Keyes v. School District No. 1 Denver, CO. Conditional Cross Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

    IN THE

Supreme Court of tfje ®totteb S>tateg
October Term, 1971

No.........

Wilfred  Keyes, et al,
Petitioners and 

Cross Respondents
v.

School D istrict No. 1,
D enver, Colorado, et al,

Respondents and 
Cross Petitioners

CONDITIONAL CROSS PETITION FOR A WRIT OF 
CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE

_____________ TENTH CIRCUIT
William K. Ris 
Wood, Ris & Hames 
1140 Denver Club Building 
Denver, Colorado
Benjamin L. Craig 
Henry, Cockrell, Quinn & Creighton 
1415 Security Life Building 
Denver, Colorado

A ttorneys for Respondents and 
Cross Petitioners

44 B R A D F O R D  P R I N T I N G ,  D E N V E R



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
OPINIONS BELOW ......................................................  1
JURISDICTION ............................................................  2
QUESTIONS PRESENTED .........................................  3

I. IN A SCHOOL DISTRICT WHICH HAS NEVER 
MAINTAINED A DUAL SYSTEM, DO THE 
ACTS OF A SCHOOL BOARD IN CONSTRUCT­
ING NEW FACILITIES AND MAKING MINOR 
BOUNDARY CHANGES TO ACCOMMODATE 
INCREASING NUMBERS OF CHILDREN 
MOVING INTO SCHOOL SUBDISTRICTS, 
ACCOMPANIED BY A CHANGE IN THE RA­
CIAL COMPOSITION OF THE AREA TO 
PREDOMINANTLY NEGRO, CONSTITUTE 
DE JURE SEGREGATION IN VIOLATION OF 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, EVEN 
THOUGH SUCH ACTS OF THE SCHOOL 
BOARD, STANDING ALONE, COULD NOT 
HAVE CAUSED SUCH SCHOOLS TO BECOME 
PREDOMINANTLY NEGRO?

II. IN A SCHOOL DISTRICT WHICH HAS NEVER 
MAINTAINED A DUAL SYSTEM, DOES THE 
CONSTITUTION REQUIRE IMPLEMENTA­
TION OF THE SCHOOL BOARD’S RESCINDED 
BUT UNEXECUTED PLANS FOR REDUCING 
MINORITY CONCENTRATIONS AND RA­
CIAL IMBALANCE IN EIGHT OF ITS ONE 
HUNDRED EIGHTEEN SCHOOLS WHERE 
THE FEDERAL COURTS HAVE CONCLUDED 
THAT STATE ACTION CAUSED SEGREGA­
TION AT ONLY FOUR OF THE EIGHT



11

SCHOOLS AND THAT THREE OF THE RE­
MAINING FOUR WERE NOT SEGREGATED 
EITHER DE FACTO OR DE JURE?

III. DOES THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A COURT 
APPROVED VOLUNTARY MAJORITY TO 
MINORITY TRANSFER PLAN WITH TRANS­
PORTATION PROVIDED, WHICH REDUCES 
THE CONCENTRATION OF NEGRO PUPILS 
IN AN ELEMENTARY SCHOOL FOUND TO 
BE SEGREGATED BY STATE ACTION FROM 
84.4% TO 58.4%, SATISFY THE CONSTITU- 
TIONAL REQUIREMENT TO REMEDY THE 
EFFECTS OF STATE IMPOSED SEGREGA­
TION?

