Clark v. Roemer Motion to Dismiss or Affirm

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Clark v. Roemer Motion to Dismiss or Affirm, 1991. 4986b5aa-ad9a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/435152b5-e17e-4f7a-9ad6-2d7c99c91bf4/clark-v-roemer-motion-to-dismiss-or-affirm. Accessed April 15, 2025.

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No. 90-952

In The

Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1990

--------------- «---------------

JANICE G. CLARK, ORSCINI L. BEARD,
EDDIE G. CRAWFORD, NORBERT C. RAYFORD,

VOTER INFORMATION PROJECT, INC., LOUIS SCOTT,
SYLVIA COOK, CONNIE SADLER,

TOM NELSON AND ALBERT RICHARD,
Appellants,

versus

CHARLES "BUDDY" ROEMER, GOVERNOR
OF LOUISIANA; WILLIAM J. GUSTE, JR.,

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF LOUISIANA; FOX
McKEITHEN, SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE STATE

OF LOUISIANA, IN THEIR OFFICIAL
CAPACITIES AS REPRESENTATIVES

OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA,
Appellees.

--------------- ♦---------------

On Appeal From The United States District
Court For The Middle District Of Louisiana

--------------- ♦---------------

MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM
--------------♦--------------

R o bert G . P ugh
Counsel of Record
R o bert G. P ugh , J r .
Of the Law Firm of
P u gh , P ugh & P ugh

Commercial National Tower, Suite 2100
333 Texas Street

Shreveport, Louisiana 71101-5302
(318) 227-2270

(Additional Counsel On Inside Cover)
January 14th, 1991

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

J o h n N. K en n ed y
Special Counsel to the

Governor
T h o m a s A. C a sey
Executive Counsel to the

Governor
Office of the Governor
Fourth Floor
State Capitol Building
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

70804
(504) 342-7015
Attorneys For And
On Behalf Of
Charles "Buddy"
Roemer Governor
Of Louisiana
M ich a el H. R ubin
C h ristin a B. P eck
R u bin , C urry, C olvin &

J oseph
Ninth Floor
One American Place
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

70825
(504) 383-9000
Attorneys For The
Louisiana
District Judges
Association

K en n eth C . D ejean
First Assistant Attorney

General
Louisiana Department of

Justice
Office of the Attorney

General
Second Floor
State Capitol
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

70804
(504) 342-7014
Attorney For And On
Behalf Of William
J. Guste, Jr. Attorney
General Of Louisiana

C yn th ia Y oung R o u ceo u
Special Counsel to the
Secretary of State
State of Louisiana
Post Office Box 94125
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

70804
(504) 342-2065
Attorney For And On
Behalf Of Fox
McKeithen
Secretary Of State Of
Louisiana

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

TABLE OF CONTENTS.................................................. i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES............................................... ii

MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM............................. 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE........................................... 2

A. The Voting Rights Act Section 2(b) Claim .. . . 2

B. The Voting Rights Act Section 5 Claim............ 4

ARGUMENT.................................................................... 7

I. WHETHER THE THREE-JUDGE COURT
ERRED IN PERMITTING ELECTIONS TO GO
FORWARD UNDER UNPRECLEARED STAT
UTES IS NOW MOOT......................................... 7

II. THE THREE-JUDGE COURT CORRECTLY
RULED THAT PRECLEARANCE OF STAT
UTES CREATING AN ULTIMATE NUMBER
OF JUDICIAL SEATS IN A PARTICULAR
JUDICIAL DISTRICT CONSTITUTES PRE
CLEARANCE OF ALL JUDICIAL SEATS
NECESSARY TO REACH THAT ULTIMATE
NUMBER .......................................................... 8

III. JUDGES WHO HAVE BEEN ELECTED
SHOULD NOT BE THROWN OUT OF
OFFICE......................... 21

CONCLUSION ............................. 28

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page

C a ses :

Allen v. Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 89 S Ct
817, 22 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969).................................................

Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 96 S.Ct. 1357, 47
L.Ed.2d 629 (1976)............................................................

Berry v. Doles, 438 U.S. 190, 98 S.Ct. 2692, 57
L.Ed.2d 693 (1978)................................................. 7, 22,

Brooks v. State Board of Elections, No. CV 288-146
1989 W.L.180759 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 1, 1989), mod
ified, (S.D. Ga. May 29 and June 25, 1990) (three-
judge court), aff'd mem., Nos. 90-272 & 90-332,
59 U.S.L.W. 3293 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1990)........................

Butts v. City of New York, 779 F.2d 141 (2d Cir.
1985), cert, denied, 478 U.S. 1021, 106 S.Ct. 3335,
92 L.Ed.2d 740 (1986).......................................

Clark v. Edwards, 725 F. Supp. 285 (M.D. La. 1988) . .3,

Clark v. Roemer, 88-3626 (5th Cir. 1988 unreported)___

Clark v. Roemer, 487 U.S. 1266, 109 S.Ct. 29, 101
L.Ed.2d 979 (1988)............................................................

Clark v. Roemer, Order, October 19, 1990 (M.D. La.
unreported)...................................................................4

Clark v. Roemer, __ F. Supp. ___ (M.D. La. 1990
unreported)...............................

Clark v. Roemer, 90-3785 (5th Cir. 1990) pending on
appeal........................................................................

Clark v. Roemer, 59 U.S.L.W. 3361 (U.S. Nov. 13
1990).....................................................................................

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39
L.Ed.2d 662 (1974)......................................

. 7

. 3

. 4

. 6

Ill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page

Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 93 S.Ct. 1702,
36 L.Ed.2d 472 (1973)........................................................ 7

Haith v. Martin, 618 F. Supp. 410 (E.D.N.C. 1985),
(three-judge court), aff'd mem. Martin v. Haith,
477 U.S. 901, 106 S.Ct. 3268, 91 L.Ed.2d 559
(1986)................................................................................13, 14

Hunter v. City of Monroe Docket Number 2031 (W.D.
La. Nov. 7, 1990, unreported) (three-judge
court) ............................................... 22, 24

Hunter v. McKeithen, (A-363) 59 L.W. 3391 (Nov. 26,
1990)..................................................................................22, 24

League of Latin American Citizens Council #4434 v.
William P. Clements, et al., 914 F.2d 620 (5th Cir.
1990) (en banc) ............................................... 3, 19, 22, 28

Martin v. Mabus, 700 F. Supp. 327 (S.D. Miss. 1988) . . . . 18

McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236, 104 S.Ct. 1037, 79
L.Ed. 271 (1984) ................................................... 13, 14, 15

Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 53
L.Ed,2d 745 (1977)............................. ........... .................... 7

Moore v. Leflore County Board of Election Commis
sioners, 351 F. Supp. 848 (N.D. Miss. 1971)............... 7

NAACP v. Hampton County Election Comm'n, 470
U.S. 166, 105 S.Ct. 1128, 84 L.Ed.2d 124 (1985)........7

Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 91 S.Ct. 431, 27
L.Ed.2d 476 (1971)........................................................... 22

Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 94 S.Ct. 2655, 41
L.Ed.2d 551 (1974) 13

Scaggs v. Larsen, 396 U.S. 1206, 90 S.Ct. 5, 24
L.Ed.2d 28 (1969)........................................ 7

Spallone v. United States, 493 U .S.___, 100 S.Ct. 625,
107 L.Ed.2d 644 (1990)........................................................ 7

Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S.Ct, 2752, 92
L.Ed.2d 25 (1986)................. 18

Tally v. Griffin, 429 U.S. 68, 97 S.Ct. 219, 50 L.Ed.2d
227 (1976)............................................................................ 13

United States v. County Commission, Hale County,
Alabama, 425 F. Supp. 433 (S.D. Ala. 1977), aff'd
mem., 430 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 1540, 51 L.Ed.2d 768
(1977)....................................................................................... 7

Wilson v. North Carolina State Board of Elections, 317
F. Supp. 1299 (M.D.N.C. 1970)...................................... 8

C o n stitu tio n a l a n d S tatutory P ro visio n s:

F ed er a l :

28 U.S.C. § 1404................................................................ 19

28 U.S.C. § 1406..................... 19

28 U.S.C. § 1631........... 19

28 U.S.C. § 1973c............................................................6, 8

28 U.S.C. § 2284....................................................................2

42 U.S.C. § 1973 [Voting Rights Act]............. passim

S tate:

Constitution of Louisiana, Art. 5, § 1 6 ....................... 20

LA. R.S. 13:582 .................................................................. 17

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page

LA. R.S. 13:621.............................................................. 9, 21

Acts 1956, Ex. Sess. No. 7, §1 ................................ 9

Acts 1966, No. 2 .......................................................... 9

Acts 1968, No. 464................................................... 12

Acts 1973, No. 117.. 9

Acts 1974, No. 515. 20
Acts 1976, No. 46. ...... ........................... 9

Acts 1978, No. 39...................................... 9

Acts 1982, No. 21................................................. .. .9, 12
Acts 1983, No. 226........................................................... 21
Acts 1987, No. 801. ...............................................................4

Acts 1990, No. 8 ............... 19

R eg u la tio n s:

28 C.F.R. ch. 1 (7-1-89 Edition) § 5 .56...........................19

R u les:

Rule 18.f .6. of the Rules of The Supreme Court of
the United States..................................................................2

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a)..............................2
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2)..........................2

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 54(b)..............................3

T ra n script R ec o r d :

Clark v. Roem.er, December 20, 1988, Page 11, Lines
22-25 and Page 12, Lines 1 -1 3 .......................................25

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page

No. 90-952

In The

Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1990

JANICE G. CLARK, ORSCINI L. BEARD,
EDDIE G. CRAWFORD, NORBERT C. RAYFORD

VOTER INFORMATION PROJECT, INC., LOUIS SCOTT
SYLVIA COOK, CONNIE SADLER,

TOM NELSON AND ALBERT RICHARD,

Appellants,
versus

CHARLES "BUDDY" ROEMER, GOVERNOR
OF LOUISIANA; WILLIAM J. GUSTE, JR.,

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF LOUISIANA; FOX
McKEITHEN, SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE STATE

OF LOUISIANA, IN THEIR OFFICIAL
CAPACITIES AS REPRESENTATIVES

OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA,

Appellees.

