Briscoe v. Louisiana Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Louisiana

    I n  th e

(Emtrt nf %  luitF&
October Term, 1960 

No.................

M ary B riscoe, et al.,
Petitioners,

— v . —

S tate of L ouisiana .

PETITION FOR W RIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

A. P. T ureaud

1821 Orleans Avenue 
New Orleans, Louisiana

J o h n n ie  A. J ones

Baton Rouge, Louisiana

T huegood M arshall  
J ack  Greenberg

10 Columbus Circle 
New York 19, New York

Attorneys for Petitioners

W illiam  C olem an , J r .
L ouis H. P ollak  
E lwood H. Chisolm  
J ames M . N abrit , III 

Of Counsel



I N D E X

Opinions B elow ........................................................... -.......  1

Jurisdiction ................................................   1

Questions Presented ................... ............................ -.........  2

Statutory and Constitutional Provisions Involved ..........  3

Statement ...................................................  1

How the Federal Questions Are Presented.......... ........  7

Reasons for Granting the Writ ......... ....................... -....  U

I. The Decision Below Conflicts With Decisions 
of This Court on Important Issues Affecting 
Federal Constitutional R ights......... ...............    H

II. The Public Importance of the Issues Pre­
sented ......................................................................  26

Conclusion ................................—- ----- ------------ —-......—  29

T able op Cases

Barrows v. Jackson, 346 TJ.S. 249 ..................................... 19
Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co., 280 F.2d 531 (oth

Cir., 1960) ....................................................... - .... - .... -20, 21
Boynton v. Virginia,------U .S .------- , 5 L. Ed. 2d 206 .... 20
Briggs et al. v. State of Arkansas (Sup. Ct. of Arkan­

sas, No. 4992) ....................-............................................- 27
Briscoe v. State of Texas (Court of Crim. App., 1960,

No. 32347) ........................................................................

PAGE

27



11

PAGE

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 ...............25, 28
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 ......... -....................
Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 ....................................... 22

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 ............. -.... -...... 16, 24
City of Charleston v. Mitchell, et al. (Ct. of Gen. Sess.

for Charleston County) ...... .................... - ................. -
City of Columbia v. Bouie, et al. (Ct. of Gen. Sess. for

Richland County) ......... ...............................................-
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3..........................................
Cole v. City of Montgomery (Ct. of App. Ala., 3rd Div.

Case No. 57) ....................................... -.......... -................ - 27
Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385 ........ -.....  16
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1............................................. —- 19

Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202 ........................-.............  18
Freeman v. Retail Clerks Union, 45 Lab. Rel. Ref. 

Man. 2334 (Wash. Super. Ct., 1959) ............ -......... —- 23

Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 ....... .............................. -18, 28
Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 — ....... ........ ...... —  17
Griffin, et al. v. Collins, et al., 187 F. Supp. 149 (D.C.

D. Md. 1960) ..... .......... ........ ................................ ------......  27
Griffin, et al. v. State of Maryland (Ct. of App. of Md.,

No. 248, Sept. Term 1960) ....... ......... ......... -..................  27

Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 .........................—......  17
Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 ........................ -  18

King v. State of Georgia (Ga. Ct. of App. Nos. 38648, 
38718) ..................-............................................................  27

Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451...........-..............—- 16
Lupper v. State of Arkansas (Sup. Ct. of Arkansas,

No. 4997) .......................................................................... 27



Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 _____ ________________ 20, 23
Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141......... .............................  22
Mnnn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 ..................................... ....  23

N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 .......... ....................  22
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 ............... ................... . 12
National Labor Relations Board v. Babcock and Wilcox

Co., 351 U.S. 105 ......... ...................... ................ ............ . 23
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 ......................... .....  12
Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 ..... ...... ..................... . 12

Orleans Parish School Board v. Bush, 242 F.2d 156
(5th Cir. 1957), cert, denied 354 U.S. 921 ............... 28

People v. Barisi, 193 Misc. 934, 86 N.Y.S.2d 277 (1948) 23

Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 ................................ .............  16
Randolph v. Commonwealth of Va. (Sup. Ct. of App.

Va., No. 5233, 1960) ............................ ........ ....... .........  27
Republic Aviation Corp. v. National Labor Relations 

Board, 324 U.S. 793 ............ .......... ..................... .........  23

Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 4 7 ............................... 25
Scull v. Virginia, 359 U.S. 344 ................................ ..... . 17
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 _____________ _______ 19
Smith v. State of Arkansas (Sup. Ct. of Arkansas,

No. 4994) .......................................................... ..... .........  27
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 ..................................  12
State Athletic Commission v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533 ..18, 25,

28
State of N. C. v. Fox and Sampson (No. 442, Supreme

Court, Fall Term 1960) ................................. .................  27
State v. Randolph, et al. (Ct. of Gen. Sess. for Sumter

County) ............................................... ............. .... —- ......  27
State v. Sanford, 203 La. 961, 14 So. 2d 778 (1943) ...... . 15
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 ...........................  22

I l l

PAGE



IV

Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1   -....................-  24
Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 ............... 11,13
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 .........................-  22
Town of Pontchatoula v. Bates, 173 La. 824, 138 So.

851 (1931) ........ ....................... - --- ------ ----- .... - .... -....10>15

United States v. L. Cohen Grocery, 255 U.S. 81 .......  16
United Steelworkers v. National Labor Relations 

Board, 243 F.2d 593 (D.C. Cir., 1956) ...........................  23

Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178........................... 17
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183................................... 17
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 ..... ....................... -  77

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 ............................. -....  18

S ta t u t e s :

28 U.S.C. §1257(3) ......................................................  1
La. Constitution (1921), Article 7, §10 .............—  10
LSA—R.S. §14-103.......................................................3,14

O th er  A uthorities

Pollitt, “ Dime Store Demonstrations: Events and Legal 
Problems of the First Sixty Days,” 1960 Duke Law 
Journal 315 (1960) ............ ........................................ -....  26

New York Times, August 11,1960, p. 14, col. 5 (late city 
edition) .............................................................................. 26

New York Times, Oct. 18, 1960, p. 47, col. 5 (late city 
edition) ...........    26

PAGE



1st th e

(Eitxtrt ni llnttpii BtaieB
October Term, 1960 

No.................

