Cager et al Brief Amici Curiae

    IN  THE

C O U R T  O F  A P P E A L S  O F  M A R Y L A N D  

September Term, 1967

No. 353

In the Matter of

BARBARA JEAN CAGER, et.a l

On Appeal from the Circuit Court 
for Prince George’s County

B R I E F  A S  A M I C I  C U R I A E

For PLANNED PARENTHOOD FEDERATION OF 
AMERICA, INC., PLANNED PARENTHOOD AS­
SOCIATION OF MARYLAND, INC. and PLANNED 

PARENTHOOD OF METROPOLITAN 
WASHINGTON, D. C., INC.

B ernard W . R ubenstein 
Attorney for Amici Curiae 

10 Light Street 
Baltimore, Maryland

Of Counsel-.
E delman, L evin, Levy & R ubenstein 

10 Light Street 
Baltimore, Maryland

Greenbaum, W olee & E rnst 
285 Madison Avenue 
New York, N. Y. 10017

H arriet F. P ilpel 
Nancy F. W echsler



T A B L E  O F  C O N T E N T S

PAGE

Statement op Inteeest op Amici C uriae ..................... 1

Statement op Facts ........................................................  5

Argument .......................................................................... 7

I—The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States forbids state compulsion to use 
birth, control .................................................................. 9
A. The Bight of Privacy ........................................  9

B. Substantive Due Process ..................................  14

C. Equal Protection ................................................  16

Conclusion ........................................................................ 18

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:

Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 5 8 ........................  8
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 ............................  10

Consumers Union v. Walker, 145 F. 2d 33 (D.C. Cir.
1944) ............................................................................ 8

Gault, Matter of, 387 U. S. 1 ..........................................  17
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 ...........8, 9,10,11,12,

13,14,15

Harper v. Virginia, 393 U. S. 663 ..................................  17

Lombard v. Louisiana, 372 U. S. 267 ............................  8
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S'. 1 ......................................  17



PAGE

McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 IT. S. 184 ..........................  17

Parrish v. Civil Service Commission of the County of
Alameda, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623, 425 P. 2d 223 (1967) 12

People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1967) 13,14
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497 ...................................... 8,11,15

Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165 ................................  11

Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 ......................................  8
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 IT. S. 535 ..............................  17
State v. Baird, 50 X. J. 376 (1967) ................................  8

Other Authorities:

Constitution of the United States:
Fourth Amendment ..................................................  9
Fifth Amendment......................................................  9
Ninth Amendment ....................................................  9
Fourteenth Amendment ...................................... 9,16,17

Social Security Act:
Title II of Public Law 90-248, January 2, 1968

Section 201(a) (1) ..............................................  15
Section 402(a) ....................................................  16

Title III of Public Law 90-248 ..............................  16
Title Y  of Public Law 90-248 ................................  16

United States Internal Revenue Code of 1954:
§501(c)(3 ) .................................................................. 3

Washington Post, June 4, 1967 ............    5
Washington Star:

June 2, 1967 ................................................................ 5
July 19, 1967 .............................................................. 7
September 24, 1967 ................................................  6



1ST T H E

C O U R T  O F  A P P E A L S  O F  M A R Y L A N D  

S eptem ber T erm , 1967

No. 353

In the Matter of 

B arbara Jean Gager, et al.

On A p p e a l from  the C ircuit Court 
fo r  P rin ce  G eorg e ’ s County

B R I E F  A S  A M I C I  C U R I A E

For PLA N N E D  P A R E N T H O O D  FE D E R A TIO N  OF 
A M E R IC A , INC., PLA N N E D  P A R E N T H O O D  A S ­
SO C IA TIO N  O F M A R Y L A N D , INC. and PLA N N ED  

P A R E N T H O O D  O F M E T R O P O L IT A N  
W A S H IN G T O N , D. C., INC.

Statement of Interest of Amici Curiae

This brief is submitted by P lanned P arenthood F edera­
tion oe A merica, Inc., P lanned P arenthoood A ssociation 
oe Maryland, Inc. and P lanned P arenthood of Metropoli­
tan W ashington, D. C., I nc., pursuant to leave granted by 
Chief Judge Hammond in an order dated February 5, 1968.



