Defendants' Response to Motion to Intervene by Wood and Midland County's Request for Reconsideration of Order Denying Intervention
Public Court Documents
February 24, 1989
4 pages
Cite this item
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Case Files, LULAC and Houston Lawyers Association v. Attorney General of Texas Hardbacks, Briefs, and Trial Transcript. Defendants' Response to Motion to Intervene by Wood and Midland County's Request for Reconsideration of Order Denying Intervention, 1989. 9a7ca516-1e7c-f011-b4cc-7c1e52467ee8. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/4418e821-4a1d-4f82-8002-86fb01d1bbe6/defendants-response-to-motion-to-intervene-by-wood-and-midland-countys-request-for-reconsideration-of-order-denying-intervention. Accessed November 06, 2025.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MIDLAND-ODESSA DIVISION
LULAC COUNCIL #4434, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Civil Action No.
MO-88-CA-154
VS.
JIM MATTOX, et al.,
Defendants. CO
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DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO MOTION TO INTERVENE BY
HARRIS COUNTY DEFENDANT-INTERVENOR WOOD AND
MIDLAND COUNTY'S REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION OF
ORDER DENYING INTERVENTION
The defendants respond as follows to Harris County District
Judge Sharolyn Wood's Motion to Intervene and Midland County's
reconsideration request, neither of which it received in the mail until
this morning, February 24th:
Harris Countv Defendant-Intervenor
Putting aside the inaccurate, ill-informed representations about
such matters as whether there is substantial opposition to the
plaintiffs’ suit, the defendants do not oppose Judge Wood's
intervention in her individual, or personal, capacity. In the last two
paragraphs of Defendants’ Response to Motions to Intervene by
Dallas County Plaintiff-Intervenors and Travis County Defendant-
Intervenors, the defendants explain why sitting judges should be
allowed to intervene in the capacity of an officeholder rather than an
office. As the Court recognized in its order denying Midland County's
motion to intervene, the Attorney General represents the interests of
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the State of Texas in this matter. The office of district judge 1s a state
office, not a county office. Under state law, the Attorney General 1s
the authorized attorney for the state and its offices in civil litigation.
See, e.g., Charles Scribner's Sons v. Marrs, 262 SW. 722, 727 (Tex.
1924); Brady v. Brooks, 89 S.W. 1052, 1056-57 (Tex. 1905); Bullock
v. Texas Skating Association, 583 S.W.2d 888 (Tex.Civ.App.--Austin
1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also United States v. Texas, 680 F.2d 356,
368 n.16 (5th Cir. 1982). By comparison, when a state district judge
is sued in federal court in a personal capacity for actions associated
with judicial activity, the judge has the option of seeking
representation from the Attorney General or from private counsel.
See, e.g., Texas Government Code § 402.024(a) (state district judges).
The allocation of authority among state officers to represent
the State is wholly a matter of state concern. New York v. Uplinger,
467 U.S, 246, 247 .nq, 104.S5.Ct. 2332, 2333 'n.1 (19834) (also noting
the special relevance of the Attorney General's views of a matter
involving state interests). The brief synopsis of state law in the
preceding paragraph on the subject of the Attorney General's powers
and duties is intended only to acquaint the Court with basic law in
this area. It was undertaken only to illustrate the firmness of the
ground on which the Court stood when it evaluated the question of
who speaks for the State in the context of Midland County's
intervention motion and on which it will stand if it evaluates the
other defendant-intervention motions from the perspective of
personal, as opposed to official, capacity. This Court need not be
confronted with a major debate on the collateral and sometimes
highly-charged issue of the Attorney General's powers and duties
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under the Texas Constitution. Analyzing the interventions as
suggested by the defendants will avoic such matters and allow the
focus to be on the important substantive issues in this case.
Midland Countv's Reconsideration Request
Midland County's request that the Court reconsider its earlier
ruling denying it intervention contains some spurious claims,
especially at page 10, about the Attorney General's representation 1n
this case. The Attorney General has no conflict in this case. Instead,
he is defending a system of electing state district judges that 1s
created and maintained by state law, not county ordinances or
judicial edicts. As with such other types of cases handled by the
Attorney General as environmental enforcement litigation, local
assistance is helpful and perhaps necessary. The defendants
formally have invited it through not opposing the putative
defendant-intervenors motions, but, by doing so, they do not
subscribe to all the arguments, some irrelevant and some misleading,
in support of those motions.
Respectfully submitted,
JIM MATTOX
Attorney General of Texas
MARY F. KELLER
First Assistant Attorney General
ing, Ah
RENEA HICKS
Special Assistant Attorney General
1 k » ve
JAVIER GUAJARDO
Assistant Attorney General
P.O. Box 12543
Austin, Texas 78711-2548
(512) 463-2085
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this 24th day of February, 1989, I sent a copy
of the foregoing document by first class United States mail, postage
prepaid, to each of the following: Rolando Rios, 201 N. St. Mary's,
Suite 521, San Antonio, Texas 783205; Ken Oden, Travis County
Attorney, P. O. Box 1748, Austin, Texas 78767; Gabrielle K. McDonald,
301 Congress Avenue, Suite 2050, Austin, Texas 78701; Edward B.
Cloutman, II, Mullinax, Wells, Baab & Cloutman, P.C., 3301 Elm
Street, Dallas, Texas 75226-1637; J." Eugene Clements. Porter &
Clements, 700 Louisiana, Suite 3500, Houston, Texas 77002-2730;
and Mark H. Dettman, Midland County Courthouse, P. O. Box 2559,
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N enea Hicks