United States v. Mississippi Brief for Appellants
Public Court Documents
January 23, 1986

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Ford v. Tennessee Petition for Rehearing of Order Denying Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Tennessee, 1964. 8048bc2d-b29a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/6c7637aa-0de2-4b19-94ec-5e1d0f1075f5/ford-v-tennessee-petition-for-rehearing-of-order-denying-petition-for-writ-of-certiorari-to-the-supreme-court-of-tennessee. Accessed June 01, 2025.
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I n the (Emtrt nf tit? United States October T erm, 1964 No................. E vander F ord, et al., Petitioners, —v.— S tate of T ennessee, Respondent. PETITION FOR REHEARING OF ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE H. T. Lockhard B. F. J ones I. H. Murphy J ack Greenberg J ames M. N abrit, III D errick A. B ell, J r. Suite 2030 10 Columbus Circle New York, N. Y., 10019 R. B. S ugarmon, J r. B. L. H ooks A. W. W illis 588 Vance Avenue Memphis, Tennessee Attorneys for Petitioners Of Counsel 30580—2 Proofs—7-13-64 I n the Supreme (dmtrt of % Itttl?b States October T erm, 1964 No................. E vander F ord, et al., —v.— Petitioners, S tate of Tennessee, Respondent. PETITION FOR REHEARING OF ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE Petitioners, Evander Ford, Jr., Alford 0. Gross, James Harrison Smith, Ernestine Hill, Johnnie May Rogers, Charles Edward Patterson, Edgar Lee James and Katie Jean Robertson, pray that this Court grant rehearing of its Order of June 22, 1964, denying the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, and that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the judgment of the Supreme Court of Tennessee in the above entitled case as prayed for in the Petition filed Sep tember 1,1962, herein. Negro petitioners were arrested in Memphis, Tennessee, on August 30, 1960, at an open air auditorium located in city-owned Overton Park which had been leased to a church group for a segregated church meeting. They were con victed on June 19 and 20th, 1961, of willfully disturbing a religious worship (§39-1204, Tenn. Code Annot.) and each was sentenced to 60 days in jail and fines of $175.00 to $200.00. The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed the convictions on March 7, 1962. 2 Reasons for Granting Rehearing, Issuing the Writ or Granting Other Appropriate Relief On May 27, 1963, this Court decided Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U. S. 526, holding that delay in desegregating public recreational facilities in the City of Memphis could not be justified under the Constitution. The original record filed in that case contains facts, which by decisions of this Court handed down subsequent to the trial of this cause, are pertinent to, but not contained in, the records of the petitioners’ convictions. At the time of petitioners’ arrests, Overton Park was designated by the City of Memphis for use by white per sons only (Orig. R. 18, 24).* Negroes were excluded from Overton Park, and if Negroes attempted to enter the Over- ton Park or any other segregated park, they could be re quested to leave by the Park Director, park employees, or any member of the public (Orig. R. 26, 188) (T. R. 75-76). Park personnel were informed as to which public parks Negroes were permitted to use (Orig. R. 26). After Watson v. City of Memphis was filed in May 1960 to desegregate public recreational facilities in Memphis, the City deseg regated some facilities previously limited to whites, includ ing a zoo and art gallery located in Overton Park to which Negroes were admitted in November 1960 (Orig. R. 167) (T. R. 66). Generally, Negroes were not advised by the City when parks and other recreational facilities were opened to them (Orig. R. 186) (T. R. 76-77). They were expected * Record references cited as (Orig. R.) are to the pages of the original record in Watson v. City of Memphis, as prepared by the district court and subsequently forwarded to the Court of Appeals and to this Court. For convenience, pertinent excerpts of the original record have been made an appendix to this petition. References cited as (T. R.) are to sections of the Watson record printed in the Transcript of Record for this Court (No. 424 Oct Term, 1962). 3 to learn of changes in racial policy by usage (Orig. R. 187) (T. R. 76). As one city official put it, Negroes were free to use any park where police did not put them out (Orig. R. 185) (T. R. 76-77). Thus, it appears that at the time when petitioners were arrested at Overton Park, it was segregated pursuant to City policy. On May 20, 1963, this Court in Peterson v. City of Green ville, 373 U. S. 244, reversed trespass convictions of Negroes who, after having been refused service at a lunch counter because of race, remained seated over the manager’s pro test. There, a city ordinance forbade nonsegregated food service, but the State contended that the arrests were made pursuant to the manager’s request and not the segregation ordinance. The Court ruled however, that: “When a State agency passes a law compelling per sons to discriminate against other persons because of race, and the State’s criminal processes are employed in a way which enforces the discrimination mandated by that law, such a palpable violation of the Four teenth Amendment cannot be saved by attempting to separate the mental urges of the discriminators.” 