Roe v Norton Brief Amici Curiae

    IN  TH E

Bupxmv (Emtrt of %  1 niUb States
October Term, 1973

No. 73-6033

Sharon R oe, et al., Appellants 
v.

N icholas Norton, Commissioner of Welfare of the 
State of Connecticut, Appellee

On Appeal from ihe United States District Court for the 
District of Connecticut

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF, AMICI 
CURIAE AND BRIEF AMICI CURIAE

Of Counsel:

Marian W right Edelman 
J ustine W ise Holier 
Hern L. Nesson

Children’s Defense Fund 
1746 Cambridge Street 
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138 

Attorneys for Amici

Norman D orsen
New York University School of Law 
40 Washington Square South 
New York, New York

L eo P feefer 
15 East 84th Street 
New York, New York

P ress of Byron S. A dams Printing, Inc., W ashington, D. C.



For the American Academy of Child Psychiatry; the 
American Association of Psychiatric Services for 
Children; the American Orthopsychiatric Associa­
tion; the American Parents Committee, Inc; the 
Center for Community Change; the Child Welfare 
League of America, Inc.; the Connecticut Child 
Welfare Association; the Consortium on Early 
Childbearing and Child Rearing; the Council of 
Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds; the Day 
Care and Child Development Council of America, 
Inc.; the Family Service Association of America; 
the Interreligious Foundation for Community 
Organization; the Rational Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People; the R A A CP 
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.; the 
Rational Association of Social Workers ; the Ra­
tional Conference of Catholic Charities; the 
Catholic Charities of Rorwich, Connecticut; the 
Catholic Charities of Bridgeport, Connecticut; the 
Rational Council of Churches of Christ in the 
United States of America; the Rational Federa­
tion of Settlements and Reighborhood Centers; the 
Rational Urban League, Inc.; the Puerto Rican 
Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.; the 
Salvation Army; the United Church of Christ, 
Board of Homeland Missions, Health and Welfare 
Division; the United Presbyterian Church in the 
United States of America, Health and Welfare 
Development Unit; the Young Women’s Chris­
tian Association of the United States of America; 
and the Children’s Defense Fund of the Wash­
ington Research Project, Inc.



(2Xmtrt of tit? ltttt?£i i^tate
October Term, 1973

IN  TH E

No. 73-6033

Sharon R oe, et al., Appellants 
v.

N icholas Norton, Commissioner of Welfare of the 
State of Connecticut, Appellee

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
District of Connecticut

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE 
BRIEF, AMICI CURIAE

For the American Academy of Child Psychiatry; the 
American Association of Psychiatric Services for 
Children; the American Orthopsyehiatric Associ­
ation ; the American Parents Committee, Inc.; the 
Center for Community Change; the Child Welfare 
League of America, Inc.; the Connecticut Child 
Welfare Association; the Consortium on Early 
Childbearing and Child Rearing; the Council of 
Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds; the Day 
Care and Child Development Council of America,



2

Inc.; the Family Service Association of America; 
the Interreligious Foundation for Community 
Organization; the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People; the NAACP 
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.; the 
National Association of Social Workers; the 
National Conference of Catholic Charities; the 
Catholic Charities of Norwich, Connecticut ; the 
Catholic Charities of Bridgeport, Connecticut; the 
National Council of Churches of Christ in the 
United States of America; the National Federa­
tion of Settlements and Neighborhood Centers; 
the National Urban League, Inc.; the Puerto 
Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.; 
the Salvation Arm y; the United Church of Christ, 
Board of Homeland Missions, Health and Wel­
fare Division; the United Presbyterian Church in 
the United States of America, Health and Wel­
fare Development Unit; the Young Women’s 
Christian Association of the United States of 
America; and the Children’s Defense Fund of the 
Washington Research Project, Inc.

The organizations listed above, all of which have 
shown a continuing, substantial interest in child wel­
fare, respectfully move this Court, pursuant to Rule 
42(3), for leave to file a brief amicus curiae in this 
action. The attorneys for appellants have consented 
to the filing of the attached brief.

THE INTEREST OF AMICI

The Washington Research Project Inc. was es­
tablished in 1968. The Children’s Defense Fund was 
established by it in 1972. The Children’s Defense



3

Fund focuses principally on the area of children’s 
rights, where it seeks systematic reforms on behalf of 
all the nation’s children, but with particular attention 
to the special problems of minority and poor children. 
The Children’s Defense Fund’s work to vindicate the 
rights of all children, depends, among other things, on 
eliminating the vestiges of discrimination against par­
ticular children at all levels of governmental policy­
making. The statute involved in this case constitutes 
such discrimination.

The Children’s Defense Fund is joined in this 
amicus brief by national and Connecticut organiza­
tions dedicated to the welfare of children, as follows:

The American Academy of Child Psychiatry is a 
professional society of physicians who are members 
of the American Psychiatric Association and who are 
qualified in child psychiatry. Its purpose is to stimu­
late and advance medical contributions to the knowl­
edge and treatment of psychiatric problems of chil­
dren. The issues raised by this case are of importance 
to the Academy because of their relationship to the 
healthy emotional development of infants and children.

The American Association of Psychiatric Services 
for Children comprises 180' organizations with a prin­
cipal interest in providing and/or planning mental 
health services to children. Among other purposes, 
it seeks to represent the clinical perspective in those 
areas which bear upon the emotional development of 
children. The Association is concerned with the is­
sues in this case because it is aware disruption of 
mother-ehild relations presents a serious threat to the 
intellectual, emotional and social development of in­
fants and young children.



4

The American Orthopsychiatric Association is a 
national professional association of psychiatrists, 
psychologists, social workers and other professionals 
in the mental health field. Its purpose is to foster re­
search and spread information concerning scientific 
work in the field of human behavior. The Association 
is concerned with the issues in this ease and the threat 
they pose to the illegitimate children affected.

The American Parents Committee, Inc. was in­
corporated in 1947 as a non-profit, non-partisan public 
service association whose purpose is to work for fed­
eral legislation on behalf of the nation’s children in the 
fields of education, child health, child welfare, juvenile 
delinquency, day care and family planning. The in­
stant case raises an issue of concern to the Committee 
since research has shown that maternal deprivation 
impairs the healthy development of children, under­
mines the essential parental role of their mothers and 
leads to disruption rather than the strengthening of 
family life.

The Center for Community Change is a national or­
ganization devoted to assisting community develop­
ment in low income, inner city areas. Its concern in 
this case arises out of its awareness of the need to as­
sist families in low income inner city areas, rather 
than subjecting them to additional discriminatory dis­
abilities.

The Child Welfare League of America, Inc. is a 
national organization with 380 local child welfare 
agency affiliates, devoted to securing public under­
standing, interest and support of programs that en­
hance the well-being of children and that insure the



b

protection and services they require. Its interest in 
this case arises from its concern that Conneticut, in­
stead of assuring protection and services to those fami­
lies most in need and so enhancing the well-being of 
children, threatens the mother-child relationship and 
the security of the child.

The Connecticut Child Welfare Association is a 
statewide organization dedicated to child advocacy and 
the advancement of child welfare for all children in 
Connecticut. As a child advocate in Connecticut, it has 
special concerns about the issue raised in this case. 
The Association regards the statute as likely to chill 
applications for public aid for children entitled to such 
aid, and as creating discriminatory, cruel state action 
against children who are poor and illegitimate.

The Consortium on Early Childbearing and Child 
Rearing is a cooperative organization devoted to re­
search utilization and information sharing geared to 
helping communities improve services to adolescent 
school-age mothers, young fathers arid their infants. 
The issues raised in this case are vital to working with 
young parents and their infants. Since the Connecti­
cut statute would impede constructive efforts to help 
such parents and children and would discriminate 
against many of them by reason of poverty and il­
legitimacy, the Consortium is interested in this case.

The Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare 
Funds is the membership association and joint instru­
ment of 225 local Jewish Federations, Welfare Funds 
and Community Councils in the United States and 
Canada. These organizations provide a wide range of 
services to parents and children. Through the Council 
they work together on common regional, national and



6

overseas problems. The Council is deeply concerned 
with the effects of this Statute upon services to young 
families most in need and the new discriminatory bar­
riers to the rendering of such services which are raised 
by it.

The Day Care and Child Development Council of 
America, Inc. is a national organization devoted to 
promoting high standards and adequate provision of 
day care for all children who need and could benefit 
from it. The issues in this case are of special con­
cern to the council because their resolution will deter­
mine whether a state can be permitted to intervene in 
the development of a child by removal of his sole 
guardian at the time in his life when maternal care is 
most crucial.

The Family Service Association of America is a 
membership federation of more than 340 community 
supported and community serving family agencies, 
each of which exists to aid families and individuals 
with personal or social needs and to advocate action 
for the needs of families under stress. The Associa­
tion’s interest in this case stems from its commitment 
to aid families with such needs. No group is more in 
need than that represented by the children in this case.

The Interreligious Foundation for Community Or­
ganization is an organization engaged in the field of 
social action to effect sound public policy in regard to 
social issues. It supports this challenge to the Con­
necticut statute because it regards the statute as unjust 
and oppressive and as leading to a cycle of poverty 
through denial of support to children in their natural 
homes.



7

The National Association for the Advancement of 
the Colored People is a non-profit association repre­
senting the interests of approximately 500,000 mem­
bers in 1,800 branches throughout the United States. 
Since 1909, the NAACP has sought to establish and 
protect the civil rights of minority citizens. In this 
respect, the NAACP has often appeared before the 
Supreme Court as amicus in cases involving school 
desegregation, employment, voting rights, jury selec­
tion, capital punishment and other eases fundamental 
human rights. It joins in this brief because this case 
threatens the civil rights of mothers and their children 
to remain together and not be subjected to threats of 
separation by reasons of poverty, illegitimacy or race.

The N A A CP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, 
Inc. is a non-profit corporation incorporated under the 
laws of the State of New York in 1939. It was formed 
to assist blacks in securing their constitutional rights 
by the prosecution of lawsuits. Its purposes include 
rendering legal aid gratituously to blacks, suffering in­
justice by reason of race, who are unable, on account 
of poverty, to employ legal counsel on their own behalf. 
For many years, its attorneys have represented parties 
in this Court and participated as amici in this Court in 
cases involving many f  acets of law, including the rights 
of welfare recipient.s The present case is of par­
ticular importance to the Legal Defense Fund becaus 
it centers around a state effort to place a stigmatizing 
burden upon a group of children most of whom are 
poor and non-white.

The National Association of Social Workers is the 
professional association o f social workers with 52,000 
members in 172 chapters. Its purposes include the 
improvement of social conditions as well as activities



8

designed to strengthen the profession. The issues in 
this case are of importance to the NASW  because they 
reflect a trend to further impair the development and 
treatment of illegitimate children who are poor and in 
need of services.

The National Conference of Catholic Charities is the 
central national organization for Catholic charities in 
the United States. It is joined by two of its affiliates, 
Catholic Charities of Norwich, Connecticut and 
Catholic Charities of Bridgeport, Connecticut. This 
case is of importance to the Catholic Charities because 
the Connecticut statute threatens the only family unit 
for a child born out of wedlock and may deprive the 
child of the care and protection of his mother. Such 
action violates the sanctity of the family.

The National Council of Churches of Christ in the 
United States of America is a federation of 33 Prot­
estant and Eastern Orthodox denominations, com­
prising 139,962 churches with 42,278,990 members. 
The NCC has long been concerned that everyone should 
be able to enjoy a decent standard of living without 
regard to race, color or religion and has expressed dis­
tress at various restrictions place upon public assist­
ance programs such as that embodied in the Con­
necticut statute challenged in this case.

The National Federation of Settlements and Neigh­
borhood Centers is the national association of 447 
centers in 90 cities and 20 states, founded in 1911 by 
Jane Addarns. Settlement houses work for com­
munity change affecting families, individuals, com­
munity groups and their social environment. As heirs 
to the pioneering work of Jane Addarns, they are con­
cerned with achieving constructive community



9

change. This case is of great importance to the Fed­
eration because the Connecticut statute constitutes 
harsh, hostile and discriminatory coercion of those who 
are poor and powerless.

The National Urban League, Inc. is a national or­
ganization, with affiliates in 98 cities, devoted to as­
sisting urban communities with minority group prob­
lems that develop' out of segregation, discrimination 
and neglect in overcrowded population areas. This 
ease is of great significance to the League because the 
Connecticut statute places further burdens on those 
already faced with problems that result from segrega­
tion, discrimination and neglect of their social needs. 
The League views this statute as one more shocking 
attempt to chill welfare applications from the poor.

The Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education 
Fund, Inc. is an organization devoted to protecting 
and promoting the legal rights of Americans of Puerto 
Rican background. Its interest in this case is due to 
the steady and mounting attacks on indigent Puerto 
Ricans which seek to deprive them of entitlement to 
aid under Federal law. It sees the Connecticut statute 
as an effort to chill applications for welfare.

The Salvation Army is a religious and charitable or­
ganization carrying out a variety of programs de­
signed to promote the spiritual life and material well­
being of all people. Its interest in this case stems from 
its view that the Connecticut statute is an attempt to 
avoid and east aside illegitimate children if  they are 
poor and need public aid. It regards this approach 
to human problems as violating the right of all in­
habitants of this land to assistance when in need.



10

The United Church of Christ, Board of Homeland 
Missions, Health and Welfare Division is the central 
agent for the United Church of Christ’s activities in the 
fields of health and welfare. Its concern is for im­
provement of the health and welfare of all people, with 
special concern for poor and minority groups. It 
opposes any state action like Connecticut Statute 52- 
440b which separates or segregates those who are en­
titled to assistance or seeks to demand of recipients of 
aid conditions that are humiliating or coercive.

The United Presbyterian Church in the United 
States of America, Health and Welfare Development 
Unit, is the central organization for agencies and in­
dividuals primarily interested in issues of health, edu­
cation or welfare. The membership includes com­
munity centers and neighborhood houses, and health 
agencies—including hospitals, nursing and convales­
cent homes, out-patient clinics, chaplaincies, services to 
children and families, and services to the aging. Its 
interest in this case springs out of concern for services 
to children and their f  amilies. The Connecticut statute 
undermines equal access to services, segregates and 
coerces applicants and denies full access to benefits to 
poor children.

The Young Women’s Christian Association of the 
United States of America is a national organization 
with 1,463,000 individual members and 6,800 local units. 
Its common goal is that of helping all women and girls 
make their full contribution to society. Its interest in 
this case stems from its opposition to the imposition of 
conditions o f aid on those who need it on the ground of 
birth, status and poverty. It believes that the Con­
necticut statute fails to promote the welfare of all 
children and equal justice for all under the law.



11

This case raises serious questions as to the constitu­
tional right of illegitimate children to be raised by 
their natural mothers. The above organizations, 
dedicated to the welfare of children, believe that this 
brief will be of assistance to the Court in its con­
sideration of the issues involved.

Respectfully submitted,

Marian W right Edelman 
J ustine W ise P olier 
P ern L. Nesson

Children’s Defense Fund 
1746 Cambridge Street 
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138 

Attorneys for Amici

Of Counsel:
Norman D orsen

New York University School of Law 
40 Washington Square South 
New York, New York

L eo P eeffer 
15 East 84th Street 
New York, New York



Table of Contents Continued

Page
(b) Forced disclosure and prosecution 

threatens the father-child relation­
ship ...................................................... 14

(c) Identification of the father prevents 
the child’s psychological and 
emotional adaption to the fact of 
his illegitimacy ................................ 15

(d) The incarceration of the mother 
will interfere with the child’s emo­
tional and psychological develop­
ment ................................................... 16

(2) The statute is unconstitutionally over
inclusive 27

II. Connecticut Statute Section 52-440b, as enforced, 
constitutes invidious discrimination on the 
basis of wealth against indigent illegitimate 
children in violation o f their right to equal 
protection of the laws that (a) the statute is 
applied only to mothers of illegitimate children 
who are receiving public assistance and (b) 
the sentencing judge has no discretion to miti­
gate or give less than the maximum penalty to 
an indigent defendant .......................................  30

A. The court below erroneously rejected the
plaintiff’s claim that the statute, unconstitu- 
tutionally applies only to the class of mothers 
of illegitimate children who are receiving 
public assistance .............................................  31

B. The statute creates an invidious discrimi­
nation against mothers of children receiving 
public assistance because it invests no dis­
cretion in the judge to punish indigents ex­
cept by imprisonment.....................................  34

III. Incarceration o f the mothers of illegitimate 
children, pursuant to Connecticut Statutes 52- 
440b, constitutes cruel, unusual and dispropor­
tionate punishment of these children in violation 
of their rights under the Eighth and Four­
teenth Amendments .........................    36



Table of Contents Continued in

Page
A. The Court should look beyond the state’s

assertion that it is only punishing the 
mother by the enforcement of this statute. 
Connecticut is punishing the ch ild ................ 36

B. Punishment of the child is unconstitutional 
in this case because (1) it constitutes punish­
ment for the “ status”  of being an illegit­
imate child of a woman receiving welfare 
assistance; (2) the child’s conduct is not 
morally blameworthy; and (3) a civil con­
tempt sanction, which does not allow the 
child control over his mother’s release, is a
disproportionate punishment ........................ 37

Co n c lu sio n ..................................................................................  38

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases :

Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 ................................................. 25
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 220 .............................  34
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 8 9 .....................................  25
Cleveland Board of Education v. La Fleur, 94 S.Ct. 791 9
Doe v. Harder, 310 F.Supp. 302 (D. Conn.), appeal

dismissed, 399 U.S. 902 ....................................... 5, 33, 36
Doe v. Shapiro, 302 F.Supp. 761 (D. Conn.) appeal

dismissed, 396 U.S. 488 ............................................. 5, 33
Doe v. Norton, 365 F.Supp. 65 (D. Conn.) ..............6,10,13,

