Clark v. Dole Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1983
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Clark v. Dole Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 1983. dac9adb0-ad9a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/56fba410-87a1-46f2-aba6-a39b423880c9/clark-v-dole-petition-for-writ-of-certiorari-to-the-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-district-of-columbia-circuit. Accessed August 19, 2025.
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No. 83-
I n THE
(Emirt of tl?£ l&nxtzh States
O ctober T erm , 1983
M arlene Gratchner Clark ,
Petitioner,
v.
E lizabeth H ansford D ole, Secretary,
United States Department of Transportation.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
J ack Greenberg
C harles S teph en R alston*
G ail J. W right
Suite 2030
10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019
(212) 586-8397
Counsel for Petitioner
Counsel of Record
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
On A p r i l 14, 1978, the United S ta tes
Department o f J u s t i c e issued a d i r e c t i v e
that the United S ta tes would not seek c o s t s
when i t was the p r e v a i l i n g defendant in a
T i t l e V I I a c t i o n u n l e s s the a c t i o n was
b r o u g h t in bad f a i t h , t h e a c t i o n was
pursued in a harass ing or ve xa t i ou s manner,
o r t h e c l a i m was p a t e n t l y f r i v o l o u s .
The d i r e c t i v e as no t f o r m a l l y r e s c i n d e d
u n t i l A p r i l 1, 1983. N e ve r t he le s s , p e t i
t i o n e r was assessed c o s t s incurred between
1978 and 1983 even though the above s tan
dards were not met.
1. Was the government estopped from
seeking c o s t s in view o f i t s p u b l i c l y an
nounced p o l i c y aga inst seeking such c o s t s
unless the standards f o r awarding a t t o r
neys ' f e e s s e t out by t h i s c our t in C hr i s -
l
t iansburg Garment Company v. EEOC were
met?
2. Whether the c o ur t s below app l i ed
the p r o p e r s t a n d a r d s in a s s e s s i n g c o s t s
aga in s t a l o s i n g p l a i n t i f f in a T i t l e VII
case aga ins t an agency o f the United S ta tes
government?
PARTIES
Marlene Gratchner Clark,
P e t i t i o n e r , P l a i n t i f f below.
E l i za be t h Hansford Dole ,
in her o f f i c i a l c a p a c i t y as
S e c r e ta r y , United S ta tes
Department o f T ra n s p o r t a t i o n ,
Respondent, Defendant below.
~ i i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ................................................ i
PARTIES .......................................................... i i
OPINIONS BELOW................................................... 2
JURISDICTION .............................................................. 2
STATUTES, RULES and DIRECTIVES
INVOLVED .............................................................. 3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................. 5
1. The Proceedings Below ................... 5
2. The Hi s to ry o f the Department
o f J u s t i c e P o l i c y on Costs in
T i t l e VII cases ........................... 9
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE W R I T ....................... 17
1. The Importance o f the Issue . . . 17
2. The D e c i s i o n Below i s in
C o n f l i c t with D e c i s i o n s o f
This Court R e la t in g t o the
R e t r o a c t i v e A p p l i c a t i o n o f
Changes in the L a w .................................. 24
CONCLUSION .................................................................. 28
Appendix I : D ec i s i o n s o f the
Courts Below ............................... 1a
Appendix I I : Documents Rela t ing
to Department o f
J u s t i c e P o l i c y on
Costs ................................. .. . 50a
Page
- i i i -
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases :
A l l e n v. U.S S t e e l C o r p . , 665 F.2d
689 (5th C i r . 1982) ............................. 18
Baez v. U.S. Dept, o f J u s t i c e , 684
F.2d 999 (D.C. C i r . 1982) ............ 20
Boas Box Co. v. Proper Fo ld ing Box
C or p . , 55 F.R.D. 79 (E.D.N.Y.
1971) ........................................................... 20
Bradley v. Richmond Schoo l Board,
416 U.S. 696 ( 1974) .......................... 24,25
Chr i s t ian sbu rg Garment Co. v. EEOC,
434 U.S. 412 ( 1978) .......................... passim
Croker v . Boeing C o . , 662 F.2d 975
(3rd C i r . 1981 ) ........... 18
Danner v. USCSC, 635 F.2d 427
(5th C i r . 1981 ) .................................... 18
Del ta A ir Lines v. August , 450
U.S. 346 ( 1981) .................................... 18
Farmer v. Arabian American Oi l Co . ,
379 U.S. 227 (1964) . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Green v. United S t a t e s , 376 U.S.
149 (1964) ............................................... 25
Hughes v. Heyl t & P at te r s on , I n c . ,
647 F.2d 452 (4th C i r . 1981) . . . 27
Page
i v
Page
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678
(1978) ........................................................ 25
la Power & Light Co. v. Bur l ington
Northern, I n c . , 647 F.2d
796 (8th C i r . 1981 ) .......................... 27
Iowa P u b l i c S e r v i c e Co. v. ICC,
643 F.2d 542 (8th C i r . 1981) . . . 27
Jaspers v. A lexander , 15 FEP Cases
1234 (D.D.C. 1977) ............................ 9 , 19 ,20
Lawler v. A lexander , 698 F.2d 439
(11th C i r . 1983) ................................. 23
Montgomery v. Yel low Fre ight System,
671 F.2d 421 (10th C i r .
1982) ............................................................. 1 8
Newman v. P i g g i e Park E n t e r p r i s e s ,
390 U.S. 400 (1968) .......................... 18
NOW v. Bank o f C a l i f o r n i a , 680
F . 2d 1291 (9th C i r . 1982) ............ 20
Parker v. C a l i f a n o , 561 F.2d 320
(D.C. C i r . 1977) ................................. 20
Parker v. Lewis, 670 F.2d 249
(D.C. C i r . 1982) ................................. 26
Poe v. John Deere C o . , 695 F.2d
1103 (8th C i r . 1983) ........................ 18,19
Smart v. Porte r Paint Co . , 630 F.2d
490 (7th C i r . 1980) .......................... 27
v
Page
Thomas v. S e c r e ta r y o f the Navy, 15
FEP Cases 572 (D.D.C. 1977) ------ 10
Thorpe v. Housing Aurho r i t y o f
Durham, 393 U.S. 268 (1969) . . . . 24,25
Other A u t h o r i t i e s :
Memorandum from the A s s i s t a n t At
t o rney General , C i v i l D i v i s i o n
t o a l l U n i t e d S t a t e s A t t o r n e y s ,
A p r i l 14, 1 978 ............................ .. Passim
Memorandum from the A s s i s t a n t At
t o rney General , C i v i l D i v i
s i on t o a l l United S ta tes
A t t o r n e y s , A p r i l 1, 1983 . . . . . . . Passim
S c h l e i and Grossman, Employment
D is c r im i n a t i o n Law, (Second
Ed. 1983) ........................................ .. 16
- vi -
No. 83-
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1983
MARLENE GRATCHNER CLARK,
P e t i t i o n e r ,
v.
ELIZABETH HANSFORD DOLE,
S e c r e ta r y , United S ta tes
Department o f Transpor ta t i on
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
P e t i t i o n e r , by her undersigned coun
s e l , prays that a Writ o f C e r t i o r a r i i ssue
t o review the order o f the United S ta tes
C o u r t o f A p p e a l s f o r t h e D i s t r i c t o f
Columbia C i r c u i t entered on June 7, 1983,
a f f i r m i n g the order o f the d i s t r i c t c our t
awarding c o s t s aga ins t p l a i n t i f f .
2 -
OPINIONS BELOW
The d e c i s i o n o f the c our t o f appeals
i s unreported and i s s e t out at pages 1a-2a
o f the A p p e n d i x . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s
memorandum d e c i s i o n o f August 18, 1982 i s
a l s o not r ep or ted and i s s e t out at pages
3a-6a o f the Appendix. The d i s t r i c t c o u r ' t
o rder denying p e t i t i o n e r ' s Motion t o A l t e r
and Amend i t s o rder a s s e s s in g c o s t s i s not
r e p o r t e d and i s s e t ou t at pa ges 7a -9 a
o f t h e A p p e n d i x . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t s
Memorandum Opinion and Order r e l a t i n g to
the mer i t s o f the T i t l e VII c la im in t h i s
case are not r epo r te d and are se t out at
pages 10a-49a.
JURISDICTION
The judgment o f the co ur t o f appeals
was entered on June 7, 1983. J u r i s d i c t i o n
o f t h i s c ou r t i s invoked under 28 U.S.C.
§1254 ( 1 ) .
3
STATUTES, RULES and DIRECTIVES INVOLVED
28 U.S.C. 1920 p r o v i d e s :
A judge or c l e r k o f any cour t o f
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s may t a x as
c o s t s the f o l l o w i n g :
(1) Fees o f the c l e r k and
marshal ;
(2) F e e s o f t h e c o u r t
r e p o r t e r f o r a l l or any
p a r t o f t h e s t e n o
g r a p h i c t r a n s c r i p t
n e c e s s a r i l y o b t a i n e d
f o r use in the c a s e ;
(3) Fees and disbursements
f o r p r i n t i n g and w i t
nesses ;
(4) Fees f o r e x e m p l i f i c a
t i o n and c o p i e s o f
p a p e r s n e c e s s a r i l y
ob tained f o r use in the
case ;
(5) Docket f e e s under s e c
t i o n 1923 o f t h i s t i t l e ;
(6) Compensat i on o f c o u r t
appointed e x p e r t s , com
pensat i on o f i n t e r p r e
t e r s , and s a l a r i e s ,
f e e s , e x p e n s e s , and
c o s t s o f s p e c i a l i n t e r
p r e t a t i o n s e r v i c e s
under s e c t i o n 1828 o f
t h i s t i t l e .
4
A b i l l o f c o s t s s h a l l be f i l e d in
the c a s e and, upon a l l o w a n c e ,
i n c l u d e d in t h e j u d g m e n t o r
d e c r e e . (As amended O c t . 28,
1978, Pub.L. 95-539, §7, 92 S ta t .
2044. )
Rule 5 4 ( d ) , F e d . R . C i v . P r o c . , p r o v i d e s :
C os t s . Except when express p r o
v i s i o n t h e r e f o r i s made e i t h e r in
a s t a t u t e o f the United S ta te s or
in t h e s e r u l e s , c o s t s s h a l l be
al lowed as o f c ourse t o the p r e
v a i l i n g p a r t y u n l e s s the c o u r t
o t h e r w i s e d i r e c t s ; b u t c o s t s
a g a i n s t the U ni te d S t a t e s , i t s
o f f i c e r s , and agenc i es s h a l l be
i m p o s e d o n l y t o t h e e x t e n t
permi tted by law. Costs may be
taxed by the c l e r k on one d a y ' s
n o t i c e . On motion s e r v i c e d w i th
in 5 days t h e r e a f t e r , the a c t i o n
o f the c l e r k may be reviewed by
the c o u r t . (As amended Dec. 27,
1946, e f f . Mar. 19, 1948; Apr .
17, 1961, e f f . J u l y 19, 1 9 6 1 ) .
This case a l s o in v o lv e s the A p r i l 14,
1978 and A p r i l 1 , 1983 d i r e c t i v e s o f the
Department o f J u s t i c e s e t t i n g guides f o r
seeking c o s t s in f e d e r a l employee s u i t s .
Because o f t h e i r l ength they are reproduced
in Appendix I I h e r e t o , at pp. 57a-58a and
63a r e s p e c t i v e l y .
5
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. The Proceedings Below
This p e t i t i o n r a i s e s the ques t i o n o f
whether the cour t s below were c o r r e c t in
awarding c o s t s against the p e t i t i o n e r , the
p l a i n t i f f in a T i t l e VII case aga inst an
ag en c y o f the f e d e r a l gov e rn m e nt . Th i s
proceed ing was begun in 1979 through the
f i l i n g o f ad m i n i s t ra t i ve complaints charg
ing d i s c r i m i n a t i o n based on sex in v i o l a
t i o n o f S e c t i o n 717 o f the Equal Employment
Opportuni ty Act o f 1972 (42 U.S.C. §2000e-
16) .
P e t i t i o n e r i s a GS-12 c i v i l i a n em
p l oy ee o f the Federal A v i a t i o n A u t h or i t y , a
sub-agency o f the Department o f Transpor ta
t i o n . D e f e n d a n t i s t h e S e c r e t a r y o f
T r a n s p o r t a t i o n . The gravaman o f the
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n c o m p l a i n t s r e l a t e d t o a
f a i l u r e t o promote p l a i n t i f f as w e l l as
a t t e m p t s t o t a k e d i s c i p l i n a r y a c t i o n s
6
ag a i n s t her .
During the ad m i n i s t ra t i v e p r o c e s s i n g
o f the c o m p l a i n t , a c o m p l a i n t s exa miner
f r o m t h e E q u a l E mp loy m ent O p p o r t u n i t y
Commission recommended t h a t i t be f ound
t h a t p l a i n t i f f had b e e n d i s c r i m i n a t e d
a g a i n s t ; however, the agency d e c l i n e d to
f o l l o w the recommended d e c i s i o n and issued
2/
a d e c i s i o n r e j e c t i n g h e r c l a i m . A
t im e ly complaint was f i l e d in United S t a te s
D i s t r i c t Court f o r the D i s t r i c t o f Columbia
and, f o l l o w i n g d i s c o v e r y , the c a s e was
t r i e d in January, 1982.
The d i s t r i c t c o ur t i ssued a memorandum
o p i n io n r e j e c t i n g p l a i n t i f f ' s c l a ims on the
1 /
V P e t i t i o n e r a l s o c laimed a v i o l a t i o n o f
the Equal Pay Act r e l a t e d t o the f a i l u r e to
promote her .
2/ Two a g e n c y i n v e s t i g a t o r s a l s o had
recommended a f i n d i n g o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n .
F u r t h e r , the d i s c i p l i n a r y a c t i o n taken
aga in s t p e t i t i o n e r had been over turned as a
r e s u l t o f an a r b i t r a t i o n p r o c e e d i n g .
7
meri t s and ho ld ing that she had not been
d i s c r im in a te d a g a in s t . (App. 10a~49a. ) No
appeal was taken from the d e c i s i o n on the
m e r i t s , and except to the ex tent d i s cussed
below r e l a t i n g to the standard f o r a s s e s s
ing c o s t s , that d e c i s i o n i s not at i s sue in
t h i s appeal .
F o l l o w i n g the d e c i s i o n in i t s f a v o r
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , a c t i n g t h r o u g h t h e
United S ta tes A t t o r n e y ' s O f f i c e , f i l e d a
b i l l o f c o s t s in the amount o f $5 , 46 2 .2 4 ,
which inc luded $2,259 f o r d a i l y t r a n s c r i p t s
that had been ordered by the government.
