the School 
Hoard’s proposed plan, most of whom objected because 
it would dilute minority voting strength. Not a

'See discussion at pa yes 113-141, infra [App., infra. 5(>a- 
57a|.



single person spoke in favor of the plan. Slip j| 108. 
At this hearing, Mr. Price presented the Board with 
a petition signed by more than 500 Bossier Parish 
citizens, asking the Board to consider an alternative 
redistricting plan. Id.

Despite the one-sided input from Bossier citizens, 
and despite the fact that the Board was under no 
time pressure to decide the issue, the Board voted 
one week later to adopt the Police Jury plan. As with 
the meetings of September I! and September 17, the 
Board’s minutes of the October 1, 1005 meeting re­
flect little substantive consideration of the Police Jury 
plan, other than to approve the Police Jury plan as 
quickly as possible.' Board Member Myrick testified 
that the Board adopted the plan that evening because 
it was “expedient.”

The Police Jury plan only became “expedient” 
when the School Board was publicly confronted with 
alternative plans demonstrating that majority-black 
districts could be drawn, and demonstrating that 
political pressure from the black community was 
mounting to achieve such a result. The common-sense 
understanding of these events leads to one conclu­
sion: The Board adopted the Police Jury plan—two 
years before the next election—in direct response to 
the presentation of a plan that created majority-black 
districts. Faced with growing frustration of the black 
community at being excluded from the electoral proc­
ess, the only way for the,School Board to ensure that 
no majority-black districts would be created was to 
quickly adopt the Police Jury plan and put the issue

" For example, the Board seems to have abandoned its con­
cerns about the Police Jury plan pitting incumbents against 
each other.



50a

tn li st. This s< 111n• tic<• nf events of “public silence 
anil private decisions," 1 culminating in the Hoard’s 
hasty decision, is evidence of the Hoard's discrimi- 
natorv purpose.

I).
The fact that the Hoard adopted a plan which de­

parts substantively from its earlier districting plans 
and which ignores factors it has usually considered 
of paramount concern, is probative of discriminatory 
purpose, "particularly if the factors usually con­
sidered important hy the decision-maker strongly 
favor a decision contrary to the one reached." Arlinq- 
tnu Ihii/lils, 12ft II.S. til 267, 07 S.Ct. at Mil. The 
most glaring example is that the adopted plan forced 
incumbents to run against each other. Incumbency 
protection has always, understandably, been a high 
priority for both the Police Jury and School Hoard. 
That wits the reason there were different redistricting 
plans in effect for each entity during the 1080s. That 
was .also the reason the Police Jury refused to con­
duct :i joint redistricting effort with the school board 
after 1 0 0 0 .

Moreover, the phut adopted by the Board contra­
venes other traditional districting principles. For ex­
ample, it creates one district containing almost half 
of the geographic area in the Parish. Stip 1| 110. 
Several of its districts are not compact, according to 
the Hoard's own consultant. Stip 120. In addition, 
the plan creates election districts without any schools 
in them and ignores school attendance boundaries. 
Stip 11 111. Finally, the plan does not respect com-

Def.-lnt. Of. at 'JO.



51a

munitios of interest in Bossier Parish. Stip 135- 
137.

Perhaps if the Board had ignored one or two of 
these standard redistricting criteria, it would not be 
noteworthy, hut when the Board’s plan plainly vio­
lates a whole number of redistricting principles, we 
have further evidence from which to infer that the 
Board's decision was fueled by discriminatory purpose.

Iv
In setting forth the evidentiary categories to be 

evaluated in determining whether invidious purpose 
was a motivating factor, the Supreme Court in Ar- 
linytoii 11eiy hts noted that its listing of such cate­
gories was not exhaustive. 129 U.S. at 2(58. 97 S.Ct. 
at 565. Thereafter, in Royers v. Lodyc, 458 U.S. 613, 
102 S.Ct. 3272, 73 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1982), the Court 
considered additional political and sociological factors 
that underscored the state’s discriminatory purpose. 
In Royers, the Court struck down Burke County, 
Georgia’s at-large election system, holding that it vio­
lated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments be­
cause the state had acted with discriminatory purpose. 
The Court considered important the fact that “linger­
ing effects of past discrimination,” caused socioeco­
nomic disparity between whites and blacks, hi. 458 
U.S. at 626, 102 S.Ct. at 3280 (citations omitted). 
The Court also said that it was important to consider 
the educational disparity between whites and blacks. 
Id. 458 U.S. at 624, 1112 S.Ct. at 3279. Here, it is 
undisputed that black citizens in Bossier Parish suffer 
a markedly lower socioeconomic status than their 
white counterparts, and that the difference is trace­
able to the legacy of racial discrimination in the 
Parish. Stip fl 200.



52a

According to the 1900 Census,* tlie poverty rate 
(nr blacks ( 1 1.7'.' ) is nearly five times the rate for 
whites (9.1'I ). The per capita income of blacks 
($.7,2(10) is only 10',' of that enjoyed by whites 
( $12.9(1(5). The unemployment rate for blacks ape 
1(1 and over (22 Pi ) is nearly four times that for 
whites. The percentage of blacks over 27 without a 
high school degree ( 10.(1',7 ) is over twice the rate of 
whites (1(1.7'; ). Only 1.877- of whites age 27 and 
older have less than a ninth grade education, while 
2 2 .8 '1  of blacks in the same age category have less 
than a ninth grade education. Almost 84% of whites 
27 years or older were at least high school graduates, 
compared to only 78.7'7 of blacks. Also, 1777 of 
whites 27 years or older had at least four years of 
college, compared to only 8.17’!> of blacks. In 1990, 
only 2.977 of the white labor force were unemployed, 
while 9.1', of the black labor force was unemployed. 
Finally, whites are five times as likely to own a ear 
as blacks, a significant fact in a rural parish where 
voting places may lie distant from people’s homes.

It is also undisputed that the depressed socioeco­
nomic and educational levels of blacks within Bossier 
Parish make it hard for them to obtain necessary 
electoral information, organize, raise funds, cam­
paign, register, and turn out to vote, and this in turn 
causes a depressed level of political participation for 
blacks within Bossier Parish. Stip. 1|21,‘). Like the 
state representative in Burke County in /for/ers, the 
School Board members in Bossier Parish “have re­
tained a system which has minimized the ability of 
[Bossier Parish] Blacks to participate in the political

Stip 1;1| 204, 208, 211



system.” 458 IJ.S. at 626, 1(12 S.Ct. at 2280 (cita­
tions omitted).

Tims, the additional factors identified by the Su­
preme Court in lior/crs, are met foursquare in this 
case. As the Court explained in A’oi/crs, “ [n]eces- 
sarily, an invidious discriuiiuatory purpose may often 
be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, 
including the fact, if it is time, that the law bears 
more heavily on one race than another.” 158 U.S. 
at (518, 102 S.Ct. at ,”276 (quoting Wax/iinc/ltm v. 
Davis, 12(5 U.S. at 212, 06 S.Ct. at 2040).

F.
We also have before us statements made by three 

School Hoard members about minority representation 
on the Hoard. School Board member Henry Burns 
said that while he “personally favors having black 
representation on the board, other school board mem­
bers oppose the idea.” U.S.Exh. 10(5 (| 17. School 
Board member Barry Musgrove said that “while he 
sympathized with the concerns of the black commu­
nity, there was nothing more he could do . . . on this 
issue because the Board was ‘hostile’ toward the idea 
of a black majority district.” Id. And School Board 
member Thomas Myrick told Ceorge Brice of the 
NAACB that “he had worked too hard to get [his] 
seat and that he would not stand by and ‘let us t Ake 
his seat away from him.’ ” U.S.Exh. 10(5 (| 2 !t, Exh. 
E]| 1 !).

These statements standing alone would certainly 
be insufficient to show discriminatory purpose. How­
ever, considered in the context of the School Board’s 
discriminatory past, the efforts to preserve segrega­
tion and exclude black representation from the Board,



the si-qui'iuv t'f events leading up to the Board’s deci­
sion, and the anomalous nature of the plan itself, the 
statements add further proof of improper motive. 
While the majority is correct that the statements are 
subject to different interpretations, Maj. Op. at Mi­
lls  | App . xiijini, ::ua-:ila|. given all the evidence 
previously set forth showing discriminatory purpose, 
mill the otl'oi Is of the past lifty years to desegregate 
the schools, it seems fair to conclude that at least 
some School Board Members were openly "hostile" 
to black representation on the school board.”

"'t'lie majority argues that the appointment of Jerome 
Blunt to till a vacant seat on the Board “proved [the Mem­
bers’! lack of hostility to this sort of black representation.” 
Maj.Op. at 117 |App., supra. 30a]. However, Mr. Blunt was 
appointed to represent a district that was only 11 r/r black, and 
bis short tenure on the job was a stark reminder of the highly 
polarized voting in Bossier Parish, see section 11(A), supru. 
Mr. Blunt's chances of reelection were slight, and his short­
lived appointment was a fur-cry from the full tenure of an 
elected black school committee member. The majority notes, 
however, that the "timing and context” of Blunt’s appointment 
indicate that the Board acted for legitimate reasons. Maj. 
Op. at 1 17 (App., supra, 30a]. The facts suggest the opposite. 
Blunt was appointed on September 17, 1992—squarely in the 
middle of the controversy surrounding the redistricting plans 

at the very meeting where the Board adopted a motion of 
intent to adopt the Police Jury plan and after Oeorge Price 
had made his demands for a majority-black district. Certainly, 
Board members knew that adopting the Police Jury plan would 
ignite controversy in the black community. And on the very 
night of that decision, the School Board appointed a black to 
fill a seat that they knew he would be unable hold, hoping to 
cpiell the political furor over adoption of the Police Jury plan.



55a

For all the foregoing reasons, the only conclusion 
that can he drawn from the evidence is that the 
Bossier School Board acted with discriminatory pur­
pose. The adopted plan has a substantial negative 
impact on the black citizens of Bossier Parish. The 
sequence of events leading up to the decision show 
conclusively how the School Board excluded the black 
community I rum the rcdistricling process and rushed 
to adopt the Police Jury plan only when faced with 
an altei native plan that provided for black represen­
tation. The plan itself ignores and overrides a num­
ber of the School Board’s normally paramount inter­
ests. And the statements of some School Board mem­
bers certainly lend strength to the other evidence. 
“Justice is blind; but courts nevertheless do see what 
Ul<'re is clearly to be seen.” "' We cannot blind our­
selves to the reality of the situation and the record 
before us. The Bossier School Board acted with dis­
criminatory purpose in adopting the Police Jurv 
Plan." ' J

10 ljO,ker Airways Limited v. Pan American World Airways, 
508 F.Supp. 811, 81(5 (D.D.C.1983). While .liuljre Hamid 
Greene made this observation in a very different context (an 
antitrust ease), its pithiness and wisdom apply hevond that 
context.

" Because of the paucity of public discussion about the 
Board’s decision (except for those who opposed it), and be­
cause the Board left virtually no legislative history, we can­
not assess the “minutes of its meetings, or reports.” A)limi- 
ton Heights, 42!) ll.S. at 2(18, 1)7 S.Ct. at 5(55. Given the con­
siderable evidence showing discriminatory purpose, however, 
the Board’s failure to document its decisionmaking process 
is certainly suspect.



56a

III.
In the face (if this considerable evidence, the School 

Hoard has offered several reasons for its adoption of 
the Police Jury plan. Keen the majority admits that 
a number of these reasons “clearly were not the real 
reasons," Maj.Op. at 116 n. 14 [App., supra, 27a 
n 1 f»J, the School Hoard lied.

For example, at one point, the School Hoard argued 
that it adopted the Police Jury plan (on October I.
10012) to comply with Shaw v. Reno, -----  IPS. —— ,
11 .'! S.Ct. 2,Sit!, 126 F.Ed.2d 511 (1992) (decided 
June 2S, l!l!).'!), which was decided nine months after 
the Hoard adopted its plan. Although the Hoard does 
not lie as fragrantly [sic] in its remaining rationales, 
they are equally unconvincing.

The School Hoard claims that it could not adopt 
any plan with majority-black districts because such a 
plan would require precinct-splitting, which violates 
state law and would be prohibitively expensive. The 
evidence shows conclusively, however, that throughout 
the redistricting process, the School Board was will­
ing to split precincts to do just that, i.e., to split pre­
cincts so long as it was for the protection of incum­
bents. It was only after the black community pre­
sented its alternative plan that the School Hoard prof­
fered the “no precinct-splitting” rationale.

The majority agrees that when “the School Hoard 
began the redistricting process, it likely anticipated 
th(> necessity of splitting some precincts.” Maj.Op. 
at I 17 | App.. supra, 29a]. The School Hoard hired 
Mr. Joiner at the beginning of the process to develop 
the plan, fully intending that he would split precincts 
(that is why he needed between 200-250 hours to 
complete the job). At the September 5, 1991 School



57a

Board meeting, the first School'Board meeting after 
the Police Jury plan had been precleared by the De­
partment, Mr. Joiner presented proposed maps that 
showed split precincts. Further, it is now undisputed 
by the School Board that splitting precincts does not 
violate state law. While the School Board itself may 
not split precincts, police juries have the authority to 
establish and modify precinct lines, Stip 1|1l 13-23, 
and many do so when requested by a school board. 
The Bossier Parish Police Jury itself created 13 new 
precincts in 19(11, Stip II fit), and the School Board has 
stipulated that the Police Juiy was currently consid­
ering consolidating some of its precincts for other 
reasons. Stip ]i (i 1.

Once again, it was only after lxdng presented with 
the black community's plan, and the possibility of a 
majority-black district in the ensuing election, that 
the Board totally reversed itself and "arrived 
quickly,” Maj.Op. at 117 [App., su/mi, 29a], at the 
conclusion that it was <t(/<ii>ist splitting districts. Nor 
did the School Board voice its concern about loo many 
precinct splits causing higher election costs in its 
initial submission to the Department. II.S. Exh. 102 
at 9 (testimony of Blunt). Moreover, the Board 
never estimated the cost of splitting precincts before 
it voted to adopt the Police Jury plan. Id. Obviously, 
“cost” did not actually motivate the School Board’s 
decision at the time it was made. The focus of our 
inquiry is what motivated the Board cil the lime of 
its derision, not whether post-decision rationales 
would have been legitimate reasons. The Board’s 
excuses on the significant subject of precinct-splitting 
are clearly not justified.

The final reason offered by the School Board is 
that the Police Jury plan guaranteed preclearance,



58a

that is, llii' Department would approve the School 
Hoard's plan because it was identical to the Police 
Jury plan which was precleared on July 29, 1991. it 
is clear, however, that “guaranteed preclearance” 
was not the School Hoard's motive as it began the 
ivdistrieting process, because if so, it would not have 
waited until October 1, 1992—almost 14 months later 
—to adopt the Police Jury plan. If guaranteed pre­
clearance was what the Hoard wanted, it would have 
acted soon after the Police Jury plan was precleared 
by tlii! Justice Department on July 29, 1991. As with 
the precinct-splitting issue, this rationale also sur­
faced only after the School Hoard was faced with 
alternative plans that could conceivably lead to 
majority-black districts and an elected black mem­
ber.' The evidence shows that School Board members 
adopted the Police Jury plan not because it “guaran­
teed preclearance," but because given growing dis­
satisfaction in the black community, it was the only 
way to ensure that there would be no black majority 
dist lifts.

The Hoard's rationales simply do not withstand a 
common-sense reading of the record. Some of the 
rationales are untrue on their face, and others do not 
bear even minimum scrutiny. Most of the alleged

l; It is hard In accept (lie majority’s unduly charitable 
characterization of this decision as nothing more than “an 
understandahle. if not necessarily laudable, retreat from a 
highly charged public debate,” Maj. Op. at 419 [App., uti/irn, 
.8 la I, w hen the evidence shows overwhelmingly that the black 
community was excluded from that public debate. School 
Hoard members did more than simply retreat from a political 
debate; in the guise of "expediency,” I)ep. of Myrick. they 
excluded black citizens from the only process that would allow 
that community to elect a candidate of its choice.



justifications arc absent from the public record, so 
the School Hoard asks us to accept their post-hoc 
rationalizations rather than focus on their motive at 
the time of the decision. “ 11 ]nvidious purpose may 
often he inferred from the totality of the relevant 
facts." Washington r. Paris, 126 1I.S. 22!*. 212, 96 
S.Ct. 211 It), 20 IS.

The evidence is clear that racial purpose was “a 
motivation factor in the [Hoard’s] decision" to adopt 
the Police Jury plan. Arlington Heigh Is, 429 U.S. at 
265-266, 97 S.Ct. at 663 (emphasis added). The 
burden of proof is on the School Hoard to show 
absence of discriminatory purpose, Home r. United 
S la t e s ,  11(1 U.S. ir.6, 1*3 n. IN, 100 S.Ct. 1", IS, 1665 
n. 18, 61 L. 14(1.2(1 lit) (1980), and it has woefully 
failed to satisfy that burden. Its rationales are so 
flagrantly pretextual as to further corroborate the 
conclusion that the School Hoard acted with discrim­
inatory purpose.

IV.
The School Hoard claims that the Supreme Court’s

recent decision in Miller r. Johnson, -----  U.S. ----- ,
115 S.Ct. 2475, 122 E.Kd.2d 762 (1995), precludes 
it from adopting any majority-black districts because 
such districts would constitute “racial gerrymander­
ing” in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. ,The 
School Hoard’s reading of Miller is erroneous for a 
number of reasons.

First, this is simply not a Miller case. We do not 
have any plan with majority-black districts to evalu­
ate, no less a plan where, as in Miller, “race was the 
overriding and predominant force in the districting 
determination.” Id. -----  U.S. at ------, 115 S.Ct. at



2 Is.'). Since the School Hoard chose to adopt the 
Police .Jury plan, it would he sheer speculation on 
the basis of this record to determine whether "race
was the predominant factor motivating," i d . -----
II S at — , llo S.Ct at 218.r>, some other hypothet­
ical rcdistricting plttn. Defendant and Defendanl- 
Intervenors are not even arguing that any particular 
plan should have been adopted by the School Hoard. 
How, in the absence of any concrete plan, can a court 
decide whether a plaintiff has proven that the 
government “subordinated traditional race-neutral 
districting principles, including but not limited to 
compactness, contiguity, [and] respect for political
subdivisions or communities” ? Id . ------ U.S. a t ----- ,
Ilf) S.Ct. at 2188. The court would be speculating, 
and the prohibition against advisory opinions pro­
hibits us from answering such hypothetical legal ques­
tions. See Float r. Cohen, 302 U.S. 83, 0fi-07, 8 8  
S.Ct. 1012, HlhO-r.l, 20 D.Ivl.2d 947 (19(58) (such 
suits lack the “clash of adversary argument exploring 
every aspect of a multifaceted situation embracing 
conflicting and demanding interests” ).

The Court was extraordinarily sensitive in Miller 
“to the complex interplay of forces that enter a legis­
lature’s redistricting calculus.” Miller, -----  U.S.
a t ----- , 11 r» S.Ct. at 2188. It recognized that legis­
latures engaged in this difficult process “will, for 
example, almost always be aware of racial demo­
graphics; but it does not follow that race predomi­
nates in the redistricting process.” Id. (citations 
omitted). The Cotwt also understood the delicate line- 
drawing that fact-finders would have to engage in:

The distinction between being aware of racial
considerations and being motivated by them may



be difficult to make. This evidentiary difficulty, 
together with the sensitive nature of redistricting 
and the |iresumpton of good faitli that must be 
accorded legislative enactments, requires courts 
to exercise extraordinary caution in adjudicating 
claims that a state has drawn district lines on 
the basis of race. The plaintiff’s burden is to 
show, either through circumstantial evidence of a 
district’s shape and demographics or more direct 
evidence going to legislative purpose, that race 
was the predominant factor motivating the legis­
lature’s decision . . .

Id.
It would be impossible, without an actual plan, 

without “circumstantial evidence of a district’s shape 
and demographics,” without a showing that “the legis­
lature subordinated traditional race-neutral district­
ing principles . . .  to racial considerations,” for a 
court to make the informed and sophisticated judg­
ment called for by the Supreme Court in Miller. If 
and when the School Hoard does adopt a plan with 
one or more majority-black districts, the court may 
then determine whether that plan violates Miller.

Second, the Court made clear in Miller by its 
repeated citations to and discussion of Arlington 
Heights, that it was not altering the legal standard 
by which we assess violations of Section 5. See, e.g.,
Miller,-----  IJ.S. a t ----- , 115 S.Ct. at 2187 (quoting
Arlington Heights for proposition that in purpose 
inquiry, courts must look at impact and “other evi­
dence of race-based decisionmaking” ). See also id.
-----  IJ.S. a t ------, 115 S.Ct. at 2183. Plaintiffs must
still prove the absence of discriminatory purpose, 
applying the standards set forth in Arlington Heights



62.i

Mini related cases in the voting rights area, such as 
Mnhilt r. Holden, t 1C II.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. M!>0 . til 
I, led.2d 17 (198(1) and Royers v. Lodge, 158 II.S. 
(ill!, 102 S.Ct. 2272. As the evidence shows, the 
School Hoard has made no such showing. The School 
Hoard would, through its reading of Miller, essen­
tially undercut the vitality of Arlington Heights in a 
Section 5 case. That was not the intent of the Su­
preme Court.