25 31 35 37
Frazier v. Jordan, 457 F.2d 726 (CA5) ................’ 36
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 1 2 ..........................................  34
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 ...........................  9
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663.. 34
*In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 ................................................... 9
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 ........................................  9
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 ................................... 9,10
Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 ...................... 37
Morris v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 508 ...............................  35
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 925 .............. 9
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 5 3 1 .........................................  37
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 1 5 8 ........................... 9,11



IV Table of Contents Continued

Page
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 6 6 1 .............................. 3/
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 155 ............................................... 9,11
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 6 1 8 ................................ 34
Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 ...................... 3 i
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 ..................................9, 25
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 9 7 ............................ 9
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 ..............................25, 26, 30
Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 3 1 8 ..................................... . 36
Taylor v. Martin, 330 F.Supp. 85 (N il Cal. 1971)

aff’d. sub nom Carleson v. Taylor, 404 U.S. 980. .. 36
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 8 4 .............................................  38
United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 1 3 9 .............................. 9
Vlandis v. Kline, 93 S.Ct. 2230 .......................................  25
Weber v. Aetna Casualty Co., 406 U.S. 1 6 4 .................. 28
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 ............................ 38
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 391 ................................. 34, 36
Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 ................................ .11, 30
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 .................................. 34

S t a t u t e s :

Connecticut Statute 17-62d 
Connecticut Statute 17-62f . 
Connecticut Statute 45-274 
Connecticut Statute 46-26b 
Connecticut Statute 52-440a 
Connecticut Statute 52-440b

OTHER AUTHORITIES
Ainsworth & Boston, Psycho diagnostic Assessments of 

a Child After Prolonged Separation in Early 
Childhood, 25 Brit. J. Med. Psychol. 170 (1952) .. 18

Bowlby, Attachment and Loss (1969) ...........................  18
Bowlby, Child Care and the Grotvth of Love (1953)... 18
Freud, Goldstein, and Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests

of the Child (1973) .....................................................  17
Glueck & Glueck, Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency

(1950) ........................................................................... 18
Maceoby and Masters, “ Attachment and Dependency”  

Manual of Child Psychology (1970) ....................  18

20
20
13
21
16
3



Table of Contents Continued v

Page
Rheingold & Bayley, The Later Effects of an Experi­

mental Modification of Mothering, 30 Child Devel.
363 (1959) ................................................................... 18

Robertson, “ Young Children in Brief Separation” ,
The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Yol. 26
(1971) ........................................................................  19

Scott, The Effects of Separation from the Mother in
Early Life, 1 Lancet 624 (1956) ..............................  18

Spitz, “ Anaelitic Depression” , The Psychoanalytic
Study of the Child, Yol. 2 (1946) ...........................  18

Spitz, The First Tear Of Life (1965) ..........................  18
United States Bureau of the Census, Characteristics

of the Population (1970) .........................................  34
United States, Department of Health Education and

Welfare, Characteristics of Recipients (1970 )...........34
White, Federal Programs for Young Children (1973).. 18
Wiltse, Foster Care, 1973 A Reappraisal, Public Wel­

fare (1974) ................................................................. 21
Williams, Chidren Who Break Down in Foster Care:

A Psychological Study of Patterns of Personality 
Growth in Grossly Deprived Children, 2 Child
Psychol. Psychiat. 5 (1961) .....................................  18

Yarrow, Maternal Deprivation: Toward an Empirical 
and Conceptual Pie-evaluation, 58 Psychol. Bull.
459 (1961) ................................................................... 18



IN THE

Bnpxxmt (£mxt of tip Ittiftfi BUIxb
October Term, 1973

No. 73-6033

Sharon R oe, et al., Appellants
V.

Nicholas Norton, Commissioner of Welfare of the 
State of Connecticut, Appellee

On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Connecticut

BRIEF AMICI CURIAE

Eor the American Academy of Child Psychiatry; the 
American Association of Psychiatric Services for 
Children; the American Orthopsychiatric Associa­
tion; the American Parents Committee, Inc.; the 
Center for Community Change; the Child Welfare 
League of America, Inc.; the Connecticut Child Wel­
fare Association; the Consortium on Early Child­
bearing and Child Rearing; the Council of Jewish 
Federations and Welfare Funds; the Day Care and 
Child Development Council of America, Inc.; the 
Family Service Association of America; the Inter- 
religious Foundation for Community Organization;



2

the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People; the NAACP Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund, Inc.; the National Association 
of Social Workers; the National Conference of 
Catholic Charities; the Catholic Charities of Nor­
wich, Connecticut; the Catholic Charities of Bridge­
port, Connecticut; the National Council of Churches 
of Christ in the United States of America; the Na­
tional Federation of Settlements and Neighborhood 
Centers; the National Urban League, Inc.; the 
Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, 
Inc.; the Salvation Army; the United Church of 
Christ, Board of Homeland Missions, Health and 
Welfare Division; the United Presbyterian Church 
in the United States of America, Health and Welfare 
Development Unit; the Young Women’s Christian 
Association of the United States of America; and 
the Children’s Defense Fund of the Washington 
Research Project, Inc.

INTRODUCTION

W e present this brief in support of the appellants 
and with their consent.

We rely on the appellants’ treatment of this Court’s 
jurisdiction, of the facts as to the individual appellants 
and of the opinions below.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution forbids the enforcement of 
Connecticut Statute 52-440b absent individual consid­
eration of the actual best interests of the children af­
fected by it.



3

2. Whether the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution forbids the discriminatory 
enforcement of Connecticut Statute 52-440b against 
only one class of people, based on their indigency.

3. Whether the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution forbids the imposition of 
the penalty of incarceration, pursuant to Connecticut 
Statute 52-440b, where the judge has no discretion, be­
cause of the defendants’ indigency, to give less than the 
maximum penalty.

4. Whether the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend­
ments of the United States Constitution forbid the in­
carceration of the mothers of illegitimate children, 
pursuant to Connecticut Statute 52-440b, as cruel, un­
usual and disproportionate punishment of these chil­
dren.

INTEREST OF THE AMICI

The Interest of the Amici is set out, supra., in the 
Motion for Leave to File this brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Connecticut Statute Section 52-440b1 forces the

1 Section 52-440b reads:
§ 52-440b. Compelling disclosure of name of putative father 
and institution of action.

a. If the mother of any child bom out of wedloek, or the 
mother of any child born to any married woman during 
marriage which child shall be found not to be issue of the 
marriage terminated by a divorce decree or by decree of 
any court of competent jurisdiction, fails or refuses to dis­
close the name of the putative father of such child under 
oath to the welfare commissioner, if such child is a recipient 
of public assistance, or to a selectman of a town in which such 
child resides, if such child is a recipient of general assistance, 
or otherwise to a guardian or a guardian ad litem of such



4

mother of an illegitimate child to disclose to the state 
the name of her child’s natural father, and then to 
prosecute a paternity action against him. I f  the mother 
fails to comply either with the duty to disclose or prose­
cute, she is punishable under the statute for contempt 
of court. The penalties provided by the statute are a 
fine of not more than $200 and/or imprisonment for 
not more than one year.

This statute is the outgrowth of two prior unsuccess­
ful attempts by the state of Connecticut to coerce 
mothers of illegitimate children who are receiving wel­
fare to name and prosecute the children’s natural 
fathers.

Connecticut’s initial attempt was a welfare regulation 
which provided that if  a mother failed to make dis­
closure of the father’s name to the Welfare Department 
she would be denied Aid to Families with De­
pendent Children (hereafter AFDC) benefits for her 
children. This was challenged on the grounds that 
punishing the children in order to coerce compliance by 
the mother violated the terms of the AFDC program 
and the federal Constitution. A  three-judge federal 
district court, reaching only the statutory issue, de­
clared that this provision conflicted with federal eligi-

child, such mother may be cited to appear before any judge 
of the circuit court and compelled to disclose the name of the 
putative father under oath and to institute an action to 
establish the paternity of said child.
b. Any woman who, having been cited to appear before a 
judge of the circuit court pursuant to subsection (a), fails 
to appear or fails to disclose or fails to prosecute a paternity 
action may be found to be in contempt of said court and may 
be fined not more than two hundred dollars or imprisoned not 
more than one year or both.



5

bility criteria established by Congress for the AFDC 
program and permanently enjoined its operation. Doe 
y. Shapiro, 302 F. Supp. 761 (D. Conn.), appeal dis­
missed, 396 U jS. 188.

The state Welfare Department changed its regula­
tion after the decision in Shapiro to provide that if 
the mother failed to make disclosure, her own AFDC 
benefits would be cut off. The Shapiro court enjoined 
the new regulation and held that its enforcement con­
stituted contempt of the prior injunction because it 
had the same harmful effect on the children. Doe v. 
Harder, 310 F.Supp. 302 (D. Conn.), appeal dismissed, 
399 IDS. 902.

Connecticut did not give up. It passed the present 
statute which differs from the old schemes in two ap­
parent respects. First, it appears to apply across the 
board to all mothers of illegitimate children, not just 
AFDC recipients. In fact, however, this appearance is 
illusory. The state has applied this statute only to 
mothers receiving public assistance, and has (as set 
forth more fully below) forced mothers who have 
refused to disclose the name of their children’s father 
to choose between relinquishing AFDC benefits and 
going to jail.

Second, the new statute purports to punish the 
mother, not the child, and to offer the court a con­
tinuum of possible punishments, from modest fines to 
imprisonment (or both). This, too, is illusory. Since 
the statute has been applied only to mothers receiving 
public assistance, the choice of a fine is meaningless be­
cause they have no money to pay. The de facto sanction 
of the statute as applied to them, then, is impris­
onment. Thus while purporting to punish only the



6

mother, the statute in this case has the devastatingly 
perverse effect of making the illegitimate child an 
orphan, a far more serious result than the prior 
schemes that were invalidated.

The psychological consequences of such separation 
to the child could be enormous. Specialists in child de­
velopment and psychiatric medicine are in unanimous 
agreement that maternal deprivation could stunt the 
child’s psychological, emotional and social develop­
ment.

The state of Connecticut claims two underlying pur­
poses for this statute: (1) protection of the state’s 
coffers by mitigating the financial burdens imposed in 
supporting impoverished illegitimate children; and 
(2) protection of the children’s best interests by estab­
lishing their paternity '“ so that they might enjoy the 
long term psychological and economic advantages to 
be gained thereby.”  (Doe v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. at 
73.) Yet the statutory scheme applies (1) even though 
there is no possibility of financial recovery from the 
father, for example, where the statute of limitations 
has run, and (2) regardless of proof that disclosure of 
the father’s name in a given circumstance may be ut­
terly contrary to the best interest of the child. Indeed, 
neither the mother nor the child are allowed an oppor­
tunity under the statute to make such a showing. The 
statute simply presumes that coercion of the mother 
and disclosure of the father’s name will always serve 
the child’s best interest.

The Children’s Defense Fund and twenty-seven 
other organizations committed to the wrelfare of chil­
dren, concerned with the cruel treatment of indigent 
illegitimate children under this staute, offer this brief 
in support of the appellants ’ constitutional challenge to



7

it. The Amici focus particularly on the constitutional 
rights of the children which are abridged by this 
statute. They demonstrate herein that § 52-450 is un­
constitutional because (a) it creates a false, but irre- 
butable, presumption that forced disclosure or incar­
ceration of the mother is in the child’s best interest; 
(b) it denies the illegitimate children of impoverished 
mothers the equal protection of the laws; and (c) it 
imposes upon such children a cruel, unusual and dis­
proportionate punishment.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This is a case which touches a most fundamental in­
terest embodied in the concept of liberty protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment: the right of a child to 
remain with and be raised by his parents. To be sure, 
that Amendment does not totally bar the states from 
legislating in this area. But this is a case in which the 
state has gone too far.

The state of Connecticut has enacted a statute pur­
porting to serve the best interests of illegitimate chil­
dren by establishing their paternity through legal ac­
tion. Its means of enforcement—coercion and/or incar­
ceration of the child’s mother—demonstrates that it is 
precisely the child’s interest that the statute destroys.

The Statute does not permit a case-by-ease review of 
the child’s best interests but operates on the basis of an 
irrebutable presumption that the child’s interests will 
be served best by the coercion and incarceration of his 
mother as a means of establishing paternity. The state’s 
insistence on this presumption, despite persuasive evi­
dence that it is harmful to the children in whose name 
it is used, is unconstitutional.



8

Moreover, the state applies this statute in cases where 
no legitimate interest of the child (or the state) can 
conceivably be served by it. To coerce or incarcerate the 
child’s mother so indiscriminately is a violation of the 
child’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Connecticut statute 52-440b, as drafted, applies to all 
mothers of illegitimate children. It is not applied as 
written; the state prosecutes only the mothers of il­
legitimate children who are receiving public assistance. 
The unequal impact of the manner of enforcement is a 
violation of the children’s rights to equal protection of 
the laws. This violation is compounded by the fact 
that the statute operates against the poor. The Con­
necticut legislature has established penalties for the 
mother’s refusal to disclose the father’s name—from 
fines to imprisonment. Where the mother is poor, 
the judge cannot exact a fine and must send her to 
prison. Thus the child’s mother is singled out because 
she is poor and incarcerated because she is poor all in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Finally, the incarceration of mothers of illegitimate 
children works an obvious punishment upon these chil­
dren. This punishment is severe and without justi­
fication and it violates these children’s rights to be free 
from cruel and unusual punishment as guaranteed by 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.



9

I. THE, ENFORCEMENT' OF CONNECTICUT STATUTE 52- 
440b, WITHOUT CAREFUL INDIVIDUAL CONSIDER­
ATION OF THE ACTUAL BEST INTERESTS OF THE 
CHILDREN INVOLVED, DEPRIVES ILLEGITIMATE 
CHILDREN OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND 
LIBERTIES GUARANTEED TO THEM BY THE FOUR­
TEENTH AMENDMENT.

A. THE RIGHT OF A CHILD TO BE RAISED BY HIS NATURAL 
PARENTS IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT IMPLICIT IN THE 
CONCEPT OF LIBERTY THAT MAY NOT BE DEPRIVED 
WITHOUT DUE PROCESS.

The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment is a constitutional guarantee of respect for those 
personal immunities which are “ so rooted in the tradi­
tions and conscience of our people to be ranked as 
fundamental.”  Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 
105 (Oardozo, J.).

The interest of parents and children2 in establishing 
and maintaining a coherent, private family unit, free 
from domination by the state, is indisputably a para­
mount and protected interest.3

2 Of course, most eases which deal with the fundamental interests 
of family life were brought by and for parents to protect their 
rights to privacy in family life and child rearing. The court has 
dealt with the issues as they regard these parental rights. Within 
the purview of both Meyer v. Nebraska, infra, and Pierce v. Society 
of Sisters, infra, however, are expressions consistent with a holding 
that a child has a fundamental interest in the protection of his 
family as well. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, which states:

[N] either the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights 
is for adults alone, [where the state directly abridges a child’s 
rights,] it is necessary that the basic requirements of due proc­
ess and fairness be satisfied.

3 Cleveland Board of Education v. La Fleur, 94 S.Ct. 791; 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 155; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12; 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 
268 U.S. 510 ; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390. Cf. United States 
v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 142; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 
165; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S 535.



10

B. WHILE THE STATES ARE NOT PRECLUDED FROM LEGIS­
LATING IN AREAS WHICH ABRIDGE SOME FAMILY INTER­
ESTS, THEY MAY DO SO ONLY IF THE INTEREST TO BE 
SERVED CONCERNS THE ACTUAL WELFARE OF CHILDREN, 
WHERE THAT INTEREST OUTWEIGHS THE FAMILY INTER­
EST, AND WHERE THE LEGISLATION IS NARROWLY 
DRAWN TO EXPRESS ONLY LEGITIMATE STATE INTER­
ESTS. CONNECTICUT STATUTE 52-440b MEETS NONE OF 
THESE CRITERIA.

Legislation restricting the liberty and privacy of 
family life must have a demonstrable relationship to 
valid state purposes:

The essential doctrine is that these liberties may 
not be interfered with, under the guise of protect­
ing the public interest, by legislative action which 
is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some 
purpose within the competency of the State to ef­
fect.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400.

Where such legislation specifically restricts the free­
dom of parents to make decisions affecting the welfare 
of their children, the Court has imposed an even heav­
ier burden on the state—that it demonstrate that the 
legislation benefits substantially the welfare of the 
children affected.4

4 Of course, the fiscal interest of the State is not disregarded 
either by the Attorney General or the court below. See State’s 
brief at 4; Doe v. Norton, supra., at 73 n. 10.

Neither this interest nor the interest of the state in obtaining, by 
the most efficient means, the name of the father [see State’s brief 
at 1] we submit, is sufficient to establish constitutionality where the 
statute is detrimental to the welfare and best interests of the chil­
dren it affects. Where the legislation specifically restricts the free­
dom of parents to make decisions affecting the welfare of their 
children, the Court has imposed a heavy burden on the state. The 
state must demonstrate not merely that the legislation serves a per­
missible state purpose, but it must prove that the restriction is



11

In addition to the Constitutional requirement that 
the state show a demonstrable, actual relation between 
the welfare of children and the challenged legislation, 
the state must demonstrate that the legislation is nar­
row enough to “ express only the legitimate interests 
at stake.”  Roe v. Wade, 410 TJ.S. 155 (1973). Connec­
ticut Statute Section 52-440b palpably fails to do this. 
It restricts the child’s right to remain with his parents 
but does not serve the best interests of the child in all

necessary for and actually -promotes the welfare of the chidren 
affected by it. For example, in Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 
309, a New York statute which permits AFDC caseworkers to 
make unannounced home visits to determine if dependent children 
are being abused or neglected was upheld against the mothers ’ chal­
lenge that it restricted their privacy. The Court recognized the 
mother’s rights to privacy and to make decisions for her child but 
it held that her rights were properly limited by this statute.