2

Amici are respectively the national health agency in the 
field of birth control (Planned Parenthood Federation of 
America, Inc., also known as Planned Parenthood-World 
Population) and two affiliates of Planned Parenthood Fed­
eration of America, Inc, whose activities relate to the geo­
graphical area out of which these proceedings arise 
(Planned Parenthood Association of Maryland, Inc. and 
Planned Parenthood of Metropolitan Washington, D.O., 
Inc.).

Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. (here­
inafter Planned Parenthood) is a New York non-profit 
membership corporation. It is the central coordinating 
organization of the private effort to bring to the American 
people the best available services for and information about 
family planning and fertility control, and to support and 
stimulate research on human reproduction and on improved 
techniques of birth control. The membership of Planned 
Parenthood consists of 154 state and local affiliates, which 
operate 400 centers throughout the nation. Planned Parent­
hood Association of Maryland, Inc. and Planned Parent­
hood of Metropolitan Washington, D.C., Inc. are duly con­
stituted affiliates of Planned Parenthood.

Planned Parenthood is an active member of the Inter­
national Planned Parenthood Federation which links na­
tional organizations for medical research and services in 
birth control in 50 countries and cooperates with the United 
States and other governments, and which is an accredited 
non-governmental agency to the United Nations Economic 
and Social Council. Planned Parenthood and most of its



3

affiliates have tax exemption under §501 (c)(3 ) of the 
United States Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

Through Planned Parenthood’s Medical and Social Sci­
ence Committees its affiliates receive guidance in the areas 
of medically directed child spacing, treatment of infertility 
problems and education for marriage and parenthood. 
Each of the affiliates functions under strict medical stand­
ards promulgated by a National Medical Committee, in 
conjunction with local medical advisory committees, all 
such committees consisting of physicians.

By means of its various committees, Planned Parent­
hood operates as a clearing house for information and ser­
vices relating to birth control. It formulates nation-wide 
medical and clinical standards and acts as an agency for 
public and professional education in this field. Its medical 
director and other consultants confer with medical school 
faculties and local committees in relation to teaching tech­
niques, formation of clinics and the like.

Planned Parenthood works with medical, social work, 
religious and professional organizations throughout the 
country. It is a member of the National Health Council 
and the American Public Welfare Association. It is affili­
ated with the National Conference on Social Welfare and 
is listed as an ‘ ‘ agency of medical interest”  in the Amer­
ican Medical Association’s Directory of National Voluntary 
Health Organizations.

Planned Parenthood encourages and stimulates research 
by scientists in leading universities and laboratories and 
guides and assists in the clinical testing of contraceptive



4

methods. It organizes conferences for experts in the natu­
ral and social sciences and it collates information and re­
search and fosters publication of articles in scientific 
journals.

Many of Planned Parenthood’s affiliates operate in co­
operation with local public health and public welfare agen­
cies. Many affiliates are also teaching centers for physi­
cians, nurses and social workers and provide referral ser­
vices for patients with suspected pathological conditions 
to qualified medical specialists for treatment. Many of 
Planned Parenthood’s affiliates receive funds from state or 
federal agencies under established government programs 
— such as the Office of Economic Opportunity program to 
combat poverty in the United States.

Planned Parenthood Association of Maryland, Inc. 
conducts centers in the City of Baltimore which offer birth 
control services and also fertility services for couples who 
have been unable to have children. It also conducts a state­
wide educational program and a professional training pro­
gram for physicians, nurses, mid-wives, social workers and 
administrators in the field of family planning and public 
health.

Planned Parenthood of Metropolitan Washington, D.C., 
Inc. conducts similar centers in a number of places in the 
District of Columbia and in Montgomery County, Mary­
land; it also conducts an extensive educational program 
in conjunction with public health facilities maintained in 
the District of Columbia and Montgomery County.



5

Amici’s programs and activities are designed to make 
it possible for all Americans to obtain or to reject birth 
control as a matter of personal choice. Amici believe that 
a judicial order requiring women to practice birth control 
is an unjustified invasion of the constitutionally protected 
area of privacy.

