Allied Chemical Corporation v. White Brief for Respondents in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari

Public Court Documents
September 8, 1977

Allied Chemical Corporation v. White Brief for Respondents in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari preview

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  • Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Allied Chemical Corporation v. White Brief for Respondents in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 1977. 12e9979e-b79a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/4ab25719-f315-43f4-a714-f88977baef0c/allied-chemical-corporation-v-white-brief-for-respondents-in-opposition-to-petition-for-writ-of-certiorari. Accessed October 10, 2025.

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    IN  T IIE
B nptm ?  (Enurt nf %  United StatesO cto b e r T e r m , 1977

No. 77-97
A L L I E D  C H E M IC A L  C O R P O R A T IO N ,P e titio n e r ,

vs.A N T H O N Y  W H IT E  and H E N R Y  C L A R K , S R . ,R esp ondents.B R IE F  F O R  R E S P O N D E N T S  IN O P P O S IT IO N  T O  P E T IT IO N  F O R  W R IT  O F  C E R T IO R A R I T O  T H E  U N IT E D  S T A T E S  C O U R T  O F  A P P E A L S  F O R  T H E  F IF T H  C IR C U IT .
D ated :Sep tem b er 8,

Donald Ju n eau 9IQ-17th S tre e t, N . W„ Suite 501W ashington, D . C . 20006C ou n sel fo r  R esp ondents.



I N  T H ESiipmite (Emtrl nf tljp Hmtrfc StatesO c to b e r  T e r m , 1977
N o . 77-97

A L L I E D  C H E M I C A L  C O R P O R A T I O N ,P e t it io n e r ,v s .A N T H O N Y  W H IT E  and H E N R Y  C L A R K , S R . ,R e sp o n d e n ts .B R I E F  F O R  R E S P O N D E N T S  IN O P P O S I T I O N  T O  P E T I T I O N  F O R  W R IT  O F  C E R T I O R A R I  T O  T H E  U N IT E D  S T A T E S  C O U R T  O F  A P P E A L S  F O R  T H E  F I F T H  C I R C U I T ,
Q U E S T IO N  P R E S E N T E D .W hether an em p loyee a g g rie v e d  by d is c r im i­n atory  em ploym ent p r a c tic e s  m ade unlaw ful by T it le  V II  of the C iv i l  R ig h ts  A c t o f 1964 has a r ig h t to a h earin g  to set a s id e  his asse n t to an E q u a l E m p loym en t O p p ortu n ity  C o m m is s io n  C o n ­c ilia t io n  A g re e m e n t on the grounds that the a sse n t was not m ade v o lu n ta r ily .■ A R G U M E N TA . T he D e c is io n  o f the C o u rt o f A p p ea ls  Is C le a r ly  C o r r e c t .

