Sipes v. McGhee Motion and Brief Amicus Curiae

    IN THE

Supreme (tort of ilirtjtijatt
A ppeals  from  t h e  C ir c u it  C ourt for t h e  

C o u n t y  of W a y n e

I n  C h a n c e r y

H o n . G u y  A. M ille r , Circuit Judge

Benjamin J. Sipes and A nna C. Sipes, James A. 
Coon and A ddie A. Coon, et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellees,
v.

Orsel McGhee and M innie S. McGhee, his wife, 
Defendants and' Appellants.

H o n . A r t h u r  A . W ebster , Circuit Judge

Northwest Civic A ssociation, a Michigan 
corporation,

Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
v.

Otis E. Sheldon, et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.

MOTION AND BRIEF FOR THE NATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF 

COLORED PEOPLE AS AMICUS CURIAE

T hurgood M a r s h a l l ,
R obert L. C arter ,
M a r ia n  W y n n  P erry ,

20 West 40th Street,
New York 18, New York, ^

E dw ard  M. T u rn e r ,
5100 Beaubien Street,

Detroit, Michigan,
Counsel for the National Association 
For the Advancement of Colored People.

S pottswood  W . R o b in so n , III,
Richmond, Va.,

Of Counsel.



I N D E X

PAGE

Motion for leave to file a brief as Amicus Curiae______  1
Brief for the National Association for the Advance­

ment of Colored People as Amicus Curiae_________  3
Statement of F acts___________________________  3
Statement of Points to be Argued--------------------  5
Argument:
I. Judicial Enforcement of the Covenant In

Question Is Violative of the Constitution and
Laws of the United States---------------------------  5
A. The Right to Take and Hold Property

Is Protected By the Constitution and 
Laws of the United States______________  6

B. The Action of the Court Below Enforcing
the Covenant by Injunction Constitutes 
State Action in Violation of the Four­
teenth Amendment _____________________  10

II. The Restrictions upon the Use of Land by
Members of Racial or Religious Groups is
against The Public Policy of the State of
Michigan and The United States of America 16
A. The Public Policy of Michigan__________  18
B. The Public Policy of the United States of

America ________________________________ 20
C. The Race Restrictive Covenant Before 

This Court is Injurious to the Interests 
of the Public, Interferes with the Public 
Welfare and Is at War With the Interests
of Society______________________________ 24

Conclusion_____________________________________  31
Table—Persons Per Room By Color of Occu­

pants, For Residents—Occupied Dwelling 
Units, By Number of Rooms, For Detroit 
—Willow Run Area: 1944_______________  32



11

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases
PAGE

A. F. L. V. Swing, 312 U. S. 321_______________________  15
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60--------------------------- 8, 9,11
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy v. Chicago, 166 IT. S. 226 14
Civil Bights Cases, 109 U. S. 1------------------------------------  13
Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371---------------------------  6
Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U. S. 323----- ---------------------- -10,16
Gandolfo v. Hartman, 49 Fed. 181------------------------------  12
Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U. S. 668-----------------------------------  9
Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 18 Sup. Ct. 383_______  8
Kennett v. Chambers, 14 How. 38-------------------------------- 12
Parmalee v. Morris, 218 Mich. 625------------ -----------10,15,16
Pittsburgh C. C. & St. Louis R. R. v. Kenny, 95 Ohio 

St. 64____________________________________________ _ 17
Raymond v. Chicago Union Trust, 207 U. S. 20---- ---- — 15
Skutt v. City of Grand Rapids, 275 Mich. 258------------ 17, 20
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U. S. 36----------—------------ 6,7, 22
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303-------------------- 6, 23
Tyler v. Harmon, 158 La. 439________________________  9
Wren, Matter of Drummond, Ontario Reports, 1945, 

page 778 ________________________________________ 21, 28



Statutes
PAGE

Michigan, Constitution, Article II, Sec. 1_____________  19
Michigan, Statutes, Title 15, Sec. 380__________________ 19

Title 24, Sec. 293____    19
Title 25, Sec. 6_________________________________ 18
Title 28, Sec. 380_______________________________ 19
Title 28, Secs. 343-5___________________________  19

United Nations Charter___________________________ _—  20
United States Code, Title 8, Sec. 42---------------------------- 8, 23
United States Constitution,

Article IV, Section 2________ ________________  6
Amendment V ________________________________ 6
Amendment X I I I _____________________________  6
Amendment XIV, Sec. 1-----------------------------------  6

Textbooks and Other Sources

12 American Jurisprudence 663-------------- -------------------- 9
Architectural Forum, January, 1946__________________ 30
Conference on Home Building, Report of Committee on 

Negro Housing____________________________    24
Detroit Free Press, March 17, 1945__________________  29
Embree, Brown Americans (1943)_____________________  29
Gelhorn, Contracts & Public Policy (1935), 35 Col. L.

Rev. 678 _____ ......__________________________ __—  23
Mydral, An American Dilemma (1944)-------------------------  30
The State of Race Relations Today, City of Detroit 

Interracial Committee ---------------------------     26
The Michigan Chronicle, May 9, 1945----------------------------- 30
Survey Graphic, Public Housing Charts Its Course, 

January, 1945 ---------------------------------    28
U. S. Dept, of Commerce, Bureau of Census,

Special Survey H . O. No. 143, Aug. 23, 1944------ 26
Population Series, C. A. 3, No. 9, Oct. 1,1944 .24, 25, 32

Woofter, Negro Problem in Cities--------------------------------  28

I l l



IN  THE

Supreme Court of jUtcfugan
A ppeals from th e  Cir cu it  C ourt fob the  

C ounty  of W ayne 
I n C hancery

H on . G u y  A. M iller , Circuit Judge

B e n ja m in  J . S ipes and A n n a  C. S ipes, 
J ames A. Coon and A ddie A. C oon, 
et al., Plaintiffs and Appellees,

v.
Orsel M cG hee and M in n ie  S. M cG h ee , 

his wife,
Defendants and Appellants.

Hon. A rth u r  A . W ebster, Circuit Judge

N orthw est C ivic A ssociation, 
a Michigan corporation,

Plaintiffs and Appellees,
v.

O tis E. S heldon , et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF 
AS AMICUS CURIAE

To the Honorable, The Chief Justice and the Associate 
Justices of the Supreme Court of the State of Michigam:

The undersigned, as Counsel for the National Associ­
ation for the Advancement of Colored People, respectfully



2

move this Court for leave to file the accompanying brief 
as Amicus Curiae in the above entitled appeals.

