Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Petitioners' Reply Brief
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1983
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Petitioners' Reply Brief, 1983. 02457f48-ae9a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/4315626a-b880-4ca4-a57e-cd10d897e897/cooper-v-federal-reserve-bank-of-richmond-petitioners-reply-brief. Accessed November 23, 2025.
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No. 83-185
I n the
i&ttprem? (Enurt of tfi? Imtrd ^tatm
October Term, 1983
Sylvia Cooper, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
Federal, Reserve Bank op R ichmond
ON PETITION POR A WRIT OP CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OP APPEALS POR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
PETITIONERS’ REPLY BRIEF
J. LeV onne Chambers
John Nockleby
Chambers, Ferguson, W att,
W allas, Adkins & F uller, P.A.
Suite 730
951 S. Independence Boulevard
Charlotte, North Carolina 28202
(704) 375-8461
Jack Greenberg
O. Peter Sherwood
Charles Stephen Ralston
Eric Schnapper*
Suite 2030
10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019
(212) 586-8397
Counsel for Petitioners
* Counsel of Record
No. 83-185
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1983
SYLVIA COOPER, e t a l . ,
Petitioners,
v .
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND
On P e t i t i o n f o r a Writ o f C e r t i o r a r i t o the
United S ta tes Court o f Appeals
For the Fourth C i r c u i t
PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF
1 . R e s po nd e nt s ac k n ow le d ge t h a t the
c o u r t o f a p p e a l s d i s m i s s e d as a f i n d i n g
o f " u l t i m a t e f a c t " t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s
c o n c l u s i o n that p e t i t i o n e r s were the v i c t im s
Gf i n t e n t i o n a l r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . They
do not o f c ourse c ha l l en g e the c o r r e c t n e s s o f
the d e c i s i o n in P u l lm a n -S t a n d a r d_____ Swi n t ,
456 U.S. 273 (1982) r e j e c t i n g the purported
d i s t i n c t i o n be tween " u l t i m a t e " and " s u b
s i d i a r y " f a c t s .
Respondents defend the d e c i s i o n o f the
co ur t o f appeals on the bo ld theory that the
Fourth C i r c u i t s imply did not mean what i t
s a i d . But whi le respondents both urge t h i s
Court to d i s r e g a rd the l i t e r a l language o f
the panel o p i n i o n , they are unable t o agree
about what that op i n io n does meair. The Bank
a s s e r t s that what the panel meant t o say was
t h a t , because the f i n d i n g o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n
was contained in a document e n t i t l e d "Memo
randum o f D e c i s i o n " , i t was no t r e a l l y a
" f i n d i n g " within the meaning o f Rule 5 2 ( a ) .
(Bank B r i e f , 19) . The United Sta tes r e j e c t s
that i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , suggest ing instead that
what the panel meant was that the d i s t r i c t
f i n d i n g invo lved a "mixed qu es t i on o f law and
f a c t . " (U.S. B r i e f , p. 8 ) .
Th i s Cour t has not h e r e t o f o r e upheld
lower cour t op i n io ns l i t e r a l l y and e x p r e s s l y
c on t ra ry to d e c i s i o n s o f t h i s Court based on
2
such s p e c u l a t i o n that an er roneous passage
may have been a mere s l i p o f the j u d i c i a l
pen. Meaningful a p p e l l a t e r ev iew would be
i m p o s s i b l e i f the a c t u a l l a n g u a g e o f the
o p i n i o n s under review cou ld be d i s regarded
on the b a s i s o f t h i s s o r t o f c o n j e c t u r a l
e x e g e s i s . I t i s s u f f i c i e n t t o r e q u i r e
summary r e v e r s a l t h a t the Four th C i r c u i t
o p i n i o n as w r i t t e n i s i n c o n s i s t e n t wi th
Swin t . I f the c our t o f appeal s intended t o
say something o th e r than what appeared in i t s
o p i n i o n , i t w i l l have ample o p p o r t u n i t y to
make that c l e a r on remand.
