County of Los Angeles v. Garza Application to Reinstate a Stay of Court-Ordered Special Election Pending Determination of Writ of Certiorari
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November 29, 1990

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission Respondents' Brief in Reply to Amici Curiae, 1948. 4c297153-c69a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/f15621c1-ba9a-45bb-814e-5c2daf1259cc/takahashi-v-fish-and-game-commission-respondents-brief-in-reply-to-amici-curiae. Accessed August 27, 2025.
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13 THE SUPREME COURT OP THE UNITED STATES October Term, 19**7 0 TAKAHASHI, Petitioner, v. FISH AND GAME COMMISSION LEE P. PAYNE, as Chairman thereof, W. B. WILLIAMS, HARVEY E. HASTAIH, and WJ'jLIAM SILVA, as members thereof, Respondents. i’ i / f ' t ' J L i MAY 7 m 'x:::;' n ® 5 can Ho. 533 INC. On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of California RESPONDENTS * BRIEF IN REPLY TO AMICI CURIAE FRED N„ HOWSER. Attorney General | of the State of California RALPH W. SCOTT, Deputy 600 State Building San Francisco 2, California Attorneys for Respondents. SUBJECT INDEX Page SECTION 990 IS NOT BASED ON RACE OR COLOR THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE INTRODUCED BY THE PETITIONER IN THE TRIAL COURT CHAPTER 181 (CALIF. STATS. 1.945 ) SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AS A WHOLE 0 IF 50 CONSTRUED ITS HISTORY SHOWS THAT IT IS NOT ANTI-JAPANESE COMMERCIAL FISHING IS NOT A COMMON OCCUPATION THE CHALLENGED STATUTE IS A CONSERVATION MEASURE , I SECTION 990 WAS CONSTRUED AS A CON SERVATION MEASURE BY THE HIGHEST COURT IN CALIFORNIA» THIS CONSTRUCTION SHOULD BE FOLLOED BY THE UNITED STATES SUPREMECOURT. PETITIONER CANNOT LIMIT HIS FISHING TO THE HIGH SEAS PETITIONER DOES NOT PRESENT A RECORD WHICH SHOWS HE CAN BE AFFORDED ANYRELIEF 1 3 6 1 1 13 15 17 2C TABLE OP AUTHORITIES Cases: Alsos v . Kendall, 227 ?ae„ 286 Bayside Pish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U.S. 422 Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 In re Ah Chong, 2 Fed. 753 Koramatsu v„ United States, 323 U.S, 239 Llndsley v. Hatural Carbonic Gas Co- 220 u. S. 61, 78, 79 Lubetlch Vo Pollock, 6 Fed. 2d 237 McReady v. Virginia, 90 U. S, 391 Morehead v.Hew York, 298 U. S. 587 State v. Catholic, 75 Ore. 367, 147 Pac. 372 State v. Leavitt, 105 Me. 76, 72 Atl. 875 Terrace Y. Thompson, 263 U. 3. 197 Thomson v. Dana, 32 Fed 2d 759 Statutes: Calif. Stats. 1945, Chap. 181 Calif. Stats. 1947, Chap. 1329 56 Stat. 182 58 Stat. 827 59 Stat. 658 Texts: Webster's International Dictionary, 2d edition IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE UNITED STATES October Term, 19^7 TORAO TASAHASHX j ) Petitioner, \ v. | Ho. 533 PISH AND GAME COMMISSION, LEE F„ \ PAYNE3 as Chairman thereof, W„ Be I WILLIAMS, HARVEY E. HASTAIN, and. ) WILLIAM SILVA, as members thereof, | Respondents, } RESPONDENTS * BRIEP IN REPLY TO AMICI CURIAE SECTION 990 IS NOT BASED ON RACE OR COLOR Of all the amici curiae briefs, the one filed by the United States comes closest to a dispassionate consid eration of section 990 of the Pish and Game Code, It avoJ.ds such tangential Issues a3 to whether California is ’’anti- Japanese'* and was actuated by dislike for the Japanese when chapter 181, Calif, Stats. 19^5* was enacted. It comes directly to the proposition that any alien Ineligible to citizenship may attack section 990 with as much propriety as the petitioner, Irrespective of whether he Is a Malayan 02? a member of any of the so-called Asiatic races (pps. 4 and 5, brief for the United States). It argues that the difficulty with section 990, as amended in 1945, is that It draws the line "based on race and color" (p. 4) and that if the petitioner wore a Malayan his attack "would surely have no less merit” (p. 5). The contention is then made that section 990 of the Pish and Game Code is based on race and color. Such a conclusion, however, can only be reached by reading the Nationality Act of 1940 (54 Stat. 1157, as amended) into the California statute. The fundamental difficulty with this argument is that California did not base chapter l3l on race and color. It based Its statute on Ineligibility to citizenship and on the relative proximity of the particular groups to beneficial ownership of the fish and game. The Congress determined which groups of persons are eligible and which are ineli gible to citizenship. California as a sovereign state had no part In the determination. If tomorrow Congress should decide that any group of white aliens thereafter would be ineligible to citizenship, such persons would be affected by section 990 of the Fish and Game Code irrespective of race or color. Conversely, the Congress might at any time permit alien Japanese to become citizens. It presently con -2- templates such action (H. R. 500̂ )., In the past It did so in the case of Chinese and persons Indigenous to India. It could similarly deny eligibility to citizenship to persons or nationals now eligible and such persons could not then contend with propriety that the California statute was aimed at them on account of their race, color or nationality. In short, it is the respondent9e contention that chapter l8l, California Stats. 