373 U. S., at 248. See also Lombard, v. Louisiana, 373 U. S. 267. Similarly, in Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U. S. 267, also decided on May 20, 1963, the Court reversed trespass con victions of Negroes who refused to leave a refreshment counter in New Orleans after being advised by the manage ment that the counter was operated on a segregated basis and served only white patrons. Segregated facilities were not dictated by any statute or ordinance in New Orleans, but the Mayor and Superintendent of Police had issued statements warning that persons participating in sit-in 4 demonstrations would be arrested. The Court ruled that the convictions as in Peterson, supra, had been commanded by the voice of the State and could not stand. On June 22, 1964, this Court, in Robinson v. State of Florida,----- U. S. ----- , reversed convictions of Negroes and whites who were refused service at a Miami restaurant. Again, relying on the rationale of Peterson, supra, and Lombard, supra, the Court ruled that State health regula tions requiring separate facilities for each race connoted a State policy of segregation which placed discouraging burdens on any restaurant serving the two races together. Petitioners submit that this Court’s rulings in Peterson, Lombard and Robinson, are applicable to the convictions for which review is sought. As the Record in Watson v. City of Memphis makes clear, segregation in Overton Park was required by the City of Memphis. Legal action had been initiated to desegregate all facilities such as Overton Park and the City had begun a practice of desegregating some parks, not by announcing that they were desegregated, but by not arresting Negroes who attempted to use them. Thus, petitioners’ arrests were not only mandated by state policy as in Peterson, Lombard and Robinson, but took place during a period when some Negroes, willing to risk humiliation and possible arrest, were being permitted to use some previously segregated park facilities. More over, as set forth in the records of their convictions (R. instant case, 78-79), their presence at the meeting was in response to newspaper invitations not limited to whites. Upon refusal to leave at the request of church officials (R. 91), they were directed to seats in the rear of the auditorium (R. 285, 293); and even after ignoring this request and obtaining seats among the audience (R. 92), the meeting continued until the police arrived, halted the proceedings and arrested petitioners (R. 298). 5 There is no significant distinction between the charges of trespass in Peterson, Lombard and Robinson, and the charges of disturbing a public worship, which would justify the reversal of trespass convictions while permitting peti tioners’ convictions for disturbing worship to stand. As set forth in the original petition, the source of disturbance when petitioners entered Overton Park Auditorium was not their conduct, but their color. Having both reversed convictions on similar facts in Peterson, Lombard and Robinson, and having on a number of occasions reversed convictions of peaceful individuals convicted of disturbing the peace because of the acts of hostile onlookers, cf. Henry v. City of Rock Hill, 376 U. S. 776; Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229; Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157, this Court, we respectfully submit, ought not assume that the Tennessee Supreme Court would, in the light of these decisions, apply the disturbance of public worship statute to petitioners’ conduct. Barr v. City of Columbia,----- U. S. —— (June 22, 1964). CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above and in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, it is respectfully urged that rehearing be granted and that upon such rehearing, a Writ of Cer tiorari issue to the Supreme Court of Tennessee. In addi tion, petitioners respectfully submit that it would not be inappropriate were this Court to enter an order vacating the judgments and remanding the cases to the Supreme Court of Tennessee for further proceedings in the light of this Court’s decisions in Peterson v. City of Greenville, Lombard v. Louisiana and Robinson v. Florida. Cf. Henry v. City of Rock Hill, ----- U. S. ----- , 11 L. ed. 2d 38; 6 Randolph v. Virginia, 374 U. S. 97; Henry v. Virginia, 374 U. S. 98; Thompson v. Virginia, 374 U. S. 99; Wood v. Virginia, 374 U. S. 100. Respectfully submitted, H. T. Lockhard B. F. J ones I. H. Murphy J ack Greenberg J ames M. N abrit, III D errick A. B ell, J r. Suite 2030 10 Columbus Circle New York, N. Y., 10019 R. B. S ugarmon, J r. B. L. H ooks A. W. W illis 588 Vance Avenue Memphis, Tennessee Attorneys for Petitioners Of Counsel 7 Certificate o f Counsel I hereby certify that the foregoing petition for rehearing is presented in good faith and not for delay and is restricted to grounds specified in Rule 58 of the Rules of this Court. Attorney for Petitioners 9 APPENDIX Pertinent excerpts from portions of original record in Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U. S. 526. H arold S. L ewis, Director of the Memphis Park Com mission. # # # # # By Attorney Willis: Q. [Referring to Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 2] Will you read the caption on there, what that list is all about! A. This is the City-owned parks, operated by the Park Commission. Q. All of the City parks! A. All of the City-owned parks. Q. All of the City-owned parks ? A. That’s right. Q. Is it true that some of those parks are used by negroes and others are used by whites! A. That is correct. Q. Is it true that some of them are used by both races! A. That is correct. Q. Are you familiar with which ones are used by negroes —18— and which ones are used by whites? A. Yes. —19— # # # # # Overton Park is white with the exception of the Zoo. —24— # # # # # Q. When you speak of white and negro you mean that negroes can not go in the park that is designated as white? A. That is right. Q. And white people can not go in the parks that are designated for negroes? A. That is right. Q. In the event negroes were in a park that was desig nated as white what would be the policy? A. They would be asked to leave. 