Robinson v Shelby Country Board of Education Reply Brief for Appellants
Public Court Documents
October 1, 1971

44 pages
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Robinson v Shelby Country Board of Education Reply Brief for Appellants, 1971. dcabfda4-c29a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/3fbca65b-089f-4965-a629-1c5ff823fac1/robinson-v-shelby-country-board-of-education-reply-brief-for-appellants. Accessed May 07, 2025.
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THl SIXTH CIRCUIT NO. 71-1825 CLAUDE BERNARD ROBINSON, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SHELBY COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee Western Division REPLY BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS WILLIAM E. CALDWEEL RATNER, SUGARMON AND LUCAS 525 Commerce Title Bldg. Memphis, Tennessee 38103 JACK GREENBERG NORMAN J. CHACHKIN 10 Columbus Circle New York, New York 10019 Attorneys for Plaintiffs- Appellants TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Cases .......................... Statement .................... Recent Procedural History................ The Board's Plan ...................... The Title IV Center's Memorandum ........ The United States' Plan .............. The District Court's Decision and the Plan Approved Therein ...................... ARGUMENT.......... Pa^e ii 3 3 7 10 11 19 22 The District Court Erred In Holding That Racially Identifiable Schools Do Not Have To Be Segregated Unless Their Racial Identity Can Be Linked To Some Specific Segregation-Causing Act Of The Defendant School Board, Which Admittedly Operated A Racially Dual School System and Which This Court and The District Courg Found Had Not Disestablished That System .................. 22 The District Court Erred In Holding That Racially Identifiable "White" Schools Do Not Have To Be Desegregated Where Pedagogically Feasible and Sound Alternatives Exist .................... 29 The District Court Erred In Approving A Plan "Which Does Not Do As Much To Disestablish Segre gation As An Alternative Proposal Which Is Feasible And Pedagogically Sound"............ 30 The District Court Erred In Approving The Closing Of Black Schools on Grounds Of White Community Hostility And Without Requiring The School Board lo Justify Such Closings With Compelling Educational Reasons, And In Holding As A Matter of Law That School Board Actions Which Place Discriminatory Burdens On Negroes In The Desegregation Process, In The Face Of Reasonable And Fair Alternatives,Are Not Constitutionally Proscribed.......... 32 Conclus ion 38 Table of Cases Page 38Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) . . . Bradley V. Milliken, C.A. No. 35257 (E.D. Mich. September 27, 1971 ........ 25 Clark v. Board of Educ. of Little Rock, Nos. 71-1409, 71-1415 (8thCir. Sept. 10, 1971.............. 26 Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 402 U.S. (1971). . 6, 24 Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968)................ 3 Haney v. County Board of Educ., 410 F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1969) ............ 26 Kelley v. Metropolitan County Board, C.A. Nos 2094, 2956 (M.D. Tenn. June 28,1971).................... • 27, 28, 29 31 Mannings V. Board of Public Instruction of Hillsborough County, C. A. No. 3554 (M.D. Fla. May 11, 1971) . . . 26-27, 29 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) .......... 3, 24-25 United States v. Watson Chapel School Dist., No. 20,699 (8th Cir. August 11, 1971) 26 Table of Cases For Motion For Summary Reversal Motion Page Bell v. West Point Municipal Separate SchooliDist., No.^pl75 (5th Cir. July Brice V. Landis, 314 F. Supp. 974 (N.D.Calif. 1969)................ .. 2.̂ Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, supra. . 9, 10-11 Gordon v. Jefferson Davis Parish School Board, No. 30075 (5th Cir. June 28, 1971). 16 Green v. County School Board, supra ........ 9,10-11 Green V. School Bd. of Roanoke, 316 F. Supp. 6 (W.D. Va. 1970), aff'd in part sub nom., Adams v. School Dist. No. 5, 444 F.2d 99 (4th Circ.1971) (en banc).............. 14-15 Haney v. County Board of Educ., 429 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1970) .......... 13 Kelley v. Metropolitan County Board, 436 856 (6th Cir. 1970) .......... F. 2d 11 Lee v. Macon County Board of Educ., No. 30154 (5th Cir. June 29, 1971) ........ 15-16 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) . . • • 13 Quarles v. Oxford Municipal Separate School Dist., Civ. No. WC 6962-K (N.D. Miss. Jan. 7, 1970) (oral opinion) . . . . 15 Smith v. St. Tammany Parrish School, 302 F. Supp. 106 (E.D. La. 1969) • • 13 Spangler v. Pasadena City Board of Educ., F. Supp. 501 (C.D. Calif. 1970) 311 • • 13 Swann v. Charlotte—Mecklenburg, supra . . • • 00 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg, C.A. No. 1974 (W.D.N.C. June 22, 1971) . • • 16 United States v. Jefferson County Board of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir.), aff'd on rehearing en banc, 380 F.2d 385 (1966), cert, denied sub nom., Caddo Parrish School Board v. United States, 389 U.S. 840 (1967). 7,8 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT NO. 71-1825 CLAUDE BERNARD ROBINSON, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SHELBY COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee Western Division REPLY BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS On September 1, 1971, plaintiffs-appellants filed in this Court a Motion for Summary Reversal of the district court's decision of August 11, 1971. By order dated September 27, 1971, the Court treated plaintiff's motion as the brief for appellants and established a schedule for filing Brief for Appellees and this Reply Brief for Appellants. The case was set for argument on October 20, 1971, and appellants were directed to file the reporter's transcript prior to that date. As the transcript was not available when the ’•'otion for Summary Reversal was filed, we take this opportunity to elaborate on the facts, with appropriate references to the transcript, in order that the Court may have a full understanding of the factual develop ments below. The issues presented for review are the four errors assigned at pages 2-3 of the Motion for Summary Reversal, i/ — Appellees have chosen to restate and consol, date the issues presented for review (Appellees' Brief at 1-2). The issues as stated by appellees, however, ave little if anything to do with this appeal, as will be further discussed, infra. Statement A. Recent Procedural History April 6, 1970, the district court entered an opinion (311 F. Supp. 97) from which plaintiffs appealed. May 10, 1971, this Court remanded the case to the district court, the principal opinion by Judge McCree holding that the district court had erred under Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968), in approving the defendant Board's zoning plan "which [did] not do as much to disestablish segregation as an alternative proposal [by the Title IV Center] which is feasible and pedago- gically sound." 442 F.2d 255, 258 (6th Cir. 1970). On remand, the district court held a pre trial conference with counsel for all parties on May 28, 1971, and entered an order the same day directing the defendant Board to file within two weeks a plan for complete desegregation of its school system, and also f-/ Plaintiffs filed their complaint in this case on June 12, 1963. The United States intervened on May 6, 1966. The pertinent history of this litigation is set forth in the district court's 1970 opinion, 311 F. Supp. at 99-101. 