M'aby B biscoe, et al.,
Petitioners,

— Y.—

S tate of L ouisiana .

PETITION FOR W RIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

Petitioners pray that a writ of certiorari issue to review 
the judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana entered 
in the above-entitled case on October 5, 1960.

Citations to Opinions Below

The opinions below are not reported. The Nineteenth 
Judicial District Court, State of Louisiana, Parish of East 
Baton Rouge, rendered an oral opinion which is set forth 
in the Statement, infra, page 6. The Supreme Court of 
Louisiana entered a brief handwritten opinion which is also 
set forth, infra, page 10.

Jurisdiction

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana was 
entered on October 5, 1960. The jurisdiction of this Court 
is invoked under 28 U.S.C., §1257(3), petitioners claiming 
rights, privileges and immunities under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.



2

Questions Presented

Petitioners, Negro students, sat down and sought food 
service at a lunch counter which served only white people 
in a public establishment which welcomed their trade with­
out racial discrimination at all counters but that lunch 
counter; for this they were arrested and convicted under 
the provisions of a law proscribing conduct “ in such a 
manner as to unreasonably disturb or alarm the public” ; 
and there was no evidence of any disorder, disturbance of 
the peace, or public alarm. Under the circumstances, were 
petitioners deprived of rights protected by the:

1. due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in 
that they were convicted on a record barren of any evidence 
of guilt;

2. due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in 
that they were convicted under a penal provision which was 
so indefinite and vague as to afford no ascertainable stand­
ard of criminality;

3. due process and equal protection clauses of the Four­
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in 
that they were arrested and convicted to enforce racial 
discrimination;

4. due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as 
that clause incorporates First Amendment type protection 
of liberty of expression ?



3

Statutory and Constitutional Provisions Involved

1. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States.

2. The Louisiana statutory provision involved is LSA- 
E.S. 14:103:

“ Disturbing the peace is the doing of any of the fol­
lowing in such a manner as would foreseeably disturb 
or alarm the public:

(1) Engaging in a fistic encounter; or

(2) Using of any unnecessarily loud, offensive, or 
insulting language; or

(3) Appearing in an intoxicated condition; or

(4) Engaging in any act in a violent and tumultuous 
manner by three or more persons; or

(5) Holding of an unlawful assembly; or

(6) Interruption of any lawful assembly of people; 
or

(7) Commission of any other act in such a manner 
as to unreasonably disturb or alarm the public.

Whoever commits the crime of disturbing the peace 
shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars, or 
imprisoned for not more than ninety days, or both.”



4

Statement

This is one of three petitions1 tiled here this day involv­
ing cases decided on identical grounds by the Supreme 
Court of Louisiana on October 5, 1960. The questions pre­
sented are identical and the factual situations from which 
they stem are in relevant particulars almost entirely the 
same. In each criminal prosecution, the State of Louisiana, 
initially acting through Captain Robert Weiner of the Baton 
Rouge City Police and other police officers including, on 
one occasion a major of the police and on another occasion 
the Chief, arrested petitioners, who were students at South­
ern University, for violating a state statute, LSA-R.S. 
14:103(7), which makes criminal “ any other act” committed 
“ in such a manner as to unreasonably disturb or alarm the 
public.” Petitioners in each case, respectively, merely re­
quested nonsegregated service at three different public lunch 
counters in stores where otherwise they were welcome as 
customers. No disturbances in fact occurred in any of the 
three cases. Petitioners in each case were tried on criminal 
informations which disclosed their race and were convicted 
and sentenced to imprisonment of four months, three 
months of which might be suspended upon payment of a 
fine of $100.00 and costs.

On March 29, 1960, petitioners in the instant case, stu­
dents at Southern University (RT 2),2 presented them­
selves as patrons at a lunch counter in the Baton Rouge

1 The other two petitions seek review of the following decisions 
of the Supreme Court of Louisiana: State of Louisiana v. John B. 
Garner, et al., Nos. 45,214 and 45,338; State of Louisiana v. Jannette 
Hoston, Nos. 45,337 and 45,213.

2 refers to the trial record and application for review 
thereof. “RQ” refers to the record on the motion to quash and 
application for review thereof.



5

Greyhound Bus Station (RT 10). The waitress told them 
that as Negroes “ they would have to go to the other side 
to he served . . . (RT 11). [W ]e are supposed to refuse 
the service of anyone that comes in there that is not sup­
posed to be on that side” (RT 11) and “ [t]he colored people 
are supposed to be on the other side” (RT 11). The only 
posted sign announced, “ Refuse service to anyone” (RT 
12) .

Petitioners “ just kept sitting there and they said they 
wanted something. . . . ” (RT 11). They did not do any­
thing else (RT 14): “ The only reason [she] asked them to 
leave is because they were Negroes” (RT 12). Another 
“place [was] reserved for colored people in this same build­
ing” (RT 14). “ [S ]o we called the police,” the waitress 
testified, “ and told them to come get them” (RT 11).

Police Captain Robert Weiner, who made the arrests in 
the Garner and Hoston cases filed here this day, and Major 
Bauer, Inspector of the Police Department, proceeded to 
the bus station with other officers and saw petitioners sit­
ting at the lunch counter reserved for white people (RT 
15-16).

