Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park Brief Amicus Curiae
Public Court Documents
September 30, 1969

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Monteilh v. St. Landry Parish School Board Reply Brief for Appellants, 1987. 488fbc29-be9a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/c40cb512-3cd7-4ea0-bcaa-2c49094e6c38/monteilh-v-st-landry-parish-school-board-reply-brief-for-appellants. Accessed July 01, 2025.
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 87-4224 MARILYN MARIE MONTEILH, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ST. LANDRY PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, et al., Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, Opelousas Division REPLY BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS MARION OVERTON WHITE 516 East Landry Street Opelousas, Louisiana 70570-6128 (318) 948-8296 JULIUS L. CHAMBERS THEODORE M. SHAW NORMAN J. CHACHKIN 16th Floor 99 Hudson Street New York, New York 10013 (212) 219-1900 Attorneys for Appellants Table of Authorities Page Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403 (11th Cir. 1 9 8 5 ) ..................7 International Woodworkers v.Champion International Corporation, 790F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1986), aff7d, 55 U.S.L.W. 4820 (U.S. June 15, 1987) ........... 5 F.R.A.P. 1 0 ........................................................ IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 87-4224 MARILYN MARIE MONTEILH, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ST. LANDRY PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, et al., Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, Opelousas Division REPLY BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS The Brief for the School Board simply fails to come to grips with the salient facts and legal issues presented on this appeal. For the reasons set forth below as well as those presented in our main Brief, the judgment below should be reversed and the case remanded with instructions. I. Preliminarily, we note that counsel for the School Board has tendered to the Court a document entitled "Appendix Summarizing Testimony" in purported reliance upon "Appeal to the Fifth Circuit Manual, Volume 2, Chapter 21, Page 12" (transmittal letter to Clerk of this Court, dated August 31, 1987). While we do not object to consideration of this material by the Court, we wish to make clear exactly what the document is, and what it is not. The "Appendix Summarizing Testimony" submitted by the School Board's counsel is a highly selective, argumentative and misleading recapitulation of the trial evidence in this matter. It is not a statement on the evidence or proceedings nor an agreed statement as the Record on Appeal as provided for by F.R.A.P. 10(c) or (d). The "Appeal to the Fifth Circuit Manual," upon which appellees rely, is a private publication and not an official promulgation of this Court — but even the portion of the Manual cited by counsel clearly contemplates the preparation of an objective, dispassionate summary of all relevant trial testimony: Where the record is voluminous and the testimony before the district court extensive, an appendix to the brief which summarizes testimony, indexes according to either transcript or printed appendix page number, and digests the content of the testimony is most helpful. This is, of course, optional. If this material is not argumentative it too does not count against FRAP 28(g) page limitations. The School Board's submission wholly fails to conform to these requirements. For a glaring example of subjectivity, the "Appendix Summarizing Testimony" at p. 23 passes from page 100 to page 102 of the transcript of the August 12, 1986 hearing without including Mr. Auzenne's admission at p. 101 (cited in the Brief for Appellants at p. 21] that the North Consolidated High School would be 80% black. Examples of the insertion of editorial commentary 2 on the evidence abound.1 We respectfully urge the Court to conduct its own examination of the Record in this matter. II. In its Brief, the School Board suggests that Appellants' counsel had information about the zoning for the proposed consolidated high schools prior to the August, 1986 hearing so that the notice provided in the district court's December 9 Minute Entry was more than sufficient to prepare for the hearing (e.q.. Brief for Appellees at 9, 10). In fact, the evidence in this matter is uncontradicted — and was presented as part of counsel's direct examination of the Superintendent — that zone lines for all of the schools had not been established at the time of the August hearing (3 R. 8). The School Board itself recognizes in its Brief (at p. 6) that "On November 20, 1986, [well after the August, 1986 hearing] proposed new attendance zone lines for the three new consolidated schools were adopted." The Board's assertion that "Plaintiffs received student population figures and preliminary attendance zone maps for the proposed consolidated schools before the August 12, 1986, hearing in Judge Duhe's court" (Brief for Appellees, at p. 9) is flatly wrong. The School Board's Exhibit No. 1 at the August hearing did include projections (confected without the Board's having 1See, e.g., pp. 10 ("thereby neatly ignoring the fact that a school combining those grades had operated successfully in the small town since 1969 [no record citation]"), 11 ("of course, this assertion is flatly contradicted by the statistics . . ."). 3 adopted final zone lines, of course), and was technically received by plaintiffs' counsel "before the August 12, 1986, hearing"— the morning of the hearing (3 R. 23) . But the Board introduced no maps at the hearing (see 3 R. 5-9, 23; appellees' Record Excerpts, Appendices Nos. 1-4; compare id. . Appendix No. 6 [exhibit at December 29, 1986 hearing]). In fact, when plaintiffs' counsel questioned the Superintendent about a map that had been published in the newspaper at the time of the bond vote (3 R. 39) , the School Board disclaimed the validity or significance of the map: THE COURT: PLAINTIFF ONE shows the proposed attendance zones? Which is it? THE WITNESS: They were never proposed to the Board officially A. Mr. White, I— to my memory we did not use that map to campaign for the tax. The purpose of this particular map was only sent— first of all was only sent to Board members. And at one time we were going to propose these attended [sic] zones to the Board, but at— at the Board meeting there was confusion about where the kids from Lawtell would attend. So the whole discussion was— the discussion at the Board meeting was held and this particular map was never presented for official action by the Board. MR. BURSON: Your Honor, at this point I'm going to object to any further questions about this map on the grounds that it's irrelevant. It was not proposed to the Board, adopted by the Board, submitted to the Court for approval. Therefore, it's really irrelevant to what we are about. (3 R. 38-39, 50.) 