Lee v. Macon County Board of Education Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees

    IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 73-3088

ANTHONY T. LEE, et al., MRS.
JAMES O'NEAL,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.

MACON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, 
et al., RANDOLPH COUNTY BOARD OF 
EDUCATION,

Defendants-Appellees.

On Appeal From The United States District Court 
For the Middle District Of Alabama 

Eastern Division

BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS

JACK GREENBERG 
CHARLES STEPHEN RALSTON 
CHARLES E. WILLIAMS, III 

10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019

DEMETRIUS C. NEWTON
408 North 17th Street 
Birmingham, Alabama 35203

Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants



■J
IN THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 73-3088

ANTHONY T. LEE, et al., MRS.
JAMES O'NEAL,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v .

MACON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, 
et al., RANDOLPH COUNTY BOARD OF 
EDUCATION,

Defendants-Appellees.

On Appeal From The United States District Court 
For the Middle District of Alabama 

Eastern Division

CERTIFICATE

- ir The undersigned counsel of record for plaintiffs-appellants, 
Mrs. James O'Neal, et al., certifies that the following listed 
parties have an interest in the outcome of this case. These 
representations are made in order that judges of this Court 
may evaluate possible disqualification or recusal pursuant to 
Local Rule 13(a).

1. Mrs. Inez Knight, Lillie Mae Knight and Rose Ella 
Knight as plaintiffs-appellants,



and

as

f̂̂ LQ i t L be * -<  * £ }  '* Q  jL lk .

2 . The Randolph County Board of Educatioo)and its members
defendants-appellees.

Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants

2



INDEX

Pa^e

Statement of Issue Presented for R e v i e w ...........  111
Statement of the C a s e ...............................  1
Statement of Facts ................................  4
ARGUMENT:

Introduction.....................    12
I. The Procedure by Which the Decision Was 

Made to Permanently Expel Lillie Mae 
Knight and Rose Ella Knight Did Not 
Comply With the Requirements of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.....................    14

C o n c l u s i o n .....................    21

1



TABLE OF CASES

Page

Black Students v. Williams, 335 F. Supp. 820 aff'd
470 F .2d 957 (5th Cir. 1972) ....................... 14

Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education,
294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961) ....................... 13, 14

Gagnon v. Scarpelli, ___  U.S. ___ , 41 U.S.L.W.
4647 (May 14, 1973) ................................  17

Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 2 54 (1970) .............  17
Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959) ...............  15
Griffin v. School Bd. of Prince Edward County,

377 U.S. 218 (1964) ................................  14
Joint Anti-Fascist Refuge Committee v. McGrath,

341 U.S. 123 (1951) ................................  15
Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., C.A. No. 847-E,

M .D . Ala..... .................... ......... ....... . . 1
Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866

(D.D.C. 1972) .......................................  14, 15
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) ............ 17
Paine v. Board of Regents of the University 

of Texas, 355 F. Supp. 199 (W.D. Tex. 1972) 
aff’d , 474 F .2d 1397 (5th Cir. 1973) ..............  18

San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriquez,
___ U.S. ____ , 41 U.S.L.W. 4407 (March 21, 1973) ... 14

Williams v. Dade County School Board, 441 F.2d .....  14
299 (5th Cir. 1971)

li



STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether the district court erred in refusing to order 

the defendant school officials to return certain black students 

to school and in upholding their permanent expulsion from 

public education?

iii



IN THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 73-3088

ANTHONY T. LEE, et al., MRS. 
JAMES O'NEAL,

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v.

MACON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, 
et al., RANDOLPH COUNTY BOARD OF 
EDUCATION,

Defendants-Appellees.

On Appeal From The United States District Court 
For the Middle District Of Alabama 

Eastern Division

BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS

Statement of the Case

This appeal brings to this Court for review the dismissal 

of a Motion for Emergency Relief filed on February 7, 1973, by 

black high school students from Randolph County, Alabama in the 

statewide school desegregation case, Lee v. Macon County Bd. of

Educ., C.A. No. 847-E, M.D. Ala. The motion prayed that three



black students, who were suspended or permanently expelled, 

without being afforded hearings, be reinstated in Randolph County 

High School and that defendant Board of Education be required 

to establish and enforce a program by which the participation 

of black students in extra-curricular activities of the high 

school would be increased to reflect the percentage of blacks 

in the student body (A. 4).