At no time did the government seek c o s t s on
the ground that the a c t i o n was f r i v o l o u s ,
brought in bad f a i t h , o r f o r the purpose o f
h a ra s sm e n t . P l a i n t i f f ' s t r i a l c o u n s e l
f i l e d a motion in o p p o s i t i o n to the b i l l o f
c o s t s .
In a d d i t i o n t o o b j e c t i n g t o c e r t a i n
p o r t i o n s o f the c o s t s , p a r t i c u l a r l y the
8
c o s t o f the d a i l y t r a n s c r i p t , the motion
brought to the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s a t t e n t i o n
the f a c t that in A p r i l , 1 978, the United
S ta tes Department o f J u s t i c e had i ssued a
d i r e c t i v e to a l l United S ta te s a t t o rn eys
i n s t r u c t i n g them that in T i t l e VII cases
c o s t s would not be sought when the govern
ment p r e v a i l e d u n l e s s the s t a n d a r d s f o r
award ing a t t o r n e y s ' f e e s e s t a b l i s h e d by
t h i s c o u r t in C h r i s t i a n s b u r g G a r me n t
Company v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 ( 1978) were
met . (App. 5 8 a - 5 9 a ) . N e v e r t h e l e s s , the
d i s t r i c t c ou r t awarded c o s t s in the amount
o f $3 ,969 .25 without d i s c u s s i n g the e f f e c t
o f the Department o f J u s t i c e d i r e c t i v e . In
i t s d e c i s i o n the d i s t r i c t c o u r t s t a t e d
t h a t :
While the p l a i n t i f f ' s c la ims in
t h i s p r o c e e d i n g were c e r t a i n l y
not w e l l suppor ted , they were not
c om pl e te ly f r i v o l o u s . The Court
w i l l c r e d i t the p l a i n t i f f w i th
the assumption that she pursued
t h e l i t i g a t i o n in good f a i t h .
9
(App. 4a) . An appeal was taken from the
award o f c o s t s , and the United S ta tes Court
o f A p p e a l s f o r th e D i s t r i c t o f Columbia
C i r c u i t a f f i rmed the d e c i s i o n o f the cour t
below per curiam without a w r i t t e n op i n io n
on June 7, 1983. (App. 1a -2a ) .
2. The Hi s to ry o f the Department o f
J u s t i c e P o l i c y on Costs in T i t l e
VII c a s e s . _______________________
In 1 9 7 7 , d i f f e r e n t j u d g e s in t h e
D i s t r i c t o f C o l u m b i a i s s u e d d e c i s i o n s
r e l a t i n g to the qu es t i o n o f assessment o f
c o s t s aga inst p l a i n t i f f s in T i t l e VII in
which the U ni te d S t a t e s government had
p r e v a i l e d . In Jaspers v. A le xander , 15 FEP
Cases 1234, 1238 (D.D.C. 1977) Judge Flan
nery held t ha t , because o f the imbalance
o f r e s ou rce s between an in d iv id ua l T i t l e
V I I p l a i n t i f f and t h e f e d e r a l g o v e r n
ment, i t would be d e s t r u c t i v e o f the goal
o f encouraging the br ing ing o f T i t l e VII
l i t i g a t i o n r o u t i n e l y t o assess c o s t s aga inst
10
p l a i n t i f f s who h a v e l o s t s u c h c a s e s .
Rather , c o s t s would on ly be assessed i f a
de ter mina t i o n were made that the a c t i o n was
brought f r i v o l o u s l y and not in good f a i t h .
( Id. at 1240) . In Thomas v . S e c r e ta r y o f
the Navy, 15 FEP Cases 572 (D.D.C. 1977) ,
on the o the r hand, Judge Richey assessed
p a r t i a l c o s t s a g a i n s t a p l a i n t i f f even
though the a c t i o n had no t been b r o u g h t
f r i v o l o u s l y or in bad f a i t h .
An a p p e a l was taken in Thomas under
the spon sorsh ip o f the Washington Lawyers
Committee f o r Equal R i g h t s Under Law, a
c i v i l r i g h t s o r g a n i z a t i o n . As a r e s u l t o f
n e g o t i a t i o n s with the C i v i l D i v i s i o n o f the
United S ta tes Department o f J u s t i c e , the
appeal in Thomas was e v e n tu a l l y d i smissed
as moot by a j o i n t motion by the p a r t i e s
based on the i s suance by the C i v i l D i v i s i o n
o f a d i r e c t i v e t o a l l United S ta te s a t t o r
neys and agency coun se l . (App, pp. 50 a -
- 1 1 -
58a) . This d i r e c t i v e , which was publ i shed
and made p u b l i c k n o w l e d g e t h r o u g h i t s
appearance at CCH Fai r Employment P r a c t i c e s
1(5083 ( 1 978) (App. pp. 57a -58a ) , prov ided
that i t was the p o l i c y o f the United S ta tes
n o t t o s e e k c o s t s a g a i n s t p l a i n t i f f s
in i n d iv i d u a l T i t l e VII cases unless the
C h r i s t i a n s b u r g s t a n d a r d s were met. In
d i s c u s s i n g the reasons f o r the p o l i c y the
f o l l o w i n g p r i n c i p l e s we re s e t f o r t h .
In Chr i s t iansburg Garment Co. v .
E q u a l Em ployment Opp o r t u n i t y
Commissin, 46 U.S.L.W. 4105, 4107
(U.S. Jan. 23, 1978) , the United
S ta tes Supreme Court , in d e c l i n
ing t o a l low a t t o r n e y s ’ f e e s to
be r o u n t in e ly awarded t o p r e v a i l
i n g d e f e n d a n t s in T i t l e V I I
a c t i o n s , c h a r a c t e r i z e d the T i t l e
V I I p l a i n t i f f - e m p l o y e e as " t h e
chosen instrument o f Congress to
v i n d i c a t e ' a p o l i c y that Congress
cons idered o f the h ighe s t p r i o r
i t y ' " ( quo t ing Newman v. P ig g i e
Park E n t e r p r i s e s , 390 u .S . 400,
402 ( 1 9 6 8 ) ) . Because the T i t l e
VI I p l a i n t i f f - e m p l o y e e ap pe ar s
b e f o r e the c o u r t " c l o a k e d in a
m a n t l e o f p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , "
12
United S t a t e s , 519 F.2d 359, 364
(3d C i r . 1 9 7 5 ) , the r u l e t h a t
p r e v a i l i n g p a r t i e s g e n e r a l l y are
e n t i t l e d t o t h e c o s t s o f t h e
l a w s u i t s h o u l d no t a p p l y a u t o
m a t i c a l l y to a c t i o n s in which the
F e d e r a l Government d e f e a t s an
e m p l o y e e ' s T i t l e V I I c h a r g e o f
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . As one cour t has
s t a t e d : "The awarding o f c o s t s
t o t h e G o v e r n m e n t w h e n i t
s u c c e s s f u l l y d e f e n d s i t s e l f
aga ins t a T i t l e VII c la im should
not become a mechanical p r o c e s s
t h a t w i l l d i s c o u r a g e p o t e n t i a l
p l a i n t i f f s from pursuing deb at
able c l a i m s . " [C i t in g Jaspers v .
A le xa nd e r , sup ra . ]
* * *
A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e G o v e r n m e n t
s h o u l d no t move f o r c o s t s as a
p r e v a i l i n g d e f e n d a n t in a d i s
c r i m i n a t i o n s u i t b r o u g h t by a
f e d e r a l employee under T i t l e VII
un less any one o f the f o l l o w i n g
t h r e e c i c u m s t a n c e s i s f ound t o
e x i s t :
(1) th e p l a i n t i f f b r ou g ht
t h e a c t i o n i n b a d
f a i t h ;
(2) the p l a i n t i f f pu rsu ed
the c la im in a ha ra s s -
i n g o r v e x a t i o u s
manner;
13
(3) the p l a i n t i f f l i t i g a t e d
a c l a i m t h a t w a s
p a t e n t l y g roundless or
f r i v o l o u s .
* * *
In a p p l y i n g t h e t h i r d f a c t o r
( b a s e l e s s n e s o f the c l a i m ) , the
G o v e r n m e n t s h o u l d h e e d t h e
S u p r e m e C o u r t ' s c a u t i o n a r y
la n g u a g e in C h r i s t i a n s b u r g , 46
U.S.L.W. at 4107-08:
[ I ] t i s i m p o r t a n t t h a t a
d i s t r i c t c o u r t r e s i s t
the understandable tempta
t i o n to engage in p o s t - hoc
r e a s o n i n g by c o n c l u d i n g
t h a t , b e c a u s e a p l a i n t i f f
did not u l t i m a t e l y p r e v a i l ,
h i s a c t i o n must have been
u n r e a s o n a b l e o r w i t h o u t
f o u n d a t i o n . Th i s k ind o f
h i n d s i g h t l o g i c c o u l d
d i s c our ag e a l l but the most
a i r t i g h t c la i ms , f o r seldom
can a p r o s p e c t i v e p l a i n t i f f
be sure o f u l t imate s u c c e ss .
No matter how honest o n e ' s
b e l i e f tht he has been the
v i c t im o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , no
m a t t e r how m e r i t o r i o u s
o n e ' s c l a i m may appear at
the o u t s e t , the c o u r s e o f
l i t i g a t i o n i s r a r e l y p r e
d i c t a b l e . D e c i s i v e f a c t s
may n o t emerge u n t i l d i s
c o v e r y o r t r i a l . The law
may c h a n g e o r c l a r i f y i n
14
t h e m i d s t o f l i t i g a t i o n .
Even when t h e law o r t h e
f a c t s appear q u e s t i o n a b l e or
un favorab le at the o u t s e t , a
party may have an e n t i r e l y
r e a s o n a b l e g r o u n d f o r
b r in g in g s u i t .
(App. 5 7 a - 5 8 a . )
As noted above p l a i n t i f f ' s c oun se l in
t h i s c a s e were aware o f t h i s p o l i c y and
brought i t t o the a t t e n t i o n o f the d i s t r i c t
c o u r t . In i t s r esponse t o the Motion in
O p p o s i t i o n t o C o s t s t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
a t t o r n ey made the a s s e r t i o n that the p o l i c y
had been re s c i nd ed but prov ided no documen
t a t i o n f o r t h i s s tatement . In f a c t , the
p o l i c y was not f o r m al ly r e s c in de d by the
Department o f J u s t i c e u n t i l A p r i l 1, 1983,
a f t e r the c o s t s in the present a c t i o n had
been in curred .
The r e s c i s s i o n was taken as a r e s u l t
o f the q u e s t i o n o f c o s t s beng r a i s e d in
another a c t i o n ( i n which the undersigned
c o u n s e l f o r p e t i t i o n e r a r e i n v o l v e d ) ,
Lewis v . N a t i o n a l Labor R e l a t i o n s Board,
15
(S.D. Tex. C.A. No. 76-H-780) . In Lewis
t h e g o v e r n m e n t s o u g h t c o s t s o f o v e r
$13,000 a f t e r a d e c i s i o n in i t s f avor on
the m e r i t s o f a T i t l e VII c l a s s a c t i o n .
C o s t s w e r e o b j e c t e d t o on t h e b a s i s
o f the A p r i l , 1978 d i r e c t i v e . T h e r ea f t e r ,
on A p r i l 1 , 1 983 , a new memorandum was
i s s u e d by t h e C i v i l D i v i s i o n s t a t i n g :
As y o u a r e a w a r e , t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s , l i k e any o ther l i t i g a n t ,
i s e n t i t l e d t o r e cov er the c o s t s
o f l i t i g a t i o n under Rule 54 ( d ) ,
Federal Rules o f C i v i l Procedure.
I would l i k e t o remind you that
when the government i s c o n s i d e r
i n g m o v i n g f o r c o s t s as th e
p r e v a i l i n g defendant in l i t i g a
t i o n , d i s c r e t i o n should be e x e r
c i s e d i n d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r
f o r the assessment o f
a r e d u c t i o n in t h e
c o s t s i s appro pr ia te ,
i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o
any s e t r u l e s f o r
d e t e r m i n i n g under what c i r c u m
s t a n c e s c o s t s s h o u l d n o t be
sought , there may be c ase s , f o r
exa m pl e , when the p l a i n t i f f ' s
f i n a n a c i a l s i t u a t i o n at the time
the l t i g a t i o n was i n i t i a t e d or as
a r e s u l t o f t h e l i t i g a t i o n ,
a reques t
c o s t s o r
amount o f
A 1 t h o u g h
e s t a b l i s h
1 6
warrants a r eques t f o r a r educ
t i o n i n c o s t s o r a w a i v e r o r
c o s t s .
* * *
T h is memorandum s u p e r s e d e s the
me mo r a n d u m o f t h e A s s i s t a n t
Atto rney General , C i v i l D i v i s i o n ,
dated A p r i l 14, 1978.
(App. p. 6 4 a ) .
In an a f f i d a v i t f i l e d in Lewis the current
head o f the C i v i l D i v i s i o n i n d i c a t e d that
as l a t e as February, 1983, he had not even
been aware o f the A p r i l 14, 1978 memoran
dum. (App. pp. 60a -61a) .
Thus, i t i s c l e a r that at the time the
c o s t s were incurred in the present a c t i o n
the 1 978 d i r e c t i v e was s t i l l in f o r c e .
P e t i t i o n e r ' s c o u n s e l , as w e l l as o t h e r
members o f t h e b a r , we re awa re o f t h e
3 /
p o l i c y and were c o n d u c t i n g l i t i g a t i o n
in l i g h t o f i t .
3 / See S c h l e i and Grossman, Employment
D i s c r i m i n a t i o n Law, (S eco nd E d i t i o n ) p .
1215, n . 186 ( 1983) .
17 -
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
This Case Rai ses Important
I s sues Concerning the Standards
By Which Costs Should Be Assessed
In Favor o f the United S ta tes In
T i t l e VII Cases___________________ __
1. The Importance o f the I s s u e .
The qu e s t i o n o f the s t a n d a r d s ■govern
ing the award o f c o s t s t o a p r e v a i l i n g
defendant in a c t i o n s brought under T i t l e
VII o f the C i v i l Rights Act o f 1964, and
o ther c i v i l r i g h t s s t a t u t e s , has ye t t o be
dec ided by t h i s Court . In Chr i st iansburg
Gament Co. v . EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 ( 1978) ,
the Court held defendants should be awarded
a t t o r n e y s ' f e e s as p a r t o f t h e c o s t s
on ly i f the a c t i o n was f r i v o l o u s , p a t e n t l y
g r oun d le ss , or brought v e x a t i o u s l y or f o r
harassment. A dual standard f o r awarding
f e e s was e s t a b l i s h e d i n l i g h t o f t h e
o v e r r i d i n g purpose o f the c i v i l r i g h t s a c t s
18
o f e n c o u r a g i n g the b r i n g i n g o f p r i v a t e
l i t i g a t i o n t o e n f o r c e t h e r i g h t s t h e y
4 /
e s t a b l i s h e d .
