Brown v. Rippy Transcript of Record
Public Court Documents
January 28, 1956
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Brown v. Rippy Transcript of Record, 1956. 1bad78ab-b69a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/581ea7eb-1817-4cf5-b4f8-07676706f522/brown-v-rippy-transcript-of-record. Accessed December 05, 2025.
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TRANSCRIPT OF RECORD.
U N IT E D S T A T E S
COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT.
No. 15,872
CHARLES BROWN, a minor, by his father and next
friend, WALTER BROWN, JR., ET AL.,
Appellants,
versus
DR. EDWIN L. RIPPY, as President of the Board of
Trustees of the Dallas Independent School District,
Dallas County Texas, ET AL.,
Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas.
(ORIGINAL RECORD RECEIVED NOV. 25/55.)
U. s. COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
JAN 2 8 1956
#oJU d ' & e e fa *h
J CLERK
INDEX
PAGE
C a p t io n ................................................................................. 1
Complaint ................................................................................... 4
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Prelim inary Injunction . . . . . . 25
Order to Show Cause, entered 9/12/55 .......................... 28
Motion of Defendants, Edwin L. Rippy, et al., to Dis
miss Complaint ........................................................... 28
Answer of Defendants, Edwin L. Rippy, et al., to
Complaint ..................................................................... 30
Transcript of Proceedings ................................................... 38
Case called for hearing, etc.......................................... 38
Colloquy between Court and Counsel .................... 38
Statem ent made by Mr. Thuss, Counsel for De
fendants ............................................... 52
Statem ent made by Mr. M arshall, Counsel for
Plaintiffs ............................................................... 56
Colloquy between Court and C o u n se l...................... 59
Statem ent made by the Court .................................. 59
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ...................... 63
Judgm ent, entered 9 /1 2 /5 5 ................................................... 66
Notice of Appeal ..................................................................... 67
Motion and O rder extending tim e to file Record in
Appellate Court ......................................................... 70
A ppellants’ Designation as to Contents of Record on
Appeal ............................................. 71
Clerk’s Certificate ................................................................... 75
CAPTION.
BE IT REMEMBERED, th a t at a Special Term of the
United S tates D istrict Court in and for the N orthern
D istrict of Texas, begun and holden at Dallas, Texas,
on the 12th day of September, A.D. 1955, and which
said term of Court is now in session, the Hon. Wm.
H. Atwell, United States D istrict Judge for the
N orthern D istrict of Texas, presiding, the following
proceedings w ere had and the following cause came
on for tria l and was tried, to-wit:
Civil Action No. 6165.
ALBERT BELL, A MINOR, BY HIS STEP-FATHER
AND NEXT FRIEND, THEODORE D. DORSEY;
SANDRA LYNETTA BERKINS, A MINOR, BY HER
MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND, (MRS.) CHARLES
BEKINS, A FEMME SOLE; HILDA RUTH
BORDERS, A MINOR, BY HER FATHER AND NEXT
FRIEND, LOUIE BORDERS, JR.; SANDRA CRAIG
BOSON, AND PAMELA BOSON, MINOR, BY THEIR
FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, LAWRENCE C.
BOSON; CHARLES BROWN, A MINOR, BY HIS
FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, WALTER BROWN,
JR .; WILLIAM C. BURTON, JR., A MINOR, BY
HIS FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, WILLIAM C.
BURTON; SHIRLEY ANN BUSH, A MINOR, BY
HER FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, FRANKIE L.
BUSH; RAYFORD COOKS, A MINOR, BY HIS
FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, ROBERT COOKS;
BILLIE MARIE COX, A MINOR, BY HER STEP
FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, VELL SNOWDEN;
HELEN JEAN GIPSON, A MINOR, BY HER
2
MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND, LUENDA GIPSON,
A FEMME SOLE; CHARLENE GOLDSTEIN, A
MINOR, BY HER MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND,
W ILLIE MAE GOLDSTEIN, A FEMME SOLE;
OSCAR W ILLIE HAWKINS, A MINOR, BY HIS
FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, OSCAR HAWKINS;
CAROL, CHEYEL AND RONALD HURDLE, MI
NORS, BY THEIR FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, EL
MER D. HURDLE; OLLIE PEARL IVY, A MINOR,
BY HER MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND, IRENE IVY,
A F E M M E SO LE; JO H N A R V IE LEW IS, A
MINOR, BY HIS STEP-FATHER AND NEXT
F R IE N D , G E O R G E F IE L D S ; M ILTON Mc-
DANIEL, A MINOR, BY HIS FATHER AND NEXT
FRIEND, WILLIAM McDANIEL; DIANN MURPHY,
A MINOR, BY HER GRANDMOTHER AND NEXT
FRIEND, (MRS.) S. L. NEELY, A FEMME SOLE;
L. LAWRENCE NELSON, II, A MINOR, BY HIS
FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, CLYDE D. NELSON;
ALONZO D. NICKERSON, JR., A MINOR, BY HIS
FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, ALONZO D. NICK
ERSON, SR.; ROSA SHARON AND MAUSE LOUIS
SIMS, MINORS, BY THEIR FATHER AND NEXT
FRIEND, (REV) PAUL A. SIMS, MARY ANN
SLIDER, A MINOR, BY HER FATHER AND NEXT
FRIEND, L. G. SLIDER; DAURITY G. SMITH, A
MINOR, BY HIS FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND,
LEO M. SMITH; JU LIA ANN VICKERS, A MINOR,
BY HER FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, SEARCY
E. VUCKERS, AND JOE ARTHUR WILLIAMS, A
MINOR, BY HIS FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND,
HERBERT WILLIAMS,
P lain tiffs ,
3
versus
DR. EDWIN L. RIPPY, AS PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD
OF TRUSTEES OF THE DALLAS INDEPENDENT
SCHOOL DISTRICT, DALLAS, DALLAS COUNTY,
TEXAS; W. A. BLAIR; ROBERT L. DILLARD, JR.;
ROBERT B. GILMORE; ROUSE HOWELL; (MRS.)
VERNON D. INGRAM; VAN M. LAMM; (MRS.)
TRACY H. RUTHERFORD; FRANKLIN E. SPAF-
FORD, DALLAS, DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS, AS
MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF
THE DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIS
TRICT, AND DR. W. T. WHITE, AS SUPERIN
TENDENT OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF THE DAL
LAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT; HOW
ARD A. ALLEN, AS PRINCIPAL OF THE W. H.
ADAMSON HIGH SCHOOL; J. H. GURLEY, AS
PRINCIPAL OF THE MAPLE LAWN ELEMEN
TARY SCHOOL; W. A. HAMILTON, AS PRINCI
PAL OF THE MIRABEAU B. LAMAR ELEMEN
TARY SCHOOL; ELLA E. PARKER, AS PRINCI
PAL OF THE JOHN HENRY BROWN ELEMEN
TARY SCHOOL; WILLIAM H. STANLEY, AS
PRINCIPAL OF THE THOMAS A. EDISON ELE
MENTARY SCHOOL; RICHARD E. STROUD, AS
PRINCIPAL OF THE THOMAS J. RUSK JUNIOR
HIGH SCHOOL, AND, THE DALLAS INDEPEND
ENT SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendants.
4
COMPLAINT.
I.
Jurisdiction.
(a) The Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court is in
voked under T itle 28, Section 1331, of the United States
Code, this being a civil action in equity tha t arises under
the Constitution and laws of the United States w herein
the m atter in controversy exceeds the sum and value of
Three Thousand ($3,000.00) Dollars, exclusive of interest
and costs, (62 Stat. 930, June 25, 1948), and, T itle 28,
Sections 1981 and 1983, of the United States Code, this
being a civil action in equity w herein citizens of the
United States contend th a t they have been, are now, and
w ill in the fu ture be deprived under color of law, of their
rights, privileges and im munities secured to them as citi
zens of the United States, by the Constitution and laws
thereof, (68 Stat. 960, A ugust 30, 1954).
(b) The Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court is fu r
th e r invoked under Title 28, Section 1343(3), of the
United States Code, this being a civil action in equity
to redress the deprivation, under color of a State law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any
right, privilege or im m unity secured by the Constitution
of the United States, or by any act of Congress provid
ing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons w ithin
the jurisdiction of the United States, (62 Stat. c. 646,
June 25, 1948).
5
II.
Injunctive Relief.
The Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court is also invoked
under T itle 28, Sections 2281 and 2284, of th e United
States Code, this being a civil action in equity for an in
terlocutory or perm anent injunction to restra in the en
forcement, operation or execution of certain statutes of
the S tate of Texas, and of certain constitutional provisions
of the S tate of Texas, upon the grounds of the unconstitu
tionality of such statutes and constitutional provisions,
(62 Stat. 968, c. 646, June 25, 1948).
III.
D eclaratory Judgm ent.
