Pearson v. National Budgeting Systems, Inc. Respondents' Brief and Appendix

    To be argued by
P h ilip  G. S chrag, Esq.

New York County Clerk’s Index No. 2721— Year 1968

iuuu fork # u|iituuv (tart
A ppellate D ivision— F irst D epartment

W illie  P earson and G eraldine P earson,

Plaintiff s-Respondents,
— against—

N ational B udgeting S ystems, I n c ., 
a corp ora tion ,

D efendant-A ppellant.

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF AND APPENDIX

J ack  Greenberg 
P h il ip  G. S chrag

Attorneys for Plaintiff s-Respondents

10 Columbus Circle 
Suite 2030
New York, New York 10019 
JU 6-8397



TABLE OF CONTENTS

BRIEF PAGE

The Nature of the Case 1

The facts 2

Argument
I. The Conduct Charged is Tortious 3

A. Under case law as well as U.C.C. §2-302,
gross overpricing of consumer goods is 
unconscionable conduct 3

B. Under the circumstances charged in the 
complaint, unconscionable overpricing
is tortious 7

II. A Finance Company Which as a Regular Business 
Practice Purchases Unconscionable Contracts,
With Knowledge or Notice of the Wrong Being 
Perpetrated, Should Be Liable Along With the 
Seller of the Merchandise 13

Conclusion 16

RESPONDENTS' APPENDIX

Consent Judgment in Peoples v. Peoples' Food, Inc.,
Index No. 41938/66 (S. Ct., N. Y. Co.) RA-1

Consent and Stipulation in above case RA-9

Consent Judgment in People v. Natpac et. al.,
Index No. 40719/68 (S. Ct., N. Y. Co.) RA-13



SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
APPELLATE DIVISION - FIRST JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — x

WILLIE PEARSON and GERALDINE PEARSON :
Plaintiffs-Respondents, :

- against - :

NATIONAL BUDGETING SYSTEMS, INC., :
a corporation,

Defendant-Appellant.

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — x

RESPONDENTS 1 BRIEF 

THE NATURE OF THE CASE

Defendant-appellant's motion for a protective 
order, denied below, was really in the nature of a 
motion to dismiss plaintiff-respondent's second cause 

of action. Appellant contended unsuccessfully that 
the tort charged by plaintiffs' complaint is unknown 

to the law, and that therefore the documents which 
might prove commission of the tort were irrelevant to 
the case and could not be inspected. Plaintiffs-

1



respondents believe that the documents sought to be 

inspected are relevant because they are necessary to 

proof of a widespread pattern of conduct which is an 
essential element of the tort charged.

The facts:

Appellant's statement of facts and description 
of the amended complaint does not list all six com­
ponents of the conduct charged. These are

(a) that appellant, a sales finance company, 
as part of its general business, finances 
many contracts made between retail dealers 
and the buying public, for the purchase
of freezers at inflated and unconscion­
able prices, and respondents' contract 
is merely typical of this practice 
(Complaint % 18; A-7);

(b) that appellant has notice and/or knowledge 
that the purchasers of the freezers- so 
financed are for the most part poor persons 
residing in poor neighborhoods, and has 
notice that sales of said merchandise to 
said persons at unconscionable prices is
a rampant abuse (Complaint f 18; A-7);

(c) that appellant purchased the unconscion­
able contracts pursuant to a course of 
dealing with the merchants who made the 
sales, and according to a pre-existing 
agreement (Complaint 13-14, A-5);

(d) that it appears on the faces of said con­
tracts that they are either unconscion­
able or executed in violation of Personal 
Property Law §402, which requires a

2



detailed description of the goods to 
appear on contracts, so that potential 
assignees are on notice if the under­
lying sale was unconscionable 
(Complaint f 15, A-7);

(e) that the guilty merchant, Peoples' Food, 
has gone out of business, so that 
respondent has no recourse except against 
appellant, which was so bound up with the 
execution of these unconscionable con­
tracts as to be jointly liable (Complaint 
n  6, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, A-4 —  A-8) ;

(f) that despite Peoples' Food having gone 
out of business, appellant continued, at 
least untir this action was commenced, 
to purchase unconscionable contracts for 
the sale of freezers from other retail 
dealers (Complaint f 18, A-7 —  A-8).

THE CONDUCT CHARGED IS TORTIOUS
A. Under case law as well as U.C.C. § 2-302, gross 
overpricing of consumer goods is unconscionable conduct.

It is now a familiar fact that "the poor pay 
more" for consumer goods. In fact, the title of Prof. 
Caplovitz1 book THE POOR PAY MORE has become a popular 
slogan, reflecting widespread public recognition that 

those who can least afford it are most victimized by 
high pricing. Of course, these are the consumers who 
cannot shop comparatively, because they lack transportation

3



"downtown" and because they are afraid to deal with 

strangers. Note, Consumer Legislation and the Poor,

76 Yale L.J. 745, 751 (1967). "Low income neighborhood 

stores usually price durables 50 per cent to 100 per 
cent above the going rate in more affluent areas, 

employing markups of 300 or 400 per cent and giving 
commissions running as high as 100 per cent of the 

value of the goods." Ibid. at 757.

Outrageous overpricing is particularly pre­
valent in sales made through installment sales contracts. 

The Federal Trade Commission recently found in the 

District of Columbia that "on the average, goods pur­

chased for $100 at wholesale sold for $255 in the low 

income market stores, compared with $159 in general 
market stores." Federal Trade Comm., Economic Report 

on Installment Credit and Retail Sales Practices, 

p. x (1968) .

Respondents' contract called for them to pay 

$914.03 for a freezer, plus $249.08 in service charges, 

for a total of $1163.11 (A-4) . Respondents allege 
that this price was so high in relation to the freezer's 

value as to render the contract void for unconscionability

4



(A-5). At the time that respondents were sold the 

merchandise, freezers were commonly being sold to 

unsophisticated poor persons at 167% to 300% over their 

retail market value. N.Y. Bureau of Consumer Frauds 
and Protection, Annual Report 7 (1965). These figures 

do not even take into account the credit service charges 

added onto the inflated cash prices.

Exorbitant pricing of consumer goods is not 

only a problem for the poor and for minority groups, but 

is of national concern, for the President's Commission 
on Civil Disorders found that rioters focused on stores 

believed to be charging much more than a fair price. 
Report of the Commission on Civil Disorders 274 (1968).

