Correspondence from Liebman to Capital Punishment Attorneys; Memorandum on Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
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July 7, 1982

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Jean v. Nelson Reply Brief for Petitioners, 1984. d4a4de1c-b99a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/f6125f0e-7c24-4661-88dc-41ff971ea63b/jean-v-nelson-reply-brief-for-petitioners. Accessed August 19, 2025.
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N o. 84-5240 IN THE Supreme (ta r t of tljr Mmtrd States October T er m , 1984 Marie Lucie Jean , Et A l., Petitioners, v. A lan C. Nelson, Et A l., Respondents. On Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS Counsel: Bruce J. Winick, Esq. Irwin P. Stotzky, Esq. Christopher Keith Hall, Esq. Michael J. Rosen, Esq. O f Counsel: Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson By: Robert E. Juceam , Esq. Terrence A. Corrigan, Esq. A ttorneys fo r Petitioners Counsel o f Record: Ira J. Kurzban, Esq. Kurzban, Kurzban & Weinger, P.A. Suite 901 700 Brickell Avenue Miami, Florida 33131 (305) 371-0268 TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.............................................. iii PRELIMINARY STATEMENT............................................ 1 1. Respondents’ Mischaracterization of the Issues .. 3 2. Respondents’ Concessions...................................... 3 3. Respondents’ Failure to Meet Petitioners’ Conten tions ................................................................................. 4 ARGUM ENT.......................................................................... 6 I. THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT RESPOND ENTS’ ATTEMPT TO EQUATE TEMPORARY RELEASE FROM DETENTION PENDING A DETERMINATION OF ADMISSIBILITY WITH ADMISSION ITSELF.................................................. 6 II. THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT RESPOND ENTS’ USE OF SHAUGHNESSY v. UNITED STATES ex re/. MEZEI TO JUSTIFY INVIDI OUS DISCRIMINATION..................................... 9 III. THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE OF RACE AND NATIONALITY DISCRIMINATION RE MAINS UNREBUTTED........................................ 12 A. The Unrebutted Facts in this Record Dem onstrate Race As Well As Nationality Dis crimination.................................................... 12 B. Discrimination Against Haitian Petitioners Is Subject to Strict Scrutiny...................... 13 C. Respondents’ Novel Rationalization As serted On Certiorari Is Insufficient to Jus tify Their Discrimination............................ 16 11 PAGE IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS PRE SENTED IN THE PETITION FOR CER TIORARI ARE NOT MOOT, AND THEIR RESOLUTION MAY NOT BE AVOIDED BY THE REMAND SUGGESTED BY THE EN BANC C O U R T........................................................ 17 CONCLUSION................................................................... 20 Ill TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES: PAGE Ahrens v. Rojas, 292 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1961)................ 11 Alvarez v. District Director, 539 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir. 1976) 15 Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Authority, 429 U.S. 252 (1977)....................................................... 2 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)................................ 17 Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1982)................ 11 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).................................. 13 Carlson v. London, 342 U.S. 524 (1952).......... ............... 9 Castaneda v. Partida, 403 U.S. 482 (1977)........................2, 19 Evitts v. Lucey, 105 S. Ct. 830 (1985).............................. 8 Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977)....................................13, 14 Francois v. Rivkind, No. 84-1894-CIV-Nesbitt (S.D. F la .) ................................................................................. 6 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) ........................ 11 Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954).............................. 14 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975)............................ 17 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).................. 13 Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980), a ff’d as modified sub nom. Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982) 8, 12 Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976)............5, 13 Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954)........................ 13 Hirabayashi v. United States 320 U.S. 81 (1943)............ 12 Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1983) (“Jean I”), .pas sim IV Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984) (“Jean II”) 19 Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972)....................19, 20 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). . .12, 13, 16 London v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982)........................ 10 Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958)................ 9 Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) ...................... 18 Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (“Louis III”) ................................................................... 8 Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (“Louis IV”) ................................................................... 7, 8 Malek-Marzban v. Immigration and Naturalization Ser vice, 653 F,2d 113 (4th Cir. 1981)......................... 15 Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976)..............................13, 14 Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982) 17 Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979)........ 15 New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979)............................................................................... 18 Noel v. Chapman, 505 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1975)............ 15 Oyama v. California, 323 U.S. 633 (1948)...................... 12 Palma v. Verdiyen, 676 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1982)............ 11 Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982).......... 2 Regents o f the Univ. o f Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) ............................................................................... 5 Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976)............................... 18 Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981)....................................................................... 11 Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65 (1974)................................ 15 PAGE V SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978).................................. 17 Shaughnessy v. United States ex re. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953)................................................................................. 5, 10 Sompteur v. Rivkind, No. 84-1892-CIV- Nesbitt (S.D. F la .) ................................................................................. 6 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. o f Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971)................................................................... 18 Thelemaque v. Rivkind, No. 84-1893-CIV- Nesbitt (S.D. F la .) ................................................................................. 6 United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 (1953) . . 17 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1977)...................... 2 Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896)........ 9 Yassini v. Crosland, 618 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1980)........ 15 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).................1, 12, 13 CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND TREATY PROVISIONS: U.S. Const., amends. Vand X IV ....................................passim 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B).......................................................... 11 8 U.S.C. § 1181(d)(4)(B).................................................. 15 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).................................................. 14 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f)............................................................... 14, 15 8 U.S.C. § 1185............................................................. .. . .14, 15 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)............................................................ 4 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) and ( e ) .............................................. 7 Refugee Act of 1980 Pub. L. No. 96-212 97 Stat. 107 .. 14 PAGE V) PAGE RULES, REGULATIONS AND ORDERS: 8C.F.R. §1 0 1 .1 ................................................................. 14 8 C.F.R. § 212.1................................................................. 15 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(c).............................................................. 7 8 C.F.R. §231 ............................................... 15 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(e)............................................................. 15 8 C.F.R. § 248.1(a).............................................................. 7 Exec. Order No. 12172 (1979).......................................... 15 Exec. Order No. 12206 (1980) .......................................... 15 OTHER AUTHORITIES: INS Operations Instruction 212.5(c)................................ 7 Dade County Resolution No. R-798-82 (June 1, 1982).. 17 Conf. Rep. on Refugee Act of 1980, 126 Cong. Rec. S3756-58 (Feb. 26, 1980)................................................ 14 I n t h e Supreme (Court of tire United States O ctober Te r m , 1984 N o. 84-5240 Marie Lucie Jean , Et Al ., Petitioners, v. Alan C. Nelson, Et Al., Respondents. On Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS PRELIMINARY STATEMENT This is an action to end a continuing pattern of unlawful discrimination against petitioners and similarly situated Hai tians. This case is not, as respondents argue, solely about the remedy of release or even the power to exclude (Respondents’ Brief at 23, 40-42; hereinafter, “R. Br.”), but rather, is about the discriminatory enforcement by INS officials of the immi gration laws of the United States. Respondents do not and cannot deny that Haitians, unlike other aliens, have been the target of unequal and discrimina tory enforcement of the immigration laws by INS officials since 1973. Jean I (LA . 251-53); Petitioners’ Brief at 14-15 and nn. 20 and 21 (hereinafter, “P. Br.”). For over a decade, the INS has applied the immigration laws to Haitians with “an unequal hand” (Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 2 (1886)) through a variety of illegal practices which have been attested to by lawsuits successfully challenging such practices, and by knowledgeable immigration experts, INS officials themselves, and a former general counsel of INS. P. Br. 14, n.20. It is against this history and continuing pattern of dis crimination against black Haitians that the discriminatory detention at issue in this case must be viewed. At trial, in addition to comprehensive and unrebutted statistical proof,1 petitioners presented a “plethora” of testimonial and docu mentary evidence which revealed that INS officials discrimina- torily targeted Haitians for incarceration, while paroling other similarly situated excludable aliens. See P. Br. at 13-14, 16-17 and nn. 23, 24.2 1. Respondents claim that petitioners’ statistical proof was inadequate because, they assert, the only criteria which petitioners’ expert considered in determining parole status was documentation. R. Br. 8. On the contrary, as both the panel recognized (J.A. 268-269) and the evidence demonstrated (R. at Vol. 45, pp. 1631-34), petitioners’ statistician tested some of the data for numerous variables including whether petitioners had any immediate family in the United States or any recommendation on their asylum claim from the Department of State. He concuded that these variables had no impact on the release decision. Id. Respondents never performed any statistical analysis of any of the data presented. 2. Contrary to respondents’ bewildering suggestion (R. Br. 58-59), the panel did not improperly rely on this Court’s decisions in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Authority, 429 U.S. 252 (1977), Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1977), and Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) in weighing petitioners’ discrimination claim. The teaching of these cases is that, unlike a Title VII case, an equal protection violation cannot be proven solely by disproportionate impact (Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239), and that “ [ajbsent a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion and Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative, and the Court must look to other evidence.” Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266. Here, not only did the panel find that the statistical evidence revealed a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion or Yick Wo, but concluded that a “plethora” of other direct and indirect evidence under Arlington Heights factors established discrimination. Jean I (J.A. 251). In addition, the panel, fully cognizant of the requirements of Pullman- Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982), properly ruled that the district court’s factual findings on a number of issues were clearly erroneous, since “the record permitted] only one resolution of the factual issues.” 456 U.S. at 292. 