19^5 is not racial and tho Nationality Act of 19^0 does not make it so. How can it logically be urged that section 990 is based on race and color when persons of the yellowand brown races are eli gible to citizenship and hence may fish commercially in California? Chinese and Hindus belong to the so-called yellow or brown races; yet they qualify for commercial fishing licenses. The argument that the statute is based on color falls of its own weight, since persons of all color are penaltted to fish commercially in California. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE INTRODUCED BY THE PETITIONER IN THE TRIAL COURT The petitioner as veil as the amici are imbued with the erroneous idea that there is any evidence in this case. At pages 9 and 10 of the brief for the United States -5- It Is assarted that the “impressive evidence assembled by the petitioner" refutes the idea that section 990 was in tended as a conservation measure. Counsel for the peti tioner pointed out in oral argument that thore was no evi dence offered because only issues of law are involved. nevertheless after the trial and during the appeal the petitioner and the amici would Inject into the case, argu endo, statements which are largely the conclusions and opinions of various persons and would not be admissible if offered in evidence in the trial court. They seem to think that the printed word Is beyond challenge. For ex ample, at pages 27 and 28 of his brief the petitioner points out that Mr. Howard Goldstein says there were no fishermen ineligible to citizenship who fished in Cali fornia except two Koreans and a Guamese. Apparently the amici rely on the same incompetent evidence. They neglect, however, to point out that Mr. Goldstein was the employee of petitioner or his counsel and that the magazine “Pacific Citizen" which contained the Goldstein "Survey" Is the official publication of the Japanese American League. The petitioner and the amici leave it to respondents to do so. The respondents took pains at pages 24 and 25 of their brief to point to two possible errors In the Goldstein report, -4- the purpose being to show that If the report la incorrect in some respects it is apt to be Incorrect in others. The only evidence In this case Is the deposition of Miss Geraldine Connor, a witness for the petitioner (R. 26-29),. This deposition was only introduced by stipu- lation. Respondents also have no objection to the con sideration of any statistical data contained in its Pish Bulletins or Biennial Reports. But they do object to the consideration of the mass of Incompetent '’evidence'1 pro duced for the first time on appeal by petitioner and some of the amici which ”evidence"was never offered In the trial court. The briefs of the Japanese American Citizens League and other amici are replete with excerpts from mag azines, books, etc. and with the conclusions and opinions of various persons. The respondents, of course, have never had an opportunity to crosa-exaalne Mr. Goldstein, or any other persons whose conclusions are set forth In the briefs. The difficulty here lies in an attempt by the petitioner and the amici to prove the case in the reviewing courts. That, of course, is contrary to normal procedure where all the pertinent evidence is or whould be produced at the trial. Here, however, we have exactly the normal process -5- in reverse. As no proof was offered by petitioner in support of the allegations of his petition and as the answer denied that section 990 of the Fish and Game Code was enacted for the purpose of discriminating and administered in a manner to discriminate against the petitioner solely because of his race, the allegations of the answer must be taken as true {see cases citod at page 5 2, brief in opposition to petition). CHAPTER 181 (CALIF. STATS. 