This is a proceeding under Title 28, Sections 2201 and
2202, of the U nited States Code, for a declaratory judg
ment. All of the parties to the controversy are subject to
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. P laintiffs seek
a definition and declaration of the legal rights and re la
tions of th e parties in the subject m atter of th is controver
sy, to wit, the question:
(a) W hether the enforcement, execution or operation
of A rticle 2900 and Articles 2922-13 and 2922-15, of V er
non’s Civil S tatutes of th e S tate of Texas, to th e extent
tha t they require or sanction the segregation of students
in th e public schools of Texas on the basis of race or
color, by th e defendant Board of Education of the Dal
las Independent School D istrict, and the adm inistrative
officers of said defendant Board, against plaintiffs, and
6
the class of persons tha t they represent, because of their
race and color deny to them their rights, privileges and
im munities as citizens of the United States, and the equal
protection of laws secured to them by the Fourteenth
A m endm ent of the Constitution of th e United States, or
of rights and privileges secured to them by Sections 1981
and 1983, of Title 42, United States Code, and are, for
those reasons, unconstitutional and void?
(b) W hether the enforcement, execution or operation
of A rticle VII, Section 7, of the Constitution of Texas,
by the defendant Board of Education of the Dallas In
dependent School District, and the adm inistrative officers
of said defendant Board, against plaintiffs, and the class of
persons th a t they represent, because of their race and
color deny to them their rights, privileges and im m uni
ties as citizens of the United States, and the equal pro
tection of laws secured to them by th e Fourteenth A m end
m ent of the Constitution of the United States, or of
rights and privileges secured to them by Sections 1981
and 1983, of Title 42, United States Code, and are, for
these reasons, unconstitutional and void.
IV.
Facts.
1. Plaintiffs, and each of them, allege tha t they are
citizens of the United States and of the State of Texas,
domiciled in the City and County of Dallas, Texas, and
w ithin th e Dallas Independent School District; tha t they
are, each of them, members of the Negro, or “colored”
race, as defined by Texas law. (Acts of 1905, p. 263, A r
ticle 2900, Vernon’s Civil S tatutes of the S tate of Tex
as, Annotated.)
7
2. The plaintiffs, and each of them, allege tha t they
are m inors between the ages of six (6) and tw enty-one
(21) years; tha t they have met all lawful health and
medical requirem ents for admission to the public schools
of the City of Dallas; tha t they are in all m aterial re
spects eligible and entitled to attend the public schools
of the City of Dallas and w ithin the Dallas Independent
School District, and to register, enter classes and re
ceive instruction in the particular schools set out in
paragraph 12, hereinafter.
3. The plaintiff Charles Brown is a m inor and he
brings this action by his father and next friend, W al
te r Brown, Jr.; the plaintiff Rayford Cooks is a minor
and he brings this action by his father and next friend,
Robert Cooks; the plaintiff W illiam C. Burton, Jr., is a
m inor and he brings this action by his fa ther and nex t
friend, W illiam C. Burton; the plaintiff Alonzo D. Nick
erson, Jr., is a m inor and he brings this action by his
father and next friend, Alonzo D. Nickerson, Sr.; the
plaintiffs Sandra Craig and Pam ela Boson are minors
and they bring this action by their father and nex t
friend, Lawrence C. Boson; the plaintiff L. Lawrence
Nelson, II., is a minor and he brings this action by his
father and next friend, Clyde D. Nelson; the plaintiff
M ary Ann Slider is a minor and she brings this action
by her fa ther and next friend, L. G. Slider; the plain
tiff Diann M urphy is a minor and she brings this action
by her grandm other and next friend, (Mrs.) S. L. Nee
ly, a femme sole; the plaintiff Helen Jean Gipson is a
minor and she brings this action by her m other and
nex t friend, (Mrs.) Luenda Gipson, a femme sole; the
plaintiff Joe A rthur Williams is a minor and he brings
this action by his father and next friend, H erbert Wil-
8
liams; the plaintiffs Rosa Sharon and Maude Lois Sims
are m inors and they bring this action by their father and
next friend, (Rev.) Paul A. Sims; the plaintiff D aurity
G. Sm ith is a minor and he brings this action by his
father and next friend, Leo M. Smith; the plaintiff Ollie
Pearl Ivy is a m inor and she brings this action by her
m other and next friend, (Mrs.) Irene Ivy, a femme sole;
the plaintiff Oscar Willie Hawkins is a minor and he
brings this action by his father and next friend, Oscar
Hawkins; the plaintiff Milton McDaniel is a minor and
he brings this action by his fa ther and next friend,
William McDaniel; the plaintiff Sandra Lynetta Berkins
is a minor and she brings this action by her m other and
next friend, (Mrs.) Charles Berkins, a femme
sole; the plaintiffs Carol, Cheyel and Ronald H ur
dle are minors and they bring this action by
the ir father and next friend, Elmer D. Hurdle;
the P laintiff Billie Marie Cox is a minor and she
brings this action by her step-father and next friend, Yell
Snowden; the plaintiff John A rvie Lewis is a minor
and he brings this action by his step-father and next
friend, George Fields; the plaintiff A lbert Bell is a
minor and he brings this action by his step-father and
next friend, Theodore D. Dorsey; the plaintiff Hilda Ruth
Borders is a minor and she brings this action by her
father and next friend, Louie Borders, Jr.; the plaintiff
Charlene Goldstein is a m inor and she brings this ac
tion by her m other and next friend, (Mrs.) Willie Mae
Goldstein, a femme sole; the plaintiff Ju lia Ann Vickers
is a minor and she brings this action by her fa ther and
next friend, Searcy E. Vickers, and the plaintiff Shir
ley Ann Bush is a minor and she brings this action by
h e r fa ther and next friend, Frankie L. Bush, pursuant
to Rule 17(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
9
4. Plaintiffs bring this action in their own behalf,
and in behalf of all other Negro minors who are sim
ilarly situated, because of their race and color, w ithin
the Dallas Independent School District. Plaintiffs say
tha t they are members of a class of persons who are
segregated and discrim inated against by the defendants
because of their race and color; tha t the members of
the class are so num erous as to make it im practicable to
bring all of them before this Honorable Court; tha t they,
as members of the class, can and will fairly and ade
quately represent all of the members of the class; tha t
the character of the right sought to be protected and en
forced for the class is several, and tha t there is a com
mon question of law affecting the several rights of all,
and a common relief is sought. They bring this action
as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(a)(3), Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.
5. Plaintiffs allege tha t the defendant Board of Trus
tees of the defendant Dallas Independent School District
is a body corporate w ith powers and authority to sue
and be sued in its corporate name. (Articles 2748 and
2772, Ibid.)
6. Plaintiffs allege tha t the defendant Board of T rus
tees, sometimes referred to as Board of Education, is
vested w ith power and authority to m anage and con
trol the public schools under its supervision and control.
(A rticle 2749, Ibid.)
7. Plaintiffs allege tha t the defendant Board of Trus
tees of the defendant Dallas Independent School District
has power and authority to adopt rules and regulations,
and by-laws, including the admission of students to pub
lic schools, to effectuate the policies of the said Board
10
w ith respect to the m anagem ent and control of the pub
lic schools under its supervision. (A rticle 2780, Ibid.)
8. The plaintiffs allege tha t the defendant Dallas In
dependent School District is a political sub-division and
an instrum entality of the State, and tha t it exists p u r
suant to an Act of the Legislature of the State of Tex
as. (A rticle 2783, et seq., Ibid.)
9. Plaintiffs allege tha t the defendant (Dr.) Edwin
L. Rippy is a citizen of the United States and of the
State of Texas; tha t he is domiciled in the City and
County of Dallas, Texas, and is subject to the jurisdic
tion of this Honorable Court; tha t he is the duly elected,
qualified and acting president of the defendant Board of
Trustees of the Dallas Independent School District; th a t
he is an agent and adm inistrative officer of the S tate
of Texas, and tha t he is sued in his official capacity.
10. Plaintiffs say tha t the defendants W. A. Blair,
Robert L. Dillard, Jr., Robert B. Gilmore, Rouse Howell,
(Mrs.) Vernon D. Ingram, Van M. Lamm, (Mrs.) Tracy
H. Rutherford and Franklin E. Spafford are, each of
them, citizens of the United States and of the S tate of
Texas; tha t they are domiciled in the City and County
of Dallas, Texas; tha t they are subject to the jurisdic
tion of this Honorable Court; tha t they are the duly
elected, qualified and acting members of the defend
ant Board of Trustees of the Dallas Independent School
D istrict; tha t they are agents and adm inistrative offi
cers of the State of Texas, and tha t they are sued in
the ir official capacities.
11
11. The plaintiffs allege tha t the defendant (Dr.)
W. T. W hite is a citizen of the United States and of the
State of Texas; th a t he is domiciled in the City and
County of Dallas, Texas; tha t he is subject to the ju ris
diction of th is Honorable Court; tha t he is the only desig
nated, qualified and acting Superintendent of the public
schools w ithin the defendant Dallas Independent School
D istrict; tha t he is an agent and adm inistrative officer
of the State of Texas, and tha t he is sued in his official
capacity.