3 Unable to rebut the evidence of discrimination against Hai tians, respondents have once again submitted a brief which is largely irrelevant to the issues raised in this case.3 In their brief, respondents mischaracterize the issues by constructing and then defending propositions that petitioners do not con test, make significant concessions which substantially undercut their position, and fail to meet petitioners’ principal conten tions. 1. Respondents’ Mischaracterization of the Issues Respondents assert that the due process clause does not augment the statutory right of excludable aliens to admission; but petitioners in this case do not seek to be admitted, and do not assert any constitutional right to admission. Respondents defend the propriety of nationality distinctions in the formula tion of immigration policy; but this case concerns the enforce ment, not the formulation, of an immigration policy that the relevant policymakers intended to be applied evenhandedly. Respondents defend the broad powers in the immigration area possessed by Congress, the President, and the Attorney General; but petitioners do not challenge the constitutional authority of Congress, the President, or the Attorney General—only the constitutionality of the actions of INS enforcement officials in applying neutral statutes and policies in a discriminatory fashion. 2. Respondents’ Concessions For the first time in this four-year old litigation, respond ents, having previously asserted that excludable aliens have no constitutional rights, now concede that they are “persons” within the fifth amendment who have “rights to due process or 3. Respondents mischaracterize the issue in this case by asserting that “ [t]he question presented . . . goes to the very heart of the sovereign power of the United States to determine whether particular aliens shall be eligible to enter our Nation and join our society.” R. Br. 20. As demonstrated below, temporary parole during the pendency of the determination of the admissibil ity of an excludable alien is in no way a determination concerning who is “eligible to enter our Nation and join our society.” 4 other constitutional protections” (R. Br. 21), but argue that these rights do not extend beyond those provided by statute, administrative rule and practice. R. Br. 29-30. This concession is fatal because petitioners do not assert any procedural or substantive due process rights with regard to admission or, indeed, to parole. What petitioners do assert is the right to have the neutral parole statute and administrative practice adopted by Congress, the President, and the Attorney General applied evenhandedly. Respondents concede that the government’s new parole policy was “intended to be applied on a wholly non-discrimina- tory basis.” R. Br. 55. Not only is the relevant statute govern ing parole neutral on its face, but respondents now also concede, contrary to their briefing below, that the statutory scheme, including 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), does not mandate incar ceration and from 1954 until this litigation was never read by the executive to mandate detention. R. Br. 2-3. These critical concessions demonstrate that the relief sought by petitioners— the evenhanded application of the law—would in no way interfere with the sovereign prerogatives of Congress and the President. Respondents concede that an alien released from detention pending a determination of admissibility “does not effect an entry into the United States in contemplation of law . . . .” R. Br. 36. Therefore, respondents’ attempt to use the entry doc trine to insulate discriminatory enforcement of a neutral deten tion policy from constitutional scrutiny hinges entirely on their characterization of parole as de facto admission, a character ization which is neither legally nor factually accurate. 3. Respondents’ Failure to Meet Petitioners’ Contentions Respondents’ brief is understandably silent concerning the facts of this case, which establish an egregious case of invidi ous race and nationality discrimination. Respondents merely protest that “[t]here is no occasion here to consider in detail the flaws in the panel’s determination that petitioners had proven nationality discrimination.” R. Br. 57. This feeble protest is disingenuous since respondents filed a printed brief 5 of 59 pages, including a 19 page factual exposition, without addressing any such alleged flaws. Similarly, respondents’ charge that petitioners “selectively canvassed” the factual rec ord to prove discrimination (id. 52, n.30) is belied by their failure to point to a single fact in the record which would rebut such proof.4 Respondents’ brief similarly fails to address the distinction between the actions of coordinate branches of government— Congress and the President—and the actions of low-level enforcement officials in enforcing the policies fashioned by these branches. See P. Br. 37-38. Not surprisingly, respondents seek to blur this critical distinction with a broad defense of the sovereign prerogatives of Congress and the President to make policy in this area. This case, properly understood, does not implicate the authority of these coordinate branches of the government, which, as even respondents now concede, in tended an evenhanded parole policy.5 Finally, as demonstrated below, respondents’ recharacteriza tion of Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953), fails totally to meet our distinction of that case from the situation presented here. Mezei was simply a case in which, given its unique facts, the relief sought—release from detention—would have set Mezei at large in the United States 4. Not only do respondents ignore the facts so graphically presented in the record, but they seek to dismiss the panel’s careful and thorough analysis of those facts on the ground that the en banc court vacated the panel’s decision. R. Br. 57. However, the decision of the en banc court would have been an academic exercise had it not accepted the findings of discrimination made by the panel. 5. Respondents wholly ignore the argument (P. Br. 37-38) based upon Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976), and Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), demonstrating the constitutional significance of this distinc tion. Rather, respondents boldly assert that the discriminatory actions of low-level enforcement officials, because done in the name of the Attorney General, “are his in contemplation of law.” R. Br. 56-57, n.33. In Hampton, the Civil Service Commissioner acted pursuant to a congressional delegation of power. This Court, however, held that although the Congress might possess the authority to discriminate against aliens, its delegate, the commis sioner, could not do so consistently with the Constitution. 