United States v. Lawrence County School District Supplemental Brief for Appellant

    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

NO. 86-4047

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Plaintiff

SHEANDA BRYANT, et. al.
Plaintiff-Intervenors/Appellants

VS.
LAWRENCE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT 

Defendant/Appellee

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF FOR APPELLANT

On appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of Mississippi

SUZANNE GRIGGINS 
Community Law Office 
Post Office Box 277 
Mendenhall, Mississippi 39114 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS
KENNETH RUTHERFORD 
Thomas, Price, Alston, Jones & Davis 
Post Office Drawer 1532 
Jackson, Mississippi 39215-1532
MALCOLM ROGERS 
George and Rogers 
Post Office Box 688 
Monticello, Mississippi 39654 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
JEANNE PETTANATI 
Educational Opportunities 

Litigation Section 
Civil Rights Division 
United States Department of Justice 
Washington, D.C. 20530 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF



SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

Table of Contents and Citations

INTRODUCTION.

Page

. . 1

ARGUMENT
I, THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITIONS WITH RESPECT

TO PLAINTIFF-INTERVENORS' CLAIMS IS BASED 
ON AN ERRONEOUS CONSTRUCTION OF THE 
NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION 
INVOLVED, TO WHICH THE GOVERNMENT 
APPLIES AN ERRONEOUS LEGAL LIMIT TO THE 
REMEDIAL AUTHORITY OF THE COURT...........1

A. The government misstates the law
with respect to the court's remedial 
authority in a de jure segregation 
case. . .......................  2

B. The violation in this former de
jure segregated district is that the 
assignment plan has not desegregated 
the system...............   6

II. ON THE ISSUES OF TEACHER ASSIGNMENT,
BUSING, AND SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION, THE 
GOVERNMENT'S ARGUMENTS HAVE EITHER 
ERRONEOUS LEGAL BASES OR NONE AT ALL.... 13

CONCLUSION.................    16

CERTIFICATE. . .......  17

Authorities

Brown v. Board of Education 2, 6, 9

Burton v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company, 335 F.2d 317 (5 Cir. 1964 13

Davis V. East Baton Rouge Parish School 
Board, 721 F.2d 1425 (5 Cir. 1983) 4, 7, 10

I .



Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 
(Dayton I), 4 3 3 U .S, 406 (1977 )

Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 
(Dayton II), 443 U.S. 526 (1979)

Green v. School Board of New Kent County, 
391 U.S. 430, 88 S.Ct. 1698,
20 L.Ed.2d 716 (1968)

Henry v. Clarksdale Municipal Separate 
School District, 409 F.2d 682, 
cert, denied, 396 U.S. 940 (1969)

Industrial Development Board of Town of 
Sexton, Ala, v. Fuqua Industries, 
523 F.2d 1225 (5 Cir. 1975) 14

Keyes v. School District No. 1 
423 U.S. 189 (1973) 2, 3

Lee V. Autauga County Board of Education! 
514 F.2d 646 (5 Cir. 1975) 1 1 .

Lee V. Macon County Board of Education, 
448 F.2d 746 (5 Cir. 1971) 5, 12

Lee V. Macon County Board of Education, 
616 F.2d 805 (5 Cir. 1980) 11

Milliken v. Bradley,418 U.S. 717 (1984)

Mitchell V. McCunney, 651 F.2d 183 (3 Cir.1981) 14

Pasadena City Board of Education v.Spangler, 
427 U.S. 424 (1977) 5, 8, 9

Price V. Dennison 11

Ross V. Houston Independent School District, 
6¥^F.2d 218 (5 Cir. 1983)

1 1 .



Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board
of EducaifTonl 4U2~U . S . I (197TT

Tasby V. Wright, 713 F .2d 90 {5 Cir. 1983) 15

United States v. Columbus Municipal Separate
School DTstrict, 558 F .2d 228 (5 Cir.1977) 3

United States v. De So Paarish School Board, 
574 F.2d 804 (5 Cir, 1978)

United States v. Hendry County School District,
504 F.2d 550 (5 Cir. 1974) 16

United States v. Montgomery Board of Education, 
395 U.S. 225, 89 S.Ct. 1670,
23 L.Ed. 2d 263 (1969)

United States v. Texas Education Agency, 
464 F.2d 848 (5 Cir. 1977) 14

United States v. Texas Education Agency, 
647 F2d' 504 ( 5 Cir. 1981 )

Valley v. Rapides Parish School Board, 
646 F.2d 925 (5 Cir)cert.denied, 
455 U.S. 939 ( 1982) 5, 7, 11

Valley v. Rapides Parish School Board, 
702 F.2d 1221 (5 Cir. 1983) 4, 10 , 14

1 1 1 .