2/judge Weick concurred in the remand and Judge Miller concurred in the result, both judges indicating that a reconsideration in light of Swann v. Charlotte- Mecklenburg Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28 L. Ed. 2d 554 (April 20, 1971) was appropriate. -3- requesting the Educational Opportunities Planning Center at the University of Tennessee [hereinafter, "Title IV Center" or "Center" or "court's expert"] to file a plan at the same time. (A. 17-18).i/ Plaintiffs were allowed one week following the filing of plans to object thereto, and then "such additional reasonable time as may be necessary for plaintiffs to prepare and submit an alter native to such plan or plans, if they so elect." (A. 17).1/ June 9, 1971, defendant Board filed its Revised Desegregation Plan (A. 19-24 and maps), and the Title IV Center filed a memorandum suggesting certain modifi cations of the Board's plan (A. 30-32).®/ June 11, 1971, plaintiffs filed their objections to the Board's plan 4/"A.___" references are to the previously-filed Appendix to Motion for Summary Reversal. —^In addition, the order provided that if plaintiffs elected to submit a plan they could apply to the Court to have the costs of any such plan assessed against defendants. (A. 18). In view of the Title IV Center's memorandum the Board, on June 15, filed an alternate proposal for two elementary schools. (A.25-26 and map). The Board subsequently filed on July 16,1971, a modi fication to its plan, necessitated by the burning of Millington Central elementary school. (A. 27-28). -4- and the Center's memorandum, and sought leave to have a plan prepared at the Board's expense. (A. 33-35).U The district court conducted a hearing on the submissions cf the Board and Title IV Center on June 21, 1971. The plaintiff-intervenor, United States of America, filed its objections to the plans at the hearing. (Tr. 9, A. 37-38). The June 21 hearing was prematurely terminated (Tr. 210) because of a commitment of defendant Board's attorney in a state court matter (Tr. 229). June 23, 1971 the district court entered a memorandum decision and order directing plaintiffs and the United States "each to file wholly new and entire plans" 7/ Plaintiffs sought to have a plan prepared at Board expense on the ground that the Board's plan and the Center's modifications patently failed to comply with this Court's remand opinion and the Supreme Court's decision in Swann, supra. (A. 35). On June 10, 1971 (the day before plaintiffs' objections were filed), however, the district court, by letter to counsel, scneduled a hearing on the submissions of the Board and Title IV Center for June 21, 1971. On June 14, 1971, plaintiffs requested a continuance of the June 21 hearing and informed the Court that they could not obtain an expert and prepare a plan in such a short period of time, but the request was denied. (Tr. 4 - 7 ) . Nevertheless, plaintiffs were able to secure an expert and had an alternative plan prepared for presentation at the June 21 hearing. (Tr. 9). Plaintiffs were not permitted to present their plan at that hearing, however, because the Court was unable to conclude tne hearing by 1:00 p.m. as it had hoped. (Tr. 43 - 44,173 - 74 . ) -5- The United States filed its plan on July 15, 1971 (A. 68-100 and maps), but plaintiffs were financially unable to present a plan. (a . 65-66).£/ July 22, 1971, plaintiffs filed their response to the United States' plan (A. 105-08) and defendant Board filed its objections to the plan. The district court conducted a 5-day hearing on August 2-6, 1971, and entered its decision on August by July 15, 1971. (A. 40-43.®/ 8 /- The district court was of the view that Justice ™ P ^ ntlffS and the Departnent o? r S i n g » 71 S42? Sd thSir demandS since 1 9 7 0 o p in i o n the c o u r t s a i d : " i t i s i m p l i c i t i n o r i g i n a l ° n l a i n t i f t hS A t t o r n e l’ G eneral and th e r e q u i r e s S ? co n te n d t h a t th e C o n s t i t u t i o n b a l a n J I f e a s i b l e s t e p s be ta k e n t o a t 101 w6 f a c e s . in each s c h o o l . " 3 H F . Supp. KG 1SSUe With the district court on wS Sid n S ^ a n d ^ r h?V® ^ escalated °ur demands and r-u not and do not seex to have the s c h n n l ? i r>Shelby County racially balanced. We merely seek t a k i n a r i i £ o S t p o s s l u l e de9 r e e o f a c t u a l d e s e g r e g a t i o n s i t u a t i o n ^ a P co u n t th e P r a c t i c a l i t i e s o f t h l ' S o b i ^ g ^ t u ^ ^ c B° a rd ? ! j e h o o ^ c o n w r s o , 71971). * ' ' 28 L. Ed.2d 577, 580-81 denied (Tr~ 217) renewed their request, previously Boa^d (A «-66 ' b h hfVe - assessed against the * decision dated 28 ?97} U Ct J°Urt' by me”°randum motion. (A. 109-lo77^On^July M ^ l ^ l ^ t l E r -* filed a motion to amend or modify the July 28 S thiS std Vp ding in -6- 11, 1971. (A. 1-15). W B. The Board's Plan The Board's proposed plan is substantially the same as the one under which it operated last year, which was disapproved in this Court's May 10 opinion. The Board's plan, as filed, contains 27 elementary schools with a projected enrollment of 15,455 pupils, of whom 4,981 or 32.2% are black, and 6 high schools with a projected enrollment of 7,517 pupils, of whom 2,624 or 34.9% are black. The total enrollment projected for the current school year was 22,972, of which 7,605 or 33.1% are black. (A. 24). — Prior to the August hearing two groups of white parents and their children moved to intervene as plaintiffs. One group ("Coro Lake Intervenors") was concerned with the proposed pairing of Coro Lake and White's Chapel elementary schools. The other group ("Ellendale Intervenors") was concerned with the Board's proposal to close Ellendale elementary school and consolidate it with Shadowlawn elementary school.In addition, the Coro Lake Intervenors moved to join the Board of Education of the Memphis City Schools as a party defendant for the purpose of utilizing the City school of Westwood in desegregating White's Chapel and Coro Lake. Since both parties sought more dese gregation then the Board proposed, plaintiffs did not oppose the interventions. The district court granted the motions to intervene and the motion to join the City Board. (A. 109). Since the August 11 decision two additional white parties have sought to intervene, but the motions were denied on August 31, 1971. Beth parties have since renewed tneir motions and seek to present alter natives to the Shadowlawn clustering, but these motions were denied on October 12, 1971. -7- At the elementary level (grades 1-8) the Board proposed only two changes: (1) pairing Barrett's Chapel and Bolton elementaries with grades 1-6 or 1-8 to be housed at Barrett's Chapel (projected 61.6% black^ V ) (Tr. 29-30); (2) closing Ellendale and adding its pupils to the Shadowlawn zone (projected 69.7% black) (Tr. 30).12/ Of the 27 elementary schools in the Board's proposed plan, 10 were projected to be more than 50% black and 10 were projected to be less than 20% black, in a system projected to be 32.2% black at the elementary level. (A. 23-24).13/ 11/The projected % black figures are taken from the projected enrollment charts filed with the Board's plan. (A. 23-24). 12/— In changing the Shadowlawn zone to take Ellendale, the Board also enlarged the Elmore Park zone to take in most of the black Ellendale students, leaving mostly white students to go to Shadowlawn. (Tr. 30-31). Last year Ellendale was 24.1% black (Exhibit 7; A. Ill) and Elmore Park was 15.1% black (A. 111). Elmore Park was projected under the Board's plan to be 20% black (A. 23). 