He asked them to move but they remained seated, saying 
nothing (RT 16). When placed under arrest, however, 
“ They came along peacefully” (RT 17).

The Captain stated that petitioners were arrested be­
cause “ according to the law, in my opinion, they were dis­
turbing the peace” (RT 17). He explained, saying, “ the 
fact that their presence was there in the section reserved 
for white people, I felt that they were disturbing the peace 
of the community” (RT 18). They were “ disturbing the 
peace,” he said, “ by the mere presence of their being there” 
(RT 20).



6

The informations filed against petitioners disclosed their 
race by the notation “ (C F )” or “ (CM ),” (ET 1, 2), i.e., 
colored female or colored male.

After motions to quash and assertions of various defenses 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States, set forth in detail infra, page 7, a trial 
was had and on the evidence set forth above petitioners were 
convicted. Following the close of the testimony, the trial 
judge rendered an oral opinion (ET 20-21):

All of the accused stand up. The State has introduced 
testimony of two witnesses in this case which is not 
disputed at all by the defense. In fact there is no evi­
dence by the defense, and under this Article 103, Sec­
tion 7, the one that they are charged under, it is the 
decision of the Court that they are guilty as charged 
for the reason that from the evidence in this case their 
actions in sitting on stools in this place of business when 
they were requested to leave and they refused to leave; 
the officers were called, the officers requested them to 
leave and they still refused to leave, their actions in 
that regard in the opinion of the Court was an act on 
their part as would unreasonably disturb and alarm 
the public. The Court is convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt from the testimony in the case that these accused 
are guilty as charged.

Motion for new trial was made and denied. Application 
for writs of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition was filed 
in the Supreme Court of Louisiana and denied (ET 37). 
Application for stay of execution for 60 days was granted 
by the Chief Justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court on 
October 7, 1960, which later was extended until January 6, 
1961.



7

How the Federal Questions Are Presented

The federal questions sought to be reviewed here were 
raised in the court of first instance (the Nineteenth Judicial 
District Court, Division A) on April 27, 1960, by peti­
tioners’ timely motion to quash the information (RQ 8-11). 
In this motion, aside from variously alleging that the infor­
mation charged no offense under Louisiana’s “ disturbing 
the peace” statute, petitioners averred (RQ 9 ):

5. That if said Statute, LSA-R. S. 14:103 of 1950, 
as amended, does embrace within its terms and mean­
ings that “ the defendants’ mere refusal to move from 
a cafe counter seat when ordered to do so by an agent 
or any other person or persons of the said Greyhound 
Restaurant constitutes a disturbance of the peace,” 
then, and in that event said Statute, LSA-R. S. 14:103, 
is unconstitutional, in that, it deprives your defendants 
of their privileges, immunities and/or liberties, with­
out due process of law and denies them the equal pro­
tection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth (14tli) 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of 
America.

6. That while the arrests and charges were for 
“ D istubbing  th e  P eace,”  there was not a disturbance 
of the peace, except for the activity in which defen­
dants engaged to protest segregation, and that the use 
of the criminal process in such a situation denies and 
deprives the defendants of their rights, privileges, im­
munities and liberties guaranteed your defendants, 
each, citizens of the United States, by the Fourteenth 
(14th) Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States of America.



8

The motion was argued, submitted and denied on April 
29, 1960, to which ruling petitioners objected, reserved a 
formal bill of exceptions and gave written notice of their 
intention to apply to the State Supreme Court for writs of 
certiorari, mandamus and prohibition (RQ 13, 15). The bill 
of exceptions was signed by the trial judge on May 6 (RQ 
17) and this application, which was presented to the Su­
preme Court of Louisiana on the same day (RQ 18-22) 
urged (RQ 19, 20):

3. That while the arrests and charges wTere for 
“ D isturbing  th e  P eace,”  there was not a disturbance 
of the peace, except for the activity in which relators 
engaged to protest racial segregation and that the use 
of the criminal process in such a situation denies and 
deprives the relators of their rights, privileges, immu­
nities and liberties guaranteed to them, each, citizens 
of the United States, by the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States of America,

4. That the refusal of your relators to move from 
a cafe counter seat at Greyhound Restaurant in obedi­
ence of an order by an agent thereof is not a crime 
embraced within the terms and meanings of LSA-R. S. 
14:103(7) of 1950, as amended, and if said act is a 
crime within the terms and meaning of said Statute, 
then and in that event, said Statute is sufficiently vague 
to render it unconstitutional on its face, thus, depriving 
your relators of their rights, privileges, immunities 
and/or liberties without due process of law and denies 
them the equal protection of the law guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States of America.

# # # *
6. That, thus, the relief which your relators seek 

herein under the Application for Writs of Certiorari,



9

Mandamus and Prohibition, should be granted by this 
Honorable Court, in that the Statute and Bill of In­
formation under which your relators are charged, both, 
are insufficient to charge a crime, otherwise your rela­
tors be deprived of due process of law and the equal 
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of 
America.

This application for writs of certiorari, mandamus and 
prohibition was denied on May 9 with a notation that 
“Relators have an adequate remedy under our Supervisory 
Jurisdiction in the event of a conviction” (RQ 28). There­
after, petitioners applied for and were summarily denied 
a rehearing on May 24 (RQ 29-30, 33).

Petitioners’ case came on for trial on June 2, 1960, at 
which time their counsel stated for the record that “ they 
wished to reserve any and all rights they may have under 
the writs of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition would 
like to renew all reservations and motions previously that 
have been denied” (RT 3).

