Houchins v. KQED, Inc. Brief in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1976
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Houchins v. KQED, Inc. Brief in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari, 1976. 15989873-b89a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/43380f1f-94df-4326-9824-8d0a7a362473/houchins-v-kqed-inc-brief-in-opposition-to-petition-for-certiorari. Accessed January 07, 2026.
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O ctober T e e m ,, 1976.
No. 76-1310.
THOMAS L. HOUCHINS,
P e t it io n e r ,
v.
KQED, INC., e t a t .,
R e spo n d e n t s .
Brief in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari.
W illia m B e n n e t t T u r n e r ,
Pound 502,
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138,
J ack G reenberg ,
J am es M. N abr.it , III,
S ta nley A. Bass.
10 Columbus Circle,
New York, New York 10019,
A n n B r ic k ,
Suite 2900,
650 California Street,
San Francisco, California 94108.
Attorneys for Respondents.
S u p r e m e C o u r t o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s .
ADDISON C. GETCHELL « SON, INC., THE LAWYERS’ PRINTER, BOSTON
Table of Contents.
Question Presented 1
Statement of the Case 2
A. Proceedings in the Courts Below 2
B. Statement of Facts 3
1. Events Leading to this Suit 3
2. The Guided Tours 4
3. Press Access to other Jails and Prisons 6
a. San Francisco County 6
b. Other County Jails 7
c. San Quentin 7
d. National Policy 8
4. Experience of Other News Reporters 9
Reasons Why Certiorari Should Not Be Granted 9
I. The Court Should Not Exercise Its Certiorari
Jurisdiction to Review an Entirely Reason
able Preliminary Injunction Granted in the
Exercise of the Trial Court’s Discretion 9
II. The Preliminary Order is Not Inconsistent
with Pell v. Procunier and Saxbe v. Washing
ton Post 12
Conclusion 14
Appendix: San Francisco Examiner, Feb. 16, 1977,
p. 1 15
T able of A u th orities Cited.
Cases.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Teamsters Local No. 633,
511 F. 2d 1907 (1st Cir.), cert, denied 423 U.S. 875
(1975) 10
11 TABLE OF AU THORITIES CITED
Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128 (N.D. Cal.
1972) 2
Deckert v. Independent Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282
(1940) 10
K-2 Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co., 467 F. 2d 1087 (9th Cir.
1972) 10
Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 423 U.S. 1327 (1975) 11
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) 6, 8,12,13
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) 11, 13
Saxbe v. Washington Post, 417 U.S. 848 (1974) 8,12
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) 13
Ot h e r A u t h o r it ie s .
Standard 2.17, National Advisory Commission on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals 8
11 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure,
Civil, § 2948 (1973) 10
O ctober T e r m , 1976.
Suprem e Court of tlie United States.
No. 76-1310.
THOMAS L. HOUCHINS,
P e t it io n e r ,
v.
KQED, INC., e t al .,
R e spo n d e n t s .
B rief in O pposition to P etitio n for Certiorari.
Q uestion Presented .
After a full evidentiary hearing, the district court
granted a preliminary injunction enjoining the petitioner
Sheriff from excluding respondent KQED from the Ala
meda County jail, for the purpose of reporting on news
worthy events there, except when exclusion is justified
by jail security. Before this suit was filed, petitioner
completely excluded both press and public. After suit
was filed, petitioner began providing limited guided tours
for the public, and the press was allowed to join the tours.
The district court found that restriction to these tours
unreasonably limited KQED’s ability to gather and dis
seminate information to the public. The court also found
that reasonable access by the press would not result in
2
harm to petitioner’s interests. The question presented is
whether, in these circumstances, the district court abused
its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction.
Statement of the Case.