13/After the Title IV Center filed its memo randum recommending the pairing of Riverdale (projected 3.2% black) and Germantown (projected 40.2% black) the Board, while contending that Riverdale was a "de facto" segregated school (Tr. 984-95; A.25), filed“an alternate proposal admitting the feasibility of dese gregating Riverdale. (A. 25-26). (This was part of the continuing bartering process carried on between the Board and the district court, see note 33,infra.) At the June 21 hearing, the Superintendent stated that his first preference (if anything at all had to be done) was to pair the two schools, with his second preference being to desegregate Riverdale by noncon tiguous zoning. (Tr. 2 5 - 2 7 ) . He subsequently reversed this order of preference. (Tr. 958-64). -8- At the high school level the Board made two changes in last year's plan: (1) Bolton became the high school (projected 65.9% black) in the pairing with Barrett's Chapel (Tr. 36); (2) Mt. Pisgah high school (94.8% black last year, A. 113) would be closed and its high school students assigned by rezoning to Germantown (projected 46.1% black), Collierville (projected 52.3% black) and Bartlett (projected 24.2% black) (Tr. 36-37). The Board refused to adopt three recommenda tions made last year by the Title IV Center and which were consequently incorporated in this Court's May 10 remand : (1) To pair Coro Lake (projected 30.1% black) with White's Chapel (projected 100% black) (see 311 F. Supp. at 103); (2) to pair E.A. Harrold (projected 76.3% black) with Millington Central elementary (pro jected 16.6% black) (see 311 F. Supp. at 104)— /; — /The Superintendent took a rather self-serving, if inconsistent view of this Court's remand opinion. For example, he testified that since the closing of Ellen- dale to desegregate Shadowlawn was part of the Center's plan which was before this Court he was not at liberty to propose other feasible and more effective alternatives, yet he completely ignored the recommendations listed in the text, as well as the Center's proposal that Barrett's Chapel be the hign school when paired with Bolton.(Tr. 1147-49). ii/The Board proposed to build a "middle school" in this area of the County and close Harrold when the middle school opens next year. (Tr. 33-36). Millington Central elementary burned during the summer, and the Board was forced to modify its plan. (A. 27-28). The modification places Millington Central grades 1-2 at a former parochial school which has been leased by the board, grades 3-4 at Harrold and grades 5-6 in portables at the burned out site. The placing of Millington Central grades 3-4 at Harrold will not desegregate Harrold, however, because the grades will remain segregated. (Tr. 1386). -9- (3) rezoning white high school students from Germantown to Mt. Pisgah ±i/ (see 311 F. Supp. at 1C4). C. The Title IV Center's Memorandum The Title IV Center '/ recommended only two modifications of the Board's plan: (1) Pairing White's Chapel and Coro Lake (A. 31; Tr. 176); (2) pairing Riverdale and Germantown (A. 31-32; Tr. 176-77).i®/ 16/The Board's plan as previously pointed out, closes Mt. Pisgah high scnool. 17/The Title IV Center was represented by Dr. Frederick P. Venditti at the June 21 hearing (Tr. 175), and by Dr. Marshall E. Meyer, Jr. at the August hearing (Tr. 1184), each testifying as the court's witness. Title IV Desegregation Centers came into existence as a result of Civil Rights Act of 1964 to assist school districts in the desegregation process. (Tr. 1328). The Centers are agencies of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) and their activities are supervised by that department. (Tr. 1328-29). For the last one and one-half years, desegregation plans prepared by Title IV Centers for presentation to a court are reviewed by a HEW "ad hoc committee" comprised of repre sentatives of HEW, the Department of Justice and the White House "to see if it is consistent with administration policy. (Tr. 1329-31). The Center's memorandum recommendations in the instant case were not reviewed by HEW's "ad hoc committee," however, because the memorandum was not considered a "plan." (Tr. 1332). 18/. . — The Center thus did not follow throughwith two of its previous recommendations. (See Motion for Summary Reversal at 4 n.5). The Center I U o initially went along with the Board's proposal to build a scnool on Whitten Road (Tr. 1 7 7 —7 8 ) , but subsequently reversed its position in that regard. (Tr. 1194-96 1 1 9 9 - 1 2 0 0 , 1 2 1 9 - 2 0 . ) ' -10- The Center admitted that its modifications of the Board's plan did not create a unitary school system in Shelby County for the 1971-72 school year. (Tr. 1327) D. The United States' Plan The plan filed by the United States was presented through the testimony of Dr. Warren Buford.12/ Although Dr. Buford prefers to "start from scratch" in preparing school desegregation plans, he was limited in the instant case by the attorneys for the United States to modifying the Board's plan--i.e., "using the School Board proposal as the basis for ... development of [the] plan." (Tr. 407-12, 439). Nevertheless, the Government's plan accomplishes substantially more desegregation than the Board's plan as modified by the Title IV Center. The Government's elementary plan leaves three majority black elementary schools: Woodstock (66% black.?0/) , Arlington (61% black) and Capleville (74% black).— / 19/Dr. Buford and the other members of the team assembled by HEW to prepare the United States' plan are affili-atsd with the Title IV Center at the University of South Carolina. (Tr. 247-49). The team has considerable experience in preparing school desegregation plans. (Tr. 245-47). — ^The % black figures are taken from the tables filed as part of the United States' plan. (A. 93-96). —i/These scnools were left alone by the Govern ment's expert because of their apparent stability and the lac.-: of relatively reasonable alternatives. Dr. Buford insisted, nowever, that these schools be closely scrutinized the next, year or two to insure that they do not become resegregated. (Tr. 316-17). In addition to these three schools, the United States plan also leaves Bolton elementary 58% black in grades 1-5, but because of an arrangement with Millington East (11.5% black last year, A. 112) Bolton is (Continued next page)-11- In addition, the Unted States' plan left four white elementary schools: Bartlett (14% black), Coleman (11% black), Raleigh-Bartlett Meadows (11% black), Spring Hills (13% black). (A. 93-96). The Government's plan desegregates Mt. Pisgah elementary school (93% black last year, A. 112) by closing James and Cordova (which the Board planned to do in 1972), zoning in additional white pupils from that portion of the Board's Riverdale zone located north of 21/— • (cont'd.) only 40% black in grades 6-8. (A. 95). Although majority black in student enrollment (in a 33% black system), these four schools were projected to have fairly substantial pupil integration and plaintiffs supported Dr. Buford's approach to these schools. 2 2/— ' Although there are feasible alternatives available which would eliminate the racial identity of these four white scnools, the schools service an area a substantial portion of which is to be annexed by the City of Memphis, and some of these schools will be operated by the Memphis school system begin ning in 1973; for this reason, Dr. Buford and the Justice Department attorneys determined that these schools should be left alone. (Tr. 330-33, 421-28). The Superintendent subsequently testified, however, that annexation was not a sufficient reason for leaving these schools alone, and he agreed to a plan (the one approved by the district court) which clustered Raleigh-Bartiett Meadows with schools not to be annexed. (Tr. 1077-78). -12- the Shelby County Penal Farm,£V and zoning black students in the Bridgewater area of the former Mt. Pisgah zone into Elmore Park. (Tr. 321-25). The projection was that Mt. Pisgah would be 49% black in grades 1-5 and 46% black in grades 6-8. (A. 94). The court's expert (the Title IV Center) agreed that the Mt. Pisgah plan was feasible (Tr. 189-90, 191-92), and, in fact, that it offered tne only promise for desegregation of Mt. Pisgah. (Tr. 1262-70, 1275).24/ Shadowlawn (97% black last year, A.112) is desegregated by using a "clustering" arrangement whereby all students in grades 6-8 in the Shadowlawn, Brownsville (1.1% black last year) and Egypt (4.8% black last year) zones are assigned to Shadowlawn, and the Shadowlawn 2 3/— The Board's Riverdale zone is in effect a noncontiguous zone, as the northern portion of the zone (known as Whitten Height's and containing some 300 white pupils) is completely cut off from the southern portion (which contains the Riverdale school) by the Shelby County Penal Farm (which contains no through roads). All of the Whitten Heights white pupils are already being bused to Riverdale, and this part of the Mt. Pisgah plan entails no increase in transportation.