In recent years, the law has been evolving 
orderly devices to help protect poor consumers from 

exorbitant overpricing. An early development was the 
development of the equity doctrine of unconscionability. 

See, e.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 
(3rd Cir. 1948), and other cases cited in the Official 
Comments to Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 

Courts could void contracts grossly unfair to one side, 

particularly where one party was a commercial entity and 

the other an individual consumer.

5



This doctrine led to the enactment of Section

2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code. In New York and 

other states, the Code section has been interpreted to 

permit courts to void contracts where the buyer was 

charged an exorbitant price for the goods. Frostifresh 

Corp. v. Reynoso, 274 N.Y.S. 2d 757 (Dist. Ct. Nassau 

Co. 1966), modified on appeal 54 Misc. 2d 119 (App.

Term, 2d Dept. 1967); Central Budget Corp. v. Sanchez,

53 Misc. 2d 620, 279 N.Y.S. 2d 391 (Civ. Ct. 1967);
American Home Improvement, Inc., v. Maclver, 105 N.H.
435, 201 A. 2d 886 (1964). The doctrine of unconscionability, 

derived from case law, is by no means wholly statutory; 

in fact, the most famous unconscionability case, Judge 
Skelly Wright's decision in Williams v. Walker-Thomas 

Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965), arose 
before the Code went into effect in the District of 

Columbia.

Appellant maintains that the New York uncon­

scionability cases, Frostifresh, supra, and Central 

Budget, supra, involved not only grossly exorbitant 

pricing, but oppressive selling methods. However, the 
Court in Frostifresh (sale of freezer to low-income

6



consumer for $1146) noted that "no defense of fraud 

was set forth...the court finds that the sale of the 

appliance at the price and terms indicated in this 

contract is shocking to the conscience.... it was 'too 

hard a bargain1". 274 N.Y.S. 2d at 759. And in Central 

Budget (sale of seven year old car in poor condition 

for $1182), no charge was made of oppressive sales 

tactics, and the Court held simply that "[e]xcessively 

high prices may constitute unconscionable contractual 

provisions..." 279 N.Y.S. at 392; see American Home 

Improvement Inc. v. Maclver, supra.

B. Under the circumstances charged in the complaint, 
unconscionable overpricing is tortious.

We do not dispute appellant's argument that the 

Uniform Commercial Code does not provide for damages 
in the case of an unconscionable sale. Respondents do 

not look to the Code for the damages they demand.

Rather, they rely upon the common law doctrine that 
"the infliction of intentional harm, resulting in damage, 

without legal excuses or justification" is tortious. 
Penn-Ohio Steel Corp. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 7 App. 

Div. 2d 441, 443, 184 N.Y.S. 2d 58 (1st Dept. 1959).

7



Respondents refer to the traditional doctrines of 

unconscionabil-ity for guidelines as to wrongful con­

duct; they refer to tort law for their remedy.

Respondents have not sought to attach a label 

to the tort of persistently and regularly financing 

unconscionable contracts. "[I]t is impossible to 

tabulate the infinite varieties of misconduct that 

give rise to actionable wrongs. It is generally 

accepted that 'There is no necessity that a tort must 

have a name. New and nameless torts are being recognized 

constantly.' (Prosser, Torts [2d ed.], p. 3)" Penn- 

Ohio Steel, supra., 7 App. Div. 2d at 441.

Fraud, like unconscionability, is usually 

merely a defense to a contract. But under some condi­
tions, it is also a tort, rendering the guilty party 

liable for punitive damages. Walker v. Sheldon, 10 

N.Y. 2d 401 (1961) .

Fraud is a tort and not merely a contract defense 

in New York when it is a general practice of the per­

petrator, aimed at the public generally. Ibid.

Respondents submit that it is under precisely those 
conditions that unconscionability is also a tort: where 

it is a regular and knowing practice.

8



The reason for this is clear. Consumer con­

tracts rarely involve more than a few hundred dollars 

each, and often involve less than a hundred dollars.
The small amount at stake in each case inevitably means 

that few, if any, consumers can afford to bring a law­

suit for recision of a contract infected with fraud or 

unconscionability. The cost of litigation will almost 

always exceed the amount of money at stake. Private 
attorneys cannot afford bo take such cases; they are not 

economical. Nor can the legal aid societies, staffed by
salaried attorneys, afford to expend hundreds of man-hours

*
bringing such cases for low-income consumers; they are all 

understaffed in relation to the need of the poor for legal 
services, to the point where the Chairman of the American 

Bar Association's committee on legal aid has estimated 

that there are potentially 14 million indigent cases annually, 

although only half a million clients are served each year 

by such offices at present. The New York Times, August 

7, 1967, p. 11, col 1 (late city ed.).

*Legal Aid attorneys had to spend 210 man hours to void 
two contracts in Williams v. Walker—Thomas Furniture Co., 
supra. Dostert, "Appellate Restatement of Unconscionability," 
54 A.B.A.J. 1183 (December, 1968). And in this very case, 
attorneys for plaintiffs-respondents had to expend seventy- 
two man-hours merely to defeat appellants' motion to dis­
miss the complaint on the ground of improper service of 
process. See decision of Mr. Justice Markowitz, N.Y.L.J., 
Sept. 12, 1968, p. 2, col. 1.

9



Therefore, were it not for a tort remedy, a 

merchant or finance company participating in a wide­

spread practice of fraudulent or unconscionable con­

sumer sales could go right ahead with his scheme, 
knowing that he would have to refund a buyer's money 

on perhaps one-fourth of one per cent of the voidable 

contracts he owned, while collecting time payments on 
the other 99 3/4% of the contracts. "In many instances 

fraudulent operators carefully avoid cheating individuals 

out of large sums of money because they realize that 

'no one bilked out of fifty dollars is going to pay a 

lawyer to get his money back.' Thus, the only cases 

lawyers are willing to handle are those brought either 

by the unusual individual who will pay more than the 

amount of his claim in order to see justice done, or by 

those defrauded out of amounts large enough to justify 

the expenditure for legal fees. The number of consumers 

having no redress because the amount lost is not com­
mensurate with the attorney's fee constitutes the vast 

majority." Note, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 395, 409 (1966).