On Appeal From The United States District
Court For The Middle District Of Louisiana

--------------- #---------------

MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM

This is a direct appeal from an Order, rendered
and entered on October 22nd, 1990,1 and an Opinion, 1

1 See Appendix to Jurisdictional Statement [hereinafter
"App."] 68a through 80a.

rendered and entered on October 31st, 1990,2 by a district
court of three judges, specifically constituted pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2284,

Appellees, pursuant to Rule 18.1.6. of the Rules of
the Supreme Court of the United States, move the Court
to dismiss the appeal herein or, in the alternative, to
affirm the final judgment and decree of the three-judge
court on the ground that it is manifest that the questions
on which this case depends are so unsubstantial as not to
need any further argument.

--------------- $---------------

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This appeal involves questions under Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act. Because the same suit involves Section
2(b) of the Voting Rights Act and because most of the
litigation thus far has involved that Section, the pro
cedural history of this case requires an initial discussion
of the Section 2(b) claims.

A. The Voting Rights Act Section 2(b) Claim

Appellants brought this lawsuit in 1986 in the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana
as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The class consisted of
all black voters in the State of Louisiana. The action
challenged the at-large voting system for the election of
District, Family Court and Courts of Appeal judges as

2 See App. la through 67a.

being in violation of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, as
amended, because, allegedly, the use of an at-large sys
tem results in a denial or abridgment of the right to vote
of appellants and all those similarly situated on account
of race and color.

The district court ultimately held in August 1988,
that the at-large judicial election system did violate Sec
tion 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Clark v. Edwards, 725 F.
Supp. 285 (M.D. La. 1988). The district court enjoined
judicial elections which were scheduled for Fall, 1988.
This injunction was overturned by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Clark v. Roemer,
88-3626 (5th Cir. 1988 unreported). An Application for
Stay to this Court was denied by Circuit Justice White.
When the Application was resubmitted to Justice Mar
shall, he submitted it to the full Court, which once again
denied the stay. Clark v. Roemer, 487 U.S. 1266, 109 S.Ct.
29, 101 L.Ed.2d 979 (1988).

In February, 1990, the district court held a remedy
trial, ultimately ordering subdistricting in nine District
Courts, the Family Court in East Baton Rouge Parish, and
in a district of one Court of Appeal. The district court
reversed its earlier decision and held that violations had
not been proven in 54 districts.

On September 28, 1990, the Fifth Circuit rendered its
en banc decision in the case of League of Latin American
Citizens Council #4434 v. William P. Clements, et al., 914
F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc), holding that Section 2(b)
of the Voting Rights Act does not apply to the judiciary.
The district court in this case then granted a Rule 54(b)
motion filed by appellees dismissing:

plaintiffs' claim that "the at-large election
scheme of electing Appeal, Family, and District
Court judges in the State of Louisiana
unlawfully dilutes black voting strength and
results in the denial of plaintiffs' opportunity to
participate equally in the electoral process and
to elect judges of their choice, in violation of
Section 2, of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
1973."

Clark v. Roemer, Order, October 19, 1990 (M.D. La. unre
ported). This decision was appealed by appellants to the
Fifth Circuit and docketed under 90-3785. Appellants
then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, before judg
ment, to this Court. No. 90-898. This petition is pending.

B. The Voting Rights Act Section 5 Claim

The appellants also asserted in their Complaint and
amendments thereto that certain Louisiana statutory pro
visions creating additional judgeships had not been pre
cleared by the Justice Department pursuant to Section 5
of the Voting Rights Act. Although the lawsuit was filed
in 1986, for four years the only action taken by appellants
regarding the Section 5 claims was to convene a three-
judge court, which action occurred two years after filing
of the Complaint.3 In July, 1990, four years after filing of
the Complaint, the appellants moved to submit the Sec
tion 5 claims to a three-judge court. The court was

3 At that time the three-judge court enjoined five pending
judicial elections provided for under Louisiana Acts 1987, No.
801. Three of those judgeships continue to be subject to that
injunction.

composed of Circuit Judge Davis, Chief Judge Parker,4
and Judge Polozola.

Well over fifty pleadings and copious memoranda
were submitted to the three-judge court. On October 22,
1990, the three-judge court held its second of two hear
ings concerning whether to halt the pending 1990 judicial
elections. In an order issued that day, October 22, 1990,
App. 68a, and in an opinion issued October 31, 1990, the
three-judge court ruled that the elections would go for
ward, App. la.

The order and opinion addressed elections to be held
under four different categories of statutes. First, elections
for judgeships previously precleared or which did not
require preclearance would take place. Opinion of the
Three-Judge Court (October 31, 1990), App. 12a-13a. Sec
ond, the three-judge court held that a number of statutes
creating judicial positions had been precleared, ruling
"that when 'the Attorney General cleared statutes creat
ing an ultimate number of judicial seats in a particular
judicial district, that preclearance constituted approval of
all judicial seats necessary to reach the ultimate number
of judicial positions in the district.' " Opinion of the
Three-Judge Court (October 31, 1990), App. 13a. Third,
the three-judge court allowed elections to proceed for
certain other judgeships which had not been precleared
but for which the three-judge court had allowed qualify
ing and campaigning. Opinion of the Three-Judge Court
(October 31, 1990), App. 14a-15a. Judges elected to these

4 Chief Judge Parker has presided over the district court
proceeding during the entire history of this case, including two
lengthy trials.

positions would serve provisionally pending further
orders of the three-judge court. Opinion of the Three-
Judge Court (October 31, 1990), App. 15a-16a. Finally, the
three-judge court enjoined certain other elections for
which the three-judge court had not permitted qualifying
to reopen since the qualification had originally occurred
more than two years before. Opinion of the Three-Judge
Court (October 31, 1990), App. 17a n. 24. The three-judge
court held that within ninety days the State of Louisiana
must either obtain preclearance of the unprecleared
judgeships or file a declaratory action with the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia under
the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1973c, failing which the
judges provisionally elected would be automatically
removed from office. Opinion of the Three-Judge Court
(October 31, 1990), App. 16a-17a.

On October 29, 1990, appellants filed an application
for injunction pending appeal to this Court. On Novem
ber 2, 1990, this Court enjoined the elections which, the
three-judge court held, had not been precleared. Clark v.
Roemer, 59 U.S.L.W. 3361 (U.S. Nov. 13, 1990). The injunc
tion was conditioned upon timely filing of a jurisdictional
statement in this Court. This Court refused to overturn
the three-judge court's order holding that approval of
later statutes increasing the number of judges necessarily
precleared earlier statutes that involved the number of
judges. This Court also refused to remove the judges who
were either elected on October 6, 1990, or who had not
drawn opposition for the October 6, 1990 election.

ARGUMENT
I. WHETHER THE THREE-JUDGE COURT ERRED IN

PERMITTING ELECTIONS TO GO FORWARD
UNDER UNPRECLEARED STATUTES IS NOW
MOOT.

Appellants first argue that the three-judge court
erred in allowing November 6 and December 8, 1990
elections to be scheduled for positions which the three-
judge court held had not been precleared. Appellees
believe that the three-judge court correctly balanced the
"interest of state and local authorities in managing their
own affairs consistent with the Constitution" with the
voting rights of the appellants. See Spallone v. United
States, 493 U.S. ___, ___, 100 S.Ct, 625, 107 L.Ed.2d 644,
655 (1990), quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81,
97 S.Ct. 2749, 53 L.Ed.2d 745, 756 (1977). Ample precedent
for allowing the elections to take place existed under such
precedents as Brooks v. State Board of Elections, No. CV
288-146, 1989 W.L. 180759 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 1, 1989), modified,
(S.D. Ga. May 29 and June 25, 1990) (three-judge court),
aff'd mem., Nos. 90-272 & 90-332, 59 U.S.L.W. 3293 (U.S.
Oct. 15, 1990); NAACP v. Hampton County Election
Comm’n, 470 U.S. 167, 105 S.Ct. 1128, 84 L.Ed.2d 124
(1985); Berry v. Doles, 438 U.S. 190, 98 S.Ct. 2692, 57
L.Ed.2d 693 (1978); United States v. County Commission,
Hale County, Alabama, 425 F. Supp. 433 (S.D. Ala. 1977),
aff'd mem., 430 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 1540, 51 L,Ed.2d 768
(1977); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 93 S.Ct. 1702,
36 L.Ed.2d 472 (1973); Scaggs v. Larsen, 396 U.S. 1206, 90
S.Ct. 5, 24 L.Ed.2d 28 (1969); Moore v. Leflore County Board
of Election Commissioners, 351 F. Supp. 848 (N.D. Miss.

1971); Wilson v. North Carolina State Board of Elections, 317
F. Supp. 1299 (M.D.N.C. 1970).