(Tr. 106-08, 323). 24/— The Superintendent did not question the feasibility of the plan, but criticized it because it does "the same thing we did under the segregated school system when blacks were picxed up and passed whites ... and they are passing each other on the road going in opposite directions." (Tr. 989). At one time the Board bused the black students in the Bridgewater area past the white schools of Elmore Park and Ellendale to Shadowlawn. (Tr. 1105). -13- students in grades 1-5 are, by zoning, equally divided between Brownsville and Egypt. (Tr. 327-28). The projection was that Shadowlawn would be 25% black, and Brownsville and Egypt each would be 31% black. (A. 95). There was no question about the feasibility of this clustering arrangement, although both the Superintendent and the Title IV Center preferred varia tions clustering different schools with Snadowlawn. (Tr. 1214-19, 1022-31, 1045-50).^/ The Superintendent, however, wanted to nouse only grades seven and eight (rather than 6-8) at Shadowlawn; the United States argued that the Superintendent's proposal placed an unreasonable share of the burden on black students and that more grades should be retained at Shadowlawn to mere equally distribute the burdens of desegregations between blacks and whites (Tr. 1401-02) , with which the Title IV Center agreed. (Tr. 129 8-9 9 ) . — ^Since the Board's plan closed Ellendale, the United States' plan did not consider using Ellendale (24.1% black last year) in the Shadowlawn cluster. The United States agreed, however, that Ellendale could be retained and incorporated into the cluster (Tr. 1401) , as did plaintiffs (A. 115). — /As we understand the position of the Ellendale Intervenors (the only party to file a response to our motion for summary reversal), this is the only issue with which they are concerned— i.e., the possibility of having only grades 1-5 at Ellendale rather than grades 1-6. As previously noted, plaintiffs agreed to Inter venors' desires to retain Ellendale (see note 25, supra). With regard to the proposal placing a disproportionate share of the burdens on black students at Shadowlawn, the district court gives plaintiffs credit for raising this issue below. (A. 14 n.14) . As pointed out in the text, the United States raised this particular (Cont'd. next page)-14- As previously set forth, the Board's plan paired Barrett's Chapel and Bolton, with Barrett's Chapel to be tne elementary facility (projected 61.6% black). The Government's expert, in addition to the pairing, preferred Bolton as the elementary facility^-Z/ and sought further desegregation by way of a rezoning arrange ment with Millington East (11.5% black last year, A. 112). (Tr. 334-40, 3 5 2 - 5 3 ) . The projection was — ^(Cont'd) point at the hearing; nevertheless, plaintiffs support that position and urge it here. 27/— Under both the Board's plan and the Government's plan, the elementary school and the high school are called "Barrett's-Bolton," because of the pairing. The Board, however, makes the formerly white facility (Bolton) the high scnool, and the formerly black school (Barrett's Chapel) the elementary school, whereas the Government's plan reverses this arrangement. 1®/The arrangement works like this: MillingtonEast is reduced from grades 1-8 to grades 1-5 and the zone is enlarged to include the eastern portion of the s-Bolton zone and the northern portion of the Millington Central elementary zone; Barrett's-Bolton serves grades 1-5 in the remainder of its zone and serves all pupils in grades 6-8 in the Millington nast and Barrett's-Bolton zones. -15- that Millington East would be 22% black and Barrett's Bolton would be 58% black in grades 1-5 and 40% black in grades 6-8. (A. 95). The Superintendent and the Title IV Center agreed that the plan was feasible (Tr. 154, 204), and the Center considered it educa tionally sound and admitted that it resulted in more desegregation than the Board's plan. (Tr. 1284-90). The final portion of the Government's elementary plan involves three schools in the Millington area: Harrold (72.7% black last year, A. 111-112), Millington Central (21.1% black last year) and Millington South (7.9% black last year). These schools are desegregated via a clustering arrangement whereby Millington South and Harrold are rezoned to serve grades 1-5 in the area, and Millington Central serves all pupils in grades 6-8 in the area. (Tr. 353-58) .29/ The projection was that Harrold would be 19% black, Millington South would be 18% black, and Millington Central would be 24% black. (A. 96). The Superintendent admitted that the plan would work (Tr. 1085-86) and the Title IV Center agreed that it was feasible and accomplished 29/ x. . . ... Alth°ugh the Millington Central Elementary facility ourned during the summer, this fact does not affect the plan aecause grades 6-8 can be ln S£aCf Wl1llch iS available in the adjoining Millington Central high school plant and the leased parochial school across tne street. (Tr. 358-66, 384-87) -16- more desegregation. (Tr. 1256-60).2£/ The Government's high school plan also accom plishes more desegregation than the Beard's plan.31/ The Government considered only one change from the Board' high school plan to be legally mandated: Barrett's- Bolton high school (projected 65.9% black, A. .24). The Government's plan places the high school at the Bar rett's Chapel facility, which Dr. Buford considers a more desirable high school plant (Tr. 286-88), alters the zone line between Barrett's-Bolton and Millington Central to bring more whites into Barrett's from the Central area. (Tr. 285-86). All parties agree that this proposal is feasible and creates no additional busing. (Tr. 299-301, 933-35, 1094-95, 1208-11, 1224- 25, 1284-90). The projection was that Barrett's- Bolton would be 53% black and Millington Central would be 33% black. (A. 91) 30/The Board proposed to close Harrold a year from now when its "middle school" is built. Although Dr. Buford was very much in favor of the middle school, he strongly opposed the proposal to close Harrold, which he sees as having a very viable educa tional function even after the middle school is constructed. (Tr. 384-87, 456). 31/It is to be remembered that Dr. Buford did not "start from scratch", but was limited to modifying tne Board's plan. (See pace , supra). Thus, he did not consider the desirability of retaining Mt. Pisgah high school, which the Board's plan closes. (Tr. 4 36-41) . -17- Although the Justice Department attorneys felt that the Barrett■s-Bolton high school modification "met minimum legal requirements”(Tr. 201), their expert felt tnat further modifications of the Board's plan were necessary for complete high school desegregation. (Tr. 407-12). Dr. Buford therefore expanded the Raleigh Egypt zone to take in more black students from the Bartlett zone, thereby increasing Egypt from 13.7% black (A. 24) to 24% black (A. 91) (Tr. 304, 309); more slack students were then added to Bartlett from the Collierville and Germantown zones, with the following effects: Bartlett increased from 24.2% black (A, 24) to 26% black (A. 91), Germantown decreased from 46.1% black to 40% black, and Collierville decreased from 52.3% black to 50% black. (Tr. 301-02). These changes do not result in any increase in busing. The Government's plan was a significant step toward complete desegregation of the Shelby County public schools, although Dr. Buford conceded that the plan does not eliminate all racially identifiable schools. (Tr. 460). ho serious questions as to the feasibility of implementing the plan are raised. The Government estimated that their plan would cost an additional $52,447.40 (A. 98), but that this cost would be more than offset by the closing of Cordova and James (A. 99) (Tr. 382-84). The plan states that ten additional buses will be needed (A. 98), but because of extra buses on hand this number was reduced to two (Tr. 381). Both - 18- Dr. Buford and the Court's expert were in agreement that cost was not significant (Tr. 460-61,. 