With regard to c o s t s g e n e r a l l y , t h i s
Court has held that t h e i r g rant ing i s t o be
governed by a c o u r t ' s e q u i t a b l e d i s c r e t i o n .
See , e . g . , Del ta A ir Lines v. August , 450
U.S. 346 ( 1981) ; Farmer v. Arabian American
Oi l C o . , 379 U.S. 227 ( 1964) . Neverthe
l e s s , in a s e r i e s o f r e ce nt d e c i s i o n s the
lower c ou r t s have held that c o s t s should be
awarded to p r e v a i l i n g T i t l e VII def endants
5 /
as a m a t t e r o f c o u r s e . In a number o f
4 / Compare, Newman v. P ig g i e Park Enter
p r i s e s , 390 U.S. 400 ( 1968) .
5/ C r ok e r v . B oe in g C o . , 662 F. 2d 975
T 3 r d C i r . 1 9 8 1 ) ; A l l en v . U. S. S t e e l
C o r p . , 665 F.2d 689 (5th C i r . 1982) ; Danner
v_L_UJLSi Ci Si Ci . , 635 F . 2 d 427 ( 5 t h C i r .
1 9 8 1 ) ; Poe v . John Deere C o . , 695 F . 2d
1103 ( 8 t h C i r . 1 9 8 3 ) ; NOW v . Ba nk o f
C a l i f o r n i a , 680 F.2d 1291 (9th C i r . 1982) ;
Montgomery v . Y e l l o w Fre ight System, 671
F.2d 412 (10th C i r . 1982) .
t h e s e d e c i s i o n s the c o u r t s have d i s t i n
g u i s h e d C h r i s t i a n s b u r g as d e a l i n g wi t h
f e e s , wi thout d i s c u s s i n g how the under ly ing
p u r p o s e o f the Act t h a t r e s u l t e d in the
C h r i s t i a n s b u r g r u l e might a l s o a p p ly t o
6/
awards o f c o s t s . In o t h e r s c o s t s are
1/
s i m p l y a s s e s s e d w i t h o u t d i s c u s s i o n .
The qu e s t i o n o f the e q u i t a b l e f a c t o r s
that should be cons ide re d in awarding c o s t s
i s o f p a r t i c u l a r i m p o r t a n c e in c a s e s
in v o lv i n g the f e d e r a l government. Thus,
the problem o f d i s c ou r ag in g p r i v a t e p l a i n
t i f f s from pursuing p o s s i b l y m e r i t o r i o u s
8/
c l a i m s i s e x a c e r b a t e d b e c a u s e t h e r e i s
no p u b l i c a t t o r n e y - g e n e r a l to br ing T i t l e
- 19 -
6 / S e e , e . g . , Poe v .__John De e r e Co ,
s u p r a ; NOW v. Bank o f C a l i f o r n i a , supra .
7 / E. g . , Danner v . U . S . C . S . C . , s u p r a .
8 / See Jaspers v. A le xander , 15 FEP Cases
1234, 1238-39 (D.D.C. 1977) .
20
VII and o the r c i v i l r i g h t s a c t i o n s aga ins t
f e d e r a l ag e nc i e s . Th e r e f o r e , enforcement
depends e n t i r e l y on the w i l l i n g n e s s o f
p r i v a t e p a r t i e s t o p u rs u e t h e i r c l a i m s .
See Parker v. C a l i f a n o , 561 F.2d 320, 331
(D.C. C i r . 1977) . Another e q u i t a b l e con
s i d e r a t i o n - - the r e l a t i v e r e s o u r c e s o f
t h e p a r t i e s - - a l s o c l e a r l y m i l i t a t e s
aga in s t r o u t i n e l y as se ss in g c o s t s in fa vor
o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t wh e r e t h e p l a i n t i f f
i s o n e o f i t s own e m p l o y e e s o f m o d e s t
1 /
means.
In a d d i t i o n t o these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,
here , there i s p resent the Department o f
J u s t i c e ' s announced p o l i c y o f not seeking
c o s t s unless the Chr i s t iansburg standards
9 / See Boas Box Co. v . Proper Fo ld ing Box
Corp . , 55 F.R.D. 79, 81 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) ;
J a s p e r s v . A l e x a n d e r , s u p r a a t 1 2 4 0 ;
c f . Un i ted S t a t e s S t e e l C orp . v . Un i ted
S t a t e s , 519 F.2d 359, 363 (3rd C i r . 1975) .
But se e , Baez v. U.S. Dept, o f J u s t i c e , 684
F . 2 d 9 9 9 , 1 0 0 5 - 0 6 ( D . C . C i r . 1 9 8 2 ) ( e n
b a n c ) .
21
are met . As d e s c r i b e d in the S t a t e
ment o f t h e C a s e , £5 jj p r a , i n 1 9 7 8 , i n
se t t l ement o f the c o s t s i ssue in another
cas e , the Department o f J u s t i c e i ssued a
d i r e c t i v e s e t t i n g out that p o l i c y . I t i s
n o t o p e n t o q u e s t i o n t h a t p l a i n t i f f ' s
a t t o r n e y s knew a b o u t t h e p o l i c y a nd ,
indeed, they brought i t to the a t t e n t i o n o f
the d i s t r i c t c o u r t . T h e r e fo r e , the l i t i g a
t i o n d e c i s i o n s made by those a t t o r n e y s , as
we l l as those o f o the r a t t o rne ys invo lved
in T i t l e VII a c t i o n s aga inst the f e d e r a l
g o v e r n m e n t we re n e c e s s a r i l y made in
l i g h t o f t h e a n n o u n c e d p o l i c y o f t he
g o ve r n m en t . Eor exa mp le , a d e c i s i o n t o
c o n d u c t c e r t a i n d i s c o v e r y o r t o e v e n
proceed with an a c t i o n might be substan-
1 0 /
10/ As a l s o noted above, the government
d i d no t a rgue t h a t t h e s e s t a n d a r d s were
met in t h i s case and the c ou r t s below did
not so f i n d .
22
t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t i f c o u n s e l knew t h a t a
p l a i n t i f f , p a r t i c u l a r l y a mid or l o w - l e v e l
GS employee such as p e t i t i o n e r here , might
have t o bear s i g n i f i c a n t c o s t s as a pen a l ty
f o r having pursued her r i g h t s under T i t l e
VII .
During the f i v e y e a r s between A p r i l
1978 when the p o l i c y was anno un ce d , and
A p r i l 1983, when the p o l i c y was o f f i c i a l l y
and p u b l i c l y r e s c in d e d , there have been a
s u b s t a n t i a l number o f T i t l e VII a c t i o n s ,
both in d i v i d u a l and c l a s s , aga ins t f e d e r a l
a g e n c i e s . T h e r e f o r e , t h e q u e s t i o n o f
whether or not the 1978 d i r e c t i v e a c t s t o
e s to p the government from seeking awards o f
c o s t s i s l i k e l y t o be a r e c u r r i n g o ne .
Indeed, i t has a l ready ar i sen in two o th er
cases that c ounsel i s f a m i l i a r with and,
g iven the government ' s p resent p o l i c y o f
seeking such c o s t s w i l l c e r t a i n l y emerge in
23
a la rg e number o f o t h e r cases which have
been p r o c e e d i n g t o t r i a l o r are w a i t i n g
d e c i s i o n .
Thus, c ou ns e l , who are a s s o c i a t e d with
one o f the major c i v i l r i g h t s l i t i g a t i n g
o r g a n i z a t i o n s , have in the pas t two years
t r i e d e i gh t cases aga inst f e d e r a l govern
ment ag e nc i e s . Of the f our that have been
de c id e d , two were l o s t at the t r i a l c our t
l e v e l and in both in s ta nc es the government
sought c o s t s . In one, c o s t s were awarded
and the i s s u e i s b e f o r e the F i f t h C i r -
11/
c u i t ; in the o t h e r , a ru l i n g in favor
o f the government on another i s s ue was r e
versed on appeal and, t h e r e f o r e , the i s sue
1 2 /
o f c o s t s d i d not have t o be r e a c h e d .
1 1 / Lewi s V. N.L. R . B . , S . D . Tex. C.A. No.
76-H-780; 5th Cir . No. 83- •
1 2 / Lawler v . A l e x a n d e r , 698 F . 2d 439
(11th C i r . 1983) .
24
Thus , the i s s u e o f the p r o p e r s t a n
d a r d s f o r a w a r d i n g c o s t s i n a f e d e r a l
government t i t l e VII case i s an important
one that should be re s o l v e d by t h i s Court .
As w i l l now be shown, the f a i l u r e o f the
c o u r t s be l ow t o g i v e e f f e c t t o the 1978
d i r e c t i v e a l s o c o n f l i c t s with d e c i s i o n s o f
t h i s Court .
2. The D e c i s i o n Below Is In C o n f l i c t
With D e c i s i o n s o f This Court Re
l a t i n g to the R e t r o a c t i v e A p p l i -
c a t i o n o f Changes In the Law
In a number o f cases t h i s Court has held
that the genera l r u le in the f e d e r a l c o u r t s
i s t h a t changes in the l aw, whether by
s t a t u t e , r e g u l a t i o n , o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
d i r e c t i v e , w i l l apply to a l l cases pending
on t h e e f f e c t i v e d a t e o f t h e c h a n g e .
Thorpe v. Housing A ut ho r i ty o f Durham, 393
U.S. 268 ( 1969) ; Bradley v. Richmond School
Board, 416 U.S. 696 ( 1974) ; Hutto v . F i n n e y ,
25
437 U.S. 678 ( 1978) . However, those cases
have a l s o held that there i s an e xc e p t i o n
t o t h i s genera l r u l e ; that i s , such changes
w i l l not be app l i ed where mani fes t i n j u s
t i c e w i l l r e s u l t . Thorpe , supra . Green v .
United S t a t e s , 376 U.S. 149 ( 1964) .
P e t i t i o n e r u r g e s t h a t t h i s i s a
c l a s s i c c a s e in which such a " m a n i f e s t
i n j u s t i c e " would r e s u l t b e c a u s e o f the
r e l i a n c e o f a t t o rne ys and t h e i r c l i e n t s on
t h e p u b l i c l y a n n o u n c e d p o l i c y o f t he
government not to seek such c o s t s except
under l i m i t e d c i r cumstances . In B r ad le y ,
supra , t h i s Court i d e n t i f i e d three f a c t o r s
t o be examined in determining whether the
e x c e p t i o n a l should apply " ( a ) the nature
and i d e n t i t y o f the p a r t i e s , (b) the nature
o f t h e i r r i g h t s , and ( c ) the nature o f the
impact o f the change in law upon t h e s e
r i g h t s . " 416 U.S. at 717.
26
P l a i n t i f f s ' t r i a l a t t o r n e y s , who are
exper i en ced c i v i l r i g h t s l i t i g a t o r s (see
Parker v. Lewis , 670 F.2d 249, 250 (D.C.
C i r . 1 9 8 2 ) ) , w e r e f u l l y aware o f t h e
D e p a r t m e n t o f J u s t i c e p o l i c y a g a i n s t
a s s e s s in g c o s t s aga ins t p l a i n t i f f s un less a
case was f r i v o l o u s . P l a i n t i f f , who i s a
G S -1 2 e m p l o y e e o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t , in
pursuing her a c t i o n based on the ad v i ce o f
c ounsel t h e r e f o r e had no contempla t ion that
i f she l o s t on the m e r i t s she would be
f a c e d w i t h t h e a s s e s s m e n t o f c o s t s .
I n d e e d , q u i t e t o the c o n t r a r y , she had
every reason and r i g h t t o expec t she would
not in l i g h t o f the A p r i l 14, 1978 d i r e c
t i v e , which was not r es c inded u n t i l long
a f t e r the government ' s c o s t s were incu rre d .
T h u s , i f c o s t s a r e now a s s e s s e d
ag a i n s t her she w i l be l i a b l e because " o f
s t a n d a r d s which [ she ] p r o p e r l y b e l i e v e d
were not a p p l i c a b l e t o [her] at the time o f
27
her a c t s . " Hughes v. Heylt & Pat te rson ,
13/
I n c . , 647 F.2d 452, 454 (4th C i r . 1981) .
Having r e l i e d on the e x i s t e n c e o f the
p o l i c y and ha v in g l i t i g a t e d her c a s e in
good f a i t h i t would be c l e a r l y unjust to
impose on the p l a i n t i f f , o r indeed on any
o t h e r T i t l e V I I p l a i n t i f f s , c o s t s f o r
l i t i g a t i o n a c t i v i t i e s conducted p r i o r to
A pr i l 1, 1983, because o f the unannounced
u n i l a t e r a l a c t i o n o f the government. This
type o f " sandbagging" would be both unjust
and in e q u i t a b l e and pr ov id e s p r e c i s e l y the
t y p e o f e x c e p t i o n t o t h e g e n e r a l r u l e
r e g a r d i n g the a s s e s s m e n t o f c o s t s which
r e q u i r e s the r e v e r a l o f the d e c i s i o n o f
the c ou r t s below.
1 3/ S ee a l s o I o w a P u b l i c S e r v i c e C o .
v- I . C . C . , 643 F. 2d 542 (8th C i r . 1981) ;
Smart v. P or t e r Paint C o . , 630 F.2d 490,
497 ( 7 t h C i r . 1 9 8 0 ) ; I a P o we r & L i g h t
Co. v. Bur l ing ton Northern, I n c . , 647 F.2d
796, 806 (8th C i r . 1981 ) .
28
C O N C L U S I O N
For the f o r e g o in g reasons , the p e t i
t i o n f o r a w r i t o f c e r t i o r a r i s h o u l d
be granted and the d e c i s i o n o f the cour t
below should be reversed .
R e s p e c t f u l l y submitted,
JACK GREENBERG *
CHARLES STEPHEN RALSTON
GAIL J. WRIGHT
Sui te 2030
10 Columbus C i r c l e
New York, New York 10019
(212) 585-8397
Counsel f o r P e t i t i o n e r s
*
Counsel o f Record
APPENDIX I
De c i s i o n s o f the Courts Below
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS,
June 7, 1983
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the D i s t r i c t o f Columbia C i r c u i t
No. 82-2249
MARLENE GRATCHNER CLARK,
App e l l an t ,
v.