A. P roceedings in t h e C ourts B elo w .
Respondents (plaintiffs in the district court) are KQED,
Inc. and the Alameda and the Oakland branches of the
NAACP. KQED is a non-profit corporation engaged in
educational television and radio broadcasting. Publicly-
supported, KQED serves the counties in the San Francisco
Bay Area. It maintains a daily television news program
on Channel 9, entitled “ Newsroom.” The members of
the NAACP plaintiffs reside in Alameda County, Cali
fornia.
Petitioner Thomas L. Houchins is the Sheriff of Ala
meda County and operates the county jail. This action
was filed because the Sheriff excluded KQED, as a mat
ter of a general policy of press exclusion, from covering
newsworthy events and questionable conditions at the jail.1
Respondents moved for a preliminary injunction, seeking
to obtain reasonable access to the jail. Numerous affidavits
were submitted with the motion, including the affidavit of
the Sheriff of San Francisco County and several experi
enced news reporters. The district court also held an
evidentiary hearing, where Sheriff Houchins and one of
his lieutenants testified. Respondents presented the testi
mony of the Sheriff of San Francisco, an official from San
Quentin State Prison and three television news reporters,
1 In Brenneman v. Madigcm, 343 F. Supp. 128, 132-33 (N.D.
Cal. 1972), the court found conditions at the jail to be “ shock
ing and debasing,” violating “ basic standards of human de
cency,” so “ truly deplorable” as to constitute cruel and unusual
punishment.
3
to the general effect that press access is freely and rou
tinely provided in other jails and prisons in the area and
that this created no problems whatever for the institu
tions.
On November 20, 1975, the district court granted pre
liminary injunctive relief, providing for reasonable ac
cess by KQED to the jail. The specific methods of imple
menting such access were left to the Sheriff. The Sheriff
then sought and was granted a stay of the order for two
weeks, to enable him to develop procedures for press ac
cess — e.g., searches of reporters and their equipment,
proper identification of press representatives, instructions
as to matters that could not be photographed, consent
forms for interviews, etc. But instead of implementing
any such procedures, the Sheriff filed notice of appeal and
obtained a stay from two judges of the Ninth Circuit. The
appeal was then expedited.
On November 1, 1976, the Court of Appeals unanimously
affirmed the preliminary injunction issued by the district
court. On December 22, 1976, the court below denied the
Sheriff’s petition for rehearing. No member of the entire
Ninth Circuit voted to rehear the case en banc. The Court
of Appeals also denied a stay pending application for a
writ of certiorari, but a stay was granted by Mr. Justice
Rehnquist on January 28, 1977.
B. S ta tem en t of F acts.
1. Events leading to this suit.
KQED’s Newsroom has for many years reported reg
ularly on newsworthy events at prisons and jails in the
San Francisco Bay Area. A large number of stories
have been covered on the premises of the institutions,
with film, video or still camera. Included have been
stories from the San Francisco, Contra Costa, San Mateo
4
and Santa Clara County jails and San Quentin and Sole-
dad prisons. None of this news gathering activity has
ever resulted in any jail disruption or danger of any kind.2
In March, 1975, KQED’s Newsroom reported on a sui
cide of a prisoner at the Alameda County jail. KQED
also reported statements by a jail psychiatrist that condi
tions at the facility were partly responsible for the pris
oners’ emotional problems. The psychiatrist was fired
after he appeared on Newsroom.
In connection with this developing news story, a KQED
reporter telephoned petitioner Houchins and requested
permission to see the jail facility and take pictures there.
The Sheriff refused, stating only that it was his “ policy”
not to permit any press access to the jail. This was also
his response to another television reporter who sought to
cover stories of alleged gang rapes and poor conditions
at the jail.
Prior to the filing of this suit, the Alameda County
jail was completely closed to the press even though the
Sheriff had never even heard of any disruption in any
jail or prison, anywhere, because of news media access.