2. The United S ta tes c an d id ly acknow
l e d g e s t h e d i v i s i o n among t h e c i r c u i t s
r e g a r d i n g t h e use o f f i n d i n g s d r a f t e d by
c o u n s e l . (U.S. B r i e f , p p . 5 - 7 ) . The govern
ment sugges ts the " b e t t e r appproach" in such
s i t u a t i o n s i s f o r the cour t o f appeal s " t o
remand the c a s e f o r new f i n d i n g s by the
d i s t r i c t c o u r t " , as in f a c t o c c u r s in the
F i r s t and Tenth C i r c u i t s . (U.S. B r i e f , p .7 ;
3
see a l s o Pet i t i o n , p . 1 8 ) . The government
no te s t h a t i t i s " n o t aware o f any c i r cu nt -
s tan c e s whic h would j u s t i f y the f a i l u r e o f
t h e c o u r t b e l o w t o f o l l o w th a t p r a c t i c e
here (U.S. B r i e f , p . 7 ) .
A l t h o u g h the c o u r t o f a p p e a l s i t s e l f
announced t h a t i t was a p p l y i n g a s p e c i a l
standard o f r ev i ew in t h i s c as e , a l t e r n a t i v e
l y phrased as " c l o s e s c r u t i n y " and " c a r e f u l
s c r u t i n y " ( P e t i t i o n , 23a) , respondents i n s i s t
that the d e c i s i o n below a c t u a l l y app l i ed the
o r d i n a r y " n o t c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s " s t a n d a r d .
(Bank B r i e f , pp . 11, 12, 15; Un i ted S t a t e s
B r i e f , p . 5 ) , The Uni ted S t a t e s t a k e s the
p o s i t i o n t h a t the c o u r t o f a p p e a l s a p p l i e d
the c o r r e c t s tandard, yet somehow reached the
wrong r e s u l t , i n s i s t i n g t h a t " t h e r e c o r d
f u l l y supports the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s f a c t u a l
f i n d i n g s . " (U .S . B r i e f , p . 4 ) . But w h i l e
the United Sta tes c ontends that a f f i rmance i s
r equ i red by the not c l e a r l y erroneous r u l e ,
the Bank maintains that the same ru le r e q u i r
4
ed r e v e r s a l o f the " e r r o n e o u s , unsupported
and o f t e n b a s e l e s s f i n d i n g s adopted by the
D i s t r i c t C o u r t . " (Bank B r i e f , p . 1 7 ) .
In Pullman-Standard v. Swint , 456 U.S.
273 ( 1 9 8 2 ) , as h e r e , the c o u r t o f a p p e a l s
a r t i c u l a t e d two d i f f e r e n t s t a n d a r d s o f
r e v i e w . R e s p o n d e n t in t h a t c a s e u r g e d
the Cour t t o assume o r c o n c l u d e t h a t the
c o r r e c t standard had in f a c t been a p p l i e d ,
but t h i s Court d e c l i n e d t o do so . 456 U.S.
at 290-93. This case i l l u s t r a t e s the c o r
r e c t n e s s o f , and i s c o n t r o l l e d b y , S w i n t .
I f mere mention o f the Rule 52 standard were
s u f f i c i e n t t o g i v e r i s e t o a c o n c l u s i v e
presumption that the not c l e a r l y erroneous
r u l e had been a p p l i e d , enforcement o f Rule 52
by t h i s Court would be i m p o s s ib l e , and "not
c l e a r l y e rroneous " would degenerate from a
ru le o f law to an empty formula r e c i t e d at
the end o f de novo a p p e l l a t e d e c i s i o n s .
3. Respondents suggest that the p r i n -
c i p l e o f res j u d i c a t a was a p p l i c a b l e t o the
5
B a x t e r p l a i n t i f f s b e c a u s e t h e d i s t r i c t
c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n on the c l a s s c la ims a c t u a l l y
r e s o l v e d on the mer i t s the i n d iv i d u a l c la ims
o f B a x t er , e t a l . :
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s Memorandum o f
D e c i s i o n c o n c l u d e d t h a t the Bank had
d i s c r i m i n a t e d . . . o n l y in p r o m o t i o n s
o u t o f G r a d e s 4 and 5 , b u t _ n o t _ i n
o t he r r e s p e c t s . J /
Elsewhere the Bank r e p e a t e d l y but more s u b t l y
i m p l i e s t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l c l a i m s were
a c t u a l l y c o n s i d e r e d and d e c i d e d , r e f e r r i n g
f o r example t o " the c l a s s a c t i o n judgment . . .