19^5) SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AS A WHOLE. IF SO CONSTRUED ITS HISTORY SHOWS THAT IT IS NOT ANTI-JAPANE3E The amici and the petitioner alike fail to con sider the rule of the statutory construction that a stat ute must be considered as a whole (R. 4l). As pointed out at page 5 of our brief in opposition to the petition the statute dealt not only with commercial fishing licanses but also the hunting licenses and sport fishing licenses. The brief of the Japanese American Citizens League goes to considerable length to try to show anti- Japanese sentiment in California during the war years. Such argument is idle. The League concedes, however, that the legMation of 19^7 and 1948 showed a turn for the* -6- bettor as far as Japanese are concerned because In 1947 there vas only one "unfavorable measure passed" In 19^8 "there vas nothing" (page 45). The League, however, fails to say there vas anything favorable passed. It does jiCt mention Stats. Cal. 1947, Chap. 1529, whereby sections 4^7 and 428 of the Fish and Game Code was amended so as to permit aliens ineligible to citizenship to enjoy hunting and sport fishing privileges. If California Is"anti-Japanese" this action of the 1947 legislature does not so Indicate. It is undoubtedly true that in 1945 Californians as well as all persons in the United States wore not fav orably impressed by the Japanese. The action of the leg islature at that time in denying alien Japanese hunting as well as sport fishing and commercial privileges would unquestionably have been upheld under the clear and present danger doctrine (Korematsu v. United States. 525 U.S. 259). In 1945 the Korematsu case had not been decided and Cali fornia did not know whether the Japanese would be returned from the concentration camps. If this Court had decided that the Japanese should be returned, it wou3.d manifestly• be absurd to give them hunting privileges whereby they could arm themselves with a 50 caliber rifle to hunt deer or to give them commercial fishing licenses to fish In ocean waters. While It Is quite possible the United States -7- Coast Guard would have never permitted them to leave port, nevertheless, the possession by alien Japanese of* commer cial fishing licenses during var time might have complicated an already aggravated situation. In 19^5 there was a large influx of military per sonnel into California,, The State was practically an armed camp. Such military personnel were granted the privilege of sport fishing free of charge. This put a tremendous bur den on the sport fishes of California. By the same token such persons hunted virtually at will, and there was simi lar pressure on the game. At that time also there had been a large Influx of commercial fishermen into the State (see respondents * brief, page 5 1 ) and by the end of19*5 it was very evident to the legislature that the ocean fisheries were facing exhaustion (see Pish Bulletin 67, page 7} see also pages 10 and 11 respondents’ brief). At that time it was clear that If the ocean fisheries were to be maintained there must be a curtailment in the number of commercial fishermen. The brief of the National Association For The Ad vancement of the Colored People (page 7 ) cites the 19^0 Cen sus, page 2 , as authority for a classification of aliens ac- 1. Fish Sulietin bj has been lodged with the Clerk. -8- cording to eligibility to citizenship. The petitioner makes the same statement (page 14 of his petition). Our perusal of that Census does not disclose any ol&sslftcation accord ing to citizenship eligibility. The classifications are based on nativity. The foregoing amicus reports at page 7 of it3 brief that there were 33*369 alien Japanese in Cali fornia in 1940. Assuming for argument alone that there were only 2,962 other aliens ineligible to citizenship, the ratio to Japanese would be about 1 to 11. We estimated that the ratio of alien Japanese to other ineligible alien fishermen was 89 to 1 1 or approximately 9 to 1 (brief, page 29). Thus if a mean is taken, It would appear that the ratio of alien Japanese to other ineligible aliens in Cali fornia would be about 10 to 1. Therefore in 1945 the leg islature increased by ten percent (1C$) the number of per sons ineligible to hunt or fish. Hence it is obvious that the 1945 legislature took a greater step in the direction of conservation when it enlarged the classification of per- sonsAdenied the privilege of hunting and fishing to all ’persons ineligible to citizenship". Moreover in 1945 it may have been apparent to the legislature that all alien Japanese were not ineligible to citizenship (56 Stat. 182; 58 3tat. 827; 59 Stat. 658), and that it would be manifestly