Subsequent to the filing of the Motion for Emergency Relief, 

counsel for plaintiffs and counsel for defendants, with the 

advice and consent of the district court, agreed to have a hearing 

of the issues raised by the motion before defendant Randolph 

County Board of Education (A. 112). Defendant Board of Education, 

after a hearing held on March 8, 1973, confirmed the suspension 

of one of the three black students and the permanent expulsion 

of the other two (A. Ill). In addition, defendant Board of Ed­

ucation. failed to establish a program for increased participation 

by black students in extra-curricular activities.

By a stipulation dated July 9, 1973, the parties agreed 

that the papers previously filed plus the transcript of the 

March 8, 1973 meeting, would be the only evidence submitted to 

the district court and that a final judgment could be entered 

without any further notice to the parties. The stipulation was 

approved by the district court on July 17, 1973 (A. 111-112).

2



On July 20, 1973, the district court, Varner, J., issued 

its order. The court held that the suspended student and the 

two students who had been permanently expelled had not been 

denied due process of the law. In addition, the court found 

that the evidence submitted established that the two students 

permanently expelled had been guilty of conduct which included 

fighting, being indignant, yelling at an instructor, failing 

to cooperate with school officials, being disorderly, cursing 

and striking an instructor. In addition, based on these findings. 

Judge Varner held that although permanent expulsion was a "harsh" 

penalty, under the circumstances it was not unreasonable.

Finally, the court found that there was insufficient evidence 

to prove plaintiffs allegations of racial discrimination in 

extra-curricular activities at Randolph County High School 
(A. 113).

The district court ordered that the Motion for Emergency
0

Relief was dismissed with prejudice and that costs incurred 

were taxed against plaintiffs (A. 118).

The Notice of Appeal, Bond for Costs on Appeal and 

Designation of Record on Appeal were filed in the district court 

on August 14, 1973 (A. 119-122).

As of the date hereof the student suspended has returned 

to school while the two students permanently expelled are still 

not receiving an education. This appeal is limited to the two 

students who have been permanently expelled from Randolph County
3



High School.

Statement of Facts

On February 2, 1973, Mrs. Inez Knight, the mother of Lillie 

Mae Knight, a seventeen-year-old eleventh grader at Randolph 

County High School, and Rose Ella Knight, a fourteen-year-old 

ninth grader at Randolph County High School,was informed that 

her two children wanted her to come to school (A. 72-73).

Upon Mrs. Knight's arrival at the school Mr. Hulond Humphries, 

principal of Randolph County High School, brought her two 

daughters to her and informed Mrs. Knight that she should take 

them home because they refused to cooperate with him (A. 73).

Mr. Humphries did not inform Mrs. Knight or her daughters of 

what specific charges, if any, were being brought against Lillie 

Mae and Rose Ella, or of what procedures would be followed in the 

future to determine whether they would be allowed to return to 

school (A. 60).
Subsequent to sending Lillie Mae and Rose Ella Knight home, 

Mr. Humphries sent two letters dated February 2, 1973, to the 

Randolph County Board of Education requesting that Lillie Mae 

Knight and Rose Ella Knight be permanently expelled from Randolph 

County High School (A. 43-46). However, neither Mrs. Knight nor 

her children were informed of these letters.

4



In the letter referring to Lillie Mae Knight, Mr. Humphries 
alleged the following: (1) That she had been involved in a
fight on January 11, 1973; (2) that he had imposed as punishment
a requirement that she write a six-page report entitled "Ways to 
Solve Problems Without Fighting," which was due on January 16, 1973 
and that he had had a conference with Mrs. Knight at the time the 
punishment was imposed (A. 43); (3) that Lillie Mae Knight did not
turn in the report on the date set and when he discussed this with 
her on January 22, 1973, she became "very indignant." Therefore, 
Mr. Humphries sent her home for three days or until she wrote the 
report (A. 43) and Lillie Mae Knight returned to school on January 
26, 1973 (A. 43); (4) that on February 2, 1973, Lillie Mae Knight
advised her sister that she did not have to obey an order from 
a teacher and when the teacher involved attempted to discuss this 
with Lillie Mae she yelled at him and told him not to touch her 
(A. 42-43). The letter concluded with a statement that because 
Mrs. Knight had failed to help in solving the problem and Lillie 
Mae had refused to cooperate he was asking that she be dismissed 
from school (A. 44).