Where the state clearly proved a countervailing interest in the 
welfare of the child, the Court said:

The public’s interest in this particular segment of the area 
of assistance to the unfortunate is protection and aid for the 
dependent child. The focus is on the child, and, further, it is 
on the child who is dependent. There is no more worthy object 
of the public’s concern. The dependent child’s needs are para­
mount, and only with hesitancy would we relegate those needs, 
in the scale of comparative values, to a position secondary to 
what the mother claims as her rights. Wyman v. James, 
supra, at 318.

Likewise, in Prince v. Massachusetts, supra., the Court upheld 
the state’s power to prevent children from selling religious news­
papers on the streets at night. The Court recognized the “  [i]t is 
cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child 
reside first in the parents. ”  Id. at 169. But it found that in this 
instance the family interest was outweighed by the overriding need 
to safeguard the children’s welfare:

[The parent claims the right to] authority in her own house­
hold in the rearing of her children . . . .  Against these sacred 
private interests, basic in the democracy, stand the interests of 
society to protect the welfare of children.

Prince v. Massachusetts, supra, at 165.



12

cases. Instead it creates an irrebuttable presumption 
that coercion of the mother and disclosure of the name 
of the putative father are in the best interests of the 
child, though it can be demonstrated that in many, if 
not most, cases the child’s best interests will not be 
served thereby. Moreover, the statute is not drawn 
narrowly to express only the legitimate interests of the 
state in advancing each child’s welfare. Rather, it 
applies to a wide range of situations in which the child’s 
interests cannot conceivably be served.

(1) Unconstitutional Presumption

The state has, in its enforcement of this legislation, 
created an unconstitutional presumption that in all 
cases the child’s best interests are served by the statute. 
It has alleged, and the District Court below found, that 
in all cases the primary purpose of the statute is the 
protection and establishment of the present and future 
interests of the illegitimate child 1) by establishing 
his paternity shortly after his birth and 2) where the 
mother does not volunteer the father’s name, by her 
forced disclosure and prosecution of the father for 
non-support. The state argued inter alia,

Aside from the matter of support, there are 
other valuable, existing and potential rights, that 
the illegitimate child has, or may have, that de­
mand the ascertaining and establishing of his pa­
ternity.

He has the potential right to share in the social 
security benefits and Veterans Benefits . . ., and 
the rights of the illegitimate child to be treated 
without discrimination. . . .

The status of legitimacy, or o f having knowledge 
and proof of one’s paternity is a real and substan­
tial asset to a person. . . .  It means for example,



13

that when an application for employment, or se­
curity clearance, or a passport or any of the myriad 
of forms that we file in our daily lives, are filled 
out by an illegitimate child, he can fill in the blanks 
pertaining to “ F A TH E R ”  . . . .

Next we must consider the question of rights 
that . . . may attach in the future with respect to 
inheritance. . . .5

There exists . . . the valuable status of being the 
child of an individual male. . . . [T ]o  have one’s 
paternity established by whatever suitable means, 
probably confers upon the child membership in a 
class of children who can take estates under docu­
ments of testacy.

State’s brief at 5-7.
The Court below expressly accepted the state’s char­

acterization of the purpose of the statute:
[T]he scope of this statute was intended not 

only to protect the state’s coffers but also to estab­
lish the paternity of all illegitimate children so 
that they might enjoy the long-term psychological 
and emotional advantages to be gained thereby.
Doe v. Norton, supra, at 73 n.10.

and it found that disclosure would invariably be in the 
interests of the child, stating that “ [i]nstead of op­
erating to the disadvantage of children horn out of 
wedlock the statute operates to their benefit.”  Id. at 79.

This assumption is patently incorrect and is directly 
in conflict with the psychological and factual data 
available on this subject. In many, and we think most

5 Connecticut Statute 45-274 permits an illegitimate child to in­
herit from his father only if his natural parents later intermarry. 
Thus, an illegitimate child who establishes his paternity stands to 
gain nothing, under Connecticut law, from his natural father’s 
estate.



14

oases, the advantages which may be gained by the 
identification of the putative father are far outweighed 
by the detrimental psychological effects on the child of 
coercion and/or incarceration of his natural mother.

(a) Coercion creates tension and anxiety for the mother which
is harmful to her child.

Where the state compels the mother to disclose the 
father’s name against her best judgment, it will in­
evitably be creating tension and anxiety for the mother. 
This tension and anxiety will be especially destructive 
for a child who is already suffering from the handicap 
of an absent parent. The mother may blame the child 
for creating strain between her and the father. 
Where this occurs, the harm to the child will be com­
pounded because the anxiety felt by the mother may 
find its expression as anger and resentment at the child 
for being the cause of mother’s embarrassment. A f­
fidavit of Edward Zigler, Ph.D., Children’s Exhibit 5 
at 5, Joint Appendix.

(b) Forced disclosure and prosecution threatens the father-
child relationship.

I f  the natural father has some tenuous relationship 
with his child, the fact of disclosure (and prosecution) 
by the mother may serve to permanently alienate him 
from both the mother and the child.

[T ]he father would avoid contact with the child 
which otherwise he might maintain and he might 
avoid contact with the mother . . .  if  he feels that 
the condition for the relationship is one required 
by the law in order to provide economic support 
for the child.

Deposition of Albert J. Solnit, M.D., Children’s Ex­
hibit 1 at 7, Joint Appendix.



15

(c) Identification of the father prevents the child's psycho­
logical and emotional adaptation to the fact of his illegitimacy.

Where the child does not know his father, psycholog­
ical and emotional adaptation to his status of illegit­
imacy may actually be threatened by the disclosure of 
the father’s identity. Child psychiatrists have found 
that the child can best adapt to the father’s absence by 
“ im agining] a father who is larger than life to help 
overcome his sense of loss at not having a father pres­
ent in his home. Part of this idealization includes a 
belief that the father wants to come live with the 
family and the child but for some reason is unable to. 
This creation of an idealized image of a father is fre­
quently the most successful adjustment possible for a 
child.”  Affidavit of Edward Zigler, supra, at para. 6.

Learning the father’s identity is likely to impair his 
psychological adjustment.

When a child learns who his father is, he has to 
cope with the knowledge that his f  ather is not ideal 
but may be . . . someone the child is ashamed to 
have for a father. In such a situation the child’s 
self-image will be severely damaged. .. . ._ [He] 
may model himself after Ms image of his real 
father [which is] likely to be bad—-to coincide with 
society’s image of men who are unwilling to sup­
port their families and desert their children. . . .

The child’s self-image will also be severely dam­
aged . . . where [the knowledge of his father’s 
identity] brings home the fact of the father’s fail­
ure to live in the home. A  young child will assume 
that his father is absent because the child is un­
worthy in some way or because his father hates 
him.

Affidavit of Edward Zigler, supra, at para. 7, 8.



1 6

In sum, “ disclosure—and particularly compelled dis­
closure—of the identity of a child’s father . . . will in 
many eases be extremely destructive to the child’s 
emotional well-being.”  Id. at para. 3.

(d) The incarceration of the mother will interfere with the 
child's emotional and psychological development.

In cases where the mother refuses to disclose the 
father’s name,6 and where she is incarcerated pursuant 
to Section 52-440b, the potential for psychological and 
emotional barm to the child is greatly increased.

The statute of limitations applicable to paternity ac­
tions is three years.7 Thus, in most eases, the child 
whose mother is incarcerated will be under three years 
of age. Leading child development authorities have 
shown that maternal deprivation during the crucial

6 And where, as in Connecticut, the reasons for her failure to do 
so are not considered. See infra, at 21-26.

7 Connecticut Statute Section 52-440a provides, in pertinent part,
No petition [to establish paternity] shall be brought after three 
years from the birth of such child, or after three years from 
cessation of contribution toward support of the child by the 
putative father, whichever is later. . . .

The transcripts  ̂o f hearings in the Connecticut Circuit Court, Ninth 
Circuit show that, in all cases, the children were under three years 
of age.

Date of Hearing 
April 2,1973

May 7,1973 
Oct. 2,1973

Maria Hareega 
Ann Abaseal 
Susan Bilodeau 
Cynthia Iverson
Phyllis Clarke
Sharon Burr 
Rosalyn Carr

born 2/16/72
1/12/71 
7 / 4/72
1/ 3/73
3/31/71 

11/ 1/71

1 year -f- 6 weeks 
18 months
26 months 
9 months
4 months
2 years 6 months 
1 year 4 - 5 months

[The complete transcripts of these hearings are attached as Appen­
dix A  hereto.]



17

early years of a child’s life may be psychologically and 
emotionally disastrous:

Disruptions of continuity have different conse­
quences for different ages. In infancy . . . any 
change in routine leads to food refusals, digestive 
upsets, sleeping difficulties and crying . . . Change 
of the caretaking person for infants and toddlers 
further affects the course of their emotional de­
velopment. Their attachments at these ages are as 
thoroughly upset by separations as they are effec­
tively promoted by the uninterrupted presence of 
a familiar adult. When infants and young children' 
find themselves abandoned by the parent, they not 
only suffer separation distress and anxiety but 
also setbacks in the quality of their next attach­
ments, which will be less trustful. They tend to 
grow up as persons who lack warmth in their con­
tacts with others . . . .  Adults who as children suf­
fered from disruptions in continuity may them­
selves treat their children as they were treated— 
continuing a cycle costly both for a new generation 
of children as well as for society itself, (emphasis 
added.)

Freud, Goldstein and Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests 
of the Child at 31-34 (emphasis added).

Among the growth processess of the child which may 
suffer the greatest damage are those which society and 
the state should do most to engender and support, e.g., 
educational ability, cognitive development and the 
capacity to work productively in society:

Certain findings point to the likelihood that ma­
ternal deprivation has a specially adverse effect 
on particular processes. Among intellectual proc­
esses, the most vulnerable seem to be language and 
abstraction. Among personality processes, the



18

most vulnerable seem to be those underlying the 
ability to establish and maintain deep and mean­
ingful interpersonal relations and the ability to 
control impulses in the interests of long range 
goals.

Bowlby, Child Care and the Growth of Love at 219.8

The court below erroneously stated that enforcement 
of Section 52-440b will not harm the child because the 
consequences of maternal deprivation will be mitigated

8 In eases where the child has no other parent (as here) even 
more severe consequences may result. In a study done for the 
United Nations, a psychiatrist found that of children in orphanages 
who received adequate health and nutritional care, many young chil­
dren died or became mentally retarded without any medical expla­
nation. The psychiatrist concluded that this syndrome, anaclitic 
depression, was caused by the deprivation of the child’s mother:

We discovered that all children in our sample population who 
developed this syndrome had one experience in common: at 
some point between the sixth and eighth month of life all were 
deprived of the mother. This separation took place for una­
voidable external administrative reasons.

Spitz, The First Year of Life at 271.
For other discussions of the harmful psychological and emo­

tional effects on children of maternal deprivation, see White, Fed­
eral Programs for Young Children;  Maeeoby and Masters, “ At­
tachment- and Dependency.”  Manual of Child Phychology, at IS­
IS? ; Bowlby, Attachment and Loss; Williams, Children Who Break 
Down in Foster Romes: A  Psychological Study of Patterns of Per­
sonality Growth in Grossly Deprived Children, 2 J. Child Psychol. 
Psychiat. 5; Yarrow, Maternal Deprivation: Toward an Empirical 
and Conceptual Re-evaluation, 58 Psychol. Bull. 459; Rheingold & 
Bayley, The Later Effects of an Experimental Modification of 
Mothering, 30 Child Develpm. 363; Scott, The Effects of Separation 
from the Mother in Early Life, 1 Lancet 624 ■ Ainsworth & Boston; 
Psychodiagnostic Assessments of a Child After Prolonged Sepa­
ration in Early Childhood, 25 Brit. J. Med. Psychol. 170; Glueek 
& Glueek, Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency;  Spitz, “ Anaclitic De­
pression,”  Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Vol. 2 at 313,



19

(but not prevented) by the state’s obligation to provide 
for alternate care for these children. Even so,9 the 
effects of foster care are demonstrably not beneficial 
for all children. Psychological studies of children in 
foster care homes and in institutions demonstrate that 
young children who are separated from their mothers 
suffer acute distress regardless of the “ circumstance 
and quality of substitute care.” 10

9 In fact, the transcripts of state eases show that the state refuses 
to make arrangements for children whose mothers are to be detained. 
See, for example, the transcript in Welfare Commissioner v. Rosalyn 
Carr ( Circuit Court, 9th Circuit, Middletown, Connecticut, October 
2, 1973, Hon. Eli L. Cramer, Judge.) In pertinent part, it reads:

The Court: You be back here two weeks from
today . . . , Mrs. Carr, and you have 
arrangements made if you do not dis­
close at that time, you have arrang- 
ments made to take care of your child.

See also the Transcript in Welfare Commissioner v. Elizabeth Stone 
(Circuit Court, 1st Circuit, Norwalk, Connecticut, January 28, 
1974, Hon. G. Sarsfield Ford, Judge.)

The Court : I accept her declining to identify the
punitive [sic] father. I will continue 
the matter until next Monday at two 
o'clock . . .  I find her refusal, through 
you, is an act of contempt at this time. 
Rather than place her in custody at this 
time I will give her until next Monday 
at two o ’clock to purge herself from 
contempt. . . .
I would suggest she get everything in 
order by next Monday . . .  if she is going 
to be continuing in this position and I 
have to restrain her, that someone is able 
to take care of her child and so forth.

Mr.. Gerlin: And if there is no one?
The Court : Then that will be her problem.

Appendix A.
10 J. Robertson, “ Young Children in Brief Separation” , The 

Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Yol. 26 at 265.



20

There is nothing in the record to show that quality 
foster care is available for these children and it is un­
likely that they wTill have access to the most desirable 
foster or temporary care. The women affected by the 
statute are poor; their immediate relatives are not 
likely to have the financial resources to be able to care 
for an additional child during the mother’s absence. 
The children will have to be placed, in all probability, 
in institutions and outside their natural families.

There is substantial risk that under the Connecticut 
law the fracture of the mother-child relationship will 
never be healed. Connecticut law requires the Court to 
place guardianship of a child whose mother is incar­
cerated in the Department of Welfare until the child 
becomes 18 or until the order of guardianship is re­
voked.11 For the mother to regain guardianship, she 
must prove that it is in the best interest of the child to 
be returned to her custody.12 The fact of her imprison­
ment, with the probable loss of the home she had with 
her child, would hardly prepare her to meet this 
burden. Studies have shown that the image of foster 
care as a temporary source oriented to short-term treat­
ment of a family or child is no longer correct. Instead 
as things stand now, the majority of children who enter 
foster care are likely to spend their growing years 
there. This has been shown to be especially true of chil­
dren who are poor or belong to minority groups, the 
objects of the Connecticut statute, so that their place-

11 Connecticut Statute Section 17-62d.

12 Connecticut Statute Section 17-62f.



21

merit of them in foster care or institutions carries with 
it an additional danger of permanent separation from 
their natural families:

Poverty and living arrangements operate against 
early return to natural parents . . .  It is as if  foster 
care can well be temporary only if the child or 
parents are tenacious in being visible . . . the de­
sired placement seems least likely to be carried 
out for the poorest families . . . Children in foster 
care take their chances; poorer children take a 
greater chance.13

Where it is clear or can be shown that the child’s best 
interests vary with the facts of each family situation, 
the state cannot constitutionally create an irrebuttable 
presumption that coerced disclosure or imprisonment 
is in the best interest of all children.

Assistant Attorney General Higgins stated at oral 
argument that Connecticut presumes that the enforce­
ment of Section 52-440b will be in the best interests of 
children in all cases and the state should not allow the 
mother or the child 14 to rebut this presumption in spe­
cific instances.15

13 Wiltse, Foster Care, 1973: A Reappraisal, Public Welfare at 
at 7.

14 In other instances where the actual harm or benefit to the child 
is considered relevant by the State, Connecticut statutes provide 
for the appointment of an attorney to represent the child’s inter­
ests. See, e.g., Connecticut Statute Section 46-26b.

15 In his argument to the District Court, the State Assistant 
Attorney General was asked to clarify this point:

Judge Newman : Do you take the position that in the con­
tempt proceeding the woman has the 
right to present facts bearing on whether 

, disclosure is in the child’s interest? . . .



22

In fact, Mr. Higgins has accurately described the 
actual practice of Circuit Court judges as they have 
applied this statute throughout Connecticut. Excerpts 
from the transcripts of two cases decided under 
Section 52-440b illustrate the practice:

The case of W elfare Commissioner v. Elisabeth 
Stone, Circuit Court, 1st Circuit, Norwalk, Connecti­
cut, January 28, 1974, Hon. GK Sarsfield Ford, Judge:

Mu. GtEELIN: Your Honor, we have a situation
here, I think, where the law is 
hard . . .  [t]he father of this child is

Can die litigate that issue in the con­
tempt hearing ?

Mr. H iggins: No, I don’t believe that she can, under
the statute.

Judge Newman : Well, when you say the Circuit Court
.judge will exercise his discretion what 
will he exercise it on if she can’t litigate 
that issue ?

Mr. Higgins : He would litigate it on whether or not
she would be held liable to the imposi­
tion of one of the penalties provided.

Judge Newman :

Mr. H iggins :

Judge Newman :

Mr. H iggins :

Yes. But what issue would he have to 
resolve to get to that ultimate conse­
quence ?
Well, the issue as in the case I stated, 
that it was impossible for her to disclose, 
[that she didn’t know the father’s 
name].
That is one. That is really standard-— 
knowledge. What about the more cur­
rent problem of desirability of disclo­
sure? . . . Would you oppose them liti­
gating that?
I would oppose them litigating that issue 
of desirability.

Transcript of the Argument before District Court at 43-45.