Page
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED ...................................  3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ...................................  3
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE W RIT................  9
CONCLUSION ..............................................................  13

TABLE OF CASES

Bell v. School City of Gary, Indiana, 324 F.2d 209
(7th Cir. 1963), cert. den. 377 U.S. 924 (1964) ........ 10

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) .... 10

Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education, 419 F.2d 1387
(6th Cir. 1969), cert. den. U.S____, 29 L.Ed.
2d 128 (1971) ..............................................................  10

Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education, 369 F.2d 55
(6th Cir. 1966), cert. den. 389 U.S. 847 (1967) ........ 10



iii

Downs v. Board of Education of Kansas City, 336 F.2d 
988 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. den. 380 U.S. 914 (1965).. 10
Keyes v. School District Number One, Denver,
Colorado, 313 F.Supp. 90 (1970) .................................2, 5
Keyes v. School District Number One, Denver,
Colorado, 313 F.Supp. 61 (1970) ........................ 2, 4, 7, 8
Keyes v. School District Number One, Denver,
Colorado, 303 F.Supp. 289 (1969) .................... ......2, 4, 8
Keyes v. School District Number One, Denver,
Colorado, 303 F.Supp. 279 (1969) .............................2 ,4
Northcross v. Board of Education of Memphis,
397 U.S. 232 (1970) .................................................... 11
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
402 U.S. 1 (1971) ........................................... ..10, 11, 12
Taylor v. Board of Education of City School District of 
New Rochelle, 294 F.2d 36 (2nd Cir. 1961), cert. den.
368 U.S. 940 (1961) ....................................................  10
United States v. School District No. 151, Cook County, 
Illinois, 404 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. den.
.___ U.S____,29L .Ed.2d 111 (1971)......................... 10

TABLE OF OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Title 28, U.S.C., Sec. 1254 (1) ........................... 2



IN THE

Supreme Court of tfje Hrateb states.
October T erm, 1971

No.

Wilfred  Keyes, et al.,

Petitioners and 
Cross Respondents

v.

School D istrict No. 1,
D enver, Colorado, et al.,

Respondents and 
Cross Petitioners

CONDITIONAL CROSS PETITION FOR A WRIT OF 
CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE

TENTH CIRCUIT

Cross petitioners will file a brief in opposition to the peti­
tion for certiorari filed by petitioners, however, should the 
Court grant petitioners’ petition for certiorari to review the 
judgment and opinion of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit, entered on June 11, 1971, such re­
view should include the questions presented herein.

OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported at 445 

F.2d 990, and appears in the Appendix to petitioners’ peti-



2

tion for writ of certiorari herein. The order of the Court of 
Appeals clarifying its June 11, 1971 opinion, issued on 
August 30, 1971, is printed in the Appendix to this condi­
tional cross petition. The opinions of the District Court for 
the District of Colorado are reported at 303 F. Supp. 279; 
303 F. Supp. 289; 313 F. Supp. 61; and 313 F. Supp. 90, 
and appear in the Appendix to petitioners’ petition for writ 
of certiorari herein.

JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir­

cuit was entered on June 11, 1971, and no petition for re­
hearing was filed therein. On September 8, 1971, Mr. Justice 
Marshall ordered that the time for filing this petition be 
extended to and including October 25, 1971. This Court’s 
jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. IN A SCHOOL DISTRICT WHICH HAS NEVER 

MAINTAINED A DUAL SYSTEM, DO THE ACTS 
OF A SCHOOL BOARD IN CONSTRUCTING 
NEW FACILITIES AND MAKING MINOR 
BOUNDARY CHANGES TO ACCOMMODATE 
INCREASING NUMBERS OF CHILDREN MOV­
ING INTO SCHOOL SUBDISTRICTS, ACCOM­
PANIED BY A CHANGE IN THE RACIAL COM­
POSITION OF THE AREA TO PREDOMINANTLY 
NEGRO, CONSTITUTE DE JURE SEGREGA­
TION IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT, EVEN THOUGH SUCH ACTS OF 
THE SCHOOL BOARD, STANDING ALONE, 
COULD NOT HAVE CAUSED SUCH SCHOOLS 
TO BECOME PREDOMINANTLY NEGRO?