Petitioners were found guilty as charged (RT 3) and, on 
June 5, they filed a motion for new trial which alleged, 
inter alia (RT 24) :

That the said verdict is contrary to the law and evi­
dence in that it is repugnant to and in violation of 
Article I, Sections 2 and 3 of the Constitution of Louisi­
ana of 1921, and also repugnant to and in violation 
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Con­
stitution of the United States; that said verdict de­
prives the said defendants of their freedom of speech, 
liberties, privileges, immunities, due process and equal 
protection of the law as guaranteed by the provisions



10

of the Constitution of the State of Louisiana and of the 
United States of America, respectively.

This motion was denied (RT 4) and petitioners filed forth­
with a bill of exceptions, renewing all reservations, motions 
and bills of exceptions previously taken (RT 6-7).

Thereafter, on July 20, 1960, petitioners applied to the 
Supreme Court of the State for writs of certiorari, pro­
hibition and mandamus (RT 26-29) which incorporated by 
reference their previous applications for such writs (RT 
26) and also urged that the verdict and sentence of the 
trial court are “ repugnant to and in violation of . . . the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of 
the United States, depriving relators of their freedom of 
speech, liberties, privileges, immunities, due process and 
equal protection of the laws as constitutionally guaranteed 
all citizens of the State of Louisiana and of the United 
States” (RT 27).

The Supreme Court of Louisiana denied this application 
on October 5, 1960, stating (RT 36):

Writs refused.
This Court is without jurisdiction to review facts in 

criminal cases. See Art. 7, Sec. 10, La. Constitution 
of 1921.

The rulings of the district judges on matters of law 
are not erroneous. See Town of Pontehatoula v. Bates, 
173 La., 824, 138 So. 851.



11

Reasons for Granting the Writ

I.
The Decision Below Conflicts With Decisions o f  This 

Court on Important Issues Affecting Federal Constitu­
tional Rights.

A. The decision below affirms a criminal conviction based 
upon no evidence of guilt and therefore conflicts with 
this Court’s decision in Thompson v. City o f Louisville,
362 U.S. 199.

The trial court reached the following conclusion on the 
evidence presented at trial, which is detailed in the State­
ment of Facts, supra:

. . .  it is the decision of the Court that they are guilty 
as charged for the reason that from the evidence in 
this case their actions in sitting on stools in this place 
of business when they were requested to leave and. 
they refused to leave; the officers were called, the offi­
cers requested them to leave and they still refused to 
leave, their actions in that regard in the opinion of the 
Court was an act on their part as would unreasonably 
disturb and alarm the public. The Court is convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt from the testimony in the 
case that these accused are guilty as charged (RT 21).

It is submitted that none of the evidence presented affords 
any basis for this conclusion and determination of guilt, if 
any conventional meaning is given to the words of the stat­
ute.3 The Supreme Court of Louisiana apparently regarded

3 In pertinent part the statute provides:
“Disturbing the peace is the doing of any of the following in 
such a manner as would foreseeably disturb or alarm the public: 

# * * # #
(7) Commission of any other act in such a manner as to un­
reasonably disturb or alarm the public.”



12

itself as inhibited from re-examining the factual basis for 
the determination of guilt,4 but under traditional principles 
this Court makes its “ own independent examination of the 
record” where facts and constructions are determinative of 
federal constitutional rights. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 
264, 271, 272.5

The record simply shows that petitioners, Negroes, quietly 
and peacefully took seats at a lunch counter which served 
only white people and requested food service; that they 
were advised by the waitress that Negroes were supposed 
to be at another counter and asked to leave; and that they 
remained seated at the counter. There was no argument or 
altercation with the waitress (or anyone else); none of the 
other customers in the store complained about petitioners’ 
presence.

A police major and police captain arrived, requested that 
petitioners leave, and then arrested petitioners on the 
ground, stated by Captain Weiner, that petitioners were 
violating the law and disturbing the peace because “ the fact 
that their presence was there in the section reserved for 
white people, I felt that they were disturbing the peace of 
the community” (ET 18).

There was no testimony in the record that anyone was 
alarmed or disturbed, no testimony that any disorder or 
disturbance actually occurred, and no testimony that any­
one even feared or apprehended that a disorder might 
occur. Thus there was absolutely nothing in the record to

4 See opinion below, RT 33.
5 It is well settled that this Court will “ decide for itself facts or 

constructions upon which federal constitutional issues rest” ; Napue 
v. Illinois, above. See Spamo v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 316; 
Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587; Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 
268, 271; and the many cases collected in Napue, at 360 U.S. 264, 
272, note 4.



13

support the conclusion that petitioners did anything “ in a 
manner calculated to” disturb or alarm the public, or that 
the public was “ actually” alarmed or disturbed, and the 
trial court’s opinion said only that their acts “ would un­
reasonably disturb or alarm the public” (emphasis sup­
plied).

Thus this case is like Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 
U.S. 199, and should have been decided on the same prin­
ciples applied in that case. In the Thompson case the peti­
tioner had been convicted of disorderly conduct and loiter­
ing. The evidence showed essentially that the petitioner had 
been out on the dance floor of a cafe alone for about half 
an hour awaiting a bus (on this the loitering charge was 
based), and that when he was arrested for loitering he 
argued with the police (on which the disorderly conduct 
charge was based). This Court held the convictions void 
as having been based on no evidence and, therefore, viola­
tive of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment. Here, as in Thompson, “ there is no support for these 
convictions in the record . . . ” (362 U.S. at 204), and, there­
fore, the convictions are “void as denials of due process” 
(Ibid.). There is in the instant suit, as the Thompson opin­
ion reiterated, “ no evidence whatever in the record to sup­
port these convictions” (Ibid.). [J]ust as “ conviction upon 
a charge not made would be sheer denial of due process,” 
so is it a violation of due process to convict and punish 
a man without evidence of his guilt (Id. at 206).

The judgment below conflicts sharply with the law as 
this Court declared it in Thompson. A  full hearing, there­
fore, should be granted so that this Court may consider 
the grave constitutional issue posed by this contradiction.