Statement of Facts

The situation here involved presents the following 
basic facts: Three young women have borne illegitimate 
children. The children all reside with their mothers (or 
with persons chosen by their mothers). The mothers sought 
public assistance, the illegitimacy of the children was dis­
closed, the mothers were arrested and child neglect proceed­
ings were instituted.

Following the arrest of the mothers the Welfare Depart­
ment of Prince George’s County on June 1, 1967 announced 
that it would refer such mothers to one of two public health 
clinics then offering birth control services, and the County 
Prosecutor announced that he would refrain in the future 
from arresting women who could show that they had done 
so (Washington Star, June 2, 1967; Washington Post, 
June 4, 1967). Subsequently, the State Department of 
Public Welfare and the Prince George’s County Welfare 
Board advised the President of Planned Parenthood, Dr. 
Alan F. Guttmacher, that neither agency’s policy permitted 
compelling unwed mothers to attend birth control clinics 
as a prerequisite for public assistance (Letter of Ealeigh 
C. Hobson, Director, State Department of Public Welfare, 
dated June 9, 1967; letter of Y. A. Hampton, Director,



6

Prince George’s County Welfare Board, dated June 12, 
1967). Thereafter the neglect proceedings against the 
children here involved continued. After a hearing at which 
the Court below made a finding of neglect, the Court stated 
(Tr. at p. 116) that it would reserve decision on whether 
to direct an investigation and report by the Department 
of Juvenile Services, and further stated the following (Tr. 
114, 115):

“ . , . I think you are entitled to know what the 
Court’s thinking is in this matter so you can govern 
yourselves accordingly.

“ I believe that some headway can be made in these 
cases against the third illegitimate child, because if 
this case had come before the Court with two, and it 
is now here some of these people have three, but I 
would require them to conduct themselves in certain 
ways in their homes. I  would require them to study 
and understand methods of birth control and to prac­
tice them at the risk of losing their children if they do 
not.”

The Trial Court further stated that it was prepared to 
supply “ some incentive to employ modern methods of 
family control”  through the Court and the Department of 
Juvenile Services (Tr. 115, 116).

It is apparent that at the time of the trial of these mat­
ters, voluntary birth control services had not been made 
readily available by the County or the State to these 
women or others like them. Such facilities were “ in­
adequate to meet the problem”  according to the statement 
of the Chairman of the Prince George’s County Commis­
sioners (Washington Star, September 24, 1967). There



7

were three public birth control clinics—each of which was 
open only once a week, for a total of 9 to 12% hours per 
week for all clinics (ibid.; Washington Star, July 19, 
1967).

Argument

Planned Parenthood Federation of America and its 
Maryland and Washington, D.C. affiliates (hereinafter 
referred to generally as “ Planned Parenthood” ) appear 
here amici curiae because they believe that these matters 
present an important issue of individual rights directly af­
fecting Planned Parenthood’s activities and objectives—the 
issue of compulsory birth control.

This brief does not deal with other grounds for holding
the action of the Trial Court in these proceedings invalid. 
The finding of “ child neglect”  upon which the Trial 
Court’s order is based is itself subject to challenge on 
both statutory and constitutional grounds; it is our under­
standing that these challenges are raised by the parties 
and others.

Planned Parenthood advocates and strives for the 
widest possible dissemination of birth control information 
and service to all who need and want it; it endeavors, 
through its medically supervised centers and in other ways 
to serve the community in this respect, Since the need 
for such services is greater than the ability of private 
agencies, such as Planned Parenthood, to meet it, Planned 
Parenthood also advocates and supports programs by 
local, state and federal governments to finance and provide 
birth control services to those who do not otherwise have 
access to them.



Planned Parenthood has at the same time consistently 
opposed governmental edicts or restrictions which interfere 
with freedom of access to birth control information or ser­
vices, or freedom to use or not to nse birth control mate­
rials. Poe v. Ullman, 367 IT. S. 497; Griswold v. Connect­
icut, 381 IT. S. 479; Consumers Union v. Walker, 145 F. 2d 
33 (D.C. Cir. 1944); State v. Baird, 50 N.J. 376 (1967).

