Robinson v Shelby Country Board of Education Reply Brief for Appellants
Public Court Documents
October 1, 1971
44 pages
Cite this item
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Robinson v Shelby Country Board of Education Reply Brief for Appellants, 1971. dcabfda4-c29a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/3fbca65b-089f-4965-a629-1c5ff823fac1/robinson-v-shelby-country-board-of-education-reply-brief-for-appellants. Accessed October 24, 2025.
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THl SIXTH CIRCUIT
NO. 71-1825
CLAUDE BERNARD ROBINSON, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
SHELBY COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Tennessee
Western Division
REPLY BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS
WILLIAM E. CALDWEEL
RATNER, SUGARMON AND LUCAS
525 Commerce Title Bldg.
Memphis, Tennessee 38103
JACK GREENBERG
NORMAN J. CHACHKIN
10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-
Appellants
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Cases ..........................
Statement ....................
Recent Procedural History................
The Board's Plan ......................
The Title IV Center's Memorandum ........
The United States' Plan ..............
The District Court's Decision and the Plan Approved Therein ......................
ARGUMENT..........
Pa^e
ii
3
3
7
10
11
19
22
The District Court Erred In Holding That Racially
Identifiable Schools Do Not Have To Be Segregated Unless Their Racial Identity Can Be Linked To
Some Specific Segregation-Causing Act Of The
Defendant School Board, Which Admittedly Operated A Racially Dual School System and Which This
Court and The District Courg Found Had Not
Disestablished That System .................. 22
The District Court Erred In Holding That Racially
Identifiable "White" Schools Do Not Have To Be
Desegregated Where Pedagogically Feasible and Sound Alternatives Exist .................... 29
The District Court Erred In Approving A Plan
"Which Does Not Do As Much To Disestablish Segre
gation As An Alternative Proposal Which Is Feasible And Pedagogically Sound"............ 30
The District Court Erred In Approving The Closing
Of Black Schools on Grounds Of White Community
Hostility And Without Requiring The School Board
lo Justify Such Closings With Compelling Educational Reasons, And In Holding As A Matter of Law That
School Board Actions Which Place Discriminatory
Burdens On Negroes In The Desegregation Process,
In The Face Of Reasonable And Fair Alternatives,Are Not Constitutionally Proscribed.......... 32
Conclus ion 38
Table of Cases
Page
38Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) . . .
Bradley V. Milliken, C.A. No. 35257 (E.D.
Mich. September 27, 1971 ........ 25
Clark v. Board of Educ. of Little Rock,
Nos. 71-1409, 71-1415 (8thCir. Sept. 10, 1971.............. 26
Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs of
Mobile County, 402 U.S. (1971). . 6, 24
Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968)................ 3
Haney v. County Board of Educ., 410 F.2d
920 (8th Cir. 1969) ............ 26
Kelley v. Metropolitan County Board, C.A. Nos
2094, 2956 (M.D. Tenn. June 28,1971)....................
•
27, 28, 29
31
Mannings V. Board of Public Instruction of
Hillsborough County, C. A. No. 3554 (M.D. Fla. May 11, 1971) . . . 26-27, 29
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) .......... 3, 24-25
United States v. Watson Chapel School Dist.,
No. 20,699 (8th Cir. August 11, 1971) 26
Table of Cases For Motion For Summary Reversal
Motion Page
Bell v. West Point Municipal Separate
SchooliDist., No.^pl75 (5th Cir. July
Brice V. Landis, 314 F. Supp. 974 (N.D.Calif. 1969)................ .. 2.̂
Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, supra. . 9, 10-11
Gordon v. Jefferson Davis Parish School
Board, No. 30075 (5th Cir. June 28, 1971). 16
Green v. County School Board, supra ........ 9,10-11
Green V. School Bd. of Roanoke, 316 F. Supp.
6 (W.D. Va. 1970), aff'd in part
sub nom., Adams v. School Dist.
No. 5, 444 F.2d 99 (4th Circ.1971) (en banc).............. 14-15
Haney v. County Board of Educ., 429 F.2d
364 (8th Cir. 1970) .......... 13
Kelley v. Metropolitan County Board, 436
856 (6th Cir. 1970) .......... F. 2d
11
Lee v. Macon County Board of Educ., No. 30154
(5th Cir. June 29, 1971) ........ 15-16
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) . . • • 13
Quarles v. Oxford Municipal Separate School Dist., Civ. No. WC 6962-K (N.D. Miss.
Jan. 7, 1970) (oral opinion) . . . . 15
Smith v. St. Tammany Parrish School, 302
F. Supp. 106 (E.D. La. 1969) • • 13
Spangler v. Pasadena City Board of Educ.,
F. Supp. 501 (C.D. Calif. 1970) 311
• • 13
Swann v. Charlotte—Mecklenburg, supra . . • • 00
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg, C.A. No.
1974 (W.D.N.C. June 22, 1971) . • • 16
United States v. Jefferson County Board of Educ.,
372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir.), aff'd on rehearing
en banc, 380 F.2d 385 (1966), cert, denied
sub nom., Caddo Parrish School Board v.
United States, 389 U.S. 840 (1967). 7,8
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
NO. 71-1825
CLAUDE BERNARD ROBINSON, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
SHELBY COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Tennessee
Western Division
REPLY BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS
On September 1, 1971, plaintiffs-appellants
filed in this Court a Motion for Summary Reversal of
the district court's decision of August 11, 1971. By
order dated September 27, 1971, the Court treated
plaintiff's motion as the brief for appellants and
established a schedule for filing Brief for Appellees
and this Reply Brief for Appellants. The case was set
for argument on October 20, 1971, and appellants were
directed to file the reporter's transcript prior to that
date.
As the transcript was not available when the
’•'otion for Summary Reversal was filed, we take this
opportunity to elaborate on the facts, with appropriate
references to the transcript, in order that the Court
may have a full understanding of the factual develop
ments below.
The issues presented for review are the four
errors assigned at pages 2-3 of the Motion for Summary
Reversal, i/
— Appellees have chosen to restate and consol,
date the issues presented for review (Appellees' Brief
at 1-2). The issues as stated by appellees, however,
ave little if anything to do with this appeal, as will
be further discussed, infra.
Statement
A. Recent Procedural History
April 6, 1970, the district court entered an
opinion (311 F. Supp. 97) from which plaintiffs appealed.
May 10, 1971, this Court remanded the case to the district
court, the principal opinion by Judge McCree holding that
the district court had erred under Green v. County School
Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968), in approving the defendant
Board's zoning plan "which [did] not do as much to
disestablish segregation as an alternative proposal
[by the Title IV Center] which is feasible and pedago-
gically sound." 442 F.2d 255, 258 (6th Cir. 1970).
On remand, the district court held a pre
trial conference with counsel for all parties on May 28,
1971, and entered an order the same day directing the
defendant Board to file within two weeks a plan for
complete desegregation of its school system, and also
f-/ Plaintiffs filed their complaint in this
case on June 12, 1963. The United States intervened on
May 6, 1966. The pertinent history of this litigation
is set forth in the district court's 1970 opinion, 311 F. Supp. at 99-101.