Despite such precedents, this Court enjoined the
November 6 and December 8, 1990 elections for these
unprecleared judgeships. Both dates have now passed
without the elections taking place. Louisiana will be
timely filing a declaratory action with the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia under the
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1973c. Consequently, although
the State of Louisiana disagrees with this Court's reversal
of the three-judge court order allowing these elections in
the Fall of last year, the question is now moot. II.

II. THE THREE-JUDGE COURT CORRECTLY RULED
THAT PRECLEARANCE OF STATUTES CRE
ATING AN ULTIMATE NUMBER OF JUDICIAL
SEATS IN A PARTICULAR JUDICIAL DISTRICT
CONSTITUTES PRECLEARANCE OF ALL JUDI
CIAL SEATS NECESSARY TO REACH THAT
ULTIMATE NUMBER.

The three-judge court correctly concluded that a
number of additional judgeships were precleared because
the Justice Department had precleared statutes for an
ultimate number of judges that necessarily included those
additional judgeships. An example of this situation is
Caddo Parish, the First Judicial District, where the fol
lowing pattern occurred:

DIVI- PRECLEARANCE
SION ADDED REQUESTED5 GRANTED6 DENIED7

A NO
B NO
C NO
D NO
E Act 2 of 1966 YES 8/18/86
F Act 117 of 1973 YES 9/23/88
G Act 46 of 1976 YES 8/11/76
H Act 39 of 1978 YES 9/20/78
I Act 21 of 1982 YES 12/2/82

The three-judge court deemed it nonsensical that adding
Judge No. 5 ("E") to the first four judges was permissible,
and likewise adding Judges No. 7, No. 8, and No. 9 ("G, H,
and I") to the existing judgeships was permissible, but that
somehow adding Judge 6 (Division "F") to Judges 1, 2, 3, 4
and 5 was objectionable. The three-judge court held as fol
lows:

We find that when the Attorney General precleared
statutes creating an ultimate number of judicial
seats in a particular judicial district, that pre
clearance constituted approval of all judicial seats
necessary to reach the ultimate number of judicial
positions in that district. . . . We reach this conclu
sion because each of the Acts of the legislature

5 Acts 1956, Ex. Sess. No. 7, § 1, in amending former R.S.
13:621, provided that the First Judicial District should have
four judges. This Act thus predated the 1965 Voting Rights Act.

6 The preclearance letters by the U.S. Department of Jus
tice are reproduced and as such appear in the Appendix to this
Motion pages 1 through 7.

7 This letter is reproduced beginning at App. 108a.

which added a new division in Caddo Parish
provided that the Act increased the number of
judges in the district from an existing number to
a new number. When the Attorney General pre
cleared seven judicial positions in Caddo Parish
at the time Division G was added, he thereby
expressly approved the first six positions, which
included Division F. Contrary to plaintiffs' argu
ment, we find that there was express approval
by the Attorney General for those judicial posi
tions set forth in Part I of our October 22, 1990,
order. The language of the various acts submit
ted to the Attorney General, as well as the let
ters submitted by the State of Louisiana seeking
preclearance, support this conclusion. Thus, the
change submitted to the Attorney General is not
only the amendment, but the entire act as pas
sed by the legislature. When the Attorney Gen
eral approves the new act, he not only approves
the amended portion but necessarily approves
the older, reenacted part, which forms part of
the new act. Thus, when an act provides for a
certain number of judicial positions, approval of
that act must include all of the judicial positions
necessary to reach that number.

In determining whether the preclearance
sought by the State of Louisiana was proper
within the meaning of Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, the Court must determine
whether the submission was in an "unam
biguous and recordable manner" and whether
the submission was "in fact evaluated" by the
Attorney General. The Court finds that the evi
dence presented in this case does show that the
submissions were made to the Attorney General
in an unambiguous manner, and he approved
the various increases in the number of judges to
be added to each of the districts set forth in Part
I of our October 22 order.

Opinion of the Three-Judge Court (October 31, 1990),
App. 24a - 29a.

The inconsistencies in the approach by the Justice
Department were not limited to the First Judicial District.
Other examples are listed below:

Sixteenth Judicial District - After approving and
preclearing judgeships for Divisions "E", cre
ated in 1977, the Justice Department objected to
a judgeship for Division "D" 13 years earlier.

Twenty-First Judicial District - After approving
and preclearing a judgeship for Division "E",
the Justice Department objected to a judgeship
created for Division "D" 16 years earlier.

Twenty-Third Judicial District - After approving
and preclearing a judgeship for Division "D",
the Justice Department objected to a judgeship
created for Division "C" 22 years earlier.

Twenty-Seventh Judicial District - After approv
ing and preclearing a judgeship for Division
"D", the Justice Department objected to a judge-
ship created for Division "C" 19 years earlier.

Twenty-Ninth Judicial District - After approv
ing and preclearing a judgeship for Divisions
"D" and "E", the Justice Department objected to
a judgeship created for Division "C" 20 years
earlier.

Thirty-Ninth Judicial District - After approving
a Special Election for a judge, the Justice Depart
ment objected 11 years later to the boundaries
within which this judge was to sit.

After considering these and many other anomalies,
and after reviewing the Louisiana statutes and the

submission letters, the three-judge court concluded that
all of these seats had been precleared.8

The eminent good sense of the three-judge court's
decision is demonstrated by the absurdity of the alterna
tive. Take for example the Twenty-Third Judicial District.
Judgeships "A" and "B" predated the Voting Rights Act
of 1965, so that no preclearance was required. Judgeship
“C” was added by Acts 1968, No. 464. Preclearance was
not sought until 1988, at which time preclearance was
rejected. Letter of September 23, 1988, Appendix 108a.
Judgeship "D" was added by Acts 1982, No. 21, for which
preclearance was sought and was received on December
2, 1982. If the Justice Department is right, there cannot be
four judges in the Twenty-Third Judicial District because
preclearance of the third judge never occurred. Addi
tionally, arguably there cannot be three judges in the

8 Significantly, substantially all of the latest Acts were
submitted to and approved by the Justice Department. How
ever, after the filing of this litigation, the Justice Department
reversed its attitude and policies, and in doing so, refused to
preclear any new statutes and refused to preclear Acts passed
as long as 20 years ago. In its October 31, 1990 Opinion, the
Three-Judge Court stated:

The evidence submitted by the parties indicates
that the Attorney General approved the method Lou
isiana used for adding judges approximately 81
times. Preclearance was denied on only three dates:
September 23, 1988; May 12, 1989; and September 17,
1990. These denials came after Judge Parker had
rendered his decision in the Section 2 case on August
15, 1988.

Opinion of the Three-Judge Court (October 31, 1990), App. 29a
n. 41.

Twenty-Third Judicial District because the Justice Depart
ment has refused to preclear having three judges in the
Twenty-Third Judicial District. Thus, there can only be
two judges in the Twenty-Third Judicial District, one-half
the number which Louisiana needs.9

The appellants cite McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236,
104 S.Ct. 1037, 79 L.Ed.2d 271 (1984), for the proposition
that preclearance of subsequent additional judgeships
does not constitute preclearance of an earlier additional
judgeship.10 McCain, however, is inapplicable because

9 Indeed, according to the Justice Department's logic,
arguably the answer is that there can be no judges in the
Twenty-Third Judicial District. As the Justice Department
approved having four judges in that district, having only two
judges would be a change from what has been precleared,
which change would itself require preclearance. Given that the
Justice Department has refused for the past two years to pre
clear any additional judgeship in Louisiana unless the district
involved is majority black (such as Orleans) or unless a black
happens to win the seat involved, see pages 19-20 infra, pre
sumably the Justice Department would not preclear having one
or two judges in that district, so there would be no judges in
the Twenty-Third Judicial District.

Appellants also cite this Court's summary affirmance of
Haith v. Martin, 618 F. Supp. 410 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (three-judge
court), aff'd mem. Martin v. Haith, 477 U.S. 901, 106 S.Ct. 3268,
91 L.Ed.2d 559 (1986). Of course, a summary affirmance is "not
of the same precedential value as would be an opinion of the
court treating the question on the merits." Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651, 671, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662, 677 (1974);
accord, Tully v. Griffin, 429 U.S. 68, 74, 97 S.Ct. 219, 50 L.Ed.2d
227, 233 (1976); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 83 n. 27, 94
S.Ct. 2655, 41 L.Ed.2d 551, 587 n. 27 (1974) (Marshall, Douglas,
& Brennan, )., dissenting). This Court in Haith never addressed

(Continued on following page)

there the earlier, unprecleared change involved a radical
alteration of the type of government in a particular
county, while the later, precleared change involved an
increase in the number of members in the governing
body. The South Carolina General Assembly had enacted
a 1966 act, totally revising Edgefield County's system of
government. 465 U.S. at 239, 104 S.Ct. 1037, 79 L.Ed,2d at
275. The act combined legislative and administrative
powers in a brand-new council. Although the council
members were required to reside in a particular district,
they were elected at-large. The act also provided for two
year terms and set forth the method of electing the coun
cil chairman. The 1966 act was never precleared. In 1971
the General Assembly passed a new act to increase the
number of council members and districts, necessitating
new district boundaries. 465 U.S. at 240, 104 S.Ct. 1037, 79
L.Ed.2d at 276. This act was precleared. 465 U.S. at 241,
104 S.Ct. 1037, 79 L.Ed.2d at 276. This Court held that
preclearance of the later act did not constitute pre
clearance of the former act. The Attorney General was

(Continued from previous page)
the argument relied on by the three-judge court in the instant
case. Indeed, this argument is never mentioned in the three-
judge court opinion in Haith. Finally, it should be noted that
the three-judge court in the instant case based its decision on a
careful analysis of the various acts in question and of the
preclearance submission letters sent by the State of Louisiana
to the Attorney General. Opinion of the Three-Judge Court
(October 31, 1990), App. at 26a - 27a. For that reason the three-
judge court concluded "[i]t cannot be said that the submission
by the State of Louisiana was ambiguous concerning the scope
of the request." Opinion of the Three-Judge Court (October 31,
1990), App. at 26a n. 38.

focusing on the change in boundaries and in the number
of seats, not on the dramatic systemic change in the type
of government made by the 1966 act. 465 U.S. at 252, 104
S.Ct. 1037, 79 L.Ed.2d at 283. While in McCain the
unprecleared act in question created a completely new
form of government, here the unprecleared acts merely
provided for additional judgeships and stated that the
total number of judgeships would be the increased
number. Any Louisiana statute submitted to the Justice
Department necessarily showed the effect of the new
judgeship and provided for the total number of judge-
ships in the judicial district, and the preclearance of the
later statute of necessity precleared the earlier added
seat.