6 permanently because no other country would accept him. Respondents have chosen to ignore the fact that because Haiti will accept the return of any petitioners found excludable and deportable, their temporary release from detention pending that determination in no way implicates the substantive admis sion power apparently thought to be impinged in Mezei. ARGUMENT I. THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT RESPONDENTS’ ATTEMPT TO EQUATE TEMPORARY RELEASE FROM DETENTION PENDING A DETERMINATION OF ADMISSIBILITY WITH ADMISSION ITSELF In view of their concession that “ parole from detention pending a determination of admissibility does not effect an entry into the United States in contemplation of law” (see R. Br. 36 and compare with P. Br. 32), respondents’ entire case is reduced to the argument that such parole is inextricably related to admission into the country because it constitutes de facto admission. In support of their contention, respondents argue that parole “ is not appreciably different from . . . formal legal admission” (R. Br. 37), that the availability of parole “ may have a corrosive effect on the government’s plenary authority to exclude aliens” (id. at 38), and that parole “ may act as an inducement to persons ineligible for admission to seek to enter the United States.” Id. Although respondents pretend that temporary release on parole is not “ appreciably different” from “ a formal legal admission,” in reality the two are quite different. Excludable aliens granted such parole may be excluded and physically removed to their country of origin;6 their parole may be terminated at any time; and they remain separated from family members who have no right to enter the United States to join 6. Indeed, since this Court granted certiorari in this case, respondents deported to Haiti several members of petitioners’ class. See, e.g., Sompteur v. Rivkind, No. 84-1892-CIV-Nesbitt (S.D. Fla.), Thelemaque v. Rivkind, No. 84-1893-CIV-Nesbitt (S.D. Fla.), and Francois v. Rivkind, No. 84-1894- CIV-Nesbitt (S.D. Fla.). 7 them, as would family members of admitted aliens. Paroled petitioners are all subject to strict reporting requirements, they must all have approved sponsors, and their physical movement is restricted (Louis IV, J.A. 179-85)—requirements to which admitted aliens are clearly not subject. The grant of temporary parole does not provide the alien with any additional procedural rights concerning his exclusion and deportation; in contrast, an admitted alien may only be deported following deportation proceedings which require con siderably more formal protections. An admitted alien may petition to change from one non-immigrant status to another, and may petition to extend his stay (8 C.F.R. §§ 214.1(c), 248.1(a)); a parolee may not petition to change his status or to extend his stay. An admitted alien who subsequently becomes out of status may also be eligible for a number of benefits under the immigration law, including entitlement to voluntary departure and to petition for suspension of deportation; in deed, even an undocumented alien who has made an entry may assert these benefits. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) and (e). As a practical matter, admitted aliens granted visas or lawful permanent residency may travel in and out of the United States, for example, to visit family members, without special permission; a parolee who leaves the country cannot re-enter unless prior permission has been specifically granted. See INS Operations Instructions 212.5(c). Moreover, upon an appropri ate basis, the government may place a variety of conditions on the grant of parole, including prohibiting the alien from working. Perhaps most importantly, time spent by admitted immigrants in this country qualifies in establishing eligibility for citizenship while time spent by parolees does not. Thus, parole provides neither the benefits of admission nor any legal status equivalent even to that of a visitor temporarily admitted, and in no way constitutes a de facto admission into the country.7 7. While it is true, of course, that temporary parole of an excludable alien may permit him to “ mingle with the mass of citizens” (see R. Br. 39), this simple observation does not lead to respondents’ conclusion that parole constitutes de facto admission. A person accused of a crime and released on bail may “ mingle with the mass of citizens.” The grant of bail, however, is 8 Respondents assert that parole constitutes de facto admis sion due to the length of time exclusion proceedings sometimes take. R. Br. 37-38. This bootstrap argument is disingenuous. The simple fact is that respondents control the pace of the exclusion process. Here, any delays in exclusion proceedings were attributable to the misconduct of the INS in implement ing those proceedings {Jean I (J.A. 271)) which led to this action, and the failure of the INS to allocate sufficient re sources to conduct such proceedings. Louis III (J.A. 119). Indeed, this is not the first example of the government seeking to justify its mistreatment of Haitians by referring to “ delays” of its own creation in the exclusion or deportation process—a justification which has properly been rejected by the courts. See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980), a ff’d as modified sub nom. Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982). Moreover, the record of this case demonstrates that subject ing discriminatory detention to constitutional review would not “ erode” the admissions process. As both the district court and panel found, and as respondents now concede, “ INS had not identified any reason to believe that Haitian aliens were more likely to abscond than other excludable aliens.” R. Br. 38, n. 19; see also Louis IV (J.A. 178), Jean I (J.A. 255 n.38).8 not a de facto acquittal. Just as granting bail to an accused does not affect a determination of the accused’s guilt or innocence, the decision to parole an excludable alien does not affect the question of his admission into this country. See Louis III (J.A. 161) (“ parole . . . is equivalent to pre-trial bond for a criminal defendant” ). Release on bail or parole permits the defendant to remain in the “ midst of our society” and “ implicates many of the same considerations” — such as deterence and incapacitation—that justify criminal incarceration. Defendants released on bail or offenders released on parole “ who choose to abscond” may also “ face only a minimal risk of apprehension.” Thus, bail may have a “ corrosive effect” on the state’s power to convict and “ may act as an inducement” to criminal activity. Nonetheless, when a state provides for a system of bail or parole, “ the procedures used . . . must comport with the demands of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitu tion.” Evitts v. Lucey, 105 S.Ct. 830, 839 (1985). 8. Respondents improperly refer to a non-record, self-serving GAO report which was amended favorably in response to respondents’ comments to directly support their arguments. Their use of this post-litigation report to 9 Similarly, as both the district court and panel found, non-dis- criminatory parole of petitioners posed no threat to our na tion’s security.