12. P laintiffs allege tha t the defendant Howard A. Allen
is the principal of the W. H. Adamson High School w ithin
the Dallas Independent School District; tha t the defendant
R. E. Stroud is the principal of the Thomas J. Rusk Jun ior
High School w ith in the Dallas Independent School Dis
trict; tha t the defendant Ella E. Parker is the principal
of the John H enry Brown Elem entary School w ithin the
Dallas Independent School District; tha t the defendant
J. H. G urley is the principal of the Maple Lawn Elemen
ta ry School w ith in the Dallas Independent School District;
tha t the defendant W. A. Ham ilton is the principal of the
M irabeau B. Lam ar E lem entary School w ithin the Dallas
Independent School District; tha t the defendant W illiam
H. Stanley is the principal of the Thomas A. Edison Ele
m entary School w ithin the Dallas Independent School Dis
trict, and tha t they are, each of them, citizens of the United
States and of the S tate of Texas, domiciled in the City and
County of Dallas; tha t they are, each of them, subject to
the judisdiction of this Honorable Court; tha t they are,
each of them, agents and employees of the defendant
Board of Trustees of the Dallas Independent School Dis
trict, and tha t they are agents and adm inistrative officer
of the State of Texas. They are, each of them, sued in
their respective official capacities.
12
13. The plaintiffs Charles Brown, Rayford Cooks, W il
liam C. Burton, Jr., Alonzo D. Nickerson, J r . Sandra Craig
and Pam ela Boson, and Lawrence Nelson, II., allege tha t
on, to wit, the 5th day of September, A. D. 1955, they, and
each of them, acting in the ir respective individual behalf,
w ent in person w ith the ir respective parents, or w ith
th e ir parents knowledge and consent, to the Maple Law n
Elem entary School w ith in th e Dallas Independent School
D istrict, during the regular period of registration and ad
mission and made application for registration and ad
mission to the said Maple Lawn E lem entary School; that
the said Maple Lawn E lem entary School was then, and
is now, the nearest public elem entary school to the ir
respective homes; tha t they w ere ready and willing to
submit to and abide by all law ful and reasonable rules
and regulations of the defendant Board of Trustees of
the Dallas Independent School District; they w ere in all
m aterial respects eligible to register, enter classes, and
receive instruction in the said elem entary school, but for
the ir race and color, but tha t in spite of the foregoing
facts, they w ere denied and refused admission to the said
Maple Law n Elem entary School by its principal J. H.
Gurley, w hile the said J. H. Gurley was acting in con
cert, conspiracy and a common scheme w ith the defendant
W. T. W hite, as superintendent of public schools in the
Dallas Independent School District, and the defendant
Board of Trustees of the Dallas Independent School Dis
tric t to w ilfully and knowingly deprive plaintiffs and the
members of the class of persons they represent, because
of the ir race and color, of rights, privileges and im m uni
ties secured and guaranteed to them by Section 1, of the
Fourteenth Amendm ent of the Constitution of the United
States.
13
14. The plaintiffs M ary Ann Slider, Diann M urphy,
Helen Jean Gipson, John Arvie Lewis, A lbert Bell, Hilda
Ruth Borders, Charlene Goldstein and Ju lia Ann Vickers
allege tha t on, to wit, the 5th day of September, A. D.
1955, they, and each of them, while acting in their
respective individual behalf w ent in person w ith their
respective parents or w ith the ir paren ts’ knowledge
and consent, to the W. H. Adamson High School w ithin
the Dallas Independent School District during the regular
period of registration and admission and made applica
tion for registration and admission to the said W. H.
Adamson High School; th a t the said W. H. Adamson
High School was then, and is now, the nearest public
high school to their respective homes; tha t they were
ready and willing to submit to and abide by all lawful
and reasonable rules and regulations of the defendant
Board of Trustees of the Dallas Independent School Dis
tric t; tha t they w ere in all m aterial respects eligible to
register, en ter classes, and receive instructions in the said
high school but for their race and color, but th a t in spite
of the foregoing facts, they w ere denied and refused
admission to the said W. H. Adamson High School by its
principal Howard A. Allen, while the said Howard A.
Allen was acting in concert, conspiracy and a common
scheme w ith the defendant W. T. W hite, as superintendent
of public schools in the Dallas Independent School Dis
trict, and the defendant Board of Trustees of the Dallas
Independent School District to w ilfully and knowingly
deprive plaintiffs and the members of the class of persons
they represent, because of their race and color, of rights,
privileges and immunities secured and guaranteed to them
by Section 1, of the Fourteenth Amendm ent of the Con
stitution of the United States.
14
15. The plaintiffs Joe A rthu r Williams, Rose Sharon
and Maude Lois Sims, D aurity G. Smith, Sandra Lynette
Berkins, Carol, Cheyel and Ronald Hurdle, and Billie
M arie Cox allege tha t on, to wit, the 5th day of Septem
ber, A. D. 1955, they, and each of them acting in their
respective individual behalf, w ent in person w ith their
respective parents, or w ith the ir parents knowledge and
consent to the John H enry Brown E lem entary School
w ithin the Dallas Independent School D istrict, during
the regular period of registration and admission and made
application for registration and admission to the said
John H enry Brown E lem entary School; tha t the said
John H enry Brown Elem entary school was then, and
is now, the nearest public elem entary school to their
respective homes; tha t they w ere leady, and willing to
subm it to and abide by all law ful and reasonable rules
and regulations of the defendant Board of Trustees of
the Dallas Independent School D istrict; tha t they w ere
in all m aterial respects eligible to register, enter clas
ses, and receive instruction in the said elem entary school
bu t for the ir race and color, bu t th a t in spite of the fore
going facts, they w ere denied and refused admission to
the said John H enry Brown E lem entary School by its
principal Ella E. Parker, while the said Ella E. P arker was
acting in concert, conspiracy and a common scheme w ith
the defendant W. T. W hite, as superintendent of public
schools in the Dallas Independent School D istrict, and the
defendant Board of Trustees of the Dallas Independent
School D istrict to w ilfully and knowingly deprive plain
tiffs and the members of the class of persons they
represent, because of the ir race and color, of rights,
privileges and im munities secured and guaranteed to them
by Section 1, of the Fourteenth Amendm ent of the
Constitution of the United States.
15
16. The plaintiffs Ollie Pearl Ivy and Oscar Willie
Hawkins allege tha t on, to wit, the 5th day of September,
A. D. 1955, they, and each of them, acting in their re
spective individual behalf, w ent in person w ith their
respective parents, or w ith their parents knowlelge and
consent, to th e Thomas A. Edison Elem entary School
w ithin the Dallas Independent School District, during
the regular period of registration and admission and made
application for registration and admission to the said
Thomas A. Edison E lem entary School; tha t the said
Thomas A. Edison Elem entary School was then and
is now, the nearest public elem entary school to the ir
respective homes; th a t they w ere ready and willing
to submit to and abide by all law ful and reasonable
rules and regulations of the defendant Board of T rus
tees of the Dallas Independent School District; th a t they
w ere in all m aterial respects eligible to register, enter
classes, and receive instruction in the said elem entary
school, bu t for their race and color, bu t th a t in spite of
the foregoing facts, they w ere denied and refused admis
sion to the said Thomas A. Edison E lem entary School
by its principal W illiam H. Stanley, while the said William
H. Stanley was acting in concert, conspiracy, and a com
mon scheme w ith the defendant W. T. W hite, as super
intendent of the public schools in the Dallas Independent
School District, and the defendant Board of Trustees of
the Dallas Independent School D istrict to W ilfully and
knowingly deprive plaintiffs and the members of the
class of persons they represent, because of the ir race and
color, of rights, privileges and im m unities secured and
guaranteed to them by Section 1, of the Fourteenth
Amendm ent of the Constitution of the United States.
16
17. The plaintiff M ilton McDaniel alleges tha t on,
to wit, the 5th day of September, A. D. 1955, he w ent
in person w ith his father W illiam McDaniel, to the Mira-
beau B. Lam ar E lem entary School w ithin the Dallas
Independent School D istrict, during the regular period
of registration and admission and made application for
registration and admission to the said M irabeau B. Lam ar
Elem entary School; tha t the M irabeau B. Lam ar Elemen
ta ry School was then and is now, the nearest public
elem entary school to his home; tha t he was ready and
willing to submit to and abide by all lawful and reason
able rules and regulations of the defendant Board of T rus
tees of the Dallas Independent School District; tha t
he was in all m aterial respects eligible to register, en ter
classes, and receive instruction in the said elem entary
school, bu t for his race and color, bu t tha t in spite of the
foregoing facts, he was denied and refused admission
to the said M irabeau B. Lam ar Elem entary School by
its principal W. A. Hamilton, w hile the said W. A. Ham
ilton, was acting in concert, conspiracy and a common
scheme w ith the defendant W. T. W hite, as superinten
dent of public schools of the Dallas Independent School
D istrict, and the defendant Board of Trustees of the
Dallas Independent School D istrict to w ilfully and know
ingly deprive plaintiffs and the members of the class
of persons they represent, because of their race and color,
of rights, privileges and immunities secured and guaran
teed to them by Section 1, of the Fourteenth Amendm ent
of the United States.