II. IN A SCHOOL DISTRICT WHICH HAS NEVER 
MAINTAINED A DUAL SYSTEM, DOES THE



3

CONSTITUTION REQUIRE IMPLEMENTATION 
OF THE SCHOOL BOARD’S RESCINDED BUT 
UNEXECUTED PLANS FOR REDUCING MI­
NORITY CONCENTRATIONS AND RACIAL 
IMBALANCE IN EIGHT OF ITS ONE HUNDRED 
EIGHTEEN SCHOOLS WHERE THE FEDERAL 
COURTS HAVE CONCLUDED THAT STATE 
ACTION CAUSED SEGREGATION AT ONLY 
FOUR OF THE EIGHT SCHOOLS AND THAT 
THREE OF THE REMAINING FOUR WERE NOT 
SEGREGATED EITHER DE FACTO OR DE 
JURE?

III. DOES THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A COURT 
APPROVED VOLUNTARY MAJORITY TO MI­
NORITY TRANSFER PLAN WITH TRANSPOR­
TATION PROVIDED, WHICH REDUCES THE 
CONCENTRATION OF NEGRO PUPILS IN AN 
ELEMENTARY SCHOOL FOUND TO BE SEGRE­
GATED BY STATE ACTION FROM 84.4% TO 
58.4%, SATISFY THE CONSTITUTIONAL RE­
QUIREMENT TO REMEDY THE EFFECTS OF 
STATE IMPOSED SEGREGATION?

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY 
PROVISIONS INVOLVED

This case involves the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States which is set out verbatim in petitioners’ petition.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This action was commenced in the United States District 
Court for the District of Colorado in June of 1969, by 
Anglo (white, excluding Spanish surnamed), Negro, and 
Hispano (Spanish surnamed) parents of children attending 
public schools in Denver, Colorado, suing individually, on



4

behalf of their minor children, and on behalf of classes of 
persons similarly situated, alleging violations of their con­
stitutional rights and seeking to remedy the alleged racial 
or ethnic segregation of certain of the Denver public 
schools.

The complaint contained two separate causes of action. 
The first cause of action alleged racial segregation in cer­
tain of the schools of northeast Denver and prayed that re­
scission of three resolutions of the Board of Education num­
bered 1520, 1524, and 1531, providing for the stabilization 
of the racial and ethnic composition of pupil memberships 
in certain schools, be declared null and void and that the 
resolutions be reinstated and implemented. The second 
cause of action alleged racial segregation and a denial of 
equal educational opportunity in other public schools in 
Denver and prayed, inter alia, for an order desegregating 
these schools.

The District Court granted a preliminary injunction or­
dering implementation of the three resolutions of the Board 
of Education, except as they affected East High School and 
Cole Junior High School, after preliminary hearing on the 
first cause of action. Keyes v. School District Number One, 
Denver, Colorado, 303 F. Supp. 279 (July 31, 1969). The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit re­
manded the case to the District Court for consideration of 
the effect of Section 407(a) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
and the District Court issued an opinion containing Supple­
mental Findings, Conclusions and Temporary Injunction on 
August 14, 1969, which is reported at 303 F. Supp. 289.

The entire case was tried on the merits in February of 
1970, and the District Court issued a Memorandum Opin­
ion and Order on March 21, 1970, which is reported at 313 
F. Supp. 61, and which reaffirmed the findings and conclu­



5

sions of de jure segregation as to the first cause of action; 
found that the racial imbalance in the schools which were 
the subject of the second cause of action was not caused by 
state action but that the schools which were over 70% 
Negro or over 70% Hispano were not providing an equal 
educational opportunity. After further hearing the District 
Court issued a Decision re Plan or Remedy on May 21, 
1970, which is reported at 313 F. Supp. 90.

There was an appeal and cross-appeal to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The opinion 
of the Court of Appeals was issued on June 11, 1971, and, 
in essence, affirmed the judgment of the District Court on 
the first cause of action and reversed it on the second cause 
of action. On August 30, 1971, the Court of Appeals issued 
its order clarifying its June 11, 1971 opinion requiring 
that immediate steps be taken to formulate and carry out a 
plan of desegregation for Hallett and Stedman Elementary 
Schools. The order of the District Court in compliance with 
this order was entered on September 28, 1971 and is printed 
in the appendix hereto. Another order of the District Court 
modifying this order was entered on October 15, 1971, and 
is also printed in the appendix hereto.