23

T h e  C o u r t  :

a man who has been arrested for 
narcotics violations, for assault and 
battery, apparently has been diag­
nosed as a schizophrenic . . . Now 
my client is terrified of this man 
. . .  I believe the court should have 
discretion to examine . . . the Sta­
tute should be read so the court 
does have discretion. The law, I 
think, is hard.
It may even be harsh. I  assume by 
reason of this citation that . . . 
[t]here is a child born which is 
living with her and is the recipient 
of Welfare Assistance . . . And to 
date Elizabeth Stone has failed to 
voluntarily disclose the name of the 
punitive (sic) father . . . Then un­
der the Statute . . .  I  wrill order that 
she disclose the name of the puni­
tive father . . .  I  have compassion 
for her too, but I  can’t let that 
shade my obligation to my oath to 
do what this law says I  should do.

The case of Welfare Commissioner v. Robin Janes, 
Circuit Court, 16th Circuit, West Hartford, Connecti­
cut, November 27, 1973, Hon. Henry J. Goldberg,
Judge:

Mr. A u d en  : [D ] o you want to tell your Honor 
why you refused to [disclose the 
name of the father] %

Ms. J a n e s : H e’s threatened my life and my 
daughter’s life. H e’s threatened me 
physically with his own hands and 
he has come after me with a gun 
and he has been on drugs charges 
and he’s also threatened my daugh­
ter’s life with a gun and I  feel that



24

it ’s just a danger to me and my 
daughter’s life to state his name

T h e  C ourt : I simply want to tell you that we 
have a statute which in essence 
states that the mother of a child, 
your situation, born out of wedlock, 
may be cited . . .  to disclose who the 
father is and if that person refuses 
to disclose the putative father, that 
person may be found in contempt 
of court. . . .

Ms. J a n e s : Well, . . .  I ’m afraid of him and 
I ’m going to be getting married in 
the Spring and my fiancee is going 
to be adopting my daughter and I 
think it would be harmful to state 
his name right now because I ’m 
afraid of him.

T h e  C ourt : [T]he statute does give the court 
the authority to compel you to name 
the father and if you still refuse, 
the court here wouldn’t have any 
alternative except to fine you up to 
$200 and imprison you for not more 
than one year or both.16

Such application collides with the long standing view 
of this court that

the wholesale condemnation of a class to . . .  an 
invasion of personal liberty, without opportunity

16 Appendix A. See also affidavit of Frances Foe, Plaintiff, who 
was cited for contempt despite the fact that:

“ the child was conceived either under incestuous conditions 
or by a person who is emotionally unstable and whose where­
abouts [were] unknown to her.”

Affidavit of Prances Poe, para. 3(b).



25

to any individual to show that his is not the case 
which would justify resort to it . . .  is lacking in 
the first principles of due process.

Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 544-45 (Stone, 
C.J., concurring). Vlandis v. Kline, 93 S.Ct. 2230; 
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645; Bell v. Burson, 402 
U.S. 535; Carrington v. Bash, 380! U.S. 89.

A similar case to this was presented in Stanley v. 
Illinois. There, an Illinois statute purportedly oper­
ated “ to protect the moral, emotional, mental and 
physical welfare of the minor and the best interests of 
the community.”  17 It provided that upon the death of 
their mother, illegitimate children would he declared 
dependents and he placed in foster care. The state re­
fused to allow the natural father to prove his fitness 
to have custody of his children. This court held that 
the state could not, consistently with due process re­
quirements, presume that the child’s best interests 
would not be served by giving his father custody. It 
stated:

[T]he State has made its interest quite plain. 
Illinois has declared that the aim of the Juvenile 
Court Act is to protect the welfare of the minor. 
. ..  But we are here not asked to evaluate the legit­
imacy of the state ends, rather, to determine 
whether the means used to achieve these ends are 
constitutionally defensible. . . . We observed that 
the State registers no gain toward its declared 
goals when it separates children from the custody 
of fit parents. Indeed, if Stanley is a fit parent, 
the State spites its own articulated goals when it 
needlessly separates him from his family. . . .

17 Stanley v. Illinois, supra, at 1213; compare State’s argument 
in Doe v. Norton, 356 F. Supp. 202, 207 (D. Conn.) and Doe v. 
Norton, supra, at 73 n.l0!.



26

It may be, as the State insists, that most un­
married fathers are unsuitable arid neglectful 
parents. It may also be that Stanley is such a 
parent and that his children should be placed in 
other hands. But all unmarried fathers are not in 
this category; some are wholly suited to have cus­
tody of their children . . .

Procedure ~by presumption is always cheaper 
and easier than individualized determination. But 
when, as here, the procedure forecloses the deter­
minative issues of competence and care, when it 
explicitly disdains present realities in deference to 
. . . formalities, it needlessly risks running rough­
shod over the important interests of looth parent 
and child . . . .  I t  therefore cannot stand, (empha­
sis added)

Stanley v. Illinois, supra, at 1213-15.

Under the standards established by the Court in 
Stanley, Connecticut’s enforcement of Section 52-440b 
unconstitutionally deprives illegitimate children of 
their right to remain with their natural parent without 
the individual determination required by due process 
of law. First, the state categorically assumes that the 
child’s best interests lie in coercion or incarceration 
of his mother despite significant persuasive evidence 
that this is demonstrably false in some cases. Supra. 
at 12-21. Second, the state has impermissibly refused 
to allow consideration of the individualized particular 
interests of each child in each case. Supra, at 21-24.

As in Stanley, the state of Connecticut “ insists on 
presuming rather than proving the child’s interests”  
(Id. at 1216) despite strong indications that they may 
not be served by uniform enforcement of Section 52- 
440b. And as in Stcmley, the due process clause requires 
a different approach.



27

(2) The Statute is Unconstitutionally Over-Inclusive.

The state has unconstitutionally failde to narrow 
the application of this statute to express only the legit­
imate state interests at stake in prosecuting paternity 
actions. Section 52-440b applies to all mothers of ille­
gitimate children regardless of whether

a) the father can be identified; 18

18 While the State Attorney General stated at argument that a 
mother would not be punished where she could not identify the 
father, the application of this statute in specific eases has demon­
strated that this is not so. See, for example, the ease of Welfare 
Commissioner v. Bosayln Carr, Circuit Court, 9th Circuit, Middle- 
town, Connecticut, October 2, 1973, Hon. Eli L. Cramer, Judge:

The Court : I am giving you fair warning, Mrs. Carr,
that I don’t want any games played. 
Disclose the name. You are under oath. 
No you have five minutes, I don’t want 
any speeches, just disclose the name.

The Defendant : I do not know. I am under oath in the 
court of the State of Connecticut and I 
can truthfully say I do not. know the 
name of my child’s father.

The Court : Well, I ’m going to order you. This is no
gross intrusion. Legislature has deter­
mined it is not and the United States 
District Court. Disclose the name and 
whether it intrudes on your privacy is 
something you can come forth yourself 
on later. I f  you don’t I -will exercise the 
penalty by law and I am going to send 
you to jail.

The Defendant: Your Honor, you are trying to make me
say something that I don’t know . . . 
[Hjaving to be here is a gross intrusion 
of my privacy.

The Court : If you wish to discontinue it, discontinue
being a ward of the State of Connecticut 
and they will have no right to compel 
you . .  . You be back here two weeks from 
today, Mrs. Carr, and you have arrange-



28

b) the statute of limitations for paternity actions 
has run;

c) the child has a formal acknowledgement of 
paternity; or

d) the state has another, less intrusive means of 
establishing the identity of the child’s father.

In cases where the father cannot be identified, and 
the state’s enforcement is futile, the child’s interest can­
not be served in anyway. Thus, the potential harm to 
the child of coercion and/or imprisonment of his 
mother clearly outweighs any benefit to the state. In­
deed the import of the statute seems purely punitive 
in these oases. Similarly, in eases where the statute of 
limitations has run, no paternity action may be insti­
tuted by either the mother or the state. Thus, the asser­
tion of state’s fiscal interest in obtaining support money 
is nullified and the child’s interest in legally establish­
ing paternity for future benefits is nonexistent.

Where the child has formal acknowledgment of 
paternity, the child’s interest in receiving support or 
future financial benefits can be enforced by him at his 
election. This Court has indicated that an illegitimate 
child’s recovery of benefits due his father does not 
depend on proof that there has been a formal court 
adjudication of paternity. W eber v. Aetna Casualty 
Co., 406 TLS. 164.

Moreover, the Connecticut legislature could demon­
strate its professed claims of concern for illegitimate

ments made if you do not disclose at 
that time, you have arrangements made 
to take care of your child.

Appendix A.



29

children by legislating away any formal disability of 
a child to recover benefits from his natural father 
where credible proof of paternity exists.

Where the state has another, less intrusive means of 
establishing the identity of the child’s father, it should 
use it rather than be permitted to coerce and/or in­
carcerate the mothers of young children. The identity 
of the father can, in some cases, be obtained by mere 
examination of the birth certificate. This seems a sim­
ple step to take. But the state has conceded that it does 
no independent investigation to determine the identity 
of the natural father other than to question (and 
coerce) the mother.19 It should be required to do so.

Even if the state could show its present methods are 
more efficient, which we doubt, this statute, as applied, 
still could not stand:

[T]he Constitution recognizes higher values than 
speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say

19 In the deposition of John A. Nadolski, an employee of the Wel­
fare Department of Connecticut, whose responsibility was to estab­
lish the paternity of illegitimate children in his district, Mr. 
Nadolski described the extent of his investigation as follows:

[Knowledge of the existence of an illegitimate child would 
come to my attention] at the time of application, through an 
intake worker, or during an annual review of existing welfare 
mothers. . . .
[T]he welfare worker would ask the mother who the father of 
the child is. I f at that time the [mother] refuses to name the 
father . . .  I would . . . ask the mother who the father of the 
child was. I would inform her that under welfare laws, if 
she refuses to name the father of the child wTe can . . . cite 
her to appear before a judge of the Circuit Court . . . .  I f she 
still refuses to name the father of the child, I would turn it 
over to an attorney . . .  to cite her.

Deposition of John A. Nadolski, Children’s Exhibit 3, Joint Appen­
dix at 4-6. Accord, Deposition of Joseph Mancini, Children’s 
Exhibit 4, Joint Appendix at 4-7.



30

of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Proc­
ess clause in particular, that they were designed 
to protect the f  ragile values of vulnerable citizenry 
from the overbearing concern for efficiency. . . .

Stanley v. Illinois, supra, at 1215.

Where, as here, there exists severe threat of harm to 
children from coercion and incarceration of their 
mothers, the state must demonstrate that it has used 
all other reasonable means to establish paternity prior 
to embarking on such a drastic course.

The public interest in this particular segment of 
the area of assistance to the unfortunate is pro­
tection and aid for the dependent child whose 
family requires such aid for that child. The focus 
is on the child, and, further, it is on the child who 
is dependent. There is no more worthy object of 
the public’s concern. The dependent child’s needs 
are paramount.

Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318 (1971).

II. CONNECTICUT STATUTE SECTION 52-440b, AS EN­
FORCED, CONSTITUTES INDIVIDEOUS DISCRIMI­
NATION ON THE BASIS OF WEALTH AGAINST IN­
DIGENT ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN IN VIOLATION  
OF THEIR RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE 
LAW S IN THAT

A. THE STATUTE IS APPLIED ONLY TO MOTHERS 
OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN WHO ARE RECEIV­
ING PUBLIC ASSISTANCE.

AND

B. THE SENTENCING JUDGE HAS NO DISCRETION 
TO MITIGATE OR GIVE LESS THAN THE M A XI­
MUM PENALTY TO AN INDIGENT DEFENDANT.



31

A. THE COURT BELOW ERRONEOUSLY REJECTED THE PLAIN­
TIFF'S CLAIM THAT THE STATUTE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY 
APPLIES ONLY TO THE CLASS OF MOTHERS OF ILLEGIT­
IMATE CHILDREN WHO ARE RECEIVING PUBLIC ASSIST­
ANCE.

The Court held:
This statute which imposes a duty upon an un­

wed mother to disclose the name of the putative 
father of her child does not distinguish between 
unwed mothers who receive public assistance and 
those who do not. The statute permits the com­
pelled disclosure of the name of the putative father 
from any mother of an illegitimate child.

Doe v. Norton., supra, at 81.

This statute, while neutral on its face, has in fact 
been applied only to mothers of welfare recipients. 
Indeed, the state could not cite a single case brought 
under Section 52-440b against a mother not receiving 
public assistance. Transcript of Argument below at 
40-41.

This statute was passed by the legislature only after 
the repeated efforts of the state welfare department to 
establish administrative procedures for identifying the 
putative father were rejected. Doe v. Norton, supra, at 
71. As the State conceded in its brief,

For a long time prior to the decision in Doe v. 
Shapiro, 302 F.Supp 767 (D. Conn.), .and 
Doe v. Harder, 310 F.Supp. 302 (D. Conn.) the 
defendant welfare commissioner handled the prob­
lem of the non-disclosing mother of an illegitimate 
child by terminating the public assistance benefits 
of the mother and the child. After this decision, 
the defendant commenced to cut off benefits to the 
mother but not the child. These procedures were 
held invalid by the Federal courts basically on the



32

theory that by so acting the commissioner was add­
ing a condition to A EDO eligibility not provided 
for in the Federal Social Security Act, and, in 
effect, was visiting the sins of the mother upon the 
child. . . .

The severance of welfare benefits having been 
precluded as a means of ascertaining the identity 
of the father of a illegitimate child, the legislature 
determined that it would be proper to cause these 
women to be cited in before the Circuit court to 
disclose the name of the putative father (emphasis 
added).

State’s brief below at 1-3.

Contempt cases heard subsequently show conclusively 
that State judges have refused to apply the statute to 
mothers who have discontinued public assistance or 
who agree to discontinue it rather than disclose the 
name of the father.

In the case of Welfare Commissioner v. Susan Bilo­
deau (Circuit Court, 9th Circuit, Middletown, Connecti­
cut, April 2, 1973 Hon. Nicholas F. Armentano, 
Judge.) the judge held the mother could not be cited 
for contempt unless she was receiving welfare:

Mr, C arta : Are you willing to disclose the
name of the father*?

T he Defendant: No . . .  .
Mr. Carta : Do you know what the statute

says? Anyone who refuses to 
disclose the name of the father 
could be held in contempt of 
court . . . Do you understand 
that?

T h e  D e f e n d a n t  : Yes.



33.

Me.. Carta : And the child is presently a re­
cipient of the State welfare ?

T he Defendant: No . . .  Yon know I ’m working.
T he Court: [C]heck whether this child is

a recipient now . . . Check that 
because she would have a right 
to refuse,. . .  if  the child is not 
presently a recipient.

The following colloquy occurred in the case of Welfare 
Commissioner v. Rosalyn Carr, (Circuit Court, 9th 
Circuit, Middletown, Connecticut, October 2, 1973) :

T he Court1: Well, I ’m going to order you
to disclose [the father’s name].

T he Defendant : I  feel that it is . . . a gross in­
trusion of my privacy.

T he Court: I f  you wish to discontinue it,
discontinue being a ward of the 
State of Connecticut and they 
will have no right to compel 
you.

T he Defendant : All right. I  will do that i f  that
is what the Court wants, then 
that is finished.20

This court consistently has held that a statute which 
appears on its face to make a rational classification is 
unconstitutional if, without a rational basis, it is

20 Bilodeau transcript at 6-10; Carr transcript, at 27-28. Appen­
dix A. Thus, disclosure has become equivalent to another eligibil­
ity requirement and should be prohibited by the prior decisions in 
Doe v. Shapiro, supra., and Doe v. Harder, supra.



34

actually applied only to one class o f individuals. In 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, it was stated:

Though the law itself be fair on its face, and 
impartial in appearance, yet, if  it is applied and 
administered by public authority with an evil eye 
and an unequal hand, so as practically to make un­
just and illegal discriminations between persons 
in similar circumstances, material to their rights, 
the denial of equal justice is still within the pro­
hibition of the constitution.

Yick W o v. Hopkins, supra, at 573-74.

This principle has been applied to cases where the 
discriminatory application of the statute was based 
on the invidious classification of indigency. Boddie 
v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 220; Williams v. Illinois, 
399 U.S. 391; Harper v. Virginia Board of Elec­
tions, 383 U.S. 663; Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 
12. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,21 It should 
be applied here.

B. THE STATUTE CREATES AN INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION 
AGAINST MOTHERS OF CHILDREN RECEIVING PUBLIC 

ASSISTANCE BECAUSE IT VESTS NO DISCRETION IN THE 
JUDGE TO PUNISH INDIGENTS EXCEPT BY IMPRISONMENT.

In his concurring opinion in the District Court, 
Judge Newman stated that a balance should be struck

21 Of course, classification by indigency implies classification by 
race. In the separation of children from their natural families, now 
threatened by Connecticut Statute 52-440b, one finds a dispropor­
tionate percentage of children from poor non-white families. The 
1970 Census shows that the population of Connecticut is six per­
cent black and ninety-three percent white. United States Bureau 
of the Census, Characteristics of the Population, 1970, Vol. 1, Pt. 8., 
Connecticut, Table 18 at 39. However, of the 8,600 recipient fami­
lies of AFDC in Connecticut, 5,400 were black, HEW, ‘ ‘ Character­
istics of Recipients’ ’ (1971).



35

in each case between the mother’s “ constitutionally 
protected interest. . .  in making decisions to maintain 
the harmony of her family unit”  and the state’s in­
terest in enforcement of the father’s obligations to 
support his child. He concluded that Section 52-440b 
permits such a balance to be made: 22

The statute accords the state judges ample dis­
cretion to determine the appropriateness of con­
tempt remedies in specific cases.

Doe v. Norton, supra, at 86.