ELIZABETH HANSFORD Dole ,
S ec r e ta ry o f Tra nspor ta t i on
Appeal from the United S ta tes D i s t r i c t Court
f o r the D i s t r i c t o f Columbia
F i l e d June 7, 1983
B e fo re : Wilkey and Mikva, C i r c u i t Judges,
and McNicho ls ,* Senior D i s t r i c t
Judge, United S ta tes D i s t r i c t
Court f o r the D i s t r i c t o f Idaho
jV S i t t i n g by d e s ig n a t i o n pursuant t o 28
U.S.C. § 294 (d ) .
2a
JUDGMENT
ORDERED and ADJUGED, by t h i s C o u r t ,
t h a t the judgment o f the D i s t r i c t Cour t
a p p e a l e d f r o m in t h i s c a u s e i s h e r e b y
a f f i r m e d . I t i s
FURTHER ORDERED, by t h i s C o u r t , sua
r t h a t t h e C l e r k s h a l l w i t h h o l d
i ssuance o f the mandate here in u n t i l seven
d a y s a f t e r d i s p o s i t i o n o f any t i m e l y
p e t i t i o n f o r r ehear ing . See Local Rule 14,
as amended on November 30, 1981 , and June
15, 1982.
Per Curiam
/ s /
George A. F isher
Clerk
3a
ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT,
Aug. 18, 1982.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
No. 80-1636
MA RLE NE G . C L A R K ,
P l a i n t i f f ,
v.
ANDREW L. LEWIS, JR. ,
S e c r e t a r y , Department o f
Transpor ta t i on
F i l e d , Aug. 18, 1982
ORDER AND JUDGMENT FOR COSTS
The Court d i smissed t h i s a c t i o n with
p r e j u d i c e by a Memorandum Opinion entered
March 1, 1982, f i n d i n g t h a t p l a i n t i f f ,
Mar lene C l a r k , had f a i l e d t o p r o v e her
c la im o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n under T i t l e VII o f
the C i v i l Rights Act o f 1964, and the Equal
Pay Act o f 1963. P l a i n t i f f now opposes a
4a
b i l l o f c o s t s submitted by the defendant in
the t o t a l amount o f $ 5 ,4 6 2 . 24 . The b i l l
o f c o s t s in c ludes cour t r e p o r t e r charges
f o r p o r t i o n s o f t r a n s c r i p t s n e c e s s a r i l y
ob ta ined and used by the defendant during
the t r i a l , f e e s f o r w i t n e s s e s , and d e p o s i
t i o n c o s t s .
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) g i v e s the Court
d i s c r e t i o n in a l l owing c o s t s to the p r e
v a i l i n g pa r ty . In e x e r c i s i n g such d i s c r e
t i o n , the Cour t n o t e s t h a t C o n g r e s s i n
tended T i t l e VII pr oc ee d in gs to a c t as a
v e h i c l e in e l i m in at in g d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in
employment and t h a t c h a r g i n g l i t i g a t i o n
c o s t s may d i s courage l i t i g a n t s from b r i n g
ing m er i t o r i o u s c la ims . While the p l a i n
t i f f ' s c la ims in t h i s proceed ing were c e r
t a i n l y not we l l suppor ted , they were not
c o m p l e t e l y f r i v o l o u s . The C o u r t w i l l
c r e d i t the p l a i n t i f f with the assumption
t h a t she pursued the l i t i g a t i o n in good
5a
f a i t h .
A f t e r c a r e f u l l y r ev i ewing the b i l l o f
c o s t s , the Court c onc ludes that t r a n s c r i p t
c o s t s were r e a s o n a b l e s i n c e the r e c o r d
shows t h a t t he y were used by c o u n s e l in
t h e i r f i n a l a rgu men ts . S i m i l a r l y , the
c o s t s i n c i d e n t to the taking o f d e p o s i t i o n s
we re n e c e s s a r y t o t h e d e f e n s e o f t h i s
l i t i g a t i o n . However, the Court f i n d s the
i t e m i z e d f e e s f o r t h e two g o v e r n m e n t
w itnesses e x c e s s i v e . Theodore Robinson, a
g o v e r n m e n t e m p l o y e e f r o m New Y o r k who
sat with de fense counse l throughout the 11
day t r i a l , l i s t e d e x p e n s e s f o r 16 d a y s .
Brian V incent , a government wi tness a l so
f rom New Y ork , l i s t e d e x p e n s e s f o r s i x
d a y s . These e x p e n s e s are e x c e s s i v e and
they should be d i s a l l o w e d . A l l o th e r c o s t s
are f a i r and reaso na b le .
A c c o r d i n g l y , i t i s t h i s 18th day o f
August, 1982,
6a
ORDERED t h a t the C l e r k o f the Cour t
s h a l l tax c o s t s a g a i n s t the p l a i n t i f f ,
Marlene Clark, in the f u l l sum o f $3 ,969 .25
c o v e r i n g the c o u r t r e p o r t e r c h a r g e s and
c o s t s i n c i d e n t t o the t a k i n g o f d e p o s i
t i o n s . A l l o ther c o s t s reques ted by the
d e f e n d a n t are d e n i e d . The judgment f o r
c o s t s in the amount o f $3 ,969 .25 i s entered
a g a i n s t t h e p l a i n t i f f M a r l e n e C l a r k .
/ s / Barr ington D. Parker
Barr ington D. Parker
United S ta tes D i s t r i c t Judge
7a
ORDER OF DISTRICT COURT, Sept . 9, 1982
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
No. 80-1636
MARLENE G. CLARK,
P l a i n t i f f ,
v.
DREW LEWIS,
S e c r e ta r y , Department o f
Tra nspor ta t i on
F i l ed Sept . 9, 1982
O R D E R
The Court has cons idered p l a i n t i f f ' s
Motion t o A l t e r or Amend, the Memorandum o f
Po in ts and A u t h o r i t i e s in Support t h e r e o f ,
t h e O p p o s i t i o n o f t h e G o v e r n m e n t , t h e
C o u r t ' s Memorandum O p i n i o n and Order o f
March 1, 1 9 8 2 , and t h e e n t i r e r e c o r d
h e r e in , and determines that the p l a i n t i f f ' s
8a
m o t i o n i s w i t h o u t m e r i t and s h o u l d be
denied.
In awarding c o s t s under Rule 54(d) o f
the Federal Rules o f C i v i l Procedure , the
c o n t r o l l i n g f a c t o r i s whether the t r a n
s c r i p t s o f d e p o s i t i o n and t r i a l t est imony
were used by the p r e v a i l i n g party in the
p a r t i c u l a r c a s e . Here , the Government
p r e v a i l e d on the m e r i t s , and, as the re cord
shows, used the t r a n s c r i p t s in the prepara
t i o n and p r e s e n t a t i o n o f i t s c a s e . The
f a c t that the p l a i n t i f f never u t i l i z e d the
t r a n s c r i p t s has no e f f e c t on the tax ing o f
c o s t s aga ins t the p l a i n t i f f . See Sun S h i p ,
Inc , v. Lehman, 655 F.2d 1311 (D.C. C i r .
1 9 8 1 ) ; Marco in, Inc , v . Edwin K. Wi l l iams
and Company, I n c . , 88 F .R .D . . 588 (E.D. Va.
1980) .
Based on the f o r e g o i n g i t i s , t h i s 9th
day o f September, 1982,
9a
O R D E R E D t h a t p l a i n t i f f ' s M o t i o n t o
A l t e r o r A m e n d b e , a n d t h e s a m e h e r e b y i s ,
d e n i e d .
/ s / B a r r i n g t o n D , P a r k e r
B a r r i n g t o n D . P a r k e r
U n i t e d S t a t e s D i s t r i c t J u d g e
O P I N I O N OF D I S T R I C T COURT ON THE M E R I T S
M a r . 1 , 1982
U N I T E D S T A T E S D I S T R I C T COURT
FOR THE D I S T R I C T OF C O L U M B I A
C i v i l Ac t i on N o . 80-1636
MARLENE C L A R K ,
P l a i n t i f f ,
v.
DREW L E W I S ,
D e f e n d a n t .
F i l ed March 1, 1982
MEMORANDUM OPINION
INTRODUCTION
In t h i s proceeding Ms. Marlene Clark
charges the Department o f T ran sp or ta t i on
and i t s agents with sex d i s c r i m i n a t i o n and
a c t s o f harassment and r e p r i s a l e x e r c i s e d
aga in s t her as we l l as f a i l i n g t o pay her
11a
equal compensation during her employment at
the Federal A v i a t i on Adm in i s t ra t i on (FAA),
a component o f the Department. She c laims
that her r i g h t s as a f e d e r a l employee were
v i o l a t e d u n d e r T i t l e V I I o f t h e C i v i l
Rights Act o f 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e -16 e t s e q . and the Equal Pay Ac t ,
29 U . S . C . ; § 2 1 6 ( d ) .
On S e p t e m b e r 5 , 1 9 7 6 , p l a i n t i f f
commenced employment w i th the FAA as a
GS-7 t r a in e e a v i a t i o n s a f e t y i n s p e c t o r in
t h e G e n e r a l A v i a t i o n D i s t r i c t O f f i c e ,
F l i g h t S t a n d a r d s D i v i s i o n B a l t i m o r e ,
M a r y l a n d . On A p r i l 2 4 , 1 9 7 7 , s he was
t r a n s f e r r e d t o th F l i g h t Standards D i s t r i c t
O f f i c e at Washington N a t i o n a l A i r p o r t .
The f u n c t i o n s o f t h a t o f f i c e were l a t e r
t r a n s f e r r e d t o D u l l e s I n t e r n a t i o n a l
A i r p o r t . On September 11, 1977, she was
promoted t o the GS-9 l e v e l . On September
10, 1978, she was promoted t o the GS-11
1 2a
l e v e l . She r e c e i v e d a promotion t o a GS-12
p o s i t i o n in e a r l y 1981.
The p l a i n t i f f ' s sex d i s c r i m i n a t i o n and
E q u a l Pay A c t c l a i m s a r o s e a f t e r h e r
t r a n s f e r from the Bal t imore to the Washing
t o n D i s t r i c t O f f i c e . She p o i n t s t o a
one-day suspens ion, her f a i l u r e t o r e c e i v e
a GS-12 promotion b e f o r e March, 1981, and
o t he r ac t s o f her s u p e rv i so r s as ev idence
o f sex d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . She c la ims that she
performed work at a GS-12 l e v e l f o r s e v e r a l
years but was on ly paid at a GS-1 1 l e v e l ,
a l l in v i o l a t i o n o f the Equal Pay A c t .
The proc eed in gs were heard without a
ju r y over a p e r i o d o f 11 days. The Court
has c o n s i d e r e d t h e o r a l t e s t i m o n y and
d o c u m e n t a r y e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d by t h e
p a r t i e s . There were sharp c o n f l i c t s in
t e s t i m o n y and th e Cour t has we i gh ed and
assessed the c r e d i b i l i t y o f the p l a i n t i f f ,
h e r v a r i o u s w i t n e s s s and t h e s e v e r a l
p e r s o n s t e s t i f y i n g f o r t h e FAA. The
v a r i o u s memoranda o f c o u n s e l and t h e i r
f i n a l w r i t t e n submissions have a l so been
c on s id er ed .
The Court c onc ludes that Ms. Clark has
f a i l e d to su s t a i n her burden o f showing a
v i o l a t i o n o f e i t h e r T i t l e VII or the Equal
Pay A c t . The c l e a r p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f
test imony demonstrates that the p l a i n t i f f
was not d i s c r im in a te d aga ins t because o f
her sex and that she does not have a v a l i d
Equal Pay Act c l a i m . A c c o r d i n g l y , her
c la ims should be denied and her complaint
d i smissed .
In accordance with Rule 5 2 ( a ) , Fed. R.
C i v . P . , the Cour t e n t e r s the f o l l o w i n g
f i n d i n g s o f f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s o f law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
W h e n t h e p l a i n t i f f w a s h i r e d a s a
t r a i n e e a v i a t i o n s a f e t y i n s p e c t o r i n
- 1 3 a -
14a
S e p t e m b e r , 1 9 7 6 , t h e FAA was a c t i v e l y
engaged in e f f o r t s to in c r e as e i t s mi nor i t y
e m p l o y m e n t o f s a f e t y i n s p e c t o r s . New
employees were g e n e r a l l y r e c r u i t e d e i t h e r
from a c i v i l s e r v i c e r e g i s t e r o f e l i g i b l e s
on which few, i f any, women were l i s t e d , or
from the ranks o f government workers found
t o be q u a l i f i e d . P l a i n t i f f ' s a p p l i c a t i o n
was submitted t o the FAA Eastern Regional
O f f i c e by Mr. C l i f f o r d Schum, an adminis
t r a t i v e a s s i s t a n t to J e f f Cochran, deputy
admi n i s t ra tor o f the FAA. Although Schum
represented that the p l a i n t i f f d id not meet
a l l q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , the FAA was eager to
show i t s good f a i t h e f f o r t s toward mi nor i t y
h i r i n g .
T h e R e g i o n a l O f f i c e o f f i c i a l i m m e d i
a t e l y i n v o l v e d i n h e r h i r i n g w a s M r . B r i a n
V i n c e n t , C h i e f o f t h e F l i g h t S t a n d a r d s
D i v i s i o n f o r t h e R e g i o n . V i n c e n t c o n f i r m e d
S c h u m ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s a s t o t h e p l a i n
1 5a
t i f f ' s l i m i t e d q u a l i f i c a t i o n s and e x p e r i
e n c e . She was no t on the r e g i s t e r and
whi le employed in government s e r v i c e , she
did not meet the b a s i c q u a l i f i c a t i o n s o f
a r e gu la r s a f e t y i n s p e c t o r . Nor did she
meet the minimum standards o f f l i g h t time
re qu i red by the FAA. Her exper i ence was
a l s o l i m i t e d as to the type o f a i r c r a f t she
had f l own , r e s t r i c t e d l a r g e l y to pr imary-
t y pe r a t h e r than a c o m p l e x - t y p e o f a i r
p lane . She was a l s o l i m i t e d in her years
o f ex p e r i e n ce .
Based on her c r e d e n t i a l s , Ms. Clark
was a p p o i n t e d t o a t e m p o r a r y o n e - y e a r
GS-7 t r a i n i n g p o s i t i o n . A c c o r d i n g t o
V in cen t , the Eastern Region had adopted a
v i a b l e a f f i r m a t i v e a c t i o n p r o g r a m and
de s i r e d t o make pr ogr es s in the employment
o f m in or i t y and female s a f e t y i n s p e c t o r s .
The p l a i n t i f f a f f o r d e d such an o pp or t un i t y .