18. The plaintiff Shirley Ann Bush alleges that on,
to wit, the 5th day of September, A. D. 1955, she
w ent in person with her m other Mae E. Bush, to the
Thomas J. Rusk Jun ior High School w ithin the Dallas
.17
Independent School D istrict, during the regular period
of registration and admission and m ade application for
registration and admission to the said Thomas J. Rusk
Junior High School; tha t the said Thomas J. Rusk Junior
High School was then and is now, the nearest public
junior high school to her home; tha t she was ready and
willing to submit to and abide by all lawful and reasonable
rules and regulations of the defendant Board of Trus
tees of the Dallas Independent School D istrict; tha t she
was in all m aterial respects eligible to register, enter
classes, and receive instruction in the said junior high
school, bu t for her race and color, bu t tha t in spite of the
foregoing facts, she was denied and refused admission to
the said Thomas J. Rusk Junior High School by its
principal R. E. Stroud, while the said R. E. Stroud
was acting in concert, conspiracy and a common scheme
w ith the defendant W. T. White, as superintendent of
public schools in the Dallas Independent School District,
and the defendant Board of Trustees of the Dallas In
dependent School D istrict to w ilfully and knowingly de
prive plaintiff and the members of the class of persons
she represents, because of their race and color, of rights,
privileges and im m unities secured and guaranteed to them
by Section 1, of the Fourteenth Amendm ent of the Con
stitution of the United States.
19. The State of Texas has unlaw fully made racial
segregation in the public schools of the State a part of its
public policy. By a constitutional provision, it is stated
that:
“Separate schools shall be provided for the white and
colored children, and im partial provision shall be made
for both.” (Art. VII, Sec. 7, Constitution of Texas.)
18
20. Acting pursuant to the aforesaid unlaw ful con
stitu tional m andate in the organic law of the State, the
Legislature illegally enacted laws to im plem ent the un
law ful constitutional provision set out in paragraph 19
hereof. A rticle 2900, V ernon’s Civil S tatutes of the S tate
of Texas provides:
“All available public school funds of this state shall
be appropriated in each county for the education alike of
w hite and colored children, and im partial provisions
shall be made for both races. No w hite child shall
attend schools supported for colored children, nor shall
colored children attend schools supported for w hite
children. The term “colored race” or “colored children”
as used in this Title, include all persons of mixed blood
descending from Negro ancestry.” (Acts of 1905, p. 263.)
21. W hile acting in fu rth er deference to the illegal con
stitutional provision set out in paragraph 19 hereof, the
51st Legislature of Texas, enacted the M inimum Founda
tion School Program Act, sometimes called the Gilmer-
A ikin Act which became effective June 8, 1949, the
pertinent portions of the Act provide as follows:
Article 2922-13: The num ber of professional units
allotted for the purpose of this Act to each school dis
trict, except as otherw ise provided herein, shall be based
upon and determ ined by the average daily attendance for
the district for the n ex t preceding year, separate for
w hite and separate for negroes. Such allotm ents based
upon w hite attendance shall be utilized in w hite schools,
and allotm ents based on negro attendance shall be
utilized in negro schools.
19
A rticle 2922-15: The to tal curren t operating cost for
each school district, o ther than professional salaries and
transportation, shall be based upon the num ber of ap
proved classroom teacher units and such exceptional child
ren teacher units as are utilized for convalescent classes,
separate for w hite and separate for negroes, ***.
22. Plaintiffs allege th a t the purpose of the Foundation
School program act is to guarantee to each child of school
age in Texas the availability of a minimum foundation
school program for nine m onths of the year, and to estab
lish the eligibility requirem ents applicable to Texas public
school districts in connection therew ith, and tha t the
segregation of the races in th e enjoym ent of public school
benefits was not its prim ary purpose. (Acts of 1949,
51st Leg., p. 625, ch. 334, Art. 1).
23. P laintiffs allege tha t only so much of th e Act as
requires or places state sanction upon racial segregation
is unconstitutional.
24. P laintiffs allege th a t the defendant Board of Trus
tees of the Dallas Independent School D istrict while
acting, or purporting to act, pursuant to the illegal laws
of th e State of Texas set out in paragraphs 19, 20, and 21
hereof, has made adopted and prom ulgated certain rules
and regulations for the managem ent and control of the
public schools under its supervision, and specifically for
the m anagem ent and control of the public schools men
tioned hereinbefore in paragraphs 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and
18 hereof, which have been enforced against plaintiffs,
and each of them, and which will be enforced against
them in the future, because of th e ir race and color, tha t
unlaw fully and wrongfully discrim inate against plaintiffs
20
and th e class of persons th a t they represent, because of
the ir race and color and deprive them of rights, privileges
and im m unities secured to them as citizens of the United
S tates by the Constitution and laws of the U nited States.
25. P laintiffs allege tha t the defendant Board of
Education of the Dallas Independent School D istrict, and
the defendant W. T. W hite, w hile acting as Superin ten
dent of public schools of the Dallas Independent School
District, and the defendants H owerd A. Allen, Ella E.
Parker, W illiam H. Stanley, Richard E. Stroud, J. H.
Gurley, and W. A. Hamilton, as principals of public
schools m entioned hereinbefore in paragraphs 13, 14, 15,
16, 17 and 18, hereof, have conspired, acted in concert
and common scheme jointly to w ilfully and knowingly
deprive plaintiffs and the class of persons tha t they
represent, because of the ir race and color, of rights and
privileges secured to them by Section 1, of the Four
teen th Amendm ent of the Constitution of the United
States, and of rights secured to them by Sections 1981
and 1983, of Title 28, United States Code, by the enforce
m ent and operation of the aforesaid rules and regulations,
to the great and irreparable harm and in jury of plaintiffs
and the class of persons tha t they represent.
26. Plaintiffs allege tha t they have no plain, efficient
or adequate rem edy at law to redress the unlaw ful action
of the defendants, and each of them, other than this
action for declaratory judgm ent and injunctive relief;
th a t any other rem edy to which they could be rem itted
would be attended by such uncertainties and delays as
to am ount to substantial denial of relief; would involve
a m ultiplicity of suits and would cause plaintiffs fu rther
irreparable harm and injury, and occasion undue hard
ships, vexations and delay.
21
V.
P ra y e r .
W herefore , the p re m ise s considered , p la in tiffs , r e
spectfu lly p ra y th a t upon th e filing of th is C om plaint,
as m a y a p p e a r p ro p e r an d conven ien t to th e Court:
1. T h a t a S ta tu to ry T h ree -Ju d g e C ourt be convened
p u rsu a n t to Sections 2281 and 2284, of T itle 28, U nited
S ta te s Code;
2. T h a t th is cause be ad v an ced on th e docket of
th is C ourt and a speedy h e a rin g be o rd e red acco rd in g
to law , and upon such p re lim in a ry h ea rin g , th a t th is
H onorab le C ourt issue a te m p o ra ry in junction to
enjoin and re s tra in th e d efendan ts , and each of them ,
fro m denying or re fu s in g to p la in tiffs th e rig h t and
p riv ileg e of en tering , and a tten d in g c lasses , and r e
ceiv ing instruc tion a t th e pub lic school w ith in the
D allas In d ep en d en t School D is tr ic t w hich is n e a re s t
to th e ir hom e, w ithou t being ass ig n ed to any public
school on th e b as is or c la ss ifica tio n of ra c e or color,
and w ithou t any d istinctions being m ad e as to th em
b ecau se of th e ir ra c e and color;
3. T h a t upon fin a l h e a rin g of th is cau se on its
m erits , th is H onorab le Court:
(a ) . E n te r a fina l ju d g m en t or d ec re e th a t w ill be
d ec la ra tiv e and defin itive of th e leg a l r ig h ts and r e
la tions of th e p a r tie s in th e su b jec t m a tte r of th is
co n troversy ;
22
(b). E n te r a f in a l ju d g m en t, o rd e r and d ecree
w hich w ill dec lare th a t Section 7, of A rtic le V II, of
th e C onstitu tion of T exas is u n co n stitu tio n a l and void
fo r the re a so n th a t it denies and d ep riv es p la in tiffs ,
and th e m e m b e rs of th e c la ss of persons w hom they
re p re se n t, th e ir p riv ileg es and im m u n itie s as citizens
of th e U nited S ta tes , and th e eq u a l p ro tec tio n of law s
secu red to th em by th e C onstitu tion and law s of the
U nited S ta te s and r ig h ts and p riv ileg es secu red to
th e m by Section 1981 and 1983, of T itle 42, U nited
S ta te s Code;
(c). E n te r a f in a l ju d g m en t, o rd e r and d ec ree w hich
w ill d ec la re th a t A rtic le 2900, of V ernon ’s Civil S ta t
u te s of th e S ta te of T exas, is unconstitu tional and
void, fo r the re a so n th a t it den ies and dep riv es
p la in tiffs , and th e m e m b e rs of the c la ss of perso n s
w hom th ey re p re se n t, th e ir p riv ileg es and im m u n i
tie s as c itizens of the U nited S ta tes , and, th e equal
p ro tec tion of law s secu red to th e m by the C onstitu
tion and law s of the U nited S ta tes , and, r ig h ts and
p riv ileg es secu red to th em by Sections 1981 and 1983,
of T itle 42, U nited S ta tes Code;
(d ). E n te r a f in a l ju d g m en t, o rd e r and d ecree
w hich w ill d ec la re th a t so m u ch of A rtic les 2922-13,
and 2922-15, of V ernon ’s Civil S ta tu te s of the S ta te
of T exas, as m a y be in te rp re te d or co n stru ed to r e
qu ire , or san c tio n the seg reg a tio n of s tu d en ts in the
pub lic schools o p e ra ted by th e d efendan ts , or any of
th em , acco rd ing to ra c e a re u n co n stitu tio n a l and void,
fo r th e rea so n it den ies and d ep riv es p la in tiffs , and
th e m e m b e rs of th e c lass of p erso n s w hom they re
p re sen t, th e ir p riv ileges an d im m u n itie s as citizens
23
of the U nited S ta tes , and, the eq u a l p ro tec tio n of
law s, secu red to th e m by the C onstitu tion and law s
of th e U nited S ta tes , and, r ig h ts and p riv ileg es se
cu red to th e m by Sections 1981 and 1983, of T itle 42,
U nited S ta te s Code;
(e). E n te r a p e rm a n e n t in junction to en jo in and
re s tra in th e d e fen d an ts E dw in L. R ippy, W. A. B la ir,
R o b ert L. D illard , J r . , R o b ert B. G ilm ore, R ouse
Howell, (M rs.) V ernon In g ra m , V an M. L am m , (M rs.)