Third, assuming nrgnendo, the existence of some 
hypothetical plan which contains one or more 
majority-black districts (we do not know which since 
we do not have a plan before us), the record makes 
clear that it is possible to draw at least one such 
district in Bossier Parish, consistent with Miller and
Show r. Reno,----- IJ.S. ------113 S.Ct. 2810, 125
E.Ed.2d 511 (I9H3). By affirming the race-conscious 
California redistricting plan in DeWitt v. Wilson, 
850 F.Supp. MOD (E.D.Cal. 1994) (decided the same
day as Miller), a/I’d -----  II.S. ------, 115 S.Ct. 2037,
132 I,.Ed.2d 870 ( 1995), the Supreme Court made 
clear that considering race in redistricting, by itself, 
does not automatically trigger strict scrutiny. In 
Pi 'Witt, the district court found that the California 
plan “evidences a judicious and proper balancing of 
the many factors appropriate to redistricting, one of 
which was the consideration of the application of the 
Voting Rights Act's objective of assuring that minor­
ity voteis are not denied the chance to effectively in- 
fluonee the political process.” 85fi F.Supp. at 1113-11.

As noted earlier, Miller recognizes that “traditional 
race-neutral districting principles [such as) compact­
ness, contiguity, and ‘•■cspect for poliLica 1 subdivisions'
. . . can defeat a claim that a district has been gerry-



mandered on racial lines." Miller,----- U.S. at — —,
ll.r> S.t't. at 2 1SS (citations omitted). As discussed 
in detail above, spc Section 11(D), supr<i, (lie alter­
native plans presented to the School Hoard and this 
court do rely upon "traditional districting principles.” 
The districts in the illustrative plans are contiguous, 
reasonably compact, and respect communities with ac­
tual shared interests. See Testimony of Price; Testi­
mony of Hawkins: Stip ,!< 181-95. Moreover, at least 
one of the alternative plans would unite a predomi­
nantly black residential area, which is split under the 
Hoard's plan. "|\V]hen members of a racial group 
live together in one community, a reapportionment 
plan that concentrates members of the group in one 
district and excludes them from others may reflect 
wholly legitimate purposes.” Shaw r. Reno, —— U.S.
a t ___ , IP! S.Ct. at 282(5 (199!!). Thus, assuming
these districts existed—and they do not—the School 
Board could not meet its burden under Miller to 
show that race rather than traditional districting 
principles was the predominant force.

For all of these reasons, the School Hoard's reliance 
on Miller r. Johnson is unpersuasive.

V.
The evidence in this case demonstrates overwhelm­

ingly that the School Hoard’s decision to adopt the 
Police Jury redistricting plan was motivated by dis­
criminatory purpose. The adoption of the Police Jui'y 
plan bears heavily on the black community because it 
denies its members a reasonable opportunity to elect 
a candidate* of their choice. The history of discrim­
ination by the Hossier School System and the Parish 
itself demonstrates the* Board’s continued refusal to



add less tile toiKcins mI the black community in Bos­
sier Parish. The sequence of events leading up to the 
adoption of the plan illustrate the Board’s discrimina­
tory purpose. The School Board’s substantive depar­
tures fiom traditional districting principles is simi­
larly probative of discriminatory motive. Three 
School Board members have acknowledged that the 
Board is hostile to black representation. Moreover, 
some of the purported rationales for the School 
Board’s decision are flat-out untrue, and others are 
so glaringly inconsistent with the facts of the case 
that they are obviously pretexts.

Sometimes we need to step back and look at first 
principles. Congress passed the Voting Rights Act 
to combat the “unremitting and ingenious defiance of 
the Constitution” by several states, South Carolina v. 
Katznihach, 383 U.S. 301, 309, 86 S.Ct. 803, 808, 
Louisiana among them. The Bossier School Board 
continues to resist the Constitution, through its in­
genious, if subtle, discrimination against the black 
citizens of Bossier parish. We are long past the point 
where discrimination can be easily proven by use of 
racial epithets, racial categories or openly exclusion­
ary voting requirements. “The Voting Rights Act 
was aimed at the subtle, as well as the obvious, state 
regulations w hich have the effect of denying citizens 
their right to vote because of their race.” Allen r. 
Slate Hoard of Klri tinns, 393 U.S. .r>M, ,r>6.r>, 89 S.Ct. 
817, 831, 22 L.Kd.2d 1 (1968). In this case, the 
School Board’s decision to adopt the Police Juiy plan 
was a thinly-veiled effort to deny black voters a mean­
ingful opportunity for representation on the School 
Board.



(>5;i

The himlen is on the School Board to show lack of 
discriminatory purpose. Because the School Board’s 
proffered reasons are pretextual, it has not met its 
burden under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 
and its roi|Ucst for pre-clearance must he denied.

Nov. 2, 1!)%
Date



APPENDIX II

[ Filed A pi 7. I pp.'i |

IN' Till; UNTIFD STATFS DISTRICT COURT
m i :  t iik  n i s i  imct o f  Co l u m b ia

Ci\ il Art ion Nn. 91-1 19!)
(I,IIS ( l ISC’A), CRR, (IK)

19 'ssi kk I ’a ims 11 Sciiooi. Hoard, p la in t iff

p.

.Janet Reno, defendant 

and

(I forme I’rice, ft ae., defendants-intervenors

FINAL STIPULATIONS OF FACT AND LAW
The parties in the nhove-captioned ease respect fully 

submit the following stipulations of fact and law.

STIPULATIONS OF FACT 

lhtcktinnnul. Mi llnnl nf Ela tion, nvd Dcmofiraphicn

1. Bossier Parish is located in northwest Louisi­
ana, bordered at the north by the State of Arkansas. 
The parish seal is Benton, hut the major city is Bos­
sier City. Benton is in the notherern part of the



67a

parish, and Mossier City is in the smith-central por- 
t imi.

2. The I! ussier 1'arish School District, which is 
coterminous with Mossier Parish, is the only school 
district in Mossier Parish.

Mossier Parish is governed by a police jury, 
which consists of twelve police jurors elected in non­
partisan elections from single-member districts to 
four-year, concurrent terms with a majority vote 
requirement.

I. The Mossier Parish School District is governed 
by a school board, which consists of twelve members 
elected in nonpartisan elections from single-member 
districts to four-year, , concurrent terms with a 
majority vote requirement. No black person ever has 
been elected to the Mossier Parish School Hoard.

f>. According to the 195)0 Census, Mossier Parish 
bad a total population of 8(5,088 of whom (55,812 
(7(5.15 percent) were non-Hispanic white persons and 
17,301 (20.1 percent) were non-Hispanie black per­
sons.

6. According to the 195)0 Census, Mossier Parish 
had a total voting age population of (50,5)0 1 of whom 
48,130 (79.03 percent) were non-Hispanie white per­
sons and 10,72(5 (17.(51 percent) were non-Hispanie 
black persons.

7. According to the 15)80 Census, Mossier Pahish
had a total population of 80,721 of whom (53,127 
(78.2 percent) were non-H ispanic white persons and 
15,021 (18.(51 percent) were non Hispanic black
persons.

8. According to the 15)80 Census. Mossier Parish 
had a total voting age population of 51,545 of w'hom 
43,(520 (79.5)7 percent) were non-Hispanie white per-



68a

sons ami 6.-'! I a (IT (IS percent) were non-Hispanic
Mack.

•I. There are four municipalities located in Mossier 
Parish: Menton (the parish seat), Mossier City,
11; 111 u I > t < > 11 and Plain Dealing (one very small portion 
of the City of Shreveport is also located in Mossier 
I 'a rish I.

In. According to the 1990 Census, Mossier City 
had a total population of 52,721 persons, of whom 
!l, Ilk! (17.65', ) were non-Hispanic hlack persons. 
Mossier City had a total voting age population of 
IS7,155, of whom 5,(556 (15.11 C ) were non-Hispanic 
hlack persons. Thus, more than 50 percent of the 
hlack population of Mossier Parish is concentrated 
within the City of Mossier. The remainder is concen­
trated in the areas of Menton (2,047 residents, of 
whom II.:’ percent are non-Hispanic black persons); 
Plain Dealing (1,071 residents, of whom 33.0 percent 
are non-Hispanic black persons); Haughton (1,0(51 
residents, of whom 1(51, or 27.9 percent are non- 
Hispanic hlack persons); and the unincorporated 
community of Princeton (035 persons, of whom 500, 
or 73.5', are non-Hispanic hlack persons).

Si i ' m u  •"> /  ‘i < i h ii i mu  c  lii ricir

11. On May 23, 1991, the Mossier Parish Police 
Jury submitted its 11191 redistricting plan to the De­
partment of Justice for preclearance under Section 5 
of the Voting Mights Act, 12 U.S.C. 1973c. The plan 
featured twelve single-member districts, all twelve of 
which had a majority of white persons. During the 
1990-1991 Police Jury redistricting process leading up 
to the preclearance submission, no alternative plan 
featuring Mack-majority districts had been presented.



An April 30, 1991 letter detailing complaints regard­
ing the redistricting process from the Concerned Citi­
zens of flossier Parish, a local black organization, was 
not included in the preclearance submission. In a 
letter dated July.29, 1991, the Department of Justice 
precleared the Police Jury plan.

12. On January 1, 1993, the Bossier Parish School 
Board submitted its redistricting plan to the Justice 
Department for preclearance review. The plan sub­
mitted was identical to the Police Jury plan precleared 
in 1991. During the 1991-1992 redistricting process 
leading up to that submission, an alternative plan was 
presented which demonstrated that two black-majority 
districts could in fact be drawn within Bossier Parish. 
During that same period of time, police jury elections 
occurred under the new police jury redistricting plan 
which shed light on voting patterns within Bossier 
Parish. In a letter dated August 30, 1993, the Justice 
Department objected to the School Board plan.

Redifttr icthifj in liossicr I ’arish, Louisiana

13. Louisiana state law provides that the parish 
governing body has the authority to draw, cut, or con­
solidate election precjncts. In Bossier Parish, that 
body is the Police Jury. State law also provides that 
precincts must he wholly contained within a police 
jury or oilier election district.

14. Pursuant to the relevant state laws in effect 
at the time, the parish police jury was to draw its 
redistricting plan (where necessary due to popula­
tion shifts and the one-person, one-vote requirement) 
in 1991, making what precinct adjustments were 
necessary to accomplish that redistricting. Once police 
jury districts and election precincts were drawn by



70a

the police jury, the parish school board would be 
able to conduct its own redistricting (if necessary).

If). State law further provided that police juries 
could not subdivide precincts during 1991, except for 
subdivisions occasioned by redistricting, which could 
be adopted during a 15-day “window” between April 
1 1991 and May 15, 1991. Louisiana R.S. 18:5:12.1
l i d ) .

lti. Louisiana Revised Statutes 18:5112.1 H (2) al­
lows a parish to divide a precinct into two or more 
precincts by visible features which are census tabula­
tion boundaries during April 1, 1991 through May 
15, 1991.

17. Louisiana Revised Statutes 18:532.1 H(2)(d) 
provides that if the Department of Justice should ob­
ject to a parish reapportionment plan, then that par­
ish may divide a precinct into two or more precincts 
by visible features which are census tabulation boun­
daries “in order to satisfy said objections of the De­
partment of Justice.”

18. There are no requirements for minimum popu­
lations in a precinct, either by total population, voting 
age population, or registered voters.

19. State law further provided that after redis­
tricting in 1991, parishes could not consolidate pre­
cincts until January 1, 1993. Louisiana R.S. 18:532.1 
11( 2 ) .

20. Pursuant to the same statutory scheme, school 
hoards in Louisiana normally would redistrict after 
the police jury. Where, as in Bossier Parish, school 
boards bad the same number of seats as the police 
jury in a particular parish, that school board could 
not change, split or consolidate the precincts estab-



71a

lished by the police jury, but instead had to use those 
precincts as units for redistricting.

21. Louisiana Revised Statutes, Title 17, Section 
71.3 K(1) and (2) reads as follows:

“ 17. (1) The boundaries of any election district 
for a new apportionment plan from which mem­
bers of a school board are elected shall contain 
whole precincts established by the parish govern­
ing authority under R.S. 18:532 or 532.1.
(2) (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of R.S. 
17:71(17) (1) or any other law to the contrary, 
if a school board is unable to meet the federal 
guideline of plus or minus live percent deviation 
in the creation of its reapportionment plan 
through the use of whole precincts, the school 
hoard may, in the creation of its reapportionment 
plan, divide a precinct into portions which are 
hounded by visible features which are census tab­
ulation boundaries. No such precinct shall be 
divided into more than two school hoard districts. 
No school board district shall contain more than 
two divided precincts.

(b) The provisions of this Paragraph shall be 
applicable only in cases in which the number of 
members of the school board is not e<|tial to the 
number of members of the parish governing au­
thority of the parish in which the school hoard 
is domiciled.

(c) The provisions of this Paragraph shall not 
be construed as authority for a school hoard 
which has adopted or accomplished reapportion- 
ment or is able to reapportion itself using whole 
precincts to divide precincts. Any plan adopted



72a

by a school board in contravention of this Sub­
section shall be null and void.

(d) The provisions of this Paragraph shall 
become null and void on December 31, 1992, un­
less a school board received an objection letter 
to its 1 ̂ apportionment plan from the Department 
of Justice. In such event the school board shall 
use the provisions of this Paragraph to satisfy 
the objections of the Department of Justice if 
said objections would require a precinct to be 
divided and the provisions of this Paragraph 
shall be null and void after such reapportionment 
is complete.”

22. Nonetheless, it is quite common for parish 
school boards in Louisiana, even those with the same 
number of members as their parish police jury, to 
draw redistricting plans different from the respective 
police jury redistricting plans. For example, of the 
nine school board redistricting plans drawn by plain- 
tilfs expert Gary Joiner in which the school board 
and police jury had the same number of members, 
five have different plans. Indeed, Bossier Parish had 
different redistricting plans for its school board and 
police jury throughout the 1980s.

23. Moreover, school boards redistricting during 
the early 1990s were always free to request precinct 
changes from the Police Jury necessary to accomplish 
their redistricting goals. In fact, the DeSoto Parish 
and Vernon Parish School Boards employed this 
method successfully during their recent redistrictings. 
Joiner testified at deposition that such a practice ‘‘is 
not unheard of, it has been done in other places.”

21. School boards and police juries have different 
needs and different reasons for redistricting, and thus



73a

have legitimate reasons for drawing different redis­
tricting plans. For example, police juries are con­
cerned with road maintenance, drainage, and in some 
cases garbage collection, and the level of demand for 
such services in each district is a concern. School 
board members, by contrast, are typically concerned 
with having a public school or schools in each district. 
The current (1991) Bossier Parish Police Jury plan 
does not have a public school in each district.

25. Louisiana Revised Statutes, Title 17, Section 
71.3 E ( l )  and (2) is racially neutral. Its purpose 
is solely to promote electoral uniformity and sta­
bility.'

Bossier Parish Police Jury History and Ri districting 
Process

26. Incumbency protection considerations come 
into play in the redistricting of the Bossier Parish 
Police Jury, and did so in 1982. Incumbency pro­
tection has always been a consideration for the Police 
Jury. Among the primary redistricting criteria em­
ployed by the Police Jury during the 1980s redis­
tricting process were one-person, one-vote considera­
tions and respecting each incumbent’s wishes regard­
ing the configuration of his own district. According 
to Police Juror James Elkins and then-Parish Admin­
istrator James Ramsey, incumbency protection also 
was the reason the Parish Police Jury and School 
Board chose different redistricting plans in the 1980s.

27. Jerome Darby, who is black, was elected to the 
Police Jury in 1983. He currently is serving his 
third term as a Police Juror.

1 The defendant and defendant-intervenors do not dispute 
this assertion, but maintain tha t  it is irrelevant.



74a

28. The Police Jury lias a President and Vice 
President, wlm are elected from among the Police 
Jury memhers to one-year terms. For at least sev­
eral decades, it has been the custom that the Vice 
President ascends to the Presidency upon the vote of 
the full Police Jury. Police Juror Burford testified 
at deposition that such a succession is “almost auto­
matic.” Even when a sitting President took the rare 
step of running for reelection to the Presidency, the 
police Jury followed the tradition of voting the Vice 
President into the Presidency. In the last 20 years, 
every white sitting Vice President eligible to serve 
as a Police Juror the following year has been elevated 
to the Presidency.

21*. Jerome Darby is the only black Police Juror 
ever to serve as Vice President. In January 1991, 
the Police Jury voted not to elevate Darby to the 
Presidency. This occurred just a few months before 
tbe adoption of the 11)91 Police Jury redistricting 
plan.

20. Paul Caplis, a sitting Police Juror at that time, 
has testified at deposition that Darby was passed 
over for tbe Presidency “solely because he was black.” 
Bob Burford, also on the Police Jury at that time, 
describes the Police Jury vote to deny Darby the 
Presidency as a “miscarriage of justice” which con­
stituted “failing to recognize him as an equal.” Asked 
why he thought the majority of Police Jurors Voted 
against Darby, Burford replied that, although none 
of Darby's opponents explicitly told Burford so, Bur­
ford “thought it was because be was black.” Burford, 
in fact, has served as President though he has served 
less time on the Police Jury than Darby. Indeed,



every Police Juror elected to office in 1 J)83 or before 
has become President, except Jerome Darby.

dl. There are other indications that the Police 
Jury operated in an atmosphere of racial prejudice. 
For example, in response to a deposition question, 
Police Juror “Pete” (llorioso identified the Sin ('report 
Times as the newspaper with the largest circulation 
in the area: when asked to identify tho newspaper 
read most widely by blacks, he answered, “ [A]ny one 
that they could get free.” He further added that 
“some papers throw away free papers,” and that at 
one time the Mossier Press “threw all the freo papers 
to every household.”

32. United States Idxhihit 1 lists the members of 
the Bossier Parish Police Jury, and their correspond­
ing districts, at the time of the 1990-1991 redistrict­
ing process. James Elkins was President at that 
time. Except for Jerome Darby, (‘very Police Juror 
at that time was white.

33. At the November 13, l!)f)0 meeting of the 
Bossier Parish Police Jury, the Jury authorized a 
contract with Gary Joiner of Petroleum Graphics to 
develop a redistricting plan. Mr. Joiner had been 
interviewed by Parish Administrator James Ramsey, 
who had arranged for Joiner to make a presentation 
to the Police Jury. Ramsey told Joiner that Joiner 
was required to “work with twelve members" of the 
Police Jury, by which he meant that Joiner had to 
be responsive to their concerns. To that end, Ramsey 
suggested that Joiner begin his work by holding one- 
on-one meetings with individual Police Jurors, at 
which each Juror could give Joiner input regarding 
the changes to be made to bis own district.



7(1.1

III. Police Jurors wcri' aware of the black popula­
tion pciventages in tlic districts under the redistrict­
ing plan proposed and adopted in 1991. Under the 
plan finally adopted, one district (District 7) is 111 
percent black in total population, and .another (1)is- 
I riel I ) is 15 pet cent black.

•'!o. No member of the Police Jury ever asked tlary 
•loinei if il were possible to adjust district lines in 
cither of those districts to raise the black percentage 
to a level over fit) percent.

lid. At the time of the 1990-1991 redistricting 
process, some Police Jurors were specifically aware 
that a contiguous black-majority district could be 
drawn both in northern Bossier Parish and in Bossier 
City. At the time of the 1990-1991 redistricting proc­
ess, il was obvious that a reasonably compact black- 
majority district could be drawn within Bossier City. 
“Contiguous” here means that all units of geography 
in the district have some common border with some 
adjacent unit.

”7. During the 1990-1991 redistricting process, 
Police Jurors had a general understanding that the 
Voting Rights Act requires jurisdictions to create 
districting plans which fairly reflect black voting 
strength.

158. During the 1990-1991 redistricting process, 
Police Jurors were aware that election precincts could 
he split by district lines for a number of reasons, 
including (a) compliance with one person, one vote 
and (b) compliance with the Voting Rights Act. 
Dining the 1990-1991 redistricting process, Police 
Jurors were told by Joiner at public Police Jury meet­
ings that they could split election precinct lines. They 
also were aware that the plan they adopted in 1991 
split precincts. At the April 30, 1991 public Police



77a

.Jury meeting at which the final redisti iding plan 
was adopted, Gary Joiner told the Police Jury mem­
bers that “approximately 10” precincts were split in 
the plan. Precinct realignments are a normal practice 
within Mossier Parish, occurring every three or four 
years. Mossier Parish has made a number of such 
precinct realignments within the last ten years.

While one of the redistricting criteria set by 
the Police Jury during the 1990-1001 redistricting 
process was the inclusion of minority input, the sole 
black Police Juror, Jerome Darby, initially was ex­
cluded from the Reapportionment Committee. At the 
December f>, 1990 meeting of the Police Jury’s Fi­
nance Committee, a Technical Advisory Reapportion­
ment Committee was selected to work with Cary 
Joiner on redistricting, (liven Mr. Joiner's previous 
emphasis on inclusion of minority input as a redis­
tricting criterion, Police Juror Jerome Darby consid­
ered it likely that if the redistriding standards were 
followed, he, as the sole black Police Juror, would be 
included on the Committee. Indeed, at that time, 
Darby had recently attended a reapportionment semi­
nar in Monroe, Louisiana. No member of the Com­
mittee (other than Joiner) had attended such a 
seminar.

40. Police Juror Hammack moved that the com­
mittee consist of a representative from the District 
Attorney’s office, the Registrar of Voters, the Tax 
Assessor, Mr. Ramsey (the Parish Administrator), 
two jurors (Mr. Caplis as the rural representative 
and Mr. Rurford as the city representative) and Mr. 
Joiner. All of these individuals were white. Upon a 
vote of ten ayes to one nay, the motion carried. Mr. 
Darby, the only black member of the Police Jury,



voted a g a in s t  th e m otion .  D a r by fidt p e rso n a illy in-
su i tedI by h is  ( Nelli sion f ro m  th e  C om m ittee ' .