It should be noted also that class actions are of 

no help to the injured consumers because it is possible

10



that under New York law up the present time, con­

sumers who sign separate though identical standard form 

contracts may not enforce their rights by a class 

action. Hall v. Coburn Corp., N.Y.L.J. Aug. 8, 1968 

(Spec. Term, Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), now on appeal to 

this Court.

The power of the Attorney General to enjoin 
fraudulent or unconscionable selling or financing, see 

Lefkowitz v. ITM Corp., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S. 2d 

303 (Sup. Ct. 1966), is not a sufficient deterrent to 

such conduct, because the mere threat of being enjoined 

creates no financial risk for a company. A seller or 

finance company may knowingly participate in uncon­
scionable sales, aware that if he is someday required 

to mend his ways, he will not have to disgorge the 

fruits of his unconscionable activities.

Indeed, this Court may take judicial notice that 

Peoples' Food, appellant's erstwhile assignor, was en­
joined on December 28, 1966, from selling freezers for more 
than 100% more than the wholesale cost. People v. Peoples1 

Food, Inc, et, al., Index No. 41938/66 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
Co.). A copy of the consent judgment is annexed in 

the Appendix to this brief. Two months later,

11



Peoples went out of business (Complaint f 19, A-8).

Yet appellee found other freezer sellers to cooperate 

with in the sale of freezers at unconscionable prices 

(Complaint 18, A-7, A-8), so that on April 19, 1968 

(three months after this case was commenced) appellee 

had to be enjoined from selling freezers at more than 

100% over cost. People v. Natpac, Inc, et al.. Index 

No. 40719/68 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.). A copy of the 
consent judgment is annexed in the Appendix to this 

brief.

The possibility that a few contracts, out of 

thousands, will be contested and voided, or that the 

state might prospectively enjoin consumer abuses, is 

obviously no real deterrent to the wrongdoer. Walker 

v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y. 2d 401 (1961), provided such a 
real deterrent in the case of fraud. By that decision, 

the would-be perpetrator of fraud upon the public 
generally knows that he may be held liable for an 

unknown amount of punitive damages. It is but a small 

step to apply the principle of Walker by analogy to 
the companion wrong of exorbitant overpricing (uncon- 

scionability), where that too, is done knowingly to 

the public at large.

12



A FINANCE COMPANY WHICH AS A REGULAR BUSINESS 
PRACTICE PURCHASES UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACTS 
WITH KNOWLEDGE OR NOTICE OF THE WRONG BEING 
PERPETRATED, SHOULD BE LIABLE ALONG WITH THE 
SELLER OF THE MERCHANDISE

Appellant strenuously argues that even if the 
conduct alleged is tortious, only the seller and not 

the finance company is liable. But the complaint does 

not describe an "innocent" third party buyer of an 

installment sales contract. Plaintiffs-respondents 

allege an extreme degree of finance company partici­

pation in the creation of these unconscionable contracts 

It is alleged (1) that defendant had notice and/or knowl 

edge that the buyers of the merchandise were mostly poor 

persons, and that the contracts were unconscionable;

(2) that it appears on the face of the contracts that
•k

they were unlawfully executed or unconscionable and 
that the defendant bought the contract pursuant to a 
course of dealing and a pre-existing arrangement between 

itself and the selling merchant. In fact, appellant 
admits to having purchased 750 freezer contracts from

* Respondents1 contract contains no model number or brand 
name, in violation of P.P.L. §402. The statute requires 
such information on the face of a contract in part so 
that a would-be assignee is on notice of the price in 
relation to the precise goods sold. Cf. Lefkowitz v.
ITM Corp., supra. 275 N.Y.S. 2d 303 at 323 (1966) .

13



the seller from 1965 to March 1967, a rate of almost 

two per day. Affidavit of Martin Schwartz, sworn to 

the 6th day of August, 1968 (A-15).

But the appellant must be liable along with 

the seller not only because of their close mutual con­
nection. Appellant's alleged Knowledge or notice of 

the unconscionability is the most important factor.

The fact is that finance companies such as defendant 

are relatively stable, whereas in the ghetto, sellers 

such as the one in this case —  Peoples Food go in 

and out of business with lightning speed. They sell 

for a year or two, and then disappear, either going 

into bankruptcy or abandoning their operation and 
going into business elsewhere, in another state, or 

under a different corporate name. Peoples' Food went 

into bankruptcy only a few weeks after its methods of 

selling freezers were enjoined by the New York State 

Attorney General. And this pattern is typical. There­

fore, a tort remedy will not prevent the mass induce­
ment of unconscionable transactions if it is available 
against sellers alone. These sellers will not remain 

solvent or in business long enough for their assets

14



really to be in jeopardy. The remedy must run also 

against finance companies working with the sellers, 

where the finance companies have knowledge or notice 

of the illegality in the contract.

Joint liability is by no means unfair to the 
finance companies, where the finance companies:

a. have notice or knowledge of the wrong and 
also,

b. by extending a line of credit to the seller, 
are providing the means whereby the seller 
can stay in business and continue to induce 
buyers to sign the unconscionable contracts.

The merchants who sell goods to the poor by 
means of installment sales contracts could not do so 
without assurance that they will be able to sell the 

obligations to a finance company. The finance company 

bankrolls the seller; the finance company is the seller's 
lifeline. As the New York courts perceived thirty years 

ago, "Looking, without the distortion of ancient notions, 
at the picture thus presented, we find the actual control 

and management of the credit and finance of sellers do­

ing a conditional sale business in the hands of these 
finance corporations. It is obvious that here we have 

a factual joint enterprise in which, so far as condi­

15



tional sales are concerned, the management rests in 

the far larger part in the hands of the finance com­

panies. The finance company and the merchant-seller 
are as a fact engaged in one business, like Longfellow's 

description of man and woman, useless one without the 

other." Buffalo Industrial Bank v. DeMarzio, 296 N.Y.S. 

783 (1937), rev. other grounds 7 N.Y.S. 2d 568 (1937). 

The merchants operate under the finance companies' 

umbrellas of protection, and the finance companies 
should be jointly liable at least where they have notice 

or knowledge of abuses in the merchants' selling 

practices.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the conduct attributed 
to appellant in the complaint is tortious, and if 
plaintiffs-respondents prove their allegations, they 

may be entitled to punitive damages. Respondents must 

inspect the other food freezer and combination con­
tracts which defendant purchased from Peoples' Food 
in order to prove the persistent course of conduct and 

knowledge or notice that are, by analogy to Walker v . 