The National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People is a membership organization which for 
thirty-five years has dedicated itself to and worked for the 
achievement of functioning democracy and equal justice 
under the Constitution and laws of the United States.

From time to time some justiciable issue is presented 
to this Court, upon the decision of which depends the course 
for a long time of evolving institutions in some vital area 
of our national life. Such an issue is before the Court now. 
In the above entitled appeals, this Court is asked to decide 
whether enforcement by state courts of a restrictive cove­
nant against use or occupancy of land by Negroes violates 
the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution and is against the public policy of the United 
States and the State of Michigan.

It is to present written argument on this issue, funda­
mental to the good order, welfare and safety of the com­
munity, that this motion is filed.

T hubgood M arshall ,
R obert L. Carter,
M arian  W y n n  P erry,
E dward M. T urner ,

Counsel for the National Association 
For the Advancement of Colored People.

S pottswood W . R obinson , III,
Of Counsel.



IN THE

upreme Court of Jltcfngan
A ppeals from th e  C ircuit  C ourt for the  

County  of W ayne 
I n  C hancery

H on . G u y  A. M iller , Circuit Judge

B e n ja m in  J. S ipes and A n n a  C. S ipes, 
J ames A. Coon and A ddie A. C oon, 
et al., Plaintiffs and Appellees,

v.
Orsel M cG hee  and M in n ie  S . M cG h ee , 

his wife,
Defendants and Appellants.

Hon. A rth u r  A . W ebster, Circuit Judge

N orthwest C ivic A ssociation, 
a Michigan corporation,

Plaintiffs and Appellees,
v.

Otis E. S heldon , et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF FOR THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR 
THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE AS 

AMICUS CURIAE

Statement of Facts

These appeals are taken from decrees of the Circuit 
Court of Wayne County by which appellants are restrained

3



4

from using or occupying their homes because of their race 
or color. In Sipes v. McGhee the restriction thus enforced 
by the court was placed upon appellants’ lot by a former 
owner, who signed and recorded an agreement as follows:

“ This property shall not be used or occupied by 
any person or persons except those of the Caucasian 
race. ’ ’

In Northwest Civic Association v. Sheldon, the restric­
tive covenant was placed by the original subdivider on 310 
lots out of a total of 338 in the subdivision in the following 
language:

“ Said premises shall not be sold nor leased nor oc­
cupied by any person other than one of the Caucasian 
race. ’ ’

The restriction does not appear in the deed of the original 
subdivider to the lot now owned by appellant Sheldon, nor 
in any subsequent deed.

Shortly after appellants commenced to occupy their re­
spective homes, bills of complaint were filed by owners of 
neighboring lots, seeking to restrain appellants from violat­
ing the said restrictions. In the Sheldon case it was alleged 
and proof was offered that Mr. Sheldon is a Negro but it 
was not alleged or proved that the other occupants of the 
house, Mrs. Sheldon and her parents, are Negroes. It was 
alleged and proof offered that appellant McGhee and the oc­
cupants of his house are Negroes.

The Circuit Court of Wayne County has entered decrees 
restraining all appellants in the McGhee case from using 
or occupying the lot in question, and in the Sheldon case 
restraining only Otis E. Sheldon from entering upon, using 
or occupying the premises in question.



0

Statement of Points To Be Relied Upon 

I
Judicial Enforcement of the Covenant in Question Is Vio­

lative of the Constitution and Laws of the United States.

A . T he Right to Take and H old Property Is P rotected by the 
Constitution and Laws o f  the U nited States.

R. T he A ction  o f  the Court R elow  E nforcing  the Covenant 
by Injunction Constitutes State A ction  in V iolation  o f  the 
Fourteenth Am endm ent.

II

The Restrictions Upon the Use of Land by Members of 
Racial or Religious Groups Is Against the Public Policy of 
The State of Michigan and the United States of America.

A . The Public P olicy  o f  M ichigan.

R. The Public P olicy  o f  the U nited States o f  A m erica.

C. The R ace Restrictive Covenant b e fo re  this Court Is In­
jurious to  the Interests o f  the Public, Interferes with the 
Public W e lfa re  and Is at W ar with the Interests o f  Society.

A R G U M E N T

I

Judicial Enforcement of the Covenant in Question 
Is Violative of the Constitution and Laws of the 

United States.

When. Government, through its courts, enforces the type 
of restrictive covenant herein complained of, it is action of 
the type proscribed by the Constitution and laws of the 
United States.



6

A. The Right to Take and Hold Property Is 
Protected by the Constitution and Laws of 
the United States.

The right to take and hold property is one of the funda­
mental and inherent rights and privileges guaranteed by 
the Constitution of the United States:

“ The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all 
the privileges and immunities of citizens in the sev­
eral States.”  Article IV, Sec. 2.

state shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property with­
out due process of law.”  Amendment XIV, Sec. 1.

“ No person shall * * # be deprived of life, lib­
erty or property without due process of law. * * * ” . 
Amendment V.

The Supreme Court of the United States has refrained 
from attempting to enumerate the several privileges and 
immunities which receive constitutional protection, but it 
early recognized as one of those rights the right to acquire, 
hold, use and dispose of property, both real and personal. 
Thus in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U. S. 36, 16 Wall. 
36, 21 L. Ed. 394 (1873), Mr. Justice Miller cites with ap­
proval Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371 as follows:

“  ‘ The inquiry . . .  is, what are the privileges 
and immunities of citizens of the several states? 
We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions 
to those privileges and immunities which are funda­
mental; which belong of right to the citizens of all 
free governments, and which have at all times been 
enjoyed by citizens of the several states which com­
pose this Union, from the time of their becoming



7

free, independent, and sovereign. What these funda­
mental principles are, it would be more tedious than 
difficult to enumerate’. ‘ They may all, however, be 
comprehended under the following general heads: 
protection by the government, with the right to ac­
quire and possess property of every kind, and to pur­
sue and obtain happiness and safety, subject, never­
theless, to such restraints as the government may 
prescribe for the general good of the whole’. ”  (at 
p. 76).