1290-91), and that the plan could be implemented with existing transportation facilities by proper staggering of school opening times so that each bus could make additional runs (Tr. 381-84, 461-62, 1293-96).!?/ ^• The District Court’s Decision and the Plan ApprovedTherein - The plan approved by the district court is basically the Board's plan, as modified by the Title IV Center. All of the Board's high school plan was approved. The court held that no further desegregation of the Barrett's-Bolton high school was required be cause "these schools would be the same if there had never been de jure school segregation applicable to the area they serve." (A. 8). The court did not mention Dr Buford's recommended changes for the other high schools. The court thus approved the operation of Barrett's- Bolton at 65.9% black and Raleigh-Egypt at 13.7% black. The Board's elementary plan was approved, with one exception: rather than close Ellendale, the court approved a clustering arrangement for Shadowlav/n sub stantially tr.e same as one agreed to by the Superintendent (Tr. 1045-50),— / involving Ellendale, Bartlett, Elmore !?/The Board always has staggered school openings to accomodate its bus schedules. (Tr. 98-59,104-06 ) . 33/The distr ict court did not order anything not agreed to by the Superintendent. Indeed, the Board's plan -19- <c°nti nued on next page) Park, Raleigh-Bartlett Meadows and Brownsville. (A. 12- 13). The plan approved by the district court thus leaves Barrett's-Bcltcn elementary at 61.6% black.* 34 35/ Coleman at 11.3% black, Egypt at 4.2% black, Harrold at 76.3% black,35/ Millington East at 13.3% black, Millington ̂-a /— (Cont'd) as filed in June can be viewed as the Superintendent's "first offer" — the first step in the bartering process with the district court. (See, e.g., Tr. 1022-31, 1045-50, 1050-58, 1385-83). 34 /— Barrett1s-Bclton elementary was left alone for the same reasons as the high school (noted in text) and the adjacent Millington East elementary (13. black) was left alone either because it "would have significant integration" (A. 10) or because "[e]ven if ... we wou)d be required to consider the use of some of the pupils in this area [Barrett's-Bolton] to treat surrounding schools, the answer is the same since we do not believe that the surrounding schools need be treated." (a. 8-9). 35 /~— As previously described, although the Harrold building will have more whites in it, they will be segregated by grade under the Board's plan, as the Superintendent testified. (Tr. 1386; see note 15, supra). -20- South at 6% black,22/Mt. Pxsgah at 93.1% black and Spring Hill at 13.5% black. (A. 23-24),22/ The district court held that racially identi fiable "white" schools did not have to be desegregated because it did not "believe that the Supreme Court held the equal protection clause to be that quixotic in purpose." (A. 4). The district court also held that discrimination against Negroes in the desegregation process is not a concern which rises to constitutional proportions. (See Motion for Summary Reversal at 11-13). — Millington South is a racially identifiable white school for more reasons than tradition. The school is located in the center of part of a 90-unit housing project operated by the Millington Housing Authority. (Tr. 344-45) The remainder of the project is located around Harrold scnool. (Tr. 344) All of the units around Millington South are occupied by white tenants and all of the units around Harrold are occupied by black tenants. (Tr. 345). These units were constructed and located where they are pursuant to a policy of racial segregation. (Tr. 348). The Millington Housing Authority is presently defendant to a complaint filed in the district court alleging racial discrimination. (Tr. 345-46). The Authority's answer defends on the ground that the segre gated "arrangement was originally made to facilitate and enable the tenants to be close to schools attended by their children." (Exhibit 12, p. 3 - filed as an offer of proof). — The Government's plan would have desegre gated all of these schools except Coleman and Spring Hill. -21- Argument The District Court Erred In Holding That Racially Identifiable Schools Do hot have to Be Desegregated Unless Their Racial Identity Can Be Linked To Some Specific Segregation-Causing Act of The Defendant School Board, Which Admittedly Operated ---------------------- ----------------- --...»-------A Racially Dual School System And Which This Court And Tne District Court Found Had Not Disestablished That System 3~o7 The district court accepted the Board's pairing plan (originally the Title IV Center's plan incorporated in this Court's remand) for Barrett' s- Chapel (formerly black) and Bolton (formerly white) and did not require further desegregation as proposed by the United States' plan, because substantially all of the evidence introduced in this case in the various proceedings supports the proposition that the contemplated racial composition of these schools would be the same if there had never been de jure segregation applicable to the area they serve. Thus the racial composition of these schools cannot be said to be a vestige of state- imposed segregation. (A. 8). 38/— ' Defendants either misunderstand or misre present this issue by arguing that our position would pronibit a determination of the racial identifiability of each school in the first instance. (Appellees' Brief at 7-10). Obviously, those schools which are substantially integrated can be left alone, unless it is necessary to make changes regarding them in order to desegregate those schools which remain substantially disproportionate in their racial compositions. Equally obvious, only those schools which remain racially identifiable have to be desegregated. Our point is that all such sc.iools nust be desearegated and some schools cannot be left segregated in former dual systems by reason of such nebulous investigations into the causes of segregation as the district court conducted here. -22- There are several things factually wrong with this determination. First, if the district court is correct, then under the same theory these schools do not even have to be paired, but could be left as they were last year with their so-called "unitary zones." But , Ithe court does not so hold, apparently recognizing the fact that the Board has historically maintained two schools in this area, one for blacks and one for whites, each serving grades 1-12. Second, there is a substantial question regarding the existence of the evidentiary support the district court claims for tnis determination. We are not aware of anything in the record of the latest proceedings which supports the court's proposition. The only testimony bearing directly on the point appears in the court's direct examination of its expert: Q. In your study of that area [Barrett*s- Bolton] have you run across anything that would indicate to you that the situation would be any different up there with respect to black-white ratios in those schools if we had never had de jure segre gation up there, or to put it another way— if you set that area down in the middle of Indiana or Illinois, do you thing that the ratio would be any different than what will be there? A. I really can't