4 Under these circumstances, counsel acted properly and responsibly in awaiting finalization of attendance zoning and submission of an appropriate motion to the district court before attempting to assess the impact on desegregation of the zone lines being proposed, and before attempting to secure expert assistance in evaluating the School Board's plan.2 III. The School Board also implies that plaintiffs were fully informed at all times because "Plaintiffs through Messrs. Pitre 2This is particularly true since, in light of this Court's decision in International Woodworkers v. Champion International Corporation, 790 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1986), aff'd. 55 U.S.L.W. 4820 (U.S. June 15, 1987) , counsel would have had to seek the district court's authorization for the expert testimony if plaintiffs wished to recover the witnesses' fees and expenses should they prevail. Counsel for the Board misstates the record and misinterprets a sentence in our Brief in asserting that "statistics were also provided to plaintiff's counsel at least 20 days in advance of the hearing on the zones lines (2 R. 5, Plaintiff's Brief, p. 8, note 15)" [Brief for Appellees, at p. 10]. The citation to the record is to plaintiffs' oral request for a continuance at the start of the December 29, 1986 hearing, at which time counsel for plaintiffs explicitly stated that "we did not have sufficient time to prepare in obtaining experts who were able to review the voluminous amount of statistics pertaining to this matter." The statement in our brief was that "After receiving the December 9 Minute Entry setting the hearing, plaintiffs' counsel was forced to pick up a copy of the board's submission from the district court's chambers" (emphasis added). The Minute Entry reflects that it was mailed by the Clerk of the district court on December 9. After it was received, plaintiffs' counsel called the court to advise that no motion had been filed by the Board and was then told that a copy of the material submitted by the Superintendent (see Brief for Appellants, at pp. 7-8) would be made available for pick-up at the Court's chambers. 5 and Austin had been considering the particulars of the consolidation plan since at least February 13, 1986 . . . [and] had full access to the same information used by the Board to support the plan or any other information they needed" (Brief for Appellees, at pp. 36-37)(emphasis added).3 In addition to the fact that neither Mr. Austin nor Mr. Pitre represent the plaintiff class in this case, before either the district court or the school board, it is unfortunately the case that the black members of the St. Landry Parish School Board are not afforded adequate assistance and information by the white majority of the Board or by the administrative staff, as indicated by Mr. Austin's inability to secure from the school staff a complete set of enrollment projections for the plan he supported (see 2 R. 117, 134-35). IV. A careful reading of the briefs in this case will demonstrate that the School Board fails to address the important legal issues raised by the appellants in this matter. First, the Board simply repeats the assertion that the school system was declared unitary by Judge Scott in 1971 (Brief for Appellees, at pp. 28-29) without any analysis of the case law cited 3See also Brief for Appellees, at pp. 5, 6 (Joshua Pitre, identified as "law partner of the plaintiffs' lead attorney," served on the School Board and "he and the other two black board members enjoyed intimate access to all statistics, facts, and figures used by the School Board in developing a consolidation plan.") In fact, although Mr. White and Mr. Pitre share office space, they are not involved in a formal partnership. 6 in our Brief (p. 25 n.49) . It is clear that Judge Scott was using the term "unitary" in 1971 to signify that overt dualism had been abolished, not that "unitary status," justifying dismissal of the case, had been achieved. See Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1413-14 & nn. 11, 12 (11th Cir. 1985)(recognizing confusion in use of term). Second, the Board fails completely to address Appellants' concerns about the manner in which these proceedings are being conducted by the district court, except to suggest that the ultimate outcome of the Superintendent's ex parte communication to the district court a hearing — was the same as the ultimate outcome would have been had the school board filed a motion. This position would make it futile to have any court rules and procedures at all. Finally, the Board's brief is premised entirely upon the projections introduced below (e.g.. Brief for Appellees, at pp. 23, 29-30), without any meaningful defense of their validity. The Board's arguments simply assume the point in issue. Conclusion The judgment below should be reversed and the case remanded to the district court, with instructions: to enjoin further school construction pendente lite, to require that a demographic study be conducted and a pupil locator map prepared, to require the school board to prepare a high school consolidation plan with the goal of furthering desegregation of the Parish's school system, 7 to conduct proceedings only upon adequate notice to the parties and following the submission of appropriate motion papers or other pleadings, to cease its practice of conducting ex parte proceedings or entertaining ex parte communications from the school superintendent, and to grant the relief sought in plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend its judgment. Respectfully submitted, MARION OVERTON WHITE 516 E. Landry Street Opelousas, Louisiana 70570-6128 (318) 948-8296 JULIUS L. CHAMBERS THEODORE M. SHAW NORMAN J . CHACHKIN 16th Floor 99 Hudson Street New York, New York 10013 (212) 219-1900 Attorneys for Appellants 8 Certificate of Service I hereby certify that on this 12th day of September, 1987, I served two copies of the foregoing Reply Brief for Appellants upon counsel for the Appellees and the United States, by depositing same in the United States mail, first class postage prepaid, addressed as follows: I. Jackson Burson, Esq. Assistant District Attorney 27th Judicial District Court P. 0. Drawer 1419 Opelousas, Louisiana 70571-1419 Hon. Joseph S. Cage, Jr. United States Attorney Joe D. Waggoner Federal Building 500 Fannin Street Shreveport, Louisiana 71101 Norman J. Chachkin