* 9 Accordingly, given the nature of the parole process, and the facts of this case, there is no support for the proposition that admission and parole are so interwoven as to preclude judicial review of discriminatory detention.10 II. THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT RESPONDENTS’ USE OF SHAUGHNESSY v. UNITED STATES ex rel. M EZEI TO JUSTIFY INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION Even if the considerations of national sovereignty which have traditionally been advanced to insulate admissions deci sions from close judicial review applied to parole decisions, no such considerations apply in the context of discriminatory support their assertion that INS might have feared that Haitians might abscond because some failed to appear at INS hearings is obviously strained. Significantly, the GAO report does not itself state that any Haitians have “ absconded,” and does not purport to explain why some may have missed appearances at INS hearings. In fact, testimony of the INS District VI district director suggests that those Haitians who failed to appear may never have received notice of their hearings due to INS failure to record changes of address by Haitians. (R. at Vol. 48, pp. 2198-2201). 9. Respondents now acknowledge that petitioners posed no security threat. See R. Br. at 38, n.19 (“ The point is not that any one individual was a security risk” ). However, respondents seek to change the meaning of “ security risk” as traditionally used in the context of parole, and redefine the phrase to mean “ the specter of loss of effective control of the Nation’s borders.” Compare Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 190 (1958), with R. Br. at 38, n.19. Even if respondents’ novel definition of “ security risk” were valid, they cannot explain how Haitians, who constitute less than 2Vo of all illegal immigrants, uniquely threaten national security. See also Brief of Amici Curiae Metropolitan Dade County et al. at 16-17 (discussing low crime rate and high motivation in Haitian community). 10. In view of the undisputed facts of this case, respondents’ reliance on Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) and Carlson v. London, 342 U.S. 524 (1952) for the proposition that admission and detention are integrally related is misplaced. Both cases treated detention as analogous to pretrial confinement, in which restraint may be necessary to prevent the accused from absconding (Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 235) or endangering the community while free on bond (Carlson, 342 U.S. at 538). As respondents concede, neither consideration was present here. 10 detention of a particular race and nationality. See P. Br. at 35. Respondents do not address this obvious truth, but claim that judicial review of discriminatory incarceration is nonetheless foreclosed by Mezei and by the purported nature of the relief sought by petitioners. R. Br. at 41-42. Neither of respondents’ arguments has merit. Respondents read Mezei far too broadly as holding that the Constitution may never afford an excludable alien the remedy of release from detention. Because no nation would accept Mezei, the remedy of release would have effectively reversed the Attorney General’s decision that he be excluded on na tional security grounds. Thus, unlike the present case, Mezei’s release would have been permanent and would have “ nullified] the very purpose of the exclusion proceed ings. . . .” 345 U.S. at 216. Further, respondents’ attempt to characterize Mezei as ex tending the entry doctrine to “ collateral claims” has been rejected by this Court’s decision in Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982). In seeking to characterize petitioners’ dis crimination claim as a “ collateral claim” foreclosed by the entry doctrine, respondents state that “ Mezei, too, arguably had a discrete constitutional claim (sounding in procedural due process) that could have been distinguished analytically from any assertion of a substantive right to parole. . . .” R. Br. 41. In Plasencia, the alien, to whom the entry doctrine concededly applied, also had a discrete constitutional claim sounding in procedural due process, which this Court recognized. If re spondents’ assertion that the entry doctrine foreclosed “ collat eral claims” such as equal protection and due process were correct, then this Court would not have permitted her to assert her procedural due process claim. Respondents also contend that “ [ujnder the entry doctrine, the bar to judicial review importing extrastatutory criteria lies not in the nature of the right asserted, but in the unavailability of the remedy requested.” R. Br. 42-43.11 Respondents have 11. Evidently fearful of the phrase “ constitutional” review, respondents have invented the term “ extrastatutory” review. 11 mischaracterized the relief sought by petitioners. Haitian class members are not claiming a procedural or substantive right to release. See P. Br. 3. Rather, petitioners seek to enjoin the INS from applying the laws unequally. Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Complaint (J.A. at 43-44). The Attor ney General, the President and the Congress remain free to fashion a non-parole policy, if in their judgment one is desir able. Having adopted, however, a discretionary parole policy intended to be applied evenhandedly, the will of the coordinate branches of government is not frustrated by judicial enforce ment of the neutrality of this policy.'2 Respondents assert that “ extention of parole to petitioners as a remedy is impermissible because the courts simply lack authority to admit excludable aliens.” R. Br. 42. This assertion is simply irrelevant because parole, not admission, is at issue here, and courts routinely review parole decisions alleged to be abuses of discretion or to violate the Constitution.12 13 Moreover, respondents suppress the fact that Congress has itself autho rized judicial review of agency action generally, including “ agency action found to be contrary to constitutional right. . . . ” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B). 12. Similarly, states may have the substantive power to impose the death penalty. But where state legislatures delegate to judges and juries the decision as to those cases in which it will be imposed, the arbitrary application of that authority may nonetheless be unconstitutional. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310-14 (1972) (White, J. concurring). Invalidating death sentences under such statutes does not infringe upon the substantive power of the state to impose capital punishment because under such statutory schemes, the “ legis lative will is not frustrated if the penalty is never imposed. . . Id. at 311 (White, J., concurring); id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring). 13. E.g., Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1982); Palma v. Verdiyen, 676 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1982); Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981); Ahrens v. Rojas, 292 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1961). 