2. The guided tours.
After this suit was filed, petitioner initiated a series
of guided tours for the public. Each tour was limited
to 25 persons. The tours were booked on a first come-
first served basis. Representatives of the press were per
mitted to go on the tours if they signed up in time. All
six tours for 1975 were completely booked within a week
after they were announced in July. Thus, any reporter
2 In covering stories on location in jails and prisons, KQED
recognizes that inmates are entitled to privacy, and this is re
spected. As a matter of policy, KQED does not photograph or
interview inmates without their consent. When appropriate or
required, KQED obtains formal written consents.
5
who did not instantly sign up for a tour weeks or months
in advance was completely barred from the jail for the
balance of the year.
The guided tours took the tourists through most but
not all of the jail facilities. Excluded was the notorious
“ Little Greystone,” the scene of alleged beatings, rapes
and poor conditions. Also excluded were the “ disciplin
ary cells” in the Greystone facility.
At the outset of each tour, the officials laid down the
ground rules for the tourists. It was forbidden to speak
with any inmates who might be encountered. No photo
graphs were permitted. The Sheriff offered a series of
20 photographs for sale to the tourists, at $2 each or
$40 for the set. None of the photos showed inmate life;
they depicted only selected portions of the plant and equip
ment.
The evidence before the district court demonstrated
several ways in which restriction to the tours unreason
ably limited KQED’s ability to gather and disseminate in
formation to the public:
(a) The tours were completely guided and were ac
companied by several guards. The tourists were of course
shown only what the guards allowed them to see.
(b) Because the tourists were forbidden to speak with
any inmate, they could hear only what the officials told
them and got only “ one side of the story.”
(c) The Sheriff testified that inmates must be kept
“ from sight and communication with the tour group.”
Thus, the tourists never saw normal living conditions
at the jail.
(d) Reporters were not permitted to take cameras with
them. The sterile and unrealistic photos proffered for
6
sale by petitioner gave only an artificial idea of the real
ity of jail life.
(e) Finally, offering only a periodic tour made it im
possible for the press to cover a specific event or follow
a developing news story. News events are evanescent.
They do not coincide with the Sheriff’s schedule of tours.
Limitation to a scheduled tour made it impossible to cover
an escape, a fire, a suicide or other newsworthy event
as it happened.3 It also made it possible for the jail
to be “ scrubbed up” specially for the tour, as was done
for a press tour in the past.
3. Press access to other jails and prisons.
The evidence before the district court showed that other
jails and prisons have no limitations of the kind imposed
by petitioner Houchins, that they routinely provide free
press access and that such access creates no problems
whatever:
a. San Francisco County.
The Sheriff of San Francisco operates four jails. He
routinely authorizes reporters to enter and cover stories
in his jails. The reporters are permitted to bring cameras
8 The Sheriff’s petition for certiorari (p. 9) asserts that re
porters may “ now” have access to cover “ special events, such
as fires or escapes.” Nothing in the record supports this asser
tion. If the assertion is true, it raises a question of what the
Sheriff considers a “ special event” and whether his practice “ op
erates in a neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the
expression.” Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 828 (1974). For
example, information about a recent riot at the jail did not leak
out to the public until nearly two weeks after the event. See
the Appendix to this Brief. If in fact access for spot news events
does not depend on the content of the news, this should be brought
to the attention of the trial court before final judgment, not as
serted without record support to this Court.
7
and tape recorders with them. The Sheriff also permits
interviews of both inmates and staff. Never, on any oc
casion, lias this created any security problems or any dis
ruptions.4
Further, the San Francisco Sheriff advanced affirma
tive reasons, from the point of view of a correctional ad
ministrator, for admitting the press to the jails. He tes
tified that jails “ routinely end up being places that are
extraordinarily and most unnecessarily abusive to people”
and that media exposure of conditions serves to enhance
public awareness and thus motivate county government
to provide adequate funds for more decent facilities.
b. Other County jails.
The evidence showed that KQED and other stations
have done stories on the premises of several other county
jails, without any difficulties or disruptions of any kind.
c. San Quentin.
