LDF 50th Anniversary, 1990 - 22 of 27

    Kl ( sTo^r

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lfinitril fitatus @uurt uf Amruls l,n)o/L"^
Fon rsn Frrtrr Crncurr

No. 24265

Joux Devrs and Fnowzrn lJ;.zztao, et aL.,

Appell,ants,
v.

Srere on AlAuuE,
Appell,ee.

APPEAI,S FNOM TEE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR TEE SOUTIIERN DISTRICT OF AIJABAMA

BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS

Oscen-W'. Anerrs, Jn.
1630 Fourth Avenue N.

Birmingham, Alsllama 35203

VpnNoN Z. Cnawrono
578 Davis Avenue
Mobilc, Alal:ama 36603

Jecx GnpoNBERG

Csenr,ns Srppnpx ILar,sroN

Csenr,ns H. JoNns, Jn.
Nonlrew C. Auer.nn
Mnr,vvN H. Ze,nn

10 Columbus Circlc
New York, New York 10019

Attorneys for Appel,lants

Arruonv G. Ansrnnorrlr
3400 Chestnut St.
Philadelphia, Pcnna. 19104

Of Couttscl



-l

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Statornent of thc Caso .,.-.... 1

A. I,'rouzic llaazav), ct al. v. Alabarn& ---....-...-..-..-.- 1

B. John Davis v. State of Alabama .......-........-....... 2

Specification of Eruor J

Ancunpxt

28 U.S.C. $1443(1) Authorizes Federal Civil Rights
Removal Jurisdiction of State Criminal Prosecu-
tions Brought Solely to Harass, Threaten or In-
timidate Negroes for Exercising Their Right to
Vote or Aiding Others to Vote 4

r\. The prosecutions iu Hazzard v. Alabama are
removable by virtue of the federal voting acts 4

ts. The Voting Eights Act of 1965 gave federal
courts sole jurisdiction of offenses such as are
chalged ir Hazza,-d ..-.......--... 8

C. In Davis v. Alabama, the Federal Voting Rights
Acts similarly grant irnrnunity from prosecu-
tion to those aiding othcrs to register to vote -... 10

Cor.rcr,usroN 13

Certificate of Service \4

Statutory Appendix 1a



ii

Tlnr,r or Cesns

PAGE

City of Greenrvood r'. Peaeoek, 384 U.S. 808 (1966) .---4,5,6,
10,11, 12

Georgia r,. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966) .--.-.--4,5,7,8,10,12

Harper v.
(1e66)

Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663

In re Loney, 134 U.S. 372 (1890)

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) 6

Sellers v. Trussell, 253 F.Supp. 915 (I,I.D. AIa. 1960) g

United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960) .............._..... 7
United States v. 'Wood, 29i F.2d 772 (lth Cir. 1961),

cert. den.,369 U.S. 850 (1962) ..T,LL

Yick W'o r'. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1386)

F ed,e.ral Statutes :

28 U.S.C. $1443 ..-._....-....-...1,3,4,!L,12

42 U.S.C. $1e71(a)(1) i
42 U.S.C. $1971(b) .-............_-5,7,8,L1

42 U.S.C. $1e73b ......_.. 8_9

42 U.S.C. $1973d 9

42 U-.S.C. $1973i(b) 5,6,7,8. 10, 11, 12
!

42 U.S.C. g1e73l(c)(1) ..........-. 6

12 tlS.C. 92000a (1964) .............. 4,5

;' i
t,

I

10

ur

PAGE

42 U.S.C. $2000a-2 (1964) --..:-.-......-.... ....--..--4,5,8

Civil Rights Act of. 7957, Act of September 9, 1957,

Pub. L. 85-315, 71 Stat. 637 ---.-....... 6

Civil Bights Act of 1960, Act of ItIay 6, 1960, Pub. L.
86-449,74 Stat. 90 -.-.........- 6

Civil Rights Act of 1964, Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L.
88-352, 78 Stat. 241 ........-... -.---.....6,11

Voting Rights Act of 1965, Act of August 6, 1965,

Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 ....-. ..-..-..-......-..--.1,2, 4, 6, S,11



Ix tsp

lfitritril $tutra $,sltrt uf Apppuk
Fon run Frrtrr Crncurr

No. 24265

JorrN Drvrs and FnoNzrn Hrzztno, et al.,

Appell,ants,
v.