2/judge Weick concurred in the remand and Judge
Miller concurred in the result, both judges indicating
that a reconsideration in light of Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28 L. Ed. 2d
554 (April 20, 1971) was appropriate.
-3-
requesting the Educational Opportunities Planning Center
at the University of Tennessee [hereinafter, "Title IV
Center" or "Center" or "court's expert"] to file a plan
at the same time. (A. 17-18).i/ Plaintiffs were allowed
one week following the filing of plans to object thereto,
and then "such additional reasonable time as may be
necessary for plaintiffs to prepare and submit an alter
native to such plan or plans, if they so elect." (A. 17).1/
June 9, 1971, defendant Board filed its Revised
Desegregation Plan (A. 19-24 and maps), and the Title
IV Center filed a memorandum suggesting certain modifi
cations of the Board's plan (A. 30-32).®/ June 11, 1971,
plaintiffs filed their objections to the Board's plan
4/"A.___" references are to the previously-filed Appendix to Motion for Summary Reversal.
—^In addition, the order provided that if
plaintiffs elected to submit a plan they could apply
to the Court to have the costs of any such plan assessed against defendants. (A. 18).
In view of the Title IV Center's memorandum
the Board, on June 15, filed an alternate proposal for
two elementary schools. (A.25-26 and map). The
Board subsequently filed on July 16,1971, a modi
fication to its plan, necessitated by the burning
of Millington Central elementary school. (A. 27-28).
-4-
and the Center's memorandum, and sought leave to have
a plan prepared at the Board's expense. (A. 33-35).U
The district court conducted a hearing on the
submissions cf the Board and Title IV Center on June
21, 1971. The plaintiff-intervenor, United States of
America, filed its objections to the plans at the hearing.
(Tr. 9, A. 37-38). The June 21 hearing was prematurely
terminated (Tr. 210) because of a commitment of defendant
Board's attorney in a state court matter (Tr. 229).
June 23, 1971 the district court entered a memorandum
decision and order directing plaintiffs and the United
States "each to file wholly new and entire plans"
7/ Plaintiffs sought to have a plan prepared
at Board expense on the ground that the Board's plan
and the Center's modifications patently failed to
comply with this Court's remand opinion and the Supreme
Court's decision in Swann, supra. (A. 35). On June
10, 1971 (the day before plaintiffs' objections
were filed), however, the district court, by letter
to counsel, scneduled a hearing on the submissions
of the Board and Title IV Center for June 21, 1971.
On June 14, 1971, plaintiffs requested a continuance
of the June 21 hearing and informed the Court that
they could not obtain an expert and prepare a plan
in such a short period of time, but the request was
denied. (Tr. 4 - 7 ) . Nevertheless, plaintiffs were
able to secure an expert and had an alternative
plan prepared for presentation at the June 21
hearing. (Tr. 9). Plaintiffs were not permitted
to present their plan at that hearing, however,
because the Court was unable to conclude tne hearing
by 1:00 p.m. as it had hoped. (Tr. 43 - 44,173 - 74 . )
-5-
The United States filed its plan on July
15, 1971 (A. 68-100 and maps), but plaintiffs were
financially unable to present a plan. (a . 65-66).£/
July 22, 1971, plaintiffs filed their response to the
United States' plan (A. 105-08) and defendant
Board filed its objections to the plan.
The district court conducted a 5-day hearing
on August 2-6, 1971, and entered its decision on August
by July 15, 1971. (A. 40-43.®/
8 /- The district court was of the view that
Justice ™ P ^ ntlffS and the Departnent o?
r S i n g » 71 S42? Sd thSir demandS since
1 9 7 0 o p in i o n the c o u r t s a i d : " i t i s i m p l i c i t i n
o r i g i n a l ° n l a i n t i f t hS A t t o r n e l’ G eneral and th e
r e q u i r e s S ? co n te n d t h a t th e C o n s t i t u t i o n
b a l a n J I f e a s i b l e s t e p s be ta k e n t o
a t 101 w6 f a c e s . in each s c h o o l . " 3 H F . Supp.
KG 1SSUe With the district court on
wS Sid n S ^ a n d ^ r h?V® ^ escalated °ur demands and r-u not and do not seex to have the s c h n n l ? i r>Shelby County racially balanced. We merely seek
t a k i n a r i i £ o S t p o s s l u l e de9 r e e o f a c t u a l d e s e g r e g a t i o n
s i t u a t i o n ^ a P co u n t th e P r a c t i c a l i t i e s o f t h l '
S o b i ^ g ^ t u ^ ^ c B° a rd ? ! j e h o o ^ c o n w r s o ,
71971). * ' ' 28 L. Ed.2d 577, 580-81
denied (Tr~ 217) renewed their request, previously
Boa^d (A «-66 ' b h hfVe - assessed against the *
decision dated 28 ?97} U Ct J°Urt' by me”°randum
motion. (A. 109-lo77^On^July M ^ l ^ l ^ t l E r -*
filed a motion to amend or modify the July 28 S
thiS std Vp ding in
-6-
11, 1971. (A. 1-15). W
B. The Board's Plan
The Board's proposed plan is substantially
the same as the one under which it operated last
year, which was disapproved in this Court's May 10
opinion. The Board's plan, as filed, contains 27
elementary schools with a projected enrollment of
15,455 pupils, of whom 4,981 or 32.2% are black,
and 6 high schools with a projected enrollment of
7,517 pupils, of whom 2,624 or 34.9% are black.
The total enrollment projected for the current school
year was 22,972, of which 7,605 or 33.1% are black.
(A. 24).
— Prior to the August hearing two groups
of white parents and their children moved to intervene
as plaintiffs. One group ("Coro Lake Intervenors")
was concerned with the proposed pairing of Coro Lake
and White's Chapel elementary schools. The other group
("Ellendale Intervenors") was concerned with the
Board's proposal to close Ellendale elementary school
and consolidate it with Shadowlawn elementary school.In addition, the Coro Lake Intervenors moved to join
the Board of Education of the Memphis City Schools as
a party defendant for the purpose of utilizing the City
school of Westwood in desegregating White's Chapel
and Coro Lake. Since both parties sought more dese
gregation then the Board proposed, plaintiffs did not
oppose the interventions. The district court granted
the motions to intervene and the motion to join the City Board. (A. 109).
Since the August 11 decision two additional
white parties have sought to intervene, but the motions
were denied on August 31, 1971. Beth parties have
since renewed tneir motions and seek to present alter
natives to the Shadowlawn clustering, but these motions
were denied on October 12, 1971.
-7-
At the elementary level (grades 1-8) the Board
proposed only two changes: (1) pairing Barrett's Chapel
and Bolton elementaries with grades 1-6 or 1-8 to
be housed at Barrett's Chapel (projected 61.6% black^ V )
(Tr. 29-30); (2) closing Ellendale and adding its
pupils to the Shadowlawn zone (projected 69.7% black)
(Tr. 30).12/ Of the 27 elementary schools in the
Board's proposed plan, 10 were projected to be more
than 50% black and 10 were projected to be less than
20% black, in a system projected to be 32.2% black
at the elementary level. (A. 23-24).13/
11/The projected % black figures are taken from the projected enrollment charts filed with the Board's plan. (A. 23-24).