INTRODUCTION

In its brief to this Court, submitted March 20, 1986, 
the United States has, for the first time in this litigation 

expressed its opinion on the student assignment plan 

and school construction in Lawrence County. The govern­

ment 's support of plaintiff-intervenors' position on 

the issue of Lawrence County's unitariness need not be 

answered. However, on all other issues the government 

has remained non-committal until now. Since the govern­

ment has never briefed these issues before, the plaintiff- 

intervenor-appellants have moved the Court to submit 

this supplemental brief to address the government's 

arguments concerning the student assignment plan, school 
construction, teacher assignment and transportation issues.

I. THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION WITH RESPECT TO PLAINTIFF- 
INTERVENORS' CLAIMS IS BASED ON AN ERRONEOUS CON­
STRUCTION OF THE NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
VIOLATION INVOLVED, TO WHICH THE GOVERNMENT APPLIES 
AN ERRONEOUS LEGAL LIMIT TO THE REMEDIAL AUTHORITY 
OF THE COURT.
The government believes that because the 1969 student 

assignment plan in this case was approved, it can be 

modified only if the defendants themselves have taken 

some subsequent action not to implement the plan (i.e. 
if the defendants violate the plan). The court's remedy, 

the government contends, is also limited to the correction 

of such violations. This position would be correct if 

the school district were unitary. However, it is incon-

1 .



sistent with the government's contention that Lawrence 
County is not unitary, and is founded on legal principles 

applicable to de facto, not de jure, districts like 
Lawrence County.

A . The government misstates the law with respect 
to the court's remedial authority in de jure 
segregation cases.

The government in citing Milliken v. Bradley, 418 

U .S. 717 (1974), Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 

433 U.S. 406 (1977) ("Dayton I"), and Keyes v. School 

District No, 1, 423 U.S. 189 (1973), misstates the law 

that should be applied in this case. These cases dealt, 

not with de jure, but de facto segregated districts where 

the extent of remedial relief depended'on the extent 

of the intentional unconstitutional act involved. More­
over , this limit is not as narrow as the government 

portrays. In Dayton II [Dayton Board of Education v. 

Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979)], the court clarified 

its holding concerning the types of relief courts, even 

in de facto districts, could fashion. It held that 

system-wide relief could be ordered when system-wide 
impact was shown. The Dayton plaintiffs met this burden 

by showing that the dual system in effect in Dayton,

Ohio at the time of Brown v. Board of Education embraced 

a system-wide program of segregation affecting a "sub­
stantial portion of the schools, teachers and facilities" 

(i.e. they showed that the system was comparable to a



a de jure segregated district). The government's reci­

tation of the Keyes holding is wholly erroneous. It 

did not limit remedies to the portion of the district 

in which they were found. Rather it held that once 

segregation has been found in a substantial portion of 

the district, there is a presumption that the district 

as a whole is dual. Keyes v. School District No. 1,

413 U.S. 189, 203 (1973). Keyes, another de facto 
case, equated such a system to de jure districts in 

terms of the systemic change needed:
Of course, where that finding is made, as in cases 
involving statutory dual systems, the school 
authorities have an affirmative duty to "effectuate 
a transition to a racially non~discriminatory 
school system".

413 U.S. at 203.
Thus, if the government's authorities apply in any way 

to this case, it would be to support the presumption 

of system-wide impact in this, a de jure case, warranting 

system-wide relief.
More applicable, however, are cases that deal with 

de jure districts that have not been found unitary.
In these, the courts have historically exercised a broad 
scope of remedial authority. In Swann v. Charlotte- 

Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971) , the 

Supreme Court said that failure on the part of school 

authorities to implement a constitutionally prescribed 

unitary system brings into play the full panoply of the 

trial court's remedial power. In United States v.

3 .



Columbus Municipal Separate School District, 558 F .2d 
228 (5 Cir. 1977 ) , this court, quoting Dayton I, held 

that courts must fashion system-wide remedies where there 

is system wide impact. 558 F.2d at 231. The system-

wide problem in that de jure district (as it is in 

Lawrence County) was racially imbalanced schools. To 

rectify the problem, the court sought to bring every 

school in the district within a relatively narrow range 

of the racial composition of the district as a whole.
Such as approach was approved as a starting point by 

the Court.

