Miller v. Johnson Brief of the Appellees
Public Court Documents
March 1, 1995

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Percy Green Brief for Petitioner, 1972. ba9fe85f-bc9a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/db46a5c1-d445-4b57-a99c-2bb7b128637f/mcdonnell-douglas-corporation-v-percy-green-brief-for-petitioner. Accessed August 27, 2025.
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IN THE U ij l i5 g r!■ ■ .f.iL i' T OCTOBER TERM, 1972 No. 72-490 \ \ \ \ McDo n n e l l d o u g l a s c o r p o r a t i o n , Petitioner, v. PERCY GREEN, Respondent. On Writ of Certiorari to trie United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit BRIEF FOR PETITIONER R. H. McROBERTS v e r y l l . r i d d l e THOMAS C. WALSH 500 North Broadway St. Louis, Missouri G3102 Attorneys for Petitioner BRYAN, CAVE, McPHEETERS & McROBERTS Of Counsel St. Louis Lav Printing Co., Inc., 411-15 N. Eighth St. 63101 314-233-4477 £ U \ INDEX Page Opinions below .................... Jurisdiction . . . . ........................................................................ 2 Questions presented ............... .................*.............. . Jj Statutes involved .............................. 3 Statement of the case ............................................... 5 Events leading up to the 1964 layoff ................... 6 The “ Stall-in” and “ Lock-in” ...................... The employment application ................ g Pre-trial matters ...................................................... 10 -the trial ....... ..................................................................... 12 The appeal . . . .......................................................... 13 Summary of argum ent............. ^ Argument __ .............................................................. 19 • An employer has the right under Title VII to refuse to hire a job applicant who has com- m ed illegal and unprotected acts against that employer even though the applicant is black .. W A. The fact that respondent is black does not ereate a pnma facie case of discrimination or relieve respondent of the burden of prov ing that petitioner’s refusal to hire him violated Title VII ......................................... 29 B. There is no requirement under Title VII hat an employment decision, racially neu ral m conception and operation, must be based only upon job performance 2o 1 . This case does not fall within the rule of ^nggs v. Duke Power Co. ................... 26 2. Section 706(g) permits any non-discrim- matory business decision made for any reason, whether or not based upon job performance . ........................... ................... 28 3. The “ StaH-m” and “ Look-in” justified pe I toner s refusal to hire respondent .. fiti IX In civil rights cases alleging discrimination, fire employer should be allowed to offer sub- jectrye evidence as to his motivation, and the we.ght to be accorded to such evidence should be determined by the trier of f a c t ................... 34 Conclusion ............................................................. by 4 Cases Cited AC.I'rOi\ v. Uannon, 450 F. 2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971) 6 ‘ or V. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 480 (1902) 3t Achm Life Insurance Company v. Ward, 140 U.S. 76 American Ship Building Co. v. N.L.B.B., 380 U.S.'aOO ^ .................................................. 28 Associated Press v. N.LR.B., 301 U.S. 103 (1937) 35 Bank v. Kennedy, 37 Wall. 39 (3872) 35 B U. s 399(S ) ° f - Buttny V. Smiley, 2S1 P Supp. 280 (D . Colo* 19*68) . .32-33 Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 633 (3968) ......... 21 City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (3966) 21 c° Z aT w T P°: S T " - v - H i " ’ 313 F S u - ' ................................................... 21 li i . I ll / Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Leonard, 315 F. Supp. 215 (W.D. Pa. 1970) ....................................... 21 Commissioner v. Duberstein, 3G3 U.S. 278 (1960) .. 35, 37 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) ........................ 21 Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183 (1909) ___ 36 Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F. 2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969) cert, denied 398 U.S. 965 (1970) 33 Fibrcboard v. N.L.R.B., 379 U.S. 203 (1964) ............. 30 Fluker v. Alabama State Board of Education, 441 F. 2d 201 (5th Cir. 1971) .............................................. ' 38 Gamer v. Los Angeles Board, 341 U.S. 716 (1951) . . . . 31 Glover v. Daniel, 318 F . Supp. 1070 (N.B.Ga. 1969), affirmed 434 F. 2d 617 (5th Cir. 1970) y.................30 Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 468 F. 2d 337 (8th Cir. 1972) ............................... 2, 13. 10. 19.08 05 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (197J) ............................................. 16,17,23,26,27,28,39 Hill v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 439 F. 2d 1016 (3d Cir. 1971) cert, denied 404 U.S. 985 (1971) ___ 21 Keen v. Long, 302 F. Supp. 1383 (E.D. Mo. 1969), affirmed, 428 F. 2d 876 (8th Cir. 1970), cert, denied 401 U.S. 923 (1971) ..................................................... 6 Moore v. Board of Education of Chidester School Dis trict, 448 F. 2d 709 (8th Cir. 1971) ............................ 33 National Packing Co. v. N.L.R.B., 352 F. 2d 4S2 (10th Cir. 1965) .............................................. 32 N.L.R.B. v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965) ....................... 35 N.L.R.B. v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U S 240 (1939) ................................................................... ' _ 32 N.L.R.B. v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967) 15, 37 f ’v-r*- IV N.L.R.B. v. Indiana Desk Co., 149 F. 2d 9S7 (7th Civ. Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S 620 (1944) ..................................... ' Schneider v. State, 30S U.S. 147 (1939) Southern Steamship Company v. N.L.R.B., 310 U.S. 31 Teamsters Local No. 357 v. N.L.R.B., 365 U S 667 (1961) .......................... ................................... ' ; g£ Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Railway Co 391 U.S. 29 (1944) ........................................... ; " 36 Tims v. Board of Education of McNeil, Arkansas 452 F. 2d 551 (8th Cir. 1971) ......................................... w Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) ............................ 19 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338 (1949) 35 Victor Product Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 208 F 2d 834 (D.C. Cir. 1953) ....................................... " qi 194B> ............................................................. : . ...3 i"\t r i > y » -x- „ _ 31-32, 33 35 31 N.L.R.B. v. Longview Furniture Co., 206 F 2d 274 (4th Cir. 1953) ........................ 33 32 37N.L.R.B. v. Walton Mfg. Co., 369 U.S. 404 (1962) . . . . fbieita Knitting Mills v. N.L.R.B., 375 F 2d 385 (4ih Ca-. 1967) ......................................... ' ' l “ T» T ^ /v» ___ 31,33 35 35 ... ... ... »-■ - -- -- ... ..• . : —*. fc-hc.;,. \ y Wallace v. United States, 162 U.S. 466 (1896) ......... 36 AV. J. Ruscoe Co. v. N.L.R.B., 406 F. 2d 725 (6th Cir ............................................................. : ...........31,33 AV. T. Rawleigk Co. v. N.L.R.B., 190 F. 2d 832 (7th Cir m i ) .......................................................................... . ' 3 3 Statutes Cited Title A711, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S C $2000e et seq.............. .....................................................passim 28 U.S.C. 1254 .................................. „ National Labor Relations Act, § 10(c), 29 U.S C ^160(c) .. ' ’ ‘ ' v ’ 28,30 « Miscellaneous Cited 110 Pono- o-crj ... ........................................................ 20 110 Cong. Rec.. 6549 ........................ ; ........... 2Q 110 Cong. Rec. 7212-14............................................ 2Q 110 Cong. Rec, 8350 .................................... 2Q 110 Cong. Rec. 11848 ................................ 2 110 Cong. Rec. 15866 ...................................................... *......... AU n o Cong. Rec. 7213___ ...................... ........................ n o Cong. Rec. 2567 ...................... ........................................... n o Cong. Rec. 2570 .......................... ................................... A\) n o Cong. Rec. 2603 ................................ ................................... A\) n o Cong. Rec. 2593 ....................... 2g 110 Cong. Rec. 2594 ................................... ...................... • • • AJ n o Cong. Rec. 2595 ................................ 29 Kule 15b, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.................... U ' — 1 -----------------.