Srern or Auneue,
Appellee.

APPEAIJS FROM TI{E UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR TEE SOUTIIERN DISTIiICT OI' AIJABAMA

BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS

Statenrent of the Lase

This is an appeal from an order of the United States

District Court for the Southern District of Alabama re-

manding in a single order and rvithout a hearing two cases

removed to the federal court under 28 U.S.C. $1443, the

civil rights removal statute. The facts as alleged in the
removal petitions and u'hiclt, for the purpose of the pres-

ent appeal, must be taken as true, are as follorvs.

A. Fronzie Hazzard, et al, a, Alabama

In tlre Hazzard, case, petitioners allegecl that prior to the

I)irssagc oll thc fr'ctlcral Votirrg liights Act of 196{'r, thcy as

Ncgro citizcrrs hzrtl bcctt clctricd thcir rights to register to

vote and to vote. Subsequent to the passage of that act



2

and under its authority, numerous Negro citizens have
registered in that county, including most of the named peti-
tioners (8. 17).

On February 23r 1966, rvith no prior rvarning, the twenty-
four petitioners were uotifiecl by the sheriff of Clarke
County that they rn'erc to appear in the Circuit Court on

February 25th to answel' to indictments for perjury. The
ostensible basis for the perjury indictments s-as that the
petitioners had made misstatements of fact uncler oath on
their voter registration forms. These forms had been fllled
out under.the authority and in exercise of the rights granted.
to petitioners rurcler the \roting Rights Act of 1965.

Petitioners alleged further that there \yere no bases in
fact for the perjury charges, but that the charges \vere
brought against them for the purpose of harassing and in-
timidating thern in the exercise of rights and privileges
granted by the Constitution and larvs of the United States
ivith the intent and effect of discouragtng themseh'es ancl

other Negro citizens from exercising their right to register
to vote ancl to vote (R. 17-18).

B. tohn Daois o. State ol Alabama

In his petition, appellant Davis alleged that he is a Negro
citizen of the State of Nerv Jersel- and the t'nitecl States
and is a voluntary rvorkel ivith a civil rights organization
in a project .whose purpose rras to "eliminate cliscrimina-
tion with reference to registration and voting" iu the State
of Alabama (R.3). At the time of his arrest, petitioner
rras at the Clarlie County Courthouse assisting other per-
sons in their efforts in becoming registered to vote. The
day bf his alrest s'as the same day that the Fecleral Yot-
ing Bights Act rvas passed by the Congress of the United
States.

.:.
-.:

.

3

A large number oi persons 'lvere }ined up at tire regis-

trar's office to try to register to vote but a sheriff's deputy

informed them, including the petitioner, that the voting
period or the period allocated to become registered to votc

had expired. When the petitioner sought clalification of

this order, he was chargecl under state larv with disorder'l-v

concluct and faiiure to obey the command of a lal' enforce-

ment officer. \

The petition alieged that the charge against petitioner

had no basis in fact ancl the purpose and effect of the

prosecution \\:as to punish him for the exercise of rights,
privileges, and immunities secured to him by the Fecleral

Constitution and larvs, aucl to detcr others from exercising

their right to register to vote in federal ancl state elec-

tions free of racial discrimination (8. 4-5).

The removal petition \n Hazzard was filed trIarch 21,

1966, while the petitiotin Doui,s rvas fiied. on September 16,

1965. Subsequently, on October 4, 1966, the District Court

entered an order remanding both cases to the state courts
(R. 8). Timely notices of appeal rvele fiIed in both cases

(R,. 9, 20). A motion for a stay of the remand order pend-

ing appeal rvas filed in botli cases but rvas denied b;- the

District Court (R,. 10-14). In neither case has a trial datc

been set trs yet in the state courts.

Specification of Error

The Court below errecl iu holding that, given the allega-

tions of the petitions for removal, these prosecutions were

not lemovable unclcr 28 U.S.C. $1443 and in rernanding

them to the state courts for trial.