Appellants, at pages 6-7 of their Jurisdictional State
ment, attempt to reurge their Motion before the three-
judge court for reconsideration and clarification of the
October 22nd Order. For the following reasons given by
the three-judge court in its October 31st Opinion, the
Motion was denied:

IV. PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECON
SIDERATION AND CLARIFICATION

The plaintiffs have filed a motion seeking to
have the Court reconsider its October 22 order
insofar as it applies to certain judgeships set
forth in Part I of the Court's order. In Part I of
the order of October 22, the Court set forth
those judicial positions which the Court found
to have been precleared by the Attorney Gen
eral. Specifically, plaintiffs ask the Court to
review its decision on the following judicial
positions: 10th District, Divisions A and B, and
39th District, Division A; all judgeships in the

First Circuit Court of Appeal; and the at-large
judgeships in the Second and Third Circuits.73

73 Plaintiffs also contend that this Court pre
cleared judgeships in the 17th and 32nd judicial dis
tricts even though there were no Section 5 objections
made on those two districts. Whether there is an
objection filed or not, the Court's decision that these
judicial positions have been precleared by the Attor
ney General is correct.

The Court has again reviewed the record
and finds that its decision which held that the
judicial positions set forth in Part I of its Octo
ber 22 order have been precleared by the Attor
ney General is correct for the reasons previously
cited in this opinion. We also find that the Attor
ney General specifically precleared the division
of the 10th and 39th Judicial Districts into two
separate districts when he approved judicial
positions for both districts. Finally, we conclude
that when the Attorney General precleared Act 3
of the 1981 Louisiana Legislature on August 26,
1981, he expressly precleared the number of
judges and divisions for each of the circuits.74

74 The state's six page letter of July 29, 1981, to
the Attorney General explained in detail the changes
made by Act 3 of 1981. On page 4 of the letter, it is
stated: "Prior law provided for alphabetical divisions
(A, B, C, . . . ) within each district of the First Circuit.
New law provides the same for all court of appeal
circuits." (emphasis in original).11 11

11 This six page letter dated July 29, 1981 to the
U.S. Department of Justice and the August 26, 1981
response thereto by the U.S. Department of Justice
are reproduced and appear in the Appendix to this
Motion pages 8 through 19.

The Court on its own motion does find that
one judicial position which the Court initially
found to be unprecleared has in fact been
expressly precleared by the Attorney General.
This district is District 20, Division B. Exhibit
D-4, which was filed in the record, clearly shows
that the split of District 20 into two parishes and
the creation of Division B was expressly submit
ted and approved by the Attorney General.
Therefore, the Court hereby amends its October
22 order to delete District 20, Division B from
the unprecleared list in Part II of the order. The
Court orders this judicial position to be included
in Part I of the October 22 order which sets forth
precleared judicial positions.

Opinion of the Three-Judge Court (October 31, 1990),
App. 50a through 53a.

Appellants also contend that subsequent pre
clearance in this case is improper because of the possi
bility of an earlier "stated discriminatory purpose" in one
of the prior Louisiana statutes. Of course, here there are
no pleadings or evidence in this Section 5 case of any
stated discriminatory purpose in the addition of much-
needed judgeships in the State of Louisiana. Indeed, the
Justice Department has admitted that its objection is "not
to the number of judges per se", Letter of October 6, 1990,
App. 169a, and that it does not question the State of
Louisiana's "need for or purpose in creating new judge-
ship positions." Letter of September 17, 1990, App. 168a.

Instead, the Justice Department has announced that it
is opposed to Louisiana's at-large system of electing
judges, a system in effect since 1946, see LA. R.S.
13:582-585, predating by two decades the Voting Rights
Act of 1965. See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 139, 96

S.Ct. 1357, 47 L.Ed.2d 629, 638 (1976). The Justice Depart
ment has been dragging its feet on preclearance requests
because it wants to uproot and destroy the entire Louisi
ana judicial election system, replacing it with another
"system" such as limited voting.12 Letter of September
17, 1990, App. 158a.13 The Justice Departm ent's
heavy-handed action in refusing to preclear additional
judgeships so as to attempt to force Louisiana to change
its "system" of electing judges ignores the decision in this
case that the Louisiana "system" of electing judges can
not violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, ignores the
holding in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 56, 106 S.Ct.
2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25, 50 (1986), that any remedy under
Section 2 must be district-specific and not systemic,

12 Under limited voting a voter can only vote for some of
the positions on the ballot. Such a system would itself appear
to violate the Voting Rights Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1973n. Limited
voting was rejected as a judicial remedy in Voting Rights Act
cases, including Martin v. Mabus, 700 F. Supp. 327 (S.D. Miss.
1988). Judge Parker rejected it as a remedy in this case, after
hearing uncontested testimony that it exists in only approx
imately 200 of the more than 86,000 local governmental units in
this country.

13 The Justice Department cited as authority Judge Par
ker's statement in his opinion on liability that the solution was
to "revise the [judicial election] system - to cast about for
alternative procedures under which black voters would have a
better chance to elect judicial candidates of their choice." Clark
v. Edwards, 725 F. Supp. 285, 303 (M.D. La. 1988). Judge Parker
reversed himself after the remedy trial, holding that the court
"lacks the power to impose a systemic remedy upon the state
and that any remedy is indeed limited to the 'guilty' districts."
Clark v. Roemer, ___ F. Supp. ___ (M.D. La. 1990), not yet
reported.

ignores the Fifth Circuit's decision in League of Latin
American Citizens Council #4434 v. William P. Clements, et
al., 914 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc), and violates the
Justice Department's internal rule requiring that pre
clearance determinations be guided by relevant federal
judicial decisions. See 28 C.F.R. ch. 1 (7-1-89 Edition)
§ 5.56.

Indeed, if there is any "discriminatory purpose" in
this case, it is the "discriminatory purpose" evidenced by
the Justice Department in its preclearance decisions
involving Louisiana judgeships.14 In two letters dated the
same day the Justice Department stated that portions of
Act 8 of 1990 adding judgeships would not be precleared,
but other portions of the same statute adding judgeships
were precleared. Compare Letter of September 17, 1990,
App. 142a, 160a, 166a with Letter of September 17, 1990,
App. 136a. Even stranger is the case of the Sixth Judicial
District. In September 1990 the Justice Department
refused to preclear an additional judgeship for that judi
cial district. Letter of September 17, 1990, App. 163a.
When an election was held in that district on October 6,

14 Appellees filed in the three-judge court a motion chal
lenging the constitutionality of the Justice Department's appli
cation of Section 5 to these Louisiana judgeships. The motion
states that the Justice Department has precleared every judicial
act of Alabama and Texas, while refusing to preclear Louisi
ana's judicial acts, even though the judicial election systems in
the three states are precisely the same: i.e., at-large, designated
post, majority vote. On January 10,1990, Appellees moved that
this motion be transferred to the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404,
1406, and 1631, as that Court will be hearing the declaratory
judgment action concerning preclearance of these Louisiana
judgeships.

1990, pursuant to the three-judge court order, a black
happened to win the election. Thereafter, on November
20, 1990, the Justice Department precleared the previ
ously unapprovable seat even though no request for pre
clearance of that seat was pending. Letter of November 20,
1990, (included herein as App. 20).

The judgeship involved in the Sixth Circuit was for
the Section B judicial position. This judgeship was autho
rized by Acts 1974, No. 515. This Act contained precisely
the same language as that of all other acts of the Legisla
ture creating judgeship positions, i.e. "the (number) judi
cial district shall have (number) judges." This Act is
reproduced, and as such included herein, as App. 22-26.
It is difficult to perceive how an individual could serve in
this unprecleared judgeship seat for 15 or 16 years, yet
the successor in office immediately serves in what is now
a precleared judgeship seat. Their constitutional powers
were the same — while sitting as a district court they
each had exclusive original jurisdiction of all civil and
criminal matters. They had exclusive original jurisdiction
of felony cases and of cases involving title to immovable
property; the right to office or other public position; civil
or political rights; probate and succession matters; the
state, a political corporation, or political subdivisions, or
a succession, as a defendant; and the appointment of
receivers or liquidators for corporations or partnerships.
Constitution of Louisiana 1974 Art. 5, § 16.

Clearly, the Justice Department does not believe that
the addition of vitally needed judgeships in a multi
member judicial district is discriminatory. Instead, the
Justice Department disagrees with the Louisiana at-large

system of electing judges (even though the system existed
for two decades before the Voting Rights Act of 1965)
except, of course, where the at-large system happens to
result in the election of minority judges.