The letter referring to Rose Ella Knight alleged the following 
(1) That on November 28, 1972, Rose Ella received five licks for 
refusing to allow a male teacher paddle her (A. 45); (2) that on
December 1, 1972, she received five licks for misconduct in the 
school library (A. 45); (3) that on January 11, 1973, she received

5



three licks, was ordered to apologize at a school assembly 
and placed on probation for the remainder of the school year 
for allegedly fighting, cursing and hitting a teacher (A. 45);
(4) that rather than apologizing as ordered, Rose Ella Knight 
protested her innocence and Mr. Humphries, ignoring her protest, 
threatened to send her home unless she apologized (A. 45);
(5) that on January 25, 1973, Rose Ella Knight got into a yelling 
match with another student (A. 45); (6) that on February 1, 1973, 
Rose Ella was brought to the office by a teacher for refusing to 
obey an order and refusing to take punishment. She turned in her 
books but returned to school on February 2, 1973, and at that 
time Mr. Humphries sent her home with her mother (A. 44-45).
The letter concluded with a statement that Mr. Humphries had 
three unsatisfactory conferences with Mrs. Knight and that he 
was asking for the dismissal of Rose Ella because she had been 
uncooperative (A. 46) .

Mrs. Knight, having received no information concerning when 
her two children would be allowed to return to school, filed 
the Motion for Emergency Relief on February 8, 1973. The 
motion alleged denial of due process of law and prayed that 
the court reinstate her two children in Randolph County High 
School (A. 4). Subsequent to the filing of the motion counsel 
for plaintiffs and counsel for defendants, with the advice 
and consent of the district court, agreed to have a hearing 
before defendant Randolph County Board of Education. This 
hearing was held on March 8, 1973 (A. Ill).

6



At the hearing, Mr. R. D. Simpson, Superintendent of 

the Randolph County High School, read into the record the two 

letters that were written by the principal of Randolph County 

High School (A. 42-46). On cross-examination Mr. Simpson admitted 

that other than the letters from the principal he had no personal 

knowledge of any disciplinary problems involving the two girls 

(A. 50). Further, Mr. Simpson stated that once a student is 

permanently expelled from the Randolph County Public School 

System no arrangements are made for the student to receive any 

form of education (A. 49). Therefore, if the Board of Education 

granted the principal's request that Lillie Mae and Rose Ella 

Knight be permanently expelled from school their public education 

would come to an end.

The only evidence presented against Lillie Mae Knight and 

Rose Ella Knight at the hearing were the letters read into the 

record by Mr. Simpson, who admitted he had no knowledge of the 

events described therein, and the testimony of Mr. Huland 

Humphries, the principal of Randolph County High School who 

wrote the letters. Mr. Humphries, however, admitted at the 

beginning of his testimony that he had no personal knowledge 

of the incidents of misconduct (A. 51). He did state that his 

letters were based on investigations he conducted, however, Mr. 

Humphries failed to describe these investigations or offer any 

statements by teachers or other proof to support his conclusions 

as to what in fact occurred (a . 51). Therefore, the only

7



evidence presented against Lillie Mae Knight and Rose Ella 
Knight at the hearing to determine whether the harsh penalty 
of permanent expulsion from public school would be imposed was 
the unsupported hearsay testimony of the principal of Randolph 
County High School.

Mr. Humphries stated that he decided to request the permanent 
expulsion of Lillie Mae Knight and Rose Ella Knight because the 
girls refused to take punishment claiming that they were 
innocent of the charges against them. He further stated that 
he interpreted this refusal to accept punishment as a failure 
to cooperate (A. 55-57).

After the hearsay testimony of Mr. Humphries, Lillie Mae 
Knight, Rose Ella Knight and Mrs. Inez Knight, unlike their 
accusers, testified in their own behalf and subjected themselves 
to cross-examination by defendants' attorney (A. 57-77).

Lillie Mae Knight testified that the fighting incident 
of January 11, 1973, occurred when she was attempting to 
defend herself from an attack by another girl (A. 62); that 
she had prepared the report assigned to her as punishement 
but it was found to be unacceptable (A. 62-63); and that she had 
intended to rewrite it but was dismissed from school before she had 
the opportunity (A. 63). In addition, Lillie Mae testified that on

8



the day she was dismissed from school she was not advising 

her younger sister to disobey the teachers1 orders, but was 

merely informing Rose Ella that their mother was coming to 

school to attempt to solve the problem and Rose Ella should 

wait for her arrival (A. 58-59). Finally, Lillie Mae Knight 

testified that she walked away from the teacher because she only 

had a limited time to get to her next class, not as was alleged, 

to defy the teacher's authority (A. 59-60).