4

ARGI]MEI{T

28 U.S.C. $1443(l) Authorizes Federal Civil Rights
Removal Jurisdiction of State Criminal Prosecutions
Brought Soleiy to Harass, Threaten or Intimidate
Negroes for Exercising Their Right to Yote or Aiding
Others to Yote.

The central issue irr these cases is lvhether. they come
n'ithin the rule of Georgiu v. Rach.el,384 U.S. 780 (1966) so
that removal is proper, orw'ithin tirat of City of Green-
toood, y. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966), which rvould defeat
removal jurisdictiotr. Appeilants contend that Rachel gov-
erns, in view both of the purpose and applicability of the
voting rights statutes in general and of the effect of the
Voting R,ig'hts Act of 1965 specificaily.

A. The prosecutions in Hazzard o. Alabanaa are
remooable by oirtue ol the lederal ooting acts.

In Georgia v. Rachel,384 U.S. 780 (1966), the Supreme
Court of the United States sustained reuroval under 28
U.S.C. $1413(1) of state criminal trespass prosecutions
brought against Negroes for refusing to leave places of
public accommodations in .rvhich they rvere given a right of
serviee lvithout racial discrimination by 42 U.S.C. g2000a
(1964). 42 U.S.C. 92000a(a) (set forth in the statutory
appendix, ,i,nfra, pp. 2a-3a), was read as giving persons
seeking restaurant service a right to insist upon such ser-
vice without discrirnination, ancl 42 U.S.C. g2000a-2 (1964)
(set forth, infra, p. 3a), \l'as read as giving a con-
comitant right not to bc prosecuted for that insistence.

ItCity of Greenu;ood v. Pcucock,3S{ U.S. 80S (1966), on
the other hancl, thc Supreme Court disallorved removal of
prosecutious against civil rights demonstrators basecl upon

p
t#
i{
t;
t'

5

their conduct in protesting the denial to Negroes of rights

to register ancl vote given by 42 U.S.C. $1971(a) (1) (set

forth, infra, p. 1a). Section 1971(a)(1) rvas read as aof

extending to persons a specific statutol'y right to protest

racial discrirnination iu voting registration, as distin-

guishecl from the right to register to vote rvithout rtrcial

discrimination. Thus, it Peacock, the question rvas neither

raised nor decicled rvhether 42 U.S.C. $$1971(b) and

1973i(b) (set fortli, infra, p. 2a), rvhich protect those

persons clirectly engaged in the exercise of voting rights
in the sanlc way as $2000a protects those engaged in sit-ins,

resulted in a right to remove state plosecutions desigrrecl

to intirnidate ancl coel'ce persons for protected activities'

Appellants thus contencl that the proper distinctiou be-

t'ween Rach,el and Peacocfr is the presence in the former'

and absence in the Iatter of a fecleral statute 'lvith language

granting the specific right exercised together s'ith a protec-

tion against harassment, intimidation, coercion, etc., be-

cause of an exercise or attempted exercise of that right'
The only other possible distinction betrseen Rachel a.nd

Peacock_ltamely, that $2000a-2 includes the rvorcl "puttish"
togetherrvith "iutimidate, threaten or coerce" \'ithiri its
prohibition, while $$19i1(b) ancl 1973i(b) do not-is so

palpably insubstantial as to trivialize the siguificance of

these important pieces of federal ciril rights legislation

and to recluce Rachel to trifling and rationally unsup-

portable dimertsions. Yet, oniy this second and rvholly im-

permissible distilction rvill support the decision belorv re-

manding appellants' cases to state court. Appellants in

Hazzard, unlike the demonstrators in' Peacock, u'ere di-

rectly engaged in the process of being registerccl to votc

ancl the concluct for rvhich they are prosecutecl comes di-

rectly rvithin thc language of $1973i(b), viz., "voting or at-



6

tempting to vote." I Thus, one of the "specific provisions
of a federal pre-enrptivc civil rights law"-91973i(b)-
"confers immunity from state prosecution" upon appel-
Iants' concluct (Peacock, supro, at 826,827).

This Court must upholcl federal civil rights removal ju-
risdiction here unless it decides that Congress has deter-
mined that votitrg rights are less rrorthy or needful of fed-
eral protection than the right to equal public accommoda-
tions, or unless it clccides that Congress has failed to pro-
tect voting rights br- sinrilarlv "specific provisions of a

federal pre-emptive civil rights lal'" (Pea cock, suytra, at
826).