II At th e  full Police J u r y  m e e t in g  five d a y s  l a t e r
on 1'i 'c e in b e r  11, 1990, a f t e r  b lack  P o lice  J u r o r D a rb y
proto?d( (1 b is  OM'lt isimi f ro m  th e  C o m m it te e  a:? a de-
ninl iif "e i |l ia l rep i e s e u ta t i o n , " th e  Police  J u r ; V voted
to i lie h ide  D a rb y  | dlls one  o thei J u r o r ,  J a m e s E lk in s ,
Oil tille ( ’ollllllit tee. K lk ins  te s t i f ied  a t  depositic m th a t
lie h a s  "n o  e a r t h l y  i d e a ” w hy th e  J u r y  voted to re-
sp en d to D a r b y 's  r ccpiest by p la c in g  E lk in s ,  as well as
D a rb y ,  on th e  C o m m it te e .

IT T h e  follow in g  c h a r t  n ■fleets th e  p o p u la t io n
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  as o f  th e  1990 C e n s u s  o f  th e Police
J ii ry d i s t r i c t i n g  p lan  a d o p te d  in th e  1980s:
District Total Pop Deviation Black Pop. 1Slack rb

1 10,108 10.90% 1,845 18.25
*> 10,099 ■10.77% 1,423 14.09
a 7,906 10.20% 1,889 23.89
t 6,151 -  14.22% 2,833 46.03
r> 7,569 5.50 % 922 12.18
t; 10,515 16.98% 954 9.04
7 5,278 26.43 %> 2,749 52.04
8 5,776 19,19% 801 13.86
!) 6,895 1.73% 1,262 18.46

to 5,615 21.31% 1,801 31.90
11 •1,989 30,54% 539 10.81
12 5,185 27.73% 363 7.00

None of the Police Jury districts was majority black 
in voting ago population in 1990. Following the in­
structions of the Police Jury, Gary Joiner used the 
1980s as a starting point for drawing a new redis- 
trioting plan. The Police July’s goal was to change 
that plan as little as possible to adjust for population 
shifts and keep the mean population deviations of the 
districts below plus or minus five percent. Hy chang-



79a

ing his own district as little as possible, each Police 
Juror hoped to retain constituents familiar with him, 
thus maximizing his chances for reelection.

■Pi. Protection of incumbents played a critical role 
in the 1990-1991 redistricting of the Police Jury. As 
a general matter, district lines were changed so that 
they came between the residences of Police Jurors, 
and incumbency was always a consideration. Incum­
bency considerations were behind the Police July’s 
rejection of the School Hoard's suggestion in 1990 that 
the bodies hold joint redistricting processes. During 
the 1990-1991 Police Jury redistricting process, the 
boundary between Districts 11 and 12 was deliber­
ately drawn in such a way as to prevent incumbents 
Hammack and Elkins from residing within the same 
district. Hammack also asked Police Juror Caplis 
to agree to change the lines separating their districts 
so that a potential candidate, Eddie Shell, would be 
placed in an open district (caused by the retirement 
of one of the incumbents) rather than in Hammack’s 
district; Caplis agreed to accommodate Hammack, 
and the change was made. Police Juror Burford’s 
district boundary was deliberately moved across Old 
Minden Road in Bossier City to ensure that Burford 
was not placed in the same district with Brad Cum­
mings, a potential opponent. Several Police Jurors 
discussed election precinct realignments with Voter 
Registrar William Johnston, but the Police Jurors 
were most concerned with the configuration of pre­
cincts within their own individual districts. The 1991 
Police Jury plan protected all incumbents who in­
tended to run for reelection by keeping their resi­
dences in separate districts.

44. At the January 15, 1991 meeting of the Bos­
sier Paiish Police Jury, Mr. Joiner presented each



80 a

Police .Iniin- with a ipiestionnaire ami asked that each 
of them complete it, milking notations of items to tie 
addressed during reapportionment. He also told the 
members of his plan to interview each member indi­
vidually and as a group in several open meetings.

in. Between the January 15, 1991 meeting and 
the final adoption of the Police .Jury plan on April .'SO, 
1991, each of the twelve Police Jurors met with Cary 
Joiner in Joiner’s office to view proposed redistricting 
plans on Joiner's redistricting computer. Present at 
each meeting were Joiner and from one to three Police 
Jurors. The intent of the meetings was to find out 
if any incumbents had concerns with their own dis­
tricts. To that end. Joiner encouraged groups id' in­
cumbents who lived in neighboring districts to come 
to him so that their concerns as incumbents could he 
worked out together. At these meetings, each Police 
Juror focused primarily on the configuration of his 
own district. These meetings with Joiner were not 
open to the public.

10. The 1990-1991 redistricting process thus took 
place in two phases. The first was a closed phase in 
which individual Police Jurors met with Joiner to 
discuss the plan, and Joiner devised a proposed plan 
with which all Police Jurors could agree. This phase 
took place away from public scrutiny. Once the 
Jurors agreed on a plan, the plan would be shown 
to the public. Except for some minor changes dis­
cussed at a Police Jury meeting on the day the plan 
was adopted, the plan agreed upon by the Police Ju­
rors during the closed phase of the process was iden­
tical to the plan ultimately adopted.

■17. Black Police Juror Jerome Darby met once 
with Joiner in Joiner’s office a few weeks before the 
plan’s final passage. By the time Darby met with



Joiner, Joiner already had met with almost all the 
other Jurors and had drawn the proposed plan. 
Joiner told Darby that, under the proposed plan, 
there was a possibility for three minority individuals 
to be elected to the Police Jury. Joiner also told 
him at that time that the proposed plan was the best 
that could possibly be drawn for blacks in Bossier 
Parish, and that it was impossible to draw a black- 
majority district.

48. During this time period, school board member 
Tom Myrick also met several times with Joiner in 
Joiner’s office, accompanied by one or more police 
jurors. Myrick lives near Benton, in an area close 
to a heavy concentration of black population. This 
area would likely be included in any majority-black 
district to he drawn in the northern part of Bossier 
Parish.

49. The result of the private meetings with Joiner 
were maps of proposed redistricting plans which were 
presented for public review at public meetings held 
by the Police Jury. The proposed maps were made 
available for inspection by the public at the Police 
Jury office, but not until the day of the public meet­
ing. No extra copies of these maps were available 
for members of the public to take home with them. 
Joiner stated that the Police Jury’s common proce­
dure was to allow members of the public to make 
their own copies. The map of the proposed plan 
on display at the public meetings which was ulti­
mately adopted was too large to be copied.

50. These public meetings were held at 2:00 p.m. 
on weekdays, when many black residents of the par­
ish were at work. Black citizens previously bad asked 
that these Police Jury meetings take place at night, 
but those requests were not granted.



8 2 a

51. The |iul)lic meetings wore advertised in one 
newspaper. The Police Jury instructed its stair to 
place advertisements in the “minority media.” The 
Police Jury, however, placed advertisements only in 
the /dossier Trihnnc, its usual legal advertiser. The 
Horsier Trilnnic is not a widely read newspaper in 
Mossier Parish, and is not part of “minority media.”

52. The first public Police .Jury meeting to dis­
cuss proposed redistricting plans was held on April 
!), 1991. Mr. Joiner presented three plans during this 
meeting. The data revealed that the ideal population 
for a Police Jury district is 7,174. None of the plans 
had a Mack-majority district. Mr. Joiner represented 
that the black population was not sufficiently con­
centrated in the parish to draw even one hlack- 
majority district. Mr. Joiner further informed the 
Police Jury that subdividing precincts would he per­
missible from April 1, 1991 through May 15, 1991. 
According to Joiner, the Police Jury likely was pre­
viously aware of this fact; the Jury was a member 
of the statewide Police Jury Association (which 
lobbied to get this statutory “window” approved) 
and was thus in “constant communication” with the* 
Baton Rouge election office.

5J. At the April 25, 1991 Bossier Parish Police 
Jury meeting, (lary Joiner presented three plans to 
the Police Jury. Those alternative plans drawn by 
Joiner were called Plan 5, Plan 8, and Plan 9. A 
number of members of the black community attended 
and asked about the creation of a black-majority dis­
trict. Joiner stated that the wide distribution of 
blacks in the parish made a black-majority district 
“statistically impossible.” At deposition, Joiner ac­
knowledged that he knew at that time that drawing 
two black-majority districts within Bossier Parish



83a

was “statistically” possible, in that you could create 
two majority-black districts at a census block level 
with the correct population, ignoring precinct con­
siderations.

54. Police Jurors responded to questions regarding 
a black-majority district at the April 25, l!)t)l meet­
ing. To repeated questions suggesting the possibility 
of creating a black-majority district, Police Jurors 
would impatiently snap, “Don’t you understand? We 
already told you it can’t he done!”, or words to that 
effect. Police Juror Ulorioso demanded, “Why are 
you asking for this? You’re already being repre­
sented adequately!”

r,.r). Black resident Oetavia Coleman, on behalf of 
a number of the black attendees, asked for a copy of 
the map of Joiner’s proposed plan. Joiner said that 
the display map he had was too large to copy, and 
that residents would have to come down to the Police 
Jury office to see it.

56. A number of black attendees asked about the 
creation of a black-majority district based in the 
town of Haughton. In response, Joiner pointed out 
that moving the (heavily black) Princeton area into 
District 4 (43 percent black under the adopted plan), 
which includes Plain Dealing, would cause “the prob­
lem” that telephone sendee would be long distance 
within that district. Under the plan ultimately 
adopted, however, District I includes both Plain Deal­
ing and an area adjacent to the corporate limit of 
Benton, and telephone service is long distance be­
tween these two towns. The Police Jury did not ex­
plore the subject of a black-majority district any fur­
ther at the April 25, 1991 meeting. Upon Police 
Juror Whittington’s motion, the Police Jury decided 
that Plan 9 would be studied further and pursued



8 la

as a final plan fur adoption at the April ito. 1991 
meeting.

r»7. In 1991, there was no legal impediment to the 
drawing of Mark-majority districts in the Mossier 
Parish Police.Jury redistricting plan.

58. At the April do. 1991 meeting o f  the Mossier 
Parish Police Jury, Mr. Joiner presented “Plan !)” 
to th e  m e m b e rs .  Mr. Joiner made two changes to 
Plan i) after the April 25, 19!) 1 meeting. Neither of 
the changes were in response to the concerns raised 
by black residents at prior meetings, nor were they 
made to increase electoral opportunities for black 
voters in the parish. The Police Jury minutes re­
flect that the 1990 Census population statistics for 
Plan 9 are:
District Total Pop. Deviation Black Pop. Black fl

1 7.272 2 c/c 2,056 27.89
2 7,181 4% 737 9.85
a (1,817 1 f t 1,728 25.24
1 0,919 3 f t 3,122 41.93
5 7,5(il 5 ft 734 9.71
f, 7,111 3 f t 274 3.08
7 0,992 'l c/c 3,008 13.88
8 6,899 3 ft 1,471 21.32
9 7,219 mrf 1,000 13.85

10 7,152 3 ft 2,004 20.89
11 7,019 2ff 504 7.18
12 0,850 1'f 003 8.80

However, Joiner testified at deposition that the actual 
figures are different, and that the total deviation 
range of Plan 9 as ultimately adopted by the Police 
Jury is 11.75 percent



85a

59. The plan submitted by the Bossier Parish Po­
lice Jury to the Justice Department for preclearance 
was as follows: :
District Total Pop. Deviation Black Pop. Black %

1 7,187 0.18% 2,009 28.8
2 7,129 3.55% 728 9.8
3 <1,851) 1. 13 % 1,737 25.3
1 <;,*)():$ 3.78% 3,120 15.2
5 7,007 0.04% 734 9.6
6 7,441 3.76% 274 3.7
7 0,992 -2.54% 3,068 43.9
8 6,899 - 3.83% 1,471 21.3
9 7,219 0.63% 1,080 15.0

10 7,452 3.88% 2,004 26.9
11 7,019 2.16% 504 7.2
12 7,081 1.30% 592 8.4
60. Precinct lines also were discussed at the April

30, 1991 meeting. Joiner informed the Police Jury 
that the proposed final plan, through splitting existing 
precincts, created 13 new voting precincts and thus 
increased administrative costs for elections. Joiner 
had discussed the number of precinct cuts occasioned 
by his proposed plans earlier in the redistricting 
process.

(51. At the April 30 meeting, however. Joiner also 
informed them that precinct changes could be made 
after January 1, 1993 so as to consolidate some pre­
cincts and thus reduce administrative costs. In fact, 
according to Joiner, in his private meetings with 
Police Jurors, and with School Board member Myrick, 
the redistricting was discussed “in the hopes of con-

2 The plan submitted by die Police Jury lo the Justice De­
partment ditfered slightly from the plan reflected in (lie April 
30, 1991 Police Jury minutes. The differences are not material 
to this case.



86a

solidating" precincts, and the Bossier Parish Police 
Jury is at the present time considering implementing 
such consolidations. This anticipation of consolidating 
precincts as soon as practicable existed throughout 
the Police Jury redistricting process.

62. At this time, it was also Joiner’s understand­
ing that even before January 1, 1993, administrative 
costs could he reduced by placing the machines and 
poll workers of two precincts at one polling place. 
This would reduce the number of poll workers which 
would need to be hired by the parish.

63. After about 30 minutes of discussion before 
the public, the Police Jury cut off discussion to retire 
into executive session. After returning from execu­
tive session, upon Mr. Caplis’ motion, Plan 9 was 
adopted with one abstention (unrelated to racial con­
cerns), and the Police Jury authorized the prepara­
tion of the plan for submission to the Department of 
Justice for Section 5 review.

61. Mr. Darby explains that he voted for the re­
districting plan because he was led to believe by Mr. 
Joiner and the other Police Jurors that it was im­
possible to create a black-majority district that would 
receive Section 6 preclearance from the Department 
of Justice. That was his understanding at the time 
of the 1990-1991 redistricting process and the subse­
quent 1991 Section 5 preclearance review by the De­
partment of Justice. Having since been shown that 
it was at that time possible to have drawn two reason­
ably compact majority-black districts, Darby has re­
versed his position and now believes that he was 
deliberately misled in this regard during the 1990- 
1991 i('districting process. But for these misrepre­
sentations, he would have voted against the plan 
finally adopted by the Police Jury.



87a

65. On April 30, 1!HM, the Police Jury received a 
letter from the Concerned Citizens of Bossier Parish, 
a hlack organization, protesting the lack of openness 
in the redistricting process. The letter alleged that 
black citizens were denied information regarding the 
redistricting which they had requested from the Police 
Jury. The letter also protested the Police Jury’s deci­
sion to go into executive session to discuss redistrict­
ing at a public Police Jury meeting. Black residents 
slate that at the April 30, 1991 Police Jury meeting, 
hlack residents specifically asked that the letter be 
placed in the Parish’s Section 5 submission to the 
Department of Justice.

66. Police Juror James Elkins, Parish Adminis­
trator James Ramsey, and Gary Joiner were among 
those responsible for making the Section 5 submission 
to the Justice Department. Though Joiner played a 
role, the submission was mailed from the courthouse. 
Police Juror Burford testified at deposition that as a 
rule, the Police Jury was “very, very careful to keep 
correspondence” it received. Parish officials involved 
in the redistricting process, including Police Juror 
Burford, acknowledged that the April 30, 1991 Con­
cerned Citizens letter normally would have been in­
cluded with the submission. The April 30, 11)91 letter 
was not included with the submission sent by the 
Police Jury.

67. At the May 14, 1991 Bossier Parish Police 
July meeting, Mr. Darby referred to the April 30 
Concerned Citizens letter regarding reapportionment 
procedures.

68. The Police Jury sent its Section 5 submission 
of the 1991 redistricting plan to the Department of 
Justice on May 22, 1991. The Department of Justice 
received the Bossier Parish Police Jury redistricting



KHa

plan on May 23, 1991. Additional information was 
received by the Department on July 19, 1991. In a 
July 29, 1991 letter from John R. Dunne, Assistant 
Attorney General for Civil Rights, to Mr. James Ram­
sey, Mr. Dunne informed the Police Jury that the 
Attorney (leneral did not interpose any objection to 
the 1991 Police Jury redistricting plan.

(it). During the course of the 1990-1991 redistrict­
ing process, some Police Jurors rejected the idea of 
drawing any black-majority districts in the 1991 re­
districting plan. The reasons given by Police Jurors 
for this rejection vary. Police Juror Burford testified 
at deposition that among other things, he felt it would 
be desirable to have Jerome Darby continue on the 
Jury as a black member elected from a white- 
majority district, and to maintain a number of other 
white-majority districts with sizeable black popula­
tions, hut to avoid the creation of a district with a 
black-majority. Police Juror Glorioso testified that 
the Police Jury never seriously considered the idea of 
creating a black-majority district because there was 
already one black person sitting on the Jury.

70. While some Police Jurors testified at deposi­
tion that a plan containing a black-majority district 
would have crossed too many precinct lines, thereby 
creating new precincts and raising election costs, the 
Police Jurors had been told by Joiner at the April 30, 
1991 meeting that the plan they were adopting in 
1991 created at least ten new precincts, and thus 
raised election costs. Actually, 20 new precincts were 
created when the 1991 Police Jury plan was drawn. 
Moreover, at the time of the adoption of the 1991 
plan, Police Jurors fil'd not know and did not seek 
to learn the number of precincts that would have to



89a

be split to create a black-majority district. Joiner 
never informed the Police Jury of an exact number 
of additional split precincts that would be caused by 
drawing a black-majority district, and no Police Juror 
ever asked for this information. To Joiner's knowl­
edge, the Police Jury never gave him a maximum 
number of precinct splits they deemed acceptable. 
The plan ultimately adopted by the Police Jury was 
not the redistricting alternative with the lowest num­
ber of splits.

71. Joiner testified at deposition that any factors 
arguing against the creation of a majority-black 
district “would be lumped under” the general cate­
gory of concerns regarding the splitting of precincts.

72. Several Police Jurors testified at deposition 
that a black-majority district would contain unaccept­
ably narrow or otherwise oddly-shaped lines. They 
claimed to base this conclusion on their examination 
of black population concentrations within the parish 
on Gary Joiner’s computer, or on their own personal 
knowledge of black concentrations within the parish. 
Police Juror Burford testified that Joiner did not 
show him anything to support this conclusion. Ac­
cording to the deposition testimony of Police Jurors 
involved in the process, at no time during the 1990- 
1991 redistricting process did any Police Juror see a 
map of a black-majority district showing the actual 
boundary lines of such a district. No parish official 
who testified has any knowledge that Mr. Joiner ever 
drew such a district, nor that any Police Juror ever 
asked him to attempt to do so. Further, at least some 
Police Jurors acknowledged that any such concerns 
relating to shape would not apply to a black-majority 
district contained within Bossier City.



90a

7:!. Several Police .Jurors admit that it was not 
their understanding at the time of the 1090-1991 re- 
districting that there was anything potentially illegal 
about drawing oddly-shaped black-majority districts.

7 1 Police Juror Pm ford admitted that if a dis­
trict in the Police Jury plan ultimately adopted was 
in his view oddly-shaped, that he would "have a prob­
lem” with it only if it were drawn specifically to 
achieve a particular racial proportion.

75. Former Parish Administrator Ramsey testi­
fied at deposition that a black-majority district in tin' 
northern part of the parish would have to include 
Renton and Plain Dealing, which are too different to 
be joined, and whose black communities would oppose 
being combined into a district. Ramsey testified that 
neither he nor any of the Police Jurors ever asked 
the black communities of either of those two towns 
whether they would oppose being combined into a 
single district; that black citizens inquiring at Police 
Jury meetings about black-majority districts were not 
asked about this point; and that he really did not 
know if black persons in either of those two towns 
would prefer a plan with all white-majority dis­
tricts over being combined into a single district. 
Even if this truly had been a concern, it would of 
course be inapplicable to a black-majority district 
within Dossier City.

7(5. The plan ultimately adopted contains a (white- 
majority) northern parish district which includes 
Benton and Plain Dealing. Former Parish Adminis­
trator James Ramsey testified that this created a 
“bad situation” for the Juror representing the dis­
trict.

77. One Police Juror testified at deposition that 
a black-majority district in Bossier Parish would



9 hi

have had to he 30 miles in length, which would be 
unacceptably long. The Police Jurors were aware at 
the time of redistricting that the current (1091) Po­
lice Jury plan contained a white-majority district 
which was approximately 30 miles long. The district 
in question was further elongated as a result of ne­
gotiations among several of the Police Jury incum­
bents. The elongation was designed to ensure an in­
cumbent’s reelection. Police Jurors were aware that 
a black-majority district contained within Bossier 
City would bo considerably shorter than 30 miles 
long.

78. The plaintiffs expert felt that it was unlikely 
that the Police Jury could have drawn two black- 
majority districts in Bossier Parish while still pro­
tecting all incumbents who were running for reelec­
tion.

79. At the November 9, 1993 public Police Jury 
meeting, (Jeorge Price, representing the local NAACP 
chapter, called for the Bossier Parish Police Jury and 
School Board “to publicly meet and develop a redis­
tricting plan that will increase the number of mi­
norities on these boards and that more accurately re­
flect the make-up of this parish.” Price also called 
upon the police jury to “seize” the opportunity to 
“assign and employ more blacks throughout the par­
ish.” Price had previously sent a letter to the Pdlice 
Jury on October 7, 1993 which included the concern 
that the 1991 Police Jury redistricling plan did not 
reflect “the make-up of our parish.” Once the idea 
of redrawing the police jury districts was presented, 
the Police Jury dismissed it real quickly. On Jan­
uary 11, 1994, the Police Jury passed unanimously 
a motion to make public the Police July’s intention



92a

to maintain its current district lines. This was the 
only Police Jury meeting at which the Police Jury 
passed such a resolution.

linkin' ravish Sr /mo/ Hoard Hr districting Process
SO. In 1992 the Bossier Parish School Board un­

dertook its obligation to present a redistricting plan 
for proelearance. It hired Mr. Gary Joiner to assist 
in the effort. Mr. Joiner met with the Board and 
explained what he perceived to be the requirements 
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In the course of 
his explanation, he told the hoard about the I olice 
Jury plan and told the Board that because the Police 
jm y  and the School Board were the same size and 
because both used twelve single-member districts the 
adoption of the Police Jury plan was a viable option. 
He also told the Board that the Police Jury plan had 
been precleared and that the same plan from the 
School Board would unquestionably get preclearance 
as well. Mr. James Bullers, Bossier Parish District 
Attorney and legal counsel for the Board, concurred 
in that opinion.