More recently, this Court in Davis v. East Baton 
Rouge Parish School Board, 721 F .2d 1425 (5 Cir 1983) , 
a case dealing with a de jure district, stated that 

district courts have "broad and flexible equitable powers 

to implement a remedy" ("presented with an inadequate 
plan by the board, the district court was responsible 

to use its broad and flexible equitable powers to im­

plement a remedy that, while sensitive to the burdens 
that can result from a decree and the practical 
limitations involved, promises realistically to 

work now". Davis at 1437, quoting United States v.

De Soto Parish School Board, 574, F .2d 804, 811 (5 Cir. 
1978). Morover, the Davis court further held that 

the exercise of such authority was often required.

Quoting Valley v. Rapides Parish School Board, 702 F .2d

4 .



1221, 1225 {5 Cir 1983), the court said that when a 
school board fails to show that the racial identifiability 

of the schools is not the result of present or past 

dicrimination, "the district court was required to 
apply its broad remedial powers to expunge from the public 

schools all vestiges of unlawful segregation". The Valley 

casetspecifically distinguishesicasesrsuch as therohe 

at hand from Pasadena City Boardof Education v. Spangler, 

427 U.S. 424 (1977) which it stated involved a district 

that had been declared unitary.

The government's narrow definition of the court's 

remedial powers is also in direct contradiction to case 
law in this circuit which holds that when a desegregation 

plan does not work, a new one is needed, Henry v. 

Clarksdale Municipal Separate School District, 409 F.2d 

682 , cert. denied, 396 U.S. 940 (1969) ; Valley 

V. Rapides Parish School Board, 646 F .2d 925 {5 Cir.

1981). For example, this court has specifically held 
that when historic residential segregation creates housing 

patterns that militate against desegregation based on 

zoning, alternative methods must be explored. Lee v .

Macon Bounty Board of Education, 448 F .3d 746, 748 (5 

Cir. 1971).
Limiting the court's scope of examination when de 

jure districts have not been declared unitary solely 

to defendants' actions and not to the effects of the 

plan in general, is totally without precedent. If the

13 .



had been declared unitary, the court's remedial power 

might be limited to subsequent segregative acts, but 

this is not the case in Lawrence County, which the govern­
ment agrees has never been declared unitary.

B . The violation in this former de jure
segregated district is that the assignment plan 
has not desegregated the system.

The constitutional violation in this case is not 

simply that the school district has allowed inter and 

intra district zone jumping,but that the attendance plan 

itself (even if enforced) has not and will not eliminate 

the vestiges of the former dual system. The most 
overt vestige, clearly shown by the record, is that four 

of Lawrence County's six pre-desegregation racially 

identificable schools remain racially identifiable today. 

Only a new student assignment plan can cure this system- 

wide violation.

The first error the government makes is limiting 
the constitutional violation in Brown v. Board of Education 

simply to the denial to black children of access to white 

schools. If this were so, then any remedy which eliminates 

exclusion would per se be constitutional, including 

freedom of choice plans. However, the Supreme Court 

has demonstrated that a plan must give more than access 
but rather achieve meaningful desegregation, which includes 

the dismantling of the dual system itself. Green v.

School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 88 S.Ct. 

1698, 20 L.Ed.2d 716 (1968). This circuit has recently

6 .



rejected this narrow interpretation of Brown in Davis 

V, East Baton Rouge Parish, 721 F.2d 1425 (5 Cir. 1983). 

There, the Court, in recounting the history of the case, 

indicated that it had considered a position taken by 

the school board which is similar to the government’s 

position. Initially, in 1970, the school board in Davis 

had formulated a student assignment plan based on attend­

ance zones and majority to minority transfers. When 

plaintiffs sought to modify that plan four years later, 

the board opposed further relief, arguing that "it had 

imposed no affirmative racial barriers to the admission 

to any of its schools..." The court rejected the board-ss 

position that merely giving access to the schools satis- 

fired its constitutional mandate to desegregate in its 

earlier holding in the case. Davis at 1427.