Neither Congress nor the Suprerne Coult has relegated
voting rights to such a subordinate position. In the Civil
Bights Acts of 1957,2 1960,3 1964,4 and 1965,i Congress has
enacted a comprehensive seheme for the protection of
voting rights, a legislative scherne certainly no less pro-
tective than Title II of the Civil Bights Act of 1964. AnaI-
ysis of this sclieme renders it hig'hl-r- unliliely that Congress
intendecl to place voting rights ou tr lorvcr plane of fecleral
protection than the light to equal public accommodations.
And the Supreure Court has long recognized that the right
to vote is a fundamental riglit, "beeause preservative of
all rights" (Yi.ck Wo y. Ho1tki.n,s,118 fI.S. 356, 370 (1836)).
In Reynolcls v. ,Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964), the Court
said:

Uncloubtedll', the right of suffrage is a fundamental
matter in a free and dcmocratic societl-. Especially

1 42 U.S.C. 919731 (c) (1) defines ('vote" or i(votiug, as includi:rg regis-
tering to vote.

2 Act of September 9,l.957, Pub. L. 85-315, 71 Stat. 637.
3 Act of IIay 6, 1960, Pub. L. 86-449, ?4 Stat. 90.
r Act of July 2, 196.1, Pub. L. 88-352, ?8 Stat. 241.
5 Aot of August 6, 1965, Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 43I.

7

since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and

unimpaired mannel' is preservative of other basic civil
and political rights, an,v alleged infringement of thc
right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticu-
lously scrutinized.6

The language and intent of feclerai Yotirlg legislatiorl eu-

able appellants and others subjected to prosecutions rvhich

repress Neglo voting activity to meet the test of remoral
anuourrced it Rachel. Section 1971(b) provicles an atnple

declaration of Congrcssional inteut to immunize from statc
prosecution a person against rvhom state crimirial chargcs

are )rrought ivith the sole purpose and effect of halassing
and intimicltrting him and otliel Negroes and punishing
them for, artd deterring them frotn, exercising their right
to vote. This Court has so held, and its reasoning ancl

authorit-v are persuasive. Cf., Uilnted States v. lYoocl,29i't
8.2d772 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. clen.,369 LT.S. 850 (1962).

Section 1971(b), as a matter of language, is broad enough

to cover the case of official intimidation through abuse of
the state criminal process; and its legislative history cau-

vassecl \r Woocl,295 F.2d at 78L'82, compels the conclu-

sion "that Congress contemplated just such activity as is
here allcgccl-rvhere the state criminal processcs are usecl

as instrurnents for the deprivation of constitutional rights"
(2e5 F.2d 781).

Section 19i3i(b) is of pzrrticular significance here for'

tl,o reasons. First, it has signifieci Congressional accept-

ance of the Tllood coustruction of $1971(b) in that there
is no'iv specifically proscribed an1 "attempt to intimidate,
threaten or coelcc any person for voting or attempting to
vote." Second, it has retained the "intimidate, threaten or'

6 See also, Ilarper v. Virginin
(1966) ; Uniteil States 1. Raines,

Booril of Elections,383 U.S. 663, 667-6E
362 U.S. 17, 27 (1960).



8

coerce" formula of $1971(b), apparently deeming it suffi-

cient to cover the case of official intimidation through
harassment prosecutions-a case utrdoubtedly recognized

by the Sgth Congress as an importaut means of repression

of persons aiding other pel'sons to registcr to votc. Thus

it can be seen that there is no magic to the lauguagc "pun-
ish or attempt to punish" of $2000a-2 rvhich qualifies it
alone to combat harassrncnt prosecutions violative of im-
portant federal rights.

To recapitulate, appellants contencl that: (1) s'hen they
registerecl to vote they exercised rights specifically granted

under federal statutes that provide for equal civii rights;
(2) the statutes, 42 U.S.C. $$1971 artcl 1973i, further pro-

vicle that they could rtot be intimidated or threatened be-

cause they exercised those rights; and (3) therefore, just

as in Racltel, removal of their prosecutions to federal dis-
trict court is essential to give tlie full protection afforded
by the statutes.