14

B. Petitioners were convicted of a crime under the 
provisions of a state statute which as applied to 
convict them is so vague, indefinite, and uncertain 
as to offend the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as construed in applicable decisions of 
this Court.

The information filed in this case charges petitioners 
with having violated “Article 103 (Section 7) of the 
Louisiana Criminal Code” (E. 1). Subsection 7 of The 
Statute invoked (LSA E.S. §14-103) prohibits the “ Com­
mission of any other act in such a manner as to unreason­
ably disturb or alarm the public.” As is evident from the 
discussion in the preceding section of this petition, no con­
ventional understanding of the meaning of the words of the 
statute explains or supports the determination of guilt on 
the present record. Whether or not the statute has been 
read by the Court below to give it any esoteric meaning 
which is not plain from a reading of the statute, it is plain 
that it is unconscionably vague and indefinite.6

It may be observed that subsection 7, the catch-all part 
of the law, has not been applied in this case in accordance 
with the maxim ejusdem generis, for petitioners were con­
victed even though they committed no acts of the same 
character as those specifically prohibited in the six specific 
subsections. It is plain that petitioners did not (1) engage 
“ in a fistic encounter” , (2) use “ any unnecessarily loud, 
offensive, or insulting language” , (3) appear “ in an in­
toxicated condition” , (4) engage “ in any act in a violent and 
tumultuous manner by three or more persons” , (5) hold “ an

6 The grammatical construction of subsection 7, viz., “ to unrea­
sonably disturb or alarm the public”—opens the door to further 
confusion and vagueness. Query: Is the act violated when the pub­
lic “unreasonably” becomes disturbed or alarmed, or when an un­
reasonable act disturbs or alarms the public? In any event the 
record fails to show that anyone was disturbed or alarmed.



15

unlawful assembly” , or (6) interrupt “ any lawful assembly 
of people” , but they were nevertheless adjudged guilty.

Prior decisions of the Supreme Court of Louisiana do 
nothing to elucidate how the diffuse command of the catch­
all section 7 prohibits and makes criminal acts such as 
petitioners’. The ease cited by the Court below, Town of 
Pontchatoula v. Bates, 173 La. 824, 138 So. 851 (1931), 
states that “a disturbance of the peace may be created by 
any act or conduct of a person which molests the inhabitants 
in the enjoyment of that peace and quiet to which they are 
entitled, or which throws into confusion things settled, or 
which causes excitement, unrest, disquietude, or fear among 
persons of ordinary, normal temperament.”  On the other 
hand, in the most recent decision of the Louisiana Supreme 
Court dealing with this section, Slate v. Sanford, 203 La. 
961, 14 So. 2d 778 (1943), the Court held that when 
Jehovah’s Witnesses were charged under subsection 7 with 
having disturbed the peace by distributing literature in the 
course of their activities, the conviction should be reversed 
where the record indicated that they were “ orderly and did 
not tend to cause a disturbance of the jjeace.” In that case 
the court expressed its view that if the statute wTere applied 
to the activities in question it might be invalid for vague­
ness :

“ . . . to construe and apply the statute in the way the 
district judge did would seriously involve its validity 
under our State Constitution, because it is well settled 
that no act or conduct, however reprehensible, is a 
crime in Louisiana, unless it is defined and made a 
crime clearly and unmistakably by statute. . . .  It is 
our opinion that the statute is inapplicable to this case 
because it appears that the defendants did not commit 
any unlawful act or pursue an unlawful or disorderly 
course of conduct which would tend to disturb the 
peace” (14 So. 2d at 781).



16

Only when the statute is viewed in the light of the 
arresting officers’ theory of the crime, namely that the 
Negro petitioners committed a crime merely by sitting at 
a lunch counter reserved for white people, does the real 
basis of the arrest and conviction emerge. But such a con­
struction and application of the statute is unfair because 
the statute gives no warning that petitioners’ mere act of 
sitting at a lunch counter reserved for white people and 
requesting food service is criminally punishable.

Subsection 7 is so broad and vague that definition of the 
actions which may be punished is effectively relegated to 
the police, and ultimately to the Courts for ad hoc deter­
mination after the fact in every case. There is no readily 
ascertainable standard of criminality or guilt.

This Court has often held that criminal lawTs must define 
crimes sought to be punished with sufficient particularity to 
give fair notice as to what acts are forbidden. As the 
Court held in Lametta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453, 
“ no one may required at peril of life, liberty or property 
to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are 
entitled to be informed as to what crimes are forbidden.” 
See also, United States v. L. Cohen Grocery, 255 U.S. 81, 
89; Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385; Raley v. 
Ohio, 360 U.S. 423. The statutory provision applied to 
convict petitioners in this case is so vague that it offends 
the basic notions of fair play in the administration of 
criminal justice that are embodied in the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Moreover, the statute punished petitioners’ protest 
against racial segregation practices and customs in the 
community; for this reason the vagueness is even more 
invidious. When freedom of expression is involved the 
principle that penal laws may not be vague must, if any­
thing, be enforced even more stringently. Cantwell v.



17

Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308-311; Scull v. Virginia, 359 
U.S. 344; Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178; Herndon 
v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 261-264.

As this Court stated in Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 
507, 520, a case where the court invalidated a state law 
applied to limit free expression on the grounds of vague­
ness : “ Where a statute is so vague as to make criminal 
an innocent act, a conviction under it cannot be sustained” . 
In this case the state has indiscriminately classified and 
punished innocent actions as criminal. The result is an 
arbitrary exercise of the state’s power which offends due 
process. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191.

C. The decision below conflicts with prior decisions of 
this Court which condemn racially discriminatory 
administration o f State criminal laws.