12/— In changing the Shadowlawn zone to take Ellendale, the Board also enlarged the Elmore Park
zone to take in most of the black Ellendale students,
leaving mostly white students to go to Shadowlawn. (Tr.
30-31). Last year Ellendale was 24.1% black (Exhibit 7; A. Ill) and Elmore Park was 15.1% black (A. 111).
Elmore Park was projected under the Board's plan to be 20% black (A. 23).
13/After the Title IV Center filed its memo
randum recommending the pairing of Riverdale (projected
3.2% black) and Germantown (projected 40.2% black)
the Board, while contending that Riverdale was a "de
facto" segregated school (Tr. 984-95; A.25), filed“an
alternate proposal admitting the feasibility of dese
gregating Riverdale. (A. 25-26). (This was part of the
continuing bartering process carried on between the
Board and the district court, see note 33,infra.)
At the June 21 hearing, the Superintendent stated that
his first preference (if anything at all had to be
done) was to pair the two schools, with his second
preference being to desegregate Riverdale by noncon
tiguous zoning. (Tr. 2 5 - 2 7 ) . He subsequently reversed
this order of preference. (Tr. 958-64).
-8-
At the high school level the Board made two
changes in last year's plan: (1) Bolton became the high
school (projected 65.9% black) in the pairing with Barrett's
Chapel (Tr. 36); (2) Mt. Pisgah high school (94.8%
black last year, A. 113) would be closed and its high
school students assigned by rezoning to Germantown
(projected 46.1% black), Collierville (projected 52.3%
black) and Bartlett (projected 24.2% black) (Tr. 36-37).
The Board refused to adopt three recommenda
tions made last year by the Title IV Center and which
were consequently incorporated in this Court's May 10
remand : (1) To pair Coro Lake (projected 30.1%
black) with White's Chapel (projected 100% black) (see
311 F. Supp. at 103); (2) to pair E.A. Harrold (projected
76.3% black) with Millington Central elementary (pro
jected 16.6% black) (see 311 F. Supp. at 104)— /;
— /The Superintendent took a rather self-serving,
if inconsistent view of this Court's remand opinion.
For example, he testified that since the closing of Ellen-
dale to desegregate Shadowlawn was part of the Center's
plan which was before this Court he was not at liberty
to propose other feasible and more effective alternatives,
yet he completely ignored the recommendations listed in
the text, as well as the Center's proposal that Barrett's
Chapel be the hign school when paired with Bolton.(Tr. 1147-49).
ii/The Board proposed to build a "middle school" in this area of the County and close Harrold when the
middle school opens next year. (Tr. 33-36). Millington
Central elementary burned during the summer, and the
Board was forced to modify its plan. (A. 27-28). The
modification places Millington Central grades 1-2 at
a former parochial school which has been leased by the
board, grades 3-4 at Harrold and grades 5-6 in portables
at the burned out site. The placing of Millington Central
grades 3-4 at Harrold will not desegregate Harrold,
however, because the grades will remain segregated.
(Tr. 1386). -9-
(3) rezoning white high school students from Germantown
to Mt. Pisgah ±i/ (see 311 F. Supp. at 1C4).
C. The Title IV Center's Memorandum
The Title IV Center '/ recommended only two
modifications of the Board's plan: (1) Pairing White's
Chapel and Coro Lake (A. 31; Tr. 176); (2) pairing
Riverdale and Germantown (A. 31-32; Tr. 176-77).i®/
16/The Board's plan as previously pointed out, closes Mt. Pisgah high scnool.
17/The Title IV Center was represented by Dr. Frederick P. Venditti at the June 21 hearing (Tr. 175),
and by Dr. Marshall E. Meyer, Jr. at the August hearing
(Tr. 1184), each testifying as the court's witness.
Title IV Desegregation Centers came into existence as a
result of Civil Rights Act of 1964 to assist school
districts in the desegregation process. (Tr. 1328).
The Centers are agencies of the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare (HEW) and their activities are
supervised by that department. (Tr. 1328-29). For the
last one and one-half years, desegregation plans prepared by Title IV Centers for presentation to a court are
reviewed by a HEW "ad hoc committee" comprised of repre
sentatives of HEW, the Department of Justice and the White
House "to see if it is consistent with administration policy. (Tr. 1329-31). The Center's memorandum
recommendations in the instant case were not reviewed by
HEW's "ad hoc committee," however, because the memorandum was not considered a "plan." (Tr. 1332).
18/. . — The Center thus did not follow throughwith two of its previous recommendations. (See Motion
for Summary Reversal at 4 n.5). The Center I U o
initially went along with the Board's proposal to build
a scnool on Whitten Road (Tr. 1 7 7 —7 8 ) , but subsequently
reversed its position in that regard. (Tr. 1194-96
1 1 9 9 - 1 2 0 0 , 1 2 1 9 - 2 0 . ) '
-10-
The Center admitted that its modifications of the Board's
plan did not create a unitary school system in Shelby
County for the 1971-72 school year. (Tr. 1327)
D. The United States' Plan
The plan filed by the United States was presented
through the testimony of Dr. Warren Buford.12/ Although
Dr. Buford prefers to "start from scratch" in preparing
school desegregation plans, he was limited in the instant
case by the attorneys for the United States to modifying
the Board's plan--i.e., "using the School Board proposal
as the basis for ... development of [the] plan." (Tr.
407-12, 439). Nevertheless, the Government's plan
accomplishes substantially more desegregation than
the Board's plan as modified by the Title IV Center.
The Government's elementary plan leaves three
majority black elementary schools: Woodstock (66%
black.?0/) , Arlington (61% black) and Capleville (74% black).— /
19/Dr. Buford and the other members of the team
assembled by HEW to prepare the United States' plan are
affili-atsd with the Title IV Center at the University of
South Carolina. (Tr. 247-49). The team has considerable
experience in preparing school desegregation plans. (Tr. 245-47).
— ^The % black figures are taken from the tables filed as part of the United States' plan. (A. 93-96).
—i/These scnools were left alone by the Govern
ment's expert because of their apparent stability and the
lac.-: of relatively reasonable alternatives. Dr. Buford
insisted, nowever, that these schools be closely scrutinized
the next, year or two to insure that they do not become
resegregated. (Tr. 316-17). In addition to these three
schools, the United States plan also leaves Bolton elementary
58% black in grades 1-5, but because of an arrangement with
Millington East (11.5% black last year, A. 112) Bolton is
(Continued next page)-11-
In addition, the Unted States' plan left four white
elementary schools: Bartlett (14% black), Coleman
(11% black), Raleigh-Bartlett Meadows (11% black),
Spring Hills (13% black). (A. 93-96).
The Government's plan desegregates Mt. Pisgah
elementary school (93% black last year, A. 112) by
closing James and Cordova (which the Board planned
to do in 1972), zoning in additional white pupils from
that portion of the Board's Riverdale zone located north of
21/— • (cont'd.) only 40% black in grades 6-8.
(A. 95). Although majority black in student enrollment
(in a 33% black system), these four schools were
projected to have fairly substantial pupil integration
and plaintiffs supported Dr. Buford's approach to
these schools.