---W------ - \ IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OCTOBER TERM, 1972 o No. 72-490 McDo n n ell douglas corporation, Petitioner, v. PERCY GREEN, Respondent. On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit BRIEF FOR PETITIONER OPINIONS BELOW The original majority and dissenting, opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, filed on March 30, 1972, and the revised majority opinion and supplemental dissert filed on May 12, 1972, are re- j a I poi ted at 4°3 F. 2d .337 and are reprinted in Appendixes A and B (pp. A-l through A-38) to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari tiled in this case. The Memorandum Opinion of the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis- /ilC(1 °n September 25> 1970, is reported A 40 it S iI'1a 846 and is reprinted Appendix ]) (pp. A-40 through A-49) to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari. JURISDICTION CouH °figAinal C;pi" i0ns 0f the three-judge panel of the W on S f°r the Circuit were tiled on Maicli oO, 1972. In rospoir^e to nofiiimmi*’ f n i du. l lo pcnuoiiei timely Petition 0ri^ ial ^ io r i ty opinion was • u( on . aj .12, 1972, and rehearing was denied with out prejudice to the right of either partv in ftp n potiti(m xur rehearing addressed lo the modified opinion. Petitioner ime y. SOUgll<’ shearing en banc on the modified opinion, which was denied by an evenly divided court on June 28 1972. The Petition for Writ of Certiorari was w u m ™ ^ i 972’ *«• OH Decem- u k c : S (1I 1,e •”irisd,c," m ”f lhis c ° - ‘ - » — 2 — W QUESTIONS PRESENTED hire Tllr V11’ LS 311 employer’s right to refuse to . , J°b appllCant who has committed illegal and un protected acts against the employer nullified or circum senbed merely because the applicant is black? i 2. In Civil Rights cases involving allegedly discrimina tory acts, should the defendant be precluded from offer in o- subjecrive evidence to explain his motivation for thos! J — 3 — i \ \ STATUTES INVOLVED This case involves the construction and interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §20000, et seq., (Public law 88-352), the relevant portions of which provide as follows:1 Section 2000e-2: (a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge anj individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his com pensation, 1 eians, conditions, or privileges of em ployment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sox, or national origin.” Civil Rights Act of 1964-, §703(a) (1). r/„ o n . o . (.]) Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer . . . subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of per sons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer . . . ” Civil Rights Act of 1964, §703(j). Section 2O0Oe-3: “ (a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his 1 This case arose under Title VII as it. existed m-ior m 1972 am endm ents (Public Law 92-261). I t should be noted how e \c r , th a t the 19(2 am endm ents did not affect any of the sla t u to ry provisions or legal issues involved in this action / / I t \ employees or applicants for employment . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful em- oyment practice by this subchapter, or because he lace a c. aige, testified, assisted or participated ” 3117 m“ mer in an investigation, proceeding, or 5 ; ! ; : tUs subchapici'-” ^ » * « . a * <* Section 2000e-5: le u lio ii lV 1,e C0“r,t fl" dS .‘la t " ,c m pondM t l.as in- > engaged m or is intentionally engaging in phinf ,7 0,ni,,0'™ cm Pracl*ce charged in life com- rlaml, (he court may enjoin (he respondent from on- gcY llg iJ1 sucil unlawful employment practice and order such atlirmative action as may he apyropriale vhieh may include reinstatement or hiring of employ ees. Avith or Avitlimit l ,.7- , ^ court eP.epi / ,ja-v ‘ • ' Ao or(ler of the ' n r o l 7 q'" Te' ' ' ‘h0 Iliri”S, reinstatement, or payment"! ° “ M"al ““ an em»'<>y«b » «*>pa.f rnent to t o . of any back pay, if s„ch individual • • • was refused employment or advancement or vas suspended or discharged for any reason other than d'sci,m,nation on account of race, color, religion sex of lid T h °r ™ V,'olntion of sootion 2000e-S(a) of this title. Civil Eights Act of 1904, 5706(g). Section 2000e-7: exeinnt ning r ' ^ 8ubohaPter sha11 be deemed to f 01 reheve any Person from any liability duty penalty or punishment provided by any present or u me aw of any State or political subdivision of a Slate, oilier than any such law which purports to re quire or permit flic doing- of any act which would be an unlawful employment practice under this sub chapter.” Civil Rights Act. of 1964, §708. — 4 — — 5 — w STATEMENT OF THE CASE Respondent Percy Green is a black citizen of St. Louis Missouri. Petitioner McDonnell Douglas Corporation is an aerospace and aircraft manufacturer with its corporate leadquarters m St. Louis County, Missouri, where it em ploys m excess of 30,000 people. This case involves an individual claim of discrimina- 1(m ed by respondent Green against petitioner McDon nell claiming that McDonnell violated Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (“ the Act” ) when it refused to 11 r° G,VOn 0,1 2fi, 1963. This is not a class action or a ‘patteni or practice suit” but presents only the ques tion of whether McDonnell violated the Act in refusing to ire Green. Respondent seeks reinstatement and back pay • or himself as a result of petitioner’s allegedly wrongful iejection of Ins employment application. The original complaint filed in the District Court charged that McDonnell had refused to hire Green because of his opposition to petitioner’s employment practices (a ' At. tria1’ however, respondent presented extensive evi dence m an attempt to establish that the decision was also motivated by the fact that respondent was black. In addi- tioiq Green also sought to prove that his previous layoff by McDonnell m 1964 was improperly motivated. The District Court and the Court of Appeals properly ield that the layoff claim, interjected for the first time at trial, was barred by the statute of limitations and re spondent has filed no cross-petition in this Court seeking icview of that issue. Hence, the layoff is not before this Comt. However, because the issue of racial discrimination against Green is allegedly involved in the refusal to retire him, we lvill undertake here to trace Pro > McDo,me11’ - v f t . m s Z tT o u r t 8's ,vere nat disturbed by the Court of Appeals.’ i — G — Events Leading Up to the 1964 Layoff Respondent was originally hired by petitioner in 1956 '■ e was a Qualified mechanic, a member of the muon, and was rated average by his supervisors (A. 323 494). In 1962, he inquired about transferring from his union job to a non-union position in the laboratory depart ment of the Electronic Equipment Division (“ E.E.D.” ) ( . 58, 270). One of respondent’s supervisors cautioned Inm against transferring out of his union status because of the danger of a layoff, the sacrifice of union seniority and because the work m the department, connected as it was with the Gemini space project, was expected to de- Ch™ (A- 10°-02’ 270’ -« )• At that time, respondent de- cided not to transfer but elected to remain at the position which he then held (A. 61, 102). In 1963, Green reapplied foi a J I U M U O U ill U K ! I ' j . i - j . l ) . laboratory and was again cautioned about the hazards of such a move, which had increased because that department ! a C°mpleti0n of thc Gemini simulator program tt ’ • i 3/ J03'00’ 2‘2’ 342)- Nonetheless, he elected to take ie jo i (A. 63) and was assigned work similar to that 2 8 7 ^ 1 n ml1™ With hiS 8Tade and exPeriencc (A. 107, 287, 346). 1 he record is replete with evidence that re spondent was not treated differently by McDonnell than was anyone else (A. 271-74, 295-96, 344-46). position in (he E.E.D. Green had been actively and publicly involved in civil lights activities and demonstrations since 1960 or 1961 and had received substantial publicity for some of his conduct (A. 69-70, 94, 208),- but such pursuits had not interfered * Green is no s tran g e r to litigation as a result of his ? I fc T r tlVj97n ? • ’ ACr ° , M V■ Gan',0"> 450 F 2d o /o (8th Cir. 19/0), cert, denied 401 U.S. 923 (1971) " d 6 k r - — 7 — “ ld " 'orc n<>‘ of any concern to McDonnell Some personnel In the E.E.D. were laid off in the spring ,,R„, ’ respondent was not among them (A. 131-32, ; ,gUSt of **?, because of the reduced man- nee s 01 the Gemini simulator program (A 352) : beernne ev,dent that more technicians had'to be declared standlrdir d t P,my thereupon made reference to the standa dmed rating system known as the “ totem pole ’’ Inch had been compiled in April (A. 292, 319) and which was used as a guide for pay and promotional purpose an ns a job evaluator (A. 289, 292-93, 354, 382, 441). Eighteen •".me tuling respondent, were declared surplus (A 352) Six of the men on the surplus list were higher than re •pondenf on t7jc totem pole (A. 353) D em rtm euIT ^ petitioner, k o n g h its Personnel ' - S S " a v ^ b a v in g 7 ^ ^ ° u t e ^ d to hoSp l 01;neGUon’ * V0h" ^ ' y tost was a d m i n t ; d to help determ ine the qualifications fo r men fo r higher job classifications which were open (A i n 394) but respondent refused to take the test (A 355) , o ’ August 28, 1964, Green was laid off together with' ■ u The “Stall-in” and “Lock-in” After his layoff, and while McDonnell was still in the process of looking for alternative employment for Green“ criminatory. asserted by Green that the test was dis- receive p r e f e r e n r i J f t r c a T m e n f a n d h P ^ 'f in,sistence th a t he job th a t involved a reduction in ioh refusal to consider any 483). reduction m job sta tu s (A. 395-96, 444-45, i in a “ s ,a ith i” a ™ * * * ™ ^ » C0EE ■ 'tlUOh I’"S|’01I' I' :" 1 and other members of 2 ” J f V " ,Cir °ars ” lhe ily trav- a shift , °tA £ l o T ^ r ’3Pla,,t «* « “* »fCiitU15e (A . 