Given the absence of any discriminatory purpose and
given that a statute providing for eleven judges in a
judicial district necessarily means that there are one-two-
three-four-five-six-seven-eight-nine-ten-eleven judges in
that district,15 the three-judge court correctly concluded
that the statutes at issue had been precleared.

III. JUDGES WHO HAVE BEEN ELECTED SHOULD
NOT BE THROWN OUT OF OFFICE

Finally, appellants finally argue that judges who were
unopposed and elected or who won in elections held on
October 6, 1990, should be thrown out of office. The
appellants never sought an injunction to prevent these
elections from occurring and should not now be able to
retroactively invalidate these elections. Nor have

15 For example, Acts 1978, No. 39, amended LA. R.S.
13:621.15 to increase judges in the Fifteenth Judicial District
from 6 to 7, and this was precleared on September 20, 1978.
Acts 1982, No. 21, amended LA. R.S. 13:621.15 to increase
judges in the Fifteenth Judicial District from 9 to 10, and was
precleared on December 2, 1982. Acts 1983, No. 226, amended
LA. R.S. 13:621.15 to increase judges in the Fifteenth Judicial
District from 10 to 11 and this was precleared on October 7,
1983. Yet, after preclearing the change from 6 judges to 7
judges; preclearing the change from 9 judges to 10 judges; and
preclearing the change from 10 judges to 11 judges; the Justice
Department objected to earlier increases from 4 judges to 5
judges; 5 judges to 6 judges; and 7 judges to 9 judges.

appellants sought relief in the three-judge court as to
these judgeships.

This Court in the past has refused to set aside elections
held under statutes that had not been precleared, holding
that "[i]n certain circumstances . . . it might be appropriate to
enter an order affording local officials an opportunity to seek
federal approval and ordering a new election only if local
officials fail to do so or if the required federal approval is not
forthcoming." Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 396-97, 91
S.Ct. 431, 27 L.Ed.2d 476, 489-90, (1971); accord, Berry v. Doles,
438 U.S. 190, 98 S.Ct. 2692, 57 L.Ed.2d 693 (1978); Allen v.
Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 571-72, 89 S.Ct. 817, 22
L.Ed.2d 1, 20-21 (1969)d6 16

16 One of the factors to be considered in determining
whether to invalidate elections is "whether it was reasonably
clear at the time of the election that the changes were covered
by § 5." Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 396, 91 S.Ct. 431, 27
L.Ed.2d 476, 489 (1971). The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit has stated that § 2 of the Voting Rights Act
does not apply to the judiciary. League of United Latin American
Citizens Council # 4434 v. Clements, et al., 914 F.2d 620 (5th Cir.
1990) ten banc). The three-judge court held in this case that § 5
of the Voting Rights Act is applicable to certain additional
judgeships, but that pending elections for those judgeships
should nevertheless go forward. This Court, however, enjoined
such elections. The three-judge court in Hunter v. City of Mon
roe, Docket 90-2031 (W.D. La. November 7, 1990, unreported)
(three-judge court) held that § 5 of the Voting Rights Act does
not apply to the "addition of more judges, to be elected by the
same voters who elect the present judges." Opinion of Three-
Judge Court, November 7, 1990. Id. Slip Opinion p. 3. This
Court refused to grant a request by the petitioners in that case
to prevent the elected judges from taking their seats. Hunter v.
McKeithen, (A-363) 59 L.W. 3291 (Nov. 26, 1990). "Given these
varying decisions, it cannot be said that the law in this area is
"reasonably clear."

In Berry v. Doles, 438 U.S. 190, 98 S.Ct. 2692, 57
L.Ed.2d 693 (1978), an action was filed in a three-judge
court shortly before a primary election to enforce the
requirements of § 5 and to prevent the pending election.
The requests for declaratory and injunctive relief were
not acted upon until after the scheduled primary election
and the subsequent run-off election. The three-judge
court afforded prospective relief only by enjoining fur
ther enforcement of the statute but did not set aside the
results of the elections. On appeal, this Court refused to
void the elections, holding:

We conclude that the requirement of federal
scrutiny imposed by § 5 should be satisfied by
appellees without further delay. Accordingly,
we adopt the suggestion of the United States
that the District Court should enter an order
allowing appellees 30 days within which to
apply for approval of the 1968 voting change
under § 5. If approval is obtained, the matter
will be at an end. If approval is denied, appel
lants are free to renew to the District Court their
request for simultaneous election of all members
of the Board at the 1978 general election.

438 U.S. at 192-93, 98 S.Ct. 2692, 57 L.Ed.2d 693, 696.

Even more recently, in October, 1990, a three-judge
court refused to enjoin plaintiffs' request to enjoin a City
Court election in Monroe, Louisiana, based on the failure
to obtain preclearance. Docket 90-2031 (W.D. La. Novem
ber 7, 1990, unreported) (three-judge court). The plaintiffs
in that case did not appeal the denial of the injunction to
this Court. Instead, two weeks after the election, they
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, Certification, and
Comprehensive Relief. The three-judge court allowed cer
tification of the winners. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed an

Application for Stay and Injunction Pending Appeal with
this Court, which application sought to prevent the
elected judges from taking their seats. No. A-363. Circuit
Justice Scalia turned the application over to the entire
Court, which denied the request 7-2. Hunter v. McKeithen,
(A-363) 59 L.W. 3291 (Nov. 26, 1990).

Appellees submit that the decision by this Court in
Hunter is applicable here. Indeed, the argument against
throwing these judges out of office is even stronger
because (a) unlike Hunter, no injunctive relief was sought
in this case until after the election had occurred, and (b)
unlike Hunter, these judges have already been seated and
are acting on a heavy docket of cases.

Counsel for appellants admitted in a hearing in this
case before Judge Parker on December 20, 1990, that the
Hunter precedent governs the judges sought to be un
seated here. During that same hearing, counsel for the
appellants stated that he would not be seeking in that
court to unseat these judges:

MR. McDUFF: Now, in all candor, with
respect to the first category of judgeships that
were elected either in July without opposition or
on October 6th, the Supreme Court did not spe
cifically enjoin them from taking office in its
injunction. And in the Hunter case which was a
case coming out of Monroe City Court which we
asked the Supreme Court to enjoin people from
taking office after they had been elected because
the timing was such that an application was not
made to the Supreme Court for election, and
they turned us down on a seven to two vote.

So, to me that means that the Supreme
Court did not specifically, in this case, enjoin the

people elected in July through qualification or
October 6th from taking office. So we are not
going to take the position in this court that they
should be kept from taking office. We do think,
of course, it is still an unprecleared judgeship
and that eventually something further is going
to happen with it.

Transcript of Hearing in Clark v. Roemer, December 20,
1988, page 11, lines 22-25, page 12, lines 1-13.

Appellees note that the United States Attorney Gen
eral has taken the position that these judges should be
permitted to take office on a provisional basis. These
same appellants sought on December 27, 1990, in the
district court to enjoin certain incumbent Louisiana state
district judges from serving in office past January 1, 1991,
thus attempting to deprive the State of Louisiana of some
of its existing judgeships. In the Response of the United
States to Plaintiffs' Motion to Prevent Certain Persons
From Holding Over in Office, filed on January 4,1991, the
United States Attorney General argued against throwing
these judges out of office, stating:

Movants here have not pointed to any reason
why those incumbent judges elected prior to the
1990 election cycle should be treated differently
from those judges elected as a result of the
October 1990 elections and who will be permit
ted to take office on a provisional basis consis
tent with this Court's prior orders.

On January 11, 1991, the three-judge court agreed with
this analysis by the United States Attorney General, and,
in so doing, issued the following Amended Order:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

JANICE CLARK, ET AL
VERSUS CIVIL ACTION
CHARLES E. ROEMER, ET AL NO. 86-435-A

AMENDED ORDER
The court has pending before it a motion on

behalf of plaintiffs to prevent certain state
judges from continuing in office and to prevent
the state from otherwise filling those offices.
The state judgeships involved are among those
the creation of which have not been "pre
cleared" by the Attorney General of the United
States as required by Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1965, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973c, and they are listed in Part II of this
court's order dated October 22, 1990. The spe
cific judgeships which are the object of the
motion are Division G of the Fourth Judicial
District, Morehouse and Ouachita Parishes, and
Divisions E, F and G of the Fourteenth Judicial
District, Calcasieu Parish.

The court's order of October 22, 1990 sched
uled elections for those judgeships (among
others) for November 6, 1990 and if runoffs
were required, for December 8, 1990 and the
order authorized those persons elected to take
office and serve provisionally as is set forth in
Part III of the order. The Supreme Court, by its
orders of November 2 and 5, 1990, set aside that
portion of this court's order which authorized
elections for judgeships which have not been
precleared and enjoined the state officials from
conducting those elections.

Because the scheduled elections were
enjoined, no person was elected to any of those

judgeships and plaintiffs seek to enjoin the state
from allowing those offices to be filled until the
state has complied with the provisions of Sec
tion 5.

At present three of those offices are filled by
incumbent judges whose terms expired on
December 31, 1990. The other position has been
filled by appointment by the Supreme Court of
Louisiana under state law.

While the October 22, 1990 order may not
authorize provisional filling of these specific
judgeships, the spirit of the order is to avoid
disruption of Louisiana's judiciary to the extent
possible until the preclearance issues are finally
resolved. All of these judgeships were created
and filled years ago. While one does not have an
incumbent because of the retirement of the
incumbent, each is an integral part of Louisi
ana's existing judicial system. Their loss would
impinge upon that system.