B. The Yoting Rights Act ol 7965 gaoe lederal courtg
sole jurisiliction ol offenses such as are charged in
Hazzard..

Appellants further argue that the overall statutory
scheme of the Voting Riglits Act of 1965 establishes the
jurisdiction of the Federal Courts oyer the offenses

charged. The operatiou of the Act trnd its effect on the
present prosecutious ean be bcst nuderstoorl by outlining
chronologically the eveuts relevant to this action.

Prior to Au;:,-ust, 1965, the registrttrs in Clarke County,
Alabama, operated utrdcr state larr. That is, they enforced
state statutor-v provisions relatitg to thc registering of
voters and imposed statc qualifications ulton prospective
registrartts. On August 6, 1965, the Yoting Rights Act of
1965 l,as signed by the President. In Section I (42 U.S.C.

I

$1973b) of the Act, the Attoruey General of the Unitecl

States n as giveu the pou'er to determine, according to a
formula, that tests or devices had been used in a state to

restrict the right of persons to vote because of race. Upon

his maliing such a determinatiort, the use of ariy test (in-

cluding a literacl- test or other requirements such as had

been in force iu the State of Alabama) in the state or po-

Iitical subdivision \\'as no longer permissible'

On August 7, 1965, the Attorney General made the re-

quirecl determinittiorr rvith regard to the entire State of

Alabamtr, inclucling Clarke County.? Uncler the statute, lie

had trvo options. He could request the Civil Service Conr-

mission to appoiut federal examiners to go into some or'

all counties in the state and to themselr'es register votels

for both federal and state elections (42 U.S.C. $1973d)' In
the alternative, he could decide that rvithin a particular

subdivision state registrars rvere making bona ficie efforts

to register voters free of racial discrimination. hi the casc

of Alabama, federal examiners 'vere sent into certain se-

lected. couuties; in most counties, includirig Clarke County,

reliance rvas placed on existing state registrars. hi either

casc, horvever, the result rvas the sane: prior requirements

of Alabama lau' were no longer in effect; litertrcy tests,

voucher requirements, etc., no longer rvere applicable;

rather, only such staudards tls \vere permitted under fed-

eral larv rvere imposecl. rn other rvords, the state registrals
rvere acting in the capacity of quasi-federal officers, doing

the same thing fcderal examiners rvould be doing, t.e., e:n-

forcing provisions of federal lau'.

Thus, to permit removal in the present case in no manllel'

enlarges federal at the expense of state trial jurisdiction.

Just as thc state courts rvould ciearly lack jurisdictio[ ovel

?See,,Sellers v. Tnussell,253 F. Supp. 915, 917 (It.D. Ala. 1966)'



10

the offense charged against appellants-petitioners if they
had registered rvith federal examiners, so they lack juris-
diction when the allegecl offense is charged to have taken
place before state officials enforcing federal larv. See, In re
Loneg,134 U.S. 372 (1890) . In Loney, the Supreme Court
held that to allorv the state to prosecute a person for per-
jury because of testimony given before a state notary pub-

lic for use in a trial iu fedcral court could effectively
hamper the administration of an inrportant federal opera-
tion. Simiiarly, the state mav not be allorr,ed to iriterfere
n'ith the enforcement of federal voting rights and the reg-
istration of voters under federal statutory standards by a

criminal prosecution merely becanse the official acting pur-
suant to federal las' holds a state rather tltan a federal
position.

For these reasons, just as in Loney, the federal courts
have full power here to intervene, *,hether by removal or
otherivise, and exercise their proper jurisdiction over the
alleged offenses.

C. In Daais rs. Alabamct, the Fed.eral Yoting Rights Acts
sinilarly granl immunity lrom prosecution to those
aiding others to register to oote.

It has been argued above that the appellants it Huezard,
are entitled to the removal of their prosecutious uuder the
rule of Georgi,av. Rachel,, since their conduct is specifically
protected by a federal .statute providing for equal civil
rights. Their case \\,as coutrasted rvith that of the respon-
dents h City of Greentt,oocl v. Peacock, since uo statute
grants the right to clemonstrate in support of equal voting
rights. Just as the appellzrnts in llazzarcl are protected for
the act of registering to vote, so appellant Davis is pro-
tected in the act of directly aidirrg persons to vote or at-
tenipting to r.ote by 42 U.S.C. $1973i(b).