Rose Ella Knight testified about the circumstances 

sourrounding the incidents of conduct alleged in Mr.

Humphries' letter (A. 63-69). She stated that the striking 

of the teacher was accidental and when she apologized the teacher 

stated that he knew she didn't mean it (A. 67-68). In addition, 

Rose Ella testified that she had written an original and four 

modifications of the paper that had been assigned as punishment 

for fighting, but each time Mr. Humphries rejected it, even 

after one of the teachers had found it to be satisfactory (A. 68). 

Generally Rose Ella Knight's testimony was that she did not 

believe that her conduct was of a nature to justify the punishment 

she had received (A. 63-69).
Mrs. Inez Knight testified that it was her opinion that prior 

to the dismissal of her two daughters, Mr. Humphries had been 

harassing them because two - members of their family had been 

charged with murder (A. 71). She stated that she tried to explain 

to the principal that her younger child was having great

9



difficult coping with this situation and asked for some special 
consideration in dealing with her, but Mr. Humphries would not 
listen (A. 71-72). She also indicated that she had told Rose
Ella not to take anymore paddlings because she believed that it

*
was improper to have her fourteen—year-old daughter paddled 
by a male teacher or administrator (A. 72-73) .

The members of defendant Randolph County Board of Education 
did not file an opinion for the record, but they did confirm 
the permanent expulsion of Lillie Mae Knight and Rose Ella 

Knight (A. Ill) .
By a stipulation dated July 9, 1973, the parties agreed 

that absent a request from the court, the papers previously 
filed plus the transcript of the March 8, 1973 hearing would be 
the only evidence submitted to the district court and that a 
final judgment could be entered without any further notice to 
the parties. The stipulation was approved by the district court 
on July 17, 1973 (A. 111-112).

The district court, Varner, J., issued its order on 
July 20, 1973. Even though all of the evidence presented against 
Lille Mae and Rose Ella Knight was hearsay, the girls 
never had an opportunity to confront and cross-examine their 
accusers and no opinion was filed by the Board of Education; 
the court held that they had not been denied due process of law. 
In addition the court found that the hearsay evidence submitted

10



established that Lillie Mae Knight and Rose Ella Knight 
had been guilty of conduct which included fighting, being 
indignant, yelling at an instructor, failing to cooperate 
with school officials, being disorderly, cursing and 
striking an instructor. The court held, based on these 
findings, that although permanent expulsion was a "harsh" 
penalty, it was not unreasonable (A. 113).

The district court ordered that the Motion for Emergency 
Relief was dismissed with prejudice and that costs incurred 
be taxed against plaintiffs.

The Notice of Appeal, Bond for Costs on Appeal and 
Designation of Record on Appeal were filed in the district 
court on August 14, 1973 (A. 118).

As of the date hereof Lillie Mae Knight and Rose Ella 
Knight are still not receiving an education.

11



ARGUMENT

Introduction

The central issue in this appeal is the constitutionality 
of the permanent expulsion of two black students from the 
schools of Randolph County Alabama. As shown by the statement 
of facts, the effect of that expulsion has been to permanently 
deny them the right to all public education.

Appellants do not argue that school officials cannot 
impose proper discipline on students for misconduct or 
that they cannot otherwise control disruptive activity in 
a school so as to be able to carry on its program of education. 
We do urge, however, that it is settled law that before a 
school system can expose students to the severe punishment 
of permanent expulsion from school they must conduct hearings 
which conform to the "rudiments of an adversarial system" 
which requires, as a minimum, that there be some opportunity 
for the student to confront his or her accusers and that a 
decision as momentous as the determination that a student 
will no longer be allowed to receive a free public education
cannot be based solely on hearsay testimony. If this basic

(

12



requirement of due process'is not met the effect is 
that a proceeding which should be a hearing in the nature 
of an adversarial proceeding is transformed into a rubber 
stamp for a predetermined verdict of guilt with the severe 
penalty of permanent expulsion as punishment.