81. The Bossier Parish School Board adopted a 
different plan from the Police Jury for the 1980s due 
to incumbency protection considerations.

82. The Bossier Parish School Board districts in 
effect during the 1980s were malapportioned after 
the 1990 Census. The district population figures af­
ter the 1990 Census were:



District Total Pop. Deviation Black Top. Rlack %
1 9,233 28.71% 1,230 13.32
2 7,889 9.97% 1,291 16.36
3 13,598 89.56% 1,501 11.04
4 6,552. 8.66% 3,055 46.63
5 6,198 9.42% 962 14.80
f. 7,963 11.00% 1,579 19.83
7 5,867 18.21% 2,569 13.79
8 6,516 9.17% 1,149 17.63
9 6,229 13.17% 1,374 22.06

10 6,054 15.61% 1,824 30.13
11 4,085 43.05% 460 11.26
12 5,601 — 21.88% 387 6.91

815. The School Board was not under the same time 
constraints to redistrict as the police jury following 
the availability of the 1990 Census. The next sched­
uled School Board elections were not until October 
1994. At the October 18, 1990 meeting of the Bossier 
Parish School Board, the School Board unanimously 
voted to authorize Dr. Peterson to “convey to the po­
lice jury that the School Board would agree to work 
with a professional demographer to hopefully end 
with the same geographical boundary lines.”

84. The Police Jury was not interested in pursu­
ing the redistricting, process jointly with the School 
Board because of incumbency protection considera­
tions.

85. One School Board member, Tom My rick, did 
participate in the Police Jury redistricting process. 
Myrick met with Joiner, who drew the Police Jury 
plan, some five times during the Police Jury process. 
On these occasions, Myrick was accompanied by at 
least two of the Police Jury members, Rick Avery 
and Tommy Scarborough, all of whom represent dis­
tricts, portions of which could be used to create a



94a

black-majority district north of Bossier City. Mvrick 
was only concerned with the configuration of his own 
district. Joiner gave Myrick a map of the Police 
Jury plan at that time.

8fi. The School Board took up the subject of re- 
districting again at its May 2, 1991 meeting. The 
policy jury had just adopted its plan on April JO, 
1991, and Joiner attended the meeting at the invita­
tion of the Superintendent of Schools, W'.T. Lewis. 
Joiner discussed the demographic changes in the par­
ish since the 1980s redistricting. Joiner also dis­
cussed the concentrations of black population in the 
parish. Joiner stated that while in the future some 
majority-black School Board districts could he created, 
at that time there were no concentrations of black 
population heavy enough to create a majority-black 
district. Joiner further explained that, unlike the 
Police Jury, the School Board had more than ade­
quate time to draw its districts since members would 
not run in the new districts until 1994. By unani­
mous vote, the Board engaged Mr. Joiner for the 
redistricting project, which Joiner estimated would 
t ake 200 to 2f>0 hours.

87. Joiner’s estimate of his time included develop­
ing alternative plans, and School Board members con­
sidered drawing a plan different from the Police Jury 
at the start of the process. No member of the all 
white School Board expressed interest in drawing 
black-majority districts. The discussions about draw­
ing a plan different from the Police Jury plan focused 
on concerns about equalizing population among the 
districts and not on achieving a racial balance.

88. The Board did not give any specific redistrict­
ing criteria to Joiner other than to draw a plan that



meets all the legal requirements. Joiner never used 
school attendance zones for the purpose of drawing 
a map. The idea of keeping “communities” together 
was not specifically stated to Joiner as a criterion 
for redistricting.

8f). At the September fj, l!l!)l Bossier Parish School 
Board meeting, Joiner distributed configuration maps 
of the new precincts for the Bossier Parish Police 
Jury, which had been precleared by the Justice De­
partment on July 2!), 1!)!)1, along with the police jury 
redistricting plan. Joiner told the School Board mem­
bers that he provided the precinct maps because they 
would have to work with the Police Jury to alter the 
precinct lines. The School Board could not itself 
alter these precinct lines and that would limit its re­
districting options. Joiner also said he planned on 
meeting with School Board members in small groups 
to develop a plan that would meet Department of 
Justice approval.

DO. At this point, Board member Tom Myrick sug­
gested adopting the police jury plan.

91. The Police Jury plan did not pair Myrick with 
another School Board incumbent or announced School 
Board candidate, and placed Myrick in a white- 
majority district. Myrick lives in the area which 
would be included in the northern parish black- 
majority district under the various alternative plans.

92. Following the October 17, 1991 School Board 
meeting, Joiner distributed maps to the Board illus­
trating the relationship of the present. Bossier Parish 
School Board districts to the districts approved by 
the Bossier Parish Police Jury, so that School Board 
members could see how their present districts would 
be affected if they adopted the police jury plan. No



■ it Ik - r :i 11 < > i'ii :i t i vr |>l;ins weri1 discussed at this time. 
The School Hoard members nave no consideration at 
this time to the creation of a minority voting district.

93. By the spring of 1 ‘>92, it had come to the at­
tention of the local chapter of the NAACP that the 
School Board was in the planning stages of the re- 
apportionment of School Board districts. On March 
25, 1902, (leorge Brice, as President of the local 
chapter of the NAACP, wrote to Superintendent 
Lewis requesting that, in light of the fact that there 
were no minorities on the Board, the NAACP wished 
to he included in all phases of the redistricting proc­
ess. Price’s letter was distributed to the members of 
the Board. The Board did not respond to Price’s 
letter and took no action to include the NAACP in 
the redistricting process.

91. After hearing no response from the School 
Board, Price wrote again to Superintendent Lewis on 
August 17, 1992, to request that the Bossier Parish 
Branch of the NAACP lie allowed to come before the 
Bossier Parish School Board and present their views 
on the redistricting. Price also stated that the 
NAACP would oppose any plan that, like the police 
jury plan, diluted minority voting strength.

95. At the August 20, 1992 meeting of the Bossier 
Parish School Board, Price, representing the NAACP, 
addressed the Board regarding immediate concerns 
that affect blacks in the Bossier Parish School System. 
At this meeting, Price presented the Board with nine 
proposals: 1) the appointment of a black to fdl the 
current vacancy on the Board: 2) development of an 
early recruitment program for black teachers; 3) dili­
gence in recruiting, hiring, retaining, and promoting 
blacks; 1) offering alternative certification to liberal



97a

arts majors; 5) development of a reassignment and 
transfer program to insure parity or equalization of 
minorities at all schools; P>) organizing a recruitment 
program with predominately black colleges; 7) en­
couraging Parish graduates to pursue education as a 
major and return to Bossier to work and live; 8) en­
couraging the Superintendent and Board to be ac­
tively involved in all communities; and !>) guaran­
teeing participation of every Parish citizen in reap­
portionment of School Board districts. No specific 
action was taken by the School Board in response to 
Price’s presentation.

96. At some point (lining the School Board redis­
tricting process, Joiner met with the School Board 
members with his computer at a time other than a 
regularly scheduled Board meeting. While all of the 
School Board members remember the meeting, no one 
remembers the date. Board member Barry Musgrove 
believes the meeting occurred in August of 1992. 
No School Board meeting minutes reflect such a meet­
ing, and there was no notice to the public of the meet­
ing. At this meeting, Joiner had his computer set up 
and individual members or groups of members gath­
ered around him as he demonstrated alternative re­
districting plans or “scenarios” for creating districts. 
This is the only time that the Board was shown al­
ternative “scenarios.”

97. Despite the NAACP’s repeated requests to par­
ticipate in the redistricting process, it was not given 
notice of such a meeting ami thus did not attend. In 
considering the adoption of a redistricting plan and 
after listening to the comments of concerned citizens, 
the school board consulted only with its attorney and 
cartographer and did not consult with any special



98a

interest group or racial organization, either white or 
Hack.

98. Frustrated hy the School Board's lack of re­
sponsiveness to his request to become part of the re- 
districting process, Brice contacted the NAACP I’e- 
distrieting Project in Baltimore in the summer of 

The Project developed a partial plan for Price 
to present to the School Board that consisted of two 
districts which reflected the black voting strength 
in Bossier Parish. The NAACP alternative plan dis­
tributed the population in those two district as fol­
lows :
Pist rit-t Total Pop. Deviation Black Pop. Black VAP

1 6,913 -3.6% 56.8% 50.6%
O 6,85 1 4.5% 62.6% 58.9%

99. The NAACP did not draw a complete plan 
because they were most interested in demonstrating 
ways to more fairly reflect black voting strength and 
did not want to raise issues as to the other districts: 
the School Board was free to draw them in any way 
they chose. When Price showed this plan to a school 
district official, he was told that the plan was unac­
ceptable and that he would need to come up with a 
plan that contained all twelve districts. Price relayed 
this information back to the NAACP Hedistricting 
Project, which then drew a plan for all twelve dis- 
f rids.

100. At the September .‘I, 1992 meeting of the 
Bossier Parish School Board, Mr. Price, speaking for 
the NAACP. Men’s Club of Bossier, Voter’s League, 
Concerned Citizens, Bossier Housing Tenant Coalition 
and the Concerned Parents of Plain Dealing, pre­
sented a map of all twelve districts and made a



99a

statement on behalf of the NAACP. Price stated that 
black-majority districts could he created for the Bos­
sier Parish School Board. The School Board mem­
bers staled that they would need to see a bigger map 
before they would analyze it. The NAACP alternative 
plan distributed the population as follows:
District Total Pop. Deviation Black Pop. Black %

1 0,87 1 1.18% 3,908 56.85
2 0.875 4.17% 4,311 62.71
3 0,886 4.01% 2,595 37.69
4 7,289 1.60% 645 8.85
5 7,002 - 2.40% 522 7.46
6 7,188 0.20% 1,000 13.91
7 6,823 4.89%' 555 8.13
8 7,457 3.94% 950 12.74
9 7,127 3.53% 584 7.86

10 7,111 3.35% 1,116 15.05
11 7,395 3.08% 514 6.95
12 7,458 3.96% 601 8.06

101. District 3 contained Barksdale Air Force
Base. One census block constituting most or all of 
the base contains 3,327 people. Most of these people 
are not registered to vote in Bossier Parish. The dis­
tribution of the population in District 3 without the 
census block which includes the military base is:

District Total Pop. Black Pop. Black VAP 

3 3,5.9!) 53.5% 51.0%

102. Both Gary Joiner and Parish District Attor­
ney James Bullets were present at the meeting. Both 
summarily dismissed the NAACP plan. The stated 
reason for their dismissal was that the plan’s district 
lines crossed existing precinct lines, and therefore 
violated state law. Joiner and Bullets were aware of



10()a

the option of obtaining prpcinrt line changes from 
the police jury.

KIT At the September 17, 1992 School Hoard 
meeting, Jerome Hhmt was sworn in as the first black 
person to serve on the School Hoard. Blunt was ap­
pointed by a vote of (>-5 by the School Board following 
a resignation. The NAACP had lobbied the School 
Hoard foi the appointment of a black person.

101. 'Fhe narrow vote in favor of Blunt’s appoint­
ment was contemporaneous with the 1992 School 
Board redistricting process. Board member Michelle 
Rodgers testified at deposition that three white con­
stituents called her to express bitter opposition to 
Blunt’s appointment. These constituents charged that 
Rodgers supported him only because he was black, 
and that she had “bowed down” to the NAACR.

105. Blunt served in the office only six months. 
Blunt was defeated in a special election by a white 
candidate, Juanita Jackson. The district in which he 
ran was 11 percent black in population, according to 
the 1990 Census.

lOfi. At the September 17, 1992 Bossier Parish 
School Hoard meeting, Price, speaking for the 
NAACP, Men’s Club of Bossier, Voter’s League, Con­
cerned Citizens, Bossier Housing Tenant Coalition 
and the Concerned Parents of Plain Dealing, again 
presented for consideration the redistricting plan de­
veloped by the NAACP. Also at the September 17, 
1992 Bossier Parish School Board meeting, the School 
Hoard unanimously passed a motion of intent to adopt 
the Police Jury plan. It was announced that the 
plan would be on display, a public meeting would be 
held on September 21, 1992 and final action would be 
taken at the October 1, 1992 School Board meeting.



101 a

The Board did not direct Joiner to conduct any fur­
ther study of the NAACP plan. The Board did not 
delay any further action on the adoption of the police 
jury plan until Joiner had more time to study the 
NAACP plan, despite the fact that Joiner had previ­
ously told the School Board that there was no reason 
for haste, because the next School Board election was 
in October 1991.

107. Blunt did not participate in any discussion 
about the redistricting process. In his opinion, the 
Board had already made up its mind to adopt the 
Police Jury plan by the time he took office.

108. A public hearing was held on September 24, 
1992. All of the members of the Board were present 
except Susan Barrera and Boyce Hensley. District 
Attorney Bullers was also present. Forty people reg­
istered their attendance, although the room, which has 
a capacity of 75 persons, was overflowing. Fifteen 
people, the majority of whom were black, addressed 
the Board. All black residents voiced their opposition 
to the School Board’s adoption of the police jury plan 
because, they alleged, it diluted black minority voting 
strength. Price, as the President of the NAACP, pre­
sented a petition which contained over live hundred 
signatures, constituting the largest petition received 
by the School Board since at least 1990. Price re­
quested that the School Board give the plan developed 
by the NAACP its utmost consideration and that it be 
used as a foundation for the creation of three districts 
that increase the possibility of blacks to he elected to 
the School Board. Price also admonished the School 
Board to be cautious about abdicating its responsi­
bility to Cary Joiner, who is not a lawyer. Price ad­
vised the Board of the supremacy clause of the United



102a

Stales ('oustillitii>n and that the state law governing 
precinct alterations could not supersede compliance 
with the Voting Rights Act. He also stated that the 
Justice Department's preclearance of the Police Jury 
plan in Id'll did not preclude an objection to the 
School Hoard's adoption of the [dan in light of the 
submission of the NAAt’l’ plan to the Hoard which 
demonstrated that it was possible to draw a plan that 
did not dilute minority voting strength. He also told 
the Hoard that the fact that the police jury plan was 
preclcnrod did not immunize the Police Jury or the 
School Hoard if they adopted the [dan from litigation 
under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

Hid. At the October 1, 1992 School Board meeting, 
the Bossier Parish School Board passed a resolution 
adopting the Police Jury plan. The vote was 10 ayes, 
1 abstention and 1 absent. Jerome Blunt, the School 
Hoard's only black member, abstainer). Blunt ab­
stained because he felt that by abstaining, he would 
draw more attention to the fact that the plan diluted 
black voing strength. Barbara W. Gray was absent. 
The plan adopted has two districts in which incum­
bents are pitted against each other and two districts 
in which no incumbents reside. The population figures 
for the adopted plan are :



103a

District Total Pop. l>t‘\ iatioii Black Pop. Black %
1 7,187 0.18% 2,069 28.79
2 7,129 3.55% 728 9.80
3 6,856 •l.-13% 1,737 25.34
4 6,903 3.78';; 3,120 45.20
5 7,607 o.oi'; 731 9.65
6 7,1 It 3.76'; 271 3.68
7 6,992 2.54% 3,068 43.88
8 6,899 3.83% 1,171 21.32
9 7,219 0.63',; 1,080 14.9G

10 7,162 3.88% 2,001 26.89
11 7,019 2.16% 501 7.18
12 7,081 1.30',' 592 8.36

110. The School Hoard proceeded to adopt its linal 
plan on October 1, 1092. .The plan was not submitted 
to the Justice Department for preclearance until 
January 1, 1992.

111. In its order of October 1, 1970, modifying the 
April 29, 1970 decree, the court in Lemon v. Bossier 
Porish School BoonI, C.A. No. 10,687 (W.D. La.), a 
school desegregation case, mandated the establishment 
of a Bi-Racial Advisory Review Committee. The com­
mittee was to be comprised of an equal number of 
black and white members. The purpose of the com­
mittee was to “recommend to the School Board ways 
to attain and maintain a unitary system and to im­
prove education in the parish.” The court directed 
the school board to supply the committee with infor­
mation requested by the committee.

112. The establishment of a Bi-Racial Committee 
to “analyze and make recommendations as to whether 
or not the present desegregation plan is to be reviewed, 
and if so, how,” was also incorporated into the con­
sent decree on April 12, 1976, in the Lemon case. The 
Committee, however, met only two or three times, and



1 04a

only the black members of the Committee attended. 
The Committee never met again after the first sched­
uled meetings in 1 976.

119. Shortly after the School Board’s redistricting 
plan was submitted to the Justice Department for 
Section f> review, another committee, this time called 
the •‘Community Affairs Committee,” was formed at 
the request of the black community. The committee 
held its first meeting on January 26, 1993.

111. It was originally the Board’s intent to use 
the Community Affairs Committee to satisfy its re­
quirement under the 1976 consent decree in the Lemon 
school desegregation case, to have a “Bi-Raeial Com­
mittee.’’ Pursuant to the Consent Decree, the Bi- 
Raeial Committee was "charged with the responsibil­
ity of investigating, consulting and advising the court 
and school hoard periodically with respect to all mat­
ters pertinent to the retention of a unitary school 
system."

115. One of the purposes of the committee was to 
address the concerns of the black community. The 
concerns inv olved the following goals: 1) develop and 
maintain an early recruiting program, starting at 
least at the sophomore level of college, and include 
lay persons from the community in this process; 2) 
demonstrate diligence in recruiting, hiring, retaining, 
and promoting African Americans in the Bossier 
Parish School System; 3) develop a reassignment and 
transfer program designed to insure parity or equali­
zation of minorities at all schools; (Elementary, Mid­
dle, and High) so that black children can see people 
from their ethnic background working as profession­
als; t) organize and maintain a recruitment program 
with (!rambling State, Southern University, Xavier 
University, and Dillard University to increase nu-



105a

merically the number of black teachers in the Bossier 
Parish School System; f>) establish and maintain a 
tracking system of Bossier Parish graduates so as to 
counsel and encourage as many as possible to pursue 
education as a irtajor, and to return to Bossier Parish 
to work and live; and G) encourage the Superintend­
ent and each School Board member to become actively 
involved in all communities, and to bring and receive 
information calculated to improve the Bossier Parish 
School System on behalf of all citizens.

116. The School Board disbanded the Committee 
after three months. Board member Musgrove stated 
that the reason the committee was disbanded was 
because, “the tone of the committee made up of the 
minority members of the committee quickly turned 
toward becoming involved in policy.”

117. This action created strong resentment on the 
part of the black community. On July 11, 1993, a 
coalition of black groups, including the NAACP, Con­
cerned Citizens of Bossier Parish, the Men’s Club of 
Bossier, and the Voting League of Bossier Parish, 
sent a letter to the Board requesting a response as to 
the steps the Board planned to take regarding the 
following concerns: -1) the establishment of a com­
munity advisory group which would supply input to 
the School Board concerning educational matters; 2) 
recruitment and placement of black teachers and ad­
ministrators in the Bossier Parish School System; 3) 
plans to address the low math'science scores of black 
children and to provide scores of Bossier Parish stu­
dents, along racial lines; 4) the updated status of the 
Bossier Parish School Board Redistricting Plan; 5) 
the need to establish a committee to study the possi­
bility of including a black history year round pro­
gram in the Bossier Parish School System; 6) the



106a

need to provide the policy ;md procedure for bidding 
oil contractual services provided to the School system; 
and 7) the need to provide a list of recent contractors 
that have completed work for the Bossier Parish 
School System.

118. On March 5, ltd).'), the Justice Department 
acting pursuant to its responsibilities under Section 
5 of the Voting Rights Act, issued a timely request 
for additional information concerning the Bossier 
Parish School Board's redistricting plan. The school 
hoard provided additional infoimation.

119. On August 30, 1993, the Attorney General 
interposed a timely objection to the 1992 redistricting 
plan for the election of Bossier Parish School Board 
members. The letter informed the School Board that 
while the Justice Department was aware that it pre­
cleared the identical redistricting plan for the Bos­
sier Parish Police Jury districts in 1991, it had taken 
into account “new information,” particularly the 1991 
Police Jury elections held under the 1991 redistricting 
plan and the 1992 redistricting process for the School 
Board. An alternative plan which demonstrated “that 
black residents are sufficiently numerous and geo­
graphically compact so as to constitute a majority in 
two single-member districts” and which was preferred 
by members of the black community was rejected by 
the School Board and the Board “engaged in no ef­
forts to accommodate the requests of the black com­
munity.” The letter further acknowledged that while 
“the School Board is not required by Section 5 to 
adopt any particular plan, it is not free to adopt a 
plan that unnecessarily limits the opportunity for mi­
nority voters to elect their candidates of choice.” The 
Attorney General also rejected the School Board’s 
argument that state law preventing splitting of pre-



107a

cincts precludes adoption of a redistricting plan with 
majority-black districts, noting that state law allows 
Police Juries to realign precincts.

120. At the September 2, 1993 School Board meet­
ing, in executive session, the Board discussed its op­
tions in light of the Attorney General’s objection. 
All of the School Board members bad been given 
copies of the objection letter. The Attorney General’s 
letter articulated the reasons for the objection and 
specifically' pointed out the Board’s option of consults 
ing with the Police Jury in an attempt to change 
precinct lines to allow the drawing of a plan which 
fairly reflects minority voting strength.

121. There was no discussion of precinct realign­
ment or conducting a further study of the potential 
to draw black-majority districts. The Board voted 
unanimously at that meeting to ask the Justice De­
partment to reconsider the objection.