T rac y H. R u th e rfo rd , and F ra n k lin E . Spafford , as
officers and m e m b e rs of the B oard of T ru s tee s of the
D allas Indep en d en t School D is tric t, and W. T. W hite,
as S u p erin ten d en t of P ub lic Schools of the D allas
In d ep en d en t School D istric t, th e ir ag en ts , th e ir s e r
van ts, th e ir em ployees, th e ir a tto rn ey s , th e ir suc-
cesors in office, and a ll o ther perso n s in concert w ith
th em who sh a ll rece iv e a c tu a l no tice of th is jud g m en t,
o rd e r and decree , fro m fu r th e r execu ting , or en fo rc
ing a g a in s t p la in tiffs , or any m e m b e r of th e c lass of
perso n s w hom th ey rep re sen t, any ru le o r regu la tion ,
or any o rd e r or o rd ers , m ade , p ro m u lg a ted , or issued
p u rsu a n t to, or p u rp o rted ly issued p u rsu an t to e ith e r
Section 7, of A rtic le VII, of the C onstitu tion of T exas,
or A rtic le 2900 of V ernon ’s Civil S ta tu te s of the S ta te
of T exas, or any portion of A rtic le 2922-13 or 2922-15,
of V ernon ’s Civil S ta tu te s of th e S ta te of T exas th a t
re q u ire s or sanctions th e seg reg a tio n of s tuden ts in
the public schools o p e ra ted by the d efen d an t B oard
of T ru s tee s of the D allas Indep en d en t School D istric t,
acco rd ing to ra c e , or color.
24
4. T h a t th is H onorab le C ourt allow p la in tiffs th e ir
costs h ere in , and, g ra n t such o th e r and fu r th e r re lie f
as m a y a p p e a r equ itab le and ju s t in the p rem ises .
W. J . DURHAM ,
(W. J . D u rh am ).
2600 F lo ra S tree t,
D allas, T exas.
C. B. BU N K LEY , JR .,
(C. B. B unkley, J r . ) .
8141/2 N orth G ood-L atim er E x p ressw ay ,
D allas, T exas.
LO U IS B E D FO R D ,
(K enneth H o lbert).
1807% S ingleton B oulevard ,
D allas, T exas.
K E N N E T H H O LBERT,
(L ouir B edfo rd ).
2531 F o re s t A venue,
D allas, T exas.
U. SIM PSO N TATE,
(U. S im pson T a te ).
2600 F lo ra S tree t,
D allas, T exas.
J . L. T U R N E R , JR .,
(J . L. T u rn e r, J r ) .
1723 R outh S tree t,
D allas, T exas.
R O B E R T L. C A RTER,
(R o b ert L. C a rte r) .
THURGOOD M ARSHALL,
(T hurgood M arsh a ll) .
107 W est 43rd S tree t,
N ew Y ork City, N ew Y ork.
A tto rneys fo r P la in tiffs .
25
Certificate of Verification.
County of Dallas
State of Texas, ss.
I, U. Simpson Tate, one of the A ttorneys for Plaintiffs
herein, after having been first duly sworn according to
law, on m y oath depose and say tha t I have read the
foregoing Complaint by me subscribed and know the con
tents thereof and tha t the same is true of m y own
knowledge, except as to m atters stated to be alleged upon
inform ation and belief, and as to that, I verily believe
it to be true.
U. SIMPSON TATE,
(U. Simpson Tate).
Subscribed and Sworn to before me this the 12th day of
September, 1955.
EDWIN C. WASHINGTON, JR.,
N otary Public in and for Dallas
(Seal) County, Texas.
PLA IN TIFFS’ MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY IN JU N C
TION.
(Title Omitted.)
Come now the plaintiffs in the above num bered and
styled cause, and respectfully move the Court for a
prelim inary injunction to enjoin and restrain the defend
ants W. T. W hite, as superintendent of public schools
in the Dallas Independent School D istrict; Howard A.
Allen, as principal of the W. H. Adamson High School;
26
Richard E. Stroud, as principal of the Thomas J. Rusk
Jun io r High School; Ella E. Parker, as principal of the
John H enry Brown Elem entary School; W. A. Hamilton,
as principal of the M irabeau B. Lam ar Elem entary School,
J. H. Gurley, as principal of the Maple Lawn Elemen
ta ry School, and W illiam H. Stanley, as principal of the
Thomas A. Edison E lem entary School, each of which
schools are public free w ithin the Dallas Independent
School District, and Edwin L. Rippy, as president of the
Board of Trustees of the Dallas Independent School Dis
trict, and W. A. Blair, Robert L. Dillard, Jr., Robert B.
Gilmore, Rouse Howell, (Mrs.) Vernon D. Ingram, Van
M. Lamm, (Mrs.) Tracy H. Rutherford, and Franklin E.
Spafford, as members of the Board of Trustees of the
Dallas Independent School D istrict, and the Board of
Trustees of the Dallas Independent School District, a
corporation, and each of them, the ir agents, their ser
vants, the ir employees and their successors in office, their
attorneys and all other persons in active concert or par
ticipation w ith them, from assigning plaintiffs, or any
m em ber of the class of Persons tha t they represent be
cause of race and color, to any public free school w ithin
the Dallas Independent School District, or from refusing
and denying plaintiffs, or any m em ber of the class of
persons th a t they represent, because of race or color, the
right and privilege of registering at, entering and a t
tending classes, and receiving instruction in the public
free school nearest to the ir respective homes, at the same
time, and under the same conditions and circumstances
th a t all other public free school pupils register, en ter
and attend classes and receive instruction w ithout any
distinctions being made as to plaintiffs and the members
of the class of persons tha t they represent, on the basis
of race or color.
27
In support of this Motion, plaintiffs incorporate by
reference the facts set out in the ir Complaint filed here
in, in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 26, as
though they w ere copied and made a p a rt hereof.
P laintiffs would fu rther show to the Court th a t unless
defendants, and each of them, are enjoined and restrained
from continuing the unlaw ful action and conduct com
plained of in th e Complaint filed herein, plaintiffs w ill
suffer unlaw ful discrim ination because of the ir race and
color, in tha t they will, each of them, be forced to travel
disproportionate distances and suffer hazards and hard
ships of inclement w eather, be away from the ir homes
and the care, guidance and protection of the ir respective
families for a longer period of time than children of the
w hite or Caucasian race who live near them ; tha t such
hardships thus placed upon the m inor plaintiffs and their
parents is real and substantial; tha t plaintiffs have no
efficient or adequate rem edy at law.
If this prelim inary injunction be granted, defendants
will suffer no financial loss, or other tangible harm or
injury. Therefore, plaintiffs pray tha t no bond be set
upon the granting of this motion.
U. SIMPSON TATE,
(U. Simpson Tate),
One of the Attorneys for
Plaintiffs.
2600 Flora Street,
Dallas 4, Texas.
28
SHOW CAUSE ORDER.
(Title Omitted.)
The Court having considered the Complaint of P e ti
tioners filed herein, and, the Application for Tem porary
Injunction, is of the opinion th a t the same should be set
for hearing, and the same is set for a hearing on a day
certain on the Petitioners’ A pplication for Tem porary In
junction on the 16 day of September, 1955, a t 10 o’clock,
A. M., and the Clerk of this Court is directed to issue
Notice to the Defendants as the law requires, to be, and
appear before this Court at 10 o’clock, A. M., on the
16 day of September, 1955, in the Court Room of the
U nited States Court House at Dallas, Texas, and show
cause, if any they have, w hy said Tem porary Injunction
should not be issued.
Dated this 12 day of September, 1955.
WM. H. ATWELL,
United S tates D istrict Judge,
for the N orthern D istrict of
Texas.
MOTION TO DISMISS.
(Title Omitted.)
1 .
The Defendants, Edwin L. Rippy, Robert L. Dillard,
Franklin Spafford, Mrs. Tracy Rutherford, Van M. Lamm,
Mrs. Vernon D. Ingram, Rouse Howell, Robert B. Gilmore,
29
W. A. Blair, Trustees of the Dallas Independent School
D istrict, the Dallas Independent School District, an educa
tional facility organized under the laws of the S tate of
Texas, Richard E. Stroud, W. T. W hite, Ella Parker,
W illiam Stanley, J. H. Gurley, Howard Allen, and W. A.
Hamilton, file this their Motion to Dismiss P lain tiffs’
complaint.
2 .