San Quentin’s Public Information Officer testified about
the press policy of the California Department of Correc
tions as implemented at San Quentin. The Department
recognizes a citizen’s “ right to know,” and provides for
completely open media access to the prisons, with re
porters allowed to bring cameras and tape recorders,
to view all areas of the prison, to talk with prisoners
generally and to interview prisoners of their choice.
The official testified that arrangements for the press to
come to the institution are very simple, and can be made
4 There is no record support whatever for the petitioner’s as
sertion that the Ninth Circuit’s decision will have “ national im
pact” because jailers everywhere will be required “ to do more”
and that this will be a “ burden” for them. To the contrary, the
only evidence of practices in other jails is that press access is
freely allowed and that this creates no problems for the jailers.
8
the same day of the request. San Quentin has experienced
no disruptions or security problems whatever because of
press access. The press could of course be excluded by
the warden if any security problem developed.®
d. National policy
The district court received in evidence the relevant
standards promulgated by the National Advisory Com
mission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. The
Commission was appointed by the LEAA to formulate
standards for institutions henefitting from LEAA grants.
Petitioner Houchins has received funds from LEAA, in
cluding a grant for the reconstruction of the jail, but he
does not comply with the standards. Standard 2.17 flatly
provides that:
“ Representatives of the media should he allowed ac
cess to all correctional facilities for reporting items
of public interest consistent with the preservation of
offenders’ privacy.”
Current Federal Bureau of Prisons policy is expressed in
the Policy Statement that the Ninth Circuit appended to
its opinion in this case. The Bureau encourages news
media access to all prisons “ to insure a better informed
public.” Reporters may freely use cameras, bring tape
recorders, conduct interviews, etc.* 6
6 In addition to providing open news media access, San Quentin
has frequent tours for the general public, during which inmates
are regularly encountered. The record here shows that the Cali
fornia authorities have completely abandoned the press restric
tion they so vigorously and successfully defended in Pell v. Pro-
cunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
6 As the Policy Statement indicates, the Bureau has completely
abandoned the press restriction it so vigorously and successfully
defended in Saxbe v. Washington Post, 417 U.S. 848 (1974).
9
4. Experience of other news reporters.
The evidence before the district court also included un
successful attempts by other news reporters to cover
stories at the Alameda County jail. One wished to gain
access to the jail to cover stories of reported gang rapes
and suicide. He spoke personally with Sheriff Houehins,
who excluded him from the jail, stating only that it was
his “ policy” not to allow any press entry. The reporter
also tried to get on the first guided tour of the jail in
July, 1975. He promptly signed up but was removed
from the list when someone in the Sheriff’s office decided
that more members of the public and fewer members of the
press would be permitted to go.
Reasons Why Certiorari Should Not Be Granted.
I . T h e C ourt sh o u ld N ot E xercise I ts C ertiorari J u
risd ictio n to R ev iew an E n tir ely R easonable P r e l im
inary I n ju n c t io n Granted in t h e E xercise oe t h e
T ria l C o u r t ’s D isc r e t io n .
Finding that the requirements for a preliminary injunc
tion were met, the district court granted an order that
was carefully tailored to protect the legitimate interests
of all parties. The order preliminarily enjoined the Sher
iff from excluding the press “ as a matter of general
policy.” The order directed that reporters be given ac
cess “ at reasonable times and hours” for the purpose of
providing full and accurate news coverage of jail condi
tions. But, deferring to the Sheriff’s administrative dis
cretion, the court provided that “ the specific methods of
implementing” press access were to be “ determined by
Sheriff Houehins.” Further, the order expressly stated
that the Sheriff may “ in his discretion” exclude all news
10
access “ when tensions in the jail make such media access
dangerous.”
In short, the order is a model of restraint. It does not
grant the press total and instant access on demand. Rather,
the Sheriff may make reasonable time, place and manner
restrictions and may even, in his discretion, deny all ac
cess when he believes that jail tensions would make ac
cess dangerous. Moreover, the district court’s direction
that “ the specific methods of implementing” access are
left to the Sheriff permits petitioner to deal with any ac
tual administrative problem. The district court granted
the Sheriff a temporary stay based on his representation
that specific procedures would be developed to cover such
matters as searches of reporters and their equipment,
proper identification of press representatives, instructions
as to items that could not be photographed, consent forms
for interviews, etc.