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In its  d e c is io n , the C o u r t  o f  A p p e a ls  held that the D is t r ic t  C o u rt should have conducted a h e a rin g  into w hether the p ro s p e c tiv e  in te rv e n o rs  had know ingly w aived th e ir  r ig h t to sue under T it le  V II , re ly in g  upon th is  C o u r t ’ s d e c is io n  In A lexan d er v . G a r d n e r -D e n v e r  C o . , 415 U . S . 36 (19741, w here it w as held that in the fa c e  of a c la im  of w a iv e r o f the r ig h t to sue under T itleV II , "a  co u rt would have t o  d e te rm in e  at the outset that the e m p lo y e e ’ s co n sen t to the s e t t le ­m ent w as v o lu n ta ry  and know ing. "  A le x a n d e r  v . G a r d n e r -D e n v e r  C o . ,  s u p r a , 415 U . S . at 52 n. 15. T h at statem en t is a r e f le c t io n  o f th is  C o u r t 's  co n siste n t p ositio n  down th rou gh  the y e a r s  on the qu estion  o f w a iv e r , i . e . , th at a v a lid  w a iv e r  m ust be "an in tention al re lin q u ish m e n t o r  aband­onm ent of a known rig h t o r  p r iv ile g e . " Jo h n so n  v . Z e r b s t , 304 U , S . 458, 464 (1938); s e e  a ls o  G a rd n e r  v . F lo r id a , 97 S . C t . 1197, 1206-07 (1977); B a r k e r  v . W ingo, 412 U . S . 218, 235-37 (1973); F a y  v . N o ia , 372 U . S . 391, 439 (1963). T h e in ­te rv e n o rs  should be g iv e n  a ch a n ce  to show  that th e ir  a sse n t to the co n cilia tio n  a g re e m e n t was not m ade know ingly o r  in te n tio n a lly . C f .  G lu s  v . B ro o k ly n  E a s te r n  D is t r ic t  T e r m in a l , 359 U . S . - 231 (1959).B . T h is  C a s e  Is Not R ip e  fo r  C e r t io r a r i .T he p resen t p o stu re  o f th is  c a s e  is  a c la s s ic  exam p le  of an in te r lo c u to r y  ap p e a l.T h e only is su e  re s o lv e d  by  the C o u rt o f A p p e a ls  is  w hether th e in te rv e n o rs  a r e  e n ­tit le d  to a h e arin g  on the v o lu n ta r in e s s  of th e ir  a sse n t to the c o n c ilia tio n  a g re e m e n t.
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T h e C o u rt o f A p p e a ls  did not la y  down any g u id e lin e s  as to the a p p lic a b le  le g a l stan d ard  to be fo llo w e d  or what w ould be the co n to u rs of the b u rden o f p ro o f; it m e r e ly  d ecid ed  that resp o n d en ts should be g iv en  a h e a rin g  on the v o ’ u n ta rin e ss  q u estio n . T h e c a s e  has been r e ­m anded fo r  fu rth e r  p ro ce e d in g s  a lo n g  that lin e , and in s im ila r  in s ta n c e s , th is  C o u rt has d e c l i ­ned to g ran t c e r t io r a r i  b e c a u se  o f u n reso lved  fa c tu a l is s u e s . S e e , e . g . , B ro th erh o o d  o f L o c o - m o tive  F ir e m e n  v . B a n g o r & A r o stook R , R . ,'389 U . S . 327, 328 (1967); A m e r ic a n  C o n s tru ctio n  C o . v . Ja c k s o n v il le , T a m p a  &- K e y  W est R y . ,148 U . S . 372, 384 (1893).T he p o s s ib ility  fo r  th e s e  p o te n tia l is s u e s  to d evelop  a s  th is  c a s e  g o e s  a lo n g  does not m ake it p ro p e r  fo r  p e tit io n e r  to s e e k  an a d v is o r y  o p in ion  fr o m  th is  C o u r t  a s  to what its  p o sitio n  w ould be on th e s e  q u e s tio n s .S e e , e . g . ,  K r e m e n s  v . B a r t le y , 97 S . C t .  1709, 1717-19 (1977), D e s p ite  p e t it io n e r 's  h yp erb ole a s  to th e co n s e q u e n c e s  o f  th e d e cis io n  o f  the C o u r t o f A p p e a ls , i f  upon re m a n d  th e  D is t r ic t  C o u r t fin d s  th at th e r e  has not in  fa c t  b een  a w a iv e r  o f T it le  V I I  r ig h t s , p e tit io n e r  would have no in ju r y  to  c o m p la in  ab o u t, and it would be the tu rn  o f re sp o n d e n ts  to have r e c o u r s e  to the ap pellate c o u r ts  a s  to th e c o r r e c t n e s s  o f the le g a l sta n d a rd  a p p lie d . In the p re se n t p o stu re  o f the c a s e , h o w ev er, th e re  is  o n ly  the fa ilu r e  o f the D is t r ic t  C o u r t  to hold a h e a rin g  on th e w a iv e r , and alth o u g h  p e tit io n e r  s tr e n u o u s ly  a r ­gues in its  p e titio n  th at the C o u r t  o f  A p p e a ls  did not in d u lge  In th e  p re su m p tio n  o f a d m in i­s tr a t iv e  r e g u la r it y , n o r did it ta k e  adequate no­t ic e  o f  the c o m p le x  n a tu re  o f m o st c o n c ilia tio n
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a g r e e m e n ts . P e titio n  fo r  C e r t i o r a r i ,  pp. 8, l l ,  p a s s im , none o f th e se  is s u e s  w e re  the su b je ct o f independent co n sid e ra tio n  b y  the co u rts  below , and thus cannot be ra is e d  h e re . C o n ce rn e d  C i t i -  zen s o f Sou th ern  O h io , In c . v . P in e  C r e e k  C o n ­s e r v a n c y  D is t r ic t , 429 U . S . 651, 652-53 (1977); E le c t r ic a l  W o rk e rs  L o c a l  790 v . R ob b in s & M y e r s , I n c . , 429 U. S . 229, 235 n. 7 (1976). P e titio n e r cannot fr a m e  any q u estio n s in its p e titio n  w h ich  w e re  not in fa c t  p re se n ted  in the r e c o r d  below . S e e , e . g . , B e lc h e r  v . S te n g e l, 429 U . S . 118, 119-20 (1976).T h e sa m e  holds tru e  fo r  p e tit io n e r 's  c o n ­ten tio n  that no r ig h t - t o - s u e  n o tice  w as issu ed  to the p ro s p e c tiv e  in te r v e n o r s , W hite and C la r k . T h e re  is  nothing in the r e c o r d  below  to support su ch  an a s s e v e r a t io n , and p e titio n e r cannot be allow ed to b rin g  it up at th is  tate sta g e  in the g a m e . S e ^  e , g . , Y o u ak im  v . M ille r , 425 U. S . - 231, 235-36 (1976); Sh adw ick v . C ity  of T a m p a , 407 U . S . 345, 352 (1972). E v e n  a ssu m in g , argu en d o, that notice of the rig h t to sue had been is su e d , the in te rv en o rs a lso  sue under 42 U. S . C . §1981, w hich c e r ta in ly  is  not co vered  under the te rm s  of the w a iv e r set out in the c o n c ilia tio n  agreem ent, 5ee P e titio n  fo r  C e r t i­o r a r i , p. 3, s in ce  the w a iv e r co v e rs  only r ig h ts  su ab le under T it le  V II , w hose re m e d ie s  and p ro ce d u re s  a re  d is c r e te  fro m  § 1981.Jo h n so n  v . R a ilw a y  E x p r e s s  A g e n c y , Inc. , 421 U . S . ”454 (1975). 4



C O N C L U S IO NF o r  the above and fo re g o in g  r e a s o n s , resp on d en ts r e s p e c tfu lly  req u est th is  C o u rt to deny p e tit io n e r ’ s p etition  fo r  a w rit of c e r t io r a r i  to the United States C o u rt o f A p p eals fo r  the F if th  C ir c u it . R e s p e c tfu lly  subm itted,
Sep tem b er 8, 1977 Donald Ju n eauC o u n se l fo r  R esp ondents.910-17th S tre e t , N . W . , Suite 501W ashington, D . C . 20006.

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