come up with an answer on that. (Tr. 1226-27). ' Even under persistent questioning by tne district court the expert was unable to agree. (Tr. 1227-29). The foregoing serves to point out the impossi bility of the district court's inquiry. Even if the -23- inquiry were proper the answer would evade us, for the question assumes a fact that never was and is not yet— i.e., that the Shelby County Board of Education never P^ac-"ticed racial discrimination. For the very reason that all things are not equal in a system that has been deliberately constructed and maintained to enforce racial segregation" (Swann, supra, 28 L. Ed. 2d at ), there is no way of knowing what the situation would be like had defendants treated Negroes equally during the century which has elapsed since the Fourteenth Amend ment became part of the Constitution. But the district court insists that Swann, by requiring elimination of "all vestiges of state- imposed segregation," requires or at least permits this "de facto - de jure" inquiry. We submit that it does n°t -- that in cases like Swann the inquiry is whether the effects and vestiges of the segregation policy have been disestablished with the thoroughness required by the remedial principles announced therein; if not, then those remedial measures must be applied throughout the system witn the goal of achieving "the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation, taking into account the practicalities of the situation." Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, supra, 28 L. Ed. 2d at 580-81. The district court overlooks that portion of Swann which recognizes the mutual interaction between school segregation and residential segregation: The location of schools may thus influence the patterns of residential -24- development .... In the past, choices in this respect have been used as a potent weapon for creating or maintaining a state- segregated school system .... Such a policy does more than simply influence the short-run composition of the student body of a new scr.ool. It may well promote segregated residential patterns which ... further lock the school system into the mold of separation of the races. 28 L. Ed. 2d at .22/ We do^comprehend Swann, therefore, to mandate a complex sociohistorical analysis of residential patterns by district courts in order to determine the relative influence of segregated schools’ impact upon housing patterns (which in turn influence the segregated character of schools). If that were indeed the rule, there would be no need for the presumption against schools which are substantially disproportionate in their racial compositions which Swann announces — announces precisely for the reason that the school- realted and other influences upon the housing patterns of an entire school district cannot be neatly separated and evaluated as independent causal factors. It follows that where a policy of segregation is established for which the constitutionally-required 39/— See Bradley v. Milliken, C . A . 35257 (E.D. Michigan September 2/, 1971) where the court found that residential segregation and school segregation in Detroit "are interdependent phenomena" (slip op. at 24) and "just as there is an interaction between resi dential patterns and the racial composition of the schools, so there is a corresponding effect on the residential pattern by the racial composition of the schools." (slip op. at 10). See also note 36, supra. -25- corrective action has not been taken, the presumption against substantially disproportionate schools is not rebutted by a claim that independent of the dis criminatory school board action, other factors might have produced the segregated situation. While population patterns are of course a factor, so also is the influence of past discriminatory acts, and no court is equipped to maxe (nor are litigants equipped to present a sufficient basis for) tne fine sociological judgment as to the relative influence of the two factors upon the present racial composition of a school. Other courts in the post-Swann era have apparently taken the system-wide approach to the remedial process which we suggest. For example, in Clark v. Board of Educ. of Little Rock, Nos. 71-1409, 71-1415 (8th Cir. September 10, 1971) (en banc), the court noted two formerly white schools were now racially identifiable as black schools as a result of population shifts (slip op. at 9). Yet the court held "that the school district was obligated to develop a unitary school sys tem" and did not immunize these two schools from the remedial process. And in United States v. Watson Chapel School District, No. 20,699 (3th Cir. August 11, 1971), the court, relying on Haney v. County Board of Educ., 410 F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1969), rejected out of hand an argument "tnat the school locations and pupil assign ments are patterned on solely a de facto basis." (slip op. at 8). In Mannings v. Board of Public Instruction 26- of Hillsborough County, C.A. No. 3554 (M.D. Fla. May 11, 1971), the district court noted that the racial makeup of several schools nad changed because of population shifts. The court held, however, that "there has not been an end to de j ure segregation," and in determining the scope of the remedy, reasoned as follows (slip op. at 40-41) : the record supports what the Court has learned in presiding over school desegregation proceedings in tnis area of Florida: a desegregation plan will be unsuccessful and entail resegre gation where a few whites are added to formerly black schools which remain intact; in short, a plan which anticipates retention of iden- tifiably black schools will fail. Partial desegregation results in white flight, resort to private schools, and other maneuverings which frustrate the course of justice. Successful desegregation must extend through out the school system and be done in such a way that the tactics which impede court orders are rendered futile. There is an old equitable maxim that equity delights to do justice, and not by halves. It never had greater application than here. In Kelley v. Metropolitan County Board of Educ. of Nashville and Davidson County, C.A. Nos. 2094, 2956 (M.D. Tenn. June 28, 1971) (applications for stays denied by this Court and the Supreme Court), the court allowed several schools in outlying Davidson County to remain all or virtually all white. It appears that the facts in Kelley are no different than the facts in the instant case, and presumably the court in Kelley, under the theory adopted by the court below, could have given these schools the "de facto" stamp of approval. But -27- that was not the Kelley court's reasoning; rather, it left the white schools segregated, not because they were "de_ facto," but because there were no feasible alternatives. The court did not stop there, however; it went further and placed severe restrictions on these schools with regard to construction and placement of portables (slip op. at 16-17), for the purpose of prevent[ing] the use of these schools as an avenue of resegregation...." (slip op. at 11).40/ We submit that it was error for the district court to approach the evidence on a school-by-school basis alone. To desegregate a few schools but leave others as they are, against the background of a segre gation policy enforced by the defendant school district, <3° nothing for the future of integration in the public schools of Shelby County. Instead, this partial solution, like the partial solutions of free choice ^ud limited rezoning, will result only in further impaction of the existing segregation. ^O/This reasoning has particular relevance for the district court's view, in the instant case, that "white" schools do not have to be desegregated. (Discussed, infra). 