12 III. THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE OF RACE AND NATIONALITY DISCRIMINATION REMAINS UN REBUTTED Respondents do not deny or rebut any of the facts in the record which evidence their ten-year history of discrimination against black Haitian refugees. They simply deny that they discriminated on the basis of race, preferring to characterize their discrimination, “ if that did indeed occur” (R. Br. 56), as discrimination based on nationality. Nationality discrimina tion, however, is no less objectionable under relevant constitu tional standards than race discrimination, and none of the arguments respondents advance to avoid the legal conse quences of their invidious discrimination has merit. A. The Unrebutted Facts in this Record Demonstrate Race As Well As Nationality Discrimination The evidence in this case went to both race and nationality discrimination against petitioners—all of whom are black. See Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. at 451. The panel did not conclude that there was no evidence of race discrimination. It simply noted that “ [t]he bulk of the evidence . . . was addressed to the nationality claim.” Jean I (J.A. 243 at n.29) (emphasis supplied). Since the panel recognized that some of the evidence went to race discrimination and since all of the evidence of discrimination was “ essentially unrebutted by the government” Jean I (J.A. 274), petitioners proved that respondents discriminated on the basis of race and nationality. Furthermore, this Court has customarily treated discrimination on the basis of national origin as racial discrimination where, as here, the nationality discrimination is coterminous with a minority’s race. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); see also Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).14 14. In any event, nationality discrimination is no less odious than racial discrimination. Race and nationality discrimination are unique. As this Court has long recognized, the protections of the Constitution “ are universal 13 B. Discrimination Against Haitian Petitioners Is Subject to Strict Scrutiny Respondents contend that decisions of INS officials must be upheld unless “ wholly irrational,” asserting that the equal protection component of the fifth amendment provides peti tioners with less protection against invidious discrimination than the equal protection guarantee of the fourteenth amend ment. R. Br. 48-50. On the contrary, “ both Amendments require the same type of analysis.” Hampton, 426 U.S. at 105; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976). While “ there may be overriding national interests which justify selective federal legislation that would be unacceptable for an individual state” (id.), the same balancing approach of strict scrutiny of race and nationality discrimination applies. The only difference is that the federal government has certain unique interests which the states lack, and that the proper assertion of those interests by the Congress or the President may outweigh the non-dis crimination principle. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).15 in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality.” Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). “ Classifications . . . based on national ity or race are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.” Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971); see also Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954). This Court has repeatedly held that invidious race and national origin discrimination under any circumstances, even by the federal government, is subject to strict scrutiny. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Respondents are unable to cite any cases by this Court holding otherwise. 15. This Court has carefully limited the situations in which overriding national interests would prevail to those where the Congress or the President, not low-level officials, are acting. Hampton, 426 U.S. at 105 (federal employment bar on resident-aliens might be justified by overriding national interest, but not if imposed by Civil Service Commissioner); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (congressional admission classification); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (same). Furthermore, each of these cases involved only semi-suspect classifications which are subject to intermediate scrutiny. Hampton (alienage); Fiallo (sex, illegitimacy); Diaz (alienage). Indeed, not since Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), has this Court held that there was an overriding national interest which could justify invidious discrimination on the basis of race or national origin. 14 Respondents also assert that “[b]ecause the subject matter of immigration law necessarily implicates the relationship of the United States with aliens and foreign countries, nationality- based classifications are precisely the kind of classifications that are entirely legitimate.” R. Br. 50. Respondents’ conten tion, however, proves too much. The ability of Congress to take nationality into account in a politically responsive manner in setting immigration policy is quite distinct from the enforce ment of neutral policies or laws in a discriminatory manner. Thus, this Court has recognized that “policies pertaining to the entry of aliens. . . are peculiarly concerned with the political conduct of government,” but that “in the enforcement of these policies, the Executive Branch of the Government must respect the procedural safeguards of due process.” Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954). In any event, petitioners have not suggested that Congress or the President, acting pursuant to expressly conferred powers (as under the statutory authority granted in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(f), 1185), may never make nationality-based deter minations concerning whom to admit or exclude—only that such classifications are subject to constitutional scrutiny. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. at 793, n.5. The power of Congress and the President16 to make such classifications does not exempt invidiously discriminatory incarceration by en forcement officials from constitutional scrutiny, and none of the regulations or cases cited by respondents (R. Br. 50-55) supports this contention. Each of the regulations cited involved nationality classifications that arose from specific statutory provisions or were required to comply with treaty obligations.17 16. Respondents assert that section 1182(d)(5)(A) authorizes the Attorney General to draw nationality distinctions, citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 81. Not only are the actions of low-level officials rather than the Attorney General at issue here, but the parole authority referred to in Diaz was expressly eliminated by Congress in enacting the Refugee Act of 1980. See Conf. Rep. on Refugee Act of 1980, 126 Cong. Rec. S3756-58 (Feb. 26, 1980). Congress has granted only the President the discretion to distinguish among classes of aliens, but has not given this power to the Attorney General or to lower-level officials. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f). 