The Plaintiffs have failed to join as Defendants in
dispensable parties hereinafter mentioned, such parties
being necessary to obtain a final judgm ent and dis
position of this case. The indispensable parties which
Plaintiffs have failed to join are the State Comptroller
of Public Accounts, R. S. Calvert, the State Board of
Education, provided for in Article 2654-2 V. A. C. S., and
the State Commissioner of Education, designated under
the relevant provisions of Article 2654-5 V.A.C.S. The
State Board of Education is the policy forming and
planning body concerning all public education in the State
of Texas, and the S tate Commissioner of Education is
clothed w ith duties concerning the general adm inistra
tion of school laws and the superintendency of business
relating to public education.
W herefore, said suit for the reasons set forth above
should be dismissed.
A. J. THUSS, JR.,
(A. J. Thuss, J r.) ,
A ttorney for Defendants.
1122 Davis Building,
Dallas 2, Texas.
30
ANSWER.
(Title Omitted.)
The Defendants, Edwin L. Rippy, Robert L. Dillard,
Franklin Spafford, Mrs. Tracy Rutherford, Van M. Lamm,
Mrs. Vernon D. Ingram, Rouse, Howell, Robert B. Gilmore,
W. A. Blair, Trustees of the Dallas Independant School
D istrict, the Dallas Independent School District, an
educational facility organized under the laws of the State
of Texas, R ichard E. Stroud, W. T. W hite, Ella Parker,
W illiam Stanley, J. H. Gurley, Howard Allen, and W. A.
Hamilton file this the ir Answ er to P laintiffs’ Complaint.
1.
All of the Defendants deny there is any scheme or
conspiracy to circum vent or evade th e law or to deprive
any child, student or other person of the ir civil rights.
The principals of the various schools w ere following the
instructions issued to them by the adm inistrative staff.
The adm inistrative staff and the district trustees are now
and have been m arking an honest, bona fide, realistic
study of the facts to m eet the obligations the law has
placed upon them to provide adequate public school
education and to perfect, as soon as possible, a workable
integrated system of public education.
2.
The Dallas Public School System, under the m an
date of State law and w ith th e approval of Federal
Courts and Federal law, has for approxim ately ninety
years operated as a segregated school system. This system
31
was regarded until May 31, 1955, by every Court in the
land as a legal and valid system and under such system
budget procedures have been installed for the purpose
of arriving at the cost of operating said system and
determ ining the am ount of funds to be raised by ta x
ation, and also under such system a building program
had been form ulated and bonds authorized and issued.
The applicable laws required the taking of a yearly
scholastic census and said census has been subdivided
into a separate enum eration of negro students and white.
Such subdivision is still required by S tate authorities.
Such scholastic census fixes the basis for the alloca
tion of funds from the S tate of Texas and the allocation
of the num ber of students to the various school buildings
and other facilities so tha t there will be a reasonable
distribution and no overcrowding.
3.
The Suprem e Court of the United States on May 31,
1955, entered a final order and decree announcing a
drastic change in legal concept of school adm inistration
and placed upon the D efendant trustees and officers the
necessity of changing adm inistrative routine, rules, and
procedures which had been in existence for m any years,
certainly from the beginning of the organization of the
Dallas School District.
4.
The school budget and the method of collecting sup
porting data is controlled by requirem ents both of S tate
law and the Texas Education Agency of the State of
32
Texas. The budget requires such intensive study and
the consideration of abundant supporting data requiring
th a t statistical analysis be accum ulated commencing in
Jan u ary of each year. The budget for the school year
1955-56 had reached an advanced state of preparation
w hen it became finally determ ined in May of 1955 tha t
a drastic change would be required so tha t it was im
possible to make adequate re-analysis of the statistical data
w ithout im pairing the system of public education. W ithin
the short tim e available it was impossible to re-arrange
the allocation of teachers and other expenses pertinent
to a drastic change in the system, and any attem pt to do
so would have resulted in financial chaos, confusion and
in in terruption of public school education.
5.
The distribution of students to school buildings is re
lated both to the budget expenditures and estim ated
costs and also to available physical facilities and calls
for the study of m any other problems. Accordingly, on
Ju ly 13, 1955, the President of the Board, issued a sta te
m ent regarding desegregation and outlined twelve
problems for study, which are:
“In order to be prepared for eventualities in this con
nection, this Board of Education months ago instructed
Dr. W. T. W hite, the Superintendent of Schools of this
District, to proceed w ith a detailed study of the problems
inherent to desegregating a m ajor school system, and these
studies are in progress in the following areas:
1. Scholastic boundaries of individual schools w ith
relation to racial groups contained therein.
33
2. Age-grade distribution of pupils.
3. Achievement and state of preparedness for grade-
level assignment of different pupils.
4. Relative intelligence quotient scores.
5. A daptation of curriculum.
6. The over-all impact on individual pupils scholasti
cally w hen all the above items are considered.
7. Appointm ent and assignment of principals.
8. The relative degree of preparedness of w hite and
Negro teachers; the ir selection and assignment.
9. Social life of the children w ithin the school.
10. The problems of integration of the Parent-
Teacher Association and the Dads Club organization.
11. The operation of the athletic program under an
integrated system.
12. Fair and equitable methods of putting into effect
the decree of the Suprem e Court.
6.
A review of scholastic census was im mediately started
and maps im m ediately prepared to fit the school building
capacity to the area producing the students on the as
sumption of a desegregated basis.
34
Time and study are necessary to properly allocate to
each school building and facilities the num ber of students
w hich can properly be taken care of at such locality. The
distribution of inhabitants throughout the Dallas School
D istric t is not uniform and is fu rth er complicated by the
fact tha t certain areas, such as commercial and m anu
facturing areas, produce no students, and it is therefore
necessary to vary the area and th e lim its of the dis
tric t w ith in which students shall be allocated to said
schools.
7.
The assignment of teachers, both w hite and negro,
m ust be re-exam ined and no definite conclusion can be
made until the re-alignm ent of district has been completed
and the proportion of w hite and negro scholastics de
term ined w ithin reasonable limits.
8 .
W hite students are not as a m atter of routine policy
perm itted to go to the nearest school. Assignm ent to
schools is made upon a basis of population and available
school facilities, and m ay result in a child going to a
school other than the nearest.
The Plaintiffs pray for an injunction requiring that
negro students be perm itted to go to the nearest school.
This, if perm itted, would resu lt in a discrimination against
w hite students.
9.
Thirty-five million dollars in bonds have recently been
authorized to effectuate a school program for the con
35
struction of physical facilities such as school buildings
and other capital improvements. This program w ill have
to be re-exam ined and drastically changed in the light
of desegregated system.
10.
The problem is not a simple one of m erely decreeing
tha t all negro and w hite children w ithin certain age limits
and living w ith in presently existing school districts be
directed to the school which now serves the particular
district. Such order would result in overcrowding of
school facilities or an unbalanced condition in which in
certain schools there would be very few students, and
the teacher personnel would be inadequate or over
m anned in certain places. The Dallas D istrict m ain
tains one hundred tw enty buildings at which instruction
is given, and there is inherent in the problem tha t m any
negro parents would p refer to send the ir children to
schools w here there is no interm ingling of the w hite and
negro children. This suit is brought for all negro children
sim ilarly situated and not for the relatively few directly
involved as P laintiffs through the ir next friend or parent,
and means a complete wiping out of the statistical data
which has heretofore concerned the allocation of num ber
of students to each school building.
11.
The allocation of State Aid is by law on a segregated
basis and notw ithstanding the resolution of S tate Board
of Education, the A ttorney General has ruled funds can
be allocated only on a segregated basis. If it is assumed
this law is invalid, there is nevertheless no authority
for distribution of S tate Aid money on a non segregated
basis.
36
12.
Confusion, chaos and a complete breakdow n in public
school education for both w hite and negro students would
resu lt if the present system is not continued until the
Board has had sufficient tim e to obtain adequate in
form ation and statistical data to find a w ay to convert the
system to an educational operation which protects the
civil and educational rights of all citizens under a new
concept just announced by the U nited States Supreme
Court.
13.
A review of the recent scholastic census now indicates
there is taking place a m ovem ent of population w hereby
the w hite population is moving out of certain areas in the
Dallas School District, such m ovem ent being observable in
those areas w here there is a fairly heavy density of negro
inhabitants. The conclusion seems w arran ted at this
tim e tha t such movement is caused by the m andate of
desegregation in public schools. W hether or not the
problem is going to be simplified by a continuation of
this population movement or complicated is too early to
make a definite statem ent. It is, however, a fact which
m aterially enters into the operation of the Dallas Inde
pendent School system and m ust be taken into considera
tion in arriving a t the cost of operating the school system,
both in the expenditures relating to m aintenance and
for capital improvements.
Prayer.
W herefore, premises considered, the Defendants respect
fully pray tha t the tem porary injunction as prayed for by
37
the P laintiffs be denied and tha t upon final hearing all
perm anent injunctive relief be denied, and fu rther that
no declaratory judgm ent of any kind or character be
entered, and for such other and fu rth er relief to which the
Defendants m ay show themselves entitled, and tha t the
costs of this proceeding be charged to the Plaintiffs.
A. J. THUSS, JR.,
(A. J. Thuss, J r.) ,
A ttorney for Defendants.