She was f i r s t ass igned t o the B a l t i
- 1 6a -
more D i s t r i c t O f f i c e o p e r a t i n g f rom the
B a l t i m o r e - F r i e n d s h i p A i r p o r t . S h o r t l y
a f t e r the assignment, she expressed s ev e r a l
areas o f d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n : her n o n - i n v o l v e
ment in a f u l l range o f p r o d u c t i v e and
i n t e r e s t i n g a c t i v i t i e s t h a t s he f e l t
c a p a b l e o f h a n d l i n g , l a c k o f t r a i n i n g
o p p o r t u n i t i e s , and d i f f e r e n c e s w i th her
s u p e r v i s o r s . At the same t ime, p l a i n t i f f ' s
s u p e r v i s o r s c o m p la i n e d g e n e r a l l y o f her
a t t i t u d e toward d i r e c t i o n and g u i d a n c e .
Fol lowing a meeting at the Regional O f f i c e
in New York, and in an e f f o r t t o r e s o l v e
t h e p r o b l e m s o f h e r e m p l o y m e n t in t h e
Bal t imore O f f i c e , Ms. Clark was t r a n s f e r r e d
in A p r i l , 1977 t o the Washington D i s t r i c t
O f f i c e .
Mr. Mi l ton Gunther served as Chie f o f
the Washington D i s t r i c t O f f i c e from 1972
t o Ju ly , 1979. When p l a i n t i f f was t ra n s
f e r r e d , Gunther was her Chie f and second
17a
l i n e s u p e r v i s o r . He de l e ga te d her immedi
ate s u p e r v i s i o n to Mr. Theodore Robinson.
She worked under R o b i n s o n ' s s u p e r v i s i o n
from A p r i l , 1977 u n t i l S e p t e m b e r , 1980,
when he ac cepted an assignment with the PAA
in the New York C i t y area.
W h i l e R o b i n s o n was d e s i g n a t e d as
p l a i n t i f f ' s i m m e d i a t e s u p e r v i s o r , she
f r e q u e n t l y d i s c u s s e d her work assignments
and d u t i e s with Gunther ra the r than with
R o b i n s o n . T h i s was t r u e e v e n t h o u g h
Gunther c l e a r l y s p e l l e d out the chain o f
s u p e rv i s i o n to her on many o c c a s i o n s . He
t e s t i f i e d that a f t e r a whi le i t was obv ious
that she avoided and r e s i s t e d su p er v i s i o n
f r o m R o b i n s o n . I n d e e d , G u n t h e r n o t e d
that there were o c c a s i o n s when she would
not even ac cept h i s s u p e rv i s i o n but would
i n s i s t upon h i s c a l l i n g t h e New York
Regional O f f i c e . As he put i t , she wanted
to hear from a h igher a u th o r i ty and would
18a
not ac cept h i s word. This was a f r equent
o c cur re nce and i t was not even unusual f o r
her t o c a l l the R e g i o n a l O f f i c e on her
own.
Gunther t e s t i f i e d t o var i ou s in s ta nc es
o f the p l a i n t i f f ' s d i s r u p t i v e b e h a v i o u r
which bordered on in su b or d i n a t i o n . While
he was hard p r e s s e d t o s u p p l y s p e c i f i c
examples o f such conduct , he had no doubt
that they o c curred and commented that they
s tood out " l i k e a sore thumb." The Court
a c ce pt s hi s test imony as c r e d i b l e . More
o v e r , i t was c o r r o b o r a t e d by o t h e r w i t
n e s s e s who w o r k e d w i t h t h e p l a i n t i f f .
At t h i s t i m e , t h e p l a i n t i f f h e l d
e i t h e r a GS-7 or GS-9 p o s i t i o n and Gunther,
a GS-14 o r GS-15. He exp la ined the reason
f o r a l l o w i n g t h e p l a i n t i f f t o i g n o r e
s u p e rv i s i o n and to take such l a t i t u d e was
the e x p r e s s e d d e s i r e o f the E a s t e r n Re
g i o n a l o f f i c i a l s t o extend a l l e f f o r t s to
19a
r e s o l v e a d i f f i c u l t s i t u a t i o n . This was
not unreasonable s in ce Ms. Clark was the
f i r s t female i n s p e c t o r h i re d .
The A l l eg ed T i t l e VII V i o l a t i o n s
P l a i n t i f f c laimed a v i o l a t i o n o f her
T i t l e V I I r i g h t s b a s e d upon a o n e - d a y
s u s p e n s i o n i n J u l y , 1 9 7 9 , h e r f a i l u r e
t o be p r o m o t e d t o a G S - 1 2 j o u r n e y m a n
l e v e l in S e p t e m b e r , 1 979 , and o t h e r
i n c i d e n t s , such as her d e t a i l t o Washington
h e a d q u a r t e r s in June , 1980. The Cour t
f i n d s t h a t the p l a i n t i f f has f a i l e d t o
e s t a b l i s h s u f f i c i e n t s u p p o r t f o r t h e s e
c l a i m s . In a d d i t i o n , the d e f e n d a n t has
c l e a r l y e x p l a i n e d the r e a s o n s f o r t h e s e
a c t i o n s , which are v a l i d and non d i s c r imina -
t o r y .
The o n e - d a y s u s p e n s i o n was based on
three s p e c i f i c a t i o n s : (1) f a i l u r e to f o l l o w
orders with regard t o a Jack King i n c i d e n t ;
20a
(2) f a i l u r e to f o l l o w FAA procedures and
r e g u l a t i o n s in handl ing airmen c e r t i f i c a
t i o n f i l e s ; and (3 ) making an un founded
p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t a b o u t a c o - w o r k e r .
P l a i n t i f f ' s s u p e r v i s o r , Theodore Robinson,
i n i t i a t e d t h e s u s p e n s i o n a c t i o n . The
t e s t i m o n y showed t h a t a f t e r c o u n s e l l i n g
s e s s i o n s w i th Ms. C l a r k , the a c t i o n was
f i l e d because o f her c ont inua l c ourse o f
conduct as w e l l as s p e c i f i c ins tan ce s where
she f a i l e d t o f o l l o w i n s t r u c t i o n s or a c cept
s u p e r v i s i o n . The re cord r e f l e c t s a pa t te rn
o f s u c h a t t i t u d e s and c o n d u c t on h e r
p a r t .
A s t o t h e J a c k K i n g i n c i d e n t , p l a i n
t i f f c o n t e n d e d t h a t s h e d i d n o t f a i l t o
f o l l o w i n s t r u c t i o n s b e c a u s e n o n e w e r e
g i v e n . H e r t e s t i m o n y w a s d i r e c t l y c o n t r a
d i c t e d b y M r . J o h n C r o u s e , h e r p r e s e n t
s u p e r v i s o r , w h o w a s a c t i n g s u p e r v i s o r a t
C r o u s e s t a t e d t h a t a l t h o u g h h ethe t ime.
21a
was unaware o f R ob in so n ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s to
Clark at the time he o r i g i n a l l y spoke with
h e r , s he l a t e r a d m i t t e d t h a t R o b i n s o n
had g iven her i n s t r u c t i o n s . The p l a i n t i f f
could pr ov i de no p l a u s i b l e exp lanat i on f o r
the d i s c r ep an cy between her test imony and
t h a t o f C r o u s e . The Cour t r e j e c t s her
t est imony in t h i s r egard.
As t o the second reason under ly ing the
suspens ion , Clark attempted t o show that
male in s p e c t o r s committed s i m i l a r e r r o r s
without reprimand. But such an exp lanat i on
misses the p o i n t and i s i r r e l e v a n t . The
p l a i n t i f f was not suspended simply because
she made one e r r o r on an airman c e r t i f i
c a t e , b u t f o r a s e r i e s o f m i s t a k e s in
handl ing the f i l e s and f o r o ther s im i la r
c o n d u c t . T h e r e i s no e v i d e n c e in t h e
re cord showing that male i n s p e c t o r s engaged
in a r epeated course o f conduct comparable
t o h e r s , namely, f a i l i n g t o f o l l o w i n s t r u c
22a
t i o n s and FAA p r o c e d u r e s and r e s i s t i n g
s u p er v i so r y guidance . In f a c t , the e v i
dence i s q u i t e t o the co nt ra ry .
Ms. C l a r k a r g u e d t h a t t h e t h i r d
s p e c i f i c a t i o n was a l s o i n a p p r o p r i a t e
b e c a u s e the e m p l o y e e , Roger B o g g s , had
c o n t r i b u t e d t o the pr o b l e m a t i s s u e and
b e c a u s e her s t a t e m e n t about him was no t
w i t h o u t f o u n d a t i o n . R o b i n s o n t e s t i f i e d
that he cons idered p l a i n t i f f ' s s tatement
u n f o u n d e d b e c a u s e B o g g s had n o t b e e n
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the m a t t e r in q u e s t i o n .
H is t e s t i m o n y was s u p p o r t e d by o t h e r
c r e d i b l e e v i d e n c e . He a l s o n o t e d t h a t
B o g g s had b e e n t h e f r e q u e n t v i c t i m o f
o f f i c e r i d i c u l e and that the p u b l i c s t a t e
ment made by Ms. C la r k at the t ime was
i n a p p r o p r i a t e and u n f a i r . The C o u r t
a c ce pt s R ob i nson ' s view o f the i n c i d e n t .
Ms. Clark and her counsel make much o f
t h e f a c t t h a t t h e o n e - d a y s u s p e n s i o n
23a
d e c i s i o n o f the agen cy was s u b s e q u e n t l y
o v e r r u l e d by an a r b i t r a t i o n award under
union gr i eva nce procedures . But her r e l i
ance upon the a r b i t r a t i o n award i s m i s
p lace d and in a p p ro p r i a t e . The i s sue o f sex
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n was never present and was
not argued in the a r b i t r a t i o n proce ed in g .
The i s s u e t h e r e was whether the ag ency
a c t i o n conformed to the requirements o f the
union c o n t r a c t . The suspension was o v e r
t u r n e d b e c a u s e the s p e c i f i c a t i o n s were
found inadequate and because o f the de lay
b e t w e e n t h e p a r t i c u l a r e v e n t s and t h e
subsequent agency a c t i o n .
Mr. V i n c e n t i n d i c a t e d t h a t he c o n
s u l t e d with the FAA Labor R e la t i o n s s e c t i o n
o f t h e P e r s o n n e l D e p a r t m e n t b e f o r e he
proceeded with the suspension n o t i f i c a t i o n .
He t e s t i f i e d that he reviewed and d i s cu ss ed
the three suspension s p e c i f i c a t i o n s with
both the p l a i n t i f f and Robinson and con-
24a
eluded that the a c t i o n was j u s t i f i e d . He
no t e d t h a t , in v i ew o f the p l a i n t i f f ' s
c ont inu ing problems, the proposed a c t i o n
was an ap propr ia te means o f ad v i s in g her
that a c ce pt in g s u p e rv i s i o n was an important
part o f o f f i c e procedure and that s u p e r v i
so ry i n s t r u c t i o n s were necessary t o a ch ieve
the o b j e c t i v e s o f d a y - t o -d a y o p e r a t i o n s in
an o r d e r l y and e f f i c i e n t manner.
The a r b i t r a t i o n p r o c e e d i n g was c o n
cerned with whether there was "good cause"
f o r d i s c i p l i n a r y a c t i o n under the c o l l e c
t i v e bargaining agreement. In t h i s T i t l e
VII pr oc ee d i n g , the concern i s whether Ms.
Clark was t rea ted d i f f e r e n t l y because o f
her sex . A f i n a l and important p o i n t t o be
noted i s that the a r b i t r a t i o n pr oceed ing
e m b r a c e d o n l y one day o f t e s t i m o n y as
c o m p a r e d t o t h e more t ha n 10 d a y s o f
t est imony in t h i s proceeding where the f u l l
range o f f a c t s r e l a t i n g t o the p l a i n t i f f
25a
and her c la imss were thoroughly explored
and presented through e x t en s iv e t est imony .
The second prong o f C l a r k ' s T i t l e VII
c laim i s her f a i l u r e t o be recommended f o r
and t o s e c u r e a p r o m o t i o n in Se pt e mb e r ,
1979 t o a GS-12 journeyman p o s i t i o n . At
the t ime, Robinson was s t i l l her immediate
s u p e r v i s o r and Gunther was C h i e f o f the
W a s h i n g t o n D i s t r i c t O f f i c e . G u n t h e r
was r ep la ce d by Mr. George Coen, a l s o a
t r i a l w i t ne s s . Soon a f t e r Coen a r r iv e d ,
p l a i n t i f f c o n f e f e r r e d w i th him about a
promotion. Coen advised her that she could
not be promoted from a GS-11 s l o t u n t i l the
s l o t was upgraded which he intended t o do.
Contrary t o the p l a i n t i f f ' s a ccount , he did
not t e l l her that she would be promoted to
the p o s i t i o n when i t was f i n a l l y c l ea re d
but r a t he r that she would be promoted when
and i f her immediate s u p e rv i so r recommended
such a c t i o n . The GS-12 s l o t was l a t e r
26a
o f f i c i a l l y approved through r e gu la r pers on
n e l and b u d g e t a r y a c t i o n s . H o w e v e r ,
when Coen d i s c us se d the p l a i n t i f f ' s promo
t i o n w i th R o b i n s o n , she was no t r e co m
mended. The ba s i s reasons f o r R ob i ns on ' s
d e c i s i o n was the p l a i n t i f f ' s deportment ,
c onduc t , a t t i t u d e and per formance.
Mr. R o b i n s o n ' s e v a l u a t i o n o f t h e
p l a i n t i f f was n o t u n s u p p o r t e d . Coen
o f f e r e d co nv inc ing test imony based on h i s
p e r s o n a l o b s e r v a t i o n s , kn owled ge o f the
p l a i n t i f f ' s i n t e r a c t i o n with her immediate
s u p e r v i s o r , i n c l u d i n g bo t h R o b i n s o n and
Crouse, and h i s own immediate c o n t a c t s with
the p l a i n t i f f . He t e s t i f i e d that Clark had
a poor a t t i t u d e , r e s i s t e d s u p e r v i s i o n , was
argumentative beyond reason and o therwise
caused unnecessary problems. During the
course o f h i s d i r e c t and c r o s s examinat ion,
Coen recounted var i ou s ep i sod es and events
t o support h i s s tatements .
27a
A t h i r d i n c i d e n t r e l i e d upon by the
p l a i n i t f f t o support her sex d i s c r i m i n a t i o n
c la im i s her four-month temporary d e t a i l
beginning in June, 1980 t o the p r i n c i p a l
o f f i c e o f the FAA. P l a i n t i f f c o n t e n d e d
that the d e t a i l was a r e t a l i a t o r y measure
t r i g g e r e d by her d i s c r i m i n a t i o n charges and
a l s o s e r v e d as a p r e t e x t f o r f a i l i n g t o
pro mo te her t o the GS-12 l e v e l . C la rk
c la ims that she o b j e c t e d t o the d e t a i l and
that Vincent and management denied her the
r i g h t to be represented by counsel at the
m ee t i n g when the d e c i s i o n r e g a r d i n g the
d e t a i l was made.