While the State defendants have not moved
for amendment of the earlier order, the court
sua sponte will amend it.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the order
of October 22, 1990 is hereby amended so as to
allow Division G of the Fourth Judicial District
and Divisions E, F and G of the Fourteenth
Judicial District to be provisionally filled in
accordance with and under the terms and
restrictions of Part III of that order.

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, January 11, 1991.

/s/ W. Eugene Davis
W. EUGENE DAVIS
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT
JUDGE

/s/ John V. Parker

UNITED STATES DISTRICT
JUDGE

/s/ Frank J. Polozola
FRANK J. POLOZOLA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
JUDGE

Appellants conclude their Jurisdictional Statement by
stating, "In the meantime, of course, the State of Louisi
ana remains free to pass and preclear legislation that
would cause these judges to be elected in a manner that
satisfies Section 5." Presumably, by this, appellants mean
that the State of Louisiana should adopt a new system of
electing judges, such as limited voting. The problems
with limited voting have been previously discussed in
this motion.17 Further, most of the unprecleared judge-
ships involve one seat in a district, and there is no way to
have limited voting for one judgeship. Under limited
voting, voters vote for some but not all of the positions to
be filled. Where there is only one position to fill, there is
no way to limit the voting population. Single judgeships
are single offices, and the Voting Rights Act has been held
not to apply to single office holders. See Butts v. City of
New York, 779 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1985), cert, denied, 478 U.S.
1021, 106 S.Ct. 3335, 92 L.Ed.2d 740 (1986); League of Latin
American Citizens Council #4434 v. William P. Clements, et
ah, 914 F.2d 620, 645 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Higgin
botham, J., concurring).

-------------4------------

CONCLUSION

Louisiana has embraced, by direct will of its people
as reflected through the framing and adoption of its

17 See footnote 12 supra.

Constitutions, an electoral judicial system during 135 of its
179 year history, which includes a period of time in excess of
all of this century and over a third of the last century.

Louisiana, unlike most of the 42 other states with an
electoral judicial section, or retention system, may not
freely make adjustments to Louisiana's judicial system
without advance approval from Washington. In days
gone past, such approval was never unreasonably with
held. On 81 such previous occasions, as found by the
three-judge court [see page 12, fn. 8 supra] approval of a
Louisiana legislative act wTas virtually automatic. From
the day [August 15, 1988] Chief Judge Parker spoke of a
systemic remedy [as subsequently recanted by Chief
Judge Parker], the Justice Department of the United
States has drawn a line in the sand, and, in so doing, has
insisted on Louisiana adopting either a limited voting
scheme or a cumulative voting scheme. As previously
reflected [page 19 fn. 14 supra] Louisiana firmly believes
that Section 5 is unconstitutional as currently applied by
the Justice Department of the United States. This and
many other issues, including the proper relationship
between Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act, are not
presented in this case.

Until these difficult questions have been entertained
and considered by the district court in the District of
Columbia (as will occur in this case under the Three-
Judge Court Order of October 22, 1990) and there is
available to this Court a fully developed record, the pre
sent consideration of Section 5 is unwise and premature.
Appellees, therefore, urge this Court to dismiss this
appeal or, in the alternative, to affirm the decision of the
three-judge court below.

All of the above and foregoing is thus respectfully
submitted.

R obert G. P ugh
Counsel of Record
R obert G. Pugh, J r .
O f T he L aw F irm of
P ugh, Pugh & P ugh

Commercial National Tower, Suite 2100
333 Texas Street

Shreveport, Louisiana 71101-5302
(318) 227-2270

K enneth C. D eJean
First Assistant Attorney

General
Louisiana Department of

Justice
Office of the Attorney

General
Second Floor
State Capitol
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

70804
(504) 342-7014

Attorney for and on behalf
of William ]. Guste, Jr.
Attorney General of
Louisiana

John N . K ennedy
Special Counsel to the
Governor

T homas A. C asey
Executive Counsel to the

Governor
Office of the Governor
Fourth Floor
State Capitol Building
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

70804
(504) 342-7015

Attorneys for and on
behalf of Charles ''Buddy"
Roemer Governor of
Louisiana

M ichael H. R ubin
C hristina B. Peck
Rubin, C urry, C olvin

& Joseph
Ninth Floor
One American Place
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

70825
(504) 383-9000

Attorneys for the Louisiana
District Judges Association

C ynthia Y oung R ougeou
Special Counsel to the
Secretary of State
State of Louisiana
Post Office Box 94125
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

70804
(504) 342-2065

Attorney for and on
Behalf of Fox McKeithen
Secretary of State of
Louisiana

APPENDIX

App. 1

SEAL U.S. Department of Justice

WBR:SSC:DHH:jmc:gmh
DJ 166-012-3
P8184-8187 Washington, D.C. 20530
P8735
P8994-9002

August 18, 1986
L. Adrienne Dupont, Esq.
Staff Attorney
State of Louisiana
Department of Justice
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804-9005
Dear Ms. Dupont:

This is in reference to four acts of the Louisiana
Legislature creating judgeships (Act No. 3 (1965) - Dis
trict 9, Division C; District 19, Division F; District 21,
Division C; District 24, Divisions F and G; Act No. 2
(1966) - District 1, Division E; District 15, Division D;
District 19, Division G; Civil District Court, Orleans Par
ish, Division I; Act No. 216 (1970) - District 19, Divisions
H, I, and J; and Act No. 5 (1972) - District 19, Division K)
and to the procedures for conducting the September 27,
1986, special election and the November 4, 1986, runoff
election to fill a vacancy for a judgeship (District 19,
Division H), submitted to the Attorney General pursuant
to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended,
42 U.S.C. 1973c. We received your submission of the
additional judgeships on July 23, 1986, and your submis
sion of the special elections on July 28, 1986. In accor
dance with your request, expedited consideration has
been given this submission pursuant to the Procedures
for the Administration of Section 5 (28 C.F.R. 51.32).

App. 2

The Attorney General does not interpose any objections
to the changes in question. However, we feel a responsibility
to point out that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act expressly
provides that the failure of the Attorney General to object
does not bar any subsequent judicial action to enjoin the
enforcement of such changes. In addition, as authorized by
Section 5, the Attorney General reserves the right to reex
amine this submission if additional information that would
otherwise require an objection comes to his attention during
the remainder of the sixty-day review period. See also 28
C.F.R. 51.42 and 51.48.

Because these submissions are related to matters
before the court in Clark v. Edwards, C.A. No. 86-435 Sec.
A (M.D. La.), we are taking the liberty of sending a copy
of this letter to the court.

Sincerely,
Wm. Bradford Reynolds
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division
By: /s/ Sandra Coleman

for Gerald W. Jones
Chief, Voting Section

cc: C. Lee Dupuis, Esq.
Clerk, United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana
Ernest L. Johnson, Esq.
Johnson, Taylor & Thomas
Samuel Issacharoff, Esq.
Lawyers' Committee for Civil

Rights Under Law

App. 3

Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

AUG 11 1976
Mr. Kenneth C. Dejean
Assistant Attorney General
Department of Justice
Post Office Box 44005
State Capitol
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804
Dear Mr. Dejean:

This is in reference to the changes affecting judicial
districts by Act No. 46 and Act No. 47 of the 1976 Regular
Session of the Louisiana Legislature, submitted to the
Attorney General pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, as amended. Your submission was
received on July 12, 1976. In accordance with your
request, expedited consideration has been given this sub
mission pursuant to the procedural guidelines for the
administration of Section 5 (28 C.RR. Section 51.22).

The Attorney General does not interpose any objec
tion to the changes in question. However, we feel a
responsibility to point out that Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act expressly provides that the failure of the
Attorney General to object does not bar any subsequent
judicial action to enjoin the enforcement of such changes.
We should further point out that the Attorney General
has no authority to waive the 60-day period for consider
ing a submission and, as our guidelines indicate (see 28
C.RR. Section 51.22), we may re-examine our position on
your submission should we receive additional informa
tion concerning the changes in voting procedure prior to

App. 4

the expiration of the 60-day period. Should such informa
tion warrant a change in the Attorney General's deter
mination, you will be so advised.

Sincerely,
/s/ J. Stanley Pottinger

J. Stanley Pottinger
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

App, 5

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 50530

SEAL
DSD:DHH:ELG:gml
DJ 166-012-3
A7300
Mr. Kenneth Dejean
Assistant Attorney General
State of Louisiana
Department of Justice
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804

Dear Mr. Dejean:

This is in reference to Act No. 39 of the 1978 Regular
Session of the Legislature of Louisiana, submitted to the
Attorney General pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, as amended. Your submission was
received on July 26, 1978.

The Attorney General does not interpose any objec
tion to the change in question. However, we feel a
responsibility to point out that Section 5 of the Voting
Rights act expressly provides that the failure of the Attor
ney General to object does not bar any subsequent judi
cial action to enjoin the enforcement of such change.

Sincerely,

DREW S. DAYS III
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division
By: I s / Gerald W. Jones

GERALD W. JONES
Chief, Voting Section

App. 6

SEAL

U.S. Department of Justice

WBR:CWG:TGL:dvs
DJ 166-012-3 Washington, D.C. 20530
G5606-5607
G7029-7030

Honorable William J. Guste, Jr.
Attorney General
State of Louisiana 2 DEC 1982
Department of Justice
P.O. Box 44005
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

This is in reference to Act No. 21 (1982), of the
Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature, which cre
ates additional district court judgeships for Judicial Dis
trict Nos. 1, 15, 18, 23 and 27, divides the 29th Judicial
District so as to create the 40th Judicial District, provides
for the election of a district attorney in the 40th Judicial
District and provides for the January 15, 1983, special
election to be held in that district in the State of Louisi
ana, submitted to the Attorney General pursuant to Sec
tion 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 42
U.S.C. 1973c. Your submission was received on October 5,
1982.