But the statute is applied only to welfare mothers. 
Thus discretion allowed by the legislation as to 
stringency of penalties is nullified by the fact that the 
mothers cannot afford to pay fines. A judge, faced 
with a recalcitrant welfare mother, must either dis­
regard his duty under Section 52-440b or give the maxi­
mum penalty prescribed imprisonment.23

The Constitution should not permit the arbitrary 
imposition of jail sentences on indigents where the leg­
islature has provided for the imposition of a fine un­
der appropriate circumstances. To impose prison sen­
tences in such cases is an invidious discrimination based 
on wealth which constitutes a denial of equal protection

22 But see supra, at 21-26.

23 See Morris v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 508, 509 (White, J., con­
curring). In fact, state judges have indicated that where any 
penalty will be imposed on the mothers, it will be a jail term. See 
Transcript of Welfare Commissioner v. Robin Janes, supra, at 27. 
(Appendix A ).



36

of the law. Cf. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 318; W il­
liams v. Illinois, supra.; Frasier v. Jordan, 457 E.2d 
726 CCA 5) (Wisdom, J.).

III. INCARCERATION OF THE MOTHERS OF ILLEGITI­
MATE CHILDREN, PURSUANT TO CONNECTICUT 
STATUTE 52-440b, CONSTITUTES CRUEL, UNUSUAL  
AND DISPROPORTIONATE PUNISHMENT OF THESE 
CHILDREN IN VIOLATION OF THEIR RIGHTS UNDER 
THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS.

A. THE COURT SHOULD LOOK BEYOND THE STATE'S ASSER­
TION THAT IT IS ONLY PUNISHING THE MOTHER BY THE 
ENFORCEMENT OF THIS STATUTE ™  CONNECTICUT IS 
PUNISHING THE CHILD.

As shown earlier, the incarceration of the mother 
will have its most drastic and harmful effects upon the 
psychological and emotional well-being of the child. 
Supra, at 13-21. And the child who will suffer 
in these circumstances has power to neither rebut the 
state’s presumption that the statute works to his best 
interests nor to control his mother’s behavior so as 
to prevent her incarceration. Where the greatest 
punishment falls on the child, the Court must look 
beyond the nominal designation of the mother as “ de­
fendant”  to examine whether its potential impact on 
the child is consistent with the Eighth Amendment. 
See Taylor v. Martin, 330 E.Supp. 85, 89 (IsT.D. Cal.) 
aff’d. sub nom, Carleson v. Taylor, 404 TT.S. 980; 
Doe v. Harder, 310 E.Supp. 302, 303 (I). Conn.), ap­
peal dismissed, 399 IT.S. 902.

24 The amici in no way intend to derogate the plaintiffs’ argu­
ment that they are unconstitutionally subjected to this statute be­
cause their right to remain silent is protected by the First, Fifth, 
Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments. Rather, we assert that even 
if the court rejects the plaintiffs’ right to privacy in this matter, 
it must hold that punishment by incarceration is unconstitutional 
because it constitutes disproportionate and cruel punishment of 
children.



37

B. PUNISHMENT OF THE CHILD IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN 
THIS CASE BECAUSE (1) IT CONSTITUTES PUNISHMENT 
FOR THE "STATUS" OF BEING AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD 
OF A WOMAN RECEIVING WELFARE ASSISTANCE; (2) THE 
CHILD'S CONDUCT IS NOT MORALLY BLAMEWORTHY; AND
(3) A CIVIL CONTEMPT SANCTION, WHICH DOES NOT 
ALLOW THE CHILD CONTROL OVER HIS MOTHER'S RE­
LEASE IS A DISPROPORTIONATE PUNISHMENT.

This Court has held that punishment may not he 
imposed, consistent with the Eighth Amendment, upon 
persons who have not committed any criminal act. 
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 661. Cf. Powell v. 
Texas, 392 U.S. 531.

Where the child has committed no criminal act but 
is deprived of his mother solely because he is the il­
legitimate child of a mother receiving public assistance, 
the child is being punished for the accident of his birth., 
a result not tolerable under the Eighth Amendment.

Further, the child, unlike the mother, has no control 
over the outcome of the disclosure proceeding or over 
the length of incarceration: He does not “ carry the 
keys to [his] prison in [his] own pocket.”  Doe v. 
Norton, supra, at 83. It is that very element which 
has been held to be the necessary justification for 
punishment for civil contempt. Shillitani v. United 
States, 384 U.S. 364.

Second, the state may not constitutionally punish a 
person whose conduct is not morally blameworthy. 
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246. In the in­
stant case, the child’s conduct is morally blameless. 
Indeed, it is not considered at all. Nor can the 
mother’s conduct be deemed conclusively blameworthy 
where Connecticut refuses to allow her to present any 
defenses for her refusal to disclose the father’s name.



38

See supra, at 21-26. Indeed, her concern for her 
child’s best interests may dictate her refusal to co­
operate.

Finally, the punishment is disproportionate. In the 
state’s view the child stands to benefit from the knowl­
edge of his father’s name and from future possible 
benefits which he may gain from the knowledge of his 
paternity. In contrast, where the child cannot benefit, 
because of the father’s unavailability (supra, at 27-29), 
because of psychological reasons (supra, at 13-21) or 
because his mother refuses to disclose, the state has 
seen fit to deprive the child of the most substantial 
benefit he has—the right to remain with his mother, the 
only available caring parent. This extreme, harsh 
punishment far outweighs the seriousness of the 
mother’s offense and it cannot be imposed. Trop v. 
Dulles, 356 U.S. 84; Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 
349.

CONCLUSION
Under the Connecticut statute only illegitimate 

children dependent on public assistance are threatened 
by the loss of their mothers. These children are poor 
and largly non-white.

The fundamental rights of the child in this class 
are violated by the statute which subjects him to re­
moval from his sole caring parent and to the 
psychological and emotional harm which this removal 
may engender. For this class alone, the statute under­
mines established standards for the separation of nat­
ural families based both on knowledge and law, which 
require that the best interests of the child must in all 
cases be considered paramount. Such state action 
violates constitutional guarantees and requires the



39

most careful scrutiny by this Court since those who are 
most powerless are subject to the deprivation of their 
constitutional rights.

Marian W right E delman 
J ustine W ise P olier 
Eern L. Nesson 

Children’s Defense Fund 
1746 Cambridge Street 
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138 

Attorneys for Amici
Of Counsel:
N orman Dorsen

New York University School of Law 
40 Washington Square South 
New York, New York

L eo P feffer 
15 East 84th Street 
New York, New York



APPENDIX



la

APPENDIX A

CIRCUIT COURT 

1ST CIRCUIT, AT NORWALK

January 28, 1974 
W elfare Commissioner

vs.
E lizabeth Stone

B efore: H on. G. Sarsfield F ord, Judge
A ppearances: A llan P. Cramer, E sq.

38 West State Street 
Norwalk, Conn.
R obert Gerlin, E sq.
Keeler Building 
Wilton, Conn.

2 T he Court : Welfare Commissioner versus Eliza­
beth Stone.

Mr . Cram er : Your Honor, I believe the defendant is 
here. We have asked her to name the punitive (sic) father 
in the situation.

T he Court : Y ou are here in behalf of the Commissioner? 
Mr . Cramer : Correct, your Honor.
T he Court : All right.
Mr. Ge r lin : Your Honor, we have a situation here, I 

think, where the law is hard. The law is very hard in a 
situation where it is deserving of compassion. Now, we 
have sought compassion from the Court before and we have 
received it and the matter was put off for a prolonged pe­
riod while I was able to appeal to the Commissioner of 
Welfare. Frankly, I have done that. I have received 
communication from him and I was stressing sympathy. 
The Commissioner of Welfare is saying he has no discre­
tion in this matter. Well, I  tend to disagree. I think he 
does. However, if he says he doesn’t wish to exercise it—



2a

Now, I will very briefly go over the facts and explain to you 
where we are now.

The father of this child is a man who has been arrested 
for narcotics violations, for assault and battery, apparently 

has been diagnosed as a schizophrenic, and has not
3 been in the State of Connecticut for two and a half 

to three years. He is a fugitive from Connecticut
right now. He can do the State of Connecticut no good. 
Now, my client is terrified of this man. He has come here 
the last time he was in the area. It is a very serious situa­
tion. My client is organizing herself well. She works part 
time, does not have a job but has been working part time 
while the child goes to nursery school and acquires public 
assistance. She does not admit on the legal record this 
man is the father of the child. She doesn’t want him to 
have a reason to come back.

Now, she tells me if the law insists she speak the name 
of this child’s father that she will leave the Welfare roll.

T he Court : She has that choice.
Mr. Ge r lin : I have tried to convince her because she 

requires the assistance to stay on Welfare and reveal the 
name of this man. She insists she will not do so. She won’t 
even tell me who it is. I would like a short continuance of 
the matter for me to try to convince her to reveal the name 
of the father or to resign from the Welfare rolls.

Mr . Cram er : Your Honor, if I may comment. First of 
all I don’t think she has the alternative.

T he Court: Not now since she has accepted the Welfare.
Mr . Gerlih : I  am not arguing that point.

4 Mr . Cramer : So even if she does go off, I  think she 
has a clear obligation to reveal the name.

T he Court : Well, a preliminary finding must be made.
Mr . Cram er : May I speak, your Honor?
T he Court : Yes.
Mr . Cramer : I think the problem here which I certainly, 

you know, personally feel compassion for, is possibly a bit 
greater than the defendant or her attorney think it is, or I



3a

should say, it is a lesser problem than they think it is. My 
understanding is if this is true, nothing would be done. 
Obviously, if they don’t know where he is, there wouldn’t 
be any objection. Obviously, we can’t control when he will 
show up. But there has been no cooperation here and 
cooperation is really the purpose of the legislature enact­
ment.

I woud just add, we can’t control when he might show 
up but if he did, the "Welfare Department at that point 
would like to—

Mb. Gerlin : The man is a fugitive. I believe frankly, 
this a problem. I believe the Court should have discretion 
to examine. It does not under the Statute. I believe the 
Statute should be read so the Court does have discretion. 
The law, I think is hard.

T he Court : It may even be harsh. I assume by 
5 reason of this citation which places Elizabeth Stone 

before the Court that the underlying factors have 
been met. There is a child born which is living with her 
and is the recipient of Welfare assistance.

Mr . Cram er : N o objection to that, is there?
Mr . Gerlin : That is correct.
T he Court : And to date Elizabeth Stone has failed to 

voluntarily disclose the name of the punitive father.
Mr. Ge r lin : Correct.
T he Court : Then under the Statute, number one, I  have 

to deny your request and number two, under the Statute, 
I will order that she disclose the name of the punitive 
father.

Mr. B erlin  : We can’t have a week, your Honor, for her 
to resign the Welfare rolls and perhaps the State in its 
wisdom would leave her alone if she did do that?

T he Court : I  d on ’t know i f  it would make any differ (nice.
Mr. Cram er : I can assure you it won’t.
T he Court : She was a recipient already. She chose 

assistance at the time the aid was sought, as I would see it 
and you are presumed to know the law.



4a

Me . Ge r m s : The law has changed. I believe it was 
attacked constitutionally. It has been amended.

T he Court : Probably. It could very well be true
6 but I am powerless to do anything. I have compas­

sion for her too, but I can’t let that shade my obli­
gation to my oath to do what this law says I should do. The 
legislature is the place to attack it, not here. As far as I see 
it.

Me . Ge r m s  : And if Elizabeth refuses she is in contempt ?
T he Court : She would be, I assume.
Mr . Ge r m s  : I  would very much like— I think the situation 

is so serious, I think that we should have some time to 
consider what she is to do about the situation. She has a 
child. She might even go to jail if she refuses to speak.

T he Court : Well, that will come up when she refuses to 
speak.

Mr. Germ s ':  Are you going to require her presence on 
the stand today or—

Mr. Cramer : I f  your Honor please, if it would make any 
difference to Counsel or be of any assistance to them, I 
have the necessary forms acknowledging paternity if they 
wished nothing be put on the court record at this time. It 
could be done that way in the alternative.

T he Court : If you want to accept Counselor’s offer it is 
perfectly all right with me. The alternative is, I would ask 
the young lady to disclose the name right here and 

now.
7 Mr . G e r m s  : May we have a short recess?

T he Court : I am going to take up another matter 
and you may discuss it with your client but be assured that 
I will follow the law.

M r . Ge r m s : Yes, your Honor.
(Recessed and then resumed.)
Mr . Ge r lin : Your Honor, my client tells me that when 

she went on Welfare she was asked for the name of the 
father and she refused to provide it and they said, “ Okay,



5a

yon don’t have to give it.”  A couple of times after than they 
again requested the name and then said, “ Okay, you don’t 
have to.”  Now she brings up the point, the law was 
changed. I guess it was in 1971. Now she sees herself 
after they have been on Welfare and now they say, “ You 
have to tell.”  or as Mr. Cramer suggests, pay back the 
money. Of course, that is ridiculous. She has a three year 
old infant child.

If in fact the Welfare Department did upon that number 
of occasions, your Honor, tell her she did not have to tell 
and now comes and tells her you must tell, it must seem— 
there must be an estoppel why she—why they would mislead 
her to detriment of rights. Now they are lowering the 
boom on what is, in fact, a defenseless person, that is a poor 
one. And, I think maybe we should—

T he Court : Multiply that a thousand times. Where are 
we? There are a thousand girls in the same situa­

tion.
8 Mr. Germs' : Are they terrified of the father or are

they trying to cheat the State of Connecticut ?
T he Court : H ow can we test the mental attitude?
Mr. Gerlin : We can talk to the applicant and question 

her.
T he Court : I am not allowed to. The law is clear. I 

have indicated to you, I have directed your client to dis­
close the name.

Mr. Gerlin : Now, I wonder what the rights of appeal are 
in this matter because I think there may be a question as to 
whether the State has estopped itself from exercising its 
right.

T he Court : Y ou are looking to me fo r  advice?
Mr. Gerlin : No, I am not.
T he Court : I  have directed you to disclose the name. I  

am asking you  to direct that inquiry to your client and 
report to us forthwith.

Mr. Gerlin : I  have spoken to her quite extensively and I 
find no alternative but to say she declines to provide that



6a

information and I take exception to the State’s insistence 
on that information on the grounds the State is estopped 
from asserting its rights to have misled her a number of 
times in accepting welfare while not revealing the name of 
the punitive father.

T he Court: All right. I accept her declining to 
9 identify the punitive father. I will continue the 

matter until next Monday at two o ’clock. I  would 
ask she concern herself with her position and to be back 
here at two o ’clock next Monday. I find her refusal, through 
you, is an act of contempt at this time. Bather than place 
her in custody at this time, I will give her until next Monday 
at two o ’clock to purge herself from contempt. If she does, 
not do it by next Monday at two o ’clock, I will take it up.

Mr . Gerlin : Thank you, your Honor.
T he Court : I would suggest she get everything in order 

by next Monday if she is going to be continuing in this posi­
tion and I have to restrain her, that someone is able to 
take care of her child and so forth.

Mr. Gerlih : And if there is no one ?
T he Court : Then that will be her problem.
Mr . Gerlih : Thank you, your Honor.

(Adjourned.)
2 T he Court : State of Connecticut and Elizabeth

Stone.
Mr. Cram er : Your Honor, I  just received a memoranda 

of law in this matter so if I don’t have a memoranda today 
to respond it is only because I wasn’t aware there would 
be one to respond to.

Mr . Ge r lin : Well, I  told the secretary on Friday there 
was a time period and I finished it this morning. Your 
Honor—

T he Court : Yes?
Mr . Ge r lih : Part of our appeal to you today, your 

Honor, is for a stay on the basis that the case of Hoe v.



7a

Norton, the 3rd District Court case is presently on appeal to 
the Supreme Court of the United States on the constitu­
tional issues. Today I have with me Frank Cochran of the 
Connecticut Civil Liberties Union who is counselor for the 
plaintiff or the appellant in the class action that is now 
before the Supreme Court of the United States. He will 
be available if we have any questions on that case, its 
present status of any of the constitutional issues raised 
here. He will be glad to help us.

My client is here. We are prepared to take testimony on 
any points that you want us to take testimony on or I can 

run through the papers now and point out to you
3 what each point that we are raising is or discuss it 

with you if you would like, however you care to
proceed.

Now, I will be very frank with your Honor. When last 
her I didn’t envision getting into the position where we had 
to in effect, fully litigate this matter because I felt that 
since my client is attempting a desire to work and become 
self-supporting and plans to go off the child assistance, 
the matter would become moot. However, last week you 
ordered her to speak the name of the father of the child 
and Counsel indicated that the State’s position would prob­
ably be that they might want to go after him for past pay­
ment irrespective of whether or not she has left or still is 
receiving assistance. I felt it necessary to protect her 
interests which I believe are very deep and very important 
that we had to prepare a full case on the matter including a 
memoranda of law and motions to dismiss.

Mb. Cram er : Your Honor, I don’t think I have read the 
memoranda of law and I don’t think anything raised in it 
his Honor is not aware of. I think it is important to keep 
in mind that the Federal Court for the District of Connecti­
cut has clearly decided there is no right in this situation and 
the majority so ruled. I believe, Mr. Gerlin, is relying 

on concurring opinion by Judge Newman which I
4 believe was Judge Newman’s opinion only and I still



8 a

don’t think there is anything in here in Judge New­
man’s opinion which gives any support here.

Also, Judge Henebry’s decision, attached to the memo­
randa of law, as I read it has absolutely no relevance here. 
It is a totally different situation where a person in fact, 
the basis of Judge Henebry’s decision was in fact the State 
was not supporting the child, in fact the voluntary payment 
made by the husband in this situation and the payment 
going to the mother, in fact for the mother and not the child 
and therefore, the Statute did not apply. So, I don’t really 
see anything here which gives Mr. G-erlin anything to 
contest this claim.