The Ninth Circuit unanimously upheld this preliminary
order. A preliminary injunction is of course a matter of
the trial court’s discretion.7 The Sheriff has presented
no reason why this Court should disturb the considered
exercise of discretion by the courts below.
The preliminary injunction was based on a finding by
the district court that respondents — the station and mem
bers of the public — would suffer irreparable injury if
preliminary relief were not granted and that the Sheriff
had failed to show that such relief would result in harm
to his interests. The most important factor, of course,
7 See, e.g., Deckert v. Independent Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282,
290 (1940); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Teamsters Local No. 633,
511 F. 2d 1097 (1st Cir.), cert, denied 423 U.S. 875 (1975) ; K-2 Ski
Co. v. Head Ski Co., 467 F. 2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1972); 11 Wright &
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil, § 2948 (1973).
11
is the irreparable injury suffered by the exclusion of
KQED from covering news stories at the jail.8
A further reason for not disturbing the trial court’s
preliminary order is that it provides an excellent oppor
tunity for definitively resolving all problems relating to
press access before this litigation goes to final judgment.9
Thus, we believe that implementation of the reasonable
access provided by the district court’s order will demon
strate even to the Sheriff that his opposition is not well-
founded. He may then decide voluntarily to change his
policy. During the litigation he may also adjust the pro
cedural details of access. Conversely, if actual problems
are encountered by the Sheriff during the pendency of
this case, that would be a reason for the district court
to deny or limit permanent relief.
8 Mr. Justice Blackmun has reasoned, in considering a restric
tion on reporting by the news media, that First Amendment in
terests are infringed each day the restriction continues:
“ The suppressed information grows older. Other events
crowd upon it. To this extent, any First Amendment in
fringement that occurs with each passing day is irreparable.”
Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 423 U.S. 1327, 1329 (1975).
Cf. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404 (1974) (judicial
abstention imposes “ high cost” when First Amendment in
terests at stake).
9 Contrary to Mr. Justice Rehnquist’s observation on the stay
application that the order did not appear to be “ preliminary” to
further proceedings that might modify the injunction, there
are indeed substantial matters that must be resolved in the trial
court before any final judgment is entered. For example, as men
tioned in note 3, supra, the question of access for spot news cov
erage must be examined to determine whether censorship of con
tent must be enjoined. Further, as suggested by the Ninth Cir
cuit, “ to determine the questions of infringement of the correla
tive rights of the public and the media and the means by which
these rights are to be implemented,” the trial court should con
sider in detail how access is handled in other prisons.
12
In sum, this is not the occasion for plenary review by
this Court. Any such review should await a final judg
ment and a complete record.
I I . T h e P r elim in a r y Order is N ot I n c o n sist e n t w it h
P e l l v . P ro c u n ier and S axbe v . W a sh in g t o n P ost.
The Sheriff’s basis for seeking certiorari is his conten
tion that the injunction is in conflict with Pell v. Procu
nier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974) and Saxbe v. Washington
Post, 417 U.S. 848 (1974). He argues that, so long as he
mechanistically equates KQED’s rights with those of the
public in general — wholly excluding both or limiting
both to guided tours — Pell and Saxbe provide him with
a complete defense. This wooden argument was properly
rejected by the lower courts.