399-403). The second demonstration - A M of the building (A. 132-33) ° ^ °n 1,10 front door “ dT lb!!d in Petiti™ * ’* Exhibit - A K ^ i T * were uisi mpfr>ri ̂ ^ tlic c<tis Plel-h t U 10 "P "eX‘ to . M h , so „ e„m- w ere m i t r ^ ^ ‘ s J o r Z 8 < A ' « * ^ on©5hour ( T w ) ^ " ‘C re‘̂ " “ l ^ M o a f t r r r S C ^ C i M r s s ; r „ r . « - hour (A 126 271 TV, 1 J 1 f ° mormilS rush problems that would re^K (1 m > H e") ™ ~ with the i n t e n / t S h T f ^ His car was m good running order bid he refn i 1 it voluntarily (A. 129). Itespondea “1 " . 'T tile police, and lie was arrested for obstructin'..- 1,'Zk- * misdemeanor under Missouri law (A 1311 1? * ?’ ]>leaded guilty to the charge of o t o c f t L "! was fined fifty dollars (A. 177). “ * and r i The “ lock-in” arose out of a demonstration on July 2, 1965 in which respondent, as chairman of ACTION, another civil rights organization, was in charge of a picket line demonstration against McDonnell (A. 132). Prior to the demonstration, a member of ACTION stated his intention to chain the front door of the Roberts Building, which housed employees of McDonnell (A. 132). Respondent, the leader of the group, did not instruct him to refrain from this act (A. 132-33) and the door was in fact chained, locking petitioner’s employees inside the building (A. 132-33). Respondent, as chairman of the group, testified that he approved the chaining of the door (A. 133). The Employment Application * On July 26, 1965, three weeks after the lock-in, respond ent applied tor a job at McDonnell as a mechanic, a posi tion lor which he was qualified (A. 84). llis application was forwarded the same day to R. C. Krone, McDonnell’s Vice President of Personnel, and C. L. Windsor, the Di rector of Personnel Services, who rejected it on the spot (A. 105, 499). The District Court found that McDonnell refused to rehire Green because of his participation in the stall-in and lock-in.5 318 F. Supp. at 850. When asked for his reasons for not rehiring Green, Wind sor pointed unequivocally to the stall in and lock-in (A. 405). Krone testified that Green had disqualified himself as a desirable employee by reason of the stall-in, which he characterized as “ an overt act to disrupt the normal activities of our company tantamount to sabotaging our ' plant” (A. 455, 501). ' Respondent filed a complaint with the EEOC contend ing that he had been denied re-employment because of his 5 For the reasons set forth below in Point I.B., the principles involved in this case are the same whether the stall-in is considered alone or in conjunction with the lock-in. — 10 — 3 i 1 I I 1 r!lC0 !tn<1 becirase of liis involvement in tl,e civil rights — I; ®E 0C fo m d ntaxxm w . cause to believe , V U , ? 0iVi' KiS''"S * * W hoc, vio- ' 1 McDonnell m refusing to employ Green because of h.s ,evolve,nent in civil rights activities. The Commis sion made no finding with respect to the allegation prom- iscd on racial discrimination. ' 1 ■ a ; » ! I ] Pre-Trial Matters Respondent’s original complaint filed in the District /Ouit contained allegations only that McDonnell had “ in- ontionally engaged in an unlawful employment practice by having domed plaintiff employment because he he! opposeu practices made unfair employment practices by s o t A,!’OVCmmgequal employment opportunities” (A ,9 ) . Although, as noted, respondent did not purport to ■' " f - “cll0,b he neverlimless embarked ]iromptlv 11 .. massive discovery campaign seeking access to and reproduction of literally hundreds of thousands of Me llonuoil records. Green tiled interrogatories (“ Set No r i l T * I™* a period nearly’ w o rk f ° 'S ,°”f d e f j lng tlK> im position of McDonnell’s nolle force broken down by job classification and race and sought further information about job transfers and promotions (A. 11). The information sought would have encompassed 662.000 applications for employment. 110,000 actualI employment records in 1,400 job classifications (A It). It was estimated that the compilation of such in’ formation would require the services of three people (A. 17)g G f0r nPProxlmat«ly three lo six mouths . ;rllc Dif rict Ctrart> 0,1 petitioner’s objections, held these in eiiogalones to be oppressive and irrelevant (A 18) following which respondent filed a motion lo produce 1 1 V A \ ~ ^ !lK! ;Sa,,1C d0Clinients a,ld information- (A. 18). , Z 10 d tliat CCrtain documents relating to re- Quh-od t “ n teStiUg °f aPP,icants would be qunod to be produced, but sustained objections to the iX r 'a lia - ^ th° gI'°inids of relevancy, stating, / ih ' Tll0I° ls 110 allegation in the complaint that I wasnotemployed w a s b — * theT peioduclioGldfthat g° f CaUS° hRd lmt been s^ v n for pioduction of over 70,000 files but did require the }>roducfi°n of documents showing the requirements for th° T tten teStS " * * * . the oral or i Pe v v 1 reqiUred’ th°Se P*™P* oral tests i L t ’• 1>Urj,0Se of thc ^ sts or interviews and the weight given to the rating resulting from such mi interview or test a s ‘they existed in July 1965 when re s ' ,0,l,,' i" 1 »l'piiod for employment (A. 2i). ’ I t was at tlmt point, following Urn discovery orders I r t l o T t t U p a“ ame,,dcd ™"P>aiat a sse r ti^ ’ addition t V ’ ‘Serm" nati011 0,1 a«™">t of race h t i t 2 2% aZ T atHtt bascd l" J0” c iv il ,ights‘ '■ etitionei moved to strike the racial alWn 1 w rl T " reafter’ a siSnihcant trend of decisioiitl , ° 'C 0p® roachmg tlie opposite conclusion and it is clear from thc record that the Distrirf p , departed from its rnling and that f i ° ,erei>fter • J — 12 — S r ' th 'lS, t0 bG treated as the racial , had been raised’ and ai>y error in striking the allega- 10118 °f flle amended complaint was rendered harmless.0 The Trial The case was tried on the m erits fo r four days before r e n l n f n p V ' 8ltting wiUloat a W The record isreple e with evidence offered by respondent attempting to establish that both the layoff and the refusal to rehire Wei'e in8pir®d by P^Jedicc against him because of his Greeif fill T 1" ^ 'T * ™ of his ciyil rights activities.Green filled the record with evidence concerning purported G2 97 9^3681 ^ bccause oi' Jlis attire (A. 59,2, £7-99, 368). He also made repeated references to the racial composition of McDonnell’s work force and of de partments therein (A 68.go 7070 100 in 1 -r i,-- . _ 362-64, 464-67, 578). The racial climate at 'cape Kennedy Mas even interjected into the case (A. 153-54, 311) There wore also various references to charges of racism filed “7 7 feen Wlth numerous agencies, including the EEOC the 1 resident’s Committee on Civil Eights, the Missouri Commission on Human Rights, the Department of Justice the Department of the Navy, the Department of the De- 80-81 9081 thA (f CG °f f Cderal COntracl Compliance (A. r)n nd resp0ndeilt’s counsel cross-examined Mc- Donnel s officers as to their own personal views about integration and racial discrimination (A. 360-61 379 414-15, 425-26, 456-57, 491-92). ’ ’ Petitioner supplied respondent willi -ill +],„ 1 m aterial sought to be discovered bv t 1 re levant and the in terrogato ries (A 099 qq 10,1 ^or Production withdrew his s u l p o c n T A fc s ^ foV Krone 267) * N ^theless, Green on his annnni 1 . y o I). Never- discovery orders entered bv the c o u r t '^ h e " C o u r t '011? i1rc' t r ial however, did not reverse any of the D istrict Co n ’s d i t r T ’ ary discovery r u l in g o7iri 1 c o u r ts discretion- those issues here ° 1 haS 1K>t sou^ht ™iew of — 13 — | Respondent also put into evidence an analysis of the racial composition of petitioner’s work force since 1943, which included a 13-page statistical breakdown for the relevant years concerning terminations, status changes training, applications, job classification, longevity and miscellaneous other information relative to petitioner’s non-Caucasian employees (PI. Ex. 33, Tab 30). It is abundantly clear that the issue of race discrimina tion was actually tried by the parties. The Memorandum Opinion of the District Court analyzed all of the evidence so submitted, and the Court of Appeals praised respond ent’s counsel for Jus resourcefulness. With respect to the hiyoff and the discussions which followed, the District Court noted that “ plaintiff indicated at these meetings that he thought he.was being laid off because of his race and civil rights activities.” 