The Supreme Court went on to state:

‘ ‘ This definition of the privileges and immunities 
of citizens of the states is adopted in the main by 
this court in the recent case of Ward v. Maryland, 12 
Wall. 430, 20 L. ed 452, while it declines to under­
take an authoritative definition beyond what was 
necessary to that decision. The description, when 
taken to include others not named, but which are of 
the same general character, embraces nearly every 
civil right for the establishment and protection of 
which organized government is instituted. They are, 
in the language of Judge Washington, those rights 
which are fundamental. Throughout his opinion, they 
are spoken of as rights belonging to the individual as 
a citizen of a state. They are so spoken of in the 
constitutional provision which he was construing. 
And they have always been held to be the class of 
rights which the state governments were created to 
establish and secure.”

To make certain that there be no misapprehension about 
the national policy on this important problem, Congress has 
not been content to rely upon the protection afforded in 
the basic framework of the Government. Instead, in order 
clearly to demonstrate the purpose of the people of the 
United States that there should be no restrictions placed 
upon the right of a citizen to acquire and hold property,



8

federal legislation designed to give added protection to these 
rights was enacted in 1866 providing as follows:

“ All citizens of the United States shall have the 
same right, in every State and Territory, as is en­
joyed by white citizens thereof, to inherit, purchase, 
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal prop­
erty.”  U. S. Code, Tit. 8, Sec. 42; R. S. 1798.

The consitutionality of this section has never been chal­
lenged. It was construed by the United States Supreme 
Court in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 38 Sup. Ct. 
16, 62 L. Ed. 149 (1917). There the constitutionality of a 
city ordinance was challenged, which forbade colored per­
sons from occupying houses as residences, places of abode 
or public assembly on blocks where the majority of the 
houses were occupied by white persons, and in like manner 
restraining white persons when the conditions as to occu­
pancy were reversed. The interdiction was based upon 
color and nothing more. The Supreme Court held the ordi­
nance unconstitutional, and stated in its opinion:

“ Property is more than the mere thing which a 
person owns. It is elementary that it includes the 
right to acquire, use, and dispose of it. The Consti­
tution protects these essential attributes of prop­
erty.”  (at p. 74).1

Bases of constitutional protection were found by the Court 
to exist in the Fourteenth Amendment and it was held that 
the Amendment had been given legislative aid by the enact­
ment of the statute above set forth. Discussing such legis­
lation, the Court stated:

“ The statute of 1866, originally passed under 
sanction of the 13th Amendment (14 Stat. at L. 27, 
chap. 31), and practically re-enacted after the adop­
tion of the 14th Amendment (16 Stat. at L. 144, chap.

1 See also Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366. 18 Sup. Ct. 383, 42 
L. Ed. 780 (1897).



9

114), expressly provided that all citizens of the 
United States in any state shall have the same right 
to purchase property as is enjoyed by white citizens. 
Colored persons are citizens of the United States 
and have the right to purchase property and enjoy 
and use the same without laws discriminating against 
them solely on account of color. . . . These enact­
ments did not deal with the social rights of men, but 
with those fundamental rights in property which it 
was intended to secure upon the same terms to citi­
zens of every race and color.”  (at pp. 78-79).

The Court concluded with this statement:

“ We think this attempt to prevent alienation of 
the property in question to a person of color was 
not a legitimate exercise of the police power of the 
State, and is in direct violation of the fundamental 
law enacted in the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Constitution preventing State interference with 
property rights except by due process of law. That 
being the case, the ordinance cannot stand.”  (at p. 
82).

Subsequently in Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U. S. 668, 47 Sup. 
Ct. 471, 71 L. Ed. 831 (1926), the Supreme Court on 
the authority of Buchanan v. Warley, supra, held unconsti­
tutional a city ordinance prohibiting the sale of land and 
property to Negroes in any “ community or portion of the 
city . . . except on the written consent of a majority of- the 
persons of the opposite race inhabiting such community or 
portion of the city.”  Tyler v. Harmon, 158 La. 439, 104 So. 
200 (1925).

Thus both an ordinance directly restricting occupancy 
on the basis of race, and an ordinance not itself fixing such 
a restriction but seeking to lend the power of the state to 
action of private citizens who wish so to limit and restrict 
residence on the basis of race, are equally contrary to our 
fundamental law, and cannot stand.



10

B. The Action of the Court Below Enforcing the 
Covenant by Injunction Constitutes State 
Action in Violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.

It is our contention here that the action of the court 
below in enforcing this covenant is unconstitutional. We 
do not argue that the contract itself violates the consti­
tution. Therefore, because our contention is based on 
action by the state itself, neither Parmalee v. Morris, 218 
Mich. 625 (1925), nor Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U. S. 323, 
46 Sup. Ct. 521, 70 L. Ed. 969 (1926), are in point.

For the reasons considered supra, there is no question 
that it would have been beyond the legislative power of the 
State of Michigan or the City of Detroit to have enacted a 
law providing that a covenant in the precise terms of those 
herein involved should be enforceable by the courts by 
means of a decree of specific performance, an injunction, 
and proceeding for contempt for failure to obey the decree. 
It seems inconceivable that so long as the legislature is so 
restricted, a court of equity may by its command compel 
the specific performance of such a covenant, and thus give 
the sanction of the judicial department of the government 
to an act which was not within the competency of its legis­
lative department to authorize.

But in this case the court below has gone further. It 
has not required that parties perform their contracts. It 
has by judicial action created a rule of property and has 
made that rule binding upon persons who have not agreed 
to it. In such circumstances it must be entirely clear that 
the government, and only the government, is the effective 
force depriving the appellants of their property.

We cannot emphasize too strongly that the immediate 
consequence of the decree now under review is to bring



11

about that which the legislative and executive departments 
of the government are powerless to accomplish. This 
decree has all the force of a statute. It has behind it the 
sovereign power. It follows that by this decree the appel­
lants have been deprived of liberty and property, not by 
individual, but by governmental action.

It is not the appellees but the sovereignty, which has 
spoken through its courts, which has issued a mandate to the 
appellants directing them to move from their homes and 
restraining and enjoining them from using or occupying 
the premises. In rendering such a decree, the court has 
functioned as a law making body. It is the court which 
has effectuated a policy of racial segregation. It is the 
court which has virtually announced to all colored persons: 
“ You shall not use or occupy land which you own or lease 
simply because you are of the African race.”

It has practically declared: “ If the owners of property 
in a particular locality, however extensive its area may be, 
see fit to agree on such a policy of segregation, these courts, 
sitting in equity, may by their decrees enforce such a policy, 
even if it be conceded that they would be prohibited from 
doing so by the decision of the Supreme Court of the 
United States if the legislative branch of the Government 
had established a like policy.”