The Cour t f i n d s t h a t the t e s t i m o n y
s i m p l y d o e s n o t s u p p o r t any o f t h e s e
charges . There was c r e d i b l e ev idence from
B r i an V i n c e n t and George Coen as t o why
such a meeting was c o n s id e r e d , namely, to
a l l e v i a t e a tense and worsening s i t u a t i o n
i n v o lv i n g the p l a i n t i f f in the Washington
28a
D i s t r i c t O f f i c e . V i n c e n t ' s t e s t i m o n y
c l e a r l y showed that the pr opo sa l was not a
d i s c i p l i n a r y a c t i o n . The reasons f o r the
d e t a i l were f u l l y exp l ianed t o Ms. Clark in
an open meeting. She did r a i s e q u e s t i o n s ,
but her expressed concerns d e a l t with the
o p p o r t u n i t i e s i t w o u l d a f f o r d and t h e
n a t u r e o f h e r a s s i g n m e n t s d u r i n g t h e
d e t a i l . While she did f i l e a d i s c r i m i n a
t i o n complaint s h o r t l y a f t e r she was on the
assignment, she nonethe less acknowledged at
the t r i a l that she sought an ex t en s i o n o f
the temporary d e t a i l upon i t s c o n c l u s i o n .
Beyond t h i s , however, i t i s noted that FAA
r e g u l a t i o n s provided f o r reass ignment o f
personnel when an employee was unable to
perform e f f e c t i v e l y in h i s immediate work
s i t u a t i o n . C l a r k ' s reassignment compl ied
with the r e g u l a t i o n in a l l r e s p e c t s . I t
d id not r e s u l t in a r ed uc t i on in rank or
c o m p e n s a t i o n . Nor was i t " a r b i t r a r y ,
- 29a
c a p r i c i o u s , or unreasonable [but] based on
sound managerial p r i n c i p l e s " (Pi . e x . 198;
Department o f T ra ns por ta t i on R e gu l a t i o n s ,
Par t 99 , Employee R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and
Conduct , Chap. 3, Par 64, page 19) .
T h e o d o r e R o b i n s o n s e r v e d as the
p l a i n t i f f ' s immediate s u p e r v i s o r f o r a
l on ger pe r i o d than any o t h e r , from A p r i l ,
1977 through the summer o f 1980. There
a f t e r Crouse became her immediate super
v i s o r . R ob i nson ' s test imony showed Clark
unreasonably ques t i oned and cha l l enged h i s
s u p e r v i s i o n and argued f r e q u e n t l y about
how assignments should be performed. She
was at t imes in subord inate and her per form
ance was unsteady and e r r a t i c . He r e l a t e d
i n c i d e n t s t o support h i s s ta tements , as did
o ther w i t n es s es . His attempts t o c ounsel
p l a i n t i f f d id not r e s u l t in any changes on
her p a r t . During h i s t est imony he r e f e r r e d
t o the above FAA r e g u l a t i o n s which a l s o
30a
provided that an employee should "Respond
p r o m p t l y t o d i r e c t i o n s and i n s t r u c t i o n s
r e c e i v e d from h i s s u p e r v i s o r . . . [and]
e x e r c i s e c o ur te s y and t a c t in de a l in g with
f e l l o w wo rke rs . . . . ( P i . e x . 198; Ch. 2
Rules o f Conduct, Chap. 2, Par 22c, d, page
5 ) .
Throughout h i s s u p e r v i s i o n , Robinson
e x h i b i t e d pa t i enc e and f o r b e a r a n c e , t r e a te d
Clark with r es p ec t and d e a l t with her in
the same manner as the o ther i n s p e c t o r s he
superv i sed . He showed no type o f b ia s or
animus toward her.
The Court f i n d s that he was j u s t i f i e d
in h i s d e c i s i o n not t o recommend her f o r
p r o m o t i o n and h i s b e l i e f t h a t she c o u l d
no t u n d e r ta k e the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s o f a
GS-12 journeyman.
Crouse was an i n s p e c t o r in the Washing
t o n D i s t r i c t O f f i c e b e f o r e he bec am e
p l a i n t i f f ' s s u p e r v i s o r . He t e s t i f i e d that
31a
she was at t imes un coopera t ive and unrea
sonable in her a t t i t u d e with Robinson. She
o f t e n r e j e c t e d s u p e r v i s i o n and, at t imes ,
in h i s words went beyond " t h e l i m i t s o f
d i s c r e t i o n . " Crouse had s i m i l a r e x p e r i
ences and r e l a t e d s e v e r a l i n c i d e n t s during
h i s s u p e r v i s i o n o f the p l a i n t i f f .
In s e e k i n g t o d i s c r e d i t B r ian V i n
c e n t ' s test imony on the e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f
the a f f i m a t i v e a c t i o n e f f o r t s pursued at
the Eastern Region, and to show that Clark
was the v i c t i m o f sex d i s c r i m i n a t i o n at
Fr i e nds h i p , the p l a i n t i f f c a l l e d C l i f f o r d
Schum as a r e b u t t a l w i tn es s . His test imony
conf i rmed V i n c e n t ' s , namely, that p l a i n t i f f
was d i s s a t i s f i e d a t F r i e n d s h i p , t h a t
her employment there presented problems,
and a change o f employment en v i ro n me n t
should be ex p l o re d . Schum a l s o t e s t i f i e d ,
as d i d V i n c e n t , a b o u t a m e e t n g a t t h e
Eastern Regional O f f i c e where p l a i n t i f f ' s
32a
p r o b l e m s we re d i s c u s s e d and p o s s i b l e
s o l u t i o n s c o ns ide re d .
Aside from Schum's t est imony about h i s
p a r t i c i p a t i o n in Ms. C l a r k ' s i n i t i a l
employment , which was no t d i s p u t e d , h i s
t e s t i m o n y do es not warr an t s e r i o u s c o n
s i d e r a t i o n . In making t h i s f i n d i n g the
Court notes that he never v i s i t e d Fr i end
s h i p o r t a l k e d t o any p e r s o n n e l who had
d i r e c t su p er v i s i o n over the p l a i n t i f f nor
did he review any document deve loped by the
agency r e l a t i n g to the p l a i n t i f f ' s employ
ment a t F r i e n d s h i p . I n d e e d , t h e s o l e
source o f Schum's in fo rmat ion r e l a t i n g t o
p l a i n t i f f ' s exper i ence at Fr i endsh ip and
the on ly source o f h i s t r i a l t est imony were
the p l a i n t i f f and her husband , R i c h a r d
Clark. As to Richard Clark, there was not
one shred o f ev idence in the re cord about
him o t h e r than th rough Schum. Schum's
l i m i t e d f a c t s and sources o f in f o r ma t i o n ,
33a
a f f o r d e d no b a s i s f o r t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s
p r o f f e r as t o h i s t est imony .
The C our t f i n d s t h a t the t e s t i m o n y
o f f e r e d by the ag ency was g e n e r a l l y f a r
more c r e d i b l e than that o f f e r e d by Clark.
Throug ho ut the r e l e v a n t p e r i o d c o v e r i n g
her s e v e r a l c l a i m s and, t o come e x t e n t
beyond, she e x h i b i t e d a nega t i ve a t t i t u d e ,
and an unwi l l i ng nes s o r i n a i l i t y t o a c cept
s u p e r v i s i o n . Such conduct undermines the
a b i l i t y o f management t o m a i n t a i n s t a f f
e f f i c i e n c y and s t a f f m o r a l e . For an
in d i v i d u a l to seek promotion t o a p o s i t i o n
o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , u n d e r s u c h c i r c u m
s t a n c e s , asks too much. Management should
not condone such conduct by advancing the
employee t o a h igher l e v e l o f r e s p o n s i b i l
i t y and t h e y assume a r i s k in d o i n g
so . As i t turned o u t , the p l a i n t i f f was
promoted to a GS—12 p o s i t i o n but many o f
t h e same p r o b l e m s a r e s t i l l p r e s e n t .
34a
No employee — whether in the p u b l i c
o r p r i v a t e s e c t o r — i s e x p e c t e d t o be
d o c i l e o r maneuvered as a puppet . I n i t i a
t i v e , i n t e l l e c t u a l c u r i o u s i t y and a robus t
i n t e r c h a n g e o f i d e a s s h o u ld be welcomed
i n g r e d i e n t s in any work s i t u a t i o n . On
d i r e c t examination the p l a i n t i f f d e s c r i b e d
h e r s e l f as pursuing a r o l e o f a " d e v i l ' s
a d v o c a t e . " I f such was her r e a l i n t e n t ,
she s t r e t c h e d d i s c r e t i o n beyond l i m i t s and
sho we d a r e m a r k a b l e l a c k o f t a c t and
r e s t r a i n t and sound judgment.
The t e s t i m o n y o f G e o r g i a Coen, who
s u p e r v i s e d t h e p l a i n t i f f was t i m e l y
and r e l e v a n t :
" . . . I t h in k i t was c l e a r l y s t a t e d
t h a t my p r o b l e m has a l w a y s b e e n
M a r l e n e ' s d e p o r t m e n t . I have s a i d
many t ime s e v e r y b o d y in the o f f i c e
makes mistakes . I t i s deportment that
I have p r o b l em s wi th Miss C l a r k . . . .
* * *
35a
Even the union agreement t a l k s t o
c e r t a i n s t a n d a r d s o f c o n d u c t and
deportment and Marlene was the union
s t e w a r d . She s h o u l d be awa re o f
them. . . .
k k k
I b e l i e v e t h a t e v e r y b o d y - - I
wou ldn ' t want peop le working with me
who were no t w i l l i n g t o speak up,
c h a l l e n g e me on o c c a s i o n when I was
go ing o f f w r o n g . . . .
* * *
I d o n ' t want p e o p l e who w o n ' t
g iv e o p i n i o n s , who won ' t c ha l l e ng e when
they think something i s wrong that we
are d o i n g so m et h i ng wrong , but the
r e s p o n s i b l e person , the one who in the
f i n a l a n a ly s i s goes t o the next man up
the l i n e . He i s r e s p o n s i b l e and once
the d e c i s i o n i s made, once i t has been
d i s c u s s e d and r e s o l v e d , I think that
should be the end o f i t and then the
p e r s o n s h o u l d go b a c k and do i t
the way the d e c i s i o n has been made,
the way they have been i n s t r u c t e d to
do i t . . . .
* * *
[Ms. C la rk ] c h a l l e n g e s e v e r y
t h i n g . She i s s t i l c h a l l e n g i n g
e v e r y t h i n g . "
(Tr. January 20, 1982, pp. 29 -3 1 ) .
The A l l e g e d Equal Pay Act V i o l a t i o n s
The p l a i n t i f f a l l e g e s t h a t s h o r t l y
36a
a f t e r her t r a n s f e r to the Washington D is
t r i c t O f f i c e she p e r f o r m e d the same or
g r e a t e r d u t i e s than t h o s e p e r f o r m e d by-
s e ve ra l male in s p e c t o r s who were c l a s s i f i e d
at higher l e v e l s . More s p e c i f i c a l l y , she
compared her work assignments with those o f
Robert Bearer , who j o i n e d the Washington
O f f i c e at a GS-12 l e v e l in February, 1979.
Approximately one year l a t e r he advanced to
a GS-13 . During t h i s p e r i o d she c l a i m s
that her du t i e s were s u b s t a n t i a l l y the same
or g r e a t e r than h i s .
Bearer t ra n s fe r re d to the Washington
O f f i c e with f i v e years o f e xp er i en ce as an
a i r t r a f f i c c o n t r o l l e r at Miami, F l o r i d a .
In t r a n s f e r r i n g he s u f f e r e d a l o s s in grade
from a GS-13 t o a GS-12 c l a s s i f i c a t i o n .
While s ta t i on e d in Miami as a t r a f f i c con
t r o l l e r he gained exper i ence in d e v e l o p
ing and compi l ing the same type o f a c c id e n t
p a c k a g e s which were c o m p l e t e d by f l i g h t
37a
standards i n s p e c t o r s . He a l s o had p r i o r
e xp er i en ce as a f l i g h t i n s t r u c t o r ; and had
e s t a b l i s h e d and o p e r a t e d an in s t r u m e n t
f l i g h t s c h o o l in Germany f o r two y e a r s .
B o t h C r o u s e and V i n c e n t c o n f i r m e d t h e
importance and re l ev an ce o f B e a r e r ' s a i r
t r a f f i c ex pe r i e n ce t o h i s expec ted per form
ance as an a v i a t i o n o p e r a t i o n s i n s p e c t o r .
C l a r k and s e v e r a l w i t n e s s e s who
t e s t i f i e d in support o f her c la im f a i l e d to
e s t a b l i s h e d that p l a i n t i f f ' s du t i e s were
the same as B e a r e r ' s o r t h a t t h e i r j o b s
r e q u i r e d s i m i l a r s k i l l s , e f f o r t s and
r e s p o n s i b i l t i e s . As e x p l a i n e d by t h e
f r o n t - l i n e s u p e r v i s o r s Gunther and Coen and
o the r w i t n e s s e s , many o f the o f f i c e d u t i e s
o f in s p e c t o r s were o f the type that could
be performed by a l l i n s p e c t o r s , whether at
a GS-7 , GS-9, GS-11 or GS-12 l e v e l . The
i m p o r t a n t d i f f e r e n c e o c c u r r e d in t h e
c o m p l e x i t y o f t h e t a s k , t h e amount o f
38a
s u p e r v i s i o n g i v e n , and t h e d e g r e e o f
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y an i n s p e c t o r was d e l e g a t e d .
A comparison o f the p o s i t i o n d e s c r i p t i o n s
o f the GS-11 and GS-12 j o b s i l l u s t r a t e s the
d i f f e r e n c e . Under the GS-11 p o s i t i o n d e s
c r i p t i o n , an i n s p e c t o r lacked the a u t h o r i t y
f o r a c t i o n o r d e c i s i o n s and r e c e i v e d
t r a i n i n g in the more complex f u n c t i o n s o f
the o f f i c e . Although Ms. Clark made much
o f the f a c t t h a t she was d o i n g v a r i o u s
f l i g h t c h e c k s and a i r t a x i work, which
B e a r e r d i d n o t p e r f o r m , h e r p o s i t i o n
d e s c r i p t i o n i n d i c a t e s that such was p e r
m i s s i b l e . In c o n t r a c t , a GS-12 in s p e c t o r
was d e l e g a t e d a u t h o r i t y t o make v a r i o u s
d e c i s i o n s and commitments f o r the agency.
Ms. Clark never had such a u t h o r i t y .