7n stating (V> contention* presented by the evidence and by Green’s post-trial brief’ the trial court characterized them as follows: ■ that defendant refused to rehire plaintiff be cause of Ins race, participating in civil rights activi ties and opposing practices made unlawful under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . ” 318 F. Supp. at 849. The District Court observed that respondent urged racial discrimination as a basis for recovery but found on a plenary record, that the stall-in and lock-in supplied the motivation for McDonnell’s decision and that these activities were not protected by Title VII. Accordingly it held that respondent was not denied employment "be cause of his race or his legitimate opposition to McDon nell s employment practices, and judgment was entered for petitioner (A. 45). The Appeal ^ c m d e n t app? led the District Court judgment to the EJighth Cncuit, and oral arguments were heard by a three judge panel on April 15, 1971. On March 30, 1972, each 14 — manber of the panel filed a separate opinion. The ma- J°U y !)1)’1U°n’ concuiTed in 1)>T two members of the panel lemanded the case to the District Court for further pro ceedings in accordance with the rules promulgated by the pmion. ihe majority opinion held (1) that the District “ m deter“ ining that the layoff claim trict Court ^ t Ki S!ftUte °f ]imitations’ (2) that the Disci Com t properly determined that the stall-in and lock-in r ivities ^ ^ v n ; (3) z out t s pi e-trial order striking allegations of racial dis elimination from the complaint was erroneous; (4) that S S T V - n0t h" mleSSi “ O O) that McDoimoll’sad - nntted reliance on the stall-in and lock-in were not suf- fleont reasons to justify its refusal to hire G r c e n T ! ! pottuonor d'd not establish lire y * a iIeo t o f £ £ d— atrons on Greeds ability to pc-form the job “ ' f eiire,USaU°‘llire « * « * case to cat had node , ' • r™ ‘° °°Urt hcld lhat respond-t had made a prima facie case of racial discrimination T he\urdog ^ !r ^ bIaCk ^ qualified for the job. Donnell 1 f ^ ^ maj°rity’ then P ^ d to Me- g " W P„ : r : by the reasons ability tn , r 8 affect his 10 'motion as a mechanic. The concurring opinion disputed the District Court’s finding that Green actively parttctpaled in the lock-in. and this obsoryation was an f . ently made a part of the majority opinion. The only etfoct of this holding is to question whether McDonnell’s connection of Green to the look-in was accurate. The ’ a Jonty opinion of Court of Appeals did not sot aside X finding that McDonnell was in fact motivated by the still in and lock-m but merely questioned the extent of Green’s involvement m the lock-in and held that M„n , not entitled to rely on the lock in '™S - a . »f the por- petitioner. He stater] <},.,< n • . d adversely to » * s i « « i : : : ; r z kt - * * * * * in served that whether the «<fln ; • ^ 1SSUe but °b- conjunction with the Jock-in, 'ill DuZcfc^ 0116 ° f “ tutely correct in hr.i r , blIICl houit was abso- “ T cilnilin , staii-m alone: or black, who had einri • ] • 1 wbether white dictive misdeed vi and asrainst kk i . - n' r hls employees, 4b3 F. 2d at 348 -49 .^^ ,0mff permitted to operate.” tiflede, di;SOnt “0t* that a 'Vhite person would n o t bo CJ, circumstances mid cC lleU “V U t,18Cnmi.natio“ ia identical *•*■0 applicant ^ ^ ^ a cause he is black V i • • ̂ W fa c ie case simply be- lion of any racial tlerc was 110 sutrges- characteriaed the majority opinio! “ “ ^ it, t S r e ^ l h f u Xb] ^ is, an I yiew involved on the part of M .n l n™11® M s » fact its refusal to hire anyone who h ,1 aild 6Ve” though unlawful acts against' it a , d cngaged in such afford Green any lee ".Cre mvol« d would not i‘ ^ d a white w,J0 “ " t » ° « than z T2 : t ^ r r u -onid disrupt its operation.,-' 16 its misreading of tins Court’s opinion in Griggs v Duke Dower Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The dissent also observed that the. erroneous shift of the burden plus the preclusion of subjective evidence has made it impossible for McDon nell to defend this action. “ What the court has held can, therefore, m my opinion, only mean that McDonnell is being required to reliire Green.” 403 F. 2d at 350. McDonnell filed a timely petition for rehearing and on lay l l , 1972, the panel majority issued a “ revised opin ion containing some primarily linguistic modifications of omf V ol the original opinion, to which Judge Johnson hied a supplemental dissent. As authorized by the order denying the original rehearing petition (A. 49), McDonnell leneived its request for a n en banc determination, which was denied by a 4-to-4 vote of thb Court en banc on June 28, 1912 (A-. 49).7 I 1972Se,hpe p 111 ? ° '11,c‘ct,on vvith the appeal. On November 2 Judge Johnson again dissenting. (See Docket E ntries, A. V,J f*"* £ — 1 7 — ■ SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT The Court of Appeals lias drastically departed from the spmt and the letter of Title VII and has rewritten time- honored rules of procedure and evidence by announcing ( ) that a black man establishes a prima facie case of racial discrimination by showing that he is black and qualified for a job, and (2) that the burden then shifts to the employer to prove by “objective” evidence that the reasons offered for not hiring the applicant were substan tially related to the requirements of the job. The language and history of Title VII clearly require the complainant to prove that the employer’s challenged ac mn was impermissibly tainted by discriminatory moti vation. The Eighth Circuit, however, has bold that Hie burden is immediately transferred to the employer to prove the absence of discrimination once a black com plainant has established his race and qualifications. This rule is premised solely upon the color of the applicant, and its benefits are not available to white persons. I t thus ig nores Title VIPs policy of color-blind equality and re quires reverse discrimination. The Court of Appeals has also held that once the burden inis shifted, the employer may justify his refusal to hire a black applicant only on the basis of the applicant’s abil ity to perform the job applied for. Petitioner’s refusal to ire respondent was based upon respondent’s illegal and unprotected activities directed against petitioner’s opera tions and employees. These factors are racially neutral m conception and in operation, and do not create arbitrary racia! barriers, but the Court of Appeals mistakenly relied upon Griggs v. I)uhe Power Company, 401 U.S. 424 (1971) to require that McDonnell’s rejection of Green, to be legal’ must be based solely upon job-related factors. Such a re - — 18 — qmmnent is violative of §706(g), which specifically sanc tions a y employment decision made for any reason “ other than discrimination on account of race, color, religion sex mi'™ T < °ng,n °r hl Vi°lati0n of §704(a).” The unlawful f 1KAr 7>0ngagCd 111 by GlCei1 I)rovided substantial rea son for McDonnell to refuse to hire him because Title VII does not restrict the right of an employer to refuse to employ those who have interfered with the employer’s operations and harassed his employees. 1 * FinaUy the Eighth Circuit erred in discrediting McDon- 1 s explanation of its motivation for rejecting Green’s maj°rity °ljhli0]1 lleld tliat “subjective” • donee offered by an employer is essentiallv unworthy o<‘ an ob’ T iU tllG empl°yer mUst eJ> b]i«h his defense by m oLjechve demonstration. This holding yuiis afoul of the ^self-eMdent proposition that the employer is the best cc o information us to tiie motivation for his decision and that he should, therefore, be allowed to testify on las own behalf as to why the action was taken. ’The trier of fact should be permitted to hear all the relevant evidence mid determine the credibility of the witnesses and wei«di mil testimony. In a case in which a determination of motivation is critical, the fact finder cannot properly per- evidence " C011sideî en ab le “subjective” ARGUMENT I. An Employer Has the Right Under Title VII to Refuse to Hire a Job Applicant Who Has Committed Illegal and Unprotected Acts Against That Employer Even Though the Applicant Is Black. It has long been recognized in labor law and civil rights cases that an employer may refuse to hire any person for good reason, bad reason or no reason, absent dis crimination. See, e.g., Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915); Tims v. Board of Education of McNeil, Arkansas, 452 F. 2d 551 (8ih Oir. 1971). The effect of the majority opinion below is to repudiate this precept as regards minorities and to permit an employer to refuse to hire a prospective employee for good" reason, bad reason or no reason unless lie is bhirl,., in which case the employer will be presumed to have discriminated and will lie required to show by “ objective” evidence that the reason given was related to the applicant’s potential job performance. Petitioner submits, in accordance with the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals, that the rules formulated by the majority, predicated as they are solely upon the race of the applicant, subvert both the spirit and the letter of Title VII. A. The Fact That Respondent. Is Black Does Not Create a Prima Facie Case of Discrimination or Relieve Re spondent of the Burden of Proving That Petitioner’s Refusal to Hire Him Violated Title VII. The cornerstone of the modified majority opinion of the Cornt of Appeals is contained in the following sen tence : “ When a black man demonstrates that he possesses the qualifications to fill a job opening and that lie — 20 — h»s boon denied the job which continues to remain open, we think he presents a prima facie case of laeia] discrimination.” 