To test the incongruity of such a situation, let us sup­
pose that after the decision in Buchanan v. Warley, supra, 
the Common Council of the City of Louisville had adopted 
an ordinance permitting the residents of the same districts 
which were affected by the ordinance which the Supreme 
Court had declared unconstitutional, to enter into a covenant 
in the precise terms of that which the court below has en­
forced in this case, and providing for their enforcement by 
the court. "Would it not at once have been said that it was



12

an intolerable invasion of the Constitution as interpreted by 
the Supreme Court? But that is exactly what has been 
done in the present cases by the adjudication which is now 
here for review.

Such inconsistency between legislative and judicial ac­
tion was the subject of the following comment in Gandolfo 
v. Hartman, 49 Fed. 181 (C. C., S. D. Cal., 1892):

“ It would be a very narrow construction of the 
constitutional amendment in question and of the deci­
sions based upon it, and a very restrictive application 
of the broad principles upon which both the amend­
ment and the decisions proceed, to hold that, while 
the State and municipal legislatures are forbidden 
to discriminate against the Chinese in their legisla­
tion, a citizen of the State may lawfully do so by 
contract, which the Courts may enforce. Such view 
is, I think, entirely inadmissible. Any result in­
hibited by the Constitution can no more be accom­
plished by contract of individual citizens than by 
legislation, and the court should no more enforce the 
one than the other. * * * But the principle governing 
the case is, in my opinion, equally applicable here, 
where it is sought to enforce an agreement made 
contrary to the public policy of the government, and 
in violation of the principles embodied in its Con­
stitution. Such a contract is absolutely void and 
should not be enforced in any Court, certainly not 
in a court of equity of the United States.”  (at pp. 
182, 183).2

An illuminating analysis of the extent to which the 
state is called upon to take action in enforcing a restrictive 
covenant appears in the brief amicus curiae submitted by 
the Attorney General of the State of California, Bobert W. 
Kenny, in the case of Andersen v. Anseth, pending on ap-

2 Compare: Kennett v. Chambers, 14 How. 38, 14 L. Ed. 316 
(1852).



13

peal in the Supreme Court of the State of California (L. A. 
No. 19759). There, the Attorney General supports the re­
spondent’s conclusion that the race restrictive covenant 
should not be enforced. In establishing the interest of the 
state in the appeal, the brief takes the following position:

“ The state as a whole is interested in this matter. 
The aid of its courts, nisi prius appellants, has been 
sought; its clerks, sheriffs and constables have been 
called to issue and serve writs, which issue in the 
name of the People of the State of California. Ulti­
mately (if the hopes of plaintiffs and appellants are 
realized) even the jails of the State may be called 
upon to play a part in these actions.
“ Under such circumstances we do not feel that the 
legal arm of the state should remain inactive.
“ When the state is called upon to take State action 
in its own name against a large segment of its law 
abiding citizens, the law officers of the state should 
be heard.”

It is settled that action by the judicial arm of the state 
is state action within the prohibition of the Fourteenth 
Amendment-

In the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 1, 3 Sup. Ct. 18, 27 
L. Ed. 835 (1883), where the Supreme Court was examin­
ing into the power of the Congress to enact legislation seek­
ing to secure for the recently freed slave full and equal 
enjoyment of accommodations, facilities, inns, public con­
veyances and other places of public amusement, judicial 
action was recognized as state action within the prohibition 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus the Court states:

‘ ‘ In this connection it is proper to state that civil 
rights, such as are guaranteed by the Constitution 
against state aggression, cannot be impaired by the 
wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by state



14

authority in the shape of laws, customs or judicial 
or executive proceedings. The wrongful act of an 
individual, unsupported by any such authority, is 
simply a private wrong, or a crime of that individual; 
an invasion of the rights of the injured party, it is 
true, whether they affect his person, his property or 
his reputation; but if not sanctioned in some way by 
the State, or not done under state authority, his 
rights remain in full force, and may presumably be 
vindicated by resort to the laws of the State for re­
dress. An individual cannot deprive a man of his 
right to vote, to hold property, to buy and to sell, to 
sue in the courts or to be a witness or a juror; he 
may, by force or fraud, interfere with the enjoyment 
of the right in a particular case; he may commit an 
assault against the person, or commit murder, or use 
ruffian violence at the polls, or slander the good name 
of a fellow citizen; but, unless protected in these 
wrongful acts by some shield of state law or state 
authority, he cannot destroy or injure the right; . . . 
(at p. 17).

“ It [the Fourteenth Amendment] nullifies and 
makes void all state legislation and state action of 
every hind which impairs the privileges and immuni­
ties of citizens of the United States or which injures 
them in life, liberty or property without due process 
of law, or which denies to any of them the equal 
protection of the laws.”  (at p. 11). (Italics added.)

In Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad v. City of 
Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 17 Sup. Ct. 581, 41 L. Ed. 979 
(1896), the Supreme Court found that the action of a court 
in the State of Illinois in depriving appellant of land with­
out due process of law was within the prohibition of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Court states:

“ But it must be observed that the prohibitions of 
the Amendment refer to all the instrumentalities of 
the State, to its legislative, executive, and judicial



15

authorities, and, therefore, whoever by virtue of 
public position under a state government deprives 
another of any right protected by that Amendment 
against deprivation by the state, ‘ violates the con­
stitutional inhibition; and as he acts in the name and 
for the state, and is clothed with the state’s power, 
his act is that of the state.’ This must be so, or, as 
we have often said, the constitutional prohibition has 
no meaning, and ‘ the state has clothed one of its 
agents with power to annul or evade it.’ ”  (at p. 234).

Further the Court states:

‘ ‘ But a state may not, by any of its agencies, dis­
regard the prohibitions of the 14th Amendment. Its 
judicial authorities may keep within the letter of the 
statute prescribing forms of procedure in the courts 
and give the parties interested the fullest oppor­
tunity to be heard, and yet it might be that its final 
action would be inconsistent with that Amendment. ’ ’ 
(at p. 235).8

The action of a state court granting an injunction 
against picketing was found by the Supreme Court to con­
stitute an invasion of the rights secured by the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Court in its opinion stated in American 
Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321, 61 Sup. Ct. 
568, 85 L. Ed. 855 (1940):

“ The scope of the Fourteenth Amendment is not 
confined by the notion of a particular state regarding 
the wise limits of an injunction in an industrial dis­
pute, whether those limits be defined by statute or by 
the judicial organ of the state.”  (Italics added.)

