District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Company Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amicus Curiae
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1952
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Company Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amicus Curiae, 1952. 2b9507f5-af9a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/40c20774-3d37-4833-aaf5-4ca48fa79dd5/district-of-columbia-v-john-r-thompson-company-motion-for-leave-to-file-brief-as-amicus-curiae. Accessed October 27, 2025.
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October Term, 1952
No. 617
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
JOHN R. THOMPSON COMPANY, INC.
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AS
AMICUS CURIAE
T hurgood Marshall,
R obert L. Carter,
D avid E. P iktskt,
Counsel for the N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense
and Educational Fund, Inc.
Supreme Printing Co., Inc., 41 M urray Street, N. Y., BArclay 7-0349
IN TH E
Supreme ( ta r t nf tfje IntteS I to ta
October Term, 1952
No. 617
-----------------------------------------------------o — ----------------------------- -— —
D istrict of Columbia,
v.
J ohn R. T hompson Company, I nc.
-------- --------------------- o-----------------------------
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AS
AMICUS CURIAE
To the Honorable, the Chief Justice of the
United States cmd the Associate Justices
of the Supreme Court of the United States:
The N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
Inc., pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of the Supreme Court
of the United States, moves for leave to file a brief as
amicus curiae in the case of District of Columbia v. John
R. Thompson Company, Inc., No. 617 in this Court,
I. Consent to file such brief has been requested of the
parties. The District of Columbia granted consent. The
John R. Thompson Company, Inc., has refused consent.
II. Movant is a national organization engaged in com
batting racial discrimination in the United States. One
of its principal purposes is to secure judicial recognition
and enforcement of federal, state and local enactments
prohibiting discrimination based on race or color.
Each of the 280,000 Negroes residing in the District of
Columbia has a direct personal stake in the outcome of
2
this case. The Equal Service Acts of 1872 and 1873 gave
all persons the right to receive the essential public services
provided by hotels, restaurants, barber shops and other
places of public accommodation without discrimination on
account of race or color. If the decision of the court below
invalidating these Acts is upheld, Negro residents par
ticularly will lose vital and precious personal rights.
The impact of this decision on Negroes residing outside
the District of Columbia will be equally as great. The
District of Columbia, the seat of our government, attracts
innumerable visitors who come to observe the processes
of democratic government in action and to see the monu
ments and memorials which symbolize our history. As
travellers, they are dependent on hotels and restaurants for
lodging and food. Unless they can be assured such essen
tial services, their privileges as citizens to visit the seat
of our government will continue to be seriously abridged.
As vital as the direct effect of this decision will be, its
indirect repercussions will be even more significant. The
District of Columbia symbolizes American democracy. So
long as racial discrimination in places of public accommoda
tion is sanctioned by law in the heart of the nation, efforts
to eliminate it in other areas will necessarily encounter
stiff resistance. Once it is clear, however, that racial
discrimination in our capital has no legal warrant, the
great mass of national opinion seeking to eliminate racial
barriers will be swelled with new moral strength and vigor.
Thus, the elimination of racial discrimination in places of
public accommodation in the District of Columbia is
especially significant to America’s progress toward full
equality for all persons.
III. Movant has not seen the briefs on the merits in this
Court and it is of the opinion that these have not yet been
.submitted. However, it does not believe that the follow
ing questions of law will be adequately presented.
3
A. Movant does not believe that the parties, in dealing
with the law with respect to municipal corporations, will
give sufficient attention to the public policy considerations
which favor local governmental effort toward the elimina
tion of racial discrimination and the broad national policy
against racial discrimination.
1. The power of local communities to deal with the
problems of racial discrimination on a local level is ren
dered extremely questionable in the light of the decision
of the Court of Appeals. Until now the validity of local
enactments in the field of civil rights has never been seri
ously questioned. In recent years, many communities have
attempted to deal with various facets of racial discrimina
tion by the enactment of local ordinances. Fair employ
ment practice ordinances are now in effect in Chicago,
Minneapolis, Cleveland, Youngstown, Philadelphia, Mil
waukee, and many other cities, thus insuring to hundreds
of thousands of Negroes the right to be free from discrimi
nation in employment. The validity of these ordinances
has suddenly become suspect in the light of decision of the
Court of Appeals. While their legality is a matter of state
law, the decision of the court below stands as a formidable
precedent. Moreover, the status of territorial acts enacted
in Alaska, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands prohibiting
racial discrimination in places of public accommodation
now becomes uncertain. If this decision stands, much of the
substantial grass roots progress in eliminating racial dis
crimination will be seriously imperiled.
2. In deciding that the Legislative Assembly for the
District of Columbia had no power to enact the Equal
Service Acts of 1872 and 1873, the Court below distinguished
the authorities which hold that ordinances requiring segre
gation are within the bounds of municipal power. This
distinction is predicated on the ground that such ordinances
are in accord with custom and, hence, necessary to the
preservation of peace and order. Movant believes that
4
this rationale is unsound and extremely prejudicial to the
rights of all minorities, for local custom may often be in
conflict with the rights of a minority and even the public
policy of the state at large.
The theory of the Court below imports into the law of
municipal corporations a new and confusing doctrine. If
it prevails, the validity of anti-discrimination ordinances
may depend on a factual determination as to whether they
are in accord or in conflict with local custom. Movant does
not believe that the full effect of this theory on civil rights
generally will be adequately explored by the parties. More
over, movant does not believe that the parties will give
adequate consideration to the broad national policy against
racial discrimination of every kind.
B. A majority of the Court of Appeals did not concur
in the opinion of Chief Judge Stephens. As a result, the
separate concurring opinion of Judge Prettyman takes on
added significance. The position of Judge Prettyman is
that, assuming the Legislative Assembly had the power to
enact the Equal Service Acts, they were, in effect, munici
pal ordinances which have now lost all force and effect
through abandonment and non-user. Ordinances and stat
utes protecting minority rights may often be frustrated by
apathy or even hostility on the part of some law enforce
ment officials. Under the theory set forth in the concurring
opinion below, such prolonged apathy or hostility may
result in nullification of the enactment.
Movant does not believe that the impact of this doctrine
on the rights of Negroes generally and its total ramifica
tions will be fully presented. And it does not believe that
the parties, in dealing with this issue, will give adequate
consideration to the broad national policy against racial
discriminaton of every kind.
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IV. Movant submits that the above considerations are
relevant to the issues at the bar and to the particular hold
ing which may emanate from this Court.
W herefore movant moves for leave to file a brief herein
as amicus curiae.
Respectfully submitted,
T hurgood Marshall,
R obert I j . Carter,
David E. Pin sk y.
Counsel for the N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense
and Educational Fund, Inc.