463 F. 2d at 353 The effect, of this holding upon the instant case, and upon ornl ngl.ts eases generally, would appear to be twofold. First, as a practical matter, it effectively shifts tbo burden of proof, in cases where a black man is in volved, from the plaintiff job applicant to the defendant faTo.0yof'' n " dl SC00nd’ “ discriminates infaioi of a b ack man and against other job applicants. IV e subnut that the Court of Appeals erred i„ pronuil- gating this principle. American jurisprudence lias traditionally imposed upon (he plaintiff the burden of proving j,is ' , upon the language or the legislative h i ^ vides even the slightest intimation that any attempt la s ' made by Congress in that statute to change the ordinary lidos ol prool. On the contrary, a Title VII action was expressly and consistently contemplated by Congress as fngThe I “ ” l ther i? ‘ ma”M r” oo'opWnant hay. ng the alhrmative harden of proving discrimination. Seo 110 Cong Eec 2060, 0549, 7212-14, 8350, 1, 848, , 5806* hv 11° T i l °f ll" soasc’ then> respondent was required e c to establish by a preponderance of the evi- deuce that he was refused employment because of his D m lT ’ °r be0aUS0 of his Ia'rfwl opposition to Me- Donnell s employment practices. s D uring the debates on the House floor show th a t there had 'p >* be brought against an employer and tb c re lf to r ' the w ould have to prove that lu> ,«,i n„t r erCd.tei the employer no t have a burden It would ho t / discrim inated. He would Cong. Eec. 2560 tl,e o ther W around.” 110 k P- // / — 21 — The District. Court, properly apportioning the burden in the historically accepted manner, found that respond ent, despite four days of trial, 690 pages of testimony and the introduction of 47 exhibits, had failed to sustain his burden of showing that McDonnell’s rejection of his em ployment application was motivated by respondent’s race oi by his legitimate opposition to petitioner’s employment practices. The District Court, having observed the de meanor of the witnesses and having assessed their verac ity, found that the evidence clearly showed that McDon nell’s decision was inspired by the stall-in and lock-in and, therefore, that the refusal to hire was validly based upon Green’s unprotected misconduct. The Eighth Circuit did not in terms disturb the finding that the stall-in and lock-in were in fact the basis for Mc Donnell’s action (although challenging the extent of Green’s participation in the lock-in) and agreed with the holding that such activities are not protected by Title VII. The District Court’s findings were overwhelmingly supported by the evidence,10 but the appellate court dis approved the standards applied by the trial court and re manded the case for further proceedings. According to the Eighth Circuit majority, respondent established a prima facie case of racial discrimination Hence, both lower courts have properly conformed to this ^ r 7 rtJ L pronouncement in Cify ° f Greenwood v. Peacock 384 U S . 80b 826 (1966): “. . . [N]o federal law confers an ’abso lu te r ig h t on p rivate citizens—on civil righ ts advocates, on .Negroes, or on anybody else— to obstruct a public s tree t,” Sec also, Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968)- Cov -i , f " . ™ ’ 'V9 U S 536, 554-55 (1965); Schneider v. S la te ,'308 160 ( ly3 9 ); Commonwealth o f Pennsylvania v. Hill, 313 F. Supp. 1139 (W .D. Pa. 1970) and Commonwealth o f Penn sylvania v Leonard, 315 F. Supp. 215 (W .D. Pa. 1970), both a f firmed sub nom. Hill v. Commonwealth o f Pennsylvania 439 F 2d 1016 (3d Cir. 1971), cert, denied 404 U.S. 985 ‘(1971)’ 10 See the of Appeals’ Donnell. discussion in Point II, infra, relative to the Court criticism of the type of evidence offered by Me- t merely by showing that he was black and qualified to fill a job opening which was denied him. Color alone, the Court held, can create a presumption of discrimination, and the employer must then come forward to prove the absence of a discriminatory animus. A white applicant- plaintiff in identical circumstances would not survive a motion for a directed verdict on such a meager showing, but a black plaintiff is said to be entitled to a presumption simply because of his color. It must be borne in mind that the aim of Title VII is equality of employment opportunity, not a guarantee of employment. It was designed to be color-blind in its oper ation and to eliminate race as. a factor in employment de cisions. Congress, in Section 703^) (42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 2( j) ), pointedly cautioned against prefe ential treatment for any group. Yet, in carving out special rules for blacks, the Court of Appeals has in actuality required discrimina tion against whites and has critically impaired the right of employers to make valid nondiscriminatory employ ment decisions. In the terminology of the supplemental dissent below, “ . . . The majority thus are holding, not that Green is entitled to the same opportunity as a white, but that he is entitled to one of a different and greater degree.” 463 F.2d at 355. Under the Eighth Circuit’s rule, if fifty technically qualified people—49 whites and one black—applied for a job and if, as would seem probable mathematically, one of the whites were hired for perfectly nondiscriminatory reasons, the Negro applicant would automatically have a prim a facie ease under Title VII, but the rejected whites would not. Even if no one were hired, the black applicant would be presumed to have been discriminated against on account of his race, but none of the white applicants could avail themselves of such an advantage. Such results, lie- sides being illogical, are totally at odds with the statutory purpose.11 In Griggs v. Duke rower Co., supra, at 430-31 this Court said: “ In short, the Act does not command that any per son be hired simply because he was formerly the sub ject of discrimination, or because he is a member of a minority group. Discriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed. AY hat is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial and other impermissible classification. ,12 In Section 706(g), the Act specifically exempts from its proscriptions any employment decision which is made for any reason other than race, color, religion, sex or national origin or in violation of § 704(a). The Act is directed only against discriminatory decisions. In the Interpretive Memorandum submitted by the Floor Managers of the Act, the proponents stated, 110 Cong. Rcc. 7213: “ It has been suggested that the concept of discrim ination is vague. In fact it is clear and simple and has no hidden meanings. To discriminate is to make a i i A fu r th e r problem arises by v irtue of the fact, that, while the E ighth C ircuit’s rule is s ta ted in term s of a “black m an,” it m ust be rem em bered th a t the sta tu te which it purported ly im plements covers not only race and color but also sex, religion and national origin. The fallacy of the ru le can be fu rth e r dem onstrated by postu lating an application for employment by v a qualified B aptist laborer. If lie were refused a job, he could \ recover even though the employer was com pletely unaw are of his religious affiliation. Sim ilar incongruous resu lts would eventuate in the case of women and, say, Canadians. i? Em phasis ours here and throughout th is brief except as otherw ise noted. I1! > ■ i i i i\ \y ? distinction, to make a difference in treatment or favor, and those distinctions or differences in treat ment or favor which are prohibited by section 704 are those which are based on any five of the forbidden- criteria: race, color, religion, sex and national origin. Anj other criterion or qualification for employment is not affected by this title.” Discrimination, as prohibited by Title VII, means in tentionally departing from normal procedure when dcal- ing with minorities. Therefore, in order for a black plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of individual dis crimination, in the absence of an unlikely admission of prejudice by the employer or, perhaps, a history of over whelmingly pervasive exclusion of blacks from the em ployer’s work force, the plaintiff must offer proof either (a) that he was intentionally treated differently than a white person was or would have been treated under the' same circumstances or (b) that some inherently discrim inatory standard was applied to him. In the context of an application for employment, it would seem essential to an individual black plaintiff’s prima facie case to show either that a white man with lesser qualifications was hired instead of him or that his own qualifications were measured by a biased caliper. The placing of such a burden on a Title VII claimant by Congress does not require him to prove facts peculiarly within the knowledge of the employer but merely means that he must be able to point to some facet of the transac tion which indicates a departure by the employer from regular procedure and which creates a permissible infer ence that the employer’s decision was improperly influ enced by a discriminatory factor. The mere fact that the applicant is black does not satisfy that requirement. The purpose of Title VII is indeed wholesome and salu tary, and in fact its proper implementation is essential to — 24 — I | 1 “"T ’ ■tmz F x tir t ;*' *.