It is plain on the face of the record from the testimony 
of the State’s own witnesses that petitioners were arrested 
merely because they were Negroes and sought food service 
at a lunch counter maintained for white persons. The 
petitioners’ race was the only basis for the police officers’ 
command that they leave the seats which they occupied 
at the lunch counter, and for the arrests which followed 
failure to follow this command. Both the arrests and con­
victions rest on the theory that petitioners violated the 
state law by their mere presence as Negroes, at the white 
lunch counter. The criminal accusation itself specifically 
identifies petitioners’ race.

As long ago as Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, a 
case involving a claim of discrimination in jury procedures, 
this Court stated the broad proposition that racial dis­
crimination in the administration of criminal laws violates 
the Fourteenth Amendment. The court said at 162 U.S. 
565, 591:



18

“ The guaranties of life, liberty, and property are for 
all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States 
or of any state, without discrimination against any 
because of their race. Those guaranties, when their 
violation is properly presented in the regular course 
of proceedings, must be enforced in the courts, both 
of the nation and of the state, without reference to 
considerations based upon race. In the administration 
of criminal justice no rule can be applied to one class 
which is not application to all other classes. (Emphasis 
supplied.)

This Court has repeatedly struck down statutes and 
ordinances which provided criminal penalties to enforce 
racial segregation. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60; 
Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879; Gayle v. Browder, 
352 U.S. 903, affirming 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956); 
State Athletic Commission v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533, affirm­
ing 168 F. Supp. 149 (E.D. La. 1958), were all cases in 
which criminal laws used to maintain segregation were 
invalidated. Cf. Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202. Likewise, 
in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, the Court nullified a 
criminal prosecution under a statute which was fair on 
its face but was being administered to effect a discrimina­
tion against a single ethnic group.

While it may be argued by the State that in this case 
the racial discrimination against petitioners is beyond the 
reach of the Fourteenth Amendment because it originated 
with the decision of a “private entrepreneur” to establish 
a “ white-only” lunch counter in deference to local customs 
and traditions, this is not dispositive of the case because 
it is racial discrimination by agents of the State of Loui­
siana, i.e., the police, which affords the primary basis for 
these prosecutions. It was the police officers acting as 
law enforcement representatives of the State who com­



19

manded petitioners to leave their seats at the lunch counter 
because petitioners were Negroes and the counter was 
maintained for white people. It was the police officers 
who arrested petitioners for failure to obey this command. 
It was the public prosecutor who charged petitioners with 
an offense, and it was the State’s judiciary that convicted 
and sentenced them. Thus, from the policeman’s order, 
the conviction and punishment, the State was engaged in 
enforcing racial segregation with all of its law enforce­
ment machinery.

This racial discrimination may fairly be said to be the 
product of state action within the reach of the Fourteenth 
Amendment which “ nullifies and makes void all State 
legislation, and State action of every kind, which impairs 
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United 
States, or which injures them in life, liberty or property 
without due process of law, or which denies to any of 
them the equal protection of the laws.” Civil Rights Cases, 
109 U.S. 3, 11. As stated by the Court in Cooper v. Aaron, 
358 U.S. 1, 17:

“ Thus the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment 
extend to all action of the State denying equal pro­
tection of the laws; whatever the agency of the State 
taking the action, . . . [citing cases] . . .  ; or whatever 
the guise in which it is taken, . . . [citing cases].”

Just as judicial enforcement of racially restrictive 
covenants was held to constitute state action in violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 
U.S. 1, and Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, so in this 
case judicial enforcement of a rule of racial segregation 
in privately owned lunch counters operated as business 
property opened up for use by the general public should 
likewise be condemned.



20

Unlike Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, and Boynton v.
Virginia, ------  U.S. ------ 5 L. ed. 2d 206, this is not a
“ trespass” prosecution involving a collision of property- 
rights and personal rights, for it was the police officer’s 
demand that petitioners leave their seats, based upon the 
officer’s determination that they violated the law by their 
very presence in the seats, that formed the basis for con­
viction.7

Here petitioners, as welcome customers in a business 
establishment open to the public, sought to obtain food 
service at a lunch counter set aside for white persons. 
They were prevented from pursuing their peaceful re­
quests for service by the intervention of the police officers 
bent upon enforcing racial segregation.

The police officer’s demand that petitioners leave their 
seats because of the racial segregation customs and the 
subsequent arrests based on this demand deprived peti­
tioners of the equal protection of the laws. A similar arrest 
was said to be an illegal deprivation of civil rights by 
police officers in Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co., 280 
F. 2d 531, 533, note 1 (5th Cir. 1960), quoting from the 
decision below sub nom. Boman v. Morgan (N.D. Ala. 
1959, C.A. No. 9255), 4 Eace Eelations Law Eeporter 1027, 
1031 (otherwise unreported):

“A  charge of ‘a breach of the peace’ is one of broad 
import and may cover many kinds of misconduct. 
However, the Court is of the opinion that the mere 
refusal to obey a request to move from the front to 
the rear of a bus, unaccompanied by other acts con­
stituting a breach of the peace, is not a breach of the

7 But even if the case is measured in terms of criminal trespass 
provisions like those in Marsh, supra, the language of the Court in 
that case is apt. See p. 23, infra, and cases cited at that point.



21

peace. In as far as the defendants, other than the 
Transit Company, are concerned, plaintiffs were in 
the exercise of rights secured to them by law.

“ Under the undisputed evidence, plaintiffs acted in 
a peaceful manner at all times and were in peaceful 
possession of the seats which they had taken on 
boarding the bus. Such being the case, the police 
officers were without legal right to direct where they 
should sit because of their color. The seating arrange­
ment was a matter between the Negroes and the 
Transit Company. It is evident that the arrests at 
the barn were based on the refusal of the plaintiffs 
to comply with the request to move since those who 
did move, though equally involved except as to 
compliance, were not arrested.