In addition, appellants urge that there are constitutional
limitations on the kind and severity of punishment that
can be meted out by school officials. As this Court held
in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education. 294 F.2d
150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961):

"Turning then to the nature of the . . . power 
to expel . . ., it must be conceded . . . that 
that power is not unlimited and cannot be 
arbitrarily exercised. Admittedly, there must 
be some reasonable and constitutional ground 
for expulsion . . . "

Appellants urge that where there has been an absolute denial 
of education the procedures followed at the hearing at which 
that penalty is imposed must meet the highest standards of

13



fairness and the reasons for the imposition of that harsh penalty 
are subject to strict scrutiny to determine whether they are 
reasonable. Students who have been permanently expelled are 
denied the right to an education that is available to all 
other students. This total denial, unlike mere inequities in 
the quality of education, violates equal protection unless it 
serves a compelling state interest that cannot be fulfilled 
by less drastic means. Cf. San Antonio Independent School
Dist. v. Rodriquez, ___ U.S. ___ , 41 U.S.L.W. 4407, 4418
(March 21, 1973); Griffin v. School Bd. of Prince Edward County. 
377 U.S. 218 (1964); Mills v. Board of Education. 348 F. Supp.
866 (D.D.C. 1972).

I.
THE PROCEDURES BY WHICH THE DECISION WAS 
MADE TO PERMANENTLY EXPEL LILLIE MAE KNIGHT 
AND ROSE ELLA KNIGHT DID NOT COMPLY WITH 
THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE 
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.

It is well established that when the government takes 
action that injures an individual, it must conform to basic 
requirements of due process. This principle has been applied 
in many instances, including the suspension or expulsion of 
students in public schools. See Dixon v. Alabama State Board 
of Education, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961); Williams v. Dade 
County School Board, 441 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1971); Black Students

14



v. Williams, 335 F. Supp. 820 aff'd 470 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1972).
See also, e.g., Green v. McElrov. 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Joint 
Anti-Fascist Refuge Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
While the specific requirements of due process may be flexibly 
applied to school disciplinary procedures, certain basic require­
ments must be satisfied.

Generally, the procedures must be such so as to produce an 
informed decision not only as to whether the students committed 
the offense charged, but also whether the offense justified 
the particular discipline imposed. Appellants contend that the 
procedures adopted by the school board below did not meet these 
requirements.

The main deficiences in the proceedings were that the 
school board relied solely on hearsay testimony and that the 
burden was placed on the students to demonstrate why they should 
be allowed to return to school rather than the burden being on 
the school authorities to justify the imposition of the severe 
penalty of permanent expulsion. C f . Mills v. Board of Education,
348 F. Supp. 966, 881 (D.D.C. 1972).

The principal presented the only testimony against Lillie
i

Mae Knight and Rose Ella Knight and he admitted that he had no 
personal knowledge of the alleged incidents of misconduct. The prin­
cipal stated that his conclusions were based on investigations, but nc 
description of the investigation was given. The teachers who made the

- 15 -



charges were not present, did not testify, nor were they 
available for cross-examination. Thus, although Lillie Mae 
and Rose Ella Knight were represented by counsel, and their 
counsel was allowed to cross-examine the principal, the right 
of confrontation and cross-examination was merely illusory.

The total absence of opportunity to cross-examine the 
students' accusers, and thereby clarify the circumstances 
surrounding the alleged incidents of misconduct, made it 
necessary for the girls to provide explanations for their 
conduct, refute the charges made, and justify their return 
to school. If they did not, the hearsay testimony of the 
principal would have been accepted as true and their permanent 
expulsion would have been automatic. Since the testimony of 
the principal would have been accepted as true absent contra­
diction by the students, the effect was that the burden of 
proof was on Lillie Mae Knight and Rose Ella Knight to establish 
that they should be readmitted to school rather than on the school 
authorities to justify their contention that the two girls should 
be permanently expelled, j

Further, the proceedings were deficient in that they did 
not address themselves to the second issue before the school 
board; that is, assuming the students did commit the acts they 
were accused of was the harsh and irrevocable punishment of 
barring fourteen and seventeen-year-old high school students 
from receiving any future education reasonable and proper.

16



As was stated in the introduction hereto, in making the 
determination of whether the punishment imposed was reasonable, 
the fact that the school board was not imposing a one week, 
one month or one year suspension from school but, instead, 
was sanctioning the permanent denial of a public education 
is of the utmost importance and requires that those who would 
impose such a penalty meet the highest possible standard of 
fairness and satisfy the most rigid procedural requirements 
possible.