1122Davis Building,
Dallas 2, Texas.
Certificate of Verification.
State of Texas
County of Dallas, ss.
I, A. J. Thuss, Jr., A ttorney for Defendants herein, after
having been first duly sworn according to law, on my
oath depose and say tha t I have read the foregoing Com
plaint subscribed by me and know the contents thereof
and tha t the same is true of m y own knowledge, except
as to m atters stated to be alleged upon inform ation or
belief, and as to that, I verily believe it to be true.
A. J. THUSS, JR.,
(A. J. Thuss, J r.) ,
Subscribed and Sworn to before me this the 15th day of
September, A. D. 1955.
NORA REVELLE,
(Seal) N otary Public in and for
Dallas County, Texas.
Filed Sep. 15, 1955.
38
SUIT FOR INJUNCTION.
In th e District Court of the United States, for the N orthern
D istrict of Texas, Dallas Division.
A lbert Bell, a minor, by his step-father and Next Friend,
Theodore D. Dorsey, and 23 other Plaintiffs,
vs. Civil No. 6165
Dr. Edw in L. Rippy, as President of th e Board of Trustees
of the Dallas Independent School D istrict, Dallas
County, Texas, and 16 other Defendants.
Appearances:
W. J. Durham, C. B. Bunkley, Jr., Louis Bedford,
K enneth H olbert, U. Simpson Tate, J. L. Turner,
Jr., Robert L. Carter, all of Dallas, Texas and
Thurgood M arshall, New York City, No. Y. Fof the
Plaintiffs;
A. J. Thuss, Jr., Dallas, Texas, For the Defendants.
Be It Rem embered That on the 16th day of September,
A. D., 1955, the above styled and num bered cause came
on to be heard before the Honorable W illiam H. Atwell,
United S tates D istrict Judge, and the following proceed
ings w ere had:
Proceedings.
The Court:
A re there form al orders desired by members of the Bar?
39
Mr. Durham:
Your Honor, I desire to introduce Mr. Thurgood M ar
shall, a m em ber of the M aryland Bar, and request he he
given leave to assist me in the tria l of this case.
The Court:
I don’t know w hat you are saying, Counsel,
Mr. Durham:
Your Honor, I desire at this tim e to introduce Mr.
Thurgood M arshall who is a m em ber of the M aryland Bar.
The Court:
Member of the w hat?
Mr. Durham:
Of the United States Court, Bar, S tate of M aryland,
and request tha t he be given leave—
The Court:
We don’t adm it here unless adm itted to the Suprem e
Court of the S tate of Texas, bu t we w ill be very glad to
allow him to appear in this case.
Mr. Marshall:
Thank you.
The Clerk:
6165, A lbert Bell, a minor, by his step-father and Next
Friend, Theodore D. Dorsey, and 23 other Plaintiffs,
versus Edwin L. Rippy, as President of the Board of
Trustees of the Dallas Independent School District, and
17 other Defendants; U. Simpson Tate for the Plaintiffs;
A. J. Thuss, Jr., for the Defendants.
40
The Court:
W hat says the Plaintiffs?
Mr. Durham:
Your Honor, the Plaintiffs are ready, and if the Court
w ill perm it me to make this statem ent: we have sub
m itted a certain stipulation of fact to Mr. Thuss which
we—
The Court:
I will get to th a t in a minute. W hat say the defend
ants?
Mr. Thuss:
The D efendants are ready, Your Honor.
The Court:
All right.
Mr. Thuss:
W e have a motion to dismiss for w ant of indispensable
parties having been joined.
The Court:
You w ant to what?
Mr. Thuss:
Motion to dismiss because of the failure to nam e and
join certain indispensable parties.
The Court:
Who are they?
41
Mr. Thuss:
They are the State Comptroller of Public Accounts,
Mr. Calvert, the State Commissioner of Education, and
the State Board of Education.
The Court:
You have a right under the Rules to have made them
parties if you wished; I don’t th ink they are indispensable
parties, and I overrule your motion to dismiss.
Mr. Thuss:
All right. Note our exception.
The Court:
All right. Have you agreed upon your facts, gentlemen?
Mr. Durham:
Your Honor, we have subm itted to Counsel for the
D efendant and he has exam ined them, and he has agreed
to p a rt of them . I think w e could save considerable
tim e if the Court would give us about th irty minutes,
and I th ink we can agree—
The Court:
About how many minutes?
Mr. Durham:
About th irty .
The Court:
Oh, lets go on w ith this case, gentlemen, we have had
a week or so, I set this case for you last Monday.
Mr. Durham:
All right, Your Honor.
42
The Court:
I w ant to ask these questions of you.
Do the D efendants adm it th a t all of the P laintiffs—
I believe the P laintiffs nam ed are the students, aren’t
they?
Mr. Durham:
Yes, Your Honor.
The Court:
—sought admission and w ere denied, is tha t adm itted
by the Defendants?
Mr. Thuss:
Yes, Your Honor, I—
The Court:
All right, tha t is all I am asking.
Mr. Thuss:
That is all—I don’t know tha t those particular ones
have.
The Court:
Well, do you w ant to put on the proofs for tha t foolish
ness?
Mr. Thuss:
I don’t w ant the proof, Your Honor, and I am adm itting
th a t some students w ere denied, th a t negro students
applied and w ere denied, w hether they lived at the
address which was alleged, I do not know.
43
The Court:
This is your case, somebody m ight w ant to appeal,
and the Court is try ing to save you costs.
Mr. Thuss:
Yes, I w ant to conserve all of the time, it is a ra ther
serious m atter.
The Court:
All I asked of you is do you—
Mr. Thuss:
I w ant to agree to everything th a t is possible.
The Court:
You have to answ er under the Rules of the Court. Do
you agree to tha t allegation?
Mr. Thuss:
Yes I agreed tha t they w ere denied.
The Court:
That is all right, the Rules require that. Now, gentle
men, do you agree tha t there is substantially 78 schools
for w hite people and substantially 18 schools for colored
people?
Mr. Durham:
We agree, Your Honor.
Mr. Thuss:
Is tha t correct, Mr. W hite?
Mr. White:
Yes, sir.
44
The Court:
I m ay have the figures a little b it wrong.
Mr. Thuss:
I w ant to get them absolutely accurate, Your Honor.
W hat is it? Your Honor, we can state this: th a t there
are a total of 128 schools, 9 w hite high schools, 1 Junior-
senior high school; tha t is right?
Mr. White:
Yes.
Mr. Thuss:
9 w hite junior high schools, 1 vocational w hite school.
Mr. White:
W hite school.
Mr. Thuss:
86 w hite elem entary, 2 negro high schools, 19 negro
elem entary, and 1 evening school, negro.
Mr. White:
Yes.
The Court:
Now, have you any agreem ent among yourselves about
the num ber of w hite people in Dallas, students, and the
num ber of colored people in Dallas?
Mr. Thuss:
You mean to tal population, Your Honor, or scholastics?
45
The Court:
Now, can you agree, gentlemen, on the substantial
equality, I m ean the teachers and the physical impedi
m enta of these schools? You see, I have been in the
schools, I know—
Mr. Thuss:
I can state as a fact—
The Court:
I judicially know tha t they are about the same in ex
perience,*good teachers in each, good buildings in each,
and libraries, and things, seats, and all of tha t sort of
thing. That is substantially correct, isn’t it?
Mr. Thuss:
I th ink tha t is substantially correct.
Mr. Durham:
We agree, Your Honor, we agree, Your Honor.
The Court:
Substantially correct. All right. Now, I believe tha t
covers all of the facts, and I would like to hear your
argum ents now, gentlemen. If you can—about how long
do you w ant to argue for the Plaintiff?
Mr. Durham:
Your Honor, I don’t th ink we need over tw enty minutes.
The Court:
How is that?
Mr. Durham:
Your Honor, I don’t th ink the P laintiff needs over
tw enty minutes.
46
The Court:
Tw enty m inutes for the Plaintiffs.
How much for the Defendants?
Mr. Thuss:
Your Honor, I don’t need any m ore tim e than the
P laintiffs need, take the same time.
The Court:
Well, suppose you take th irty m inutes on the side, if
you wish; you don’t have to take it, if tha t is satisfactory.
Is th a t satisfactory to both sides?
All right, gentlemen.
Mr. Durham:
Your Honor, the facts are p re tty clear here; they are
agreed upon—
The Court:
Well, I have to ask you to speak out because the
acoustics in th is building, this Courtroom, are not satis
factory like I would like to have them.
Mr. Durham:
Your Honor, w e are not going to burden the Court
w ith m uch argum ent. The facts are undisputed tha t
these m inor plaintiffs w ere denied on the account of
race and color, and th a t there are no efforts being made
and no sta rt to desegregation in the public schools of
Dallas, so we th ink it is ju st a question of an arb itrary
refusal to even s ta rt on desegregation. I t isn’t a question
of w here the kid lives, or—the only thing th a t he was
denied upon was his race.
47
The Court:
Was his w hat?