As t o Be ar er no t b e i n g a s s i g n e d t o
f l i g h t checks the test imony showed that i t
was agency p o l i c y not t o a l l ow i n s p e c t o r s
t o perform c e r t a i n f l i g h t checks u n t i l they
39a
had taken a p p r o p r i a t e t r a i n i n g c o u r s e s .
A f t e r B e a r e r c o m p l e t e d t h e r e q u i r e d
c o u r s e s , he performed the r e l e v a n t duty.
He was then autho r i zed t o commit the agency
as t o a i r t a x i o p e r a t i o n s , an a u t h o r i t y
wich p l a i n t i f f never p o s s e s s e d .
The p l a i n t i f f ' s equal pay c la im f a i l e d
t o r e c o g n i z e t h e i m m e d i a t e l y r e l e v a n t
f a c t o r s such as complex i ty o f ass ignments ,
the degree o f s u p e rv i s i o n extended and the
type o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y de l eg ate d and as
sumed by an i n s p e c t o r . T h o s e f a c t o r s
were e i t h e r minimized or ignored by her .
However, Ms. C l a r k ' s two f r o n t l i n e super
v i s o r s , Gunther and Coen, as we l l as Robin
s o n , o f f e r e d s u b s t a n t i a l and c o n v i n c i n g
t est imony on t h i s p o i n t . Those f a c t o r s ,
t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e f a c t t h a t t h e r e was
no showing t h a t she e v e r c ommit ted the
agency, compels a f i n d i n g aga ins t her equal
pay c la im.
40a
Two w i t n e s s e s , John Crouse and John
Sheehan, supported p l a i n t i f f ' s c la ims that
she was serv ing at a GS-12 l e v e l . Crouse
b e l i e v e d that she was per forming at that
l e v e l w h i l e s he was a G S - 1 1 . He was
u n c l e a r and u n c e r t a i n as t o t h e G r a d e
12 requi rements . He t e s t i f i e d , however,
that i t invo lved a u th o r i ty to commit the
a g e n c y and make d e c i s i o n s , w h i c h , o f
c o u r s e , was n e v e r t r u e . I t was a l s o
a p p a r e n t f r o m t h e t e s t i m o n y o f C o e n ,
Robinson and Gunther that Crouse, in many
r e s p e c t s , had a d i f f e r e n t view o f what was
inc luded in a GS-12 p o s i t i o n d e s c r i p t i o n .
He a c k n o w l e d g e d t h a t he had no d i r e c t
k n o w l e d g e o f t h e l e v e l o f s u p e r v i s i o n
e x e r c i s e d over Ms. Clark or o f any c o r r e c
t i o n s t h a t Ro b i ns on might have made o f
her work. Thus, Mr. Cr ous e ' s op i n io n on
t h i s p o i n t mer i t s l i t t l e weight . The same
i s t rue o f Sheehan who l e f t the Washington
41a
O f f i c e in September, 1978, at the po i n t in
time when the p l a i n t i f f ' s equal pay c laim
began.
Other Findings
During the course o f a proc eed ing the
t r i a l c our t has an o p p or t un i t y t o see and
hear the w i tnesses and t h e r e a f t e r judge and
assess t h e i r c r e d i b i l i t y . That e va lu a t i o n
p r o c e s s o c c u r r e d in t h i s p r o c e e d i n g and
was e s p e c i a l l y warranted as t o the p l a i n
t i f f ' s t e s t i m o n y . There were i n s t a n c e s
when Ms. C l a r k ' s d i r e c t c r o s s and r e b u t t a l
test imony appeared t o be tang led with the
t ru th . Severa l o c c a s i o n s were po i n te d out
in the g o v e r n m e n t ' s f i n a l argument w i th
which the Court agrees .
* * *
As a l r e a d y n o t e d , the t r i a l o f t h i s
p r oceed ing extended through a f u l l e l even
d a y s . T h a t t i m e was n o t w a r r a n t e d by
42a
e i t h e r the f a c t u a l o r the l e g a l i s s u e s
p r e s e n t e d . Whi l e p r e t r i a l r e q u i r e m e n t s
were imposed , d e s i g n e d t o f a c i l i t a t e a
c l e a r and e f f i c i e n t p r e s e n t a t i o n o f i s s u e s ,
the de s i r ed r e s u l t was not o b t a i ne d . In
r e t r o s p e c t , o ther a c t i o n s should have been
pursued to f a c i l i t a t e a b e t t e r p r e s e n t a
t i o n . Beyond that , however, the re cor d and
the t r i a l t r a n s c r i p t in t h i s and o t h e r
T i t l e VII proceed ings p o in t to the n e c es
s i t y o f im pr ov i ng the q u a l i t y o f t r i a l
advocacy among that bar. The t r i a l o f such
pr oc eed ings should not serve as a s u b s t i
tute f o r a law s choo l or a c ont inu ing l e g a l
educat i on course , or a l earn ing expe r i en ce
in t r i a l p r a c t i c e .
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Thi s C o u r t ' s j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r Ms.
C l a r k ' s sex d i s c r i m i n a t i o n c laim i s c o n f e r
red under T i t l e VII o f the C i v i l R ights Act
43a
o f 1964, as amended by 24 U.S.C § 2000e~16.
J u r i s d i c t i o n over her equal pay c la im i s
c o n f er r e d by 29 U.S.C. § 2 0 6 ( c ) ( 1 ) .
The p l a i n t i f f has f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h
a prima f a c i e case o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n and
t h e r e f o r e cannot p r e v a i l on her T i t l e VII
c l a i m . McDonnell Douglas Corpora t i on v .
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973 ) . However, even
assuming, arguendo , that she has presented
a P^ima f a c i e case o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , she
has not met her subsequent burden o f demon
s t r a t i n g that the s ta te d nond i s c r i mi nat or y
reasons f o r d i s c i p l i n a r y a c t i o n and non
promotion were merely p r e t e x t s f o r unlawful
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . The u l i t m a t e burden o f
p r o o f r e s t s with p l a i n t i f f at a l l t imes.
Texas Department o f Community A f f a i r s v .
Burd ine , 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981 ) . She has
f a i l e d to meet that burden.
The c r e d i b l e t e s t i m o n y and e v i d e n c e
a r e more t h a n s u f f i c i e n t t o r e b u t a l l
44a
in f e r e n c e s o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . There were
se ve r a l l e g i t i m a t e reasons f o r the d i s c i
p l i n a r y a c t i o n s i n i t i a t e d a g a i n s t t h e
p l a i n t i f f . There was abundant ev idence to
<?"nnort and j u s t i f y the d e c i s i o n o f her
s u p e r v i s o r s . There was no showing t h a t
t h e i r a c t i o n s were d i s c r i m i n a t o r y and that
they were i n i t i a t e d in a d i f f e r e n t manner
aga inst her as compared t o o ther employees ,
male o r o t h e r w i s e . Green v . Armstrong
Rubber C o . , 612 F.2d 967, 968 (5 th C i r .
1980) ; S u l l i v an v. B o o r s t i n , 484 F. Supp.
836 , 842 (D .D.C. 1 9 8 0 ) ; s ee McDonald v .
Sante Fe T r a i l Transpor ta t i on C o . , 427 U.S.
273, 283 (1976) .
The defendant c l e a r l y showed that the
reasons f o r Ms. C l a r k ' s one-day suspension
were her r e s i s t a n c e t o s u p e r v i s i o n , r e f u s a l
to f o l l o w i n s t r u c t i o n s , and insubord ina
t i o n . These were l e g i t i m a t e n o n - d i s c r i m i -
n a t o r y r e a s o n s f o r d i s c i p l i n a r y a c t i o n .
45a
Hoc h s t a d t v . __Wo r c e s t e r F o u n d a t i o n f o r
E x p e r i m e n t a l B i o l o g y , 545 F .2d 222, 230
(1 s t C i r . 1976) ; EEOC v. Mead Foo ds , 466 F.
Supp. 1, 4-5 (W.D. Okla. 1977) ; Gonzalez v .
B o l g e r , 486 F .Su pp . 595 , 6 0 1 -0 2 (D .D .C.
1980) .
L i k e w i s e , f o r the same r e a s o n s , her
s u p e r v i s o r s wre j u s t i f i e d and had l e g i t i m
ate and n o n -d i s c r im in a to r y reasons f o r not
recommending promotion.
S e c t i o n 2 0 6 ( d ) ( 1 ) o f the Equal Pay
Act p r o h i b i t s the f e d e r a l government from
paying a female employee a d i f f e r e n t ra te
o f pay from that o f a male employee " f o r
equal work on j o b s the performance o f which
r e qu i r es equal s k i l l , e f f o r t and r e s p o n s i
b i l i t y , and w h i c h a r e p e r f o r m e d u n d e r
s i m i l a r wor k ing c o n d i t i o n s e x c e p t where
such payment i s made p u r s u a n t t o ( i ) a
s e n i o r i t y s ys tem ; ( i i ) a m e r i t s ys t em ;
( i i i ) a system which measures earnings by
46a
qu ant i ty or q u a l i t y o f p r od u c t i o n or ( i v ) a
d i f f e r e n t i a l based on any o t h e r f a c t o r
o ther than sex . . . . "
P l a i n t i f f has f a i l e d to make a prima
f a c i e showing s in ce she has not shown that
the d u t i e s she p e r f o r m e d as compared t o
B e a r e r ' s were the same and f a i l e d t o show
t h a t the j o b s e n t a i l e d s i m i l a r s k i l l s ,
e f f o r t s and r e s p o n s i b i l i i t i e s . Taking in to
c o n s i d e r a t i o n a l l o f the t e s t i m o n y and
ev idence on the equal pay c laim there were
s i g n i f i c a n t and s u b s t a n t i a l v a r i a t i o n s in
the work a s s i g n e d and p e r f o r m e d by the
p l a i n t i f f . The agency thus was j u s t i f i e d
in i t s a p p l i c a t i o n o f p o s i t i o n c l a s s i f i c a
t i o n s and s a la r y d i f f e r e n t i a l s between the
two. La f f e y v. Northwest A i r l i n e s , I n c . ,
567 F.2d 429 (D.C. C ir 1976) ; c e r t . d e n i e d ,
434 U.S. 1086 (1978 ) . Nor was there any
showing that the agency used the c l a s s i f i
c a t i o n system as a means o f c i rcumvent ing
47a
the p r o v i s i o n s o f the Act or that r esp ons
i b l e s u p er v i so r y personne l r e cog n ize d that
p l a i n t i f f ' s p o s i t i o n c l a s s i f i c a t i o n was
i m p r o p e r o r f l a w e d and d i d n o t h i n g t o
c o r r e c t the s i t u a t i o n .
The p l a i n t i f f ' s emphasis and f o c us on
the f a c t that Bearer was unable t o perform
fu n c t i o n s which she performed during hi s
i n i t i a l pe r i od at the Washington O f f i c e ,
was misp laced . As e xp l a in ed , the reason
f o r t h i s , was agency p o l i c y not to a l l ow
i n s p e c t o r s to perform c e r t a i n d u t i e s and
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s u n t i l they had exper i enced
appro pr ia te t r a i n i n g c ou r s e s . A f t e r Bearer
r e c e i v e d such t r a i n i n g he p e r f o r m e d the
re l e v a n t duty. To the ex tent that Clark
and Bearer were per forming the same d u t i e s
b e c a u s e B e a r e r had p u r s u e d a t r a i n i n g
c ou r s e , was a f a c t o r o ther than sex under
the Equal Pay Ac t .
48a
The p l a i n t i f f ' s c l a i m f o r r e l i e f i s
d e n i e d . An a p p r o p r i a t e O r d e r w i l l be
entered .
Entered: MARCH 1, 1982
/ s /
Barr ington D. Parker
United S ta tes D i s t r i c t Judge
49a
ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT ON THE MERITS
March 1 , 1982
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
C i v i l A c t i o n No. 80-1636
MARLENE CLARK,
P l a i n t i f f ,
v.
DREW LEWIS,
Defendant .
O R D E R
F o r t h e r e a s o n s s e t f o r t h in t h e
Memorandum f i l e d in t h i s c a s e , i t i s by
the Cour t t h i s 1s t day o f March, 1 982,
ORDERED that judgment be entered f o r
defendant and d i smiss ing t h i s cause with
p r e j u d i c e .
/ s / ________________________________
Barr ington D. Parker
United S ta tes D i s t r i c t Judge
APPENDIX II
Documents R e la t in g t o Department
o f J u s t i c e P o l i c y on Costs
50a
ORDER AND M O T IO N IN THOMAS V . S E C R E T A R Y
OF THE NAVY, June 7, 1978
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
September Term, 1977
No. 77-1965
Charles Thomas, on b e h a l f o f h i mse l f
and a l l o t h e r s s i m i l a r l y s i t u a t e d ,
A p p e l l a n t s ,
v.
Se cr e t a ry o f the Navy, et a l ,
BEFORE: Wright , Chie f Judge and Fahy,
Senior C i r c u i t Judge
O R D E R
F i l e d June 7, 1978
On c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the j o i n t motion
o f ap pe l l an t and ap p e l l e e t o vaca te order
on appeal and d i sm is s , i t i s
51a
ORDERED BY THE C o u r t t h a t t h e a f o r e
sa id motion i s granted and t h i s appeal i s
d i s m i s s e d .
The C l e r k i s d i r e c t e d t o t r a n s m i t a
c e r t i f i e d copy o f t h i s o rder t o the D i s
t r i c t Court as promptly as the bus iness o f
h i s o f f i c e permi ts .
Per Curiam
52a
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
September Term, 1977
No. 77-1965
CHARLES A. THOMAS,
P l a i n t i f f - Ap p e l l an t ,
v.
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
De fendant-Appe l l ee .
JOINT MOTION TO VACATE ORDER AND
DISMISS APPEAL
The p l a i n t i f f - a p p e l l a n t , C h a r l e s A.
Thomas, and the d e f e n d a n t - a p p e l l e e , S e cr e
t ar y o f the Navy, hereby j o i n t l y move that
the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s August 31, 1977 o rder
t a x i n g c o s t s a g a i n s t t h e p l a i n t i f f be
v a c a t e d as moot and t h i s a p pe a l be d i s
missed.
53a
1. P l a i n t i f f , a c i v i l i a n employee o f
the Department o f the Navy, brought th i s
s u i t under T i t l e VII o f the C i v i l Rights
Act o f 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C § 2000e-
16, charging that he was the v i c t i m o f race
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . P l a i n t i f f was unsuccess
f u l , and f i n a l judgment was e n t e r e d in
fa vo r o f the government. The government
then moved that c o s t s in the sum o f $409.50
be taxed aga ins t the p l a i n t i f f . P l a i n t i f f
opposed any ta xa t i on o f c o s t s , arguing that
the government was s t a t u t o r i l y barred from
r e c o v e r i n g c o s t s in a T i t l e V I I c a s e .