122. In a letter dated September 3, 1993, District 
Attorney Bullers requested reconsideration of the ob­
jection.

123. At the September 1G, 1993 School Board 
meeting, NAACP President Price again addressed the 
Board representing a coalition of black organizations, 
and requested that the School Board reconsider its 
decision to ask the Justice Department to withdraw 
the objection, because the Police Jury plan adopted 
by the Board diluted black voting strength. The 
Board never responded to Price’s suggest ion.

124. Price again appeared before the School Board 
on November 18, 1993 to discuss the concerns that 
had been raised by the black community in its letter 
of July 14, 1993 and to which the School Board had 
failed to respond. School Board member Musgrove



108a

admitted that there is a need far a hotter relationship 
between tlie Hoard and the minority community.

12fi. In a letter dated December 20, 1008, the 
Attorney (leneral denied the Bossier Parish School 
Hoard's request for reconsideration of the objection. 
The letter concluded that “given the apparent pat­
tern of racially polarized voting in parish elections, 
black Miters will lie unable to elect a candidate of 
their choice to the school hoard under the objocted- 
to redistricting plan.” The letter also referenced the 
failure of the School Hoard “to accommodate the re­
quest of the black community that the board develop 
a plan with two black-majority districts.” The letter 
also noted that, despite the fact the original August 
30, 10!);! objection letter noted that “the school board 
could have, but did not, seek a realignment of voting 
precincts by the Bossier Parish Police Jury that 
would have facilitated the development of a plan that 
fairly reflects black voting strength,” the School 
Hoard made no attempt at this potential solution 
to its state law concerns. The letter noted the School 
Hoard’s argument, made for the first time in its re­
quest for reconsideration, that under Show v. Reno, 
113 S. Ot. 28It! (1903), the NAACP plan “is ‘so 
irrational on its face that the plan could be under­
stood only as an effort to segregate voters into sep­
arate voting districts because of their race.’ ” The 
letter stated, however, that the Board provided no 
explanation or basis for this conclusion. “Moreover, 
the Hoard does not appear to dispute the fact that 
black residents are sufficiently numerous and geo­
graphically compact in the parish so that two black- 
majority districts could be created. You contend only 
that it is not possible to do so given current pre-



109a

cinct configurations.” Accordingly, the School Board’s 
reliance on Shaw v. Rena, was deemed “pretextual.”

12(1. Following the January 20, 1994, School 
Board meeting, at the request of Board member 
Barry Musgrovc, the School Board requested that 
Cary Joiner review the redistricting plan to see if 
there was any possibility that he may have missed 
any alternative configurations.

127. At the March 17, 1994, School Board meet­
ing, Price inquired into the status of Joiner’s prog­
ress at developing alternative proposals. In a letter 
dated March 18, 1994, District Attorney Cullers re­
quested from Joiner a report regarding the status of 
his attempts to develop alternative redistricting pro­
posals. No School Board member has ever requested 
that Joiner produce maps or otherwise demonstrate 
any of bis attempts to draw black-majorily districts 
for the Bossier Parish School Board.

128. At no time during the redistricting process, 
including up to the present time, did the Bossier Par­
ish School Board or any other representative of the 
School Board ever direct Cary Joiner to approach the 
Police Jury to request that the precinct lines be re­
drawn to enable the creation of majority-black School 
Board districts.
Geographic Compactness and Analysis of Alternative 
Plans

129. Dr. Ceorge Castille is qualified as an expert 
in Louisiana geography. He is competent to analyze 
maps and accompanying statistics and to testify to 
that analysis.

130. William S. Cooper is qualified as an expert in 
redistricting and geographic information system soft­
ware as it relates to redistricting. He is competent.



1 1 0 ; i

td draw ami analyze maps, to analyze accompanying: 
statistics, and to testify to that analysis.

1 :t 1. The boundary markers used in the 1992 Bos­
sier Parish School Board redistricting plan are roads, 
streams, railroads, and corporate limit liras. Within 
Bossier City, the School Board's plan also rises the 
limits of Barksdale Air Force Base.

192. The use of corporate limit lines as election 
district boundaries is problematic, in that corporate 
limits are usually arbitrary, and often divide racial 
concentrations or other communities of interest. This 
division can occur when corporate lines are not 
revised frequently enough to accommodate urban 
growth. It can also occur as a result of selective, 
discriminatory policies regarding annexation and de­
annexation. People can have common interests for 
redistriding purposes even though they are split by 
corporate boundaries.

IT!. One factor to be avoided in redistricting is 
“fracturing,” defined by plaintiff’s expert Gary 
Joiner as drawing boundary lines to divide a “pop­
ulation that has a traditional cohesiveness, lives in 
the same general area, [and] has a lot of commonal­
ities,” where this division is effected with “a purpose­
ful intent to splinter . . .  to fracture that population 
into adjoining white districts.”

Bil. Among the considerations in determining 
“commonalities" within a district (or between two 
areas) are socioeconomic commonalities among the 
residents thereof.

1 .‘?f>. Black persons in Benton and in Plain Deal­
ing have some commonalities of interest.

1:!(!. The community of Benton has expanded out­
side the corporate limits in several areas, and the 
corpmate limits fragment those black neighborhoods



that straddle the corporate line. Hy following the 
corporate limits, the proposed plan’s district boundary 
lines fragment black neighborhoods, splitting them 
between Districts It and 1. One cluster of black 
families lives along Shaffers Road on the east side 
of Renton, and a large black subdivision has de­
veloped along Highway Hit! just north of the Renton 
Community Club Cemetery. Another group of black 
residents is located immediately north of the Renton 
corporate limits at the end of Second Street.

137. In the school board’s proposed plan, the area 
within Dossier City bounded by Shaver, Beckett, Ful­
ler and McArthur Streets is included within District 
8 rather than District 7 located immediately to the 
west. The boundary used, a railroad track, separates 
this neighborhood from a larger black residential 
area on the District 7 side of the line. A nearby road 
could have been used as the boundary marker, keep­
ing the two adjacent communities together.

138. Plaintiff’s expert Cary Joiner testified at 
deposition that though he could not be certain without 
further inquiry, this boundary line “appears to be an 
example of fracturing.” Joiner also testified that it 
is likely that there are “numerous options” available 
to avoid this instance of fracturing short of causing 
another precinct split.

139. Plaintiff’s expert Gary Joiner employs, as a 
standard part of his redistricting mapping work, one 
test for compactness: the “Swartzburg major-minor 
axis test.” This test is run on Joiner’s computer. 
Joiner ran this test on the former and current Police 
Jury plans. At least four of the twelve Police Jury 
districts drawn in the 1991 Police Jury plan failed 
this compactness test. Joiner suggested at deposition 
that at least two of the twelve districts (Districts



in and 12) would fail this compactness test because 
they were "elongated.” Joiner also stated that Dis­
tricts 1 and I of the plan were not compact either.

1 to. Former Parish Administrator Ramsey, who 
uas involved in the redistricting process, noted that 
t|u, northern parish district (District 1) in the 1991 
Police Jury plan takes up almost half of the geo­
graphic area id' the parish. According to Ramsey, 
this district contains an inordinate number of roads 
and drainage areas to he maintained, and is “impos­
sible to represent.”

Ml. The plan adopted by the school hoard in 1992 
does not have a public school in each district. The 
district lines do not correspond with school attendance 
zones within Bossier Parish.

M2. Rlack students comprise approximately 29 
percent of the student enrollment in the Bossier Par­
ish school system. As of March 24, 1994, there are 
live schools in the Bossier Parish School District in 
which the majority of the students are black: Bos­
sier Elementary (77.1% black), Butler Elementary 
(74.2% black), Plain Dealing Elementary (77.7% 
black), Plain Dealing Middle/Senior High School 
(7 (5.9 '-; black), and Plantation Park Elementary 
School (51.9% black). Bossier and Butler Elemen­
tary Schools are the only two schools within the pro­
posed Bossier City black-majority district in the 
NAACP School Board redistricting plan (or within 
similar alternative districts drawn by William 
Cooper). Plain Dealing Elementary and Plain Deal­
ing High School are the only schools within the pro­
posed black-majority district in t.he northern portion 
of the parish under the NAACP Plan (or similar 
alternative districts drawn by Cooper). Indeed, the



I 1 3a
two Plain Dealing schools are the only I wo schools 
north of Kenton in the Bossier Parish school system.

143. During the 19!)2 redistricting process for the 
Bossier Parish School Board, black citizens offered an 
alternative redistricting plan which created two black- 
majority districts, one in the northern part of the 
parish, and one within Bossier City. This plan, the 
“NAACP Plan,” demonstrates that, using Census 
blocks, two contiguous districts with a black voting 
age population majority can be drawn within Bossier 
Parish for the Bossier Parish School Board.

l i t. The NAACP Plan employs the same types of 
physical and artificial features as in the School 
Board’s plan: roads, streams, railroads, corporate 
limits, and, within Bossier City, the limits of Barks­
dale Air Force Base. The NAACP Plan uses streams 
to a greater extent than the School Board Plan; the 
district boundaries correlate with streams in at least 
14 locations, as opposed to only 6 in the School Board 
Plan. Overall, in the use of logical, traditional fea­
tures such as roads, streams, etc., as boundary mark­
ers, the NAACP Plan is not significantly different 
from the School Board plan.

14f>. Census blocks are certainly irregular and 
varied in shape within Bossier Parish.

146. Curves in the NAACP Plan District 2 lines 
occur immediately north of Plain Dealing, withii) the 
Bodcau Wildlife Management Area in the east cen­
tral part of the parish, and in the areas immediately 
north and east of the Black Bayou Reservoir. All of 
these district curves represent boundaries which fol­
low local stream patterns and rural roads. Irregu­
larly shaped Census blocks (and therefore irregularly 
shaped district boundaries) are more likely to occur 
in rural parishes within hilly terrain, such as Bossier



1 I I I

Parish, than in relatively Hat areas sueli as in the 
si mi t h u est ern part of Louisiana.

! IT. After the School Hoard adopted its proposed 
plan, defendant-inters etiors' expert, William Cooper, 
drew other plans containing' two Mack-majority dis- 
I rift s. one in the northern part of the parish and one 
within Mossier City. Maps and descriptions of these 
plans are included as exhibits to the direct testimony 
of William Cooper These plans include one drawn 
lor the lecent l \mi iht  v. Mchei then  litigation (Cooper, 
Exh. 1 ); and one drawn with a view toward maxi­
mizing compactness (Cooper, Exh. 3). Hotli these 
plans, particularly the latter, also demonstrate that, 
using Census blocks, two contiguous black-majority 
districts can lie drawn within Bossier Parish for the 
Bossier Parish School Hoard. Both plans comply with 
the principles of one person, one vote, fairly reflecting 
minority voting strength, and contiguity.

1 18. The northern parish minority district in the 
Cooper Plan, District 8, is similar in shape and loca­
tion to District 2 of the NAACP Plan, but is less 
elongated and more compact. The two are sufficiently 
similar so that the possibility of creating a district 
like the Cooper District 8 was readily discernible. 
However, Cooper District 8 is shorter and more com­
pact.

l it). District 1 in the 1991 Police Jury Plan (the 
Proposed School Board Plan) is similar to District 8 
shown in Exhibits 1 and 3 to the direct testimony of 
William Cooper, to the extent that both tire large 
districts centered in the north-central portion of the 
parish. District 1 in the Proposed School Board Plan 
has a land area of 421 square miles, 49.6 percent of 
the entire Bossier Parish area. District 8C in Exhibit 
3 has a land area of 252 square miles, 29.5 percent



115a
of the entiie parish area: District 4 in the Proposed 
School Board Plan is 33.5 miles long from the extreme 
northwest to the extreme southeast. District 8C from 
Exhibit 3 is 34.5 miles long from the extreme north­
west to the extreme southeast. Thus, each alternative 
minority district for northern Bossier Parish shown 
in Exhibits 1 and 3 is virtually identical in length 
to the School Board’s proposed district eon figuration 
and covers 1(1 percent less land area.

150. The minority district configuration within 
Bossier City used by Cooper is an acceptable con­
figuration from the standpoint of district shape.

151. Using the current precinct lines in Bossier 
Parish in place at the time of the 1992 School Board 
redistricting, the NAACP Plan creates It! precinct 
splits, and the Cooper Plan causes 27. Using the 1990 
precinct lines in existence at the time of the 1990- 
1991 Police Jury redistricting, the NAACP Plan 
causes 22 precinct splits, and the Cooper Plan causes 
25.

152. It is impossible to draw, on a precinct level, 
a black-majority district in Bossier Parish without 
cutting or splitting existing precinct lines.
History of Black Electoral Success in Bossier Parish 
after MHO

153. No black candidate ever has been elected to 
the Bossier Parish School Board. Since 1980, black 
candidates have run for election to the School Board 
on four occasions.

154. In the October 17, 1981 primary election for 
School Board District C (28.1 percent black in total 
population based upon the 1980 Census), black can­
didate Floyd Coleman received 389 votes (38.5 per­
cent), white candidate Annie Johnston received 401



1 16a

votes (lit).7 percent), white candidate Ken Larsen 
received 150 votes (1 1.8 percent) and white candidate 
Nonnic Moak received 71 votes (7.0 percent). Cole­
man was defeated in the November 28, 1981 runoff 
election, in which he received 584 votes (10.5 percent) 
and his white opponent, Annie B. .Johnston, was 
elected with 858 votes (59.5 percent).

155. In th(> September 27, 1986 election for School 
Board District .1 (80.1 percent black in total popula­
tion based upon the 1990 Census), black candidate 
Jeff Darby was defeated. Darby received 848 votes 
(45.7 percent) and his while opponent, Ruth Sullivan 
(who was the incumbent) was elected with 408 votes 
( 5-1.8 percent).

156. In the October 6, 1990 election for School 
Board District.I (80.1 percent black in total popula­
tion based upon the 1990 Census), black candidate 
Johnny Gipson was defeated. Gipson received 480 
votes (46.8 percent) and his white opponent, Ruth 
Sullivan (who was the incumbent), was reelected 
with 489 votes (53.2 percent), a difference of 59 
votes. District .1 has a white majority and consists 
of two precincts.

157. In the April 3, 1993 special election for 
School Board District K (11.3 percent black in total 
population based upon the 1990 Census), a black can­
didate, Jerome Blunt (who was the appointed incum­
bent), was defeated. Blunt received 93 votes (23.9 
percent) and his white opponent, Juanita Jackson, 
was elected with 296 votes (76.1 percent).

158. Since 1980, black candidates also have sought 
election to the Bossier Parish Police Jury; only one 
black candidate has been elected to the Bossier Parish 
Police Jury since 1980.



117a
159. In tlie October 22, 1983 election for Police 

Jury District 7 (29.3 percent black in total population 
based on tbe 1980 Census), black candidate James 
Abrams received 358 votes (22.1 percent), white can­
didate Jerry Baker received 385 votes (23.8 percent) 
and white candidate Pete Glorioso won with 875 
votes (51.1 percent).

1 Go. In the October 22, 1983 election for Police 
Jury District 10, black candidate Jerome Darby re­
ceived 407 votes (33 percent), black candidate Johnny 
Gipson received 260 votes (21 percent), and white 
candidate Tom McDaniel received 568 votes (46 per­
cent). Darby prevailed in the November 19, 1983 
runoff election with 328 votes (53.2 percent) to Mc­
Daniel’s 289 votes (46.8 percent).

161. In 1983, Police Jury District 10 was 37.9 
percent black in total population based upon the 1980 
Census, and consisted of two precincts: 2-15 and 2-16. 
Precinct 2-15 included Barksdale Air Force Base and 
population areas adjacent to the base; precinct 2-16 
also was comprised of population areas adjacent to 
the base.

162. Many of tbe residents in and around Barks­
dale Air Force Base are military population who do 
not vote. Police Jurors have testified that, as a re­
sult, the proportion of actual voters on election day 
in District 10 who are black is closer to 45 percent, 
and may even be a majority.1 As a further result

According to the 1990 Census, the total population of 
Precinct 2-15 (in 1990) is 5,440; the total voting age popula­
tion of the precinct is 3,703, of whom fil percent were non- 
Hispanic white and 32 percent were non-llispanic black. The 
Census block that comprised the Air Force Base portion of the 
precinct in 1990 contained a total population of 3,327, of 
whom 75 percent were non-IIispanic white and 22 percent



! 18a

of the inclusion of the military base area in District 
10, many of the white voters in that district are from 
areas outside Bossier Parish and outside Louisiana. 
According to police jurors, because of that area’s dis­
tinctive character, black community leaders “have a 
good chance" of being elected in the district. The 
circumstances described above are unique to this area 
of the parish and therefore to districts that include 
this area.

163. According to the plaintiff’s expert, most of 
the Air Force base personnel do not vote in Bossier 
Parish. Out of approximately 6,000 military per­
sonnel and dependents, it is not unusual to have only 
100 or so votes cast in a local election. In effect, 
Darby’s local neighborhood is electing the Police Juror 
for that district; in that sense, the district is a 
“stealth district,” according to Joiner. Many military 
retirees also settle permanently in this area. The 
hulk of these retirees are not from Bossier Parish 
originally, and thus would tend on average to vote in 
a less polarized way.

161. In the October 24, 1987 primary election for 
Police Jury District 10, the black incumbent, Jerome 
Darby, was reelected with 506 votes (60.5 percent). 
Another black candidate, Johnny Gipson, received 146 
votes (17.4 percent) and the white candidate, Tom 
McDaniel, received 185 votes (22.1 percent).

165. In the only election held to date under the 
1 DO 1 redistricting plan for the Police Jury (on Oc-

were non-IIispanic black. If that Census block is removed 
from (lie precinct, the total voting age population is 1,117, 
of whom 40 percent are non-IIispanic white and nearly .00 
percent non-IIispanic black. As of April 29, 1989, there were 
1,229 registered voters in Precinct 2-15, of whom 55 percent 
were w hite and 11 percent were black.



1 1 9 a

tober 19, 1991), black incumbent Jerome Darby was 
reelected without opposition.

16(5. In the October 19, 1991 election for Police 
Jury District 7 ( Hi.87 percent black in total popula­
tion according to the 1990 Census), the white incum­
bent, Pete (llorioso was reelected with 1,099 votes 
(64.5 percent). His black opponent, Leonard Kelly, 
received 604 votes (35.5 percent).

167. Black candidates experienced limited success 
in municipal election contests against white oppon­
ents in Bossier Parish during the 1980s. In two in­
stances in which a black candidate was elected to 
municipal office in the 1980s, however, he was unsuc­
cessful in seeking reelection in the 1990s.

168. Bossier City, which includes more than half 
the population of Bossier Parish, is the largest mu­
nicipality wholly contained in the parish. According 
to the 1990 Census, Bossier City had a total popula­
tion of 52,721 of whom 40,895 (77.57 percent) were 
non-Hispanic white persons and 9,463 (17.95 percent) 
were non-Hispanic black persons.

169. In the March 30, 1985 election for Bossier 
City Council District 3 (17 percent black in total 
population based on the 1990 Census), black candidate 
Odis Easter was defeated with 214 votes (17.2 per­
cent) to white candidate Wanda Bennett’s 1,033 votes 
(82.8 percent).

170. In the April 1, 1989 election for Bossier City 
Councilman at Large (two positions), black candidate 
Don Rushing came in last with 2,222 votes (11.84 
percent) against three white candidates.

171. In the April 1, 1989 election for Bossier City 
Council District 4 (18.9 percent black in total popula­
tion based on the 1990 Census), black candidate Earl



120a

Smith came in last with 137 votes (7.1 percent ) 
against two white candidates.

172. In the April 1, 1089 election for Mossier City 
Council District 2 (25.6 percent black in total popula­
tion based on the 1990 Census), black candidate .IcIT 
Darby advanced to the runoff after receiving 356 
votes (33.27 percent) against two white candidates. 
In the April 29, 1989 runoff, Darby was elected with 
631 votes (51.17 percent) against his white oppon­
ent, Donald Brown, who received 595 votes (48.5 
percent). At the time of the election, District 2 was 
similar in configuration to Police Jury District 10 
and included Barksdale Air Force Base and adjacent 
population.

173. In the October 16, 1993 special election for 
Bossier City Council District 2 (which was reduced 
to 24.3 percent black in total population under the 
1993 redistricting plan), black incumbent JefT Darby 
was defeated with 416 votes (46.7 percent) to 474 
votes (53.3 percent) received by his white opponent, 
Jim Sawyer. Under the 1993 plan, much of the Barks­
dale Air Force Base area was removed from the dis­
trict.

174. Black candidates also have run against white 
candidates for municipal ofFice in Haughton. Ac­
cording to the 1980 Census, Haughton had a total 
population of 1,510 of whom 1,034 (68.487! ) were 
non-Hispanic white persons and 456 (30.20rf ) were 
non-Hispanie black persons. In Haughton, elections 
for the Board of Aldermen are at large, in which 
five seats are to he filled and each voter has five votes 
to cast.

175. The April 7, 1984 Haughton Alderman elec­
tion featured 11 candidates, three of whom were black.



1 21 a

Black candidate James Bell, who received the highest 
number of votes (396), was elected along with two 
white candidates, Conrad Isom and Shirley Stephens, 
who received 357 and 311 votes, respectively. Black 
candidate Cashic Cole, Jr., who received ‘237 votes, 
was forced into a run-off with three white candidates 
—John I). Garland, Jr. (213 votes), Billy Joe Maxey 
(230 votes) and M.H. Walker, Jr. (228 votes). The 
third black candidate, Johnny Ruffin, who received 
211 votes, did not receive enough votes to advance 
to the riinoir.

176. In the May 5, 1981 runoff election for I laugh- 
ton Alderman, Cashic Cole Jr. was elected with 236 
votes, but he subsequently lost his bid for reduction. 
In October 1992, he finished sixth out of a field of 
seven candidates with only 13.9 percent of the votes 
cast.