This conditional cross petition seeks review of the judg­
ment of the Court of Appeals on the first cause of action 
only.

Denver has never maintained separate educational facili­
ties for different races. Pupils in the Denver school system 
are assigned to schools on the basis of their residence. 
School attendance areas are established for each school 
based upon a so-called neighborhood school policy. The 
eight schools which were the subject of the Board’s three 
resolutions were: Barrett, Park Hill, Philips, Hallett and 
Stedman elementary schools; Cole and Smiley junior high



6

schools; and East High School. The four schools which were 
found to be segregated by prior actions of the Board were 
Barrett, Hallett and Stedman elementary schools and Smiley 
Junior High School. The trial court expressly found that 
Cole, although a predominantly minority school, was not 
made so by state action. It also found that Park Hill and 
Philips elementary schools and East High School were not 
segregated schools either de jure or de facto.

Prior to the end of World War II all these schools were 
predominantly white. Shortly after World War II, the small 
Negro population of Denver which was concentrated in the 
north central area of the City began to increase and move 
into white residential areas to the east. In addition to 
changing the racial composition of the public schools in 
its path, this migration caused overcrowding in those 
schools because families were larger. This condition re­
quired school authorities to construct additional facilities, 
both temporary and permanent, and to adjust attendance 
boundaries of certain schools in order to accommodate in­
creasing numbers of school children.

The trial court found and concluded from the evidence 
that the circumstances surrounding the construction of Bar­
rett Elementary School in 1959 and 1960 evidenced pur­
poseful action on the part of the Board of Education to cre­
ate a predominantly Negro school. It also found from the 
evidence that minor changes in 1962 and 1964 in the east­
erly and southerly subdistrict boundaries of Stedman and 
Hallett elementary schools resulted in moving some of the 
white pupils out of these schools at the same time that the 
eastward Negro migration engulfed them and concluded 
that these were acts of segregation which caused these two 
schools to become segregated. The findings and conclusions 
as to Smiley Junior High School are even more tenuous. No 
boundaries had been changed during the Negro migration



7

and the school had been constructed prior to the Negro 
migration. Yet, the trial court found that because of 
the racial composition of the student body and faculty, the 
racial composition of the Smiley feeders (which included 
Stedman and Hallett, but not Barrett), and the Negro 
population movement into the area, Smiley was a segre- 
grated school in 1968; that the resolutions of the Board 
passed in 1969, to take effect that fall, were designed to 
reduce the Negro percentages; and that in the absence of the 
resolutions, the Negro percentages would increase as a re­
sult of future Negro population movement.

The trial court’s finding of de jure segregation at Cole 
Junior High School was based entirely on rescission of the 
Board’s resolution:

“The rescission of Resolution 1524 as applied to 
Cole Junior High was an action taken which had 
the effect of frustrating an effort at Cole which at 
least constituted a start toward ultimate improve­
ment in the quality of educational effort there.”
313 F. Supp. 61, 67.

. . [T]he segregation (or racial concentration) 
which presently exists at Manual and Cole, except 
insofar as Cole was affected by Resolution 1524 
and its rescission as explained above in part I, is 
not de jure.” Id. at 75.

The trial court expressly found from the uncontroverted 
evidence that Park Hill, Philips and East were not even 
segregated.

“Thus, even though Philips and Park Hill were 
not segregated as of 1969, the Board felt that 
effective desegregation could take place at Bar-



8

rett, Stedman, and Hallett only if other Park Hill
area schools were included in a total plan.” 303
F. Supp. 289, 292.
“Neither before nor after the passage of 1520 
could East be considered a segregated school.”
Id. at 294.

Because there was no evidence of de jure segregation at 
East and Cole, the preliminary injunction mandating the 
three resolutions expressly omitted East and Cole (303 F. 
Supp. 289, 296), although the order included Park Hill and 
Philips because they were deemed necessary to the relief of 
the other Park Hill schools.