I must say that it would seem that under the circum­
stances cited here, this claim could be very prevalent. I 
don’t think any mother in a situation like this wishes to 
reveal the name of the father. On the other hand, there 
are interests in the State that have been a legal enactment 
with this court, as I see it, is bound to follow and under the 
circumstances Miss Stone is forced to follow that legisla­
tive enactment and her argument if it is an argument, 
should not be with this court which is bound to be with legis­

lative enactment and I would respectfully ask you— 
5 T he Court : I took an oath to enforce the law. Now,

we are here under 52-440b. I want to know whether 
you have any feeling that this, at this present point in time 
is [ejffective in any way at all?

Mr. Cram er : N o, I don’t your Honor.
T he Court : Can you tell me why you feel that you are 

on solid ground to move as you have?
Mr . Ge r l ix : Well, I  will respond to Counselor ’ s points 

first.
T he Court : N o, respond to mine first.
Mr . Gerliw : Judge Henebry’s and the District Courts 

both say you have discretion to exercise of what this 
Statute calls for. Therefore, you can hear or are 
empowered to hear testimony or to take testimony on the 
questions that are raised with respect to the rights of



9a

privacy, the constitutional right to privacy that this mother 
has with respect to her child’s rearing and her sexual life. 
Judge Henebry makes that very clear in his opinion as to 
the majority in footnote fourteen, not just in the concurring 
opinions, and I have quoted from that on page three of my 
memorandum. It states, both opinions state, that what must 
be weighed are the interests of the state against the 
interest of privacy of the mother and child. Here we have 
told the Court and we are prepared to support it, we 

have supported with and are prepared with testi-
6 mony that the punitive father has not been seen in 

two and one half years that this man is a drug addict,
a thief, and a schizophrenic.

Also we show your Honor that the Statutes of Limitations 
well may have run on bringing a paternity action.

T he Court : That may be but is that effective against 
the order of this Court asking her to disclose the name and 
failure to do so in turn because this Court had to find her in 
contempt I

Mr . Ge r lin : Yes, your Honor, because you are empow­
ered to listen to what she has to say, listen to what Counsel 
has to say and to determine whether or not the sanction or 
the discretion of the Statute and if she refuses to obey the 
directions under the Statute whether the sanctions pro­
vided under the Statute should be applied in this case. You 
are empowered to do that. Now, we raise other issues. We 
raise constitutional issues. They are all on appeal to the 
Supreme Court. I can say she has resigned from Welfare 
and is no longer receiving payment. Therefore, the State 
can no further be damaged if it has been in any way by 
either staying or certainly not by dismissing it because if 

she was out of the State, the Statute—
7 T he Court : All I  have is a memoranda fo r  a m o­

tion to dismiss. Is there a m otion?
Mr . Ge r lin : I filed it on Friday.
T h e  C o u r t  : Then I should have it, shouldn’t I?



10a

M r . Gerlin : Yes, there is also an affidavit with the mo­
tion.

Mr . Cram er : Your Honor, if I may quote just briefly 
from Judge Blumenfield’s decision on privacy, as Counsel 
has indicated, and in fact in the majority opinion, I believe 
that Judge Blumenfield’s comments were as follows, there 
was a claim, apparently made that there was invasion of 
privacy, forcing a wife to testify against her husband. The 
relationship which these unwed mothers seek to protect 
from disclosure is emphatically different. There is no privi­
lege to withhold testimony of a parent. I think Judge 
Blumenfield clearly disposed of it and I think your Honor, 
the case has been stated. I feel, under the circumstances, 
and fortunately I think this case has got to be differentiated 
from Judge Henebry’s decision where your Honor, it 
doesn’t rise or fall at all on anything. I think your Honor 
can recognize there is a reluctance to testify for fear of 

action by the punitive father.
8 T he Court : I will rule on it today. I  haven’t had

an opportunity to read this, of course you just gave 
me the memoranda and I haven’t read them so I will take 
a short reces and I  am going to read these. When I read 
them I am going to come out and I will have your client 
who I already have in contempt, take the stand and I will 
inquire of her myself.

Mr . Ge r lin : A s I recall you ordered her to return today 
and speak but that you have not held her in contempt.

T he Court : I clearly found her in contempt last week. 
I said I made a finding that she was in contempt and I will 
give you until two o ’clock next Monday to purge herself 
but I would like to inquire of her myself.

Mr . Gerlin : There is another possible suggestion.
T he Court : No, this is what I  am going to do so we will 

pass it fo r  now and I  will take it up later and I  would like 
to read this and come back and I  w ill m ove from  that 
point.

Mr. Ge r lin : Fine.



11a

(Passed and then resumed.)
T he Court : This case is pending in the Supreme Court 

of the United States.
Mr . Cochrau : The appeal was documented in January, 

I believe it was January 4th. No action to my knowl-
9 edge has been taken on it to date. The jurisdictional 

statement has been submitted. The Court has neither
noted probable jurisdiction  nor made any other rulings on 
the case.

T he Court : I  have read your m otion and I  have read 
the memoranda. I  deny the m otion to dismiss and I  deny 
the request fo r  stay.

Now, to inquire o f  you—
Mr. Ge r lin : Your Honor, excuse me, has she been put 

under oath?
T he Court : I am going to tell her why and when I finish 

we will have her sworn and I will take it from there.
I am going to inquire of you what your situation is, 

what you have done, what you are trying to do, and I will 
advise you that you have to— The Statute requires you to 
answer the Court. That is different than answering every­
body else because I have a power to hold you in contempt. 
If I am not satisfied with the way the matter is developing 
I can, by your merely asking, or the failure to answer, I 
can have you remanded into custody and stay here at my 
wish until I see fit to release you with a term not exceeding 
a year. Okay? I will ask the clerk to put you under oath 

and I am going to ask you what the background of
10 this matter is. Okay? Not only with respect to the 

name of the punitive father but to any other matters
that I may inquire.

Mr. Ge r lin : We will be entitled to inquire as well?
T he Court : I don’t know what reason you would have. 
Mr . Ge r lin : We would like to make a factual record if 

we may.
T he Court : I  would suggest that you see what develops 

then we will take it up at that time. As I said to you, I



12a

have read your memoranda, read the motion and I will 
take it from there, rule on it and take it from there.
11 Elizabeth Stone having been duly sworn was exam­

ined and testified as follows :
B y the Court :

Q. Miss Stone, at one time or another, were you inquired 
of by the Welfare Department as to the parentage of your 
offspring? A. Yes.

Q. How long ago was that? A. The first time they asked 
me was when I applied and I refused to do it and they told 
me I was not required to.

Q. Who told you that? A. The Welfare Department.
Q. Who in particular? A. I don’t know, one of the social 

workers at the office.
Q. This was at the time you applied for assistance? A. 

Before I went on Welfare.
Q. Were you afforded assistance at the time? A. After 

my daughter was born. I  was only eligible until her birth.
Q. And you were both eligible after the birth ? A. After 

the birth but I applied before she was born.
Q. Your daughter was born and then thereafter were you 

again inquired of by the Welfare Department as to the 
father of the child? A. Yes.

Q. And when was that? A. I don’t know exactly but I 
believe it was once a year or a couple of times and

12 again they told me I did not have to name the father.
Q. Who told you that? A. Social workers.

Q. Do you know who they were? A. I don’t know off 
hand but I do have a record, papers that they sent me. 
They have a person who reviews my case.

Mr . Curlin ' : May it please the Court, could the witness 
raise her voice?

T he C ourt : They would like to hear you.



13a

Q. So, that you indicated at least three times someone in 
the Welfare Department told you there was no need for you 
to disclose the name of the punitive father? A, Yes.

Q. What is your age ? A. Twenty-four.
Q. What? A. Twenty-four.
Q. And how old is your child? A. Three and a half.
Q. And where is the father of your child? A. I don’t 

know.
Q. When is the last time you saw him? A. Just before 

her first birthday which was about two years ago.
Q. Where did you see him? A. He was at my house.
Q. And you haven’t seen him since then? A. No, I 

haven’t.
13 Q. Do you know where he is? A. No, I don’t.

Q. Do you have any indication? A. I have heard 
rumors but nothing legitimate.

Q, What is you background? A. My background?
Q. What is your education? A. I completed Wilton High 

School I haven’t gone to college but I have been a ballet 
dancer since I was seven years old and—

Q. Are you employed? A. Not at the moment but I am 
seeking employment.

Q. When is the last time you were employed? A. About 
three years ago.

Q. Where do you live? A. Right now in Norwalk, 27 
Rambler Avenue.

Q. Who do you live with? A. My girlfriend.
Q. Do you have a family? A. Yes, I do.
Q. Mother and father? A. Yes.
Q. Where do they live? A. Norwalk.
Q. Did they assist you? A. If I am broke they would 

give me a few dollars hut nothing regular.
Q. Are you indebted to the Welfare Department? Do 

they have an account in your name which is for you per­
sonally? A. Do you mean—

Q. Have you, yourself, received benefits from the
14 Welfare Department? A. For my daughter.



14a

Q. The answer to yon is negative! To you, you have 
never received anything? A. I guess so, yes.

Q. And your daughter, I notice from the papers issued to 
the attorney, you have resigned? A. Yes.

Q. You indicate that you have resigned from Welfare 
benefits ? A. Right.

Q. And you did that as of February 1? A. Yes.
Q. How much were you receiving ? A. Two hundred and 

four something a month.
Q. And how long have you been receiving that? A. Since 

my daughter was born, 1970.
Q. You haven’t seen the father of your child in three 

years? You have no idea of his whereabouts? A. No.
Q. Will you tell me how, with that fact in your mind, 

how it concerns you at this time ? A. Because he has family 
here. I believe that if he had any excuse to come back here 
he would come back and this would be a good excuse for 
him to come back. It has taken me seven or eight years to 
get him out of my life, out of my mind and to set myself 
straight and it is appalling to me to have the thought of him 
coming back into my life.

Q. Well, that is a conclusion on your part, I want to 
know why? I want to know why? He has not returned 

here in three years and he has everything else that 
15 you have in your mind except for this fact that you 

have not told me his name and you haven’t seen 
him in over three years.

I am concerned about it because it is a mandate of legis­
lature for me to act and I have a right to act. As I told 
you last week I am going to. Now, you have to show me 
some justification for me to not to. In three year the same 
set of facts existed in your mind and have been true. He 
doesn’t know whether or not you have disclosed the name 
of his—-his name to anybody during the course of that time. 
And, his family ties were here and yet he has not seen fit 
to bother you, communicate with you in any way. What I 
would like to know is what makes you think, not just what



15a

emotionally affects you, that there would be a change 
toward you if you were to comply with the Statute and tell 
me two words? A. Well, because—

Q. Which may never go any further than this? A. It 
might.

Q. We have any indication by the State, if what you said 
is true and it ’s verifiable which they are entitled to, they 
probably would not proceed. A. But then again they might.

Q. Well, I don’t know. It is speculation. If you are 
telling me the truth, I have no reason to believe you are 
not, then what they would determine is exactly what you 
have been saying and if they said to you that is the end 
of the matter, then I would assume you are in good faith. 
A. They also told me I wouldn’t have to give his name. 

Now I am in court.
16 Q. I have a Statute that says that you have to do 

this. Now, you are telling me on occasions this hap­
pened but you are not telling me who. You have a copy of 
a letter from a woman but you have to be more specific. 
They may be unauthorized to say that.

M e . Ge b l in : Your Honor, may I speak?
T h e Coubt : N o.
T he W itness : The type of person that he is, and I feel 

knowing him for eight years can sort of qualify me to speak 
on how he is. ITe is a schizophrenic personality. He will 
be one way for a certain amount of time and you have him 
figured out and you can react to his emotions and then he 
will turn around and do something completely opposite so 
that there is no guidance by him. You can’t tell how to 
act. He has been violent with me. He has threatened me 
with a knife and in a public area and he is a drug user, 
which you are familiar with. It has taken me so long to 
get away from this type of life, this type of person, and to 
set myself up straight with my daughter that I don’t know 
how else to put it into words. To sink back into that situa­
tion again is something that I don’t know how to handle 
and by my refusing to give his name is keeping my head



16a

above it. I  am not trying to gyp the State out of anything 
that is coming to them. I don’t like being on Welfare

17 anyway but it was something I felt was necessary 
in order to take care of my daughter the best way I

could.
Q. There is no shame of being on Welfare. Listen, you 

yourself were not, your daughter was ? A. My daughter.
Q. And I forget whether you responded and, if you did, 

what your answer was about the last time you worked? 
A. The actual last job I wasn’t being paid for but I was 
getting experience as a bartender.

Q. How long ago? A. Six months or so but it wasn’t 
actually a job. Before that I was working while I was 
pregnant. I was working.

Q. That was three and a half years ago? I want to know 
what you have been doing for the last six months ? A. Rais­
ing my daughter.

Q. You have been going only on the allotment that your 
daughter has? A. Yes.

Q. Taking care of you, too? A. Yes.
Me . Gerlix : Your Honor, if I  might, I can see you are 

puzzled on this.
T he Court : I  haven ’t asked my last question yet.
Mr. Ge r l ix : All right.
Q. When is the last time you were asked to disclose your 

child’s father name? A. Before these proceedings?
18 Q. Yes. A. It was the last review that I had and 

I think it was at least six weeks ago.
Q. No, I will ask you to disclose to me, under oath you 

understand that, and I will ask you to disclose to me the 
name of the father of your child? A. And if I refuse?

Q. I f  you refuse to do so you have a number of things 
that will happen. The best that can happen is nothing. 
The worst that can happen is you will be incarcerated. 
You can be fined. That’s about it. That is your decision. 
A. I am not sure. I guess what I am supposed to do is if 
I  refuse, is taking my chances. Is that what you are saying?



17a

Q. No, you can be confined not exceeding a year and you 
can be fined— ft]hat is up to me. I told you last week what 
it would be. I gave you a week to think about it, that the 
situation was to purge yourself if you liked. Now, I have 
listened to those comments that you made. I wanted to 
hear them myself. A. Okay, if it is a point of going to jail, 
naturally I am going to tell you. I don’t know if there is 
anything more that my lawyer has to say before we make 
a final decision. Can I have a minute to speak to him!

Q. No. I have an obligation to follow the Statute. It is 
hard but I have an obligation. It is not easy sitting up 
here. I have asked you under the Statute to tell me and 
either you tell me his name or you can remain mute and 
say you are never going to say it and that is up to you.

Mb. Ge b l iu : I think I take exception to you 
19 asking that question at this point on the grounds 

that if the testimony is her uncontradicted testimony 
and is accurate, there is no reason for the State to know 
the name of this man.

T he Coubt : I don’t know that but you may have an 
exception to my asking her that. May wTe ask if the State 
has had any evidence bearing on her credibility to produce, 
bearing on the -witnesses credibility!

Mb. Cbam eb : No, I  have no evidence.
T he Coubt : The credibility, the problem as I see it, 

doesn’t go to her problems as to what the father of her 
child is like. The problem I have is that she is here in 
front of me and as a judge of the Circuit Court and she is 
to disclose to me and if she doesn’t that is contemptuous 
to me, to the Court. That is where I have to take action.

Mb . Geblih : Assuming the other circumstances of law—
T he C oubt: There are other issues I  will take into effect 

when she fails to answer or she answers.
M b . Geelin : As I  read Judge Henebry’s decision—
T he Coubt : I  am not concerned with his decision. I  am 

concerned with what I have to do. I am not unmeaningful 
of that decision. I am unmeaningful that she is going to



18a

answer or is not. Depending on what she does I will have 
to take any action. It is very clear to me in my mind,

20 I will try to be very fair. But, I am spending a little 
more time than I should on this. This girl can

answer or she will tell me that she is not. All right?
Mb. Ge r l ix : When yon have completed your examina­

tion, may I ask a couple of questions ?
T he Coubt : I have completed. I have asked her to dis­

close the name. If she does, she will do so soon or she will 
tell me she is not going to do it.

Mb. Ge r l ix : May I inquire of her now before she is 
required—•

Mb . Cramer : I  object to any further questioning. The 
issue has been totally framed.

T he Court : This is the problem. I  can appreciate your 
problem. I can appreciate this. But, the answer to your 
problem is in the legislature as far as I can see it.

Mr . Gerlix : As to our point on the Statute of Limita­
tions having run on paternity actions—

T he Court : She has already indicated he is out of the 
state. She returned home to have the baby.

Mb . Ge r l ix : In so far as she is concerned he is out of 
the state.

T he Court : That is his burden. That is the problem of 
the state in the next action. I cannot be guided by it in 
this action. That is my reading of the Statute and I don’t 

think there is much to quarrel with.
21 Mr. Gerlix : I only have a couple of questions to 

ask for the record.
T he Court : I have asked the name and I have asked her 

to tell me. Either she tells me or she is not. If she tells 
me, depending on her answer and if you then want to ask, 
which, I believe go to the merits of what I do, I have no 
qualms and I think all your questioning and argument has 
to do with how I exert my discretion.

It is up to you.



19a

T he W itness : May I  ask you a question? I f  I  refuse at 
this time to give the name, can I reverse that action at 
any time?

T he Coubt : Well, if you refuse and I  confine you, you 
will stay there until you purge yourself. That will be at 
any time you care to make delivery of that name. You will 
purge yourself from contempt and I will release you. You 
are asking me that and in so doing you get an impression 
as to what my ultimate judgment may be. That is one way. 
You can’t refuse to tell me and ask me to come back tomor­
row because I gave you a week to do that. I gave your 
Counsel a week to consider it with you and you are here.

M b . Cochban : May I be heard?
T he Coubt : I  would like to but it is just one more issue 

as to whether your appearance is in the file and whether 
you  are involved in it. A t this point it is not. I  

22 d on ’t want to be unfair but he is doing a fine job.
Mb . G-eblin : I  would like to take exception to your 

refusal to let me question the defendant prior to your ask­
ing her the question.

T he Coubt : Y ou m ay have an exception.
T he W itness : Well, I don’t want to go to jail so I guess 

there is only one thing left for me to do. Do I have to 
say it right here?