177. In the October 1!), 1991 election for Hough­
ton Mayor, black candidate Mark Hill placed last 
with 67 votes (10.8 percent). White candidate 
George J. Hunter received 97 votes (15.6 percent) 
and the white incumbent, Cecil L. Blackstock, was 
reelected with 458 votes (73.6 percent).

178. According to the 1900 Census, the Town of 
Benton had a total population of 2,047 of whom 
1,166 (56.96 percent) were non-Hispanie white per­
sons, 816 (11.33 percent) were non-Ilispanic black 
persons and 35 (1.71 percent) were other minorities.

179. In the March 10, 1992 election for Mayor 
of Benton, black candidate Thelma Harry received 
218 votes (36.2 percent), white candidate Joe Stickell 
was elected with 378 votes (62.8 percent) and an­
other white candidate, Ronny P. Vaughn, received 6 
votes (1.0 percent).



122a

1H0. I Hack candidates have won elections in Bos­
sier Parish from majority-white districts.

llncinllII I ’olnri:) (I \'nti>ii/ Patterns

181. Police Juror Bnrford’s understanding in 1991 
was that at least SO percent of black and white voters 
voted for candidates of their own race, and that the 
crossover rale, i.<\, voting for candidates of the other 
race, was generally 20 percent although sometimes 
it could be even lower. To some extent, voting pat­
terns in Bossier Parish are affected by racial pref­
erences.

182. As one element of proof of the existence of 
racially polarized voting in Bossier Parish, the United 
States presented the analysis and testimony of Dr. 
Bichard Engstrom. I)r. Engstrom is a professor of 
political science at the University of New Orleans 
with extensive experience in the statistical analysis 
of electoral behavior. Dr. Engstrom has been recog­
nized as an expert witness in this field in numerous 
vote dilution cases in federal courts and has served 
as a court-appointed expert in this regard.

182. Dr. Engstrom’s analysis covered the only 
parish-wide election for local office in recent years 
(15)88 primary election for a scat on the 2Gth Ju­
dicial District Court), as well as the last three elec­
tions for seats on the Bossier Parish School Board 
in which voters in the respective districts were pre­
sented with a choice between black and whit£ can­
didates (1080. 1090 and 1993). In addition, he ex­
amined the vote in the six other elections in the 
parish during the 1990s in which voters were pre­
sented with a choice between black and white can­
didates. I)r. Engstrom’s analysis sought to deter­
mine the extent to which black voters supported black



I 2.1a

candidates and the extent to which white voters sup 
ported white candidates.

181. Hi variate ecological regression analysis is 
based upon the correlation between the proportion 
of the votes received in each precinct and the propor­
tion of black or white voters in each such precinct. 
Based upon his analysis of the 1988 primaiy elec­
tion for the seat on the 20th Judicial District Court, 
l)r. Engstrom found that there was a very consistent 
relationship between the percentage of those signing 
in to vote who were black in each precinct and the 
percentage of the votes received by the black can­
didate, Bobby Stroniile, in the precincts. The esti­
mate of support for Stroniile among black voters was 
79.2 percent, while the estimate of support for 
Stroniile among white voters was only 28.9 percenl.

185. Homogeneous precinct analysis simply tabu­
lates the votes cast in precincts with overwhelmingly 
black and overwhelmingly white populations. These 
analyses support the estimates produced by ecological 
regression analysis. In the 1988 primary election, 
over 90 percent of the people signing in to vote were 
white in 25 of the 42 precincts in Bossier Parish. 
Stroniile received only 31.3 percent of the votes cast 
in those 25 precincts, while his white opponent re­
ceived 69.9 percent of the vote in those precincts. 
There were no homogeneous black precincts in the 
parish (the highest percentage of black voters among 
those signing in to vole was only 75.1 percent).*

186. Dr. Engstrom examined two elections for 
School Board District J : one in 1986, in which Jeff 
Darby was the black candidate who competed wi'h

4 The plaintiff does not dispute the assertions in paragraphs 
183 through 185, but maintains that they are irrelevant.



I 24j

one while candidate, and mu* in 191)0, in which 
Johnny Gipson was the black candidate, who eom- 
Ileted against the same white candidate. District .1 
was comprised of only two precincts and thus does 
imt provide sullicieiit data to perform a repression 
analysis. Precinct 2-la was racially mixed and Pre­
cinct 2-lb was homogeneously white. In Precinct 2- 
1 <>, !>7. I percent of' those signing in to vote in 1990 
were while and 99.2 percent of those registered to 
vote in September of 1986 were white (sign-in data 
by race are not available for elections prior to 1988). 
In both these elections, precinct 2-16 supported the 
white candidate. (lipson received 31.8 percent of the 
votes cast in that precinct in 1990 and Darby re­
ceived 26.6 percent in 1986. Both Gipson and Darby 
won, however, in Precinct 2-15 in their respective 
elections. In Precinct 2-15, 48.9 percent of those sign­
ing in to vote in 1990 were black and 48.9 percent of 
those registered to vote in September 1986 were black. 
Gipson received 73.5 percent of the votes cast in 
Precinct 2-15 in 1990 and Darby received 75.9 per­
cent of the votes cast in that precinct in 1986. The 
contrast in candidate support as between these two 
precincts suggests that the black candidates were the 
choice of the black voters in these elections, but were 
not the choice of the white voters.

187. In the 1993 special election for School Board 
District K (1 1.3 percent black according to the 1990 
Census), in which the appointed black incumbent, 
Jerome Blunt, was defeated by a white opponent, only 
nine of the 130 people who signed in to vote were 
black. Even if every vote Blunt received had been 
cast by a white voter and every black voter who 
signed in to vote had cast a ballot for Blunt’s oppo­
nent. Blunt still would have received only 37.1 per-



125a

cent of tlie w hite votes in tlit' election. While it is not 
possible to determine whether Blunt was the choice of 
black voters, he clearly was not the choice of white 
voters.

188. I)r. Engstrom also examined the vote in 
police jury and municipal elections din ing the 1990s 
in which voters were presented with a choice between 
black and white candidates.

189. In the 1991 election for Police Jury District 
7, a black candidate, Leonard Kelly, was deleatcd by 
the white incumbent, who received 01.5 percent of 
the vote. A regression analysis of the five precincts 
produced an estimated black vote for Kelly of 11.5 
percent and a white vote of 33.8 percent. Duly two 
precincts were racially homogeneous and both were 
white. He received 38.3 percent of the votes in those 
precincts. Thus, Kelly was not the choice of either 
black or white voters.

190. In the 1993 Bossier City special election, Jeff 
Darby, the black incumbent in District 2, faced one 
white opponent and black candidate Will Jones ran 
in District 1 against two white opponents. This was 
the first election held under the new 1993 redistricting 
plan for the Bossier City Council. The election was 
delayed until October 16, 1993 because the new redis­
tricting plan had not been precleared in time for the 
regularly scheduled April 6, 1993 election. Turnout 
was extremely low in these two districts. I1 ewer than 
25 percent of the eligible registered voters cast ballots 
in the District 2 contest and approximately 29 per­
cent of the eligible voters in District 1 signed in to 
vote in the election.

191. Bossier City Council District 2 is comprised 
of three whole precincts and portions of four others.



I 2 ( k i

H;isi‘(l 111 >< ji i Dr. Kngst rum's repression analysis, 
Parity is estimated to have received 01.0 percent <tf 
the votes cast hy blacks and 41.3 percent of the votes 
cast hy whites. The correlation coefficient for the re­
lationship between the percentage of the votes re­
ceived hy Parity and the racial composition of the 
precincts in District 1! is .5 19. This coeflieicnt, based 
on only seven precincts, is not statistically significant. 
In the homogeneous white precincts, Parity received 
In.7 percent of the votes cast.

I!*2. All five of the precincts in Bossier City Dis­
trict I were homogeneously white. The percentage 
of people signing in to vote in these precincts who 
were black ranged from 2.3 to 8.2. Although it is not 
possible to determine whether the black candidate was 
the choice of black voters, it is clear that he was not 
the choice of white voters, having received only 10.1 
percent of the votes cast in this election.

103. In the 1092 mayoral election for the Town of 
Benton, blacks comprised 38.3 percent of tbe people 
signing in to vote and the black candidate, Thelma 
Harry, received 3(5.2 percent of the votes cast. Be­
cause the votes were cast in a single precinct, it is not 
possible to produce estimates of the voles by race.

101. In 1002, Cashie Cole, Jr., a black incumbent 
on the Haughton Board of Aldermen, was defeated 
in his bid for reelection. All of the votes cast in the 
election were cast in a single precinct so that no esti­
mates of the votes by race can be produced. Blacks 
comprised 25.(i percent of the people signing in to vote 
and Cole finished sixth in a field of seven candidates, 
with 13.9 percent of the votes cast in this at-large 
elect ion.

195. In the 1991 mayoral election in Haughton, 
also held in one precinct, 25.4 percent of those sign-



1 27a

ing in to vote were black and the black candidate, 
Mark Hill, finished last among three candidates, with 
only 10.8 percent of the votes cast.

lttti. Of the 11 elections since 1980 in which black 
candidates have run against white candidates for a 
single-member district or for mayor, only two candi­
dates have won. .Jerome Darby defeated a white op­
ponent on two occasions in Police Jury District 10, 
which included population in and around Barksdale 
Air Force Base, and Jeff Darby defeated white candi­
dates in Bossier City District 2, which also included 
population in and around Barksdale Air Force Base 
in 1989, but lost his bid for reelection after much of 
that population was removed from the district in 
1992.

Relationship Between Depressed Levels of Socioeco- 
nomie Status and Political Participation Among Black 
Citizens of Bossier Parish

197. According to pre-election statistics for the 
April 3, 1993 election prepared by the Department of 
Elections and Registration, the total number of regis­
tered voters in Bossier Parish was 40,350 of whom 
33,755 (83.fi percent) were white and (>,279 (15.fi 
percent) were black. Thus, as of the April 3, 1993 
election, 70.1 percent of the 1990 Census white voting 
age population were registered to vote, while' only
58.5 percent of the 1990 Census black voting age 
population were registered to vote. Current voter 
registration statistics reveal similar disparities. As 
of October 28, 1994, Bossier Parish had 38,870 regis­
tered voters, of whom 32,474 (83.5 percent) were 
white and 0,044 (15.5 percent) were black. Thus,
07.5 percent of the white voting age population were



1 2 8a

registered to vote, while only 5f>.3 percent of the 
Mark voting age population were registered to vote.

HIS. Turnout statistics prepared by the Depart­
ment nf Klei lions ami Registration also reveal a 
pattern of lower turnout rates among Mark voters 
than among white voters in Bossier Parish.

I'll). Education, income, housing and employment 
are considered standard measures of socioeconomic 
status. These factors repeatedly have been found to 
translate into political efficacy.

200. Black citizens of Bossier Parish suffer a 
markedly lower socioeconomic status than their white 
counterparts. This lower socioeconomic status is 
traceable to a legacy of racial discrimination affect­
ing Bossier Parish’s black citizens.

201. According to the 1990 Census, the per capita 
income of whites in Bossier Parish in 1989 was 
$12,906, while the per capita income of blacks in 
Bossier Parish in 1989 was $5,260.

202. According to the 1990 Census, the proportion 
of white families in Bossier Parish below' the poverty 
level in 1989 was 6.8 percent, and the proportion of 
black families in Bossier Parish below' the poverty 
level in 1989 was 40.2 percent.

203. According to the 1990 Census, the propor­
tion of white persons in Bossier Parish below the 
poverty level in 1989 was 8.7 percent, and the propor­
tion of black persons in Bossier Parish below the 
poverty level in 1989 was 42.7 percent.

204. According to the 1990 Census, 4.8 percent of 
white persons in Bossier Parish 25 years of age and 
older had less than a ninth grade education, and 22.8 
percent of black persons 25 years of age and older 
iuid less than a ninth grade education.



1 2 0 a

205. According to the 1990 Census, the proportion 
of white persons in Bossier Parish 25 years old and 
over who were at least high school graduates (includ­
ing equivalency) was S p e r c e n t ,  and the proportion 
of black persons in Bossier Parish 25 years old and 
over who were at least high school graduates (includ­
ing equivalency ) w as 58.7 percent.

200. According to the 1990 Census, the proportion 
of white persons in Bossier Parish 25 years old and 
over who had at least four years of college was 17.0 
percent, and the proportion of black persons in Bos­
sier Parish 25 years old and over who had at least 
four years of college w as 8.1 percent.

207. According to the 1990 Census, the proportion 
of white persons in the labor force of Bossier Parish 
who were unemployed was 2.9 percent, and the pro­
portion of hlack persons in the labor force of Bossier 
Parish w ho were unemployed was 9.1 percent.

208. According to the 1990 Census, 1.2 percent of 
the housing units in Bossier Parish occupied by white 
persons had no vehicle available, and 25.9 percent of 
the housing units occupied by black persons in Bossier 
Parish had no vehicle available.

209. According to the 1990 Census, the propor­
tion of occupied housing units in Bossier Parish 
owned by their occupants was 70.0 percent qniong 
white persons and 19.1 percent among blacks.

210. According to the 1990 Census, 07) percent of 
owner-occupied housing units in Bossier Parish with 
a white householder lacked complete plumbing for 
exclusive use, whereas 7.2 percent of owner-occupied 
housing units with a black householder lacked such 
facilities. The percentage of black households with­
out access to vehicles (25.9' ! ) is over six times higher



I 1()a
than tile compai able percentage (1.2'’! ) for white 
households.

211. According in tlit* 1990 Census for Bossier 
1’arish, the poverty rate for black persons (11.7'! ) 
is nearly live times the rate for white persons 
(It. I 1, ). The per capita income of black persons 
($5,21)0) is only 10 percent of that enjoyed by whites 
($12,90(5). The unemployment rate for black persons 
aged Hi and over (22.1'! ) is nearly four times that 
for whites.

212. According to the 1990 Census for Bossier 
Parish, tlit* socioeconomic disparities are matched by 
similarly severe disparities in education. The per­
centage of black persons over 25 without a high 
school degree (10.67! ) is over twice the comparable 
rate (10.7''! ) for whites.

212. The depressed socioeconomic and educational 
levels of black persons within Bossier Parish, coupled 
with their limited access to vehicular transportation, 
makes it harder for blacks to obtain necessary elec­
toral information, organize, raise funds, campaign, 
register, and turn out to vote, and this in turn causes 
a depressed level of political participation for black 
persons within Bossier Parish.

Historji of Official Ifncinl Discrimination
211. Slavery was sanctioned by law in Louisiana 

prior to the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment 
and vestiges of discrimination persist which affect the 
rights of black persons to register, to vote or other­
wise participate in the democratic process.

215. In 189(5, 12(5,819 black persons and 153,174 
white persons were registered to vote in Louisiana, 
according to the 1902 Report of the Secretary of State 
of Louisiana.



131a

210. In 1890, the Louisiana legislature adopted 
two new laws designed to disenfranchise black voter's. 
One law provided a complex new Australian ballot 
and prohibited election officials from assisting illiter­
ates. Tlie other required all voters to reregister using 
a complex application form, prohibited explanation 
of application questions, and facilitated wholesale 
purges by either registrars or party officials of indi­
vidual voters who managed to register successfully. 
Discriminatory application of the new laws reduced 
black registration by 90 percent, leaving only 10 per­
cent of adult black males on the rolls. .1. Morgan 
Kousser, The Shaping- of Southern Politics: Suffrage 
Restriction and the Establishment of the One-Party 
South, ISSO-tUW (New Haven, Ct., Yale University 
Press, 1974), 100-0:5.

217. The State of Louisiana’s Constitutional Con­
vention of 1898 imposed a “grandfather" clause as 
well as educational and property qualifications for 
voter registration which were designed to limit black 
political participation.

218. Implementation of the disfranchising devices 
in the 1898 constitution reduced blacks to about 1 
percent of the state's registered voters, although they 
made up approximately half the state’s population. 
United States v. State of Louisiana, 22f> F. Supp. 358, 
373 (E.I). La. 1963). See generally, Richard Eng- 
strom, et al., Louisiana, in Quiet Rerolnlion in the 
South 103-135 (Chandler Davidson and Bernard 
Grofman, eds., 1994).

219. On March 17, 1900, 5,320 black persons and 
125,438 white persons were registered to vote in 
Louisiana, according to the 1902 Report of the Secre­
tary of State of Louisiana.



132a

22H In 1*121, tin* state Democratic Party estalv 
lislied, pursuant to state law, an all-white primary 
w Inch u as used unt il lit 11.

221. In 1921, the state amended its constitution 
and replaced the "grandfather" clause with a require- 
meiit that an applicant "give a reasonable interpreta­
tion” of any section of the federal or state constitu­
tion. The United States Supreme Court in Louisiana 
\ .  United Stnl is,  "SO U.S. 1 lb (196b), held this "in­
terpretation" test to be one facet of the state’s suc­
cessful plan to disenfranchise its black citizens.

222. Fallowing the invalidation of the all-white 
primary in 1911, the state adopted such electoral de­
vices as citizenship tests, anti-single-shot laws, and a 
majority vote requirement for party officers. Major 
v. Trent, b7 I V. Supp. 32b, 311 (E.D. La. 1983).

223. Following the decision of the U.S. Supreme 
Court in llrotni v. Board of Education, 317 U.S. 183 
(19b 1), outlawing segregation in public schools, the 
Louisiana legislature in I9b4 established a joint com­
mittee chaired by State Senator Willie Rainach. 
Popularly known as the ‘‘Segregation Committee,” 
the committee’s stated purpose was “to provide ways 
and means whereby our existing social order shall be 
preserved,” in order “to maintain segregation of the 
races in all phases of our life in accordance with the 
customs, traditions, and laws of our State.” United 
States v. State of Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 3b3, 378 
( L.D. La. 19(13).

221 Senator Rainach was among the founders of 
the Louisiana Association of Citizens’ Councils, which 
published in 19b(i a pamphlet entitled “Voter Qualifi­
cation Laws in Louisiana—The Key to Victory in the 
Segregation Struggle." In the pamphlet the organiza-



133a

tion urged its members to initiate a purge campaign 
to challenge the right to vote of “the great numbers 
of unqualified voters who have been illegally regis­
tered,” and who, according to the pamphlet, “invari­
ably vote in blocks and constitute a menace to the 
community.” The pamphlet’s subtitle was: “A Man­
ual of Procedure for Registrars of Voters, Police 
Jurors and Citizens Councils.” The state government 
distributed the pamphlet to parish registrars with 
instructions to follow its guidelines as closely as pos­
sible. United, States \. State of Louisiana, 225 F. 
Supp. 353, 278 (E.I). La. 1903)/'

225. Published congressional hearings on the Vot­
ing Rights Act included quantitative evidence con­
cerning racial discrimination in voter registration in 
Louisiana, drawm from the various federal court 
cases filed by the Department of Justice. In addition, 
the hearings reproduced evidence of racial disparities 
in educational expenditures by the state over several 
decades together with documentation that these dis­
parities were a product of the state's official policy 
of racial discrimination in education. Hearings Be­
fore the Committee on the Judiciary, United States 
Senate, Eighty-Ninth Congress, First Session . . . 
Part 2 (Washington, D.C., G.P.O., 1955), 1 103-59, 
1189, 1191-92, 1199-1201, 1208-10, 1220-21, 1224-26, 
1229-31, 1250-52, 1203-70, 1280-81, 1112-11, 1447- 
55, 1479-84. Congress and the federal courts have 
concluded that such educational disadvantages, typi­
cally correlated with disparities in socioeconomic 
status, tend to depress voter registration and turn­
out, as well as other forms of political participation.

“ The plaintiff does not dispute the assertions in paragraphs 
214 through 223, but maintains that they are irrelevant.



I 34a

S. Hep. Nn. ‘>7-117, at 2!), citing White v. Rcgcster, 
412 U S. 7f»f>, 7(’>8 (1972), and Kirksey v. Hoard of 
Sii)» rrisars, 551 I .2d 129, 142 (5th Cir. 1977) (en 
b a n c ) .

22(5. In 19(51, the year liefore adoption of the Vot­
ing Rights Act, 1 1 percent of the nonwhite voting- 
age population in Louisiana was registered to vote, 
yet SO percent of the white voting-age population was 
on the registration rolls. United States Commission 
on Civil Rights, Political Participation (Washington, 
D.C., C.I’.O., 19(58), 212-42. This disparity was the 
result of a series of discriminatory election laws, ac­
cording to the United States Supreme Court, which 
enjoined further use of the state’s requirement that 
prospective voters demonstrate to the satisfaction of 
local registrars that they could understand or inter­
pret a passage from the state or federal constitutions. 
Louisiana v. United States, 280 U.S. 145, 147-51 
( ISI(>5). This registration test, like its predecessors, 
was racially neutral on its face but had been admin­
istered in a racially discriminatory manner. Id. at 
150, 152.

227. The State of Louisiana and its subjurisdic­
tions, including Bossier Parish, are subject to the pre- 
clearance provision (Section 5) of the Voting Rights 
Ai l of 19(55 because in 19(55 the state employed a 
“test or device," as defined in the Act, as a prerequi­
site to register to vote and less than 50 percent of the 
state’s voting age population (at that time, 21 years 
of age or older) voted in the 1964 presidential 
election.

228. Since 19(55. the United States Attorney Cen- 
oi al has designated twelve Louisiana parishes, includ­
ing Bossier Parish, which was designated on March 
22, 1907, for the appointment of federal examiners



1 3 5 a

pursuant to Section 0 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 
IJ.S.C. section 1973d.