Sheldon, supra, essential elements of the tort.

16



Therefore, the inspection demanded by respondents' 

notice to inspect is relevant, both on the issues of 

liability and damages, and Special Term properly 
ordered production of the contracts (leaving appellant 

free to object to the inspection of any particular 
contracts, presumably on grounds of privilege) .

Its order should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

JACK GREENBERG 
PHILIP G. SCHRAG ^  

10 Columbus Circle 
Suite 2030
New York, New York 10019 
Tel: No.: JUdson 6-8397

Attorneys for 
Plaintiffs-respondents

17



RESPONDENTS' APPENDIX



At a Special Term, Part II of the 
Supreme Court of the State of 
New York, held in and for the 
County of New York, at the 
Courthouse at Pearl and Centre 
Streets, Borough of Manhattan, 
City and State of New York on 
the 28th day of December, 1966

P R E S E N T  :
HON. George Tilzer 

Justice

In the Matter of the Application of the 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK by
LOUIS J. LEFKOWITZ, Attorney General 
of the State of New York,

Petitioner, CONSENT JUDGMENT
for an order enjoining and restraining : Index No.
PEOPLES FOOD, INC., PEOPLES FOOD 
PACKAGING CORP., L. & S. CREDIT CORP., 
SAM BRISKMAN, ARNOLD BARRY BRISKMAN AND 
LILLIAN BRISKMAN,

:

41938/ 66

Respondents. :

pursuant to Section 63, subd. 12 of the 
Executive Law from carrying on, conduct- m

ing and transaction their business in 
a persistently fraudulent and illegal
manner.

RA 1



The Attorney General having commenced a special 
proceeding pursuant to Section 63 subdivision 12 of the 
Executi\^ Law against the above named respondents by 

notice of application, verified petitioner and affidavit 
of Assistant Attorney General James Princiotta, all 
dated October 18, 1966, the supplemental affidavit of 

Assistant Attorney General Princiotta verified the 24th 
day of November, 1967, the verified answer of the respond­
ents dated October 31st, 1966 and the matter having duly 
been come on to be heard at Special Term, Part I of this 
Court on October 31, 1966 and the matter having been 
adjourned to November 21, 1966, November 22, 1966,

November 28, 1966, December 6, 1966, December 13, 1966, 
December 15, 1966, December 22, 1966 and then to January 
5, 1967 upon a stipulation placed on the record on 
November 22, 1966 that the respondent would not sell or 

advertise for sale the freezers or freezer combination 
during and throughout the period of adjournment, and 
upon the subjoined stipulation and consent.

NOW, on motion of LOUIS J. LEFKOWITZ, Attorney 
General of the State of New York (Assistant Attorney 
General James Princiotta of counsel) it is

RA 2



ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED, that the answer 

of the respondents be withdrawn without prejudice to 

any of the respondents and respondents shall not be 

deemed to be in default

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the respond­

ents named in the said petition ARNOLD BRXSKMAN, and 
LILLIAN BRISKMAN be served from the said petition and 
discontinued as against said parties for all purposes

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the respond­
ents, their servants, agents and employees in any 
further business transactions are hereby enjoined, 

restrained and prohibited from:

a. Representing that the food freezer which is 

sold by Peoples Food is a commercial model.

b. Representing that the freezer is reasonably 

priced unless such is the fact.

c. Stating that the respondents are interested 

solely in selling a food program without mentioning the 

sale of a freezer.

RA 3



d. Stating that the food freezer is guaranteed 

for 20 years both as to parts and labor.

e. Setting forth that the food freezer will 

"pay for itself" out of the savings realized on the 

food purchased.

f. Claiming that the food supplied by Peoples 

Foods Packaging Corp. is adequate in amount to fulfill 

the needs of the buyer's family for any particular 
length of time or that said food will last for any 

particular amount of time.

g. Representing that the price of the food sold 

by Peoples Foods Packaging Corp. is at wholesale or is 
lower than comparable retail supermarket prices.,

h. Stating that the food supplied is from 
respondents' own food depot unless this is in fact the 

truth.

i. Setting forth that respondents supply famous 

brand foods without stating exactly which brands are 

supplied.

j. Raising the cash selling price of a freezer 

to absorb any allowances given on a trade-in.

RA 4



k. Failing to provide an adequate description 
of the freezers sold which complies with Personal Pro­

perty Law, Section 402 (3) (a).

l. Permitting customers to sign contracts which 

contain black spaces if such practice would violate 
Personal Property Law, Section 402 (4) .

m. Failing to set forth the net weight and price 
charged for meat, poultry and fish as required by the 
Agriculture and Markets Law, Sections 193 and 196-a and 
the regulations of the New York State Department of 
Agriculture and Markets promulgated hereto (1 NYCRR 221.1(c).

n. Operating L & S Credit Corp. without first 
obtaining a license from the Superintendent of Banking 
if such a license is required by the Banking Department.

o. Setting forth that a freezer is supplied 

rather than sold, and it is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the respondents 

in any further business transactions:
a. specify as closely as possible the percentage 

of prime and choice meats that are supplied to sub­
scribers of the Peoples Foods Packaging Corp. food program

RA 5



b . expand the one-year guarantee on parts and 

labor to three years, without further expense to the 

customer.

c. put in their freezer contracts, at no extra 
charge, a food spoilage program which will guarantee to 
the consumer replacement, at no charge, of all spoiled 
foods, providing the food spoiled was sold by respond­

ents, or by respondents through their subcontractor food 
companies who have been assigned and sold the food order.

d. pay the expenses of moving the freezer for 

any customer who, within three years after purchase, 
changes his place of residence to any point within 75 
miles of New York City, providing the customer is 

current in his payments.

e. supply with each food delivery a list reflect­
ing unit price or cost per pound for the food delivered 

therein.