App. 7

See the Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 (28
C.F.R. 51.48).

Sincerely,
Wm. Bradford Reynolds
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division
By: /s/ Calvin Gabil

Gerald W. Jones
Chief, Voting Section

App. 81

SEAL
WILLIAM J. GUSTE JR
ATTORNEY GENERAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

BATON ROUGE
70804

July 29, 1981

CERTIFIED - RETURN RECEIPT
REQUESTED - #P05 8840222

Mr. James P. Turner
Acting Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division
Voting Rights Section
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

RE: Submission of Act 3 of 1981 under
Section 5 of Voting Rights Act

Dear Mr. Turner:

The State of Louisiana, through its Attorney General,
William J. Guste, Jr., hereby submits Act 3 of the Regular
Session of the Louisiana Legislature of 1981, a duly certi
fied copy of which is attached hereto.

1 Mr. James P. Turner, July 29, 1981, with sequential page
numbers, i.e. two, three, four, five, and six have been omitted
from this copy.

App. 9

This Act is submitted pursuant to the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, Section 5, and in accordance with 28 C.F.R.,
Part 51, as this Act effects changes with respect to voting
in the State of Louisiana by amending and reenacting
certain portions of the Louisiana Revised Statutes. Those
sections are: R.S. 13:312, R.S. 13:312.1, R.S. 13:321, and
R.S. 13:353.

Act 3 was originally introduced in the Louisiana
Senate as Senate Bill 170. The purpose of the bill is to
assist in facilitating changes in appellate jurisdiction of
the Louisiana Supreme Court and the Louisiana Circuit
Courts of Appeal. Prior to 1980, the Louisiana Courts of
Appeal had no criminal jurisdiction. However, by reason
of Act 843 of 1980, approved by the Louisiana electorate
on November 4, 1980, as an amendment to the Louisiana
Constitution, effective July 1, 1982 appellate jurisdiction
in criminal matters will be vested in the Louisiana Courts
of Appeal. With the change in the appellate jurisdiction of
the Courts of Appeal, the Legislature recognized the need
for additional judgeships to handle the additional crimi
nal appeal workload that these courts will assume and
accordingly, Act 3 made the following changes:

New law, relative to the courts of appeal, basically pro
vides for the creation of a Fifth Circuit, out of the present
Fourth Circuit, and also increases the number of appellate
judges from 33 to 48 throughout the state.

New law creates the court of appeals for the Fifth Circuit
out of the present Fourth Circuit. The chart below shows
the number of judges and arrangement of districts in the
prior law, Act 661 of 1980, and the new law to wit:

PRIOR LAW ACT 661, 1980 R.S. NEW LAW

1. First Circuit
Districts Judges Districts Judges Districts Judges

1st - Ascension, Assumption,
Iberville, Lafourche, Pointe

1st - (Same) .. ..........3 1st - (Same) .. ..........4

Coupe, St. Mary, Terrebonne,
and West Baton Rouge............ 3

2nd - East Baton R ouge..................... 3 2nd - (Same) . ..........3 2nd - (Same) . ..........4

3rd - East Feliciana, Livingston, St. 3rd - (same).. ..........3 3rd - (Same). . ..........4
Helena, St. Tammany,
Tangipahoa, Washington, and
West Feliciana............................. _3

At Large . . . . . .......... 1

Total.. 9 Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 Total ................ ..........12

A
pp. 10

PRIOR LAW ACT 661, 1980 R.S. NEW LAW

2. Second Circuit
Districts

1st - East Carroll, Franklin, Madison,
Morehouse, Ouachita, Richland,
Tensas, and West Carroll . . . . . 1

1st - (Same) . .. . .. .. 1 1st - (Same)........... . . 2

2nd - Bienville, Bossier, Caldwell,
Claiborne, Jackson, Lincoln,
Union, Webster, and Winn. . . . 1

2nd - (Same) . . . ___1 2nd - (Sam e)........ .. 2

3rd - Caddo, DeSoto, and Red
River. ............................................1

3rd - (Same). . . . .. .. 1 3rd - (Same).......... . . 2

At Large......................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ._2 At Large ............ . . . . 3 At Large ................ . . 1

Total..............................................................5 Total................... . . . . 6 Total ....................... . . 7

A
pp. 11

PRIOR LAW

3. Third Circuit (No Change by
new law)
Districts

1st - Avoyelles, Catahoula,
Concordia, Grant, LaSalle,
Natchitoches, Rapides, and
Sabine............... 2

2nd - Allen, Beauregard, Calcasieu,
Cameron, Jefferson Davis, and
Vernon................................. 2

3rd - Acadia, Evangeline, Iberia,
Lafayette, St. Martin, St.
Landry, and Vermilion............. 2

At Large.................................. 3

Total................................................................ 9

ACT 661, 1980 R.S. NEW LAW

1st - (Same)............. 2

2nd - (Same).......... • 2

3rd - (Same). . . . . . . . 2
At Large.................. _3

1st - (Same)................2

2nd - (Sam e)..............2

3rd - (Same)................2
At Large....................__3

Total 9 Total 9

A
pp. 12

PRIOR LAW

4. Fourth Circuit
Districts

1st - Jefferson ........................... 2
2nd - Orleans ....... ..................................5
3rd - St. Charles, St. James, St. John

the Baptist................................... 1
4th - Plaquemines and St. Bernard. . . 1

From combined 1st, 3rd, and 4th
districts........................................................ _ i

Total...............................................................10

ACT 661, 1980 R.S. NEW LAW

1st - Orleans......... . 8
2nd - Plaquemines. . 1
3rd - St. Bernard .. . 1

1st - Orleans............8
2nd - Plaquemines. . 1
3rd - St. Bernard . .. 1

Total 10 Total 12

A
pp. 13

TOTAL

Fifth Circuit (New)

PRIOR LAW ACT 661, 1980 R.S. NEW LAW

1st - Jefferson 1 1st - (Same).. . . . 6 (7)
2nd - St. James,
St. John the
Baptist (east of
the Mississippi) 1

2nd - (Same). . . . 1

3rd - St. Charles,
St. John the
Baptist (west of
the Mississippi).. . .. 1

3rd - (Same) . . . . 1

Total..................... . . . 6 Total.............. . . . . 8 (9) I—i

.33 TOTAL................... . .41 TOTAL............ . .48 (49)

App. 15

An additional judge for the first district exists
until January 1, 1983.

Act 661 of 1980 would create the additional judgeships
shown on the chart effective December 1, 1981.

New law repeals the above digested provisions of Act 661
which are to be effective December 1, 1981, except that it
retains the provisions of Act 661 which created one addi
tional judgeship for the Fourth Circuit. That judgeship
has been filled. (Effective on signature of the governor).

Prior law provided that a sheriff's deputy shall attend
each session of court for the First, Second, and Third
Circuits. The Fourth Circuit is attended by the New
Orleans police. New law adds sheriffs' deputies for the
Fifth Circuit. (Effective May 1, 1982).

New law provides that all additional judgeships shall be
established as soon as this Act is signed by the governor.
Provides for a special election by special primary on the
third Saturday in October and special general election on
the sixth Saturday following the third Saturday in Octo
ber. The new judges for the First, Second, and Fourth
Circuit take office on January 1, 1982; the judges for the
Fifth Circuit take office May 1, 1982. The new judges for
the "new" Fourth Circuit will be elected to districts of the
"old" Fourth Circuit, take office on January 1, 1982, and
be transferred to the "new" Fourth Circuit on May 1,
1982.

Provides that nine judgeships shall be established for the
Fifth Circuit until January 1, 1983. Provides that seven of
the judges shall be elected from the first district of the
Fifth Circuit. Provides that one judgeship from the first
district shall be abolished on January 1, 1983 (when the

App. 16

incumbent judge's term expires). Provides that four of the
nine judges are incumbent judges, the remaining five
additional judges shall be selected as follows: one from
the third district, and four from the first district of the
Fifth Circuit.

Prior law provided for alphabetical divisions (A, B, C,
. . . . ) within each district of the First Circuit. New law
provides the same for all court of appeal circuits. (Effec
tive on the signature of the governor).
Effective dates (a) On Act's signature by governor -

establishment of all judgeships.
(b) May 1, 1982 - creation of the Fifth

Circuit.
(c) On signature of the governor - all

other provisions.

Act 3 was adopted by the Louisiana Legislature pur
suant to its general legislative powers provided in Article
III, Section 1 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 and
the Constitution of the United States of America, Amend
ment X.

Act 3 was finally passed by the Legislature on May
27, 1981, when the Louisiana Senate concurred in House
amendments by a vote of 33-0. The House of Representa
tives had previously adopted the bill by a vote of 77-1 on
May 2, 1981. The Act was signed by Governor David C.
Treen on June 2, 1981.

Section 13 of the Act provides with respect to the
effective date of the various sections of Act 3. In accor
dance with the mandate of Act 3, Governor Treen has
issued an Executive Proclamation calling for elections to
fill the newly created judgeships which are scheduled to

App. 17

be conducted on October 17, 1981 and November 28, 1981
for the primary and general elections, respectively. A
copy of this proclamation is enclosed. Due to these
impending elections, the State of Louisiana requests
expedited consideration.