41/— This process is already underway withproposals to build additional "black" housing in the Barrett's Chapel area. (Tr. 948, 1159). -28- The District Court Erred In Holding That Identifiable ".vnite” Schools Do hot Have Desegregated Where Pedaqoqically Feasible Alternatives exist ‘ ‘----- ---------- Racia Ail To Be and Sound Defendants have operated a dual set of schools, one for whites and one for blacks. The existence today of white" schools is just as much an indicia of segre gation as is the existence of "black" schools. (Tr. 406-407).11/ Furthermore, the retention of "white" schools has an adverse effect on the stability of the remainder of the system. (Tr. 418-21). Mannings v. Board of Public Instruction', supra; Kelley v. Metropolitan County Board of Lduc., supra (Mannings and Kelley are discussed in the preceding section of this brief, pages 2 6 - 2 8 , supra). During the course of the latest hearing, the district court properly stated the legal standard (Tr. 603) : 42_/ Defendants combine this issue with our fourth assignment of error "for the sake of clarity and brevity." (Appellees' Brief at 11). We think it obvious that the issues are not combinable and that defendants, despite their assertions to the contrary, are attempting, if unsuccessfully, to cloud the issues. 4 3/Additionally, it is just as important that white children are exposed to black children in the educational process as it is that black youngsters be exposed to white youngsters. (Tr. 396-97). But whether or not the Equal Protection Clause is this "quixotic in purpose" is immaterial to the constitu tional requirement that all vestiges of the dual system be eliminated. -29- THE COURT: I thought that's one way you defined a desegregated system within the meaning of the law, is to reach a point where no scnool is racially identi fiable as either black or white, but just schools. Isn't that what the Supreme Court said? Eight days later, however, the district court said: "we do not believe that the Supreme Court held the equal protection clause to be that quixotic in pur pose." (A. 4). Nevertheless, it seems quite clear that the law requires dismantling of "white" schools, as well as black schools. (See Motion for Summary Reversal at 9-10). The District Court Erred In Approving A Plan "Which Does Not Do As Much To Disestablish Segregation As An Alternative Proposal Which Is Feasible and Peda- qoqically Sound" Defendant's concede, as they must, that the Government's plan accomplishes more desegregation than the plan approved by the district court.li/ The only impediment to implementation of the plan found by the district court was that "at this time it would be necessary to stagger the daily starting times of the schools." (A. 6). If this finding is meant to be a valid reason for not implementing the United States' plan, it overlooks £.1/Defendants attempt to cast plaintiffs in the posture of seeking mathematical racial balance. (Appellees' Brief at 16-18). It should be perfectly clear from our position below and here that we do not seek racial balance. Plaintiffs s u d s tantially supported the plan filed by the United States, which could not by any stretch of the imagination be classified as a "racial Balance" plan. The fact that a plan achieves (Cont'd. on next page) - 30- the fact that defendants already stagger school opening times to accomodate their transportation scheduling. (Tr. 98-99 , 104-06). It further overlooks the broad remedial principles established in Swann. (See Motion for Summary Reversal at 11). In Kelley v. Metropolitan County School Board, supra, the district court, when faced with the same problem, said: Practical solutions are available such as the multiple use of buses, staggered hours for school opening, and staggered hours for individual grades. (Slip op. at 10). Much of what has been said in the two preceding sections is applicable here, for part of the reason the district court approved a less effective plan was be cause it found some schools to be "de facto" and felt that white schools did not have to be desegregated. But the court also approved a less effective plan for Millington South, Millington Central and Harrold (see note 35, supra) and simply refused to desegregate Mt. Pisgah elementary (apparently because of white community hostility, see Tr. 1271-72, A. 15 n.15). For various reasons, the district court failed to carry out the principles announced in this Court's re mand opinion and in Swann, with the result that Shelby County still does not have a unitary school system. -Li/ (Cont1 d. ) mere desegregation necessarily means that it achieves a better "racial balance." This is not the same thing, however, as a plan predicated upon achieving the system-wide racial ratio, or some other arbitrary racial ratio. -31- The D i s t r i c t Court E r r e d In A pproving The C l o s in q Of B la ck Scno o la On Grour.cs Of White Community H o s t i l i t y And »\it.iout R e q u ir in g m o bcnool B oard To J u s t i fy Such C l o s i n g s Witn Compelling E d u c a t i o n a l R e a s o n s , And In Holding As A M a t t e r Of Law That School Board A c t i o n s Which P l a c e D i s c r im .n i t o r y Burdens On Xeqroes In The D e s e g r e g a t i o n P r o c e s s , In The~Face Of Reasonable-------- And F a i r A l t e r n a t i v e s , Are h o t C o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y - P r o s c r i b e d — " Within the very recent past defendant Board operated from five to seven high schools which were constructed and maintained for black students. (Tr. ^3-75, 1314, 1319). Now, under the plan approved by the district court (closing the remaining two black high schools), no formerly black high schools are in operation.il/ All of the black high school students who were in those schools have been assigned to formerly white high schools. (Tr. 1315). Thus the entire burden of high school desegregation has fallen on black people. If all of the black high schools were inferior or substandard educational facilities, this might be a necessary burden for black people to bear, and they would no doubt bear it willingly for improved educational opportunities for their children. But the facts are to the contrary. The Government's expert, Dr. Buford, reco mmended that Barrett's Chapel be the high school in 4 5/ . — F i v e of the s c h o o l s (Woodstock, Capleville, Shadowlawn, Mt. P isg a h and B a r r e t t ' s Chapel) have r e t a i n e d t h e i r e l e m e n t a r y o p e r a t i o n . But o f t h e s e , o n ly Shadowlawn has had i t s racial i d e n t i t y removed. - 32- the pairing arrangement with Bolton, because he considers Barrett's Chapel to be a superior high school facility, and because black high school students would be shoul dered with an unfair share of the desegregation burdens. (Tr. 292-93, 457-58). The Superintendent testified that it didn't make any difference facility-wise, although he thought Bolton was "probably a little better." (Tr. 146). Assistant Superintendent for Special Services, C. L. Wells, testified that the Bolton and Barrett's Chapel high school facilities were equal. (Tr. 1345). The court's expert also testified that the schools were equal and that either school could be the high school (Tr. 1319), but admitted that he personally preferred Barrett's Chapel as the high school because of the unfair burdens placed on black high school students in the system. (Tr. 1340).!