In the matters now before this Court, Maryland author­
ities and specifically the Trial Court, have asserted author­
ity to require the use of birth control. The Trial Court has 
threatened to enforce such asserted authority by removing 
children from the custody of mothers who fail to practice 
birth control if ordered to do so by the Court. Further­
more, the authority of the county prosecutor, as well as that 
of other local officials, has been invoked to attempt to en­
force a system of compulsory birth control for welfare 
recipients exclusively. Thus, in addition to the specific 
threat of the Trial Court which is of record here, the situa­
tion is also affected by the assertion of similar power by 
other agencies—agencies which can have immense impact 
on the lives of indigent citizens of the State of Maryland. 
Cf. Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 IT. S. 267; Bantam Books v. 
Sullivan, 372 IT. S. 58; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 IT. S. 1.

In the instant proceedings, the judicial branch, acting 
without any specific legislative authority, has threatened 
to penalize the mothers here concerned if they fail to prac­
tice birth control. We believe that these threats directly 
impinge upon the protected area of privacy recently de­
lineated by the United States Supreme Court in Griswold 
v. Connecticut, supra.



9

Moreover, while the plight of the mothers is plain, 
the social problem symbolized by the situation is real and 
non-coercive remedies are desirable and feasible, yet, the 
State of Maryland does not make adequate birth control 
services available and private agencies such as Planned 
Parenthood have not had the resources or facilities to 
meet the need. It is in this context that the Trial Court 
has threatened these mothers.

Planned Parenthood urges that resolution of the social 
problems involved in the manner threatened here violates 
fundamental constitutional rights of the women concerned 
in these proceedings.

I. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States forbids state compulsion to 
use birth control.

We submit that, in the circumstances of these cases, to 
compel these women “ to practice birth control’ ’ would in­
fringe their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States.

A . T h e R ight o f  P rivacy

We believe that the question of compulsion to practice 
birth control must be evaluated in light of the constitutional 
right of privacy enunciated in Griswold v. Connecticut, 
supra. In that case, live of the justices derived this consti­
tutional right from the fact that a number of specific provi­
sions of the Bill of Rights, including the due process clause 
of the Fifth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment and the 
reservation of rights clause of the Ninth Amendment “ have



10

penumbras, formed by emanation from those guarantees 
that help give them life and substance” , concluding that 
these “ various guarantees create zones of privacy”  (at 
page 484), from which a constitutional right of privacy 
must be acknowledged. Two of the justices rested their 
concurrences on their understanding of the scope of per­
sonal “ liberty”  as a constitutional concept, and thus found 
a right of privacy in the due process clause as such.

We believe that whatever specific provision or provi­
sions of the Bill of Bights may be thought to have dom­
inated in Griswold, the fundamental considerations which 
led to the result in Griswold require a comparable result 
here.

Griswold was a case involving the claim of the State of 
Connecticut that it could validly forbid the use' of contra­
ceptives. We submit that the reasoning of Griswold (and 
of related cases touching on rights of personal privacy) 
must apply also to prohibit compulsory use of contracep­
tives.

In each situation the fundamental invasion of privacy 
relates to the intrusion by the state into personal intimacies 
which should be beyond such intrusion in a country where 
human dignity and “ the privacies of life”  (Boyd v. United 
States, 116 U. S. 616, 630) are held supreme. We believe 
that the marital status of the persons involved cannot be 
determinative in resolving the basic problems of personal 
privacy necessarily presented both here and in Griswold. 
Surely the intrusion on protected privacy here presented 
respects matters of personal intimacy and is shocking to



1 1

the conscience of a civilized society. (Bochin v. California, 
342 U. S. 165; Poe v. Uliman, supra; Griswold v. Connecti­
cut, supra.)