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Peoples Foods, 

Inc. insert into its contracts a clause providing that if, 
at any time within 10 days after delivery by Peoples Foods, 
Inc. of a freezer to his home, a customer is dissatisfied 
he may, without stating any reason, return that freezer

RA 6



to respondent, Peoples Foods, Inc. and cancel his con­
tract; that at the time of the delivery of the freezer 

the consumer shall be given a copy of the 10-day pro­

vision and sign an original of same: that in the event 
of cancellation under this provision the respondents 
will pick up the freezer and assume the trucking costs; 
and that the copy of such notice shall state that 

written notice of dissatisfaction be given to the 
respondents at their specified address, and it is 

further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the respondents 

sell the freezers or refrigerator freezer combinations 
to the general public at a reasonable price which shall 
be in no event in excess of 100% over the actual cost 
to respondents for the freezer or refrigerator, and it 

is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the respond­

ent SAM BRISKMAN, be and he is hereby ordered to pay 
to the petitioner the sum of $500 cost pursuant to 
CPLR § 8308; that the respondent PEOPLES FOOD, INC. 
be and it is hereby ordered to pay to the petitioner 
the sum of $500 cost pursuant to CPLR § 8308; that the

RA 7



respondent PEOPLES POOD PACKAGING CORP be and it is 
hereby ordered to pay to the petitioner the sum of 
$500 cost pursuant to CPLR § 8308; that the respondent 
L. & S. CREDIT CORP. be and it is hereby ordered to pay 
to the petitioner the sum of $500 cost pursuant to 
CPLR § 8308; and it is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the petitioner 
may make such further application under the provisions 
herein on five days notice as it deems proper and 
necessary for the enforcement of this order and judgment.

E N T E R

GT

J . S . C .

BA 8



SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

x
In the Matter of the Application of 
the PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, :
by LOUIS J. LEFKOWITZ, Attorney 
General of the State of New York,

Petitioner,
For an Order enjoining and restraining :
PEOPLE'S FOOD INC., PEOPLE'S FOOD CONSENT AND
PACKAGING CORP., L. S. CREDIT CORP- STIPULATION
ORATION, SAM BRISKMAN, ARNOLD BARRY :
BRISKMAN and LILLIAN BRISKMAN,

Respondents, :
Pursuant to Section 63, Subdivision 
12 of the Executive Law from carrying :
on, conducting and transacting their 
business in a persistently fraudulent 
and illegal manner. :

x

It is hereby acknowledged, stipulated, consented 
to and agreed by and between the respondents and LOUIS 
J. LEFKOWITZ Attorney General of the State of New York, 
attorney for the petitioner herein, as follows:

1. That the respondents herein have each re­
ceived a copy of the verified petition and affidavit in 
this proceeding and know the contents thereof.

RA 9



2. That the within stipulation and consent is 
entered into by the respondents as their own free will 

and voluntary act with full knowledge and understanding 
of the nature of the proceeding commenced and the 
obligations and duties imposed upon them by the order 
consented to be entered herein and that no further 
agreement or inducement of any nature whatsoever have 
been made to them by the petitioner herein or its 
attorney or any employee of the Attorney General's 
office to procure this consent and stipulation.

3. That the respondents acknowledge receipt
of a copy of the annexed papers and judgment and hereby 
consent to the making and the entering thereof without 
further notice and hereby waive notice of any applica­

tion for the entry thereof.

4. It is further submitted by the respondents 
that the following is a general breakdown of costs with 
respect to the sale of a freezer selling to the general 

public for the sum of $799.95:

Approximately $135.00 for salesman's commission

on the original sale and revisit to consumer;

RA 10



Approximately $35.00 for trucking and a 
service guarantee;

Approximately $120.00 as a discount to the 

finance companies purchasing the freezer contract;

Approximately $100.00 for the cost of advertising 
in various media in an attempt to secure the 
customer's interest; and

Approximately $300.00 as the cost of the freezer 
unit itself.

In addition there are various administrative 
expenses which are impossible to determine at this time.

Dated: New York, New York
December 27, 1966

PEOPLES FOOD INC.
BY SAM B R I S K M A N ______
PEOPLES FOOD PACKAGING CORP.
BY SAM BRISKMAN_________
L. S. CREDIT CORP.
BY SAM BRISKMAN_________

SAM BRISKMAN_______ __
SAM BRISKMAN

LOUIS J. LEFKOWITZ 
Attorney General of 
the State of New York 
Attorney for 
Petitioner

By________________ _
JAMES PRINCIOTTA 
Assistant Attorney 

General
PHILLIPS, NIZER, BENJAMIN, 
KRIM & BALLON, ESQS.



At a Special Term, Part II of
the Supreme Court of the State 
of New York, held in and for 
the County of New York, at the 
Courthouse at Pearl and Centre 
Streete, Borough of Manhattan, 
City and State of New York, 
on the 19th day of April, 1968.

P R E S E N T  :
HON. George Postel 

Justice.

— — x
In the Matter of the Application of 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
by LOUIS J. LEFKOWITZ, Attorney General 
of the State of New York,

Petitioner,

for an order enjoining and restraining 
NATPAC, INC., NATPAC OF NEW YORK, INC.,
NATPAC OF LONG ISLAND, INC., GUARANTEED 
HOME FOOD SERVICE, INC., QUALIFIED HOME 
FOOD SERVICE, INC., FOOD FINANCIERS, INC., 
ASSOCIATED BUDGETING CORP., NATIONAL 
BUDGETING SYSTEMS, INC., and MARTIN 
SCHWARTZ,

Respondents,

pursuant to Section 63, subd. 12 of the 
Executive Law from carrying on, conducting 
and transacting their business in a 
persistently fraudulent and illegal 
manner.
— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — x

CONSENT
JUDGMENT

RA 12



Upon reading and filing the verified petition with 
exhibits annexed thereto dated February 16, 1968 and the 
affidavit of Assistant Attorney General James Princiotta 
with exhibits annexed thereto sworn to February 16, 1968 
and the stipulation and consent dated April 12, 1968 
executed by the respondents, represented by their counsel 
Harold E. Horowitz, Esq., and the respondents having 
interposed an answer denying any illegal or improper 
practices on their part and having expressed to the 
petitioner their willingness to comply with all provisions 
of law and of the provisions of this judgment relative to 
the conduct of their business, and, for the purpose of 
setting this case and evidencing their willingness as 
aforesaid, having consented to the entry of this judgment

NOW, on motion of LOUIS J. LEFKOWITZ, Attorney 
General of the State of New York, attorney for the 
petitioner herein (Assistant Attorney General James 
Princiotta, of counsel), it is

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Natpac, Inc., 
Natpac of New York, Inc., Natpac of Long Island, Inc., 
Guaranteed Home Food Service, Inc., Qualified Home Food 
Service, Inc., Food Financiers, Inc., Associated

RA 13



Budgeting Corp., National Budgeting Systems, Inc., and 
Martin Schwartz, the respondents mentioned in the 
petition, be and they are hereby enjoined, restrained 
and prohibited from engaging in the following business 
practices in the State of New York:

(a) Representing the sale of a family food 
program without specifying the sale of a freezer, un­
less such is a fact. The term "family food program" 
shall be deemed to mean the sale of food and freezer.