Later, after the trial on the merits, the trial court rested its 
ruling that the resolutions should be implemented as to East 
and Cole on the conclusion of law that the recission of the 
resolutions was the operative act of de jure segregation and 
therefore unconstitutional. 313 F. Supp. 61.

The Court of Appeals, in its treatment of this portion of 
the case, reviewed the trial court’s findings of acts of de jure 
segregation as to Barrett, Stedman, Hallett and Smiley (as 
to Smiley, it omitted the feeder theory and substituted a ref­
erence to the permitting of whites to transfer out of Smiley, 
although the trial court made no such finding in this re­
gard), and applying Rule 52, F.R.Civ.P., concluded that 
these findings were not clearly erroneous and affirmed 
them.

Then, on Page 23 of its opinion, the Court of Appeals 
concluded:

“Since we have sustained the findings regarding 
state imposed segregation in the Park Hill area 
schools, it is unnecessary to futher decide whether 
the rescission of Resolutions 1520, 1524 and 
1531 was also an act of de jure segregation.”



9

Yet rescission was the basis and the only basis for imple­
menting the rescinded resolutions as to Park Hill, Philips, 
Cole and East.

Thus, the opinion of the Court of Appeals, provides no 
legal basis for the remedy (reinstatement of the resolutions) 
as to Park Hill, Philips, Cole and East.

Prior to the commencement of this action and in the fall 
of 1968, the Board of Education instituted a voluntary open 
enrollment policy (V.O.E.) which permitted majority to 
minority transfers with transportation provided whenever 
such transfers improved integration. It decided to employ 
this policy in the Hallett demonstration integrated school 
plan which was contained in rescinded Resolution 1531 and 
in Resolution 1533 which replaced the rescinded resolutions.

As a result of the operation of this plan during 1969 and 
1970, the Negro enrollment at Hallett Elementary School 
was reduced from 84.4% in 1968 to 58.4% in the fall of 
1970, 12 percentage points below what the trial court 
viewed as a segregated school. Yet in the fall of 1971, both 
the Court of Appeals and the District Court ordered addi­
tional mandatory reduction in the Negro population at 
Hallett.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
Cross petitioners intend that this Conditional Cross 

Petition be considered only in the event this Court deter­
mines to grant the petition of petitioners. While cross peti­
tioners do not agree with petitioners’ reasons for granting the 
writ, they do urge that if this Court determines that it will 
review this case, it should review the entire case and resolve 
all questions therein.

The questions raised by the decisions of the lower federal 
courts on the first cause of action in this case are important



10

constitutional questions which have not been decided by 
this Court.

Since Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954), this Court has taken and decided many cases in­
volving formerly dual school systems and while questions 
continue to arise in these jurisdictions which need to be set­
tled by this Court, many cases are now working their way 
up the federal court system from jurisdictions which have 
never maintained dual school systems. This Court has 
denied certiorari in the northern and western cases 
presented to it up to this time. Taylor v. Board of 
Education of City School District of New Rochelle, 294 
F.2d 36 (2nd Cir. 1961), cert. den. 368 U.S. 940 (1961); 
Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education, 369 F.2d 55 (6th 
Cir. 1966), cert. den. 389 U.S. 847 (1967); Deal v. Cin­
cinnati Board of Education, 419 F.2d 1387 (6th Cir.
1969), cert, den____U.S____, 29 L.Ed. 2d 128 (1971);
Bell v. School City of Gary, Indiana, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 
1963),cert. den. 377 U.S. 924 (1964); Downs v. Board of 
Education of Kansas City, 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1964), 
cert. den. 380 U.S. 914 (1965); and United States v. 
School District No. 151, Cook County, Illinois, 404 F,2d
1125 (7th Cir. 1968), cert, den____U.S____, 29 L.Ed. 2d
111 (1971).