17. The nationality distinctions contained in 8 C.F.R. § 101.1 were based on distinctions contained in immigration statutes during the periods set forth 15 Each of the classifications in the cases cited (R. Br. n.28) involved residence or alienage, or were promulgated pursuant to the direction of the President in retaliation to direct threats by a foreign government.18 Accordingly, none of these classifi cations provide support for the invidious race and nationality discrimination here. Respondents’ claim that subjecting discriminatory incarcera tion by enforcement officials to constitutional scrutiny would inhibit the ability of the Executive to respond effectively to foreign policy threats such as the seizure of the American Embassy in Teheran or waves of immigrants (R. Br. 51-52) is without merit. The President has ample statutory authority, never invoked here, to respond to any such crisis. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(f), 1185. Furthermore, this Court subjected dis criminatory incarceration on the basis of race and national in the regulation. Thus, for example, certain Oriental nationalities who entered the United States after July 1, 1924, were not given a presumption of lawful admission because, as of that date, restrictive legislation barring their entry was in effect. Nationality distinctions in 8 C.F.R. § 212.1, waiving certain documentary requirements for some nationalities, is based on 8 U.S.C. § 1181(d)(4)(B) which allows waiver of such requirements. The same statutory basis would provide the justification for relaxed procedures for certain residents of Canada and Bermuda in 8 C.F.R. § 231. Finally, 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(e) provides certain nationals privileges regarding communications with diplomatic personnel based upon “ [ejxisting treaties.” 18. Each of these cases involved challenges based on alienage, not na tionality. Each involved admissions criteria. Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65 (1974) (admission classification based on residence in a contiguous country); Alvarez v. District Director, 539 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir. 1976), cert, denied, 430 U.S. 918 (1977) (same); Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 423 U.S. 824 (1975) (alienage not a suspect class). During the Iranian Crisis, the President issued executive orders under 8 U.S.C. § 1185 authorizing limitations on the rules and regulations governing the entry of Iranian students. See Exec. Orders 12172, 12206 at 44 F.R. 67947 (1979), 45 F.R. 24101 (1980); Malek-Marzban v. Immigration and Naturali zation Service, 653 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1981); Yassini v. Crosland, 618 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1980); Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert, denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980). (However, in each of these cases, the courts improperly relied on alienage cases when they concluded that nationality classifications are subject to rational basis review.) 16 origin by the President to constitutional scrutiny even when this nation was faced with what it perceived as the far more extreme threat of invasion and sabotage during a world war, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), and the Republic survived. It can do no less here. C. Respondents’ Novel Rationalization Asserted On Cer tiorari Is Insufficient to Justify Their Discrimination Perhaps despairing of persuading this Court that their dis criminatory conduct is not subject to judicial review, respond ents, for the first time in nearly four years of litigation, offer a post hoc rationalization for their discriminatory incarceration of black Haitian refugees.19 In light of the neutral policy prescribed by Congress, the later confirmation of evenhanded enforcement announced by the President, and the record in this case, the belated rationalization cannot survive constitu tional scrutiny. Respondents seek to justify singling out Haitians for dis criminatory incarceration as necessary to deter arrivals of illegal immigrants in South Florida because, they assert, South Florida was inundated with 150,000 aliens.20 However, the 35.000 Haitians who arrived over a ten year period comprised only a small portion of the total in comparison with the 125.000 Cubans who arrived “in a fraction of the time” (Jean I (J.A. 198 n.3)), and the almost one million excludable aliens apprehended by INS each year. There simply was no justifica tion for singling out black Haitians from all others for dis criminatory incarceration, especially where responsible local officials branded such discrimination for what it obviously 19. As the panel found, respondents simply protested at trial that they did not discriminate. Jean l (J.A. 275). Respondents’ appellate briefing and position here has been a continuing effect to avoid the consequences of their inability to make an evidentiary response which could be tested on the factual record. 20. Significantly, respondents do not identify the individuals who targeted Haitians for discrimination, preferring to refer to them anonymously as “decision makers.” See R. Br. 56 17 was—“illegal, inhumane and unacceptable.” See Dade County Resolution No. R-798-82 (June 1, 1982), cited in Brief of Amici Curiae Metropolitan Dade County et al. at 11. IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS PRESENTED IN THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ARE NOT MOOT, AND THEIR RESOLUTION MAY NOT BE AVOIDED BY THE REMAND SUGGESTED BY THE E N B A N C COURT Respondents concede that this case is not moot and that the grant of the writ of certiorari was proper. Nonetheless they proceed to make a thinly-veiled mootness argument in the guise of requesting that this Court not decide the constitutional question presented. See R. Br. 15-20. Petitioners could not more strongly disagree. Respondents’ first argument is premised on the fallacy that INS’ discriminatory treatment of Haitians has ceased. R. Br. at 14-15 n.8, 20 n.12. This bald, self-serving assertion, in the context of the decade-long history of INS discrimination against Haitians, does not make it unlikely that INS officials will continue their discrimination without a mandatory injunc tion based upon the Constitution. Furthermore, respondents’ purported voluntary cessation of their illegal conduct does not deprive this Court of its power to review the legitimacy of their prolonged practices, United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 (1953), and there can be no assurance that respondents will not revert to their prior practices. Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982) (“city’s repeal of objectionable language would not preclude it from reenacting precisely the same provision”); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978).21 Respondents next invoke the doctrine that a court should not reach a constitutional issue if it can decide a case on a 21. In any event, this is a classic case of “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110 n. 11 (1975) (although no longer in pretrial detention, “ [t]he individual could nonetheless suffer repeated deprivation”); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 526 (1979). 