■< ' — 25 Ihe realization of the ideal of true equality. Because the Act was born of compromise, however, its reacli was in tentionally confined, a circumstance which has caused some of the lower federal courts to believe that judicial revision and amplification is desirable. With respect to the issues presented by this case, however, the Court of j Appeals’ burden-of-proof rule does not further Title VIPs mandate but in fact leads to results which are diamet rically opposed to the expressed statutory purpose. Peti tioner submits, in accordance with the dissent below, that the Eighth Circuit has sponsored favoritism rather than equality and, by its creation of presumptions based on race, has sanctioned reverse discrimination. B. There is No Requirement Under Title VII That an Employment Decision, Racially Neutral in Conception and Operation, Must Be Based Only Upon Job Performance. The Eighth Circuit majority opinion appears to hold that the stall-in and lock-in could not be relied on by McDonnell as reasons for rejecting Green’s application unless it could prove some connection between those ac tivities and Green’s ability to be a mechanic.13 This hold- ing, like the burden-of-proof rule, was presumably prompted solely by respondent’s status as a Negro and is thus subject to the same legal and logical infirmities discussed above in Subsection A. 13 The original and revised m ajority opinions both contained the statem ents th a t “the d istric t court failed to consider w hether the reasons given by McDonnell for not reh iring Green were re la ted to the requirem ents of the job,” and “the record shows th a t McDonnell has taken the position th a t it has the r ig h t under Title V II to make subjective h iring judgm ents which do not necessarily rest upon the ab ility of the applicant to perform the w ork requ ired .” 463 F. 2d a t 342, 343 352 This language seems to nu llify the effect of the revised opinion’s deletion of th a t portion of Section V containing an express re quirem ent for tying the reason to the job. See the supplem ental dissent, 463 F. 2d at 355. ■ 2 6 ■ If ** I w ̂■ This Case Does Not I'all Within the Rule of Griggs v. Duke Power Co. The sole authority cited by the appellate court in sup port. of its “ job-related” requirement is Griggs v. Duke Dower Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1071). With due deference to Hie Court of Appeals, we submit that the majority opinion is predicated upon a distorted reading- of Griggs and rep resents an extension of Title VII which is totally unjusti fied by the history or the language of the statute or by the Griggs decision. Griggs was a class action against an employer with a history of overt pre-Act discrimination. The issue pre sented to this Court was the validilv of two standardized employment practices, i.e., the requirement of a high school diploma, and the successful completion of two gen- eial aptitude tests. These were employer-erected barriers io employment which, though neutral on their face and not intended to be discriminatory, “ operated to render ineligible a markedly disproportionate number of Ne groes.” Id. at 429. The purpose of Title VII, the Court stressed, was to achieve equality of employment opportunity and to re move roadblocks that historically had favored whites over blacks. Ilie Court held that Negroes’ substandard per formance on the tests was directly traceable to race be cause of the inferiority of schooling which had been provided through the years for members of their race. Since the Act is designed to remove artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary barriers to employment which operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of race, it there fore prohibits not only overt discrimination but also practices which are fair in form but discriminatory in operation. Also proscribed are practices, procedures or tests neutral on their face and neutral in terms of intent “ if they operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior dis- 3T-3s — 27 criminatory employment practices.” Id. at 430. Tlie Court expressly disclaimed any suggestion that the employer’s intent is irrelevant in a Title VII case, but held that “ good intent or absence of discriminatory intent docs not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.” Id. at 432. The gist of Griggs was thus only that an employer has the burden of showing that any standardized job require ment which has a tendency to reduce job opportunity be cause of race has a demonstrable relationship to the job in question. The u n a n im o u s Griggs decision has no ap plication to the issues presented in the instant case. Here the District Court, was called upon to analyze not: the validity of procedures or tests but simply the motivation of an employer in refusing to hire a single individual. The behavior to he scrutinized in this case is not. that of the employer in formulating general practices which re sult in arbitrary barriers to employment, but that of the would-be employee who is seeking the benefits of the Act. The condition in which respondent finds himself here is not the regrettable result of years of racial subjugation and was not caused by publicly sanctioned deprivation of adequate education or training. His failure to gain em ployment with McDonnell resulted from his intentional and purposeful illegal activity. Finally, we are not here concerned with an inherently discriminatory employer act, practice or decision, either as intended or as implemented. It goes without saying that any individual—whether black or white, Catholic or Protestant, male or female—who committed the deeds en gaged in by Green would have been denied employment by any self-respecting employer against whom they were directed. There is no inherent or subtle discrimination in a decision not to hire a saboteur, and thus the “ joh- VST"*' 28 related” test of Griggs does not come into play because of the absence of “ built-in headwinds for minority groups.” Clearly, the rejection of a white applicant under identical circumstances would not be required to be eval uated in terms of job performance, and the rules should not be changed solely on the basis of applicant’s color. 2. Section 706(g) Permits Any Non-discriminatory Business Decision Made for Any Reason, Whether or Not Based Upon Job Performance. The Eighth Circuit’s approach to racially neutral em ployer decisions, discriminatory neither in their form nor in their consequences, is unrealistic and would produce bizarre results antithetical to the philosophy of Title VIL It deprives the employer of his\>gitimate right to make business decisions based upon valid, non-discriminatory business considerations. It further ignores the specific language of Section <06(g) of the Act, which pio\ides as follows: “ No order of the court shall require . . . the hiring . . . of any individual as an employee, or payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was . . . refused employment . . . for any reason other Ilian discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin or in violation of § 704(a).” Like the National Labor Relations Act ( NLRA ), Title VII was obviously intended “ to leave unscathed a wide range of employer actions taken to serve legitimate business interests.” American Ship Building Go. v. N.L. R.B., 380 U.S. 300, 311 (1965). The legislative history of Section 706(g) is instructive as to the Congressional intent. As originally drafted, the bill read much like § 10(c) of the NLRA (29 U.S.C. § 160(c)), in that it insulated only those employer actions X / taken for “ cause.” The Celler Amendment, recognizing the limited purpose of the proposed legislation, struck the word “ cause” from the bill, so that any employer action would expressly be beyond the pale of the Act if taken “ for any reason other than discrimination on account of I race, color, religion or national origin.” Representative Celler, the floor manager of the bill, explained his amendment, 110 Cong. Rec. 2567: “ Mr. Chairman, the purpose of the amendment is to specify cause. Here, the court, for example, cannot find any violation of the act which is based on facts other-—and I emphasize ‘other’—than discrimination on the grounds of race, color, religion or national origin. The discharge might be based, for example, on incompetence or a morals charge or theft, but the court can only consider charges based on race, color, religion or national origin.” 14 The amendment, eventually adopted, was also character ized as clarifying the employer’s right to discharge an employee for ineptness or drunkenness (110 Cong. Rec. 2570), or because he drank or smoked or swore (Id. at 2603). Significantly, during the debate on Title VII, another amendment was offered which would have prohibited a union from giving a preference to any applicant in certain programs for “ reasons other than job qualifications” and reasons which might be indirectly discriminatory on the basis of race. (110 Cong. Rec. 2593.) The amendment, while praised for its humanitarian aspirations, was de nounced by Title VII proponents as not being germane to the issue of race discrimination (Id. at 2594, Remarks of Reps. Roosevelt and Griffin), and was defeated (Id. at 2595). Hence, Congress considered and rejected the very concept espoused below7 by the Court of Appeals. 