£/ In 1969 the Superintendent testified that the Board could never close Mt. Pisgah high school. (Tr. 84). Yet this year, moved perhaps by the prospects created by Swann that actual desegregation might at iî Theyear (which was Barrett Title IV Center's recommendation last be fore this Court on appeal) was that Chapel be the high school (Tr. 83, 1130), and the Board initially preferred Barrett's Chapel as the hign scnool (Tr. 287, 1130). -33- last be required, the Board's plan closed Mt. Pisgah high school. Although Dr. Buford did not consider utilizing Mt. Pisgah as a high school (since he was limited to modifying the Board's plan), he was con cerned about the situation because he thought Mt. Pisgah was an adequate high school facility and could be worked into a desegregation plan. (Tr. 436-41, 458-60). The Superintendent testified that Mt. Pisgah was equal to Bolton as a high school facility (Tr. 1150), and last year the Title IV Center recommended zoning white high school students from Germantown into Mt. Pisgah (See 311 F. Supp. at 104). The Title IV Center would prefer retaining Mt. Pisgah high school if it could be worked into a desegregation plan. (Tr. 1340-41) The educational justifications for closing these two high schools are not to be found in the record.11/ only educational justification even l l ^ n ^ nd ^hlchaP?ellees cite in their brief, at p. 14) is the.inferior curriculum offering at Mt. Pisaah hi!hC«rriC?1Um disparities between Mt. Pisgah and white s^nools was drought out by Dr. Buford. (Tr. 730- 739) inequality reflects discriminationPTr q 7 tne direct product of the dual system ^795~97’ ■ Ifc would be an anomaly indeed if the black m ?ermitt?d t0 Contlnue to discriminate against so in Jne pasU students the ground that it did (Tr. doesn't and that to integ don't pr they res addition just red The Board does also argue that Mt. Pisgah have enougn students with its present boundaries some.iow more transportation would be required rate Mt. Pisgah. (Tr. 75). Of course, plaintiffs opose to retain the present boundaries, as ult m segregation. And it would not require al transportation to desegregate the school -- irecting some of the buses already in use. -34- The primary justification must be something else, since it is not educational, and it appears to be the hostility of the white community to sending its youngsters to formerly black high schools.48/ Assistant Superintendent Wells testified that, in his opinion, Bolton was chosen as the high school rather than Barrett's Chapel to accomodate the white Bolton community. (Tr. I34C-47). And the Superintendent testified that whites would support the high school better if it were at Bolton. (Tr. 1146-47). With regard to Mt.. Pisgah, the court permitted a spokesman for the white community to testify in opposition to sending whites to Mt, Pisgah (Tr. 844-61), and the court itself was apparently of the view that the higher socioeconomic status of whites in the area would allow them to avoid sending their children to Mt. Pisgah. (Tr. 1271-72). At any rate, the district court approved the closing of the black high schools at least in part on the grounds of white community hostility. (A. 15 n.15). And the court also approved a grade reorganization for Shadowlawn which placed an unfair and unnecessary burden on black students (see page 14, supra). In the 4 8/— High schools occupy a higher status than elementary schools in the community's eyes, and also create more community involvement. (Tr. 1319-20). By the same token, high school desegregation probably also creates more community hostility, at least in rural systems where botn elementary and high school pupils have traditionally been bused to school. -35- district court's view, however, none of these things raises a constitutional question. As both Dr. Buford and the court's expert testified, one of the educational harms resulting from the dual school systems is that black and white youngsters were treated differently; they therefore perceived themselves as being different, and because our society was structured around whiteness, black youngsters perceived themselves as being inferior and white young sters perceived tnemselves as being superior. (Ti. 395-96 1318-19). Both experts agreed that it was important that the desegregation process be fair to both blacks and whites (Tr. 428-29, 1283). Dr. Buford felt that the closing of Barrett's Chapel was discriminatory (Tr. 435-36), and the court's expert agreed that the high school desegregation process had been unfair (Tr. 1317-J8) The court's expert also agreed that this process did the same thing as the dual system — i.e., treated blacks differently than whites (Tr. 1318-19), and both agreed that these facts had an adverse effect on the desegregation process. (Tr. 428-29, 1318). Although we have set forth the facts regarding this issue, we recognize that the district court made no findings as to the reasons or justifications for 49/- And defendants are of the same view (App ellees' Brief at 11-15). While we cannot comprehend much of defendants' argument in this regard, we do emphasize, as we emphasized to the district court (see, e.g. , Tr. 81-82, 1315-16) that we do not seed (Cont'd on next pace) - 36- closing the black high schools. The reason for this failure, of course, is the fact that the district court did not think these facts raise a substantial consti tutional question. On the basis of the cases cited in our Motion for Summary Reversal (pp. 13-17), and for the reasons contained therein, we submit that this is a clearly erroneous view of the law. To summarize what we have said in our motion, the constitutional issues arise in several ways. (1) A former dual school system, with a history of racial discrimination, should bear a heavy burden of justification with regard to all actions it takes in the desegregation process which affect black people, particularly the closing of black schools and "one-way busing" plans. (2) In any event, a systematic pattern of closing black schools, as here, amounts to a racial classification which the Board, as in all racial classification cases, bears a very heavy burden to justify. (3) Actions taken in the desegregation process which unfairly place the burdens on black people, when there are available equally reasonable but fairer alternatives, violate the Equal Protection Clause for the same reasons that segregation 4 9 /— 7 (cont'd.) to retain formerly black schools because of their racial identity. Rather, we seek to retain them because the proposals to close them are borne out of racial discrimination and such closings, where there a r e e q u a l l y reasonable and fairer alternatives, place a discriminatory burden on blacks. -37- is unconstitutional. Additionally, we submit, any desegregation plan which places disproportionate and unfair burdens on blacK parents and their children, when more equitable means are available, violates the Due Process Clause. Cf. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). district court should be reversed and this case remanded for proper desegregation of the SHelby County public schools. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Respectfully submitted RATNER, SUGARMON & LUCAS By : UJp/Jcsi+HWILLIAM E. CALDWELL 525 Commerce Title Building Memphis, Tennessee 38103 10 JACK GREENBERG NORMAN J. CHACKKIN 10 Columbus Circle New York, New York 10019 - 38- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing Reply Brief has been served on counsel for the defendants and plaintiff-intervenors, Paul Hancock, Esquire, United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Education Section, Washington, D. C. 20530, Lee Winchester, Jr., Esquire, Suite 3200, 100 North Main Building, Mempnis, Tennessee 38103, James A. Crislip, Esquire, 110 South Court Avenue, Memphis, Tennessee 38103, by United States Mail, postage prepaid, this 14th day of October, 1971. UUjLkm £. William E. Caldwell CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing Reply Brief has been served on counsel for the defendants and plaintiff-intervenors, Paul Hancock, Esquire, United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Education Section, Washington, D. C. 20530, Lee Winchester, Jr., Esquire, Suite 3200, 100 North Main Building, Mempnis, Tennessee 38103, James A. Crislip, Esquire, 110 South Court Avenue, Memphis, Tennessee 38103, by United States Mail, postage prepaid, this 14th day of October, 1971. tuUJb~ £.William E. Caldwell