2 2/— ' Although there are feasible alternatives
available which would eliminate the racial identity
of these four white scnools, the schools service an area a substantial portion of which is to be annexed
by the City of Memphis, and some of these schools
will be operated by the Memphis school system begin
ning in 1973; for this reason, Dr. Buford and the
Justice Department attorneys determined that these
schools should be left alone. (Tr. 330-33, 421-28).
The Superintendent subsequently testified, however,
that annexation was not a sufficient reason for leaving
these schools alone, and he agreed to a plan (the one
approved by the district court) which clustered
Raleigh-Bartiett Meadows with schools not to be
annexed. (Tr. 1077-78).
-12-
the Shelby County Penal Farm,£V and zoning black students
in the Bridgewater area of the former Mt. Pisgah zone into
Elmore Park. (Tr. 321-25). The projection was that Mt.
Pisgah would be 49% black in grades 1-5 and 46%
black in grades 6-8. (A. 94). The court's expert
(the Title IV Center) agreed that the Mt. Pisgah plan
was feasible (Tr. 189-90, 191-92), and, in fact, that
it offered tne only promise for desegregation of Mt.
Pisgah. (Tr. 1262-70, 1275).24/
Shadowlawn (97% black last year, A.112) is
desegregated by using a "clustering" arrangement whereby
all students in grades 6-8 in the Shadowlawn, Brownsville
(1.1% black last year) and Egypt (4.8% black last year)
zones are assigned to Shadowlawn, and the Shadowlawn
2 3/— The Board's Riverdale zone is in effect a
noncontiguous zone, as the northern portion of the zone
(known as Whitten Height's and containing some 300 white
pupils) is completely cut off from the southern portion
(which contains the Riverdale school) by the Shelby
County Penal Farm (which contains no through roads).
All of the Whitten Heights white pupils are already
being bused to Riverdale, and this part of the Mt.
Pisgah plan entails no increase in transportation.(Tr. 106-08, 323).
24/— The Superintendent did not question the
feasibility of the plan, but criticized it because
it does "the same thing we did under the segregated
school system when blacks were picxed up and passed
whites ... and they are passing each other on the
road going in opposite directions." (Tr. 989). At
one time the Board bused the black students in the
Bridgewater area past the white schools of Elmore
Park and Ellendale to Shadowlawn. (Tr. 1105).
-13-
students in grades 1-5 are, by zoning, equally divided
between Brownsville and Egypt. (Tr. 327-28). The
projection was that Shadowlawn would be 25% black,
and Brownsville and Egypt each would be 31% black.
(A. 95). There was no question about the feasibility
of this clustering arrangement, although both the
Superintendent and the Title IV Center preferred varia
tions clustering different schools with Snadowlawn.
(Tr. 1214-19, 1022-31, 1045-50).^/ The Superintendent,
however, wanted to nouse only grades seven and eight
(rather than 6-8) at Shadowlawn; the United States
argued that the Superintendent's proposal placed an
unreasonable share of the burden on black students and
that more grades should be retained at Shadowlawn to mere
equally distribute the burdens of desegregations between
blacks and whites (Tr. 1401-02) , with which the Title IV
Center agreed. (Tr. 129 8-9 9 ) .
— ^Since the Board's plan closed Ellendale, the United States' plan did not consider using Ellendale
(24.1% black last year) in the Shadowlawn cluster. The
United States agreed, however, that Ellendale could be
retained and incorporated into the cluster (Tr. 1401) , as did plaintiffs (A. 115).
— /As we understand the position of the Ellendale Intervenors (the only party to file a response to our
motion for summary reversal), this is the only issue with
which they are concerned— i.e., the possibility of
having only grades 1-5 at Ellendale rather than grades
1-6. As previously noted, plaintiffs agreed to Inter
venors' desires to retain Ellendale (see note 25, supra).
With regard to the proposal placing a disproportionate share of the burdens on black students at
Shadowlawn, the district court gives plaintiffs credit for
raising this issue below. (A. 14 n.14) . As pointed out
in the text, the United States raised this particular
(Cont'd. next page)-14-
As previously set forth, the Board's plan
paired Barrett's Chapel and Bolton, with Barrett's
Chapel to be tne elementary facility (projected 61.6% black).
The Government's expert, in addition to the pairing,
preferred Bolton as the elementary facility^-Z/ and
sought further desegregation by way of a rezoning arrange
ment with Millington East (11.5% black last year, A.
112). (Tr. 334-40, 3 5 2 - 5 3 ) . The projection was
— ^(Cont'd) point at the hearing; nevertheless, plaintiffs support that position and urge it here.
27/— Under both the Board's plan and the Government's plan, the elementary school and the high school
are called "Barrett's-Bolton," because of the pairing.
The Board, however, makes the formerly white facility
(Bolton) the high scnool, and the formerly black school
(Barrett's Chapel) the elementary school, whereas the Government's plan reverses this arrangement.
1®/The arrangement works like this: MillingtonEast is reduced from grades 1-8 to grades 1-5 and the
zone is enlarged to include the eastern portion of the
s-Bolton zone and the northern portion of the
Millington Central elementary zone; Barrett's-Bolton
serves grades 1-5 in the remainder of its zone and
serves all pupils in grades 6-8 in the Millington nast and Barrett's-Bolton zones.
-15-
that Millington East would be 22% black and Barrett's
Bolton would be 58% black in grades 1-5 and 40% black
in grades 6-8. (A. 95). The Superintendent and the
Title IV Center agreed that the plan was feasible
(Tr. 154, 204), and the Center considered it educa
tionally sound and admitted that it resulted in more
desegregation than the Board's plan. (Tr. 1284-90).
The final portion of the Government's elementary
plan involves three schools in the Millington area:
Harrold (72.7% black last year, A. 111-112), Millington
Central (21.1% black last year) and Millington South
(7.9% black last year). These schools are desegregated
via a clustering arrangement whereby Millington South
and Harrold are rezoned to serve grades 1-5 in the
area, and Millington Central serves all pupils in grades
6-8 in the area. (Tr. 353-58) .29/ The projection
was that Harrold would be 19% black, Millington South
would be 18% black, and Millington Central would be
24% black. (A. 96). The Superintendent admitted that
the plan would work (Tr. 1085-86) and the Title IV
Center agreed that it was feasible and accomplished
29/
x. . . ... Alth°ugh the Millington Central Elementary facility ourned during the summer, this fact
does not affect the plan aecause grades 6-8 can be
ln S£aCf Wl1llch iS available in the adjoining Millington Central high school plant and the leased
parochial school across tne street. (Tr. 358-66, 384-87)
-16-
more desegregation. (Tr. 1256-60).2£/
The Government's high school plan also accom
plishes more desegregation than the Beard's plan.31/
The Government considered only one change from the Board'
high school plan to be legally mandated: Barrett's-
Bolton high school (projected 65.9% black, A. .24).
The Government's plan places the high school at the Bar
rett's Chapel facility, which Dr. Buford considers a
more desirable high school plant (Tr. 286-88), alters
the zone line between Barrett's-Bolton and Millington
Central to bring more whites into Barrett's from the
Central area. (Tr. 285-86). All parties agree that
this proposal is feasible and creates no additional
busing. (Tr. 299-301, 933-35, 1094-95, 1208-11, 1224-
25, 1284-90). The projection was that Barrett's-
Bolton would be 53% black and Millington Central would
be 33% black. (A. 91)
30/The Board proposed to close Harrold a year from now when its "middle school" is built.