T he Coubt : Y ou have to tell me.
T he W itness : Wayne Murray.
T he C oubt : I  will convey it to the State and I think that 

will probably be the end of it.
Mb . Cbam eb : Your Honor, might I inquire for some 

further information? First, I  did not hear the name.
T he Coubt : I will convey it to you as she has been 

brought here, as I read the Statute, to disclose it to me.
M b. Cbameb : I hope, your Honor, the court reporter was 

able to hear it. I need a transcript of this.
T he Coubt : Well, I  don’t think you do. All you need 

is the name. I will give you the name. I don’t know of any 
necessity to give it publicly.



20a

Me. Cram ee : I wonder if I  might inquire or his Honor 
might inqxiire as to the family situation here, are they in 

Norwalk? So, in the event there does have to he an 
23 attempt to locate him we are familiar—

T he Court : I  have to be fair to everybody and I 
am trying my darndest and the Statute merely says that 
before the Judge of the Circuit Court you are compelled to 
disclose the name of the punitive father under oath.

Me . Cram ee : Tour Honor, the only reason I  would ask 
is that, obviously, it would only be for the purpose of being- 
sure the person the State pursued is the correct person by 
that name.

T he Court : Okay. Do you have anything further that 
you want to ask this young lady?

Me . Gterlih: Are you going to let Counsel inquire?
T he Court : No, I don’t think there is any question. The 

Statute told me to ask the name. She gave me the name. 
I will give it to you people. You will then, under the Stat­
ute, she must cooperate in the institution of a paternity 
action if you deem it necessary.

Mr . Cramer : Correct, your Honor.
T he Court : I think yon have made it crystal clear last 

week, if what this young lady was saying was true, and if 
it was verifiable, and it couldn’t be done until you knew 
who it was, the State would probably realize the futility of 
trying to find or collect anything from him.

Mb. Ceam er : But I am going on the basis of testimony 
she has made in the court to the effect the family is living 
in the town.

T he Court : What fam ily?
Me. Ceambe : His family.
T he Court : She didn’t say that.
Mr . Cram ee : Yes, she did. May it please the court.
T he Court : In Norwalk or her town ?
Mr. Cram er : She indicated Norwalk in her testimony.
T he Court : Are these people involved in this case? The 

disclosure for the record was Wayne Murray. That is the



21a

end of my inquiry as far as I am concerned. Do you have 
any feelings in regard to that! That is the end of my 
inquiry.

Mb . Ge e l in : We have further questions and we would 
object to Counsel inquiring further into this matter. I be­
lieve the Statute has been fully met and that he not inquire 
further here.

T he Coxjbt : I would tend to agree. I, too, agree and I 
will tell you why. Because, as I view the problem here, it 
is my hope that this young lady won’t have any further 
concern with what she has conjured up, and I don’t mean 
to say she made it up. She may have good reason to think 
he could cause her difficulty but I have in no way deter­
mined whether or not that was true.

Now, you have it in this file and of course, on record, 
signed by this girl, and if there is an arrest record and now 
that you know who it is—I would have no difficulty in locat­
ing and identifying that person within an hour based on 
the affidavit. I f  he was convicted in our court system and 
given a conditional release or was in a drug program home 
—You can find out these things. It would be a lot easier, 
I know, if she would very quietly and cooperatively tell 
you this but as to whether or not you have a right to in­
quire of her in respect to that facet of the case in open 
court I would sustain the objection of the young lady’s 
counsel.

Mb. Cramer : Thank you for your patience.



22a

CIRCUIT COURT 

SIXTEENTH CIRCUIT 

WEST HARTFORD

November 27, 1973
PATERNITY PETITION

CV-16-7311-13598 
S tate of Connecticut

vs.
R obin J anes

before : Honorable Henry J. Goldberg, Judge
appearan ces : Richard H. Alden, Esq., For the Welfare 

Department
2 T he Court : Any other case I haven’t called?

Mr . A lden : You called us and I was out in the hall. 
This is the matter of the State Welfare Commissioner and
Robin Janes. I t ’s one of these petitions to------

T he Court : That’s the last thing on the list, I believe. 
Oh, the paternity division.

Mr . A ld e n : Yes.
T he Court : All right. It had previously been marked off, 

it ’s ready.
Mr . A ld en : She is here. I can put her on the stand I 

suppose. The reason that she has told me she didn’t want 
to give the name is because she is under physical threat. 

T he Court : She is what ?
M r . A lden : She is under physical threat.

3 Robin Janes having been duly sworn was examined 
and testified as follows:
B y the Clerk :

Q. State your name and address. A. Robin Janes, 85 
Dyer Avenue, Collinsville, Connecticut.



23a

The Court : May I ask how old are yon!
T he W itness : Eighteen.
T he Court : All right.

D irect E xamination by Mr. A lden :

Q. Miss Janes, are yon the mother of a child born out 
of wedlock on May 26 ? A. Yes.

Q. And, is that child on welfare! A. Yes.
Q. State of Connecticut! A. Yes.
Q. Receiving support from the State of Connecticut. And, 

have you been asked to disclose the name of the father of 
that child by the Welfare Department! A. Yes.

Q. And have you refused to do so! A. Yes.
Q. And, do you want to tell your Honor why you

4 refused to do so! A. H e’s threatened my life and 
my daughter’s life. H e’s threatened me physically

with his own hands and he has come after me with a gun 
and he has been on drugs charges and he’s also threatened 
my daughter’s life with a gun and I feel that it ’s just a 
danger to me and my daughter’s life to state his name. 

T he C ourt : What section is that?
Mr. A lden : That’s Section 52-440b. 52-440b General Stat­

ute 1971, your Honor.
T he Court : Do you have that statute available ?
Mr. A ld en : I could let you—This is from the Welfare 

Department, down at the bottom, 52-440b.
T he Court : Well, what are you requesting of the court? 
Mr. At.pen : Well, this is—I just learned of this particular 

problem about fifteen minutes ago for the first time.
T he Court : What is that ?
Mr. A lden : I just learned of this problem that she has 

fifteen minutes ago. I don’t have any contact at this point 
with somebody in the Welfare Department that can make 
a decision whether they want to withdraw this thing or go 
forward, this is the problem I had. We are required to cite 

them in here.
5 T he Court : What is your name, again, please. 

T he W itness : Robin Janes.



24a

T he Court : I simply want to tell yon that we have a 
statute which in essence states that the mother of a child, 
your situation, born out of wedlock may be cited in court 
to appear before a judge and to disclose the paternity, to 
disclose who the father is and if that person refuses to 
disclose the putative father, that person may he found in 
contempt of court and the court could fine you as much as 
$200.00 or imprison you in jail for a year or both. So, you 
see, young lady, we are in a pretty serious situation.

T he W itness : Well, you know, I ’m afraid of him and I ’m 
going to be getting married in the Spring and my fiancee 
is going to be adopting my daughter and I think it would 
be harmful to state his name right now because of I ’m 
afraid of him. I ’m afraid he’s going to disturb everything 
for my future this Spring. My fiance is going to school 
now and he will be graduating pretty soon.

T he Court: The statute doesn’t say that she shall 
6 be found in contempt, it simply states that she may 

be found in contempt.
M r. A uden : One suggestion, if she is going to be married 

and if some other man is going to adopt this child------•
T he Court : That would resolve—
Mr . A uden : This would resolve it. Of course this man has 

no obligation to support this child at this time until he 
adopts him but once she is off, once the child is off welfare 
of course that takes care of this whole problem and I don’t 
know whether that is a possible solution for her.

T he Court : W here do you live right now? W ho do you 
live with?

T he W itness : My fiance, right now.
T he Court : When did you expect to be married?
T he W itness : This Spring.
T he Court : The Spring?
T he W itness : Yes.
T he Court : We have quite a few months to go.
T he W itness : He will be graduating in a month and 

then he has to go for—



25a

T he Court : He is graduating from where?
7 T he W itness : C.P.I., Computer Processing Insti­

tute.
T he Court : Well, Counsel, I ’ll consider any suggestion 

that you have.
M r . A lden : I ’m thinking. Your Honor, could this matter 

be continued to some time so that we could make, maybe 
check into it a little bit more so that we could see if we 
could work out an arrangement with her. The department 
learned today of this problem, maybe we could work out 
something to be satisfactory for both parties, if it would 
be continued.

T he Court : Well, all right. I just simply want to 
straighten one thing out. I think the statute speaks of may 
be found in contempt rather than shall. But the statute 
does give the court the authority to compel you to name 
the father and if you still refuse, the court here wouldn’t 
have any alternative except to fine you up to $200.00 and 
imprison you for not more than one year or both. Now, you 
are requesting to have this continued?

Mr. A uden : Yes, your Honor. I  think that maybe some­
thing can be worked out.

8 T he Court : Well, how much time has elapsed? We 
are not going to run into the statute of limitations?

Mr . A lden : No, this child was born last May so a year 
hasn’t even elapsed. We do have time.

T he Court : All right. W e’ll continue this matter in other 
words, it may go off now and if you want to reclaim it again 
you can reclaim it.

Mr. A lden : Why don’t we have it go off, then.
T he Court : You understand the matter is just simply 

going off at this time and subject to being brought up again 
to allow the state to work out something with you. All right.

M r . A lden : Thank you, your Honor.
# *  #  #  # . #  #  #  #  #



26a

CIRCUIT COURT 

NINTH CIRCUIT 

MIDDLETOWN, CONN.

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

N icholas N orton, Welfare Commissioner 
State of Connecticut

before :
The Honorable Nicholas F. Armentano, Judge 
The Honorable Henry J. Goldberg, Judge 
The Honorable Eli L. Cramer, Judge 
The Honorable Daniel F. Spallone, Judge

APPEARANCES :

For the Plaintiff:
John J. Carta, Jr., Esquire 
547 Main Street 
Middletown, Connecticut

INDEX
APRIL 2,1973. B y: The Honorable Nicholas F. Armentano, 

Judge.
MAY 7,1973. B y : The Honorable Henry J. Goldberg, Judge.
OCTOBER 2, 1973. By: The Honorable Eli L. Cramer, 

Judge.
DECEMBER 31, 1973. By: The Honorable Daniel F. Spal­

lone, Judge.



27a

2 April 2, 1973, Middletown, Conn,
Before: The Honorable Nicholas F. Armentano, Judge.

T he Clerk : At this time we have those show cause 
orders.

T he Court : Maria Hareega.
T he Cle r k : Will you identify yourself for the record? 
Mr . Carta : Attorney John J. Carta, Jr. I  think you called 

Hareega.
T he C ourt: Yes. You represent the commissioner?
Mr . Carta : Representing the Commissioner of Welfare. 
T he Court : Are you represented by counsel?
T he D efendant : No.
T he Court : Y ou m ay proceed.
Mr. Carta : Basically, your Honor, I think the Statute 

52-440b provides that whenever a child is born out of wed­
lock to a mother and that child then receives public as­
sistance from the State of Connecticut the mother is com­
pelled to identify the father of the child. And Maria Hareega 
here the respondent in this case, I  guess, was requested by 

the State Welfare Department in New Britain and
3 refused and still continues to refuse to disclose the 

identity of the father of the child. That is the reason
for the citation this afternoon.

T he Court : Do you wish to put on any evidence ?
M r . Carta : Yes. The only evidence is Mrs. Hareega,
T he Court : Are you willing to disclose the name of the 

father?
T he D efendant: Sure.



28a

M ARIA HARCEGA, 42 Farmington Avenue, New Britain, 
Connecticut, called as a witness, being duly sworn by the 
clerk, testified as follows:

By th e  Court :

First of all, the child’s name is Sire Harcega, born 
February 16, 1972? A. Yes.

Q. And the child is receiving State aid? A. Yes.
Q. And you are willing to name the putative father of 

the child? A. Yes.
4 Q. You do so voluntarily? A. Yes.

Q. What is the name of the father? A. David
Negri.

Q. Where does he reside? A. He lives in New Britain, 
Connecticut.

Q. What street? A. 198 Elm Street, New Britain.
Q. How old a man is he, about? A. He is twenty-five. 
T he C ourt : Any questions?
Mr . Carta : I  have no further questions.
T he Court : Y ou m ay step down.

(Whereupon, the witness was excused and the matter was 
concluded.)

Ann Abascal

April 2, 1973, Middletown, Conn. 
T he Court : Ann Abascal, how old are you?
T he D efendant: Twenty-five.
T he Court : I s this lady w illing to disclose the name of 

the father?
Mr . M urphy : Your Honor, as you probably know there is 

currently pending in the Federal Court an action on 
5 Section 52-440b, In fact, today is the date of the 

hearing on the matter. I would respectfully ask this



29a

Court to continue this matter pending the outcome of the 
case.

T he Court : Is this the United States Court in Hartford?
Mr . M u r p h y : Yes, it is, and the issue of this case------ -
T he Court : The only trouble is that their decision may 

not be binding on this court. I will continue it for a week or 
a short stay. I ’ll give you a short stay because we are not 
going to wait until that case goes to the Supreme Court of 
the United States. There are various district courts and 
may differ throughout the country on your decision. I found 
that on the Court of Appeals. They are not binding on my 
court unless I agree with it.

Mr . M u r p h y : I don’t believe the State of Connecticut is 
going to be adversely affected by the continuance. The child 
is only eighteen months old and there is exactly a year and 
a half to [run] on the statute, the limitation to a paternity 

action. Your Honor, I would ask at least one month.
6 T he Court : I will give you a month. But if that

decision is unduly delayed, as I have said before, 
unless I agree with the decision it is not binding on me 
because it is a trial court level collection. What particular 
date?

T he Clerk : May 1st.

(Whereupon, the matter was continued to May 1st, 1973.)

Arm Abascal

May 7, 1973, Middletown, Conn.
Mr . Carta : Ann Abascal, your Honor, that may go off. 

That person is no longer receiving state aid.
T he Court : May go off.
(Whereupon, the matter was concluded.)



30a

Susan Bilodeau

Mb. Carta : Are yon willing to disclose the name of the 
father?

T he D efendant : No.
T he Court : Y ou are not?

T he D efendant: No.
7 T he Court : All right, take the witness stand.

SUSAN BILODEAU, 67 Collins Street, New Brit­
ain, Connecticut, being duly sworn by the clerk, testified as 
follows:

By Mr. Carta :

Q. Miss Bilodeau, are you the mother of a child born 
on January 21,1973? A. January 12.

Q. 1973? A. 1971.
By t h e  Court :

Q. Steven Bilobeau? A. Right.
Q. When was he born? A. January 12,1971.

By Mr. Carta :

Q. Have you had a child born this year, January of this 
year? A. No.

Q. That’s your only child? A. Yes.
Q. Now, Miss Bilodeau, have you been on public assist­

ance from the State of Connecticut? A. Yes.
8 Q. Are you presently on public assistance? A. I 

was supposed to get a check on the first of the month
and I didn’t because I ’m working.

Q. When did you start working? A. Last Thursday.
Q. Have you been on public assistance in the past? A. 

Yes.
Q. Now, have you been as a result of the birth to you of 

this boy? A. Yes.

April 2, 1973, Middletown, Conn.



31a

Q. Now, you reside at 67 Collins Street, New Britain! A. 
Yes.

Q. That is still your present address? A. Yes.
Q. Have you been questioned by the Welfare Department 

in New Britain concerning the father of the child? A. Yes.
Q. Will you tell his Honor the identity of the father of 

the child? A. No.
B y the Court :

Q. You will not? A. No.
Q. Do you know what the statute says? Anyone

9 who refuses to disclose the name of the father could 
be held in contempt of court and could be fined not

more than $200 and imprisoned not more than one year or 
both. Do you understand that? A. Yes.

Q. And you still refuse? A. Yes.
Q. And the child is presently a recipient o f the State 

Welfare? A. No.
Q. You didn’t get one the first of this month. Was it ever 

terminated? Did you get the last check? A. No. You know 
I ’m working. They found me a job and I was supposed to 
have the check on the thirty-first.

Q. Do I understand now that you are working this child 
is going off welfare? A. Yes.

T he Court : Well, why don’t you check that matter out, 
check whether this child is a recipient now. The statute 
says at the present is a recipient. You ought to amend your 
petition.

Mr . Carta : I  think at the time I received notice—you just 
began working?

10 T he D efendant: Yes.
T he Court : Continue this also to May first. Check 

that because she would have a right to refuse even if the 
statute is constitutional if the child is not presently a re­
cipient.

(Whereupon, the matter was continued to May 1, 1973.)



32a

Cynthia Iverson

T he Court : Miss I verson, are you  willing to disclose the 
name of the father?

T he D efendant: Yes.
T he Clerk : Take the stand, please.
CYNTHIA IVERSON, 53 South High Street, New Brit­

ain, Connecticut, being duly sworn by the clerk, testified as 
follows:

B y Mr. Carta :

Q. You have a daughter Stacy Ann Iverson? A. Yes.
Q. What is the date of her birth? A. July 4th, 1972.

11 Q. And is that child presently on public assistance? 
A. Yes.

Q. And do you know the identity of the father? A. Yes. 
Q. Are you willing to disclose that identity? A. Yes.
Q. What is the identity of the father? A. His name?
Q. Name and address. A. Jack Rust.

B y the Court :

Q. R-U-S-T? A. I believe it is. I ’m not too positive.
Q. Is his name Jack or John? A. I don’t know. I have 

always called him Jack.
Q. Where does he reside? A. Stratford, Connecticut. I 

don’t know the street.
Q. Do you know how old a man he is, about? A. Thirty 

or thirty-one.
Q. Do you know where he is employed? A. I believe he 

is a fireman.
Q. He is a fireman in the Town of Stratford? A. Right. 

Q. Do you know what make of car he drives? We
12 want to get the right person, that is, the State does. 

I t ’s not funny. There are several people known by

April 2, 1973, Middletown, Conn.



33a

the same name. I f  you know, that is only as an aid so that 
the State can locate him. A. I don’t know the make of 
the car; its a white car. That’s all I  know.

Me. Caeta : Thank you, your Honor.
T he Cotjet : You may step down.