The case of Parmalee v. Morris, 218 Mich. 625 (1922), 
wherein a race restrictive covenant was upheld as not in 3

3 See also Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 207 U. S. 20, 
28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 7, 52 L. Ed. 78 (1907).



16

itself violating the 14th Amendment, is not controlling in 
this case, since the issue-of state action was not raised on 
that appeal. In its decision there, this Court made the fol­
lowing statement:

“ Were the defendant’s claim of rights based 
upon any action taken by the authority of the State, 
an entirely different question would be presented. ’ ’ 4

Further, in the decision in the Parmalee case, it is stated 
that the protection of the 14th Amendment is confined to 
“ state legislation” . Such a narrow definition of state ac­
tion is not in line with the United States Supreme Court’s 
decisions on this point as indicated, supra. Therefore the 
Parmalee case can no longer be considered authoritative.

II

The Restrictions Upon the Use of Land by
Members of Racial or Religions Groups Is
Against the Public Policy of the State of Mich­

igan and the United States of America.

It is said an agreement is against public policy if “ it is 
injurious to the interests of the public, contravenes some 
established interest of society, violates some public statute, 
is against good morals, tends to interfere with public wel­
fare or safety, or, as it is sometimes put, if it is at war with 
the interests of society and is in conflict with the morals of 
the time.”  12 Amer. Jur. 663.

4 The case of Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U. S. 323, 46 Sup. Ct. 521, 
70 L. Ed. 969 (1926), is sometimes cited in support of the constitu­
tionality of judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants. There the 
Supreme Court pointed out that the constitutionality of the decrees 
of the lower court had not been raised on appeal and was not before 
the Court.



17

In Skutt v. City of Grand Rapids, 275 Mich. 258 (1936), 
this Court adopted as its definition of public policy the fol­
lowing statement from Pittsburgh C. C. <& St. Louis R. Co. 
v. Kenney, 95 Ohio St. 64:

“ What is the meaning of ‘ public policy’ ! . . . 
In substance it may be said to be the community com­
mon sense and common conscience, extended and 
applied throughout the State to matters of public 
morals, public health, public safety, public welfare, 
and the like. It is that general and well settled public 
opinion relating to man’s plain, palpable duty to his 
fellow men, having due regard to all the circum­
stances of each particular relationship and situation.

“ Sometimes such public policy is declared by con­
stitution, sometimes by statute, sometimes by judicial 
decision. More often, however, it abides only in the 
customs and convictions of the people—in their clear 
consciousness and conviction of what is naturally and 
inherently just and right between man and man. It 
regards the primary principles of equity and justice 
and is sometimes expressed under the title of social 
and industrial justice, as it is conceived by our body 
politic. . . .  It has frequently been said that such 
public policy is a composite of constitutional provi­
sions, statutes and judicial decisions, and some courts 
have gone so far as to hold that it is limited to these. 
The obvious fallacy of such a conclusion is apparent 
from the most superficial examination. When a con­
tract is contrary to some provision of the Constitu­
tion, we say it is prohibited by the Constitution, not 
by public policy. When a contract is contrary to 
statute, we say it is prohibited by statute, not by 
public policy. When a contract is contrary to a 
settled line of judicial decisions, we say it is pro­
hibited by the law of the land, but we do not say it is 
contrary to public policy. Public policy is the corner 
stone—the foundation—of all constitutions, statutes 
and judicial decisions, and its latitude and longitude,



18

its height and its depth, greater than any or all of 
them. ’ ’

A  proper exercise of the equitable discretion of the 
Court, in the light of the anti-social character of the con­
tract here involved and the large actual and potential injury 
to public and community interests which would result from 
the enforcement of the decree in the court below requiring 
the appellants to move from their homes, should have led 
the court below to refuse the relief requested by the plain­
tiff-respondent.

A. The Public Policy of Michigan

The decree of the court below in Northwest Civic Asso­
ciation v. Sheldon has the effect of barring appellant Otis 
E. Sheldon from living with his wife, Louise Sheldon, who 
is likewise an appellant, in a home which they have pur­
chased for that purpose. Such a result, in itself, is clearly 
grounds for finding that the action of the court below in 
the Sheldon case is against public policy. In 1883 the Mich­
igan legislature by Public Act 23 validated marriages and 
legitimatized the issue of marriages between Negroes and 
whites. (25 Mich. Stat. Ann. 6.) The practical fact of the 
situation is that the appellant Louise Sheldon may remain 
in her home but her husband may not visit her without be­
coming liable to contempt proceedings. And this result is 
arrived at solely because of appellant Otis E. Sheldon’s 
race. Such an unwarranted interference, against the wishes 
of the parties, with a marital relationship violates the most 
fundamental concepts of human decency and runs counter 
to the purpose of Public Act 23 of the Michigan legislature 
of 1883.

There are many other clear indications that the public 
policy of the State of Michigan, insofar as it is reflected



19

in it's constitution and statutes, is opposed to segregation. 
Discrimination or segregation based on race or color is 
forbidden in inns, hotels, restaurants, and other places of 
public resort and amusement, 28 Mich. Stat. Ann. 343-5; in 
public schools, 15 Mich. Stat. Ann. 380; and in the premiums 
or policies of life insurance companies, 24 Mich. Stat. 
Ann. 293.

The state is forbidden by Article II, Section 1, of the 
constitution of Michigan from discrimination in the follow­
ing language:

“ All political power is inherent in the people. 
Government is instituted for their equal benefit, se­
curity and protection.”

In an opinion of the Attorney General of the State of 
Michigan, October 7, 1940, cited at 28 Mich. Stat. Ann. 343, 
it is stated that Negroes may not lawfully be prohibited 
from living in a city or from staying all night solely because 
of race or color.

In the light of these constitutional and statutory provi­
sions, it is clear that the Michigan public policy is opposed 
to segregation of the races whether accomplished by indi­
vidual action or by authority of the state.

It is apparent that should a suit in equity be brought 
before this Court against an innkeeper whose inn was built 
upon land covered by a race restrictive covenant, seeking 
to force him to exclude Negroes, this Court must hold that 
enforcement of the covenant would be in violation of the 
public policy of the State. Otherwise this Court would, by 
its decree, require the innkeeper to commit a misdemeanor. 
The laws of Michigan would also require this Court to find 
such a covenant unenforceable as against a public school 
built on land covered by such a covenant.