18 non-constitutional ground, and urge this Court not to decide the question presented by this case. However, this doctrine applies only where the non-constitutional remedy will provide “virtually all of the relief” which would be provided under the Constitution. New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 583 n.23 (1979). Here, the en banc court’s remedy denies petitioners full relief because both the scope of the remedy and the standard of review are woefully inadequate.22 The scope of the non-constitutional remedy provided by the en banc court would, quite simply, not provide petitioners with the injunctive relief against future discrimination which they seek and to which they are entitled. Swann v. Charlotte-Meck- lenburg Bd. o f Ed., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).23 The difference between the remedy for a constitutional violation and the remedy for a statutory violation is well illustrated by a com parison of the relief ordered by the panel and by the en banc court. The panel, having found unconstitutional discrimina tion, properly remanded for broad class-wide relief to remedy past discrimination and prevent future discriminatory enforce ment, in order to assure that all aliens are accorded equal 22. Contrary to respondents’ assertion (R. Br. 17, n. 10), the class did not terminate at the time of the final judgment. See J.A. 189 (“The Court finds to be without merit Defendants’ contention that the class cannot include individuals who are not a part thereof at the time of Final Judgment”). Although the district court recently expressed the “view” that the definition of the class should be rethought, the court has not, as respondents assert, made any determination in this regard. See Order on Mandate, No. 81-1260- CIV-EPS (S.D. Fla. June 8, 1984), at 1 n .l. 23. Respondents’ assertion (R. Br. 20 n. 12) that Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), bars injunctive relief to remedy invidious discrimination is without merit. In Lyons, this Court denied injunctive relief because the individual respondent lacked standing as there was no likelihood that he would be injured again. Flere, unlike Lyons, the court has certified a class, some of whom remain in detention and all of whom are potentially subject to re-detention (R. Br. 17 n. 10). Furthermore, in the light of the ten-year history of discrimination, there is no reason to believe that respondents will not repeat their discrimination. Respondents’ citation of Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 377 (1976) can only be described as puzzling since there this Court denied injunctive relief because “none of the petitioners had deprived the respondent classes of any rights secured under the Constitution.” 19 treatment. Jean I (J.A. 291). In contrast, the en banc court limited its relief to only those class members currently in detention, and further limited the relief to a determination of whether the agency action was arbitrary.24 25 Under this ap proach, the majority of the class released because of respond ents’ APA violation would not receive the injunctive relief against future discrimination to which they are entitled. Second, the narrow standard on remand suggested by the en banc court—limiting review to whether there was a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” provided by the agency—is altogether inadequate to protect against discriminatory action, and indeed, provides an all too easy way for the agency to mask discrimination. This standard would effectively preclude the district court from looking behind a “facially legitimate and bona fide” reason put forth by the agency to justify its action, even if wholly pretextual.2' Moreover, the “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” standard directs the court to determine whether the agency has exercised its substantive discretion and, if so, whether the agency has asserted a justifi cation for its determination consistent with its legal mandate. This standard does not purport to be a test for determining whether discrimination occurred. While this standard of review may be appropriate to measure the validity of an immigration policy, see Fiallo v. Bell, or to review decisions concerning 24. Plainly, the en banc court’s remand does not contemplate injunctive relief for all class members even if arbitrary official conduct is found with respect to detained class members. Similarly revealing is the en banc court’s suggestion that the district court “may wish to reconsider whether class treatment is still an appropriate vehicle for making [relief] determinations.” Jean II {J.A. 331). 25. This standard would permit INS to offer mere protestation that they had a facially legitimate and bona fide explanation for conduct challenged as discriminatory. This Court has, of course, rejected the notion that, in the context of a discrimination suit, “a simple protestation from a commissioner that racial considerations played no part [in his decision] would be enough” to rebut a prima facia case of discrimination. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. at 498, n.19. Furthermore, under the facially legitimate standard, it is unlikely that a trial court would permit discovery to test the validity of an assertion of bona fide action. See Kliendeinst v. Mandell, 408 U.S. at 770 (under facially legitimate standard, “the courts will [not] look behind the exercise of . . . discretion”). 20 admission, see Kliendienst v. Mandel, it simply cannot func tion as a standard to measure the existence of discrimination in a parole context. CONCLUSION For all the foregoing reasons, and the reasons set forth in petitioners’ initial brief, this Court should reverse and vacate the decision of the en banc court, reinstate the panel opinion, and order the district court to enter broad injunctive relief to remedy the invidious discrimination against petitioners. Respectfully submitted, Bruce J. Winick American Civil Liberties Union Foundation o f Florida, Inc. University of Miami School of Law P.O. Box 248087 Coral Gables, FL 33124 (305) 284-2971 Irwin P. Stotzky University of Miami School of Law P.O. Box 248087 Coral Gales, FL 33124 (305) 284-2549 Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson One New York Plaza New York, NY 10004 By: Robert E. Juceam Terrence A. Corrigan Ira J. Kurzban National Emergency Civil Liberties Committee and Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. Kurzban, Kurzban & Weinger, P.A. Suite 901 700 Brickel Ave. Miami, FL 33131 (305) 372-0268 Ira J. Kurzban Christopher Keith Hall 32-32 32nd Street Long Island City, NY 11106 (718) 204-5427 Michael J. Rosen American Civil Liberties Union Foundation o f Florida, Inc. 19 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33131 (305) 377-3736 RECORD PRESS, INC., 157 Chambers Street, N.Y. 10007 (212) 619-4949