Although Dr. Buford was very much in favor of the
middle school, he strongly opposed the proposal to close
Harrold, which he sees as having a very viable educa
tional function even after the middle school is constructed. (Tr. 384-87, 456).
31/It is to be remembered that Dr. Buford did not "start from scratch", but was limited to
modifying tne Board's plan. (See pace , supra).
Thus, he did not consider the desirability of retaining
Mt. Pisgah high school, which the Board's plan closes. (Tr. 4 36-41) .
-17-
Although the Justice Department attorneys
felt that the Barrett■s-Bolton high school modification
"met minimum legal requirements”(Tr. 201), their expert
felt tnat further modifications of the Board's plan
were necessary for complete high school desegregation.
(Tr. 407-12). Dr. Buford therefore expanded the Raleigh
Egypt zone to take in more black students from the
Bartlett zone, thereby increasing Egypt from 13.7%
black (A. 24) to 24% black (A. 91) (Tr. 304, 309);
more slack students were then added to Bartlett from the
Collierville and Germantown zones, with the following
effects: Bartlett increased from 24.2% black (A, 24)
to 26% black (A. 91), Germantown decreased from 46.1%
black to 40% black, and Collierville decreased from
52.3% black to 50% black. (Tr. 301-02). These changes
do not result in any increase in busing.
The Government's plan was a significant step
toward complete desegregation of the Shelby County public
schools, although Dr. Buford conceded that the plan
does not eliminate all racially identifiable schools.
(Tr. 460). ho serious questions as to the feasibility
of implementing the plan are raised. The Government
estimated that their plan would cost an additional
$52,447.40 (A. 98), but that this cost would be more
than offset by the closing of Cordova and James (A. 99)
(Tr. 382-84). The plan states that ten additional
buses will be needed (A. 98), but because of extra buses
on hand this number was reduced to two (Tr. 381). Both
- 18-
Dr. Buford and the Court's expert were in agreement that
cost was not significant (Tr. 460-61,. 1290-91), and
that the plan could be implemented with existing
transportation facilities by proper staggering of
school opening times so that each bus could make
additional runs (Tr. 381-84, 461-62, 1293-96).!?/
^• The District Court’s Decision and the Plan ApprovedTherein -
The plan approved by the district court is
basically the Board's plan, as modified by the Title
IV Center. All of the Board's high school plan was
approved. The court held that no further desegregation
of the Barrett's-Bolton high school was required be
cause "these schools would be the same if there had never
been de jure school segregation applicable to the
area they serve." (A. 8). The court did not mention Dr
Buford's recommended changes for the other high schools.
The court thus approved the operation of Barrett's-
Bolton at 65.9% black and Raleigh-Egypt at 13.7% black.
The Board's elementary plan was approved, with
one exception: rather than close Ellendale, the court
approved a clustering arrangement for Shadowlav/n sub
stantially tr.e same as one agreed to by the Superintendent
(Tr. 1045-50),— / involving Ellendale, Bartlett, Elmore
!?/The Board always has staggered school
openings to accomodate its bus schedules. (Tr. 98-59,104-06 ) .
33/The distr ict court did not order anything not
agreed to by the Superintendent. Indeed, the Board's plan
-19- <c°nti nued on next page)
Park, Raleigh-Bartlett Meadows and Brownsville. (A. 12-
13). The plan approved by the district court thus leaves
Barrett's-Bcltcn elementary at 61.6% black.* 34 35/ Coleman
at 11.3% black, Egypt at 4.2% black, Harrold at 76.3%
black,35/ Millington East at 13.3% black, Millington
̂-a /— (Cont'd) as filed in June can be viewed
as the Superintendent's "first offer" — the first step
in the bartering process with the district court.
(See, e.g., Tr. 1022-31, 1045-50, 1050-58, 1385-83).
34 /— Barrett1s-Bclton elementary was left alone for the same reasons as the high school (noted in text) and the adjacent Millington East elementary (13.
black) was left alone either because it "would have
significant integration" (A. 10) or because "[e]ven
if ... we wou)d be required to consider the use of
some of the pupils in this area [Barrett's-Bolton]
to treat surrounding schools, the answer is the same
since we do not believe that the surrounding schools need be treated." (a. 8-9).
35 /~— As previously described, although the Harrold building will have more whites in it, they
will be segregated by grade under the Board's
plan, as the Superintendent testified. (Tr. 1386; see note 15, supra).
-20-
South at 6% black,22/Mt. Pxsgah at 93.1% black and
Spring Hill at 13.5% black. (A. 23-24),22/
The district court held that racially identi
fiable "white" schools did not have to be desegregated
because it did not "believe that the Supreme Court held
the equal protection clause to be that quixotic in
purpose." (A. 4). The district court also held that
discrimination against Negroes in the desegregation
process is not a concern which rises to constitutional
proportions. (See Motion for Summary Reversal at 11-13).
— Millington South is a racially identifiable white school for more reasons than tradition. The school
is located in the center of part of a 90-unit housing
project operated by the Millington Housing Authority.
(Tr. 344-45) The remainder of the project is located
around Harrold scnool. (Tr. 344) All of the units around
Millington South are occupied by white tenants and all
of the units around Harrold are occupied by black tenants.
(Tr. 345). These units were constructed and located
where they are pursuant to a policy of racial segregation.
(Tr. 348). The Millington Housing Authority is presently
defendant to a complaint filed in the district court
alleging racial discrimination. (Tr. 345-46). The
Authority's answer defends on the ground that the segre
gated "arrangement was originally made to facilitate
and enable the tenants to be close to schools attended by their children." (Exhibit 12, p. 3 - filed as an
offer of proof).
— The Government's plan would have desegre
gated all of these schools except Coleman and Spring Hill.
-21-
Argument
The District Court Erred In Holding That Racially
Identifiable Schools Do hot have to Be Desegregated
Unless Their Racial Identity Can Be Linked To
Some Specific Segregation-Causing Act of The
Defendant School Board, Which Admittedly Operated ---------------------- ----------------- --...»-------A Racially Dual School System And Which This
Court And Tne District Court Found Had Not
Disestablished That System 3~o7
The district court accepted the Board's
pairing plan (originally the Title IV Center's plan
incorporated in this Court's remand) for Barrett' s-
Chapel (formerly black) and Bolton (formerly white)
and did not require further desegregation as proposed
by the United States' plan, because
substantially all of the evidence
introduced in this case in the
various proceedings supports the
proposition that the contemplated racial
composition of these schools would be
the same if there had never been
de jure segregation applicable to the
area they serve. Thus the racial
composition of these schools cannot
be said to be a vestige of state-
imposed segregation. (A. 8).
38/— ' Defendants either misunderstand or misre
present this issue by arguing that our position would
pronibit a determination of the racial identifiability
of each school in the first instance. (Appellees'
Brief at 7-10). Obviously, those schools which are
substantially integrated can be left alone, unless it
is necessary to make changes regarding them in order
to desegregate those schools which remain substantially
disproportionate in their racial compositions. Equally
obvious, only those schools which remain racially
identifiable have to be desegregated. Our point is
that all such sc.iools nust be desearegated and some
schools cannot be left segregated in former dual systems
by reason of such nebulous investigations into the
causes of segregation as the district court conducted
here.