11

The importance to adequate federal protection of voting
rights of protection ancl insulation of persons aidirrg others
to register was recognized by this Court in United, Stotes
v. Wood,,295 F.2d 772 (lth Cir. 1961) . Tn Wootl, the court
ordered a federal injunction against the state prosccutiorr
of John Hardy, a Negro voter registration rvor'lier in
'Walthall County, 1\{ississippi, for peacefully attempting to
aid and encoulage Negro citizens to attempt to rcgistet to
vote. Hardy had been arrested, rvithout cause, for breach
of thc peace. The court held that the prosccution of Hardy,
regarcliess of its outcome, rvoukl effectively intimiclate Ne-
groes in the exercise of their right to vote in violation of
$1971(b). 42 U.S.C. $19i3i(b) thus in effect accepted ancl

codified the holding of Wood by prohibiting any "attempt
to intimidate, tltreaten or coelce any person for urging or
aiding any person to vote or attempt to vote." Thus the
section sets to rest'ivhatever doubt $1971(b) may hnve left
that appellant Davis merits the protection of federal vot-
ing legislation in aiding others to register to vote.

Again, the distinction betlveen this case and Peucock lies
in the fact that appellant x'as directil- involved in the vot-
ing registration process, rvhereas the demonstrators in the
latter case rvere only taugentially involved. Thc Suprcue
Court in Peacock made it clear that it construed a "larv
providing for . . . equai civil rights" rvithin the rneaning of
28 U.S.C. $1443, as excluding the First Amendment rights
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amenclment. On the other hand, the phrase cloes inclucle
the Equal Protection Clause, the Fifteenth Amenclment,
42 U.S.C. $1971, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, ancl the Vot-
ing Rights Act of 1965.

Tn Peacock, tlte only claim available to the demonstrator;s
rvas the claim not that they rvele being prosecutecl for pro-
tected acts, but that their prosecutions \rere harassing de-



L2

vices ind,irectly aimed at Negro voting activity. Therefore,
the Supreme Court held, there was no establishment of a

denial of the equal rig'hts of the demonstrators themselves

by their prosecution in the state courts.

Appellant Davis, on the otlter hand, as in the case of
the appellants in Haazarcl, is being prosecuted for conduct

which is itself direcUy protected by the "aiding" provision
of the voting rights statutes, and the "aiding" provision is
part of a section prohibiting all forms of intimidation, 42

U.S.C. $1973i(b). Where prosecution is based on conduct

thus directly protected by such a federal las' protecting
equal rights, the prosecution necessarily denies the defend-

ant his equal federal rights rvithin the meaning of 28 U.S.C.

$1443(1), as the Supreme Court helcl in Georgia v. Rachel.

In conclusion, to permit appeilants to prove in a federal
evidentiary hearing that the state prosecutions against
them are nothing more than an attempt to stifle the exer-

cise of the right to vote by Negloes in Clarke Courlty,
A-labama rvill not "work a u'holesale dislocation of the his-
toric relationship betrveen the state artcl fecleral courts in
tlre administration of the crirninal lanv" (Peucock, supra,
at 831). Bather', it rvill vindicate respect for that larv b1'

assuring that it rvill not be used to interfere rvith specific

rights declared by Cotigress to be essential for the

achievement of equal civil rights.

13

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the order. of the District
Court remanding appellants' czlses should be reversed.

Eespectfully submitted,

Oscen W. Aoens, Jn-
1630 X'ourth Avenue N.
Birmingham, Alabama 35203

YnnNoN Z. Cnewronr
578 Davis Avenue
Nlobile, Alabarna 36603

Jecx GnonNBEBG

Csear,ns SrBpunN Ber,sroN
Csenr,ps H. Jor.rns, Jn.
NonlreN C. Alrernn
Mnr,vyx H. Zl.r;n

10 Columbus Circle
Neu' York, Nerv York 1001g

Attorneys for Appellamts

Axtuoxr G. Ausrnnoan
3400 Chestnut St.
Philaclelphia, Penna. 19104

Of Counsel



1-

.ri
!,

14

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that I have servecl copies of appellants'

Brief on appellee by sending copies to Hon' Lee B' Wil-

liams, County Solicitor of Clarke County, Clarke County

Courthouse, Grove Hill, Alabama, and Hon' J' I\[assey

Edgar, District Attorney, Butler, Alabama, by United

States mail, Postage PrePaid.