(b) Representing that the food freezer is a 
commercial model.

(c) Representing that the freezer sold is fully 
warranteed or guaranteed for 25 years or for life without 
specifying the particulars of the coverage as to labor 
and parts and the extent pertaining thereto, unless such 
is a fact.

(d) Representing that the food freezer purchased 
by the consumer "pay for itself" out of the savings to
be realized on the food purchased under the food plan.

(e) Representing that a specified amount of food

RA 14



will fulfill the needs of a family consisting of a 

specified number of people for a specified period of time.

(f) 1. Representing that the price of the food 
is at wholesale, unless such is a fact.

2. Representing that the price of food is 
at discount price, unless such is a fact.

3. Representing that prices charged for food 
are lower than prices charged in a retail supermarket, 
unless such is a fact.

(g) Representing the sale of prime meat and 
choice meat unless it is specified that prime meat is 
available to the consumer upon request.

(h) Representing that the food program being 
sold is supervised and directed by a food consultant or 
home economist, when such is not a fact. A food con­
sultant or home economist shall be defined as one who 
has expert knowledge of food from the aspects of 
calories, nutrition and health.

(i) Representing that the food spoilage certi­
ficate issued by the respondents would cover all of the

- m  15



food spoiled, unless the limitations are specifically 
stated.

(j) Stating that a specified delivery weight 
of meat and groceries would be delivered unless such 
be the actual weight received by the consumer, unless 
the substitution of food by the consumer with respect 
to the original order accounts for the variance in 

the weight.

(k) Stating that the food supplied under the 

food plan would cost the consumer an average price per 

pound, unless such is a fact.

(l) Stating that an itemized list would be 
furnished to the consumer that would reflect the weight 
and cost per pound with respect to the meat, poultry 
and fish, and the cost per unit with respect to the 
grocery items, unless such is a fact.

(m) 1. Representing and stating that the 

freezer is furnished, unless such is a fact.

2. Representing that the freezer is 
supplied, unless such is a fact.

RA 16



3. Representing the providing of a freezer, 

unless such is-a fact.

(n)
unless such

Representing the leasing of a freezer, 
is a fact.

(o) Representing to the consumer that he has 
won a prize in a contest where in fact no contest has 

been held.

(p) Consummating the sale of a used or repos­
sessed freezer without complying with General Business 

Law Section 395.

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that respondents 
herein be directed to comply with the requirements of 
the Agriculture and Markets Law Section 193 and Section 
196-a and the regulations of the New York State Depart­
ment of Agriculture and Markets promulgated hereto 
(1 NYCRR 221.1) and (1 NYCRR 221.9 [c]), and it is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the respond­
ents be and they hereby are enjoined, restrained and 
prohibited from failing to comply with the Agriculture 
and Markets Law Section 188, and it is further

RA 17



ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the respondents 
be and they are hereby enjoined, restrained and prohibited 
from writing up any retail installment contracts for the 
sale of freezers without specifying the make and model 
number of the freezer as required by Personal Property 
Law Section 402 (3-a), and it is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that respondents 
be and they hereby are enjoined, restrained and prohibited 
from writing up any retail installment contracts for the 
sale of freezers in which the contract is in blank or 
partially in blank in violation of Personal Property Law 
Section 402 (4), and it is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the respondents 
be and they hereby are enjoined, restrained and prohibited 
from stating that respondents Food Financiers, Inc., 
Associated Budgeting Corp., and National Budgeting Systems, 
Inc. are unassociated with respondents, and it is further 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the respondents 
in any further business transaction:

(a) Whenever the term "delivery weight" is used 
by respondents that they shall specifically state that 
the delivery weight is to be the actual weight, unless the 
substitution of food by the consumer with respect to the 
original order accounts for the variance in weight.

RA 18



(b) Will comply with the Agriculture and 
Markets Law Section 193 and 196-a and the regulations 
of the New York State Agriculture and Markets Law 
promulgated hereto (1NYCRR 221.1) and (1 NYCRR 221.9 [c]).

(c) Whenever the term "net weight" is used in 
respondent's advertisements they shall specify clearly 
the weight reduction with respect to the meats that 
are to be trimmed and deboned.

(d) Specify that the prices charged under the 
food plan are subject to increase on future orders 
depending on the market trend.

(e) Will furnish to the consumer a facsimile 
of the food spoilage certificate before the signing of 
the freezer contract, if such is represented as part 

of the sale.

(f) Will furnish to the consumer, in trans­
actions involving the sale of a freezer or refrigerator- 
freezer combinations service as specified in manufacturer's 
warrantee for the term of one year effective from the date 
of delivery of the freezer without charge. It being 
understood that the parts required shall be obtained

RA 19



from the manufacturer of the freezer in accordance 
with the freezer manufacturer's warrantee to the 
consumer.

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the respond­
ents sell the freezer or refrigerator-freezer com­
binations to the general public at a cash price which 
shall be, in no event, in excess of 100% over the 
actual cost of the freezer or refrigerator-freezer 
combinations. In computing costs, the sum of $35.00 
shall be added for trucking.

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that respondents 
pay to the petitioner the sum of $16,000 costs of the 
investigation pursuant to CPLR Section 8303(6), and 
it is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the petitioner 
may make such further application under the provisions 
herein on five days notice as it deems proper and 
necessary for the enforcement of this order and judgment.

E N T E R

J . S . C .

RA 20



r  FIRST JUDICIAI

•APPFJI -VTF. n i}4 S X A .V  1 3
•— j~-— 1

«> T '» ofsist:

By Capozzoli, .1.1'.; McGivern, McNally 
and Steuer, JJ.