-22-
There are several things factually wrong with
this determination. First, if the district court
is correct, then under the same theory these schools do
not even have to be paired, but could be left as they
were last year with their so-called "unitary zones." But
, Ithe court does not so hold, apparently recognizing the
fact that the Board has historically maintained two
schools in this area, one for blacks and one for whites,
each serving grades 1-12.
Second, there is a substantial question
regarding the existence of the evidentiary support the
district court claims for tnis determination. We
are not aware of anything in the record of the latest
proceedings which supports the court's proposition.
The only testimony bearing directly on the point
appears in the court's direct examination of its expert:
Q. In your study of that area [Barrett*s- Bolton] have you run across anything that
would indicate to you that the situation
would be any different up there with
respect to black-white ratios in those
schools if we had never had de jure segre
gation up there, or to put it another way—
if you set that area down in the middle of
Indiana or Illinois, do you thing that
the ratio would be any different than what will be there?
A. I really can't come up with an answer on that. (Tr. 1226-27). '
Even under persistent questioning by tne district court the
expert was unable to agree. (Tr. 1227-29).
The foregoing serves to point out the impossi
bility of the district court's inquiry. Even if the
-23-
inquiry were proper the answer would evade us, for the
question assumes a fact that never was and is not yet—
i.e., that the Shelby County Board of Education never
P^ac-"ticed racial discrimination. For the very reason
that all things are not equal in a system that has
been deliberately constructed and maintained to enforce
racial segregation" (Swann, supra, 28 L. Ed. 2d at ),
there is no way of knowing what the situation would be
like had defendants treated Negroes equally during the
century which has elapsed since the Fourteenth Amend
ment became part of the Constitution.
But the district court insists that Swann,
by requiring elimination of "all vestiges of state-
imposed segregation," requires or at least permits this
"de facto - de jure" inquiry. We submit that it does
n°t -- that in cases like Swann the inquiry is whether
the effects and vestiges of the segregation policy have
been disestablished with the thoroughness required by
the remedial principles announced therein; if not, then
those remedial measures must be applied throughout the
system witn the goal of achieving "the greatest possible
degree of actual desegregation, taking into account the
practicalities of the situation." Davis v. Board of
School Comm'rs, supra, 28 L. Ed. 2d at 580-81.
The district court overlooks that portion of
Swann which recognizes the mutual interaction between
school segregation and residential segregation:
The location of schools may thus
influence the patterns of residential
-24-
development ....
In the past, choices in this respect
have been used as a potent weapon for
creating or maintaining a state-
segregated school system .... Such a
policy does more than simply influence
the short-run composition of the student
body of a new scr.ool. It may well promote
segregated residential patterns which ...
further lock the school system into the mold of separation of the races.
28 L. Ed. 2d at .22/ We do^comprehend Swann,
therefore, to mandate a complex sociohistorical analysis
of residential patterns by district courts in order to
determine the relative influence of segregated schools’
impact upon housing patterns (which in turn influence
the segregated character of schools). If that were
indeed the rule, there would be no need for the presumption
against schools which are substantially disproportionate
in their racial compositions which Swann announces —
announces precisely for the reason that the school-
realted and other influences upon the housing patterns
of an entire school district cannot be neatly separated
and evaluated as independent causal factors.
It follows that where a policy of segregation
is established for which the constitutionally-required
39/— See Bradley v. Milliken, C . A . 35257 (E.D. Michigan September 2/, 1971) where the court found
that residential segregation and school segregation in
Detroit "are interdependent phenomena" (slip op. at 24)
and "just as there is an interaction between resi
dential patterns and the racial composition of the
schools, so there is a corresponding effect on the
residential pattern by the racial composition of the
schools." (slip op. at 10). See also note 36, supra.
-25-
corrective action has not been taken, the presumption
against substantially disproportionate schools is
not rebutted by a claim that independent of the dis
criminatory school board action, other factors might
have produced the segregated situation. While population
patterns are of course a factor, so also is the influence
of past discriminatory acts, and no court is equipped to
maxe (nor are litigants equipped to present a sufficient
basis for) tne fine sociological judgment as to the
relative influence of the two factors upon the present
racial composition of a school.
Other courts in the post-Swann era have apparently
taken the system-wide approach to the remedial process
which we suggest. For example, in Clark v. Board of
Educ. of Little Rock, Nos. 71-1409, 71-1415 (8th Cir.
September 10, 1971) (en banc), the court noted two
formerly white schools were now racially identifiable
as black schools as a result of population shifts
(slip op. at 9). Yet the court held "that the school
district was obligated to develop a unitary school sys
tem" and did not immunize these two schools from the
remedial process. And in United States v. Watson Chapel
School District, No. 20,699 (3th Cir. August 11, 1971),
the court, relying on Haney v. County Board of Educ.,
410 F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1969), rejected out of hand an
argument "tnat the school locations and pupil assign
ments are patterned on solely a de facto basis." (slip
op. at 8).
In Mannings v. Board of Public Instruction
26-
of Hillsborough County, C.A. No. 3554 (M.D. Fla. May
11, 1971), the district court noted that the racial
makeup of several schools nad changed because of
population shifts. The court held, however, that "there
has not been an end to de j ure segregation," and in
determining the scope of the remedy, reasoned as follows
(slip op. at 40-41) :
the record supports what the Court has
learned in presiding over school
desegregation proceedings in tnis area
of Florida: a desegregation plan
will be unsuccessful and entail resegre
gation where a few whites are added to formerly
black schools which remain intact; in short,
a plan which anticipates retention of iden-
tifiably black schools will fail. Partial
desegregation results in white flight, resort
to private schools, and other maneuverings
which frustrate the course of justice.
Successful desegregation must extend through
out the school system and be done in such
a way that the tactics which impede court
orders are rendered futile.
There is an old equitable maxim that
equity delights to do justice, and not by
halves. It never had greater application than here.
In Kelley v. Metropolitan County Board of
Educ. of Nashville and Davidson County, C.A. Nos. 2094,
2956 (M.D. Tenn. June 28, 1971) (applications for stays
denied by this Court and the Supreme Court), the court
allowed several schools in outlying Davidson County to
remain all or virtually all white. It appears that the
facts in Kelley are no different than the facts in the
instant case, and presumably the court in Kelley, under
the theory adopted by the court below, could have given
these schools the "de facto" stamp of approval. But
-27-
that was not the Kelley court's reasoning; rather, it
left the white schools segregated, not because they
were "de_ facto," but because there were no feasible
alternatives. The court did not stop there, however;
it went further and placed severe restrictions on these
schools with regard to construction and placement of
portables (slip op. at 16-17), for the purpose of
prevent[ing] the use of these schools as an avenue of
resegregation...." (slip op. at 11).40/
We submit that it was error for the district
court to approach the evidence on a school-by-school
basis alone. To desegregate a few schools but leave
others as they are, against the background of a segre
gation policy enforced by the defendant school district,
<3° nothing for the future of integration in the
public schools of Shelby County. Instead, this partial
solution, like the partial solutions of free choice
^ud limited rezoning, will result only in further impaction
of the existing segregation.
