Motion of Petitioners to Advance Consideration of the Petition for A Writ of Certiorari

    \*, 

No. 90-757 

IN THE 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

October Term, 1990 

RONALD CHISOM, et al., 
Petitioners, 

V. 

CHARLES E. ROEMER, et al., 
Respondents. 

X 

MOTION OF PETITIONERS TO ADVANCE CONSIDERATION 
OF THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 

Petitioners Ronald Chisom, et al., by their undersigned 

counsel, respectfully request that consideration of the petition 

for a writ of certiorari in this matter be advanced so that if 

certiorari is granted the case may be heard and decided during this 

term of Court. In support of this motion petitioners would show 

the following. 

1. In this case and in a companion case, LULAC v. Clements, 

920 U.S. 620 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. petitions pending sub nom., 

Houston Lawyers' Association v. Mattox, No. 90-813 and LULAC v. 

Mattox, No. 90-974, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held 

that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 

1973, does not govern the election of judicial officials.' 

2. The decisions in Chisom and LULAC have created uncertainty 

and confusion in the courts below that will affect the conduct of 

'See also Clark v. Roemer, No. 90-898, also pending on a 

petition for a writ of certiorari; Clark involves a challenge to 
the election of trial court judges in Louisiana. 



2 

elections in 1992 unless resolved by this Court. Not only are the 

decisions of the Fifth Circuit directly contrary to the decision 

of the Sixth Circuit in Mallory v. Eyrich, 839 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 

1988), in a number of instances proceedings in cases in other 

circuits have already been delayed because of Chisom and LULAC. 

Thus, the district court in SCLC v. Siegelman, 714 F. Supp. (M.D. 

Ala. 1989), while adhering to its earlier opinion that Section 2 

covers judicial elections, has recently certified the question to 

the Eleventh Circuit, delaying trial on the merits. In Hunt v. 

Arkansas, No. PB-C-89-406 (E.D. Ark.), the defendants have filed 

a motion for summary judgment based on LULAC/Chisom; plaintiffs 

(who are represented by counsel in the present case) are opposing 

the motion on the merits, but it is likely that the trial in Hunt 

scheduled for June, 1991, will be delayed until this Court resolves 

the issues presented by the present case. 

3. In the meantime, a three-judge district court has relied 

on LULAC to hold that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act does not 

cover judicial elections either (Hunter v. City of Monroe No. 90-

2031 (W.D. La., Nov. 7, 1990), despite this Court's recent summary 

decision to the contrary in Brooks v. State Bd. of Elections, 59 

U.S. L. W. 3293 (Oct. 15, 1990), and its earlier decision in Haith 

v. Martin, 618 F.Supp. 410 (E.D. N.C. 1985), aff'd, 477 U.S. 901 

(1986). However, the Attorney . General of the United States 

continues to adhere to the position that Section 5 does apply to 

judicial elections and has disapproved changes in the elections of 

judges in Texas and Louisiana. 



3 

4. It is essential that these questions be resolved at an 

early date. The filing and qualifications periods for elections 

to be held in the Fall of 1992 will be held in the early Spring of 

1992. In addition, primary elections for judicial offices at issue 

in many of the cases now pending will take place in mid-year, 1992. 

If argument is not heard until the Fall of 1991, which would be the 

case if certiorari is granted later in this Term, then a decision 

in this and related cases might not be issued until June, 1992. 

The resulting uncertainty could result in potential candidates 

being unsure whether to . seek office; if the Court rules for 

petitioners and reverses Chisom and LULAC at that late date, there 

could be substantial disruption in holding primary elections or in 

the qualifying of candidates. These problems would all be avoided 

if the question of the applicability of Section 2 to judicial 

elections were authoritatively resolved by this Court by the end 

of the current term. 

5. The state respondents in the present case have filed their 

brief in opposition to certiorari; it is petitioners' understanding 

that the United States will file its views by the end of the week 

of December 24. In the meantime, the state of Texas has filed its 

memorandum in Nos. 90-813 and 90-974 urging that certiorari be 

granted. Thus, the petitions for certiorari in Chisom, Houston 

Lawyers' Association, and LULAC are ready for disposition. 

Petitioners are prepared to file their opening brief and the Joint 

Appendix in 30 days from the date of a grant of certiorari and to 

file any reply brief 15 days from receipt of the brief of 



, 

4 

respondents in the present case. Therefore, there is sufficient 

time for the petition for writ of certiorari to be granted and the 

case set down for argument and decision in this Term of Court. 

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, petitioners pray that 

consideration of the petition for writ of certiorari be advanced 

and that after certiorari is granted that the cause be set down for 

briefing and argument during the current Term of Court. 