a d v e r s e t o " t h e B a x t e r p l a i n t i f f s (Bank
B r i e f , p. 7; see a l s o i_d. at 3, 6, 9 ) . The
a c t u a l l a n g u a g e o f t h a t p o r t i o n o f t h e
d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s op i n io n de a l in g with promo
t i o n s out o f the grades in which the Baxter
p l a i n t i f f s were found, however, r eads :
1 / R e s p o n d e n t ' s B r i e f in O p p o s i t i o n t o
P e t i t i o n ( h e r e i n a f t e r c i t e d as "Bank B r i e f " )
(Emphasis a d d e d ) , p . 1 ; s e e a l s o Memorandum
f o r the Federal Respondent ( h e r e i n a f t e r c i t e d
as "U.S. B r i e f " ) , p. 1 n. ( " t h e f i n d i n g o f no
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a g a i n s t the g roup t o which
they b e l o n g " ) .
6
There do e s not app ear t o be a p a t t e r n
and p r a c t i c e p e r v a s i v e enough f o r the
c ou r t t o o rd er r e l i e f . 194a.
This passage ho lds o n l y that such d i s c r i m i n a
t i o n was n o t s u f f i c i e n t l y w i d e s p r e a d t o
j u s t i f y a c l a s s - w i d e r e m e d y . Far f r o m
c onc lud ing that no c l a s s member had ever been
t h e v i c t i m o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , t h e c l e a r
im por t o f the o p i n i o n i s t o the c o n t r a r y .
The Bank fu r t h e r a s s e r t s that the Baxter
p l a i n t i f f s have had " t h e i r day in c o u r t . "
(Bank B r i e f , p. 3 ) . When that day supposedly
was the Bank does not say. I t c e r t a i n l y was
not in m i d - S e p t e m b e r , 1 980 , when the Bank
s u c c e s s f u l l y prevented the Baxter p l a i n t i f f s
f rom even t e s t i f y i n g at the Cooper t r i a l
abo ut t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l c l a i m s . Nor was i t
J a n u a r y , 11, 1983, when the Fourth C i r c u i t
h e l d , at the Ban k ' s b e h e s t , t h a t t h e r e was
never to be a t r i a l in Baxter i t s e l f . Never
in t h e h i s t o r y o f t h i s d i s p u t e , d e s p i t e
r e p e a t e d e f f o r t s t o do s o , ha ve P h y l l i s
B a x t e r , Brenda G i l l i a m , Glenda Knot t and
7
S h e r r i McCorkle been p e r m i t t e d t o t a k e the
s tand and d e s c r i b e t o a f e d e r a l j u d g e the
a l l e g e d v i o l a t i o n o f t h e i r r i g h t s . The
p r i n c i p l e s o f res j u d i c a t a cannot c o n c e i v a b l y
apply to c la ims that were n e i t h e r ad ju d i ca te d
nor even heard.
CONCLUSION
For the above r e a s o n s a w r i t o f c e r t
i o r a r i s h o u ld i s s u e t o r e v i e w the judgment
and op in io n o f the Fourth C i r c u i t .
R e s p e c t f u l l y submit ted ,
J. LEVONNE CHAMBERS
JOHN NOCKLEBY
Chambers, Ferguson, Watt,
Wal las , Adkins & F u l l e r , P.A.
Sui te 730
951 S. Independence Boulevard
C h a r l o t t e , North Caro l ina 28202
(704) 375-8461
JACK GREENBERG
0. PETER SHERWOOD
CHARLES STEPHEN RALSTON
ERIC SCHNAPPER*
Suite 2030
10 Columbus C i r c l e
New York, New York 10019
(212) 586-8397
Counsel f o r P e t i t i o n e r s
*Counsel o f Record
MEJIEN PRESS INC. — N. Y. C. t l 9