Because the government believes that desegregation 
involves only access to schools, their reasoning leads 

them to another uniformly rejected principle--that the 

implementation of a student assignment plan desegregates 

the system. This court has resoundingly rejected such 

a proposition, saying that "a plan which gives promise 
of establishing a unitary system cannot foreclose further 

relief if it does not in fact abolish the evidences of 

segregation." Valley v. Rapides Parish School Board,

646 F.2d 929 (5 Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 939 
(1982). This court recently stated in Ross v. Houston

7



Independent School District, 699 F. 2d 218 (5 Cir, 1983) 
that "a school system is not, of course, automatically 

desegregated where a constitutionally acceptable plan 
is adopted and implemented, for the remnants of discrim­

ination are not readily eradicated". Id. at 225. See 
also United States v. Texas Education Agency, 647 F.2d 

504, 508 (5 Cir. 1981) .

The government misreads and misapplies Pasadena City 
Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 96 S.Ct.

3697, 49 LEd.2d 599 {1977) to support its claim that 
the Court here has no authority to interfere with 

Lawrence County's student assignment plan. The facts 

in Spangler are substantially different from those in 
this case and its holdings expressly exempt cases such 

as the one before the court. Spangler, again, involved 
a de facto, and not former de jure segregated school 

district. Plaintiff there had raised and proved only 

one complaint— racially motivated student assignment-- 

as an intentional violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

The court ordered relief for this one specific violation 
by requiring the implementation of a new plan for student 

assignments. The court did not enter a multi-faceted 

Singleton order as courts dealing with de jure segregation 

usually did (and did in Lawrence County). When Pasadena 

followed the court order, all parties agreed that the 

intentional violation was cured and that the system was



unitary. Any subsequent imbalance in the schools, then, 
was to be tested for whether it was the result of still 

more racially motivated intentional conduct of the 

defendants. Finding none, the court declined to require 

yearly adjustments in student assignment.
In the ease at hand, the court is dealing with a 

formerly de jure segregated district. The schools 

in Lawrence County's former dual system were racially 
identifiable, and the 1969 order, fashioned according 

to Singleton, sought the eradication of the vestiges 

of the old system by ordering relief in a number of 

areas. (Note, prior to the 1969 order, Lawrence County 

had been under a freedom of choice plan which was un­

successful.) Monitoring of the system was ordered, not 
only in 1969, but even in 1974. This type of desegregation 

order is specifically excluded from the narrow Spangler 

holding:
In so concluding, we think it important to note 
what this case does not involve. The [district 
court's] "no majority of any minority" requirement 
with respect to attendance zones did not call for 
defendants to submit "step at a time" plans by definition 
incomplete at inception. See. e.g. United States 
V. Montgomery Boardof Education, 395 U.S. 225, 89 
S.Ct. 1670, 23 L.Ed.2d 263 (1969). Nor did it 
call for a plan embodying specific revisions of the 
attendance zones for particular schools, as well 
as provisions for later appraisal of whether such 
discrete individual modifications had achieved the 
"unitary system" required by Brown v. Board of Education. , 

427 U.S. 424, 435
Thus, Spangler does not apply to ongoing school cases that 

involve the transition of de jure segregated systems

9 .



to unitary systems. This court,as noted above, has
not applied Spangler to any case such as ours, distinguishing

it as applying only to unitary districts. Valley v.

Rapides Parish School Board, 702F.2d 1221, 1225,fn.5 

(5 Cir.1983)
Because the government is applying only de facto 

segregation school cases to this de jure case, the 

government would limit inquiry only to defendants' violations 

subsequent to 1969. Such a position is analogous to 

treatment of school districts who have achieved unitary 

status. There is no precedent for treating school districts 

that simply implement plans as if they were unitary.

On the contrary, where here, as in Davis v. East Baton

The government also objects to plaintiff-intervenors' 
request for a new assignment plan as being a substitute 
for an appeal and not available through the court's authority 
to modify its previous orders. Here Spangler does have 
some application. In Spangler, there had been no appeal 
from the district court's order that there be no school 
with a majority of minority students. Four years later, 
the district sought to be relieved of that duty by re­
questing the court for a modification of the plan. While 
the district court declined to modify, the Supreme Court, 
in affirming the circuit court's reversal, did, finding 
that there had been changed circumstances and intervening 
Supreme Court decisions. In the case at hand , there 
has been a change in circumstances in Lawrence County, 
in that there is no longer a Silver Creek School and 
therefore, the plan is not the same; the school district 
is adding a school and implementing additional busing 
of students even in their retention of the current student 
assignment plan; there are now funds available to^expand 
the schools (in 1970, there were no funds and the schools 
could not accomodate consolidation); most importantly, 
the student enrollments have changed at the schools over 
the years, creating an unconstitutional imbalance. The 
defendant school district has not implemented other portions 
of the Singleton order, such as inter and intra district 
transfers and teacher assignrnent--al 1 contributing to 
a change in the circumstances since 1969. Moreover, 
there are several intervening court decisions affecting this
case.