W h i l e m a i n t a i n i n g t h a t t h e r e was no
s t a t u t o r y bar , and that under Rule 5 4 ( d ) ,
Fed. R. C iv . P r o . , the United S t a t e s , l i k e
any o ther l i t i g a n t , i s e n t i t l e d to c o s t s ,
the government s ta ted that s in ce p l a i n t i f f
appeared to be h e a v i l y in debt due t o the
l i t i g a t i o n , t h e r e would be no o b j e c t i o n
54a
" t o a d i s c r e t i o n a r y r e d u c t i o n o f c o s t s by
the Court . "
2. the d i s t r i c t c o u r t , in an o rder
entered August 31, 1977, agreed t h a t , as
a m a t t e r o f law, the government was e n
t i t l e d t o c o s t s . H o w e v e r , t h e c o u r t ,
n o t i n g the g o v e r n m e n t ' s s u g g e s t i o n , and
ob se rv in g that , even though he l o s t , the
p l a i n t i f f had performed a p u b l i c s e r v i c e in
br in g in g the s u i t , reduced the c o s t award
t o $248.65 . P l a i n t i f f appealed s o l e l y on
the c o s t qu es t i o n .
3. D u r i n g t h e p e n d e n c y o f t h e
p l a i n t i f f ' s a p p e a l , t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f
J u s t i c e i ssued g u i d e l i n e s s p e c i f y i n g the
c i rcumstances under which the government
would se ek c o s t s when i t p r e v a i l e d as a1/
d e f e n d a n t in a T i t l e VI I c a s e . Under
the c r i t e r i a se t f o r t h in the g u i d e l i n e s ,
V A copy o f those g u i d e l i n e s , i ssued on
A p r i l 14 , 1 9 7 8 , a r e a t t a c h e d t o t h i s
m ot i on .
55a
t h i s i s not the type o f case in which the
government would seek c o s t s .
4. The issuance o f the g u i d e l i n e s ,
and the g o v e r n m e n t ' s c u r r e n t p o s i t i o n ,
based on the g u i d e l i n e s , t h a t p l a i n t i f f
should not be taxed f o r c o s t s has e l i m i
nated any c on t r o v e r s y between the p a r t i e s
and has rendered the appeal moot. A c c o r
d i n g l y , the p l a i n t i f f and the government
j o i n t l y a g re e t o wa ive a l l r i g h t s which
they have have aga inst each o th e r f o r c o s t s
o r a t t o r n e y ' s f ee incurred in t h i s a c t i o n
at the t r i a l o r a p p e l l a t e l e v e l s . They
c o n s e q u e n t l y j o i n t l y r e q u e s t t h a t t h i s
Court vaca te as moot the August 31 , 1977,
o rder taxing c o s t s aga inst the p l a i n t i f f
and d i smiss the appeal .
R e s p e c t f u l l y submitted
ROBERT E. KOPP, 202-739-3389
56a
PAUL BLANKENSTEIN, 202-739-3427
Attorneys f o r the de fe nda nt -
ap pe l l e e
A pp e l l a t e S e c t i o n , C i v i l
D i v i s i o n ,
Department o f J u s t i c e
Washington, D.C. 20530
ARTHUR F. GREENBAUM, 202-331-4706
At torney f o r the p l a i n t i f f -
appe l l ant
Hogan & Hartson
815 Connec t i cu t Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20006
57a
[ f 5 0 8 3 ] GUIDES FOR SEEKING COSTS IN FEDERAL EMPLOYEE SUITS
Guidelines for government attorneys in filing motions for the assessment of court
costs against federal employees bringing bias actions against federal agencies were supplied
in a memorandum issued by" the Assistant Attorney General on April 14, 1978. Text of
the Memorandum appears below. -
In Ckristiansbterg Garment. Co. tt Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, ■ [IS
E PD f 8041] 46 U. S. L - W . 4105, 4107
(U. S. Jan. 23, 1978), the United States
Supreme Court, in. declining to allow attor
neys’ fees to ■ be routinely awarded to pre
vailing defendants in Title V II actions,
characterized the Title V II plaintiff-em
ployee as “ the chosen instrument of Con
gress to vindicate ‘a policy that Congress
considered of the highest: priority’” ' (quot
ing Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, [2
EPD f9834] 390 U. S. 400, 402 (1968)).
Because the Title V II plaintiff-employee
appears before the court “ cloaked in a
mantle of public interest,” United' States
Steel Corp. v. United States, [9 EPD ][ 10,225]
519 F. 2d 359, 364 (3d Cir. 1975), the rule
that prevailing parties generally are entitled
to the costs of the lawsuit should not apply
automatically to actions in which the Fed
eral Government defeats an employee’s Title
V II charge of discrimination. As one court
has stated: “The awarding of- costs to the
Government when it successfuly defends
itself' against a Title V II claim should not
become a mechanical process that will dis
courage potential plaintiffs from pursuing
debatable claims.” ' Jaspers v. Bernstein, Civil
Action No. 76-1411 (D. D. C. Sept: 19,
1977); cf. Alonso v. Union Oil of Calif., 71
F. R. D: 523, 524 (S. D. N. Y. 1976). The
Government must be particularly wary of
creating an in terrorem effect on potential
plaintiffs with meritorious Title V II' claims,
in view o f the fact that many of these
plaintiffs can scarcely afford to bear their
own costs of. litigation. See Miller v. Inter
national Paper Co., [1 EPD U 9968] 408 F.
Zd 283, 293 ( 5th Cir. 1969); cf. Boas Box
Co. v. Proper Folding Box Corp., 55 F. R. D.
79, 81 (E. D. N. Y. 1971) (considering
economic resources of parties).
Employment Practices fl 5083
58a
3 2 8 4 Hew Developm ents
Accordingly, the Government. should not
move for costs as a. prevailing defendant
in a discrimination suit brought by a fed
eral employee under Title VII unless any
one of the tallowing: three circumstances
is found to exist:
(1) the plaintiff brought the action in
bad faith;
(2) the plaintiff pursued the claim in a
harassing or vexatious manner;
(3) the plaintiff litigated a claim that
was patently groundless or frivolous.
Application of the first factor (bad faith)
is illustrated by the case of Carrion v.
Yeshiva University, 535 F. 2d 722 (2d Cir.
1976). In allowing, the imposition of costs
and attorneys’ fees on the plaintiff, the
court found that the plaintiff’s Title VII
claim was substantially the same as charges
she had previously brought and litigated,
that she had' perjured herself in pursuing
her claim, and that she and another em
ployee had deliberately attempted to ruin
the reputation of. their supervisor.
Application'of the second factor (harass
ing or vexatious conduct) is illustrated by
the case of Quaker Chair Carp. v. Litton
Business Systems, Inc., 71 F. R. D. 527, 537
(S. D. . N. Y. 1976). There the court
awarded costs to the . (non-Titie V II)
plaintiff in connection with its opposition
to defendant's motion to vacate a deposi
tion. Even though the deposition was
vacated, the- court found it appropriate to
assess costs against the defendant, where
the defendant, after refusing to stipulate to
facts that plaintiff sought to discover and
after forcing plaintiff to incur costs in seek
ing to establish those facts, belatedly con*
ceded those facts. See also Reeves Brothers,
Inc. v. U. . S - Laminating Corp., 417’ F. 2d
869, 873 (2d Gir. 1969) (awarded costs to
prevailing party where, opposing party “ con
sumed needless time and effort in trying
frivolous ‘shotgun’ claims”).
. In applying this second factor, the- Gov
ernment should avoid penalizing the client
unfairly for the unreasonable conduct of
his or her attorney. If the lawyer's conduct
is unacceptable, the Government should in
appropriate, cases consider alternatives that
do not impute that conduct to the client—
for example, asking, the court to find the
lawyer in contempt, or initiating'disciplinary-
action. Where plaintiff’s counsel “ so mul
tiplies the proceedings in any case, as to
increase costs unreasonably and vexa-
tiously,” the attorney may be held per
sonally liable for such costs under 28
U. S. C. § 1927. The Government should
move to hold the plaintiff liable for costs
under this factor only where it. would not
be unfair to charge the plaintiff with coun
sel’s unreasonable conduct. Generally, if
the client clearly did not know of counsel's
behavior or otherwise took no part in it,
the Government should not move for costs
based upon this factor. Moreover, in assess
ing the unreasonableness of plaintiff’ s con
duct, the Government should consider
whether its own conduct was at. all times
reasonable.
In applying the third factor ( baselessness
of the claim), the Government should heed
the Supreme Court’s cautionary language
in Christians burg, 46 U. S. L. W. at 4107-08:
[I ]t is important that a district court
resist the understandable temptation to
engage in post-hoc reasoning by conclud
ing that, because a plaintiff did not ulti
mately prevail, his action must have been
unreasonable or without foundation. This
kind of hindsight logic could discourage
ail but the most airtight claims, for
seldom can a prospective plaintiff be- sure
of ultimate success: No matter how
honest one's belief that he has been the
victim of discrimination,. no matter how
meritorious one's ciaim may appear at the
outset, the course of litigation is rarely
. predictable. Decisive facts may not
emerge until discovery or trial. The law
may change or clarify in the midst of
litigation. Even when..the law or the tacts
appear questionable or unfavorable at the
outset, a party may have an entirely
■ reasonable ground for bringing suit. .
While it is difficult to establish any
hard-and-fast rules for determining whether
a claim is patently frivolous, a few guide
lines. may, be., offered, to assist in that
' determination.- - First, • a ■ plaintiff is less
-likely to have a. “ frivolous” claim if he or
she is able to establish a- prima facie case
Second, a claim based on a novel, legal
theory should not be deemed “ frivolous”
if the theory, though novel, is at least
debatable. Finally,-if the plaintiff abandons
a frivolous suit promptly after the discovery
of the facts that demonstrate- its baseless
ness, the Government generally should not
seek costs; the abandonment 'o f patently
frivolous claims will thereby be encour
aged.
As a final note, there may be cases in
which the assessment of costs is appropriate
but the plaintiff’s financial situation war
rants reduction of costs. Remember that
motions for costs are intended to deter
baseless or unreasonable claims and not to
create an extreme hardship on. the plaintiff.
Back reference.—$1211.
U 5083 © 1979, Com metre Clearing House, Inc.
59a
AFFIDAVIT re : COSTS POLICY FILED
IN Lewis v. N .L .R .B . , S.D. Tex.
76-H-780, A p r i l 6, 1983
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
DONALD R. LEWIS, et a l . .
P l a i n t i f f s ,
v.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
e t a l . ,
Defendants .
A F F I D A V I T
J . PAUL McGRATH h e r e b y s w e a r s as
f o l l o w s :
1. I am A s s i s t a n t Atto rney General f o r
the C i v i l D i v i s i o n o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s
Department o f J u s t i c e . As s u c h , I have
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y over matters o f l i t i g a t i n g
60a
p o l i c y , in c l ud in g the p o l i c y o f the Depart
ment o f J u s t i c e w i th r e g a r d t o s e e k i n g
c o s t s as a p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y , as permitted
by R u l e 5 4 ( d ) , F e d e r a l R u l e s o f C i v i l
P ro ce du re .
2. In F e br ua r y 1983 I r e c e i v e d an
in qu i r y from Robert Rodr igues , A s s s i s t a n t
United S ta tes At t o rney , Southern D i s t r i c t
o f Texas, as to t h i s Department ' s p o l i c y
with regard to moving f o r c o s t s as p r e v a i l
i n g d e f e n d a n t in a T i t l e V I I a c t i o n .
I r e p l i e d that I saw no reason to d i f f e r e n
t i a t e between T i t l e VII and o the r a c t i o n s
where the United S ta tes p r e v a i l s and that I
was not aware o f any law r e q u i r i n g the
United S ta tes t o do so . I conc luded that
the United S ta tes would move f o r c o s t s as
the p r e v a i l i n g party in T i t l e VII cases as
i t would in any o ther ca se , and I author
i zed the A s s s i s t a n t United S ta tes Attorneys
t o make such a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in c o u r t .
61a
When l a t e r appr ised o f an A p r i l 14, 1978
memorandum o f a former A s s i s t a n t Attorney-
G e n e r a l t o t h e c o n t r a r y , I s e n t o u t a
s u p e r s e d i n g memorandum on A p r i l 1, 1983
(copy at tached as Exhib i t 1) making c l e a r
t h a t the D e p a r t m e n t ' s p o l i c y on s e e k i n g
c o s t s was u n i f o r m as I u n d e r s t o o d i t
t o be when the i s s u e f i r s t came t o may
a t t e n t i o n .
3. Ther e fo re the p o l i c y expressed in
my A p r i l 1, 1983 memorandum was in f u l l
f o r c e and e f f e c t as o f March 4, 1983 as
r e p r e s e n t e d in the R e p ly o f the Un i ted
S t a te s to P l a i n i t f f s ' Response to Defen
d a n t ' s B i l l o f Cos ts f i l e d March 4, 1983,
in t h i s a c t i o n , Lewis v. NLRB, Civ . Ac t i on
No. 76-H-78Q (S.D. T e x . ) ( c o p y at tached as
Ex h ib i t 2 ) . The r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s made in
t h e R e p l y we re t r u e and a c c u r a t e when
62a
made and cont inue t o be so .
/ s /
J. PAUL MCGRATH
A s s i s ta n t At to rney General
Subscr ibed t o and sworn t o b e f o r e
me t h i s 6th day o f A p r i l , 1983
My commission e x p i r e s May 31, 1984.
/ s / Vera H. Wi l l iams
Notary P ub l i c
53a
Office o f the Assistant Attorney Ccnerai Mcshinfion. D.C. 20530
t A??: 13S3
jgMORAKDOM
TO: All United States Attorneys
FROM: J . P a u l M cGrath'Assistant Attorney General
Civil Division
SUBJECT: Guidelines for Motions for Costs
As you are aware, the United States, like any other litigant,
is entitled to recover the costs of litigation under Rule 54(d),
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. I would like to remind you that
when the government is considering moving for costs as the
prevailing defendant in litigation, discretion should be exercised in determining whether a request for the assessment of costs or a
reduction in the amount of costs is appropriate. Although it is difficult to establish any set rules for determining under what
circumstances costs should not be sought, there may be cases, for
example, when the plaintiff's financial situation at the time the
litigation was initiated or as a result of the litigation,
warrants a request for a reduction in costs or a waiver of costs.
If you have any questions concerning this matter, contact my
Special Assistant, Greg Walden, at 633-5713. This memorandum ,
supersedes the memorandum of the Assistant Attorney General, Civil
Division, dated April 14, 1978.
5 gove rnm en t
j EXHIBIT
■r /
M£lLcN PRESS INC.