20

It would seem to follow that such a race restrictive cove­
nant, the enforcement of which in some instances would 
require this Court to direct the commission of a crime, must 
be against public policy of the state of Michigan in all 
eases. Since the restriction runs against use or occupancy, 
it would be most inequitable to enforce it against a private 
owner, forbidding him to occupy his own property, while 
refusing to enforce it against a commercial owner, and re­
quiring him to allow Negroes to live in his hotel or inn.

B. The Public Policy of the United States 
of America

The public policy of the United States concerning seg­
regation is also reflected by the Constitution, by the Amend­
ments thereto, by statutory enactments thereunder, and by 
the decisions of the courts interpreting this written body 
of law. In addition, the public policy of the United States 
must necessarily be changed and increased by its subscrip­
tion to the Charter of the United Nations, the preamble of 
which contains the following statement:

“ We, the people of the United Nations, determined 
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of 
war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold 
sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in funda­
mental human rights, in the dignity and worth of 
the human person, in the equal rights of men and 
women and of nations large and small . . . and 
for these ends to practice tolerance and live together 
in peace with one another as good neighbors . . . ”

As a member of the United Nations the United States is 
pledged to promote universal respect for the observance 
of “ human rights and fundamental freedoms for all with­
out distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.”



21

In determining the solemnity with which onr govern­
ment has undertaken its responsibility for promoting these 
basic purposes of the United Nations, it is significant that 
the United Nations grew out of the struggle in which our 
government and the people of the country willingly sacri­
ficed the lives of thousands of its citizens in order to insure 
the perpetuation and maintenance of our way of life. In 
that war, the declared purpose of our government as set 
forth in the Atlantic Charter was the establishment of the 
four freedoms which included freedom from fear and free­
dom of worship. It cannot be said that the dedication of our 
nation to victory in the war to establish these principles 
did not affect our public policy. In fact the actions of the 
whole people in sacrificing their lives and resources to 
establish these principles is the clearest evidence of the 
public policy of this country.

The effect of the United Nations Charter and the Atlantic 
Charter upon the public policy of a member nation of 
the United Nations has been discussed in full in Matter 
of Drummond Wren decided in the Ontario Supreme Court 
on October 29, 1945 (Ontario Reports, 1945, p. 778). In 
that case the Ontario Court found a restriction against the 
sale of land to Jews “ or persons of objectionable nation­
ality”  to be unenforceable as against the public policy of 
Ontario and Canada. Significantly after reviewing the re­
sponsibility of the Government of Canada for maintaining 
the principles expressed in the Charter of the United 
Nations, the Court stated that the public policy applicable 
did not depend upon the terms of a local statute against 
racial discrimination but was based on a broader policy, 
established through the adoption of the United Nations 
Charter, which, after ratification, became a part of the 
fundamental law of the Dominion.



Further documenting of the public policy of the United 
States and member nations of the United Nations in 
this regard, the Anglo-American Commission, consisting 
of representatives appointed by the British Crown and the 
President of the United States to conduct an inquiry on 
Jews in Europe and Palestine, discussed at some length in 
Eecommendation No. 7 of its report the effect of racial or 
religious restrictions upon the sale, lease or use of land 
in Palestine and stated that the retention of such stipula­
tions are “ harmful to cooperation and understanding be­
tween Arabs and Jews.”

Even prior to the entry of our country into a war 
against fascism in Europe and Asia, public policy of the 
United States was opposed to segregation and proscriptions 
based on race or color. Public policy concerning the legal 
rights of Negroes was first established following the Civil 
"War when the people of the United States enacted the 13th 
Amendment to abolish slavery and the 14th Amendment 
to abolish the badges of servitude.

In a consideration of the Amendments in 1872 while the 
struggle for their enactment was still alive in the memory 
of the court, the Supreme Court stated in the Slaughter-
House Cases, supra:

“  . . .  no one can fail to be impressed with the 
one pervading purpose found in them all, lying at 
the foundation of each, and without which none of 
them would have been even suggested; we mean the 
freedom of the slave race, the security and firm 
establishment of that freedom, and the protection of 
the newly made freedman and citizen from the op­
pressions of those who had formerly exercised unlim­
ited dominion over him.”  (at p. 71).



23

Subsequently, in 1879, in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 
U. S. 303, 25 L. Ed. 664, after referring at length to its 
decision in the Slaughter-House Cases, the Court stated:

“ What is this [the amendment] but declaring 
that the law in the States shall be the same for the 
black as for the white; that all persons, whether 
colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws 
of the States, and, in regard to the colored race, for 
whose protection the Amendment was primarily de­
signed, that no discrimination shall be made against 
them by law because of their color! The words of 
the Amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but they 
contain a necessary implication of a positive im­
munity, or right, most valuable to the colored race— 
the right to exemption from unfriendly legislation 
against them distinctively as colored; exemption from 
legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil 
society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of 
the rights which others enjoy, and discriminations 
which are steps toward reducing them to the condi­
tion of a subject race.”  (at p. 308).

Nothing can be more explicit in explaining the public 
policy of the United States than section 42 of Title 8 of the 
United States Code which we shall set forth here once more.

“ All citizens of the United States shall have the 
same right, in every State and Territory, as is en­
joyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, 
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal prop­
erty.”

The significance of such legislation upon the exercise of 
judicial discretion in dealing with contracts inconsistent 
with public policy, thus authoritatively declared, has been 
stated by one commentator in the following language:

“  . . . the courts will refuse to enforce a con­
tract, not ‘ because it is illegal’ or because the legis-



24

lature ‘ intended that a person making* such a con­
tract be punished’, but because they have satisfied 
themselves, in the light of what has been indicated 
to them by legislative bodies, at home or abroad, the 
contract is against public policy . . . the courts 
should frown upon contracts which, though not 
touching a penal statute, involve other conduct which 
has been inveighed against by the legislature. What 
is suggested is not an extension of the scope of judi­
cial disapprobation of contracts, for at all times the 
courts have freely declared that non-criminal agree­
ments might be against public policy and conse­
quently unenforcible. What is urged, again, is 
merely that legislative judgments should be used as 
indicators of the occasion for employment of the 
common law rule governing the validity of con­
tracts.”  (Italics added.) Gelhorn, Contracts and 
Public Policy (1935), 35 Col. L. Rev. 678, 691-2.