^O/This reasoning has particular relevance
for the district court's view, in the instant case, that
"white" schools do not have to be desegregated. (Discussed, infra).
41/— This process is already underway withproposals to build additional "black" housing in
the Barrett's Chapel area. (Tr. 948, 1159).
-28-
The District Court Erred In Holding That
Identifiable ".vnite” Schools Do hot Have
Desegregated Where Pedaqoqically Feasible Alternatives exist ‘ ‘----- ----------
Racia Ail To Be
and Sound
Defendants have operated a dual set of schools,
one for whites and one for blacks. The existence today of
white" schools is just as much an indicia of segre
gation as is the existence of "black" schools. (Tr.
406-407).11/ Furthermore, the retention of "white"
schools has an adverse effect on the stability of the
remainder of the system. (Tr. 418-21). Mannings v.
Board of Public Instruction', supra; Kelley v. Metropolitan
County Board of Lduc., supra (Mannings and Kelley are
discussed in the preceding section of this brief,
pages 2 6 - 2 8 , supra).
During the course of the latest hearing, the
district court properly stated the legal standard (Tr.
603) :
42_/ Defendants combine this issue with our fourth assignment of error "for the sake of clarity
and brevity." (Appellees' Brief at 11). We think it
obvious that the issues are not combinable and that
defendants, despite their assertions to the contrary,
are attempting, if unsuccessfully, to cloud the issues.
4 3/Additionally, it is just as important that white children are exposed to black children in
the educational process as it is that black youngsters be exposed to white youngsters. (Tr. 396-97). But
whether or not the Equal Protection Clause is this
"quixotic in purpose" is immaterial to the constitu
tional requirement that all vestiges of the dual system be eliminated.
-29-
THE COURT: I thought that's one way
you defined a desegregated system within
the meaning of the law, is to reach a
point where no scnool is racially identi
fiable as either black or white, but
just schools. Isn't that what the Supreme
Court said?
Eight days later, however, the district court said:
"we do not believe that the Supreme Court held the
equal protection clause to be that quixotic in pur
pose." (A. 4). Nevertheless, it seems quite clear
that the law requires dismantling of "white" schools,
as well as black schools. (See Motion for Summary
Reversal at 9-10).
The District Court Erred In Approving A Plan "Which
Does Not Do As Much To Disestablish Segregation As
An Alternative Proposal Which Is Feasible and Peda-
qoqically Sound"
Defendant's concede, as they must, that the
Government's plan accomplishes more desegregation than the
plan approved by the district court.li/ The only impediment
to implementation of the plan found by the district court
was that "at this time it would be necessary to stagger
the daily starting times of the schools." (A. 6).
If this finding is meant to be a valid reason for not
implementing the United States' plan, it overlooks
£.1/Defendants attempt to cast plaintiffs in
the posture of seeking mathematical racial balance.
(Appellees' Brief at 16-18). It should be perfectly
clear from our position below and here that we do not
seek racial balance. Plaintiffs s u d s tantially supported
the plan filed by the United States, which could not
by any stretch of the imagination be classified as a
"racial Balance" plan. The fact that a plan achieves
(Cont'd. on next page)
- 30-
the fact that defendants already stagger school opening
times to accomodate their transportation scheduling.
(Tr. 98-99 , 104-06). It further overlooks the broad
remedial principles established in Swann. (See Motion
for Summary Reversal at 11). In Kelley v. Metropolitan
County School Board, supra, the district court, when
faced with the same problem, said:
Practical solutions are available
such as the multiple use of buses,
staggered hours for school opening,
and staggered hours for individual grades. (Slip op. at 10).
Much of what has been said in the two preceding
sections is applicable here, for part of the reason the
district court approved a less effective plan was be
cause it found some schools to be "de facto" and felt
that white schools did not have to be desegregated.
But the court also approved a less effective plan for
Millington South, Millington Central and Harrold (see
note 35, supra) and simply refused to desegregate Mt.
Pisgah elementary (apparently because of white community
hostility, see Tr. 1271-72, A. 15 n.15).
For various reasons, the district court failed
to carry out the principles announced in this Court's re
mand opinion and in Swann, with the result that Shelby
County still does not have a unitary school system.
-Li/ (Cont1 d. ) mere desegregation necessarily
means that it achieves a better "racial balance." This is
not the same thing, however, as a plan predicated upon
achieving the system-wide racial ratio, or some other
arbitrary racial ratio.
-31-
The D i s t r i c t Court E r r e d In A pproving The C l o s in q Of
B la ck Scno o la On Grour.cs Of White Community H o s t i l i t y
And »\it.iout R e q u ir in g m o bcnool B oard To J u s t i fy Such
C l o s i n g s Witn Compelling E d u c a t i o n a l R e a s o n s , And In
Holding As A M a t t e r Of Law That School Board A c t i o n s
Which P l a c e D i s c r im .n i t o r y Burdens On Xeqroes In The
D e s e g r e g a t i o n P r o c e s s , In The~Face Of Reasonable--------
And F a i r A l t e r n a t i v e s , Are h o t C o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y -
P r o s c r i b e d — "
Within the very recent past defendant Board
operated from five to seven high schools which were
constructed and maintained for black students. (Tr.
^3-75, 1314, 1319). Now, under the plan approved
by the district court (closing the remaining two
black high schools), no formerly black high schools
are in operation.il/ All of the black high school
students who were in those schools have been assigned
to formerly white high schools. (Tr. 1315). Thus
the entire burden of high school desegregation has
fallen on black people.
If all of the black high schools were inferior
or substandard educational facilities, this might be
a necessary burden for black people to bear, and they
would no doubt bear it willingly for improved educational
opportunities for their children. But the facts are
to the contrary.
The Government's expert, Dr. Buford, reco
mmended that Barrett's Chapel be the high school in
4 5/ .
— F i v e of the s c h o o l s (Woodstock, Capleville,
Shadowlawn, Mt. P isg a h and B a r r e t t ' s Chapel) have
r e t a i n e d t h e i r e l e m e n t a r y o p e r a t i o n . But o f t h e s e ,
o n ly Shadowlawn has had i t s racial i d e n t i t y removed.
- 32-
the pairing arrangement with Bolton, because he considers
Barrett's Chapel to be a superior high school facility,
and because black high school students would be shoul
dered with an unfair share of the desegregation burdens.
(Tr. 292-93, 457-58). The Superintendent testified
that it didn't make any difference facility-wise,
although he thought Bolton was "probably a little
better." (Tr. 146). Assistant Superintendent for
Special Services, C. L. Wells, testified that the Bolton
and Barrett's Chapel high school facilities were equal.
(Tr. 1345). The court's expert also testified that the
schools were equal and that either school could be the
high school (Tr. 1319), but admitted that he personally
preferred Barrett's Chapel as the high school because of
the unfair burdens placed on black high school students
in the system. (Tr. 1340).!£/
In 1969 the Superintendent testified that the
Board could never close Mt. Pisgah high school. (Tr.
84). Yet this year, moved perhaps by the prospects
created by Swann that actual desegregation might at
iî Theyear (which was
Barrett
Title IV Center's recommendation last
be fore this Court on appeal) was that
Chapel be the high school (Tr. 83, 1130), and
the Board initially preferred Barrett's Chapel as the hign scnool (Tr. 287, 1130).