Res ectfully submitt d, 

harles Stephen Ralston 
99 Hudson St., 16th Floor 
New York, N.Y. 10013 
(212) 219-1900 . 
Counsel of Record for 

Petitioners 



No. 90-757 

IN THE 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

October Term, 1990 

X 

RONALD CHISOM, et al., 
Petitioners, 

CHARLES E. ROEMER, et al., 
Respondents. 

MOTION OF PETITIONERS TO ADVANCE CONSIDERATION 
OF THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 

Petitioners Ronald Chisom, et a/., by their undersigned 

counsel, respectfully request that consideration of the petition 

for a writ of certiorari in this matter be advanced so that if 

certiorari is granted the case may be heard and decided during this 

term of Court. In support of this motion petitioners would show 

the following. 

1. In this case and in a companion case, LULAC v. Clements, 

920 U.S. 620 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. petitions pending sub nom., 

Houston Lawyers' Association v. Mattox, No. 90-813 and LULAC V. 

Mattox, No. 90-974, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held 

that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 

1973, does not govern the election of judicial officials.' 

2. The decisions in Chisom and LULAC have created uncertainty 

and confusion in the courts below that will affect the conduct of 

'See also Clark v. Roemer, No. 90-898, also pending on a 

petition for a writ of certiorari; Clark involves a challenge to 
the election of trial court judges in Louisiana. 



2 

elections in 1992 unless resolved by this Court. Not only are the 

decisions of the Fifth Circuit directly contrary to the decision 

of the Sixth Circuit in Mallory v. Eyrich, 839 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 

1988), in a number of instances proceedings in cases in other 

circuits have already been delayed because of Chisom and LULAC. 

Thus, the district court in SCLC V. Siegelman, 714 F. Supp. (M.D. 

Ala. 1989), while adhering to its earlier opinion that Section 2 

covers judicial elections, has recently certified the question to 

the Eleventh Circuit, delaying trial on the merits. In Hunt v. 

Arkansas, No. PB-C-89-406 (E.D. Ark.), the defendants have filed 

a motion for summary judgment based on LULAC/Chisom; plaintiffs 

(who are represented by counsel in the present case) are opposing 

the motion on the merits, but it is likely that the trial in Hunt 

scheduled for June, 1991, will be delayed until this Court resolves 

the issues presented by the present case. 

3. In the meantime, a three-judge district court has relied 

on LULAC to hold that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act does not 

cover judicial elections either (Hunter v. City of Monroe No. 90-

2031 (W.D. La., Nov. 7, 1990), despite this Court's recent summary 

decision to the contrary in Brooks v. State Bd. of Elections, 59 

U.S. L. W. 3293 (Oct. 15, 1990), and its earlier decision in Haith 

v. Martin, 618 F.Supp. 410 (E.D. N.C. 1985), aff'd, 477 U.S. 901 

(1986). However, the Attorney General of the United States 

continues to adhere to the position that Section 5 does apply to 

judicial elections and has disapproved changes in the elections of 

judges in Texas and Louisiana. 



3 

4. It is essential that these questions be resolved at an 

early date. The filing and qualifications periods for elections 

to be held in the Fall of 1992 will be held in the early Spring of 

1992. In addition, primary elections for judicial offices at issue 

in many of the cases now pending will take place in mid-year, 1992. 

If argument is not heard until the Fall of 1991, which would be the 

case if certiorari is granted later in this Term, then a decision 

in this and related cases might not be issued until June, 1992. 

The resulting uncertainty could result in potential candidates 

being unsure whether to seek office; if the Court rules for 

petitioners and reverses Chisom and LULAC at that late date, there 

could be substantial disruption in holding primary elections or in 

the qualifying of candidates. These problems would all be avoided 

if the question of the applicability of Section 2 to judicial 

elections were authoritatively resolved by this Court by the end 

of the current term. 

5. The state respondents in the present case have filed their 

brief in opposition to certiorari; it is petitioners' understanding 

that the United States will file its views by the end of the week 

of December 24. In the meantime, the state of Texas has filed its 

memorandum in Nos. 90-813 and 90-974 urging that certiorari be 

granted. Thus, the petitions for certiorari in Chisom, Houston 

Lawyers' Association, and LULAC are ready for disposition. 

Petitioners are prepared to file their opening brief and the Joint 

Appendix in 30 days from the date of a grant of certiorari and to 

file any reply brief 15 days from receipt of the brief , of 

A 



„ 

4 

respondents in the present case. Therefore, there is sufficient 

time for the petition for writ of certiorari to be granted and the 

case set down for argument and decision in this Term of Court. 

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, petitioners pray that 

consideration of the petition for writ of certiorari be advanced 

and that after certiorari is granted that the cause be set down for 

briefing and argument during the current Term of Court. 

Res ectfully submitt d, 

harles Stephen Ralston 
99 Hudson St., 16th Floor 
New York, N.Y. 10013 
(212) 219-1900 
Counsel of Record for 

Petitioners