unfair to deny fishing and hunt- -9- Ing privileges to an alien Japanese who was eligible to cit izenship. If a statute is susceptible of two constructions the one which will uphold the statute will be adopted rather than the on© which will defeat it (Llndsley v. Natural Car bonic Qaa Co.. 220 V. S. 61, 78, 79). In 19^7 the pressure on California sport fishes and game was greatly relieved by the termination of hostil ities and by the dispersal of the large number of persons in the armed forces temporarily quartered in California. Therefore, the legislature apparently saw no further need for denying aliens ineligible to citizenship the privilege of hunting or fishing for pleasure. Hence sections 427 and of the Pish and Same Code were amended to permit ineli gible aliens to enjoy the privilege of hunting and sport fishing. However,the situation with respect to commercial fishing was becoming worse. As indicated in our brief (pages 3 1 , 3 2) the number of commercial fishermen had gone up during the war years but the take of fish had dropped off until in 1947 the sardine supply was virtually extinct. In 1947 and 1948 fishing boats were obliged to go from Monterey and San Francisco to southern California waters. Hone of the fish packing plants received enough fish to keep them in operation. Fish were at a premium because there were no fish. As shown by Fish Bulletin 67 there -10 are approximately 7^6 eligible aliens engaged in commer cial fishing in California. According to the petitioner's brief there are at least 700 alien Japanese who vould like to enjoy the privilege. Assuming, aa w© pointed out at page 29 of our brief that the ratio of alien Japanese to other alien fishermen presumably ineligible to citizen ship Is approximately 89 to 11 or 9 to 1. Therefore if all aliens vere eligible to fish at this time approxi mately one-half vould be eligible aliens and the other one-half vould b© ineligible aliens. Consequently, it is dear that denying the privilege to ineligible aliens California made a big step in the direction of conserva tion as each fisherman alone accounts for more than 78,000 pounds of fish.^ COMMERCIAL PISHISQ IS HOT ACOMMON OCCUPATION All the amici stress the rule in Truax v. Ralsch, that an alien cannot be denied the means of livelihood in one of the "common occupations'5. They assume that commer cial fishing is a '’common occupation" but cite no authority in support thereof other than their ovn conclusions. Web- 1. This figure is computed from Pish Bulletin 67 by dividing the annual take of fish by the number of commercial fishermen. -11- 3tor’s International Dictionary, 2d edition, defines the adjective "common” as belonging or pertaining to manyj frequent; customary; usual. There are approximately 12,500 commercial fishermen in California out of an esti mated population of 10,000,000. There are also 13*655 lavyer3 in California. This number compares favorably with the number of fishermen. In other words, if com mercial fishing is a "common occupation” so is the prac tise of the law. However, Truax v. Raisch excepts fishing from the classification of a common occupation (McReady v, Virginia. 90 U. 3. 591). Pishing is not a common occupation for the rea son that it is not open to all persons against the legis lative will or the will of the state because it Involves the appropriation of the property belonging to the citi zens, residents of the State (Alsos v. Kendall, 227 Pac. 286). State v. Catholic, 75 Ore. 367, 1^7 Pac, 372, also indicates that commercial fishing is not a common occupation. It holds (page 375);j . . that before the Fourteenth Amend ment Is Infringed by preventing one from engaging in such a business (commercial -12- fishing) It must appear that Catholic had a right to catch salmon which is guaranteed to and way be exercised by every citizen of the United States though a non-rssident of the State. . . . The business which is protected from Interference by state legislation must be a calling vhich any person can pursue in any place of the United States as a common, right." (parenthesis and emphasis added) In short, the case holds that fishing is not a common right and it follows that fishing is not a common occupa tion. This case va3 cited vith approval in Thomson v. Dana. 52 Fed. 2d, 759, which, in turn, was affirmed by this Court at 285 U. S. 52 9. THE CHALLENGED STATUTE IS A CONSERVATION MEASURE .The brief of the American Veterans Committee at pages 6, 7 , 8 and 9 argues that the statute is not a con- servation measure because the "needs of the market will in fact be met by the