In Poe v. Uliman, supra, in a dissenting opinion pro­
phetic of the result in Griswold (and involving the same 
Connecticut use statute), Mr. Justice Harlan pointed out 
what would be involved in enforcement of a law forbidding- 
use of birth control drugs or devices:

“ • ■ • this could allow the deployment of all the 
incidental machinery of the criminal law, arrests, 
searches and seizures; inevitably it must mean at the 
very least the lodging of criminal charges, a public 
trial, and testimony as to the corpus delicti. Nor 
would any imaginable elaboration of presumptions, 
testimonial privileges, or other safeguards, alleviate 
the necessity for testimony as to the mode and manner 
of the married couple’s sexual relations, or at least 
the opportunity for the accused to make denial of the 
charges.”  (at page 548)

-M-i’- Justice Douglas, both in his dissenting opinion in 
Poe  and in his opinion for the Court in Griswold, found 
the same basic flaw in the law. Thus, in Poe, Mr. Justice 
Douglas said:

“ I f  we imagine a regime of full enforcement of 
the law in the manner of an Anthony Comstock, we 
would reach the point where search warrants issued 
and officers appeared in bedrooms to find out what 
went on.”  (at pages 519, 520)

Obviously, these objections to a statute prohibiting use of 
conti aceptives, are equally applicable—probably more so— 
to a court order requiring use of contraceptives. In the



12
opinion for the Court in Griswold, Mr. Justice Douglas 
asked :

“ Would we allow the police to search the sacred
precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the 
use of contraceptives!”  (at pages 485, 486)

and answered:

“ The very idea is repulsive to the notions o f pri­
vacy surrounding the marriage relationship.”  (at 
page 486)

We submit that the very idea—either in enforcing prohibi­
tion against use, or in a requirement of use—is repulsive to 
the notions of privacy surrounding sex relationships, 
whether in or outside of marriage in a society which re­
spects human dignity. Moreover, the confidential relation­
ship between physician and patient would undoubtedly be 
affected.

In our society today, the home is not the traditional 
one of simpler times; as between many men and women 
to-day, sexual relations are not exclusively and conven­
tionally limited to the legal confines of matrimony. This 
is true in all strata of society. It would be unthinkable 
to conclude that the absence of adherence to traditional 
social forms renders individual citizens vulnerable to inva­
sion of personal privacy to which those who are married 
may not constitutionally be subjected.*

* In this connection it should be noted that the invasion of privacy 
which is in question here goes far beyond what would be involved if 
laws against fornication and adultery were actually enforced— which, 
of course, is not the case (perhaps in considerable part because of 
community repugnance to even that degree of systematic intrusion 
on personal relationships). Cf. Parrish v. Civil Service Commission 
of the County of Alameda, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623, 425 P. 2d 223 (1967), 
where the Supreme Court of California held unconstitutional early 
morning raids (called “ Operation Bedcheck” ) on homes of welfare



13

There should he no doubt about the impact of state com­
pulsion relative to the use of contraceptives—as Justice 
Douglas pointed out in Poe v. Uttman:

“ I f  it (the state) can make this law, it can enforce 
it. And proof of its violation necessarily involves 
an inquiry into the relations between man and wife.”  
(at p. 521)

How would the state enforce a law requiring the use of 
contraceptives? Surely not without, at the very least, an 
inquiry into the intimate details of the physician-patient 
relationship and subsequently of the patient’s sexual activ­
ities. Will the law seek to establish whether a woman uses 
a particular method of contraception; whether a male con­
traceptive is used; whether, for example, if the woman is 
using an intrauterine device she has taken the necessary 
precautions to ensure its continued effectiveness? Ob­
viously no such inquiry should be permitted. Equally ob­
viously the fact of pregnancy would not make it possible 
to short cut such inquiries—no contraceptive method has 
yet achieved 100% effectiveness—either because of itself 
or because of errors in its use or failure to use it.*

recipients designed to detect the presence or absence of “ unauthorized 
males’ ' ; where state employees were directed to “ conduct a thorough 
search of the entire dwelling, giving particular attention to beds, 
closets, bathrooms and other possible places of concealment” . Such 
searches, the California court said, posed constitutional questions 
“ relating both to the Fourth Amendment’s stricture against unrea­
sonable searches and to the penumbra right of privacy and repose 
recently indicated by the United States Supreme Court in Griswold 
v. State of Connecticut.”