150. PEOPLE, &C. res, v. EARL 
CLOUD, def-ap—Judgment of convic­
tion unanimously affirmed, No opinion. 
Order filed.

By Stevens, P.J.; Eager,, Tiber. .
• and McNally, JJ.

7 PARKE-BERNET GALLERIES, 
INC., plf-ap. v. FRANKLYN, def-res 
—Order entered May 27. 1968 affirmed, 
with $50 costs and disbursements to 
the respondent. Opinion by Tilzer, J.

All concur except McNally, J., who 
dissents in an opinion.' -- 

Order filed.
By Stevens, P.J.: Tilzer, McGivern,

; Nunez and Macken, JJ.
106. STATE OF N. Y.. plf-res, v. 

SECURITY' ADVERTISING CO., INC., 
def-ap — Judgment unanimously af­
firmed, with $50 costs and disburse­
ments to the respondent. No opinion. 
Order filed.

trig

recover puru- 
da’mages from deiendant assert- 
a complaint based on Uniform

By Stevens, P.J.; Eager, Marke-svicb.
■ Nunez and Steuer, JJ.

145. PEOPLE, &C., res, v. THEO­
DORE SAMUELS, def-ap—Order en­
tered May 3. 1968, unanimously
affirmed. No opinion. Order filed.

By Eager, J.P.; Capozzoli, Markewich 
and M*Nally, JJ.

130-1. PEOPLE, S:C., res. V. RICH­
ARD RIFFON, def-ap—Order entered 
Jan. 29, 1968, unanimously affirmed. 
No opinion. Order filed.
By Stevens, r.J.; Tilzer, McGivem, 

Nunez and Macken, JJ.
103. IN RE BATES, pet-res-xp 

(Montes, res-ap-res)—Order, entered 
Aug. 14, 1968, unanimously affirmed, 
without costs and without disburse­
ments. No opinion. Order filed.

107. IN RE KINSELLA. pet-res 
(Davis, res-ap)— Decree unanimously 
effrmed, with costs and disbursements 
to all parties filing briefs payable out 
of the estate. No opinion. Order filed.
By Carozzol'-'TT.: McGivern, McNally 

and Steuer, JJ.
157. PEOPLE. &C.. res, v. VERNON 

•TURNER, def-ap—Judgment of con­
viction unanimously affirmed. No opin­
ion. Order filed.

156. PEOPLE ex rel. ROBERT VI­
DAL. rel-ap, y. THOMAS, res—Order 
entered .Jan. 11, 1968. unanimously af­
firmed, No opinion. Order filed.

By Eager, j'P .: Capozzoli, Tilzer 
and McNally, J.J.

132. PEOPLE ex rel. LUIS MEN­
DEZ, rel-ap, v. THOMAS, res—Order 
entered Jan. 11, 1968, unanimously af­
firmed. No opinion. Order filed.

By Stevens, P.J.; Capozzoli. McGiTcrc, 
Markewich and Macken, JJ.

S6N. IN RS SCHRIER, pet-ap-re3 
(Schrier, res-res-ap) — Order of the 
Family Court, New York County, en­
tered April 30, 1958. unanimously
affirmed, without costs and without 
disbursements. No opinion. Order filed.

commercial Code section 2-302 in that 
plaintiffs were Induced to buy a re­
frigerator freezer at an “unconscion­
able" price within the meaning of the 
said statute. The defendant, a finance 
company, purchased the said install­
ment sales contract from the seller.

Section 2-302 of the Uniform Com­
mercial Code does not provide any 
damages to a party who enters into 
an unconscionable contract. This sec­
tion gives the court the power to re­
fuse to enforce such an uncoil,soionable 
contract or it may enforce the re­
mainder of the contract without the 
unconscionable clause or it may so 
limit the application of any uncon­
scionable clause as to avoid any uncon­
scionable result.

The. documents called for under the 
notice of inspection are neither ma­
terial nor necessary to plaintiff’s cause 
of action and their production would 
be an undue harassment of defendant.

Under the circumstances, it was an 
improvident exercise of discretion not 
to grant the motion.
I Order filed,_____ 1_________ _______ .

LEROY FUNNY—Mm i, 
appeal as poor person 
terms and contUti-..- 
orders of this court.' Or ;.

Bv Eager, .? !*.; r.: - 
McGivern and .M.uk„

M-167. TELARO v. 1, 
tlon granted only t0 
staying defendant-;-,- 
disposing of the —:un: " 
remaining in the jive-' 
count 111 the nan-.-" 
defendant at Hay.
Inc. on condition t’ ; 
respondent have the right 
or otherwise trade in" ti 
remaining in the joint a - 
as the assets of proceed', 
or sales remain in said 
ing appeal and on the ■ 
dition that the appellant 
appeal for the April, 196:T, 
Court. Order filed.

By Stevens, P.J.; Eager, Capozzoli, 
McGivern and Babin, JJ.

13543. 13544. 13545. PEOPLE, kC.. 
res, v. JAMES SMILEY, def ap — 
Having reconsidered these appeals 
following the submission of supple­
mental briefs and the order of this 
court dated Oct. 1, 1968 which vacated 
its orders of Sept. 19, 1968 which af­
firmed these appeals, this court now 
affirms the judgment of conviction 
rendered Nov. 2, 1967 as also the or­
ders entered Aug. 15. 1967 and Oct. 9. 
1967 dismissing appellant's writs of 
habeas corpus.

Orders filed.

By Eager, J.P.: Capozzoli. Markewich,;
Rabin and Macken, JJ.

55. 53. 57. IN RS CHASE MAN­
HATTAN BANK. N.A., res .Miner, f 
ep i—Order entered June 23. .9co. ar.lj 
two decrees of the Surrogate s Court, 
New York County, unanimously af­
firmed, with one bill of costs and 
disbursements to ail parties filing 
briefs, payable out of the trust estate. 
No opinion. Order filed.

58. 59. HALL, plf-ap. Y. COBURN 
CORP. OF AMERICA, def-res—Order 
entered Aug. 23. 1968, and judgment,, 

nanimouslv affirmed, without cos.s 
and without disbursements. No opin­
ion. Order filed.