capture of fish by others than in the restricted class". The reeds of the market have not been met -13- "by the capture of fish toy others, There is a greater de- msxid for the fish than there is a supply. It is urged by the amici that other measures of conservation such as size limits, bag limits, etc. have been adopted by California with respect to the commercial fisheries, and that section 990 which denies ineligible aliens the privilege of fish ing does not follow that pattern. From a practical stand point there is only one sure and safe way to oonserve com mercial fisheries where the fishing is chiefly carried on toy the use of nets. That way is to reduce or limit the number of fishermen. It Is not practical to prescribe a size limit or bag limit on fish which are taken with a net. When fishermen encompass a school of fish with a net, they do not know the size or the amount of the fish until taken ashore and veighed. JHoreover, to count the individual fish and measure them for size would be Im practical because by the time the count and measure ments were made the fish would spoil, Therefore the only logical way of conserving the commercial fisheries 1 b to reduce the number of fishermen eligible to take them or to prohibit the taking of them entirely. The latter course has been adopted in the case of 3triped bass, for example. Sardines constitute 75 percent of the California fisheries and the other fish greatly rely on then for food. If the sardines are eliminated the other species would soon disperse and seek food elsewhere. At this time California does not believe it is necessary to stop all fishing for sardines. Otherwise it would have done so. However, by eliminating a group of persons constituting about one-half of all alien fishermen, the first step in the direction of conservation has been taken. If It la found necessary to further reduce the number of persons eligible to take them presumably this will be done by the elimination of all aliens, then non-resident citizens and finally by denying the privilege to everyone.. SECTION 990 WAS CONSTRUED AS A CON SERVATION MEASURE BY THE HIGHEST COURT IN CALIFORNIA. THIS CONSTRUC TION SHOULD BE FOLLOWED BY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT. The Supreme Court of California construed Sec tion 990 of the Fish and Oame Code as a conservation measure (R. 58, 59). It reasoned that if the legislature desires to conserve fish and game, it could reasonably do so by reducing the number of persons eligible to take fish or game. This idea is not novel. In State v. -15- Laavltt, 105 Ms, 76, 72 Atl. 875* It was Bald: (page 879) "» . . Indiscriminate taking might be destructive of the fishing Itself . . . That a state may by regulation prevent such destruction we think must be conceded, To do this the state oust necessarily limit the times within which or the number of persons by whom they (olams) may be taken." (parenthesis and emphasis added) The same principle is recognized in State v. Catholic. 75 Ore, 367, lVf Pac. 572, where it was said at page 575 that for the purpose of protecting its fish the state nmay wholly exclude persons who are not residents from catching or tak ing fish in its waters," 'Ph© Catholic case was cited with approval in Thomson v, Cana, 52 Fed. 2d, 759* end as pointed out hereinabove, affirmed by this Soiirt. Moreover, the construction placed on the cod© section by the California Supreme Court is or should be followed by this Court. In Morehead v. Mew lrork. 298 -16- U. S. 58 7, it was said: "This Court Is without power to put a different construction on the state enactment from that adopted by the high est court of that state. We are not at liberty to consider petitioner's argu- ment based on the construction repudi ated by that Court. The meaning of the statute as fixed by its decision must be accepted here as if the meaning had been specifically expressed in th© enactment." (page 609) PETITIONER CANNOT LIMIT HIS PISHING TO THE HIGH SEAS Mr. Takahashi intends to fish on the territorial waters as well as the high seas. Counsel for Mr. Takahashi in the companion case of Tsuchiyame concedes that it is impossible and impractical to fish on the high seas alone (see pagss 6, 7 and 8, respondents' brief). If it is impossible for Mi*, Tsuchiysma and the 200 Japanese fishermen in whose behalf he sued to limit their activities to the high seas it is equally impossible for Mr. Takahashi to do so. Mr. Takahashi virtually con- -17- coflea this in his brief by Indicating that th© fish and the fishermen pay little attention to the three-mile territorial