10 Q. By whom? A. By the Park Director. Q. The line is drawn clear and you all have instructed your employees which parks negroes can not use? A. That is right. Q. And which parks white people can not use? A. Yes, that is right. —26— # # # # # Q. Again we would like to have you indicate on these lists those [park facilities] which are used by negroes and which by white? A. (Reading) “Golf Courses” : —27— # * # * # Overton is for white. —28— # # # # # Q. (Continuing) Now will you look at that list [Plain tiffs’ Exhibit 3] and tell us what it is about? A. That is the 1961 list of the playgrounds operated by the recreation department of the Memphis Park Commission, controlled by the Park Commission. Q. Again we will go down that list and indicate those used by negroes and those used by white and those that are used by both, if any? —31— # # # # # Overton is white. —33— # # # # # Q. We had mentioned the park—Overton Park. I believe the only thing used by both, the zoo? A. And art gallery. Q. But are there dual sets of toilets out there? A. There - 3 5 - are dual sets of toilets. Harold 8. Lewis—Direct *# # # — 36— 11 H arry P ierotti, Chairman of the Memphis Park Com mission. Q. Now, what about your plan for the future, Mr. Pier otti? Does the Park Commission plan to open up other facilities in the future? Have you evolved any plan with —114- regard to that? A. Mr. Prewitt, I think I can better ex press that if I would read the plan which we have evolved, so there won’t be any mistake about what our plan is for the immediate future. Q. All right, sir. Suppose you read that plan. A. (Read ing) “Having heretofore, before the filing of this suit, pro vided twenty-one parks in the City on a non-segregated basis, and having recently removed restrictions at Overton Park Zoo, Art Gallery in Overton Park and the Boat Dock at McKellar Lake, the Park Commis sion, following a practice already adopted, has evolved the following plan and the following facilities will be open to all races without restrictions at the dates indi cated.” —115— # # # # # “Overton Park Golf Course, March 1st, 1963, . . . ” —116- Harry Pierotti—Direct H a rold S. L ewis, Director of the Memphis Park Commis sion. # # # # # By Attorney Preivitt: Q. As testified by Mr. Pierotti, the Overton Park Zoo has already—all restrictions about admittance of colored as well as white has been removed? A. Right. 12 Q. So that both races may be admitted to the Overton Park Zoo at any time the Zoo is open? A. Right. Q. And that restriction was voluntarily removed by the Park Commission in December of 1960? A. The day after Thanksgiving, 1960. Q. And the art gallery in Overton Park, the restriction there was likewise removed a few months ago on a voluntary basis? A. Right. —167— # # # # # Q. I say they can use any place where the police do not put them out? Is that your statement? A. The police do not put them out there. —184— Q. I say if the police do not put them out of a particular park, then they are free to use it? A. Certainly. Q. They would not know, according to your testimony, whether they are free to use it until the police asked them to get out? A. That could be. —185— * # # # # Q. Does the Park Commission have any policy of public announcement when they integrate a facility? A. The - 1 8 5 - Park Commission’s policy has been to avoid any trouble as to integrating without any fanfare, such as was done at the Zoo. Q. But there was an announcement that the Zoo was de segregated, was there not? A. There was a very small an nouncement, yes. Q. As to these other integrated facilities that you men tioned in your testimony, has there been any announcement that negroes could use them? # # * # # Harold 8. Lewis—Direct 13 A. There was no announcement that negroes could use them, nor was there an announcement that whites could use places that had been for negroes. —186— Q. As I understand your testimony, the criteria is whether or not the police arrest you or run you out? A. I wouldn’t say that. Q. What is the criteria? A. The criteria is the parks are open to all races and they use them. Q. How would the members of the public know that the parks are open to all races if there is no announcement made? A. By usage. Q. If the police don’t run you out, as you said before? A. By usage. Q. You are saying that we are free to go to any park in the City of Memphis that we wish to go to, as long as no one runs us out, is that your testimony? A. As long as no one asks you to leave. Q. We are free to go to all of them as long as no one asks us to leave? A. Yes. Q. At the point that we are asked to leave, then what is the policy? A. We are still operating under a segregated park system in that case, and we would ask you to leave, —187— and if you caused trouble by not leaving, we would then call the police. Q. Who would have the authority to ask us to leave, any member of the public, or would it have to be an employee of the Park Department or the Police? A. Certainly any member of the public could ask you, but it would have to be park personnel to have any authority as far as the Park Commission is concerned. Q. Are you familiar with the location of Glenview Park? A. I am. Harold S. Lewis—Cross * 14 Harold S. Lewis—Cross Q. Negroes could go there and use that if they are not asked to leave? A. They would be asked to leave. Q. They would be asked to leave? A. That’s right. Q. Who would ask them to leave? A. The Director of the park or the police. Q. If they peacefully refused to leave, what would be the follow-up procedure of the Park Commission? A. After being asked in every nice way known, the Park Di rectors are instructed to call the Park Police. Q. And have the negroes arrested? A. Have them forcibly ejected or arrested, yes. — 189—