(Whereupon, the witness was excused and the matter was 
concluded.)

Linda Dunphy

May 7, 1973, Middletown, Conn. 
Before: The Honorable Henry J. Goldberg, Judge.

T he Court : Show cause in the case of Linda Dunphy.
Me . Caeta : Attorney DeFraneisco from Meriden has ap­

parently asked for a continuance and this, and I have no 
objection.

T he C otjet: Any particular date?
Mr. Caeta : I have no particular date, your Honor. I leave 

that up to the Court.
T he Cotjet: Suppose we continue this—I don’t know 

what date it will be. You will hear from the clerk’s 
office.

13 Mr. Carta : I have to check with the clerk on other 
matters anyway, your Honor.

Lisa Hall

May 7, 1973, Middletown, Conn.
T he Court : Lisa Hall.
Mr. Carta : Your Honor, she called me this morning and 

said although she had arranged to be here somehow the 
arrangement fell through and asked for a continuance. She 
stated Wednesday would be all right for her at two o ’clock.

T he Court : May ninth at two o ’clock.
(On May 9,1973, the matter went off, settled.)
(Whereupon, the matter was concluded.)



34a

Phyllis Clarke

PHYLLIS CLARKE, 141 Mansfield Avenue, New Brit­
ain, Connecticut, being duly sworn by the clerk, testified 
as follows:

B y Me . Carta :

Q. Miss Clarke, did you on or about January 3rd
14 of this year, did you give birth to a child? A. Yes, 

I did.
Q. What is the name of the child? A. Tyrone Timothy. 
Q. That is the date? A. Yes.
Q. Was the child born out of wedlock; are you married? 

A. No, separated.
Q. Are you and the child presently receiving state aid? 

A. Yes.
Q. Are you, Miss Clarke, willing to identify the father 

of that child? A. Yes.
Q. And could we have the name of the father of the 

child? A. Tyrone Howard.
Q. Tyrone? A. Yes.
Q. Howard? A. Yes.
Q. H-O-W-A-R-D? A. Yes.

Q. Do you have his address? A. No.
15 Q. Do you know? A. Springfield is all I know. 

Q. Springfield, Mass? A. Yes.
Q. Do you know where he is employed? A. No.
Q. Or any other fact which might help the State in ob­

taining his address or finding him? A. I believe it ’s State 
Street. I believe that is the street he lives but I don’t know 
where he works.

Q. You dont’ know where he works? A. No.
Mb. Caeta : I have no further questions, your Honor.
T he Court : All right, you may step down.

May 7, 1973, Middletown, Conn.

(Whereupon, the matter was concluded.)



35a

Noella Cote

Mb . Carta : Noella Cote, your Honor, that matter may go 
off. She called me and already identified the father.

T he Court : That may go off.

(Whereupon, the matter was concluded.)

16 Sharon Burr

October 2,1973, Middletown, Conn.

Before: The Honorable Eli L. Cramer, Judge.
T he Court : The matter of Sharon Burr, 363 Main Street, 

Portland, Connecticut, this is an order to show cause under 
the provisions of Section 52-440b.

SHARON BURR, 363 Main Street, Portland, Connecti­
cut, being duly sworn by the clerk, testified as follows:

B y  Mb. Carta :

Q. Is that Miss Burr? A. Yes.
Q. Miss Burr, you are presently residing at 363 Main 

Street, Portland, Connecticut? A. Yes.
Q. And you were served with the order to show cause? 

A. Yes.
Q. Now, Miss Burr, did you on or about March 31, 1971, 

give birth to a daughter named Melisa? A. Yes.
Q. Are you able and willing to identify the father 

16-A of that child? A. Yes.
Q. And could you please give me the name of the 

father of that child? A. Richard Coburn.
T he Court : Spell it.
T he D efendant : C-O-B-U-R-N.
T he Court : His address.
T he Defendant : I t ’s New London.
T he Court : Y ou  have no knowledge o f  the street?
T he D efendant : No.

May 7, 1973, Middletown, Conn.



36a

By Me. Carta :

Q. Could yon please spell the last name ? A. C-O-B-U-R-N. 
Q. Yon say the address, as far as you know, is New Lon­

don? A. New London, Connecticut.
T he Court : You have no further questions ?
Mr . Carta : I  have no further questions.
T he Court : Do you have any questions, Mr. Miller ?
Mr. M iller : Your Honor, we originally had objected to 

the proceeding. And it was, in fact, stated sometime
17 ago based upon the that the three judge Federal 

panel was looking into the constitutionality of this
procedure. Just recently the panel decided—do you have a 
copy of that decision? Do you, Mr. Carta?

Mr . Carta : I don ’t.
T he Court: We took the matter up at our Circuit Court 

meeting but copies were not available to anyone of us. 
Anything further?

Mr. M iller : Yes, your Honor. The reason we objected in
this particular instance------

T he Court : Isn’t it academic at this time ?
Mr. M iller : No, it is not, because I would like at this 

point an order restraining the putative father of this child.
Miss Burr for reasons which I can bring out her failure 

to answer questions, she is afraid Mr. Coburn will retaliate 
against her in any manner whatsoever in a paternity action. 
I would like to pass the motion to the Court, restraining
order restraining him to make any effort to------

T he Court : This isn’t within the jurisdiction of it here 
today.

18 Mr . M iller : I f  the Court can compel Miss Burr to 
testify, I would submit that the Court has the power

to protect her.
T he Court : I have no power at this time. I see nothing 

in the present hearing. I would like to oblige you but I 
can’t oblige on the basis—let me put it in the following 
way: I f Mr. Coburn for any reasons threatens, there is a



37a

statute on threatening which provides amply. I t ’s a crim­
inal statute. I f  you at this time would make complaint to 
the prosecuting attorney, I will at that time indicate to the 
prosecuting attorney that he should take action. I can’t do 
anything more than that. I can’t restrain him from, some­
thing which he is under no execution. This is under no 
criminal statute. I appreciate Miss Burr’s insistence with 
you. I see no legal power that I have to restrain something 
which hasn’t happened and only speculative. I fully ap­
preciate this but if there is any form of threat, it is in 
the nature of a criminal action and you call the police im­

mediately. People do not have the right to threaten
19 you in any way. If in any way he comes near you or 

threatens you by felony, you call the police. If that
isn’t satisfactory, you come into the prosecutor of this 
court, either Mr. Kane or Mr. Natalie and they will take 
care of your situation.

Mr. Miller : I  think that would be sufficient.
T he Court : I can’t issue a restraining order about some­

thing that hasn’t happened.
M r. M iller : Yery well. Thank you.
T he Court : Do you want the record to show the name of 

the putative father?
Mr . M iller : I  don ’t think i t ’ s necessary.
T he Court : All right. You may leave Miss Burr. You 

need not proceed any further. Thank you.
(Whereupon, the matter was concluded.)

Rosalyn Carr

October 2,1973, Middletown, Conn.
Before: The Honorable Eli L. Cramer, Judge.
ROSALYN CARR, 248 Bunker Avenue, Meriden, Con­

necticut, being duly sworn by the clerk, testified as fol­
lows:

20 T he Court : Do you have counsel, Miss Carr?
T he Defendant: No, I haven ’t.



38a

T he Court : D o you want counsel?
T he D efendant: N o, I don’t believe it ’s necessary.
T he Court : Y ou d on ’t feel i t ’ s necessary?
T he D efendant : No.
T he Court : And you wish to appear at this time on your 

own behalf without counsel?
T he D efendant : Right.
T he Court : A nd you  don ’t wish counsel appointed for 

you?
T he D efendant : No.
T he Court : All right. Do you wish to consult with a law­

yer? There is a lawyer present and I can ask him to give 
you advice.

T he D efendant : I don’t believe it is necessary.
T he Court : Y ou don ’t wish a lawyer to act as a friend 

o f the court and this gentleman is here and is very  fam iliar 
with the subject i f  you want to discuss it fo r  a moment.

Do you want to take a few moments to discuss it? 
21 Mr . Carta : I think that would be a good idea. I 

discussed this matter with this lady.
T he Court : This gentleman is a lawyer who is familiar 

with statutes, familiar with their implications. Your name, 
for the record.

Mr . M iller : Donald Miller, your Honor.
T he Court : And a member of the Middletown Bar is 

going to discuss this matter with you. You are not being 
appointed but merely as amicus curiae in this case. We 
will take a few minutes.

(At 2 :45 o ’clock a ten minute recess was taken.)
A fter R ecess

T he Cle r k : Miss Carr, do you want to step down here 
please?

T he Court : She has been sworn ?
T he Cle r k : Yes, she has been sworn, your Honor.



39a

B y  M b . Cabta :

Q. Miss Carr, is your present address— A. My name 
is Mrs. Carr.

Q. I beg your pardon. Is your present address
22 248 Bunker Avenue, Meriden? A. Yes, it is.

Q. Are you presently on State aid? A. I receive 
$106.89 a month from the State.

Q. Mrs. Carr, on or about November 1, 1971, did you 
give birth to a daughter? A. On November the first, 1971, 
yes.

Q. Mrs. Carr, are you able today to identify or are you 
willing and able today to identify the father of your 
daughter? A. I would be willing if I knew. But I don’t 
know so I can’t.

Q. Is it your testimony therefore that you do not know? 
A. I do not know the name of my child’s father.

Q. Mrs. Carr, the birth date o f Jennifer was November 
1,1971. Is that correct? A. Yes.

Q. That would place the date of conception somewhere 
around January of 1970? A. Yes, January.

Q. It was January, 1971? A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall some of your male companions

23 during that period of time ? A. No. I  can truthfully 
say that I do not remember. It was an affair that I

have wanted to put out of my mind and I do not know.
Q. You don’t know this individual’s name? A. No, I 

don’t. I believe at the time that it was a false name.
Q. Well, do you recall the name that he did give you? 

A. No, I don’t.
Q. Do you recall the address of this individual? A. No, 

I don’t.
Q. Where were you living at the time? A. In Meriden 

at the same address that I ’m at at present.
Q. Did you know that he was living in Meriden? A. No, 

I  knew that he was living somewhere in the Wethersfield 
area or I was told that is where he lived.

Q. And you have no remembrance, no memory at this



40a

time of the identity, the name of that person? A. No, I do 
not.

Q. Can you describe that person? A. Well, I could de­
scribe him. He was about forty-six, forty-seven, approxi­
mately five feet eleven, light complected, light hair, reddish, 
sort of auburn hair, and other than that I couldn’t say too 

much about him.
24 Q. Well, Mrs. Carr, you have described him fairly 

well considering the length of time that has passed.
Is it your testimony now------  A. Let me say this, I mean,
the type of a person that is an unpleasant person, I might 
remember this name. I will associate a person I can recall 
them by sight but never be able to hook a name to that 
person.

Q. Mrs. Carr, how frequent, how many times did you see 
this person, was he a frequent companion? A. I saw him 
four times.

Q. And yon can’t remember what he was known by that 
or the name that he gave you? A. No, I certainly do not. 
I wish I did but I don’t.

Q. You recall the discussion I had with you yesterday 
in the lawyers’ lounge in this building? A. I certainly do.

Q. Didn’t you indicate to me that even if you knew the 
name you wouldn’t give the name? A. I didn’t say I 
wouldn’t give the name; I said I would consider it a gross 
intrusion of my privacy to have to give the name.

T he Court : Mrs. Carr, let’s stop playing games. I ’m 
going to read to you the law under which I am pro-

25 ceeding which compels disclosure of the putative 
father. I will read it to you and you listen carefully.

You just listen.
I will read it so it will be a matter of record. The mother 

of any child born out of wedlock, or the mother of any 
child born to any married woman during marriage which 
child shall be found, if you know, not to be issue of the 
marriage terminated by a divorce decree or by decree of 
any court of competent jurisdiction, fails or refuses to dis­
close the name of the putative father of such child under



41a

oath to the welfare commissioner, if such child is a re­
cipient of public assistance, or to a selectman of a town in 
which such child resides, if such child is a recipient of 
general assistance, or otherwise to a guardian ad litem of 
such child, such mother may be cited to appear before any 
judge of the Circuit Court and compelled to disclose the 
name of the putative father under oath and to institute an 
action to establish the paternity of said child. And this is 
why you are here. Now (b) any woman having been cited 

to appear before a judge pursuant to subsection (a),
26 fails to disclose or fails to prosecute a paternity ac­

tion may be found to be in contempt of Circuit Court,
fined not more than $200 and imprisoned not more than 
one year or both. This is an act of the Legislature and we 
are not here to play games. It has been upheld by the three 
judge panel—and I am giving you fair warning, Mrs. Carr, 
that I don’t want any games played. Disclose the name. 
You are under oath. Now, you have five minutes to do it. 
I  don’t want any speeches, just disclose the name.

T he D efendant : I do not know. I am under oath in the 
court of the State of Connecticut and I can truthfully say 
I do not know the name of my child’s father.

T he Coubt: What was the name under which he was 
known when you went with him?

T he D efendant : That I can truthfully say I do not recall 
either.

T he Court : Counsel, was there some inform ation given 
to you yesterday that this lady said she w ouldn ’t disclose 
the name?

Mr. Carta : No, your Honor.
27 T he Court : Did you tell this to the lawyer yester­

day that you wouldn’t disclose the name?
T he D e f e n d a n t : I didn’t say I wouldn’t. I said if I did 

know, I would consider it a gross intrusion of my privacy 
to have to do so.

T he Court : Well, I ’m going to order you. This is no 
gross intrusion. Legislature has determined it is not and the 
United States District Court. I do not consider it a gross



42a

intrusion, nor the Legislature of the United States. Disclose 
the name and whether it intrudes on your privacy is some­
thing you can come forth yourself on later. If you don’t, 
I  will exercise the penalty by law and I am going to send 
you to jail.

T he D efendant : Your Honor, you are trying to make me 
say something that I don’t know.

T he Court : You have made ambivalent statement that it 
is a gross intrusion on your privacy.

T he D efendant : I  feel that it is. Even having to be here 
is a gross intrusion of my privacy.

28 T he Court : I f you wish to discontinue it, discon­
tinue being a ward of the State of Connecticut and

they will have no right to compel you.
T he D efendant : All right. I will do that if that is what 

the Court wants, then that is finished.
T he Court : That can happen later. But you are receiv­

ing aid at the present time when you were served.
Mr. M iller : May we have this continued for a week pos­

sibly? I believe Mrs. Carr does honestly at this time not 
remember the name of this person but perhaps in a week 
she might be able to find out the name of the father.

T he Court : I  w ill continue it a week, and i f  you do not 
disclose-------

T he Defendant: Your Honor, if I don’t know, how can 
I-------

T he Court : You do know, Mrs. Carr. I  don’t believe you. 
Mr. Carta : May that be two weeks to place that on the 

same day as the other ones?
T he Court: Y ou be back here two weeks from

29 today with the other matters at two o ’clock Mrs. 
Carr, and you have arrangements made if you do not

disclose at that time, you have arrangements made to take 
care of your child.

T he D efendant : I have two children, your Honor.
Mr. M iller : Your Honor, am I required to be back on 

that day as well?



43a

T he Court : Do you wish this young man to act as your 
attorney?

Mr . M iller : I should say I am with Legal Aid, one of 
which Mrs. Carr does not meet.

T he Court : Do you wish some form of representation! 
T he D efendant : I  will get counsel.
T he Court : Y ou will get your own?
T he D efendant: I will get counsel.
T he Court : Continued to October 16th, two o ’clock.
(Whereupon, the matter was continued to October 16, 

1973.)
October 2,1973, Middletown, Conn. 

Before: The Honorable Eli L. Cramer, Judge.
30 Mr. Carta : These matters we have gotten the re­

quired information from individuals in question so
I would ask that these matters either go off or on behalf 
of the State withdraw these matters from any further ques­
tions.

T he Court : I  am putting the following notation, counsel, 
on each file which has been withdrawn: Counsel for the 
plaintiff appeared and stated that the requested informa­
tion had been given to the Welfare Commissioner by the 
defendant to his satisfaction, and the matter is withdrawn 
from court.

Mr . Carta : That’s fine, your Honor.
T he Court : Would you give the names ?
Mr. Carta : Irza Camacho, Adeline Pelletier, Patricia 

Gaudet, Jean Hoadly, Maureen Hunt, June Stergos, Deb­
orah Staples.

Your Honor, the matter of Denise Russell. She is being 
represented by counsel. I  have been in communication with 
them. Because this matter has not been disposed as yet, I 
would ask that it go over or continued to a date certain. 

T he Court : Continue it to a date certain?
31 Mr. Ca r t a : Yes.

T he Court : What date, Mr. Kay?



44a

T he Clerk : A  couple of weeks at two o ’clock,
Mr . Carta : I  have a feeling it will be disposed of.
T he Court : October 16.
Mr . Carta : That would be fine.
Linda Dunphy, your Honor, did not answer the show 

cause order. She is being represented and again I have 
called her.

T he Court : Continue it.
Mr . Carta : She has been served.
T he Court : October 16.
Mr . Carta : One of the ones which isn’t a part of the 

clerk’s file hasn’t been served yet.
T he Clerk : I  d on ’t want that.
(Whereupon, the matters were concluded.)

December 31, 1973, Middletown, Conn. 
Before: The Honorable Daniel F. Spallone, Judge.

T he Court : Kathleen Warren.
32 Mr . Carta : That has been disposed of, your Honor.

That can go off.
T he Court : Barbara Pino.
Mr. Carta : She is now represented by Attorney Miller, 

and he has asked for a continuance about two weeks and I 
have no objection to that.

T he Court : Continued to January 14th, 1974. That 
would be two months from today.

Mr . Carta : Thank you, your Honor.
T he Court : We are concerned with the Denise Russell 

matter. Keep an eye out for her and let the Court know if 
she shows.

(Denise Russell did not appear.)
(WFereupon, the Court adjourned.)