The sole restriction on press access upheld by Pell and
Saxbe was a prison rule against interviewing inmates
specifically singled out by the press. The Court upheld
this limited restriction because there was evidence in both
cases that the restriction was necessary to avoid security
problems caused by undue attention to “ big wheels” who
gained notoriety and influence over other prisoners. How
ever, Pell and Saxbe did not authorize any press restric
tions like those maintained by the Sheriff here. Indeed,
the Court expressly pointed out in Pell that “both the
press and the general public are accorded full oppor
tunities to observe prison conditions.” 417 U.S. at 830
(emphasis added). Thus, in Pell the Court noted that
“ newsmen are permitted to visit both the maximum and
minimum security sections of the institutions and to stop
and speak about any subject to any inmates whom they
might encounter.” 417 U.S. at 830. In addition to tours,
13
newsmen were permitted “ to enter the prisons to inter
view” randomly selected inmates. The same was true in
Saxbe. There, the Conrt noted that “ members of the
press are accorded substantial access to the federal pris
ons in order to observe and report the conditions they
find there.” 417 U.S. at 847. In addition, newsmen were
permitted to tour and photograph any prison facilities
and interview inmates they encountered. Id. at 847, n.5.
Thus, the only restriction upheld by Pell and Saxbe
was the rule against the press singling out specific in
mates for interviews, and this narrow rule was upheld
only on a record showing that the press in fact had sub
stantial access to the prisons. As the district court noted
in the present case, the press access actually permitted
by the institutions in Pell and Saxbe is precisely the ac
cess sought by KQED. Absent a showing that such access
would interfere with a valid correctional interest, the
courts below properly found that Pell and Saxbe do not
preclude relief here.
The trial court found that the Sheriff’s policy disables
KQED from gathering nonconfidential information on
matters of public interest. The court also found that rea
sonable access to the jail would not endanger security
or result in any harm to petitioner’s legitimate interests.
Since the Sheriff’s restrictions were found to be “ greater
than is necessary or essential to the protection of the par
ticular governmental interest involved,” the preliminary
order was entirely appropriate. See Procunier v. Mar
tinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974); United States v. O’Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
14
Conclusion.
For the reasons stated, the petition for certiorari should
he denied.
Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM BENNETT TURNER,
Pound 502,
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138,
JACK GREENBERG,
JAMES M. NABRIT, III,
STANLEY A. BASS,
10 Columbus Circle,
New York, New York 10019,
ANN BRICK,
Suite 2900,
650 California Street,
San Francisco, California 94108.
Attorneys for Respondents.
15
APPENDIX
x u m tttt
112th Year No. 215 ■ft 777-2424 WEDNESDA ,̂ FEBRUARY 16. 1977 Daily 20c CITY EDITION
Riot at Santa Rita:
26 women locked up
Battle blamed
on ‘hardcore
troublemakers’
B y D oa M artin ez
Twenty-six women are in Santa
Rita Prison’s maximum security
Greystone section as a result of a
disturbance Feb. 6. Details were
learned only today. ~~
Lt. George Vien, night com
mander at the Alameda County
facility, said all privileges for Santa
Rita’s 140 women were still revoked
as a result of the melee.
‘They’re going to have to earn
back the privileges,” Vien said.
He said the privileges included
commissary, movies, visiting and
television.
Vien said the women in Grey-
stone are hardcore troublemakers
and are being housed in what
usually is the men’s section. Board
partitions and a 24-hour security
watch by a squad of matrons,
isolate the women from male pris
oners, he said
Vien said the women in Grey-
stone include both sentenced and
unsentenced prisoners. Their offen
ses include armed robbery, assault
with a deadly weapon, heroin pos
session and possession of heroin for
sale, auto theft and burglary.
The uprising a week ago Sun
day caused $1,000 in damage and
involved 53 women and a number
of jailers. It was sparked when an
inmate and a deputy started argu
ing in the mess hall.
Sprinklers were ripped from
the ceilings, door panels kicked out
and lockers overturned.
“W e originally moved all 53 to
Greystone where they were locked
in a dayroom,” he said. “Since then,
those prisoners who felt ready to
return to their regular quarters
have been screened and put back in
their regular cells.”
Despite a few skirmishes, the
situation is pretty much normal,
Vien said, and male prisoners are
helping to keep the situation cool
by yelling “shut up” when the
women make noise.