-33-
last be required, the Board's plan closed Mt. Pisgah
high school. Although Dr. Buford did not consider
utilizing Mt. Pisgah as a high school (since he was
limited to modifying the Board's plan), he was con
cerned about the situation because he thought Mt.
Pisgah was an adequate high school facility and could
be worked into a desegregation plan. (Tr. 436-41,
458-60). The Superintendent testified that Mt. Pisgah
was equal to Bolton as a high school facility (Tr. 1150),
and last year the Title IV Center recommended zoning
white high school students from Germantown into Mt.
Pisgah (See 311 F. Supp. at 104). The Title IV Center
would prefer retaining Mt. Pisgah high school if it
could be worked into a desegregation plan. (Tr. 1340-41)
The educational justifications for closing these
two high schools are not to be found in the record.11/
only educational justification even
l l ^ n ^ nd ^hlchaP?ellees cite in their brief, at p. 14) is the.inferior curriculum offering at Mt. Pisaah
hi!hC«rriC?1Um disparities between Mt. Pisgah and white s^nools was drought out by Dr. Buford. (Tr. 730-
739) inequality reflects discriminationPTr q 7 tne direct product of the dual system
^795~97’ ■ Ifc would be an anomaly indeed if the
black m ?ermitt?d t0 Contlnue to discriminate against
so in Jne pasU students the ground that it did
(Tr.
doesn't
and that
to integ
don't pr
they res
addition
just red
The Board does also argue that Mt. Pisgah
have enougn students with its present boundaries
some.iow more transportation would be required
rate Mt. Pisgah. (Tr. 75). Of course, plaintiffs
opose to retain the present boundaries, as
ult m segregation. And it would not require
al transportation to desegregate the school --
irecting some of the buses already in use.
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The primary justification must be something else, since
it is not educational, and it appears to be the hostility
of the white community to sending its youngsters to
formerly black high schools.48/ Assistant Superintendent
Wells testified that, in his opinion, Bolton was chosen
as the high school rather than Barrett's Chapel to
accomodate the white Bolton community. (Tr. I34C-47).
And the Superintendent testified that whites would
support the high school better if it were at Bolton.
(Tr. 1146-47). With regard to Mt.. Pisgah, the court
permitted a spokesman for the white community to
testify in opposition to sending whites to Mt, Pisgah
(Tr. 844-61), and the court itself was apparently of
the view that the higher socioeconomic status of whites
in the area would allow them to avoid sending their
children to Mt. Pisgah. (Tr. 1271-72).
At any rate, the district court approved the
closing of the black high schools at least in part on
the grounds of white community hostility. (A. 15 n.15).
And the court also approved a grade reorganization
for Shadowlawn which placed an unfair and unnecessary
burden on black students (see page 14, supra). In the
4 8/— High schools occupy a higher status than
elementary schools in the community's eyes, and also
create more community involvement. (Tr. 1319-20). By
the same token, high school desegregation probably also
creates more community hostility, at least in rural
systems where botn elementary and high school pupils
have traditionally been bused to school.
-35-
district court's view, however, none of these things
raises a constitutional question.
As both Dr. Buford and the court's expert
testified, one of the educational harms resulting from
the dual school systems is that black and white
youngsters were treated differently; they therefore
perceived themselves as being different, and because our
society was structured around whiteness, black youngsters
perceived themselves as being inferior and white young
sters perceived tnemselves as being superior. (Ti. 395-96
1318-19). Both experts agreed that it was important
that the desegregation process be fair to both blacks
and whites (Tr. 428-29, 1283). Dr. Buford felt that
the closing of Barrett's Chapel was discriminatory (Tr.
435-36), and the court's expert agreed that the high
school desegregation process had been unfair (Tr. 1317-J8)
The court's expert also agreed that this process did
the same thing as the dual system — i.e., treated
blacks differently than whites (Tr. 1318-19), and both
agreed that these facts had an adverse effect on the
desegregation process. (Tr. 428-29, 1318).
Although we have set forth the facts regarding
this issue, we recognize that the district court made
no findings as to the reasons or justifications for
49/- And defendants are of the same view (App
ellees' Brief at 11-15). While we cannot comprehend
much of defendants' argument in this regard, we do
emphasize, as we emphasized to the district court
(see, e.g. , Tr. 81-82, 1315-16) that we do not seed
(Cont'd on next pace)
- 36-
closing the black high schools. The reason for this
failure, of course, is the fact that the district court
did not think these facts raise a substantial consti
tutional question. On the basis of the cases cited
in our Motion for Summary Reversal (pp. 13-17), and
for the reasons contained therein, we submit that this
is a clearly erroneous view of the law. To summarize
what we have said in our motion, the constitutional
issues arise in several ways. (1) A former dual school
system, with a history of racial discrimination, should
bear a heavy burden of justification with regard to
all actions it takes in the desegregation process which
affect black people, particularly the closing of black
schools and "one-way busing" plans. (2) In any event,
a systematic pattern of closing black schools, as here,
amounts to a racial classification which the Board,
as in all racial classification cases, bears a very
heavy burden to justify. (3) Actions taken in the
desegregation process which unfairly place the burdens
on black people, when there are available equally
reasonable but fairer alternatives, violate the Equal
Protection Clause for the same reasons that segregation
4 9 /— 7 (cont'd.) to retain formerly black schools
because of their racial identity. Rather, we seek to
retain them because the proposals to close them are
borne out of racial discrimination and such closings, where
there a r e e q u a l l y reasonable and fairer alternatives,
place a discriminatory burden on blacks.
-37-
is unconstitutional. Additionally, we submit, any
desegregation plan which places disproportionate and
unfair burdens on blacK parents and their children,
when more equitable means are available, violates the
Due Process Clause. Cf. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954).
district court should be reversed and this case remanded
for proper desegregation of the SHelby County public
schools.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the
Respectfully submitted
RATNER, SUGARMON & LUCAS
By : UJp/Jcsi+HWILLIAM E. CALDWELL
525 Commerce Title Building
Memphis, Tennessee 38103 10
JACK GREENBERG
NORMAN J. CHACKKIN
10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019
- 38-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing
Reply Brief has been served on counsel for the defendants
and plaintiff-intervenors, Paul Hancock, Esquire, United
States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division,
Education Section, Washington, D. C. 20530, Lee Winchester,
Jr., Esquire, Suite 3200, 100 North Main Building,
Mempnis, Tennessee 38103, James A. Crislip, Esquire,
110 South Court Avenue, Memphis, Tennessee 38103,
by United States Mail, postage prepaid, this 14th day
of October, 1971.
UUjLkm £.
William E. Caldwell
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing
Reply Brief has been served on counsel for the defendants
and plaintiff-intervenors, Paul Hancock, Esquire, United
States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division,
Education Section, Washington, D. C. 20530, Lee Winchester,
Jr., Esquire, Suite 3200, 100 North Main Building,
Mempnis, Tennessee 38103, James A. Crislip, Esquire,
110 South Court Avenue, Memphis, Tennessee 38103,
by United States Mail, postage prepaid, this 14th day
of October, 1971.
tuUJb~ £.William E. Caldwell