Rouge Parish, supra, the school board has not eliminated 
the racial identiflability of the school, further broad 

remedial relief, if possible, is necessary.

The government argues that the 1969 plan has worked 
because the schools in Lawrence County are accessible 

to all within their zones. Not only does this definition 

fall short of a desegregated system (See discussion of 

Brown above, p.6-7), it also erroneously views the 

system in parts, not as this Court has required as a whole. 
[Valley v. Rapides Parish School Board, 646 F.2d 925,

938 (5 Cir. 1981); Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, 
616 F.2d 805 {5 Cir. 1980)]. There would be no zones 

but for the 1959 order which is subject to revision if 

the plan does not work. See also, Lee v. Autauga County 

Board of Education, 514 F.2d 646 (5 Cir. 1975) where 

changes in one zone were still subject to court scrutiny 

even if they created no problem within the zone itself 
but affected adjoining zones. Thus, to view Lawrence 

County's schools by zones, and not the district as whole 

is improper.
The government ignores the evidence in the record 

that the 1969 plan has not erased the racial identiflability 

of Lawrence County's schools. Plaintiff-intervenors 

showed in the brief in chief, p.17-20, and their response 

brief, p. 5-7, that under any standard (whether looking 

at statistics alone or the Price v. Dennison factors),

11 .



Beulah Williams, Topeka Tilton, New Hebron and McCullough

are now racially identifiable (four of Lawrence County's

six schools). The government takes the curious position

that because the racial disparity between Topeka Tilton

and Beulah Williams are not linked, the imbalances in

their enrollments should be discounted. They add that

these schools happen to be in racially identifiable communities

which accounts for the imbalances. The government cites

no cases for a requirement that the racial imbalaneeir

in one school be related to another racially imbalanced

school. And while Topeka Tilton and Beulah Williams
are located in white and black communities, they don't

"happen" to be there. They were deliberately located
there when the system was segregated by law. As mentioneds

earlier, if attendance zones canot be developed around
these historically segregated residential communities,

then an alternative must be tried. Lee v. Macon County

Board of Education, 448 F.2d 746, 748 (5 Cir. 1971).

Consolidation is one such alternative.
The government fails to apply the Price factors to 

its analysis of New Hebron, relying solely on the alleged 
integration of the student body and activities, to claim 

that it is not identifiably white. The government ignores 

the other factors— faculty assignment, faculty by position, 

prior position in the dual system, location within a 

white community and Judge Russell's 19 8 4 finding--and

12 .



discounts the attractiveness of New Hebron to out of 

zone whites. If it were not racially identifiably 

white, why would these whites be seeking to go to 
school there? Moreover, the record clearly shows that 

the out of zone transfers have not been stopped and there 

is little hope of any method being designed that whites 
intent on attending a particular school would not be 

able to circumvent (with or without the school district's 

support). (See appellant's brief, p.24-26 for a discussion
on the failure of zone jumping monitoring in Judge Russell's 

1984 order).

II. ON THE ISSUES OF TEACHER ASSIGNMENT, BUSING AND 
SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION, THE GOVERNMENT'S ARGUMENTS 
HAVE EITHER ERRONEOUS LEGAL BASES OR NONE AT ALL.

The government spends little time dealing with 

the other issues raised by the plaintiff-intervenors.

Like the appellees, they acquiesce, without citing any 

authority, to the district court's failure to decide 

an issue tried (Lawrence County's failure to implement 

a teacher assignment plan). Except in cases of default 
judgment, the trial court is bound to grant whatever 

relief the facts show necessary or appropriate. Burton 

V. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company,
335 F.2d 317 (5 Cir. 1964) . In this case, it was un­

disputed that Lawrence County has no faculty assignment 
plan and this Court has held that the trial court has 

the ultimate responsiblity to apply the law to the uncon-

13 .



tested facts before it. Industrial Development Board 

of Town of Secton, Ala, v. Fuqua Industries, 52 3 F .2d 

1226 (5 Cir. 1975) . Thus, the trial court committed 
reversible error in failing to find Lawrence County 

in violation of the 1969 order for failure to have and 

implement a teacher assignment plan.