229. In 19(58, Louisiana altered its policy prohibit­
ing the use of at-large elections for parish police 
juries and school hoards by the adoption of two stat­
utes enabling both types of local governing bodies to 
use parish-wide elections rather than realign their 
single-member districts. The state was required by 
the decision of the IJ.S. Supreme Court in Allen v. 
Slate Hoard of Election*, 393 U.S. 514 (1969), to 
submit these changes for review by the Department 
of Justice pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights 
Act. On June 26, 1969, the Attorney (lonera! ob­
jected under Section 5 to the two state enabling acts 
on the grounds that at-large elections would in many 
instances, if implemented, “have the effect of discrim­
inating against Negro voters on account of their 
race.’’ See objection letter of June 26, 19(59, objecting 
to Acts 115 and 5(51 of 1968, and the discussion in 
Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1301-02 n. 7 
(5th Cir. 1973) (en banc).

230. In 1971, the legislature incorporated multi­
member districts in the Shreveport metropolitan 
areas, including Dossier Parish, and in other areas, 
into its redistricting plans for both state senate and 
house. The Attorney General objected under Section 
5 of the Voting Rights Act, citing both the dilution 
caused by multi-member districting and the frag­
mentation of black voting strength in each area. The 
1 T.S. District Court hearing a constitutional challenge 
to the state’s redistricting plan observed that had the 
Attorney General not objected, he would have found 
the districting plan unconstitutional because it was 
malapportioned, diluted minority voting strength, 
and employed “gerrymandering in its grossest fonn.”



1 3 6 a

Bussie v. Governor of Louisiana, 3153 F. Supp. 452, 
454 ( F.I). La. 1971). The court ordered legislative 
elections to be held under its own interim plan, rely­
ing exclusively on single-member districts.

231. A 1J.S. Commission on Civil Rights publica­
tion, The Voting Rights .let: Ten Years After 
(Washington, D.C., 1975), listed 12 parishes, includ­
ing Bossier Parish, in which minority plaintiffs filed 
lawsuits challenging police jury and school board re- 
districting plans enacted in the 1970s.

232. The Department of Justice objected to the 
1991 redistricting plans for the Louisiana state house, 
in part, because the Justice Department determined 
that the district alignments appeared to minimize 
black voting strength in and around Bossier Parish.

233. Public accommodations and facilities in the 
State of Louisiana were not open to members of both 
races until the late 19(i0s.

231. The State of Louisiana maintained a dual 
university system until at least 1981.

235. After 1954, school boards in Louisiana failed 
to abolish de jure segregation in the public schools 
voluntarily, and it was necessary for local federal 
courts to issue decrees in order to obtain compliance 
with federal law.

2:3(1. The Bossier Parish School Board is the de­
fendant in Lemon Rossi! r Parish Scliiml Hoard, 
C.A. No. 10.G87 (W.I). La ), in which it was found 
liable for intentionally segregating the public schools 
of Bossier Parish in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Board, 240 F. Supp. 
709 (W.D. La. 1965).

237. The Bossier Parish School Board for years 
sought to limit or evade its desegregation obligations.



137a

The School Board sought to assign black children of 
Barksdale Air Force Base personnel to black schools 
without a right to transfer to white schools, claiming 
that they were “federal children” and not within (he 
“jurisdiction” of the school district. Judge Wisdom 
rejected the School Board’s “new and bizarre excuse 
for rationalizing [its] denial of the constitutional 
right of Negro school children to equal educational 
opportunities as white children.” Bossier Parish 
School Board v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 817, 84!) (5th Oir. 
1967).

238. The Fifth Circuit also rejected the school 
district’s subsequent attempt to implement a “free­
dom of choice plan,” Hall v. St. Helena Parish School 
Board, 417 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1969), and after “pro­
tracted litigation” subsequently rejected yet another 
inadequate remedial plan proposed by the district. 
Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Board, 421 F.2d 121 
(5th Cir. 1970). The School Board then attempted 
to assign students to one of two schools in I ’lain 
Dealing based on their success on the California 
Achievement Test. The Fifth Circuit rejected this 
effort as well. Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Board, 
444 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1971).

239. In 1979, the School Board tiled a motion 
seeking a declaration of unitary status and release 
from further court supervision. The motion was 
denied.

240. Notwithstanding the requirements of the or­
der in Lemon concerning the desegregation of its 
faculty and staff, since 1980, the School Board has 
assigned an increasingly disproportionate number of 
black faculty to schools with predominantly black 
student enrollments and has reduced the percentage 
of black teachers in the school district from 14 per-



I IKa

cent to less than 10 percent. As of March 1991, while 
fewer than 10 percent of the district’s teachers were 
black, the School Board assigned faculties that were 
more than 20 percent black to the five predominantly 
black schools in the district. The School Board as­
signed a faculty that was more than 70 percent black 
to one school, Butler Elementary. The School Board 
assigned more than half of its 119 black teachers to 
seven of its 28 schools and one or fewer black teach­
ers to ten of its schools.

2 11. Since 1980, despite the Bossier Parish School 
Board’s affirmative duty to desegregate, the number 
of elementary schools with predominantly black stu­
dent enrollments has increased from one to four.

2 12. As of the 1999-94 school year, the Bossier 
Parish School Board assigned predominantly black 
student enrollments to five of its 27 regular schools. 
Despite the fact that the overall racial composition 
of the school district’s student population is 29 per­
cent black, four of these schools have student bodies 
that are more than 70 percent black.

213. As of the 1999-91 school year, the School 
Bottrd also maintained six schools in which the white 
enrollment was greater than 80 percent, and two 
schools in which the white enrollment is greater than 
90 percent. Of the lti regular elementary schools, 
four had predominantly black student enrollments, 
and live had student enrollments that were more than 
80 percent white.

211. Blacks and whiles today are treated identi­
cally by public officials in registering to vote, filing 
for public office and voting in primaries and general 
elections. No black individual or black person repre­
senting a black organization has been denied the right



I 1').,
to speak to the Bossier Parish School Board at its 
public meetings.

215. No black in the past two decades has tiled 
a suit or an official protest alleging that his right to 
register to vote, file for public office, or to vote in a 
primary or general election has been hampered or 
interfered with*

216. On July 26, 1991, (Jary W. Moore, a resident 
of Bossier Parish, pled guilty to conspiring to oppress, 
threaten and intimidate minority individuals of the 
State of Louisiana in the free exercise and enjoy­
ment of rights, including the right to vote, secured to 
them under the Constitution and laws of the United 
States. As set forth in the Bill of Information to 
which Moore pled guilty, Moore willfully conspired 
to join with others, under the cover of darkness, to 
burn numerous crosses at chosen places in and 
around Shreveport. July 27, 1991, Shreveport Timex, 
Meridian Star ; see also, May 30, 1991, Shreveport 
Times.

217. On July 26, 1991, Herbert I). Haynes, a 
resident of Bossier Parish, pled guilty to conspiring 
to oppress, threaten and intimidate minority individ­
uals of the State of Louisiana in the free exercise 
and enjoyment of rights, including the right to vote, 
secured to them under the Constitution and laws of 
the United States. As set forth in the Bill of Infor­
mation to which Haynes pled guilty, Haynes will­
fully conspired to join with others, under the cover 
of darkness, to burn numerous crosses at chosen 
places in and around Shreveport. July 27, 1991, 
Shreveport Times, Meridian Star-, see also, May 30, 
1991, Shreveport Times.

• The defendant and defendant-intervenors do not dispute 
this assertion, but maintain that it is irrelevant.



I4()a

2 18. On .July 12, 1991, Edward Wayne McGee, a 
resident of Bossier Parish, pled guilty to conspiring 
to oppress, threaten and intimidate minority individ­
uals of the State of Louisiana in the free exercise 
and enjoyment of rights, including the right to vote, 
secured to them under the Constitution and laws of 
the United States. As set forth in the Bill of Infor­
mation to which McOee pled guilty, McGee willfully 
conspired to join with others, under the cover of 
darkness, to burn numerous crosses at chosen places 
in and around Shreveport. July 27, 1991, Shreveport 
Times; July 28, 1991, Meridian Star; see also, May 
30, 1991, Shreveport Times,7

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
219. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 

42 IJ.S.C. 1973c, prohibits a covered jurisdiction like 
the Bossier Parish School Board from implementing 
any “voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or 
standard, practice, or procedure with respect to vot­
ing different from that in force or effect on Novem­
ber 1, 1964” unless and until it has proven to either 
this Court or the Attorney General that the voting 
change at issue “does not have the purpose and will 
not have the effect of denying or abridging the right 
to vote on account of race or color.”

2o(). In an action for a declaratory judgment 
under Section 5, the burden of proof is on the plain­
tiff. South Carolina v. Katzcnbach, 383 II.S. 301, 328 
(1966).

251. To sustain that burden, the Bossier Parish 
School Board must demonstrate the absence of both

7 The plaintiff does not dispute the assertions in paragraphs 
245 through 247, but maintains that they are irrelevant.



I 4 h i

discriminatory purpose and discriminatory effect in 
the adoption and maintenance of its 1992 redistrict­
ing plan. City of Rome v. United Stoics, I Hi II.S. 
156, 172 (1980); City of Richmond v. United Stoles, 
■122 II.S. 358, 378-379 (1975). In addition, the plan 
may not be precleared pursuant to Section 5 if imple­
mentation of the plan will result in a violation of 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as 
amended, 42 U.S.C. 1973.

252. The 1992 redistricting plan is not retrogres­
sive to minority voting strength compared to the 
existing benchmark plan and therefore will not have 
a discriminatory effect, as that term has been con­
strued by the Supreme Court in Beer v. United 
States, 425 U.S. 130 (1975). The reductions here 
are de minimis. But this does not end the inquiry. 
As this Court has recognized, “nonretrogression is 
not the only test for compliance with the Voting 
Rights Act.” Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 491, 516 
(D.D.C. 1982). Even if a plan increases black voting 
strength, plaintiff is not entitled to the declaratory 
judgment unless it can also demonstrate the absence 
of a racially discriminatory purpose. Ibid.

253. The inquiry into whether the plan has a 
discriminatory purpose requires an examination into 
any circumstantial or direct evidence of intent that 
is available. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro­
politan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 
266 (1977); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 618 
(1982). “ (I)nvidious discriminatory purpose may 
often be inferred from the totality of the relevant 
facts.” Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 
(1976). Relevant areas of inquiry include: (1) 
the historical background of the decision; (2) the 
sequence of events leading up to the action taken;



1 4 2 a

(3) procedural departures from the customary deci­
sional process; (1) substantive departures from the 
normal process; and (,r>) the legislative or adminis­
trative history, including contemporary statements 
by the members of governing body, minutes of their 
meetings, and any testimony by the decision makers 
regarding their intent. Villcujc of Arlington Heights 
v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., supra, 
12!i U.S. 207-68; see Garni \. County of Los Angeles, 
91S F.2d 768, 771 (9th Cir. 1900). In obtaining a 
declaratory judgment that the proposed plan is free 
of any racially discriminatory purpose, the plaintiffs 
must show the absence of such factors.

254. The impact of the official action on the 
minority group often provides “an important start­
ing point’’ to the determination of whether invidious 
intent is implicated. Village of Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., supra, 129 
U.S. at 266; Busbee v. Smith, su]>ra, 519 F. Supp. at 
517 (three-judge court). As Justice Stevens observed 
in Washington v. Davis, “Frequently the most proba­
tive evidence of intent will he objective evidence of 
what actually happened rather than ev idence describ­
ing the subjective state of mind of the actor. For 
normally the actor is presumed to have intended the 
natural consequences of his deeds.” 126 U.S. at 258 
(concurring opinion).

255. The objective of protecting incumbents’ op­
portunities for reelection is a well recognized political 
reality of the redistricting process and is not per se 
evidence of racial animus. Rybicki v. State Board of 
Elections of Illinois, 574 F. Supp. 1082, 1110-11, n.81 
(N.D. 111. 1982). See also Bums v. Richardson, 384 
U.S. 73, 89, n.16 (1966). But, where, as here, the 
motive of protecting incumbency necessarily involves



I 43.1

the adoption of a plan that denies minority voters an 
equal opportunity to elect their preferred candidates 
to the school board, it may be viewed as evidence of 
racially discriminatory intent. Ketch mn v. Byrne, 
740 F.2d 1389, 1408 (7th Fir. 1984). It has been 
held in similar circumstances that “the requirements 
of incumbency are so closely intertwined with the 
need for racial dilution that an intent to maintain a 
safe . . . district for fa white incumbent] is virtually 
coterminous with a purpose to practice racial dis­
crimination.” Rybicki v. State Board of Elections of 
Illinois, supra, 574 F. Supp. at 1109. Here, plaintiffs 
must demonstrate that such incumbency considera­
tions did not prevent the drawing of a minority 
district.

256. A finding of racially discriminatory purpose 
does not require a finding of racial hatred or animus. 
Garza v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 918 F.2d at 
778 n.l (Kozinski, J. concurring in relevant part) :

The lay reader might wonder if there can be 
intentional discrimination without an invidious 
motive. Indeed there can. A simple example may 
help illustrate the point. Assume you are an 
anglo homeowner who lives in an all-white* 
neighborhood. Suppose, also, that you harbor no 
ill feelings toward minorities. Suppose further, 
however, that some of your neighbors persuade 
you that having an integrated neighborhood 
would lower property values and that you stand 
to lose a lot of money on your home. On the 
basis of that belief, you join a pact not to sell 
your house to minorities. Have you engaged in 
intentional racial and ethnic discrimination? Of 
course you have. Your personal feelings toward



I44.i

minorities don’t matter; what matters is that 
you intentionally took actions calculated to keep 
them out of your neighlxirhood.

257. Section 5 preclearance of the Bossier Parish 
School Board’s redistricting plan also must be denied 
if the plan violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act, as amended, 42 IJ.S.C. 1973. If this Court con­
cludes that the plaintiff has failed to meet its burden 
of proof on the issue of purpose or effect, preclear­
ance must be denied and there will be no need to 
decide whether the plan also violates Section 2 of 
the Act. However, should this Court find that the 
Bossier Parish School Board has met its burden of 
proof on the issues of purpose and retrogression, this 
Court must also determine whether the plan consti­
tutes a violation of Section 2 for which Section 5 
preclearance must be denied. See S. Rep. No. 97-417, 
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 n.31 (1982); 28 C.F.R. 
51.55 (b)(2).

258. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits 
any denial or abridgment of the right to vote on 
account of race or color. Section 2 provides as 
follows:

(a) No voting <pi a I i licat ion or prerequisite to 
voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall 
he imposed or applied by any State or political 
subdivision in a manner which results in a denial 
or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the 
United States to vote on account of race or color, 
or in contravention of the guarantees set forth 
in section 4 (f)(2 ), as provided in subsection 
(b).

(b) A violation of subsection (a) is estab­
lished if, based on the totality of circumstances,



115.1

it is shown that the political processes leading 
to nomination or election in the State or political 
subdivision are not equally open to participation 
by members of a class of citizens protected by 
subsection (a) in that its members have less op­
portunity than other members of the electorate 
to participate in the political process and to elect 
representatives of their choice. The extent to 
which members of a protected class have been 
elected to office in the State or political sub­
division is one circumstance which may be con­
sidered: Provided, That nothing in this section 
establishes a right to have members of a pro­
tected class elected in numbers equal to their 
proportion in the population.

42 IJ.S.C. 1973 (“Section 2” ). See also S. Rep. No. 
97-417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).

2f>9. Absent proof of intentional discrimination, 
where vote dilution in violation of Section 2 occurs, 
“a bloc voting majority must usually be able to defeat 
candidates supported by a politically cohesive, geo­
graphically insular minority group.” Tliornliury v. 
Ginylcs, 478 IJ.S. 30, 49 (198G) (emphasis in origi­
nal). In Gingles, which involved a challenge to a 
multimember district system, the Court enunciated 
three threshold factors that must he present to prove 
a vote dilution claim under Section 2: (1) the minor­
ity group is sufficiently large and geographically 
compact to constitute a majority in a single-member 
district; (2) the minority group is politically cohe­
sive; and (3) the white majority votes sufficiently 
as a bloc to enable it, in the absence of special 
circumstances, usually to defeat the minority’s pre­
ferred candidate. 478 IJ.S. at 49-51. The Supreme



I 40a

Court recently held that these prerequisites also 
apply to challenges to redistricting plans under Sec­
tion 2. Growe v. L'niisnn, lt;i S. Ct. l()7f> (11)93); 
Voinovicli v. Quilter, 1111 S. Ct. 1141) (199:1).

260. When Congress amended Section 2 it in­
tended courts to take "a ‘functional’ view of the 
political process,” and to make ‘‘a searching practical 
evaluation of the ‘past and present reality.’ ” Thorn­
burg v. dingles, supra, 178 1J.S. at 45; see also 
Gomez v. City of Watsonville, 863 F.2d 1107, 1413 
(9th Cir. 1988), cert, denied, 489 D.S. 1080 (1989).

261. The purpose of the geographic compactness 
criterion is to determine whether the challenged elec­
tion plan is causing the violation. As the Supreme 
Court explained:

Unless minority voters possess the potential to 
elect representatives in the absence of the chal­
lenged structure or practice, they cannot claim 
to have been injured by that structure or prac­
tice. The single-member district is generally the 
appropriate standard against which to measure 
minority group potential . . . because it is the 
smallest political unit from which representatives 
are elected.

Thornburg v. Gingles, supra, 178 U.S. at 50, n.17 
(emphasis in original). According to the Supreme 
Court in Gingles, the issue is wlather there is an 
alternative to the challenged plan that would provide 
the minority group with the potential to elect candi­
dates of choice.

262. Voting is racially polarized when racial 
minority voters vote differently from white voters. 
Thornburg v. Gingles, supra, 478 U.S. at 53 n.21. 
The Supreme Court explains that “ [t ] he purpose of



1 47a

inquiring into the existence of racially polarized Not­
ing is twofold: to ascertain whether minority group 
members constitute a politically cohesive unit and to 
determine whether whites vote sufficiently as a bloc 
usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidates.” 
Thornburg v. Gingles, supra, 178 U.S. at 50. Racially 
polarized voting is legally significant if minority 
voters are cohesive in support of their candidates and 
those candidates are usually defeated by white bloc 
voting. Ibid. The reasons why those racial differ­
ences in voting patterns occur are not relevant to 
the basic polarization inquiry. Thornburg v. Cringles, 
supra, 478 U.S. at 61-74; 478 IJ.S. at 100 (O’Connor, 
.1., concurring).

263. According to the Supreme Court in (tingles, 
the statistical method of ecological regression analy­
sis, used here by the expert witness for the United 
States, is the standard method for establishing 
racially polarized voting and in most circumstances 
it produces valid and reliable estimates of voting 
behavior for racial groups. See, e.g., Thornburg v. 
(tingles, supra, 478 U.S. at 52-53 & n.20; Campos 
v. Cilg of Baytown, supra; Citizens for o Belter 
Gretna v. City of Gretna, 834 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 
1987); Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 750 F. Supp. 
1298, 1331-1334 (C.l). Cal.), aff’d, 918 F.2d 703 
(9th Cir. 1990), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 1028 (1991). 
In addition, homogeneous precinct analysis (also 
known as extreme case analysis) and anecdotal testi­
mony can provide further evidence1 on the polariza­
tion issue. See Romero v. City of I’onwna, 883 F.2d 
1418 1423; Garza v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 
756 F. Supp. at 1332.

264. The racial polarization inquiry in vote dilu­
tion cases should focus on contests between minority



14«a

candidates and non-minority candidates. A focus on 
such elections appropriately ties together the two 
key Senate Report factors: racial polarization and 
“the extent to which members of the minority group 
have been elected to public office." S. Rep. No. 97- 
417, supra, at 29 & n.115. In Citizens for a Better 
Gretna v. City of Gretna, 834 F.2d 496 (5th Cir.
1987) , the Fifth Circuit ruled, “implicit in the 
Gingles holding is the notion that black preference 
is determined from elections which offer the choice 
of a black candidate.” Id. at 503. See also Smith 
v. Clinton 687 F. Supp. 1310, 1316-17 (E.D. Ark.
1988) , summarily tiff'd, 188 U.S. 988 (1988) (three- 
judge court).

265. Generally, where it is available, the best evi­
dence to measure racially polarized voting is the elec­
tions conducted for positions within the challenged 
election system. Analysis of elections outside the 
challenged system is appropriate, however, if viable 
minority candidates have been deterred from seeking 
office. Cf. Wcstwcgo Citizens for Better Gov't v. City 
of Wcstwcgo, 872 F.2d, 1201, 1208-1209 n.9 (5th 
Cir. 15)89) ; McMillan v. L'seambia ('aunty, 718 F.2d 
1037, 1045 (5th Cir. 1981); Garza \. County of Los 
Angeles, supra, 756 F. Supp. at 1329.

260. After the preconditions have been established, 
the court must examine the "totality of circum­
stances to determine wheilnr minority group mem­
bers have an equal opportunity to participate in Un­
political process and elect representatives of their 
choice. Johnson v. Uc Grundy, 114 S. Ct. 2647 
(1994). Typical factors relevant to an inquiry into 
the totality of the circumstances include, but are not 
limited to, the following:



149a

1. the extent of any history of official discrimi­
nation in the state or political subdivision that 
touched the right of the members of the minority 
community to register, to vote, or otherwise 
participate in the democratic process;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of 
the state or political subdivision is racially polar­
ized ;
3. the extent to which the state or political 
subdivision has used unusually large election 
districts, majority vote requirements, anti- 
single-shot provisions or other voting practices 
or procedures that may enhance the opportunity 
for discrimination against the minority group;
4. if there is a candidate slating process, 
whether the members of the minority group have 
been denied access to that process;
5. the extent to which members of the minority 
group in the state or political subdivision bear 
the effects of discrimination in such areas as 
education, employment, and health which hinder 
their participation in the political process;

(1. whether political campaigns have been char­
acterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; and,

7. the extent to which members of the minority 
group have been elected to office in the jurisdic­
tion.