Done this 17th day of February, 1967'

Attorney f or APPellants

Statutory Appendix

1. 28 U. S. C. $1443(1) (1e6a):

$1443. Civil rights cases

Any of the follorving civil actions or criminal prosecu-

tions, commenced in a State Court may be removed

by the defendant to the district court of the United
States fol the district and division embraciug the placc

rvherein it is pending:

(1) Against any person rvho is denied or canuot

enforce in the courts of such State a right urtder arty

Iarv providing for the equal civil rights of citizens
of the United States, or of all pelsons within the juris-
dictionthereof;...

2. 42TJ. S. C. $1e71(a)(1) (1e64) (R.S.$2004 (1875):

$1e71 . . .

(a) (1) AII citizens of the Lrnited States rvho are

otherrvise qualified by larv to vote at any election by

the people in any State, Territory, district, county,

city, parish, torvnship, school district, municipality, or
other territorial subdivision, shall be entitled and al-

lorvecl to vote at all such elections, without distinction of
race, color, or previous condition of serritude; an)'

constitutioll, Ia$', custom, usage, or regulation of any
State or Territory, or by or under its authority, to the

contrary nots'ithstanding.

3. 42 V. S. 0. $19i1(b) (1964) (Sec. 131 of the Civil
Rights r\ct of L957,71Stat. 637) :

$1971 (b) Intimidation, threats, or eoercion

No persou, t'hether acting under color of law or

otherrvise, shall intimidate, threaten, coerce, or at-



Za

tempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any other per_
son for the purpose of interfering with the right of
such other person to vote or to vote as he may choose,
or of causing such other person to vote for, or not to
vote for, any candidate for the office of president, Vice
President, preside,tial elector., trfember of the Senate,
or Member of the House of Repr.esentatives, Delegates
or commissioners from the Territo,ies or possessions,
at any general, special or pri*rary erection herd solery
or in part fol the purpose of selecting or electing any
such candidate.

4. 42U. S. C. $1978i (b) (Supp. I, 196b) (Sec. 11(b) of
the Voting Rights Act of 190b, Z9 Stat. 448) :

$1973 i. . . (b) Intimidation, thleats, or coercion

. No person, v'hether acting under color of law or
otherrvise, shall intimidate, threaten, or coerce, or at-
tempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person
for voting or attempting to vote, or intimidate,
threaten, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten,
or coerce any person for urging or aiding any person
to vote or attempt to vote, or intimiclate, threaten, or
coerce alr)'pe.son for exercising aDy powers or duties
nnder section 19ZBa(a), 1973d, 7gZBf,19739, lg73h, or
1973j(e) of this titte.

5. 42 U. S. C. 92000a (a) (196{) (See. 201(a) of the
Civil Biglits Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 2tB):

92000a. Prohibition against cliscrimination or segrega_
tion in places of public accommodation_Equal
access

(a) ,\ll per.sons shall be entitled to the full and
equal cnjoyrrrent of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, ancl accommodations of any

3a

place of public accommodation, as defined in this sec-

tion, without discrimination or segregation on the
ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.

6. 42 U. S. C. 92000a-2 (1964) (Sec. 203 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,78 Stat. 244) :

92000a-2. Prohibition agaiust deprivation of, inter'-
fereuce with, and punishment for exercising
rights and privileges secured by section
2000a or 2000a-1 of this title

No person shall (a) rvithhold, deny, or attempt to
rvithhold or deny, or deprive or attempt to deprive, any
person of any right or privilege securecl by section
2000a or 2000a-1 of this title, or (b) intimidate, threaten,
or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce

any person rvith the purpose of interfering rvith any
right or privilege secured by section 2000a or 2000a-1

of this titie, or (c) punish or attempt to punish any
person for exercising or attempting to exercise any
right or privilege secured by section 2000a or 2000a-1

of this title.