When Brown and its companion cases were decided in 
1954, the word went out very clearly. Dual systems are for­
bidden by the Constitution. No such clear guidance exists as 
to what the Constitution requires of boards of education 
which have never operated dual systems but are faced with 
racially imbalanced schools and population shifts which 
cause the racial composition of schools to change.

In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 
402 U.S. 1 (1971), this Court answered one of the ques­
tions suggested by the Chief Justice in his separate opinion



II

in Northcross v. Board of Education of Memphis, 397 U.S. 
232 (1970), when it stated:

“The constitutional command to desegregate 
schools does not mean that every school in every 
community must always reflect the racial compo­
sition of the school system as a whole.” 402 U.S. 
at 24.

This statement of the law would seem to apply with equal 
force to systems which have never maintained racially sepa­
rate schools.

Other language in Swann, although intended to apply to 
dual system cases, should apply with equal force to systems 
which have always been unitary:

“At some point, these school authorities and 
others like them should have achieved full com­
pliance with this Court’s decision in Brown I. The 
systems will then be ‘unitary’ in the sense required 
by our decisions in Green and Alexander.

“It does not follow that the communities served 
by such systems will remain demographically sta­
ble, for in a growing, mobile society, few will do 
so. Neither school authorities nor district courts 
are constitutionally required to make year-by- 
year adjustments of the racial composition of stu­
dent bodies once the affirmative duty to desegre­
gate has been accomplished and racial discrimi­
nation through official action is eliminated from 
the system. This does not mean that federal 
courts are without power to deal with future 
problems ; but in the absence of a showing that ei­
ther the school authorities or some other agency 
of the State has deliberately attempted to fix or



12

alter demographic patterns to affect the racial 
composition of the schools, further intervention 
by a district court should not be necessary.” 402 
U.S. at 31-32.

It thus appears that once a dual system has been desegre­
gated, it is on the same footing with a school district which 
has never operated a dual system. Both are unitary systems 
and neither has a constitutional duty to make periodic ad­
justments of the racial composition of student bodies even 
though population shifts occur. Yet, school districts are free, 
in the exercise of discretionary educational policy, to at­
tempt to alter racial imbalance without violating the Consti­
tution:

“School authorities are traditionally charged 
with broad power to formulate and implement ed­
ucational policy and might well conclude, for ex­
ample, that in order to prepare students to live in 
a pluralistic society each school should have a 
prescribed ratio of Negro to white students re­
flecting the proportion for the district as a whole.
To do this as an educational policy is within the 
broad discretionary powers of school authorities; 
absent a finding of a constitutional violation, 
however, that would not be within the authority 
of a federal court.” 402 U.S. at 16.

If these actions are truly within the discretion of local 
school authorities, they may be reversed, rescinded or re­
placed with other and different policy actions without vio­
lating the Constitution.

To the extent the courts below have invaded this area of 
governmental action reserved to the local school board, 
their actions are in conflict with the decision of this Court 
and their decisions should be reviewed by it.



13

The decisions of the courts below on the first cause of ac­
tion in this case usurp the discretionary power of the school 
authorities at the very least as to four of the eight schools in­
volved and the effect of their holdings is that school boards 
have a constitutional duty to foresee and remedy the effects 
of demographic mobility contrary to the decision of this 
Court in Swann. For these and the foregoing reasons, cross 
petitioners respectfully request that this Court grant their 
cross petition if it grants the petitioners’ petition.

Respectfully submitted,

William K. Ris 
Wood, Ris & Hames 
1140 Denver Club Building 
Denver, Colorado
Benjamin L. Craig 
Henry, Cockrell, Quinn & Creighton 
1415 Security Life Building 
Denver, Colorado

C O N C L U SIO N

Attorneys for Respondent and
Cross Petitioners



A-l

APPENDIX

JULY TERM—AUGUST 30, 1971

Before Honorable John C. Pickett, Honorable Delmas C. 
Hill and Honorable Oliver Seth, Circuit Judges

Wilfred  Keyes, etc., et al.,
Plaintiffs-A ppellees,

v.