S. Rep. 97-417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29 (1982). 
In addition, the Senate Report listed two additional 
factors that may have some probative value as part 
of the evidence to establish a violation of Section 2:



I 50a

whether there is a significant lack of responsive­
ness on the part of elected officials to the partic­
ularized needs of the members of the minority 
group.
whether the policy underlying the state or politi­
cal subdivision’s use of such voting qualification, 
prerequisite to voting or standard, practice or 
procedure is tenuous.

S. Rep. 5)7-117, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29 ( 1982). 
“ If present, the[seJ other factors . . . are supportive 
of, but not essential to, a minority voter’s claim.” 
Thornburg v. Cringles, supra, 178 IJ.S. at 18-49 n.15 
(emphasis in original). There is no requirement that 
all, or any particular number of these factors he 
shown in order to prove a violation of Section 2. 
Rather, the court should "determine, based ‘upon a 
searching practical evaluation of the ‘past and pres­
ent reality’,’ . . . whether the political process is 
equally open to minority voters.” Thornburg v. 
Gingles, supra, 478 IJ.S. at 75).

267. A violation of Section 2 also is shown if the 
evidence demonstrates that the challenged election 
plan was adopted or has been maintained with a dis­
criminatory purpose. Garza v. County of I.os Angeles, 
918 F.2d 768, 770 (9th Cir. 195)0), cert, denied, 198 
IJ.S. 1,028 (15)91 ); see MeMdlan \. Escambin County, 
748 I’.2d 1027, 1016 47 (6th Cir. 15)81); United 
States v. Marengo County Commission, 721 I'.2d 
1546, 1558 (11th Cir.), appeal dismissed, cert,
denied, 469 IJ.S. 976, ( 1984); Dillard v. Baldwin 
County Board of Education, 686 F. Supp. 1459, 1460, 
1467-69 (M.D. Ala. 1988); S. Rep. No. 97-417, 97th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1982). Courts since Thornburg 
have continued to analyze intentional discrimination



1 5 1 a

claims independently of the “results” test. Garza v. 
County of Los Angeles, supra, 918 F.2d at 766; see 
also Overton v. City of Austin, 871 F.2d 529, 540- 
511 (5th Cir. 1989); Carrollton Branch of NAACC 
v. Stallings, 829 F.2d 1517, 1552-1553 (11th Fir. 
1987), cert, denied sub nom. Duncan v. City of 
Carrollton, 485 U.S. 936 (1988); and Brown v. Bd.  
of Comm’rs of City of Chattanooga, 722 F. Supp. 380 
(E.D. Tenn. 1989). Such proof of intentional dis­
crimination also establishes a violation of the Four­
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Rogers v. Lodge,  
supra, 458 U.S. at 618.

[Original document contains no 268-281.)
282. No redistricting plan can be designed and 

drawn for the Bossier Parish School Board with one 
or more black-majority districts without splitting and 
cutting precincts in violation of Louisiana Revised 
Statutes, Title 17, Section 71.3. Under Louisiana 
law, the Bossier Parish Police Jury is the governing 
authority for Bossier Parish and is vested with the 
authority and duty of redistricting after each ten 
year census. Under Louisiana law, the precinct lines 
it draws may not be cut, split or otherwise violated 
by the Bossier Parish School Board if the School 
Board is the same size as the Police Jury. This law 
is clearly set out in Louisiana Revised Statutes, Title 
17, Section 71.3.

283. The majority opinion in Shaw v. Rnio, -----
U.S. ----- , 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993), contends that
racial gerrymandering separates the citizens on the 
basis of race. Shaw stands for the legal proposition 
that a redistricting plan which rationally cannot be 
understood as anything other than an effort to sepa­
rate voters into different districts on the basis of 
race, without sufficient justification, is a violation of



I 52a

the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

281. Vote dilution is meaningful only with respect 
to a norm to be established; in order to decide 
whether an electoral system has made it harder for 
minority voters to elect candidates they prefer, a 
court must have an idea in mind of how hard it 
should be for minority voters to elect their preferred 
candidates under an acceptable system.

285. It is a fiction to conclude that only blacks can 
govern fairly other blacks.

Respectfully submitted,

Deval L. Patrick
E ric H. Holder, J r. Assistant Attorney Ueneral 
United States Attorney

/s, Caye E. Hume
E lizabeth J ohnson 
Rebecca .1. W ertz 
Cave E. H ome 
D.C. Bar No. 31)15lit)
Steven .1, Mui .roy 
Nancy I. Saudeson 
Attorneys, Voting Section 
Civil Rights Division 
Depart ment of .1 list ice 
l’.O. Box (5(1128 
Washington, D.C. 20035-6128 
202-307-6302



153a

Respectfully submitted,

/ s /  Samuel I.. Walters 
Sam uel L. W alters 
D.C. Bar No. 105651 
Lawyer’s Committee For 

Civil Rights Under Law 
1450 (1 Street, N.W.,

Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20005 
(202) 662-8222 
Patricia A. Brannan 
D.C. Bar Number 282544 
Hogan & Hartson, L.L.P.
555 Thirteenth Street, NW 
Washington, D.C. 2000 1 
(202) 627-8686 
J ohn W. Borkowski 
Hogan Si Hartson 
546 Carondelet Street 
Suite 207
New Orleans, LA 7012(1 
(504) 502-082 1 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
INTERVENING 
DEFENDANTS

/s /  James J. Thornton
J ames J. T hornton, Estp 
Attorney-at-Law 
642 Stoner Avenue 
Shreveport, Ixmisiana 71101 
(318) 221-6294 
FAX: (218) 221-4456

[Certificate of Service Omitted in Printing]



154a

A P P E N D I X  C

[DOJ Logo] U.S. Department of Justice
C3ii 1 Rights Division 
Washington, DC.. 20031>

Office of tlie Assistant Attorney Oeneral

[Aug. JO, 1993]
Mr. W. T. Lewis 
Superintendent of Bossier 

Parish Schools 
P.O. Box 2000
Benton, Louisiana 71006-2000 

Dear 1\1 r. Lewis:
This relers to the 1992 redistricting plan and the 

renaming of districts from letters to numbers for the 
Bossier Parish School District in Bossier Parish, 
Louisiana, submitted to the Attorney General pur­
suant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
as amended, 12 U.S.C. 1973c. We received your re­
sponse to our request for additional information on 
June 29, 1993.

The Attorney General does not interpose any ob­
jection to the renaming of the districts from letters to 
numbers. However, we note that Section 5 expressly 
provides that the failure of the Attorney General to 
object does not bar subsequent litigation to enjoin 
the enforcement of the change. See the Procedures 
for the Administration of Section 5 12.3 C.F.R.
51.41).

We cannot reach the same conclusion with regard 
to the proposed redistricting plan. We have consid­
ered carefully the information you have provided, as



155a

well as Census data and information and comments 
received from other interested parties. According to 
the 11)90 Census, black residents comprise 20.1 per­
cent of the total population in Mossier Parish. The 
Mossier Parish School District, which is coterminous 
with the parish, is governed by a twelve member 
school hoard elected from single-member districts. 
Under both the existing and proposed districting 
plans, not one of the twelve single-member districts 
is majority black in population. Currently, there are 
no black members on the school board.

in light of the pattern of racially polarized voting 
that appears to prevail in parish elections, the pro­
posed plan, adopted by the parish police jury and rec­
ommended by the school board’s consultant, would ap­
pear to provide no opportunity for black voters to 
elect a candidate of their choice to the school board. 
We note that under the proposed plan, the school 
board district with the highest black population per­
centage, District 4, is 45 percent black. The informa­
tion provided in your submission indicates that prior 
to the adoption of the proposed redistrieting plan, 
members of the black community appeared before the 
school hoard and requested that the board draw a re­
districting plan that would fairly reflect black voting 
strength in the parish by creating two majority 
black districts.

We are mindful of the fact that we granted Section 
f>  preclearance to an identical redistricting plan for 
the Mossier Parish police jury in July 1991. How­
ever, in reviewing the submitted redistricting plan 
for the school board, we have taken into account new 
information, particularly the 1991 police jury elec­
tions held under the 1991 redistricting plan and the 
1992 redistricting process for the school board. Dur-



! 5 6 . i

ing that process, it appears that an alternative plan 
that would have provided for two districts which are 
approximately 02 and 00 percent black in total popu­
lation was presented to the school board at a public 
hearing.

Our analysis of this alternative, preferred by mem­
bers of the black community, shows that black resi­
dents are sufficiently numerous and geographically 
compact so its to constitute a majority in two single­
member districts. Apparently, the school board re­
jected this plan and engaged in no efforts to accom­
modate the requests of the black community, instead 
adopting the redistricting plan adopted by the parish 
police jury. While the school board is not required 
by Section 5 to adopt any particular plan, it is not 
free to adopt a plan that unnecessarily limits the op­
portunity for minority voters to elect their candidates 
of choice.

We have considered the school board’s explanation 
that the proposed plan was adopted in order to avoid 
voter confusion by having the same districting plans 
for both school board and police jury elections. In 
addition, the school board has indicated that the need 
to avoid split precincts, pursuant to state law, limited 
its ability to adopt a redistricting plan with majority 
black districts.

We do not find either of t he se  arguments persua­
sive. We understand that during the 1980’s the 
school hoard and police jury used different districting 
plans as a result of the reapportionment of their re­
spective districts following the 1980 Census and no 
evidence has been presented to show that voter con­
fusion resulted. And while we are aware that state 
law prohibits precinct splits in school board redis­
tricting plans, we also note that state law allows



157a

police juries to realign precincts and such a realign­
ment in Bossier Parish could have facilitated the de­
velopment of a school hoard redistricting plan with 
majority Idaek districts. The information that you 
have provided discloses no evidence that the school 
hoard ever sought a precinct realignment that would 
have allowed the drawing of such a plan.

Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the sub­
mitting authority has the burden of showing that a 
submitted change has neither a discriminatory pur­
pose nor a discriminatory effect. See Georgia v. 
United States, 411 U.S. 520 (19711); see also the 
Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 (28 
O.F.R. 51.52). In addition, preclearance must he 
withheld where a change presents a clear violation 
of Section 2. 28 C.F.R. 51.55(b) (2). In light of the 
considerations discussed above, I cannot conclude, as 
I must under the Voting Rights Act, that the pro­
posed redistricting plan meets the Act’s preclearance 
requirements. Therefore, on behalf of the Attorney 
Ueneral, I must object to the 1992 school board re- 
districting plan.

We note that under Section 5 you have the right to 
seek a declaratory judgment from the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia that the 
proposed change has neither the purpose nor will 
have the effect of denying or abridging the light to 
vote on account of race or color. In addition, you may 
request that the Attorney Ueneral reconsider the 
objection. However, until the objection is withdrawn 
or a judgment from the District of Columbia Court 
is obtained, the 1992 redistricting plan continues to 
be legally unenforceable. Clark v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct, 
2096 (1991); 28 C.F.R. 51.10 and 51.45.



I5S.I

I o enable this Department to moot its responsibility 
to enloree the Voting' Rights Act, please inform us of 
the course of action the Mossier Parish School Dis­
trict plans to take with respect to this matter. If you 
have any questions, you should call Gaye Hume (202- 
307-0302), an attorney in the Voting Section.

Sincerely,

s James P. Turner 
J amks P. T iihnku 
Acting Assistant Attorney General 
Civil Rights Division



I59.i

APPENDIX I)

[DOJ Logo] U.S. Department of Justice
Civil Rights Division 
Washington, D.C. 20035

Office of the Assistant Attorney General

[ December 20, 1993]
James M. Buffers, Esq.
Distinct Attorney 
26th Judicial District 
Bossier-Webster Parishes 
P. 0. Box 69 
Benton, Louisiana 71006

Dear Mr. Lewis:
This refers to your request that the Attorney Gen­

eral reconsider the August 30, 1993, objection under 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as 
amended, 42 U.S.C. 1973c, to the 1992 redistricting 
plan for the Bossier Parish School District in Bossier 
Parish, Louisiana. We received your request on Sep­
tember 7, 1993; supplemental information was re­
ceived on October 20, 1993.

We have reconsidered our earlier determination in 
tins matter based on the information and arguments 
the school board has advanced in support of the re­
quest. According to the 1990 Census, black persons 
comprise 20.1 percent of Bossier Parish’s total popu­
lation and 17.6 percent of its voting age population. 
The school board is elected from twelve single-member 
districts; none of the districts in the 1992 redistrict­
ing plan subject to our objection have a black ma­
jority. As explained in the August 30, 1993, objec-



I 60a

tion letter, our analysis of your initial submission 
showed that, given the apparent pattern of racially 
polarized voting in parish elections, black voters will 
be unable to elect a candidate of their choice to the 
school board under the objected-to redistricting plan. 
Our review of the redistricting process further indi­
cated that the school board made no effort to accom­
modate the request of the black community that the 
board develop a plan with two black-majority districts 
and gave no consideration to such a plan developed 
by the NAAOP.

In support of its request for reconsideration, the 
school board continues to argue that it is impossible 
to draw a redistricting plan with black-majority dis­
tricts without splitting precincts in violation of state 
law. We considered this argument during our prior 
review and found this explanation unpersuasive. Our 
objection letter specifically noted that the school 
board could have, but did not, seek a realignment of 
voting precincts by the Mossier Parish Police Jury 
that would have facilitated the development of a plan 
that fairly reflects black voting strength while ad­
dressing these state law concerns. The information 
made available to us indicates that the school hoard 
has not requested that the police jury make any nec­
essary realignment of precincts.

In addition, your letter, citing Sl<m K | |; t
S. (It. ‘JSlti (1993), argue.- that the alternative plan 
developed by the NAACP is "so irrational on its face 
that the plan could lx* understood only as an effort to 
segregate voters into separate voting districts because 
of their race.” However, the school board provides 
no basis in fact nor explanation for this assertion, 
and our analysis of the plan does not support your 
conclusion. Moreover, the school board does not ap-



161a

pear to dispute the fact that black residents are suffi­
ciently numerous and geographically compact in the 
parish so that two black-majority districts could be 
created. You contend only that it is not possible to 
do so given current precinct configurations, which the 
school board has not sought to alter. In these circum­
stances, Shaw v. Reno does not provide a legal basis 
for withdrawing our objection, and the school board’s 
reliance upon that decision appears to be pretextual.

In light of the considerations discussed above, I 
remain unable to conclude that the Bossier Parish 
School District has carried its burden of showing the 
submitted change has neither a discriminatory pur­
pose nor a discriminatory effect. See Georgia v. 
United States, 411 IJ.S. 526 (1976); see also the 
Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 (28 
C.F.R. 51.52). Therefore, on behalf of the Attorney 
Ceneral, I must decline to withdraw the August 80, 
1993, objection to the 1992 redistricting plan for the 
school board.

As we previously advised, the school board retains 
the right to seek a declaratory judgment from the 
United States District Court for the District of Co­
lumbia that the objected-to change has neither the 
purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridg­
ing the light to vote on account of race or color. In 
addition, we remind you that unless and until a judg­
ment from the District of Columbia Court is obtained, 
the objection remains in effect and the objected-to 
change continues to be legally unenforceable. Clai k v. 
Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2096 (1991 ); 28 C.F.R. 51.10 
and 51.48(d).

To enable us to meet our responsibility to enforce 
the Voting Rights Act, please inform us of the action 
the Bossier Parish School District plans to take con-



162.1

cernjng this matter. If you have any questions, you 
should call (iaye Hume (20U-U07-GH02), an attomey 
in the Voting Section.

Sincerely,

s Janies I’. Turner 
J ames I*. T urner 
Acting Assistant Attorney General 
Civil Rights Division



I t r i . i

A P P E N D IX  E

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil Action No. 94-1495 
(LHS (USCA), CRR, UK)

B o s s i e r  P arish School Board, 
plaintiff

r.

J a n e t  Reno, defendant 

and
Georoe P rice, et al., 

DEFENDANT-INTERVENORS

NOTICE OF APPEAL
Notice is hereby given that, pursuant to 28 IJ.S.C. 

1292 and 42 U.S.C. 1972c, defendant Janet Reno 
hereby appeals to the United States Supreme Court 
from the Order of the United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia (three-judge court) en­
tered on November 2, 1995, granting preclearance 
under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 19(15, as 
amended, 42 U.S.C. 1973c, for the 1992 redistricting 
plan of plaintiff Bossier Parish School Board.



164a

Respectfully submitted,
Deval L. Patrick 
Assistant Attorney General

E ric H. Holder, J r.
United States Attorney

/'a/ Gaye L. Hume
E lizabeth J ohnson 
Rebecca J. W ertz 
Gave L. H ume 
D C. Bar No. 391539 
Steven ,). Miilroy 
N ancy J. Sardeson 
Attorneys, Voting Section 
Civil Rights Division 
Department of Justice 
P.0. Box 66138 
Washington, D.C. 20035-6128 
202-307-6302

[Certificate of Service Omitted in Printing]



1 6 5 a

APPENDIX F

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 
IJ.S.C. 1973, provides:

(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to 
voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall 
be imposed or applied by any State or political 
subdivision in a manner which results in a de­
nial or abridgement of the l ight of any citizen of 
the United States to vote on account of race or 
color, or in contravention of the guarantees set 
forth in section 1973b(f) (2) of this title, as pro­
vided in subsection (b) of this section.

(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this sec­
tion is established if, based on the totality of 
circumstances, it is shown that the political- proc­
esses leading to nomination or election in the 
State or political subdivision are not equally open 
to participation by members of a class of citizens 
protected by subsection (a) of this section in that 
its members have less opportunity than other 
members of the electorate to participate in the 
political process and to elect representatives of 
their choice. The extent to which members of a 
protected class have been elected to office in the 
State or political subdivision is one circumstance 
which may lie considered: Provided, That noth­
ing in this section establishes a right to have 
members of a protected class elected in numbers 
equal to their proportion in the population.

Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 
U.S.C. 1973c, provides:

Whenever a State or political subdivision with 
respect to which the prohibitions set forth in sec-



166a

tion 197;5b(a) of this title based upon determina­
tions made under the first sentence of section 
197dl>(h) of this title are in effect shall enact 
or seek to administer any voting qualification or 
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or 
procedure with respect to voting different from 
that in force or effect on November 1, 19(54, or 
whenever a State or political subdivision with 
respect to which the prohibitions set forth in 
section 1973b(a ) of this title based upon deter­
minations made under the second sentence of 
section 1973b(b) of this title are in effect shall 
enact or seek to administer any voting qualifica­
tion or prerequisite to voting, or standard, prac­
tice, or procedure with respect to voting different 
from that in force or effect on November 1, 
19(58, or whenever a State or political subdivision 
with respect to which the prohibitions set forth 
in section 1973b(a) of this Ij 1 It: based upon de­
terminations made under the third sentence of 
section 1973b(b ) of this title are in effect shall 
enact or seek to administer any voting qualifica­
tion or prerequisite to voting, or standard, prac­
tice, or procedure with respect to voting differ­
ent from that in loree or effect on November 1, 
1972, such State or subdivision may institute an 
action in the United States Disrtict Court for 
the District of Columbia for a declaratory judg­
ment that such qualification, prerequisite, stand­
ard, practice, or procedure does not have the 
purpose and will not have the effect of denying 
or abridging the right to vote on account of race 
or color, or in contravention of the guarantees 
set forth in section 1973b( f ) (2) of this title, 
and unless and until the court enters such judg-



167a

ment no person shall he denied the right to vote 
for failure to comply with such qualification, 
prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure: 
Provided, That such qualification, prerequisite, 
standard, practice, or procedure may he enforced 
without such proceeding if the qualification, pre­
requisite, standard, practice, or procedure has 
been submitted by the chief legal officer or other 
appropriate official of such Stale or subdivision 
to the Attorney General and the Attorney Gen­
eral has not interposed an objection within sixty 
days after such submission, or upon good cause 
shown, to facilitate an expedited approval within 
sixty days after such submission, the Attorney 
General has affirmatively indicated that such 
objection will not be made. Neither an affirma­
tive indication by the Attorney General that no 
objection will be made, nor the Attorney Gen­
eral’s failure to object, nor a declaratory judg­
ment entered under this section shall bar a sub­
sequent action to enjoin enforcement of such 
qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or 
procedure. In the event the Attorney General 
affirmatively indicates that no objection will be 
made within the sixty-day period following re­
ceipt of a submission, the Attorney General may 
resei-ve the right to reexamine the submission 
if additional information comes to his attention 
during the remainder of the sixty-day period 
which would otherwise require objection in ac­
cordance with this section. Any action under 
this section shall be heard and determined by a 
court of three judges in accordance with the pro­
visions of section 2284 of title 28 and any appeal 
shall lie to the Supreme Court.



168a

APPENDIX G

28 C.F.It. 51.55 (1995)

Consistency with constitutional and statutory  
requirements.

(a) Consideration in general. In making a deter­
mination the Attorney General will consider whether 
the change is free of discriminatory purpose and 
retrogressive effect in light of, and with particular 
attention being given to, the requirements of the 14th, 
15th, and 24th amendments to the Constitution, 42 
U.S.C. 1971(a) and (b), sections 2, 4(a),  4(f)(2),  
4(f) (4), 201, 203(c), and 208 of the Act, and other 
constitutional and statutory provisions designed to 
safeguard the light to vote from denial or abridge­
ment on account of race, color, or membership in a 
language minority group.

(b) Section 2. (1) Preclearance under section 5
of a voting change will not preclude any legal action 
under section 2 by the Attorney General if imple­
mentation of the change' subsequently demonstrates 
that such action is appropriate.

(2) In those instances in which the Attorney 
General concludes that, as proposed, the submitted 
change is free of discriminatory purpose and retro­
gressive effect, buL also concludes that a bar to imple­
mentation of the change is necessary to prevent a 
clear violation of amended section 2, the Attorney 
General shall withhold section 5 preclearance.

it a .  a .  aovitHMiMT M i n i m  o r n c i .  i t a a 4 0 0 0 I 7 4 0 0 7 4