*C f. People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1967), where it 
was made a condition of probation that the defendant have no further 
illegitimate children. The defendant claimed that “ . . . she started 
having intercourse but used birth control. For some reason the birth 
control medication was not effective.” The court revoked probation; 
the Appellate Court reversed, saying “ Contraceptive failure is not an 
indication of criminality”  (at page 293).



14

Thus we think it is plain that to compel use is in a 
constitutional sense, so far as the right of privacy is con­
cerned, no different from forbidding use and is barred by 
Griswold v. Connecticut. Like the law forbidding use, en­
forced use would “ attain its goals by means having a 
maximum destructive impact”  upon the right of privacy 
( Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, at page 515).

B. Substantive Due Process

Furthermore, there are other aspects of the situation 
here presented which implicate fundamental liberty within 
the meaning of due process. Quite aside from the privacy 
problem involved, it is patently arbitrary and capricious 
for the state to order an indigent woman to practice birth 
control when the state fails to make it possible for indigent 
women to obtain medical birth control service. Thus, the 
state is saying to the mothers here, and others who seek 
public assistance, that it will separate them from their 
children unless they practice birth control, when it is per­
fectly clear that the women will not be able to comply, 
since the services needed for such compliance are not there. 
This is like arresting a man for being without visible means 
of support in a period of mass unemployment. We submit 
that any such state action is arbitrary and capricious and 
would deprive these mothers of liberty without due process.

In People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Bptr. 290 (1967) the 
Supreme Court of California held invalid a condition of 
probation that the defendant should have no further illegiti­
mate children. The California court said (at page 294):



15

“ The motive (of the condition of probation) was to 
prevent the appellant from producing offspring who 
might become public charges . . .  a grave problem, but a 
court cannot use its awesome power in imposing condi­
tions of probation to vindicate the public interest in 
reducing the welfare rolls by applying unreasonable 
conditions of probation.”

In Poe (at page 542), Mr. Justice Harlan pointed out 
that:

‘ ‘ Due process has not been reduced to any formula; 
its content cannot be determined by reference to any 
code . . .  it has represented the balance which our nation 
built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the 
individual, has struct between that liberty and the 
demands of organized society.”

In Griswold, Justice Goldberg wrote a concurring opin­
ion, joined in by the Chief Justice and Justice Brennan, in 
which he enumerated the following principle of due process 
in relation to birth control (at page 497):

“ . . . if, upon a showing of a slender basis of ra­
tionality a law outlawing voluntary birth control by 
married persons is valid, then, by the same reasoning, 
a law requiring compulsory birth control also would 
seem to be valid. In my view, however, both types of 
laws would unjustifiably intrude upon rights of marital 
privacy which are constitutionally protected.”

In this connection, we should bring to this Court’s at­
tention that recent federal legislation providing for exten­
sion of publicly supported birth control services embodies 
a clear policy against compulsion in this field. Thus, while 
the recent amendments to Section 201(a)(1) and Section



16

402(a) of the Social Security Act (Title II  of Public Law 
90-248, January 2,1968) provide that welfare agencies must 
offer “ in all appropriate cases family planning service”  to 
recipients of aid to Families with Dependent Children, they 
also explicitly require that “ the acceptance . . .  of family 
planning services . . . shall he voluntary, and shall not be 
a prerequisite to eligibility for or the receipt of any other 
service or aid.” *

C. Equal Protection

Moreover, grave question of denial of equal protection 
of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment is presented 
where the state singles out for mandatory birth control 
women on public assistance who have had illegitimate chil­
dren. We do not address ourselves as amici to the equal 
protection issues raised as to the children and the mothers 
by the “ neglect”  finding, points which we understand will 
be briefed by the parties. Our special concern as amici is to 
note that the result of an order such as that threatened 
by the Trial Court would be to create an arbitrary and in­
vidious classification of women who need public assistance, 
as distinguished from other women who might bear illegiti­
mate children. As to these indigent women only, the state 
seeks to intrude into matters which, as we have discussed, 
are within the constitutionally protected area of personal 
privacy. Only the poor, in other words, are to be subjected

* See also Title III of Public Law 90-248 which provides that 
state plans for maternal and child health under Title V  of the Social 
Security Act must provide “ that acceptance of family planning serv­
ices . . . shall be voluntary on the part of the individual to whom 
such services are offered and shall not be a prerequisite to eligibility 
for or the receipt of any service under the plan.”