ocean boundary line (see page 1 2 ). Jloreover his brief disputes the allegation of his amended petition that h® fished on the high seas since 1915 (Cf. R. 1 and 6 and page 1 1 , petitioner's brief). As It is impossible for the petitioner to limit his fishing activities to the high seas and as fish taken on the high seas are indistinguishable from fish taken in territorial waters (Bayslde Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry. 297 Ho 8 , 422), it follows that the doctrine of sovereign state ownership is applicable here. Counsel for petitioner concedes that he cannot "limit the issues . . . to the right to fish on the high seas" (see respondent's brief, page 8) in the companion case of Tsuchlyama v. Pish and Gam© Com mission (K. 26) and It is again urged that the same limita tion Is applicable to the case at bar. Although not cited in petitioner's briefs, ref erence was made by his counsel during argument to the oase In re Ah Chong. 2 Fed. 753. That case Is also cited by some of the amici. That cas© is discussed in the main opinion of the Supreme Court of California (R. 41). That case was decided in 1880 and Is superceded by Geer v. Con- -18- nectiout, 161 U „ S. 519 (1396), Lubetlch v. Pollocks 6 Pod. 2d 237 and others. Moreover, the Ah Chonre case ap pears to have been superceded by Terrace v. Thompson. 263 U. S. 197 and allied cases holding that eligibility to citizenship furnishes a reasonable basis for classifi cation by a state. In the Ah Chong case the court re viewed several statutes of California and section art icle XIX of Its Constitution which singled out Chinese by name. The Tenth Census of the United States showed no miscellaneous group of aliens in California. The only races disclosed were persons hailing from British America, Eng land and Vales, Ireland, Scotland, other parts of Great Britain, Germany, Prance, Sweden and Borway, Mexico and China. The Ah Chong case turned on two other points, namely (l) that th© statute would preclude Caucasian women from fishing because they oould not become electors and {2} that the statute violated the terms of an existing treaty between the United States and China. The Ah Chong case went no further than to hold that if one class of aliens is permitted to fish the same privilege must b© ex tended to all aliens who are protected by treaty. Said th© Court: \ -19- "Conceding that the State may exclude all aliens from fishing in its waters, yet if it permits one class to enjoy the privilege it must permit all others to enjoy, upon like terms, the same priv ileges, whose governments have treaties securing to them the enjoraont of all privileges granted to the most favored nation." (2 Fed. 7 3 7) (emphasis added) PETITIONER DOES MOT PRESEHT A RECORD WHICH SHOWS HE CAM BE AFFORDED AMY RELIEF The amici as veil as the petitioner ask this Court to reverse the Supreme Court of California. Pre sumably in making such a prayer they desire the petitioner to be licensed to fish commercially without limitation as to place vhere the fish are to be taken. This, however, cannot be done on the present state of the record. The amended judgment of the trial court com manded the issuance of a commercial fishing license with out qualification as to place of use (R. 21). That judg ment was made after the trial court lost jurisdiction and Is void (R. 33). The invalidity of the amended judgment -20- : conceded by petitioner in. oral argument. Moreover, .' a-landed judgment gave the petitioner more than h© asked lie only wants a commercial fishing license "to engage in commercial fishing on the high seas'* (R. 6). That Is the substance of the prayer of his petition, as amended and that is what he got from the trial court (R. 7). The respondents cannot issue such a license in the absence of legislation providing for a license in such form. Moreover, they could not endorse across the face of a license (as suggested by petitioner) that it is good for fishing the high seas only without vio lating their oath of office and the statutes made and provided. If the Supreme Court of California is reversed the respondents cannot comply with the original judgment of the trial court until the 3tate Legislature amends the statute and provides for licenses in the form which the original Judgment directs. Until that time, the original judgment is in effect nudum pactum. Hence all issues,' ex- cept the issue raised under this point, are purely abstract and hypothetical. Respectfully submitted, PISffiD SL HAWSER, Attorney Oen-er 3T DATED‘.APRIL JO, 19^8 v. iscmr^mw- ■ Attorneys for Respondents