Defendant-Intervenors' Reply to States Motion and Incorporated Memorandum to Dismiss

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 

CLEMENT F. PERSCHALL, JR., 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

THE STATE OF LOUISIANA, 

Defendant, 

and 

RONALD cHISOM, et al., 

Defendant-Intervenors. 

Civil Action No. 95-1265 

SECTION "A" 

MAGISTRATE: (1) 

DEFENDANT-INTERVENORS' REPLY TO STATE'S MOTION AND INCORPORATED 
MEMORANDUM TO DISMISS 

Defendant-intervenors, Ronald Chisom, et al., by their undersigned counsel, file this 

reply to the motion to dismiss filed by the State of Louisiana. The defendant-intervenors agree 

with the views expressed in the State's Motion and Incorporated Memorandum to Dismiss. As 

stated in the State's Motion and Incorporated Memorandum, Plaintiff sought only a declaration 

that La. Acts 1992, No. 512 ("Act 512") was unconstitutional. On July 1, 1997, the Louisiana 

Supreme Court issued a ruling granting the relief sought by plaintiff. This ruling renders moot 

the issue of whether this Court should make a similar declaration. Furthermore, because of 

the Louisiana Supreme Court's ruling, plaintiff no longer has a cognizable "injury" sufficient to 

invoke this Court's jurisdiction. 



Defendant State of Louisiana's Motion To Dismiss Should Be Granted  

Plaintiff's action should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure for the Court now lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(1). The requirements of mootness and standing must be satisfied by any and every 

federal action. Article III of the United States Constitution requires nothing less. Article III 

"limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to 'Cases' and 'Controversies' . .. ." Lujan v. Defenders 

of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992). In this case, given the Louisiana Supreme Court's ruling, 

plaintiff's action can no longer satisfy these threshold requirements. Therefore, dismissal 

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules is appropriate. 

A. Plaintiff's Action is Moot 

Any legal action "must remain alive throughout the course of litigation, to the moment 

of final appellate disposition." Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Edward H. Cooper, 

Federal Practice and Procedure, § 3533.2 (1984). If the matter no longer involves a live case or 

controversy, then the matter is quite simply moot and there is no need for any further action 

by a federal court. "[The definitive mootness of a case or controversy . . . ousts the jurisdiction 

of the federal courts and requires dismissal of the case." Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 

445 U.S. 326, 332-333 (1980); see Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982)(the issue must be 

"live" for mootness not to be found); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969) (case is 

moot when "the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome"); see also In re Tucson 

Estates, Inc., 912 F.2d 1162, 1170 (9th Cir. 1990) (cross-appeal taken by officers of bankrupt 

corporation became moot when state appellate court vacated underlying judgment, which was 

the basis for officers' cross-appeal concerning interpretation of bankruptcy court's stay of 

execution of judgment). The granting of the relief sought by a party in one court renders moot 

any remaining actions seeking the same relief. See James v. Singletaty, 995 F.2d 187, 188 (11th 

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Cir. 1993)(party received relief in another tribunal); Simpson v. Camper, 974 F.2d 1030, 1031 

(8th Cir. 1992)(federal action moot when party receives in a state court proceeding "precisely 

the relief that petitioner has been seeking in . . . federal proceeding"). Plaintiff's action must 

now be considered moot. 

All the relief sought by the plaintiff has been granted. Both the Petition for Declaratory 

Judgment and the First Supplemental and Amending Petition filed by the Plaintiff sought only 

a declaration that Act 512 was unconstitutional. See Motion And Incorporated Memorandum 

To Dismiss at 1-2 and Exhibits 1 and 2. The Louisiana Supreme Court has issued a ruling 

granting plaintiff this relief. See id. at Exhibit 3. Since the plaintiff has already been afforded 

complete relief, the action should be dismissed as moot. 

B. Plaintiff Lacks Standing To Maintain This Action 

Stated another way, having received the relief sought, plaintiff's action not only becomes 

moot, but plaintiff now no longer has standing to pursue the action. "[T]he core component 

of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of 

Article III." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. To have standing, a three-prong test must be satisfied. 

"First, the plaintiff must have suffered an 'injury in fact' -- an invasion of a legally protected 

interest." Id. The "injury in fact" must be both "(a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual 

or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Id. Second, there must be a causal connection 

between the injury and the defendant's action. Id. "Third, it must be 'likely,' as opposed to 

merely 'speculative,' that the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision." Id. at 561 

(quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 43 (1976)). Plaintiff cannot 

satisfy this standard. 

Plaintiff Perschall does not have standing to pursue this action any further. When the 

Louisiana Supreme Court ruled in plaintiff's favor and declared Act 512 unconstitutional, 

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plaintiff lost any claim to having an injury upon which standing could be based. See Powder 

River Basin Resource Council v. Babbitt, 54 F.3d 1477, 1485 (10th Cir. 1995)(plaintiffs action, 

based on the refusal of the state to reimburse plaintiff for its attorney's fees, "lost the injury on 

which its standing was originally based" when the Wyoming Supreme Court ordered the state 

to pay for the attorney's fees incurred by plaintiff). Thus, plaintiff lacks standing and this 

action should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 

Conclusion  

For the reasons stated above and addressed in the State of Louisiana's Motion And 

Incorporated Memorandum To Dismiss, this Court should dismiss this action pursuant to Rule 

12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Ronald L. Wilson 
837 Gravier Street 
New Orleans, LA 70113 

Elaine R. Jones 
Director-Counsel 

Norman J. Chachkin 
Charles Stephen Ralston 
Victor A. Bolden 
Jacqueline A. Berrien 
NAACP Legal Defense & Educational 
Fund, Inc. 

99 Hudson Street, Suite 1600 
New York, New York 10013 
(212) 219-1900 

William P. Quigley 
(Bar No. 7769) 
Loyola University School of Law 
7214 St. Charles Avenue 
New Orleans, LA 70118 
(504) 861-5590 

Walter Willard 
1100 Poydras 
Suite 2150 
New Orleans, LA 70112 
(504) 568-0541 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing Plaintiff's DEFENDANT-INTERVENORS' 

REPLY TO MOTION AND INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM TO DISMISS, have been 

served by depositing same in the United States mail, first class postage prepaid, on this 

November 3, 1997, addressed to the following: 

Clement F. Perschall, Jr., Esq. 
One Galleria Boulevard 
Galleria One, Suite 1107 
Metarie, Louisiana 70001 
Telephone: (504) 836-5975 

Richard P. Ieyoub 
Attorney General, State of Louisiana 
State Capitol 
P.O. Box 94005 
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804-9005 

Robert McDuff, Esq. 
767 N. Congress Street 
Jackson, Mississippi 39202 
Telephone: (601) 969-0802 

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Peter Butler (Bar# 3731)-T.A. 
Peter J. Butler, Jr. (Bar# 18522) 
Richard G. Passler (Bar# 21006) 
LL&E Tower, Suite 2400 
909 Poydras Street 
New Orleans, Louisiana 70112 
Telephone: (504) 584-5454 

Tyron D. Picard (Bar# 20473) 
Mark Stipe (Bar# 19803) 
Petroleum Tower, Suite 330 
3639 Ambassador Caffrey Parkway 
Lafayette, Louisiana 70503 
Telephone: (318) 983-0090 

Jacqueline Carr 
L.C.I.W.- Post Office Box 26 
St. Gabriel, Louisiana 70776 

WILLIAM P. QUIGLEY