School D istrict Number One ,
Denver, Colorado, et al.,

Defendants, Appellants,

AND

M r . and M rs. Douglas Barnett, 
etc., et al.,

Intervening Defendants.

Appellees-plaintiffs in the captioned appeal have filed 
what they denominate as a “Motion For Clarification Of 
Opinion.” As pointed out in that motion, both the Trial 
Court and this Court have determined the Hallett and Sted- 
man schools to be de jure segregated schools. Under author­
ity of our opinion, immediate steps should be taken to formu­
late and carry out a plan of desegregation for such schools. 
We do not deem this action to be a proper function of an 
Appellate Court.

The authority of the Trial Court to hear these matters and 
to determine the proper relief to be granted is clearly set 
out in the last sentence of our opinion.

Nos. 336-70 
• and

337-70



A true copy 
Teste

A-2

/ s/ Howard K. Phillips 
HOWARD K. PHILLIPS 
Clerk

Howard K. Phillips 
Clerk, U. S. Court of 
Appeals, Tenth Circuit

By / s/ Anne Cabot 
Deputy Clerk



A-3

A P P E N D IX

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

Civil Action No. C-1499

Wilfred  Keyes, et al.,

vs.

School D istrict N o. 1,
D enver, Colorado, et al

D

THIS MATTER coming on for hearing on September 8, 
1971, in compliance with the Order of the Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit dated August 30, 1971, stating that 
immediate steps should be taken to formulate and carry out 
a plan for the disestablishment of de jure segregation at Hal- 
lett and Stedman Elementary Schools, the Court, having 
heard the evidence and the statements of counsel, finds as 
follows:

1. That the constitutional rights of the minority school 
children attending these de jure segregated schools 
should be restored as quickly as is practicable under 
the circumstances.

2. That no just cause exists for delaying the disestablish­
ment of de jure segregation at Hallett and Stedman 
Elementary Schools beyond Monday, November 8, 
1971; the school district already having in existence 
plans for such disestablishment.

Plaintiffs,

order re desegre­
gation OF HALLETT 

AND STEDMAN 
ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS

efendants.



A-4

3. That the school district requires some time to allow 
for making adjustments in the plan as selected by the 
Court, to ensure that the desegregation called for 
herein is effective, and further, needs some additional 
time for the preparation of the schools affected, the 
teachers, staff, pupils and parents, for the implemen­
tation of the plan.

4. That “Plan A” as proposed by the school administra­
tion in its Report of June 8, 1970, and as it relates to 
the desegregation of Hallett and Stedman shall be 
implemented by the defendants, amended to the ex­
tent necessary to carry out this Court’s Order, set 
forth below.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED 
AND DECREED as follows:

A. That the disestablishment of de jure segregation at 
Hallett and Stedman Elementary Schools shall be accom­
plished no later than Monday, November 8, 1971*; as a 
minimum the implementation will in fact create the racial 
compositions at all affected schools projected in the June 8, 
1970 Report under Plan A;

B. That on or before Friday, October 8, 1971, the 
defendants shall present to the Court and the community 
the details of the plan to be implemented on November 8, 
1971, including the resulting racial compositions at the 
affected schools;

C. The defendants shall conduct a racial and ethnic 
census of the students in the geographic areas designated

*The School District is, of course, free to implement this 
order at an earlier date if it is ready to implement it and if 
it believes that disruption would be minimized thereby.



A-5

under Plan A relating to desegregation of Hallett and Sted- 
man, including the areas in Montbello to be assigned to 
those schools; such census shall be completed prior to pre­
sentation of the plan on October 8,1971;

D. Prior to Friday, October 8, 1971, the defendants 
shall make any adjustments in geographic areas under Plan 
A required to ensure the racial compositions under the Plan, 
and shall incorporate such changes together with any neces­
sary changes in receiving schools into the Plan prior to 
presentation on October 8, 1971.