“Under the facts in this ease, the officers violated 
the civil rights of the plaintiffs in arresting and im­
prisoning them. Ordinance 1487-F, and their ‘willful’ 
refusal to move when directed to do so, did not 
authorize or justify their conduct.” (Emphasis sup­
plied.)

It is submitted that the use of the criminal laws of the 
states to enforce racial segregation and discrimination 
presents a grave challenge to the integrity of our system 
of criminal justice in the United States. Because, un­
fortunately, arrests and convictions based upon racial con­
siderations are not uncommon,8 it is all the more important 
that this Court should exercise continued vigilance in 
protecting civil rights in such cases. For this reason it 
is submitted that this ease presents a question of public 
importance which merits plenary review by this Court.

See II, infra.



22

D. The decision below conflicts with decisions of this 
Court securing the Fourteenth Amendment right to 
freedom of expression.

Petitioners were requesting service at public lunch 
counters in establishments where their trade was welcome, 
except that they were not permitted to sit at counters 
reserved for white persons— and for this, and this alone, 
they were arrested. Their presence at these counters ex­
pressed in Baton Rouge what thousands of other Negro 
students have been manifesting throughout the nation— 
dissatisfaction with being relegated to second class status 
in public establishments which accept on an equal basis 
their trade at all counters except lunch counters; there 
racial segregation prevails.

As the motion to quash in each of these three cases stated, 
“your defendants, each, in protest of the segregation laws 
of the State of Louisiana, did . . . ‘sit in’ a cafe counter 
seat reserved for members or persons of the White race, 
and for which activity your defendants, each, were 
arrested . . .” .

The liberty secured by the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment insofar as it protects free ex­
pression is hardly limited to verbal utterances. It covers 
picketing, Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88; free distribu­
tion of handbills, Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141; display 
of motion pictures, Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495; join­
ing of associations, N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449; 
the display of a flag or symbol, Stromberg v. California, 
283 U.S. 359. What has become known as a “ sit in” is a 
different but obviously well understood symbol, a meaning­
ful method of communication.

These “ sit ins” occurred in places entirely open to the 
public and to petitioners as well. That the premises were 
privately owned should not detract from the high constitu­



23

tional position which such free expression deserves. This 
is hardly a case involving, for example, expression of 
views in a private home or other restricted area private in 
nature. The establishment here, as in the other two peti­
tions presented today, were open to the public and the 
patronage of the public, including that of Negroes, was 
sought.

Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506, rejected argument 
that being present upon private property per se divests a 
person of the constitutional right of free expression:

Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. 
The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his 
property for use by the public in general, the more do 
his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and 
constitutional rights of those who use it. . . .

In that case, therefore, this Court held unconstitutional 
convictions of Jehovah’s Witnesses for trespass for prose­
lytizing on private property of a company town. See also, 
Republic Aviation Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 
324 U.S. 793, 801, note 6; National Labor Relations Board 
v. Babcock and Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112; United Steel­
workers v. National Labor Relations Board, 243 F. 2d 593, 
598 (D.C. Cir. 1956), rev. on other grounds, 357 U.S. 357; 
People v. Barisi, 193 Misc. 934, 86 N.T.S. 2d 277, 279 
(1948); Freeman v. Retail Clerks Union, 45 Lab. Bel. Ref. 
Man. 2334 (Wash. Super. Ct. 1959).

These decisions, of course, are manifestations of the 
fundamental view, stated in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 
126, that “when . . . one devotes his property to a use in 
which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to 
the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be 
controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent 
of the interest he has thus created. . .



24

Although in the case now at bar there was no evidence 
of anything remotely resembling breach of the peace, 
Cantwell v. Connecticut held in invalidating a conviction 
for inciting breach of the peace, “ obvious is it that a state 
may not unduly suppress free communication of views, 
religious or other, under the guise of conserving desirable 
conditions.” 310 U.S. 296, 308. “ Here,” Justice Roberts 
wrote, “we have a situation analogous to a conviction under 
a statute sweeping in a great variety of conduct under a 
general and indefinite characterization, and leaving to the 
executive and judicial branches too wide a discretion in its 
application.” Id. at 308. Therefore, “ . . .  in the absence of 
a statute narrowly drawn to define and punish specific 
conduct as constituting a clear and present danger to a 
substantial interest of the State, the petitioner’s communi­
cation, considered in the light of the constitutional 
guaranties, raised no such clear and present menace to 
public peace and order as to render him liable to conviction 
of the common law offense in question.” Id. at 311.

Indeed, in the Cantwell case there was evidence that 
defendants’ acts had provoked some hostility. That is not 
the situation in the instant case. But even if petitioners 
here had stirred unrest by their demonstration, this is 
precisely the type of expression that the freedom of speech 
guarantee of the Constitution is supposed to protect.

Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4, held that:

[A] function of free speech under our system of 
government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best 
serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of 
unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they 
are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often 
provocative and challenging. It may strike at 
prejudices and preconceptions and have profound un­



25

settling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. 
That is why freedom of speech, though not absolute, 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra (315 U.S. pp. 
571, 572, 86 L. ed 1034, 1035, 62 S. Ct. 766), is never­
theless protected against censorship or punishment, 
unless shown likely to produce a clear and present 
danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far 
above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.

As Justice Holmes wrote for a unanimous Court in 
Schenck v. United, States, 249 II.S. 47, 52:

The question in every case is whether the words 
used are used in such circumstances and are of such 
a nature as to create a clear and present danger that 
they will bring about the substantive evil that Congress 
has a right to prevent.