C. The Race Restrictive Covenant Before This 
Court Is Injurious to the Interests of the 
Public, Interferes with the Public Welfare 
and Is at War with the Interests of Society

Residental segregation, which is sought to be maintained 
by court enforcement of the race restrictive covenant before 
this Court, “ has kept the Negro occupied sections of cities 
throughout the country fatally unwholesome places, a 
menace to the health, morals and general decency of cities, 
and plague spots for race exploitation, friction and riots!”  
Report of the Committee on Negro Housing of the Presi­
dent, Conference on Home Building, Vol. VI, pp. 45, 46 
(1932).

The extent of overcrowding resulting from the enforced 
segregation of Negro residents is daily increasing. The 
United States Census of 1940 examines the characteristics 
of 19 million urban dwellings. The census classifies a



25

dwelling as overcrowded if it is occupied by more than 1% 
persons per room. On this basis 8 percent of the units occu­
pied by whites in the nation are classified in the 1940 census 
as overcrowded, while 25 percent of those occupied by non­
whites are so classified. In Baltimore, Maryland, Negroes 
comprise 20 percent of the population yet are constricted 
in 2 percent of the residential areas. In the Negro occupied 
second and third wards of Chicago, the population density 
is 90,000 per square mile, exceeding even the notorious 
overcrowding of Calcutta.

In Table A, post, there are set forth the statistics of 
number of persons per room by color for resident occupied 
dwelling units in 1944 in the Detroit-Willow Run Area. 
These figures show that while in the total population over­
crowding was serious, for the non-white population the 
problem reached critical proportions.

Thus, 8 percent of the non-white residents of the Detroit- 
Willow Run Area lived at a density in excess of IV2 persons 
per room, while only 2.3 percent of the white residents were 
classified as overcrowded in the census of 1940.

The critical lack of housing facilities in Michigan’s non­
white population is emphasized by the following quotation 
from another census study of the Detroit Metropolitan 
District.

“ Vacancy rates were generally lower in Negro 
sections than in white sections. The gross vacancy 
rate among dwelling units for Negro occupancy was 
0.4 percent and among those for white occupancy 0.8 
percent.

“ Habitable vacancies represented about seven 
eighths of the unoccupied dwellings intended for 
white occupants and one half of those for Negro 
occupants.



“ Crowded dwelling units-—those housing’ more 
than IV2 persons a room—made up 1.3 percent of 
the dwellings in white neeighborhoods and 7.4 per­
cent of the dwellings in Negro neighborhoods. These 
units [Negro housing*] had only one percent of all 
the entire area but were occupied by three percent 
of its population.”  (U. S. Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of Census, Special Survey H. 0. No. 143, 
August 23, 1944.)

The overcrowding of the entire community during the 
period from 1940 to 1944 can be emphasized by the growth 
of the Detroit Metropolitan District’s population from 
2,295,867 in 1940 to 2,455,035 in 1944. During the same 
period the non-white population in the Metropolitan area 
increased from 171,877 to 250,195 (U. S. Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of Census, Population Series C. A. 3 
No. 9, October 1, 1944).

According to the Bureau of Census, the non-white popu­
lation of Detroit itself increased from 150,790 in 1940 to 
213,345 in June of 1944, a percentage increase of 41.5 per­
cent. There exists no accurate survey of the extent of race 
restrictive covenants in the Detroit Metropolitan District. 
However, the experience of the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People in Detroit indicates 
that such restrictions constitute a serious limitation on the 
amount of living space available for Detroit Negro citizens.

On June 19, 1946, the City of Detroit Interracial Com­
mittee submitted its Report on The State of Race Relations 
Today. In this report is the statement of Director George 
Schermer which contains a discussion of the social effect 
of restrictive covenants. Mr. Schermer states:

“ These practices have inflicted serious injury to a 
large number of individuals. Also it takes no effort 
to demonstrate that they have inflicted serious social 
injury upon the entire community.”  (at p. 7).

26



27

Competent professionals working in the housing field 
repeatedly have pointed out the social cost and public injury 
which resulted from these race restrictions. Thus, John J. 
Blandford, Jr., Administrator of the National Housing 
Agency, speaking in Columbus, Ohio on October 2, 1944, 
had this to say:

“ I do not need to tell you of the difficulties we 
encountered even after we could establish the need 
of migrating Negro war workers. We met troubles 
from the start of the war housing job, but they were 
multiplied every time we tried to build a project, 
open to Negroes. These difficulties—of site selec­
tion, of obtaining more ‘ living space’—were deep- 
rooted and had to be overcome, one by one. And 
delays only made more desperate the plight of both 
those who migrated to take war jobs and those al­
ready living in war industry centers.

“ The average citizen knows generally that re­
strictions on Negroes abound, just as he knows slums 
abound in our major cities. But does he know that, 
as in those cities, there’s hardly a decent piece of 
land a Negro can build on in his own home town! 
Does he know that new living space is imperative 
because the present limited spaces are crowded to the 
point that disease and crime ultimately will be bred 
there—if it doesn’t already exist? Does he know 
how the concentration of war industries has affected 
the lives of Neg’roes who have lived a few blocks 
away from his own home for years—now crowded 
together as never before—or the newcomers who 
have been forced upon them? Well, if not, the facts 
must be told and told again as facts about his home 
town—not of cities far away.

“ The core of the housing problem of Negroes is, 
of course, more living space.”

To the same effect is the comment of the Commissioner, 
Federal Public Housing Authority, Philip M. Klutznick, in



his article, Public Housing Charts Its Course, published in 
Survey Graphic for January, 1945:

“ But the minority housing problem is not one of 
buildings alone. More than anything else it is a 
matter of finding space in which to put the buildings. 
Large groups of these people are being forced to 
live in tight pockets of slum areas where they in­
crease at their own peril; they are denied the oppor­
tunity to spread out into new areas in the search for 
decent living.

“ The opening of new areas of living to all 
minority groups is a community problem. And it is 
one of national concern.”