E. Prior to Friday, October 8, 1971, the defendants 
shall have included in the Plan provisions for:

1. Facuity and staff assignments;
2. Transportation of children affected by the plan and 

the specific details thereof shall be finalized no later 
than Friday, October 22, 1971.

3. Programs for the training of teachers in the affected 
schools with regard to minority history and culture 
and how to effectively teach in an integrated environ­
ment.

4. Provisions for orientation programs at the new 
schools, parent-faculty conferences, open houses and 
other means for promoting familiarity with the new 
school, understanding of the Plan and affording those 
affected an opportunity to have questions answered 
concerning the Plan.

5. Any required changes in the curriculum, and the 
specific details thereof shall be finalized no later than 
Friday, October 22, 1971.

6. Compensatory or remedial educational programs 
shall continue to be provided in the new schools after 
implementation for those children previously enrolled 
in such programs.



A-6

F. The Superintendent or his designee may make indi­
vidual adjustments for particular students affected by any 
of the Orders of this Court in this Action in cases of hard­
ship, or for other valid, equitable reasons where it is de­
termined by the Superintendent or his designee that valid 
reasons exist and that the adjustment is not for the purpose 
of avoiding this Court’s Orders. A record of each such ad­
justment, including the reason or reasons therefor shall be 
maintained.

G. Those students now participating in the Hallett Plan 
shall continue; those students now being transported to re­
lieve overcrowding at Hallett and Stedman shall continue in 
the schools to which they are presently assigned.

H. The Plan shall provide for the transportation of all 
students affected, said transportation to be provided by the 
School District without cost to the student.

I. Any changes in Plan A believed necessary by defend­
ants to carry out this Order shall be described and presented 
to Counsel for plaintiffs at least five days prior to presenta­
tion to the Court on October 8,1971.

J. Decision on plaintiffs’ request for the appointment 
of a lay advisory committee is deferred for the present.

DATED this 27th day of September, 1971.
BY THE COURT 
/ s/ William E. Doyle
William E. Doyle, Judge 

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
Wood, Ris & Hames
By_________ ___________________ _
William K. Ris
H enry, Cockrell, Quinn & Creighton

By-------- --------------- ------ ------- .
Benjamin L. Craig 
Attorneys for Defendants 
/ s/ Gordon G. Greiner
Gordon G. Greiner 
Attorney for Plaintiffs

ENTERED 
ON THE DOCKET 

SEP. 28, 1971 
G. WALTER BOWMAN 

CLERK
BY: S.H.

DEP. CLERK



A-7

A P P E N D IX

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

Civil Action No. C-1499

W ilfred Keyes, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

vs.

School D istrict No. 1,
Denver, Colorado, et al.

Defendants.

ORDER

THIS MATTER coming on upon the stipulation of the 
parties, and the Court having examined the Stipulation and 
the file herein and being otherwise fully advised in the 
premises DOTH ORDER:

1. That the previous Order re: Desegregation of Hallett 
and Stedman Elementary Schools entered on September 28, 
1971, following hearing on September 8, 1971, be, and the 
same is hereby modified as follows:

(a) The effective date for the implementation of plans 
to desegregate Hallett and Stedman Elementary Schools is 
hereby established as the beginning of the second semester 
of the 1971-1972 school year rather than November 8, 
1971, as provided in said order.

(b) “Plan A” as modified in the Hallett-Stedman Plan, 
attached to the Stipulation of the parties as Exhibit A, be 
and the same is hereby approved for implementation at the



beginning of the second semester of the 1971-1972 school 
year.

(c) The specific details of “Plan A” as modified in the 
Hallett-Stedman Plan shall be developed no later than De­
cember 1,1971.

DATED this 15th day of October, 1971.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ William E. Doyle 
William E. Doyle, Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
/ s/ Gordon G. Greiner_____
Gordon G. Greiner

H enry, C ockrell, Quinn  & Creighton 
Is/ Michael H. Jackson
A ttorneys for Defendants