We urge that recent decisions of the Supreme Court that 
establish procedural requirements in the area of probation and 
parole revocation are directly applicable and should govern.
In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the court explicitly 
held that a parole revocation hearing had to address itself 
not only to "any contended relevant facts" but also as to 
"whether the facts as determined warrant revocation." 408 U.S. 
at 488. Moreover, a person faced with revocation must be given 
an opportunity to show why the violation did not warrant revo­
cation. Ibid. Further, the parole board must not only make 
findings of fact, but must specify the "reasons for revoking
parole." I<3. at 489. See also, Gagnon v. Scarpelli, ___  U.S.
___, 41 U.S.L.W. 4647 (May 14, 1973), imposing the same require­
ments in probation revocation proceedings. Morrissey, of course, 
relied heavily on Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), which 
applied similar requirements to determine whether to terminate 
welfare benefits.

17



In view of the great importance of education in our society 
it seems self-evident that a student faced with permanent 
expulsion from public school and the consequent termination

• iof education at a level which is considered less than the 
minimum for social and economic success is entitled to no less

1/than criminals facing re-incarceration.
The principal of Randolph High School stated both in his letters 

requesting the permanent expulsion of Lillie Mae Knight and Rose 
Ella Knight (A. 44, 46) and in his testimony at the hearing 
(A. 52) that his decision to request that penalty was not based 
solely on the alleged incidents of misconduct involving the two girls 
but also on the fact that he failed to get cooperation from 
them and their mother in solving what he viewed as a substantial 
disciplinary problem. Therefore, the actions and statements 
of Mrs. Knight and her two daughters that the principal 
interpreted as being examples of lack of cooperation were 
important factors in his decision to see the punishment 
imposed.

Mrs. Knight explained to the members of the Board of 
Education that the conduct that the principal interpreted as a

1/ Just as a person faced with being returned to prison or 
with being deprived of the necessities of life, a student has 
"an interest of extremely great value" that must be protected. 
Paine v. Board of Regents of the University of Texas, 355 F. 
Supp. 199 (W.D. Tex. 1972) aff'd, 474 F.2d 1397 (5th Cir. 1973)

IB



refusal to cooperate was in fact an attempt on her part to 
explain to him the great strain that she and her two children 
were under because of the murder charges against her brothers 
and an attempt to work out a procedure for handling any future 
disciplinary problems that might arise which would take the 
problems her daughters were experiencing at home into consideration 
(A. 70-73). This testimony clearly refutes the principal's 
claim that Mrs. Knight and her children were uncooperative. 
However, the Board of Education failed to discuss the issue of 
whether in view of the facts presented at the hearing the 
school authorities had established that the permanent expulsion 
of Lillie Mae and Rose Ella Knight was a reasonable and proper 
punishment.

Since the Board of Education did not file an opinion
setting forth how the decision supporting permanent expulsion
was arrived at it cannot be determined whether this issue was
ever considered off the record, however, even if it was, the
very failure to explain why a lesser sanction was not chosen
was in and of itself a denial of due process of law. Therefore,
whether the Board failed to consider the issue or just failed
to report the reasons for its decision, its actions amounted to

2/-
a denial of due process of law.

2/ The denial of due process of law makes it unnecessary 
for this Court to reach the ultimate question of whether the 
imposition of the penalty of permanent expulsion was unreasonable 
in this case, however, if such a determination was necessary 
it would be appellants' contention that it is clear on the record 
that it was and the district court's holding to the contrary 
was error.

19



Appellants are aware, of course, that in administrative 
proceedings such as a school disciplinary hearing, due process 
requirements cannot be imposed too rigidly. However, where, 
as in the instant case, the harsh penalty of termination of a 
student's education is involved, the highest possible standards 
of fairness must be adhered to. Therefore, the total reliance 
on hearsay, the shifting of the burden of proof from the school 
authorities to the students and the failure to either consider 
or properly report the consideration of the issue of whether 
the penalty imposed was reasonable, both singularly and in 
conjunction, amounted to a denial of due process of law and 
the District Court's holding to the contrary was erroneous.

20



CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the District 
Court to the extent it affects Mr. Inez Knight and her 
daughters Lillie Mae Knight and Rose Ella Knight should be
reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

JACK GREENBERG 
CHARLES STEPHEN RALSTON 
CHARLES E» WILLIAMS, III 

10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019

DEMETRIUS C. NEWTON 
408 North 17th Street 
Birmingham, Alabama 35203

Attorneys for Plaintiffs- 
Appe Hants

21



CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that on the 5th day of October,
1973, copies of the Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants were
served upon counsel for appellees via United States mail,
air mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:

JohnS. Casey, Esq.
P. 0. Box 266 
Heflin, Alabama 36264

* * frc*
Attorney for Plaintiffs- 
Appe Hants