This is not a new situation, but it is becoming more 
aggravated from year to year. As far back as 1928 one of 
the most discerning writers in this field clearly pointed out 
what was happening and its social dangers:

‘ ‘ Congestion comes about largely from conditions 
over which the Negroes have little control. They are 
crowded into segregated neighborhoods, are obliged 
to go there and nowhere else, and are subjected to 
vicious exploitation. Overcrowding saps the vitality 
and the moral vigor of those in the dense neighbor­
hoods. The environment then, rather than heredi­
tary traits, is a strong factor in increasing death- 
rates and moral disorders. Since the cost of sick­
ness, death, immorality and crime is in part borne 
by municipal appropriations to hospitals, jails and 
courts, and in part by employers’ losses through 
absence of employees, the entire community pays for 
conditions from which the exploiters of real estate 
profit.”  Woofter, Negro Problem In Cities (1938) 
at page 95.

It is also widely recognized that these anti-social cove­
nants are not characteristically the spontaneous product of



29

the community will but rather result from the pressures 
and calculated action of those who seek the exploit for their 
own gain residential segregation and its consequences. 
This process has been aptly discribed by W oof ter, op. cit. 
supra at page 73:

“ The riots of Chicago were preceded by the 
organization of a number of these associations 
(neighborhood protective associations); and an 
excellent report on their workings is to be found in 
The Negro in Chicago, the report of the Chicago 
Race Commission. The endeavor of such organiza­
tions is to pledge the property holders of the 
neighborhood not to sell or rent to Negroes, and to 
use all the possible pressures of boycott and ostra­
cism in the endeavor to hold the status of the area. 
They often endeavor to bring pressure from banks 
against loans on Negro property in the neighbor­
hood, and are sometimes successful in this.

“ The danger in such associations lies in the ten­
dency of unruly members to become inflamed and to 
resort to acts of violence. Although they are a usual 
phenomenon when neighborhoods are changing from 
white to Negro in northern cities, no record was 
found in this study where such an association had 
been successful in stopping the spread of a Negro 
neighborhood. The net results seem to have been a 
slight retardation in the rate of spread and the cre­
ation of a considerable amount of bitterness in the 
community.”  Cf. Embree, Broivn Americans (1943) 
at page 34 reporting 175 such organizations in Chi­
cago alone.

James M. Haswell, in a featured article in the Detroit 
Free Press for March 17,1945, estimates 150 such organiza­
tions are functioning in Detroit.



30

The same thesis with reference to the City of Detroit 
was recently elaborated by Dr. Alfred M. Lee, Professor of 
Sociology at Wayne University:

“ Emphasizing overcrowding and poor housing as 
one of the major causes of racial disturbances, Lee 
declared that in his opinion real estate dealers and 
agents have been doing more to stir up racial an­
tagonisms in Detroit than any other single group.

“  ‘ These men (real estate dealers),’ Lee said, 
‘ Are the ones who organize, promote and maintain 
restrictive covenants and discriminatory organiza­
tions. I am convinced that once it is possible to 
break the legality of these covenants, a great deal of 
our troubles will disappear.’ ’ ’ As reported in The 
Michigan Chronicle for May 9, 1945.

Other significant analyses of racial conflicts emphasize 
the evils of segregation and its contribution to tension and 
strife.

“ But they [the Negroes] are isolated from the 
main body of whites, and mutual ignorance helps 
reinforce segregative attitudes and other forms of 
race prejudice” . Myrdal, An American Dilemma, 
(1944) vol. 1, page 625.

‘ ‘ The Detroit riots of 1943 supplied dramatic evi­
dence: rioting occurred in sections where white and 
Negro citizens faced each other across a color line, 
but not in sections where the two groups lived side 
by side.”  Good Neighbors, Architectural Forum,, 
January 1946.

The dangers to society which are inherent in the restric­
tion of members of minority groups to overcrowded slum 
areas are so great and are so well recognized that a court 
of equity, charged with maintaining the public interest, 
should not, through the exercise of the power given to it



31

by the people, intensify so dangerous a situation. There­
fore, in the light of public interest, the court below erred 
in granting the plaintiff’s petition and ordering the defen­
dants to move from their homes.

Conclusion

The action of the Court below enforcing the race re­
strictive covenants against appellants violates the Constitu­
tion of the United States and is against public policy of the 
State of Michigan and the United States of America. 
Therefore, the decrees below should be vacated.

Respectfully submitted,

T hurgood M arshall,
R obert L. Carter,
Marla n W y n n  P erry,
E dward M. T urner,

Counsel for the National Association 
For the Advancement of Colored People.

S pottswood W. R obinson , III,
Of Counsel.



32

TABLE A *
T able 28.—Persons Per Room by Color of Occupants, for Resident-O ccupied Dwelling 

Units, by Number of Rooms, for Detroit-W illow Run A rea: 1944

T otal

N umber of Rooms

Total
1 room .................
2 rooms .................
3 rooms .................
4 rooms .................
5 rooms .................
6 rooms .................
7 rooms .................
8 rooms .................
9 or more rooms. .

Reporting Persons per room
person 0.50 or 0.51 to 0.76 to 1.01 to 1.51 to 2.01 or

per room less 0.75 1.00 1.50 2.00 more
733,040 250,745 204,600 201,355 55,055 16,995 4,290

16,885 9,845 4,620 2,420
32,505 9,570 15,510 4,675 2.035 715
68,750 8,360 32,615 17,215 6,270 3,685 605

108,460 38,115 31,515 22,550 13,475 2,255 550
229,295 67,980 61,435 80,410 15,070 4,400
159,610 70,290 39,765 38,665 10,890
59,840 24,915 23,210 8,910 2,805
33,880 19,635 9,350 3,025 1,870
23,815 11,880 6,710 5.225

Nonwhite

Number of Rooms Reporting Persons per room

person 0.50 or 0.51 to 0.76 to 1.01 to 1.51 to 2.01 or
per room more 0.75 1.00 1.50 2.00 more

Total............. 56,100 11,990 11,275 17,655 10,450 3,575 1,155

1,705 880 385 440
2 rooms ................... 3/410 770 1,485 660 275 220
3 rooms ......... '........ 7,535 770 3,080 1,815 935 715 220
4 rooms ................... 11,385 3,410 2,530 2,530 2,090 550 275
5 rooms ................... 15,015 3,135 2,255 5,445 2,530 1,650
6 rooms ................... 9,570 2,255 1,320 3,080 2,915
7 rooms ................... 3,630 770 990 1,155 715
8 rooms ................... 2,640 770 825 440 605
9 or more rooms. . . 1,210 110 275 825

* United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Series CA-3, No. 9, October 1, 
1944.

The figures on white occupancy in the text of the brief are arrived at by subtracting the figures 
for “non-white” from the figures for “total” occupancy.



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