In the context of this record the State apparently asserts 
the power to prevent two evils, as it views them: (1)
disturbance of the peace—but the record offers no support 
for an inference that any such danger was present in any 
degree; (2) nonsegregation at lunch counters—but the 
State has no power to compel segregation. See Brown v. 
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483; State Athletic Commis­
sion v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533, affirming 168 F. Supp. 149 
(E.D. La. 1918). Therefore, having no valid interest to 
preserve, the State has no power to impose criminal 
penalties for the expression in which petitioners here en­
gaged.



26

II.
The Public Importance of the Issues Presented

A. This ease presents issues posed by numerous similar 
demonstrations throughout the nation which have resulted 
in widespread desegregation and also in many similar cases 
now pending in state and federal courts. Petitioners need 
not multiply citations to demonstrate that during the past 
year thousands of students throughout the nation have par­
ticipated in demonstrations like those for which petitioners 
have been convicted.

A  comprehensive description of these “ sit-in” protests 
appears in Pollitt, Dime Store Demonstration: Events and 
Legal Problems of the Fiyst Sixty Days, 1960 Duke Law 
Journal 315 (1960). These demonstrations have occurred 
in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia and 
elsewhere. Pollitt, supra, passim.

In a large number of places, this nationwide protest has 
prompted startling changes at lunch counters throughout 
the South, and service is now afforded in many establish­
ments on a nonsegregated basis. The Attorney General of 
the United States has announced the end of segregation at 
public lunch counters in 69 cities, New York Times, August 
11, 1960, page 14, col. 5 (late city edition), and since that 
announcement the number of such cities has risen above 
112, New York Times, Oct. 18, 1960, page 47, col. 5 (late 
city edition).

In many instances, however, these demonstrations, as in 
the case at bar, have resulted in arrests and criminal prose­
cutions which, in their various aspects, present as a funda­
mental issue questions posed here, that is, may the state 
use its power to compel racial segregation in private estab­



27

lishments which are open to the public and to stifle protests 
against such segregation. Such cases having been presented 
to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia,9 the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina,10 the Supreme Court of Arkan­
sas,11 the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas,12 13 the Court 
of Appeals of Alabama,18 the Court of Appeals of Mary­
land,14 several South Carolina appellate courts,15 and the 
Georgia Court of Appeals.16 * Numerous other cases are 
pending at the trial level.

It is, therefore, of widespread public importance that the 
Court consider the issues here presented so that the lower 
courts and the public may be guided authoritatively with

9 Raymond B. Randolph, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Va. (No. 5233, 
1960).

10 State of N. C. v. Fox and Sampson (No. 442, Supreme Court, 
Fall Term 1960).

11Chester Briggs, et al. v. State of Arkansas (No. 4992) (con­
solidated with Smith v. State of Ark., No. 4994, and Lupper v. 
State of Ark., No. 4997).

12 Briscoe v. State of Texas (Court of Crim. App., 1960, No. 
32347) and related cases (decided Dec. 14, I960; conviction re­
versed on ground that indictment charging in alternative invalid 
for vagueness).

13 Bessie Cole v. City of Montgomery (3rd Div. Case No, 57) 
(together with seven other cases, Case Nos. 58-64).

14 William L. Griffin, et al. v. State of Maryland, No. 248, Sep­
tember Term 1960 (two appeals in one record) ; see related civil 
action sub nom. Griffin, et al. v. Collins, et al., 187 F. Supp. 149 
(D.C. D.Md. 1960).

15 City of Charleston v. Mitchell, et al. (Court of Gen. Sess. for 
Charleston County) (appeal from Recorders Ct.) ; State v. Ran­
dolph, et al. (Court of Gen. Sess. for Sumter County) (appeal 
from Magistrates Ct.) ; City of Columbia v. Bouie, et al. (Court 
of Gen. Sess. for Richland County) (appeal from Recorders Ct.).

16 M. L. King, Jr. v. State of Georgia (two appeals: No. 38648
and No. 38718).



28

respect to the constitutional limitations on state prosecu­
tions for engaging in this type of protest.

B. The holding below, if allowed to stand, will in effect 
undermine numerous decisions of this Court striking down 
state enforced racial discrimination. For example, the dis­
crimination on buses interdicted by the Constitution in 
Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903, aff’g 142 F. Supp. 707, 
could be revived by convictions for disturbing the peace. 
In the same manner, state enforced prohibitions against 
members of the white and colored races participating in the 
same athletic contests, outlawed in Dorsey v. State Athletic 
Commission, 168 F. Supp. 149, aff’d 359 U.S. 533, could be 
accomplished. Indeed, segregation of schools, forbidden by 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, and innumer­
able cases decided since that time, especially those affecting 
Louisiana, e.g., Orleans Parish School Board v. Bush, 242 
F. 2d 156 (5th Cir. 1957), cert, denied 354 U.S. 921, might 
also be accomplished by prosecutions for disturbing the 
peace even though no disturbances in fact occurred.

The holding below, if allowed to stand, would be com­
pletely subversive of the numerous decisions throughout 
the federal judiciary outlawing state enforced racial dis­
tinctions. Indeed, the segregation here is perhaps more 
invidious than that accomplished by other means for it is 
not only based upon a vague statute which is enforced by 
the police according to their personal notions of what 
constitutes a violation and then sanctioned by state courts 
but it suppresses freedom of expression as well.



29

CONCLUSION

Wherefore, for the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully 
submitted that the petition for writ of certiorari should be 
granted.

A. P. T ureaud

1821 Orleans Avenue 
New Orleans, Louisiana

J o h n n ie  A. J ones

Baton Rouge, Louisiana

T htjrgood M arshall  
J ack  Greenberg

10 Columbus Circle 
New York 19, New York

Attorneys for Petitioners

W illiam  C olem an , J r. 
L ouis H . P ollak  
E lwood H. C hisolm  
J ames M. N abrit, III 

Of Counsel



38