17

to state control over how they manage their sexual rela­
tions. Cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535, 541:

“ When the law lays an unequal hand on those who 
have committed intrinsically the same quality of of­
fense and sterilizes one and not the other, it has made 
as an invidious a discrimination as if it had selected a 
particular race or nationality for oppressive treat­
ment.”

See also Loving v. Virginia, 388 IT. S. 1; Harper v. 
Virginia, 383 U.S. 663; McLaughlin v. Florida, 
379 U.S. 184.

In Matter of Gault, 387 U. S. 1, Mr. Justice Fortas, writ­
ing for the Court in setting forth basic rights of juvenile 
offenders, said “ . . . neither the Fourteenth Amendment 
nor the Bill of Bights is for adults alone”  (at page 13). 
That principle applies with equal force to the people here 
involved—the constitutional rights of privacy and freedom 
from arbitrary action are not for the affluent alone. Surely 
state officials cannot single out for compulsion only those in 
our society whose economic circumstances require them to 
seek public assistance.



18

Conclusion

Nothing herein stated is intended to suggest that 
Planned Parenthood objects to state efforts to make birth 
control information and service available to all on a volun­
tary basis— on the contrary, Planned Parenthood believes 
that extension of voluntary birth control service is wholly 
lawful and is of the utmost social importance. We are 
obliged, however, to object to state compulsion to practice 
birth control and to request this Court to make clear that 
such compulsion violates basic personal rights guaranteed 
by the Constitution of the United States.

Respectfully submitted,

B ernard W. R ubenstein 
Attorney for Amici Curiae 

10 Light Street 
Baltimore, Maryland

Of Counsel:

E delman, L evin, Levy & R ubenstein

Greenbatjm, W olfe & E rnst

Harriet F. P ilfer 
Nancy F. W echsler



<̂ gĝ > 307 BAR PRESS, Inc.. 132 Lafayette Street, New York 13 -  W O 6-3906



- 3-

County D irectors’ Inforaation & illetin No. 20 Hay 6 , 1963

Contraceptive Advice to  AFDC Applicants

The Board voted to reword i t s  policy requiring contraceptive advice for certain  
AFDC applicants as follow s:

"Every applicant requesting an AFDC grant, which would include a female parent 
or step-parent and/or her children or step-children, shall cause to bo presented 
to  the county welfare department a current written statement from a duly licensed  
physician or a county health director that the said fm a le  parent or step-parent 
has been given adequate contraceptive advice or that she is  physically incapable 
o f bearing a child . This statement must be presented before such parent or 
step-parent can be found e l ig ib le ."

AFTP Medical Review Board

In other action the Board voted to direct the State sta ff to  request the coopera­
tion  o f the Modical Society to  study the fe a s ib ility  o f setting up, in appropriate 
counties, sedic&l review teams to determine the e l ig ib i l i t y  and r e -e l ig ib i l i t y  of 
APTD applicants and recipients and report to  the Board.

Physician Payment

It  also voted to  ask the Interagency Technical Coeaittee on Health Planning and
Health Servicea to  sake roccKaendations to the Board for  establishing physician fees  
and saelhod of paysent so that such payments can ba related to a unifora system for  
a l l  State agencies. It  i s  expected that physician payments w ill begin on or about 
1 July 1968 and that county funds required would be either $500,Ca >D or £1,100,(XX).
To provide lim ited physician services, the 1967 General Assembly provided $500,000 
State money fo r  1967-68 and $600,000 for 1968-69. The funds would have to be matched 
by the counties. Inasmuch as none of the $500,000 has been used during 1967-68, 
there i s  & question of whether or not the Interagency Technical Ccoaittoe and 
Advisory Budget Cosaaiaaion will combine the 1967-68 and 1968-69 funds for the payment 
plan.