69 61. RUSSELL. HI. p'f-ap. V.
COBURN CORP. OF AMERICA, def-
j-tvij_Order entered Aug. 23, 1968, and
judgment, unanimously affirmed. with­
out costs and without disbursements. 
Ho opinion. Ore r died.

By Stevens, T.J.; Eager, Capozzoli, 
McGivern and Nunez, JJ.

112. NEW YORK S P O R T I N G  
ARMS ASSOCIATION, INC., plf-ap, 
v. CITY OF HEW YORK, def-res — 
Judgment enr^’-ed April 23, 1968,
unanimously modified on the law to 
the extent of striking therefrom the 
last decretal paragraph dismissing the 
complaint as to plaintiffs T. Anthony 
Bloch and Jack Appel and substituting 
therefor a provision declaring that 
Local Law 106 for the year 1967 
amending Chapter 18 of the Adminis­
trative' Code of the City of New York, 
in its general provisions and intend­
ment, is constitutional and valid and 
that the said plaintiffs are in no way 
unconstitutionally aggrieved by any 
specific provisions of said law; and 
as - so ' modified, affirmed with S50 
costs and disbursements to respond­
ents. Special Term correctly deter­
mined that the ^attack by the said 
plaintiffs upon' the constitutionality 
and validity cf Local Law 106 had no 
merit, and correctly sustained the va­
lidity of that law. However, Special 
Term erroneously dismissed the com­
plaint because plaintiffs were not en­
titled # to the declaration sought by 
them.' (Lanza v. Waener. 11 N. Y. 2d 
317, 334. Park Avenue Clinical Kosci- 
tal v. Kramer. 26 A. D. 2d 613. aff’d 
19 N. Y. 2d 958; Medical World Pub- j 
lishing Co., Inc. v. William J. Kauf- ! 
man. 29 A. D. 2d 859). A declaration j 
should have beer, granted in defend­
ants’ favor as indicated hereir.aoove. \

Order ffled.

, By Eager. J.P.; Capo/- 
and McGivern. J 

! M-130. IN RE LAC: - 
rent!)—Motion for a 
condition that the apm\.; 
for the April, 1969, term . 
Order filed.

By Eager, J.P.; Chpor-- 
McGivern and Mark*---* 

' M-153. WAGNER v. Gi 
Motion for a stay denied.

M-152. STULBERG v 
FASHIONS. INC.—Mo*: :: 
appeal granted, with $10 . 
filed.

By Stevens, P.J.; Eager, < 
McGivern and S'unr.- 

M-18. IN RE PATER SO' 
polifcan Mutual Insurance 
tion to dismiss appeal . 
costs. Order riled.

By Eager. J.F.; CapozzG 
McGivern and Markc'. 

M -lil. RAPP v. RING:.; 
—Motion to dismiss apm. 
with S10 costs. Order filed.

M-197. PEOPLE. kC . v. 
CASELLAS; M-198. Poor 
CHARLES CIERS v. TOC 
peals withdrawn. Orders ft

M-I45. IN RE MEN 
fBerman)—Motion to i.o 
party tenant respondent ; 
der filed.

.M-124. PEOPLE, kC.. v. 
WELLS—Motion granted pr­
of this _court. entered on C 
Is amended by striking o r 
tion of Anthony F. Mr •: 
counsel to prosecute the 
substituting therefor O "• 
Esq., of 22 West Firo - 
Vernon. N. Y. The tun: • 
appellant shall perfect 
hereby enlarged until O 
the date of the erd : d

By Stevens. P.J.: Fr 
Tilzer and Met, 

M-6174. PEC?: ”  
BERTO CARS All. O “  
kc, v. FRANKLIN 
M-6189. People ■ . -■*
l ia m s  v. w a t t :■
LAND PENITENT: . 
pie. kc.. v. ELS. - 
M-l 16, -Peep'' '
LARD v. to ' 
p e n it e n t : a o v "
V. JOHN l a g : 
rel. GILE- OI
d e n . n  ̂v. c :r*

PRE5TI:. W-I 
CRUE v. T O

ite-ar ichBy Fager, J.P.; Carv-umlf. Mi 
Rabin and Macsen, JJ.

62N. M A T T E R  OF G O R D O  Oh : 
claimants-res. v. M. V. A. I. C-. re-t-G : ; 
—Order, entered June 24. ItTo, -..an - \ 
ir.g a temporary stay cf arbitration * 
to M. V. a . I. C., unanimously re- ; 
versed, on the law. without costs and j 
disbursements, id  M. V. A. I. GOT , 
motion for a permanent stay granted.; 
without costs. The infant claimant j 
was allegedly injured on May 22. 1965. j 
trh**n «r* automobile in. which he W" 
riding a r '’ which was being driven 
Stern, ct aided with an automob

5ENAN

Mori'
appe

.*11
driven by Indelicato. The claims
c the. infant and his mother) La.ve„
ieged that they were 'ffnsuroc
sons under the uninsured 4;;
cation indc ■ -■ .
suranee ;s_

in
r.r rv



ta^er, ,?.P.: Tiller, Nl$cr,;
;! RaBia and Mackcn, JJ,

7?n A p e a f e S S .  ptf-res. r . “SX* 
TIONAL BUDGETING SYSTEMS, 
INC., def-ap — Order entered cn 
Sept. 15, 1963 denying motion for a 
__oteotive order unanimously reversed, 
"on th e. law and the facts, without 
chats' or disbursements,;; the" motion 
granted and the notice is vacated.

Py i t t v " r  . h..l.: Eager, C
T it -"  a;.1 M cGjierjl, S3,

Y.-'-ANTHOtlTl ' f 13. PEOPLE, &C. 
TlDANTELS, JR.; M-6190. People, &c„ 
v. ANTH&NY DANIELS; M-41. People,
&c., V. 'iFALENTINE A. NEGRON;
M-62. People, &c., V. EDWARD NEE­
LEY: M-SS. People, &c., v. RAYMOND 
HUARNEGK-.true name Paul Navarro:
M-148. Efeople, lx:, V. RUDOLPH

By StmL J.’’ .;-0 
Hofsta'IWr

BETH POWERS, de:-:; 
conviction unanimou.-.y 
opinion.

584. PEOPLE. S.-C. re 
REINHART, def-ap - - 
conviction ur.a nirr.ouA /

RUTPINl M-190. People, Lc„ v. opinion.

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