The Act will be effective with respect to only those
portions of the State of Louisiana where additional Court
of Appeal judgeships have been created, and it is not
anticipated that the Act will affect adversely any lan
guage or racial minority group.

An action entitled Elmer Tapper v. David C. Treen,
Governor of Louisiana, was filed in the Nineteenth Judicial
District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge, State of Loui
siana, relative to the implementation of Act 3. A copy of
the Plaintiff's petition is included, although Mr. Trapper
has voluntarily dismissed his petition as of July 22, 1981.
The prior practices were precleared by the United States
Attorney General in a letter dated August 28, 1980, a
copy of which is attached hereto.

Requests for further information should be directed
to the undersigned, Kenneth C. Dejean, Assistant Attor
ney General, Post Office Box 44005, Baton Rouge, Louisi
ana 70804, telephone: (504) 342-7013.

Sincerely,
WILLIAM J. GUSTE, JR.
Attorney General
BY: /s/ Kenneth C. Dejean

KENNETH C. DEJEAN
Assistant Attorney General

KCD:lg
Enclosures (4)

App. 18

SEAL
WBR:CWG:TGL:gml
DJ 166-012-3 Washington, D.C. 20530
D9992-9993
Kenneth C. Dejean, Esq,
Assistant Attorney General
State of Louisiana Aug 26, 1981
Department of Justice
P.O. Box 44005
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804

Dear Mr. Dejean:

This is in reference to Act No. 3 of the 1981 Regular
Session of the Louisiana Legislature, which provides
additional appellate court judges and a special election in
October 1981, submitted to the Attorney General pur
suant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. 1973c. Your submission was received
on August 4, 1981. In accordance with your request expe
dited consideration has been given this submission pur
suant to Section 51.32 of the Procedures for the
Administration of Section 5 (46 Fed. Reg. 877).

App. 19

Attorney General to object does not bar any sxibsequent
judicial action to enjoin the enforcement of such changes.

Sincerely,
Wm. Bradford Reynolds
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division
By: /s/ Calvin Gabil

Gerald W. Jones
Chief, Voting Section

App. 20

SEAL U.S. Department of Justice
Civil Rights Division

Office of the Assistant Attorney General
Washington, D.C. 20530

Cynthia Y. Rougeou, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
RO. Box 94125 Nov. 20, 1990
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804-9125
Dear Ms. Rougeou:

This refers to the September 23, 1988, objection,
under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. 1973c, to Act 515 (1974), which cre
ates an additional judgeship (Division B) and provides
for a special election therefor in the 6th Judicial District of
the State of Louisiana.

As you know, on September 17, 1990, the Attorney
General declined to withdraw the objection, based on the
information that was then available. Since that time, we
have received and carefully reviewed additional factual
information relevant to the creation and implementation
of the Division B judgeship position. See the Procedures
for the Administration of Section 5 (28 C.F.R. 51.46). More
specifically, our analysis of the October 6, 1990, election
returns has led us to further reconsider our determination
with regard to the 6th Judicial District, and, based on that
reconsideration we are satisfied that the concerns we
previously entertained no longer prevail in that district.
Accordingly, the objection interposed September 23, 1988,
and continued September 17, 1990, to the specified
changes under Act 515 (1974) is hereby withdrawn. See 28
C.F.R. 51.48 and 51.55. However, we feel a responsibility
to point out that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act

App. 21

expressly provides that the failure of the Attorney Gen
eral to object does not bar any subsequent judicial action
to enjoin the enforcement of such changes. 28 C.F.R.
51.41.

Because this matter remains pending before the court
in Clark v. Roemer, No. 86-435-A (M.D. La.), we are send
ing a copy of this letter to the court and counsel of record
in that case.

Sincerely,
/s/ John R. Dunne

John R. Dunne
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division

cc: Honorable John V. Parker
Chief Judge, United States District Court
Michael M. Rubin, Esq.
Fred J. Cassibry, Esq.
Robert G. Pugh, Esq.
Kenneth C. Dejean, Esq.
John N. Kennedy, Esq.
Jack C. Benjamin, Esq.
George A. Blair, III, Esq.
Anthony Skidmore, Esq.
Robert P. McLeod, Esq.
Harry Rosenberg, Esq.
Ernest L. Johnson, Esq.
Robert B. McDuff, Esq.
Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Esq.

Regular Session, 1974

SENATE BILL NO. 202

BY MR. C. M. BROWN

App. 22

ACT 515

ORIGINATED

IN THE

SENATE

/s/ Charles Wm. Roberts
Se c r e t a r y o f t h e
SENATE

Rec'd by the Governor
July 11, 1974 at 11:45 PM

D. Davenport
Received by Secretary of State
the 13th day of July, 1974
/s/ Wade O. Martin, Jr.

Secretary of State

Certified by the Governor as
Emergency Legislation.
H 7/9/74, S 7/9/74
date

Wade O. Martin, Jr.
Secretary of State

AN ACT
To amend and reenact Sections 621.5, 621.9 and
621.32 of Title 13 of the Louisiana Revised Stat
utes of 1950, relative to the number of judges in

App, 23

the Sixth, Ninth and Thirty-Second Judicial Dis
tricts, to create an additional office of district
judge for each of said judicial districts; to pro
vide for the qualifications, election, term of
office, compensation and expenses of said addi
tional judges, including the election of the initial
judges; and otherwise to provide with respect
thereto.

Be it enacted by the Legislature of Louisiana:

Section 1. Sections 621.6, 621.9 and 621.32 of Title 13
of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950 are hereby
amended and reenacted to read as follows:

§ 621.6. Sixth judicial district

The sixth judicial district court shall have two
judges.

* * *

§ 621.9. Ninth Judicial District

The Ninth Judicial District Court shall have five
judges.

* * *

§ 621.32. Thirty-Second judicial district

The thirty-second judicial district shall have four
judges.

Section 2. For purposes of nomination and election
only there is created in the sixth judicial district two
divisions, to be designated as Division A and Division B.
Division A shall be occupied by the present judge of the
sixth judicial district court and his successors in office,
and Division B shall be occupied by the first person to

App. 24

serve as judge of the herein newly created judgeship and
his successors in office.

Section 3. There is created in the thirty-second judi
cial district one new division, to be known as Division O.
The divisions of the thirty-second judicial district which
are already existing on the effective date of this Act shall
be occupied by the present judges and their successors in
office and Division O shall be occupied by the first per
son elected to serve as judge of the herein newly created
judgeship and his successors in office. The creation of this
division is for the purpose of nomination and election
only.

Section 4. The additional judges provided for by this
Act for the sixth and thirty-second judicial districts shall
have the same qualifications and shall be elected at the
same time and in the same manner, shall serve the same
term of office and shall be entitled to the same compensa
tion and expenses, payable from the same sources, as is
now or may hereafter by provided for the other judges of
the sixth and thirty-second judicial districts.

The first occupant of the additional judgeship pro
vided for by this Act shall be elected at a special election
which shall be called by the governor for the first term,
and the judge so elected shall serve a term to expire at the
same time as the term of the other judge of the sixth
judicial district.

The first judge to fill the additional judgeship of the
thirty-second judicial district herein created shall be
elected at a special election to be called by the governor
to be held at the same time as the congressional elections
in 1974.

App. 25

Section 5. There is created in the Ninth Judicial Dis
trict one new division, to be known as Division E. The
divisions of the Ninth Judicial District which are already
existing on the effective date of this Act shall be occupied
by the present judges and their successors in office. Divi
sion E shall be occupied by the first person elected to
serve as judge of the herein newly created judgeship and
his successors in office. The creation of this division is for
the purpose of nomination and election only.

Section 6 . The additional judge provided for by this
Act shall have the same qualifications and shall be enti
tled to the same compensation and expenses, payable
from the same sources as is now or may hereafter be
provided for the other judges of the Ninth Judicial Dis
trict Court, and shall be elected by the qualified voters of
the said judicial district at a special election to be called
by the governor to be held on the first Tuesday after the
first Monday in November, 1974, for a term ending with
the term of the present district judges in said judicial
district, and thereafter the said judge shall be elected at
the same time and in the same manner and shall serve the
same term of office, as is now or may hereafter be pro
vided for the other judges of the Ninth Judicial District
Court.

Section 7. The legislature has knowledge of the fact
that more than one bill has been introduced and/or pas
sed at this 1974 Regular Session, each of which increases
the number of district judges, and the legislature hereby
declares its intent that each such bill enacted at this
session creating any new judgeship in a judicial district is
not intended to repeal or conflict with another bill
enacted at this session creating any judgeship in another

App. 26

district, and that it is the intent of the legislature that any
such bills enacted at this session, whether enacted prior
to or after the enactment of this Senate Bill No. 202, shall
be construed in harmony to give each bill effect in the
judicial district in which it increases the number of
judges.

Section 8. If any provision or item of this Act or the
application thereof is held invalid, such invalidity shall
not affect other provisions, items or applications of this
Act which can be given effect without the invalid provi
sions, items or applications, and to this end the provi
sions of this Act are hereby decalred (sic) severable.

Section 9. All laws or parts of laws in conflict here
with are hereby repealed.

/s/ Tames E. Fitzmorris, Jr.
LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR
AND PRESIDENT OF THE
SENATE

/s/ E.L. Henry
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES

/s/ Edwin Edwards
GOVERNOR OF THE STATE
OF LOUISIANA

APPROVED: July 12, 1974

E at 3:15PM

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Clark v. Roemer Motion to Dismiss or Affirm

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