The governm.ent argues that 'plaintiff-interveners 
claims with regard to busing lack merit because it believes 

it should be no burden to blacks to be bused to New Hebron 

or Topeka Tilton or any school. In fact, they seem to 
think that blacks should be happy because such busing 

gives them access to "fully integrated schools". This 

position again reflects the governments erroneous con­

ception of desegregation as simply equal access to schools, 

not equal education. This has been discussed above at 

p .6-7. In addition, the government is apparently unaware 
of the cases that deal with the burden of busing and 

how in any desegregation plan, the burden should fal1 
equally on blacks and whites as much as possible. See 

Valley v. Rapides Parish School Boards 702 F .2d 1221,
12 2 8 {5 Cir.) cert. denied, 104 U.S. 276 (1983 ) where 

this court approved a plan that envisioned equidistant 

transportation of an equivalent numiber of white and black 

students in the same age bracket. The court cited as 

support United States v. Texas Educational Agency, 467 

F .2d 848 (5 Cir. 1977)(en banc) and Mitchell v. McCunney, 

651 F.2d 183 (3 Cir. 1981 ) .

14



with regard to construction ,the government dismisses 

plaintiff-intervenors complaints because it feels no 

student reassignment is necessary. How it can feel there 

is no dualism in this school system, when three to four 

of Lawrence County's six school are still racially iden­

tifiable, escapes appellants. In addition, there is 

uncontradicted testimony in the record from Dr. Feilds, 

an expert in the area of school construction and desegregation, 

that this construction plan impedes desegregation.

Groping for some argument, the government finally 

states that only one race (i.e. 100% white or black) 

schools need to be eliminated. Not only does this depart 

from the government's earlier insistence on the Price 

(many factors) analysis of racially identifiable schools, 

but it contradicts this Court's practice of looking at both 
one race and predominantly one race schools. See 

Tasby v. Wright, 713 F. 2d 90 (5 Cir. 1983). Again, the 

problem in Lawrence County is that most of its schools 

(all built prior to desegregation and built to be racially 

identifiable) retain that same racial identiflability 
today. Nothing less than systemic change will eradicate 
this.

The government apparently believes that the Monticello 

Elementary School can be located anywhere in the town 

of Monticello because it is a majority black school and 

because Monticello is located in the center of the county.

15 .



Th© government ignores the fact that some of the zone 

jumping from the Beulah Williams area was to Monticello 

Elementary, and though it is now a majority black school 

putting it in this undisputably white neighborhood might 
encourage more whites to zone jump. Moreover, as 

argued in appellant' s brief in chief, the site fails 

on many of the Copeland and Brewer criteria that have 

been used by this Court to assess sites. The government 

IS silent about the appropriateness of the current site 

which is certainly more accessible to both blacks and 
whites in Monticello.

The government says the voc tech site should be 

approved because the voc tech is a consolidated school 

apparently believing that a system can locate a con- 

solidated schoo1 wherever it wants. However, the law 

on the matter is the opposite. In United States v. 

Hendry County School District, 504 F.2d 550 (5 Cir.

1974) the court still evaluated a site for effects 

on desegregation and did not simply approve it because 

a consolidated middle school was being built there.

Conclusion
The government's position is untenable and not 

supported by any legal precedent applicable to this 

school district, formerly segregated by law. Plaintiff- 

intervenor-appellants claims are amply supported by 

the facts in the record and the law of this circuit.

16



Upon careful review, this court should reverse the 

district court and order one of plaintiff-intervenors 

plans for student assignment, order the creation and 

immediate implementation of a teacher assignment plan, 

order the cessation of the current transportation 

system and the design of a new system, and order 

whatever construction is necessary to implement 
the plan chosen by the court.

SUZA^E GRIGGIl

Attorney for Appellants

The Community Law Office 
Box 277
Mendenhall, MS 39114

Certificate

I, Suzanne Griggins, attorney for the appellants,

hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy

of the foregoing Supplemental Brief of Appellants to

the counsel of record below by U.S. mail, postage pre
paid on this day and date:

Hon. Kenneth Rutherford 
P.O. Drawer 1532 
Jackson, MS 39215-1532

Hon. Malcolm Rogers 
P.O .Box 688 
Monticello, MS 39654

17



Hon. Frank Allen 
U.S. Department of Justice 
Civil Rights Division 
Educational Opportunities Section 
Washington, D.C. 20530

So certified this the 5/ day of March, 1986

f  7 r? 7s r^T i T  r ' r* •r r̂ ~SUZA GRIGGINS