14 Sex was added later as a classification of discrimination. - 2 9 - 4 I ■ 30 - . i t. I; I V i'i1 There is simply no foundation in law, equity or com mon experience for the Eighth Circuit’s holding that the stall-in and lock-in must affect Green’s future job per formance in order to validate McDonnell’s rejection of his application.15 3. The “ Stall-in” and “ Lock-in” Justified tioner’s Refusal to Hire Respondent. Peti- As noted, Section 706(g) is comparable to but even more explicit and restrictive than § 10(c) of the NLRA, which prohibits the reinstatement of any individual or payment to him of any back pay if he was suspended or discharged for just cause. In Fibrcboard v. N.L.R.B., 379 II.S. 203, 217 (1964), the Court observed that § 10(c) was intended to dispel the notion that “ engaging in union activities car ries with it a license to loaf, wander' about the plant, re fuse to work, waste time, break rules and engage in in civilities and other disorders and misconduct.” The Court held in addition that § 10(c) was “ designed to preclude the Board from reinstating an individual who had been discharged because of misconduct.” Neither does Title V II authorize prospective employees to engage in oppro brious misconduct against a company and then allow them to charge “ bias” when their applications meet the fate which they should have readily anticipated. A full rejoinder to Green’s contentions was given in Glover v. Daniel, 318 F. Supp. 1070, 1075 (N.D. Ga. 1969), affirmed 434 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1970): “ . . . [Wjhile a teacher undoubtedly has the right to disagree with the boss and even to tell him off, it has nothing to do with race to say that he does so at ir> E ven in public employment, it is clear th a t job perform ance need not be the sole yardstick for m easuring the fitness of an employee. Bcilan v. Board of Education of Philadelphia, 357 U.S. 399 (1958). i u •W -,•2 rrr •̂ ta.NPuaa ■v t ,-* v c « & 31 — his peril. Unquestionably, the First Amendment gives a teacher the right to speak his mind; but it does not give him the right to disrupt a school or to choose its principals or to sabotage its programs.” McDonnell’s rejection of respondent was not attributable to his status as an innocent victim of history or of his en vironment. Rather he had shown himself to be devoted to the disruption of McDonnell’s operations. “ There is no more elemental cause for discharge of an employee than disloyalty to his employer.” N.L.R.B. v. Local Union 1229, I.B.E.W., 346 U.S. 464, 472 (1953). Percy Green’s behavior should not be required to be forgiven or forgot ten by McDonnell unless Title VTT was designed to abro gate widely respected concepts of civility and morality. In Adler v. Board,of Education, 342 U.S. 4S5, 492 (1952), the Court, quoting with approval from flamer v. Los An geles Board, 341 U.S. 716, 720 (1951), held tha t not even a public employer need blind itself to the trouble-making propensities of an employee: “ AVe think that a municipal employer is not dis abled because it is an agency of the State from in quiring of its employees as to matters that may prove relevant to their fitness and suitability for the pub lic service. Past conduct may well relate to present fitness; past loyally may have a reasonable relation ship to present and future trust. Both are commonly inquired into in determining fitness for both high and low positions in private industries and are not less relevant in public employment.” Under the NLRA, it has consistently been held that an employer has the absolute right to discharge an employee who has participated in barring access to the employer’s premises. IF. ,7. Ruscoc Co. v. N.L.R.B., 406 F. 2d' 725 (6th Cir. 1969); Victor Product Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 208 F. 2d 834 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Oneita Knitting Mills v. N.L.R.B., 375 F. 2d 3S5 (4th Cir. 1967); N.L.R.B. v. Indi- ana Desk Co., 149 F. 2d 987 (7th Cir. 1945); N.L.R.B. v. Perfect Circle Co., 162 F. 2d 506 (7tli Cir. 1947). Both the NLRA and the Civil Rights Act condone only that type of demonstration or opposition which consists of lawful behavior. In N.L.ll.B. v. Pansteel Mctalhugical Corp., 300 U.S. 240 (1939), the Court upheld the right of an employer to fire employees who had participated in an illegal “ sit-down” strike, stating at 252: “ This conduct on the part of the employees mani festly gave good cause for their discharge unless the National Labor Relations Act abrogates the light- of the employer to refuse to retain in his employ those who illegally take and hold possession of his prop erty. ’ ’ The Board argued that the employer’s previous unfair labor practices justified the employees actions and le- quired their reinstatement.. Those contentions were re jected, the Court holding that no matter how reprehensible the employer’s conduct, the employees must confine their retaliation to legal acts or avail themselves of their legal remedies or their right to strike, but they cannot expect judicial approbation of unlawful acts which infringe upon the rights of others: “ To justify such conduct because of the existence of a labor dispute or of an unfair labor practice would be to put a premium on resort to force instead of legal remedies and to subvert the principles of law and order which lie at the foundations of society. We are unable to conclude that Congress in tended to compel employers to retain persons in their employ regardless of their unlawful conduct. The conduct thus protected is lawful conduct.” See also Southern. Steamship Company v. N.L.R.B., 316 U.S. 31 (1942); National Packing Co. v. N.L.R.B., 352 F. 2d 482 (10th Cir. 1905); Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. — 32 — 33 280 (D. Colo. 1968); Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F. 2d 1077 (Stli Cir. 1969) cert, denied 39S U.S. 965 (1970). The reasoning of these decisions is even more apt when applied to the operations of a major government defense contractor like McDonnell. If Green had a legitimate quarrel with McDonnell’s policies, the appropriate vehicle for ventilating his views was the legal process of the EEOC and the courts, not the illegal blocking of streets and sidewalks, lie cannot inter fere with McDonnell’s operations and harass its employees and thereafter claim an exemption for his actions because of his color. The fact that no violence or personal or prop erty damage occurred, thanks to efficient police work, does not excuse Green’s behavior. IF. T. Rawlcigh Co. v. N.L.R.B., 190 F. 2d 832 (7th Cir. 1951); N.L.R.B. v. In diana Desk Co.supra. For this Court to approve the rules and the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit would he to give the judicial im primatur to conduct such as that, of respondent, and would thwart the mandate of Title VII by authorizing the substitution of physical self-help for conciliation. The District Court was correct in ruling the stall-in and lock-in30 to be justifiable disqualifying factors, whether 10 The concurring judge in the C ourt of Appeals thought it significant tha t Green did not personally chain the doors of the R oberts B uilding during the “lock-in.” The evidence is clear, however, th a t he was in charge of the dem onstration and had advance notice of the p lan to chain the door, in which he ac quiesced. Those who partic ipa te in illegal p ro test activities and who actively cooperate w ith offenders are equally to blame and must suffer the consequences. W . J. Ruscoc Co. v. N .L .R .B ., supra; N .L .R .B . v. Longview Furniture Co., 206 F. 2d 274 (4th Cir. 1953); Oncita Knitting Mills, Inc. v. N .L .R .B ., supra. In any event, even if McDonnell had been m istaken as to Green’s role in the lock-in, such a m isconception w ould not have ta r nished its perfec tly valid employment decision based on the stall-in. The record is clear th a t the individuals who made the decision had been advised th a t Green was the leader of the lock-in dem onstration (A. 404), and th e ir good-faith reliance on this inform ation— even if m istaken in fac t—would not con s titu te a T itle V II violation. - ’* C '* 7 r T rT ' VJW* i li R l I — 34 or not they would have affected Green’s job performance. To hold otherwise would be to allow respondent to profit by his own wrongdoing. II. In Civil Eights Cases Alleging Discrimination, the Employer {Should Be Allowed to Offer Subjective Evidence as to His Motivation, and the Weight to Be Accorded to Such Evidence Should Be Determined by the Trier of Fact. The majority opinion of the Court of Appeals held in effect that “ subjective” criteria are entitled to little or no weight in a case of alleged job discrimination. It dis missed petitioner’s evidence of respondent’s illegal activi ties as unvoithj of credence in the context oi a refusal to hire, and characterized it, and employer evidence gen- erallyf as “ pretextual.” The effect of the opinion, as the dissenting judge interpreted it. is to instruct the trier of tact that no evidence which petitioner might offer that the stall-in or lock-in occasioned the refusal to hire should be given any consideration. Although, for the reasons cited above in Point I.A., Arc Donnell submits that Green failed to make a prima facie case of discrimination, nevertheless McDonnell did not rest at the end of respondent’s case and did not merely deny any wrongdoing, but came forward with an abun dance of creditable evidence of its motivation and es tablished valid non-discriminatory reasons for refusing em ployment to Green. But according to the Court of Appeals, petitioner’s evidence is suspect and cannot support its de fense. We submit that the Eighth Circuit’s effective abo lition of subjective evidence was based on an erroneous premise, and the adoption of such a rule by this Court would hamstring the judicial process in its quest for truth. Even if we assume, arguendo, that respondent made a prima facie case under the Act, then at most “ the burden 35 — is on the employer to establish that he was motivated by legitimate objectives since proof of motivation is most ac cessible to him.” N.L.R.B. v. Great Dane. Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 2G, o4 (19G7). The search in a discrimination case is for the employer's “ real motive” in an attempt to identify and rectify employment decisions prompted by racial 01 other forbidden prejudices. Associated Press v. N.L.R.]{., 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937); Iladio Officers v. N.L. R.B., 347 L.S. 17 (1954); N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Lauglilin Steel Carp., 301 U.S. 1, 4G (1937). Once a pritna ‘facie case of discrimination has been made out, the inquiry should then focus upon whether the employer’s conduct was primarily motivated by racial animus and was thus un lawful. A .Jj.R.B. r. Rromi, 380 U.S, 278, 2SS (19G5) • Radio Officers v. N.L.R.B., supra; Teamsters' -Local No. 3 5 7 v. N.L.R.B.. 365 F.& 667, G75 (1963). The unprecedented holding of Court of Appeals has severely hindered this investigatory process by its command that the employ er’s subjective explanation for his actions be disregarded. A requisite of the orderly functioning of our legal sys tem is the entrustment of the fact finding process to the jury or court, under proper standards, and the recogni tion of the fact finder’s superior ability to appraise a wit ness candor and to evaluate the testimony given by that witness in the light of his interest, in the outcome of the lawsuit. Often the most critical and difficult inquiry which must be made by the fact finder is that of motivation, for m a wide variety of legal actions, the actor’s intent or motivation is outcome-determinative. Nonetheless, in anti trust,1' tax,17 18 * and other civil cases,10 as well as in crim- 17 United Stales v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338 (1949). 18 Commissioner v. Duberstcin. 363 U.S. 278 (I960) - Rudolbh iu United Stales, 370 U.S. 269 (1962). ’ ^ 10 Bank v. Kennedy, 17 Wall. 19 (1872). — 36 — &■ *3* Hi k 4 I : \ \ ii i >■ \ -- *,* inal proceedings,20 this Court lias consistently afforded the defendant the right to state his intent and has allowed the trier of fact to determine the trustworthiness of the witness and the weight to be given to liis testimony. For example in Wallace v. United States, 162 U.S. 466, 477 (1896), the Court stated as follows: “ If has often been decided that where the intent is a material question, the accused may testify on his own behalf as to what his intent was in doing the act.” Certainly if such a rule is appropriate in a criminal case, where the witness’ very freedom is at stake and the risk of falsified testimony is thus maximized, there is no reason to foreclose an employer from explaining his state of mind in a Title V I1 case. No court had so held until the Fightli Circuit decision under review here. While the Court of Appeals rule ostensibly referred only to tiie “ weight’’ to be granted to subjective evidence, in operation it actually functions as one of admissibility, or, perhaps more ac curately-, as a substantive rather than an evidentiary rule. Even on the compelling facts of the instant case, McDon nell’s clear showing of its motivation is, under our read ing of the opinion of the Court of Appeals, to be given no weight whatsoever. As a practical matter, the evidence is relegated to the same status as if it had been declared totally inadmissible.21 20 Wallace v. United States, 162 U.S. 466 (1896); Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183 (1909). \ „ 21 To the extent, however, that we are in fact concerned with a question of w eight ra th e r than adm issibility, the E ighth Cir cuit has d isregarded the well-established doctrine th a t^ th e task of weighing the evidence properly belongs to the d istrict court. Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Railway Co., 321 U.S. 29 (1944) ; Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 628 (1944); Aetna L ife Insurance Company v. W ard 140 U S 76 (1891). ’ l f The apparent thesis underlying Ihe Court of Appeals’ abolition of subjective evidence is a suspicion that men may lie when questioned about their motives. Such rea soning smacks of the old common law rule which rendered a party to an action incompetent to testify because of his interest in the outcome of the litigation. For years, how ever, modern courts have recognized the ability of the fact finder to weigh the interest of a witness in assessing his veracity. N.L.R.B. v. Walton Mfg. Co., 369 U.S. 404 (1962).22 This Court’s opinions in the labor cases, see N.L.R.B v. Great Bane Trailers, Inc, supra, have specifi cally acknowledged that the person who makes the chal lenged employment decision is the best possible source or knowledge as to why it was made, and he should be allowed to state the reason. The safeguard of cross-exam ination, as well as the fact finder’s opportunity to observe the witness’ demeanor*, provides ample protection against the possibility that perjured testimony mi edit carry fho day. In.Commissioner v. Buber stein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960) the Court reaffirmed its adherence to the historically rec ognized role of the fact finder, in language befitting a Title VIT case: “ Decision of the issue presented in these cases must be based ultimately on the application of the fact finding tribunal’s experience of human conduct to the totality of the facts of each case. The non-technical natuie of the statutory standard, the close relationship of it to the data of practical human experience, and the multiplicity of relevant factual elements, with the various combinations, creating the necessity of ascrib ing the proper force to each, confirm us in our conclu sion that primary weight in this area must be given to the conclusions of the trier of fact.” 22 I f we repose such confidence and lay ju rors, certain ly a t least the to federal d istric t judges. in adm inistrative agencies same respect m ust be paid f « ft / :s; The “ objective evidence” rule formulated by the Eighth Circuit was not advocated by any of the parties to this case but was conceived by the panel majority su-a sponte, as were the burden-of-proof rule and the job-relatedness test. Cited in support of this prohibition of subjective evidence was a school-teacher displacement case decided by an appellate panel of which the authors of the ma jority and concurring opinions below were members, Moore v. Board of Education of Chidcster School District, 4.48 F. 2d 709 (8th Cir. 1971). There it was held that where the number of available public teaching jobs is reduced by virtue of the implementation of a desegrega tion plan, teacher layoffs must be measured against ob jective criteria, such as amount of education,, experience, and the like. Such rules have no relevance in a case where the judicial inquiry seeks only to determine the reasons why a particular job applicant was refused employment. A or are such standards adaptable to applications for em ployment in private industry, where the circumstances are likely to be infinitely varied and where the statute au thorizes rejection of a prospective employee for any rea son other than a discriminatory one. In Fluker v. Alabama State Board of Education, 441 F. 2d 201 (5th Cir. 1971), the court rejected the contention that a school board could justify its termination of a non- tenured teacher only by demonstrating “ that he has failed to comply with some previously announced stand ard.” The court acknowledged that such a principle would afford security for school teachers but found it wanting in law and deleterious to the school’s right to up grade its faculty and academic standing, stating, at 207: “ Appellants’ proposal of this requirement also ignores the highly subjective nature of employer- employee relationships. . . . We can see that . . . there are an enormous number of fact situations in — 38 — 4 t \ — 39 — * which the non-reappointment of an employee may be justified by highly subjective and perhaps unforsee- able considerations. ’ ’ Like (he dissenting judge below, petitioner is at a loss lo understand how an inquiry as to motivation can be undertaken on the basis of only “ objective” evidence or, for that matter, to understand what “ objective” evidence is in the context of (he instant case. Would it require McDonnell to have a written policy of not hiring anyone who had intentionally disrupted traffic or locked its em ployees in a building? Did the Court of Appeals mean to say that a suspected embezzler or arsonist could not be rejected unless the employer can point to some objective standa 1 d covering the situation? Common sense confirms the existence of such' policies but also demonstrates the ■rib of ‘d e f i n e the? i i iu g and Lne i u u u t y of attempting (o anticipate the almost infinite number of possible factual variations. In summary, the District Court committed no error with regard to the admissibility or weight accorded to McDonnell’s testimony as to its reasons for not hiring- Green. CONCLUSION The record amply supports the determination of the experienced trial judge that McDonnell acted within its rights in refusing employment to Green. The District Court tried this case under proper standards and reached \ the light result. The Court of Appeals misconstrued the statute and this Court’s opinion in Griggs, improperly assigned (he burden of proof and erroneously restricted (he evidence which could be considered in explanation of petitioner’s actions. I