Mr. Durham:
W as his race and color. They adm it tha t; there is no
other claim by the Defendants, even in the answer, that
the denial was based upon any other proposition than
the race and color of the child. There is no testimony
and there is an admission inferentially tha t there is no
sta rt even made, bu t on the contrary, the Board has re
declared the policy of segregation and efforts would be
made in the light and for the sole purpose of m aintaining
segregation on the account of race and color; so, Your
Honor, I don’t th ink there is much argum ent to it; the
Court, Your Honor, is fam iliar w ith the decision tha t
segregation on th e basis of race and color is unconstitu
tional, and there is a m andate th a t desegregation be
started forthw ith, and in this case, they adm it tha t since
May 17, 1954, they w ere cognizant of tha t fact, bu t they
have made no effort w hatever, but on the contrary, they
have—and it is pleaded—they have sent out a declara
tion declaring th a t segregation w ill continue on the basis
of race and color.
Mr. Thuss:
Your Honor, we have Dr. Rippy here and the Court
m ight be interested in hearing from Dr. Rippy as to
w hat acts w ere actually perform ed by Dr. Rippy and the
Board. The conclusion tha t Mr. D urham makes is not
w arranted by any of the facts which we can show to
the Court. The Court is fam iliar w ith the fact, of course,
the tim e elem ent involved in the Supreme Court’s de
cision. The answ er sets up, and we can prove, tha t Dr.
Rippy im mediately w ent to A ustin following th e May
48
31, 1955, statem ent of the Suprem e Court. He talked to
the S tate Superintendent of Education—
The Court:
Now, Counsel, you know tha t tha t is not a legitim ate
argum ent. I asked you if you had any testimony. You
are telling me now something about testimony.
Mr. Thuss:
I w ant to put on testimony, Your Honor.
The Court:
W hat?
Mr. Thuss:
I w ant to put on testim ony as to w hat has been done,
and w hat the Board has done, and w ant the Court to
know w hat has been done in good faith in an attem pt to
follow the m andate of the Suprem e Court.
The Court:
Suppose you state w hat Dr. Rippy has done and then
see if the other side w ill agree to it w ithout putting a
witness on.
Mr. Thuss:
All right, Your Honor. In making these prelim inary
agreements, I didn’t w ant the Court to understand tha t
tha t was all tha t we considered to be in the case. I was
m aking at the outset those admissions which I thought
would shorten the trial. W ith reference to Dr. Rippy,
Dr. Rippy w ent to A ustin in the spring of this year,
and talked to Mr. Edgar, the State Superintendent. He
also talked to the A ttorney G eneral of this State, and
49
outlined w hat the problem was in Dallas tha t there are
this large num ber of schools which we have entered in
the record here, tha t the areas tha t the districts and
schools from which the students go to the schools is
ra th e r irregular, tha t the S tate Law has up to now re
quired the enum eration to be upon a segregated basis.
The State Law still requires an allocation—an allotm ent
of the funds on a segregated basis. The Gilmer-Akin
Act is a very complicated feature, and it requires—it
is a State Law th a t requires certain credits for teacher
units, and so forth, and so on, to make education gener
ally available to all children in Texas. And he was
advised at tha t tim e under all of the problems involved,
and also the S tate Board was requested in June of this
year to make their request for allotm ent on a segregated
basis, and after all of those conferences they w ere advised
tha t it was better required to continue the schools on the
basis in which they had continued them and make the
change, if at all, la ter on.
That is w hat Dr. Rippy would testify to.
The Court:
Well, now, Counsel, you are a practicing lawyer, you
know you can’t do that. I am asking you, we passed the
testimony, we agreed on our facts, and the argum ent
has been entered into.
Mr. Thuss:
Your Honor, I don’t understand.
The Court:
I w ill a sk th e o th e r side if you a g re e to the s ta te
m en t th a t th e a tto rn e y m ad e th a t D r. R ippy did do
these th ings?
50
M r. D urh am ;
Y our H onor, th e P la in tiffs w ill a g re e to a ll of th e
s ta te m e n t excep t th e po rtion th a t th e re is a va lid
law in the S ta te of T ex as p rov id ing fo r seg reg a tio n .
W e w ill a g re e th a t th e re is a law .
The C ourt:
Of C ourse, th a t is in issue h ere .
M r. D urh am :
Y es.
The C ourt:
All right, go ahead now.
M r. Thuss:
All right, sir.
The C ourt:
L e t’s try th e case acco rd in g to law , now, gen tlem en .
M r. Thuss:
Y our H onor—
T he C ourt:
Do you w an t to a rg u e —do you w an t to a rg u e your
ca se now ?
M r. T huss:
No, s ir, I w an t to pu t m y ev idence on.
T he Court:
W hat ev idence?
51
M r. Thuss:
The evidence tha t th e Board—the evidence of good
fa ith on th e p a r t of th e B oard .
The C ourt:
W ell, th ey h av e ag re e d w ith you th a t D r. R ippy
did th a t.
Mr. Thuss:
Well, I have other evidence than that, Your Honor;
I have other things th a t the Board had done. W hat Dr.
W hite has done.
The Court:
Do you plead tha t in your pleading?
Mr. Thuss:
Yes, sir, we set it out step by step in our pleading.
The Court:
Well, do you agree, gentlemen, tha t those facts are
all right?
Mr. Durham:
Your Honor, we can’t agree to his pleadings.
The Court:
All right. Thank you. Now, le t’s go on w ith your
case.
Mr. Thuss:
Well, I would like to know w here I am. I didn’t
intend—
52
The Court:
Your are going on w ith your pleadings as you pleaded
it. Now, you can understand that, can’t you?
Mr. Thuss:
Well, Judge, if you just tell me w hat you w ant me to
do, I will be glad to do it, I have certain evidence which
I th ink—
The Court:
You have an opportunity, now, to argue your case,
your statem ent of fact, and your pleadings are considered,
are agreed to.
Mr. Thuss:
Do they adm it my pleadings? That is fine, tha t is fine.
The Court:
All right.
Mr. Thuss:
Now, Dr. Rippy, in Ju ly—this is in my pleadings,
Your Honor—in order to prepare, issued this order to all
personnel: “In order to be prepared for the eventuali
ties in connection, this Board of Education m onths ago
instructed Dr. W hite, the Superintendent of Schools of
this D istrict, to proceed to make a detailed study of the
problem inherent to desegregation of a m ajor school
system, and these studies are in progress in the following
areas:” They then set out, Your Honor, and I w on’t
read to you, 12 areas of investigation, the scholastic
boundaries, and the re-arrangem ents of the scholastic
boundaries, the location of the building, the personnel,
the relative—the relative population comparison as to
negroes and w hite, in some districts, there are con
53
siderably m ore negroes than whites and vice versa, that
had to be investigated. The m atter of the budget was
also pled here, and sixty percent, sixty percent of the
school money spent in the Dallas D istrict comes from
the state. As I had mentioned, and as agreed to, they
w ere authorized to ask for this state money on a segregated
basis, and w ere told by the state to do so. And the whole
m atter has been gone into thoroughly, honestly, and
fairly, to comply w ith the m andate of the Suprem e Court.
There has, the enrollm ent, I don’t know w hether we
agreed to this, bu t I th ink the Court asked for it, is
78,000 white, 78691, and 14,593 negro. That is as of
Septem ber 12. Now, this required the re-arrangem ent
of all of these scholastics at various places and w here they
would be pulled up and should go. They have asked
in this case, Your Honor, tha t the—tha t these negro
children be allowed to go to the school which is closest
to the ir home. Well, th a t is a rule th a t is not in
variably followed as to w hite children, because the
topography and arrangem ent of the school district might
be such and the population density m ight be such that
to provide a uniform or provide a reasonable num ber of
scholastics in relation to the size of the building, that
they would have to go—w hite children would have to go
to a school fa rther from their home, tha t is not unusual.
So even w hat they ask for in this case, tha t these negro
scholastics go to the school closest to the ir home, is
not a ru le which is followed as to the w hite scholastics.
So w ith reference to the facts, good faith, the honesty,
these good men have been charged, and charged either
directly or by implication tha t they have made no honest
effort. In this pleading which is agreed to, it shows
throughout, Your Honor, tha t they have done everything
reasonable under the trem endous impact of the ir new
concept of education, tha t could be done by any Board.
54
Now, it is interesting to note, Your Honor, and while
it is not m andatory on this Court to follow it, is w hat
has been done in another case. I th ink it is interesting
to note tha t in the case tha t w ent to the Suprem e Court
th a t arose in Virginia, one of the cases which was de
cided by the Suprem e Court in October of 1954, and the
decision which was last w ritten in May of 1955, shortly
before this Septem ber of 1955. These same lawyers
appeared before the Federal Court up there in tha t case.
I t was before the Suprem e Court th a t had been reversed
and sent back, and said tha t in tha t case there had been no
effort to desegregate and tha t it was entirely too slow,
and they asked tha t it be desegregated as of the be
ginning of this te rm of Septem ber 19, 1955.
A three judge Court, composed of Joe Bell, Circuit Judge
and two other D istrict Judges, in the case tha t had been
before the Suprem e Court, held tha t under the fact in tha t
case, and they charge—and they charge here tha t those
m em bers of this School D istrict had adequate time, it was
more tim e there was more notice given to those school
trustees in the Virginia case. The Court held in tha t case
th a t it was not consistent w ith the public interest to
desegregate tha t Virginia school th a t was involved in
th is Suprem e Court case for the year 1955. I say, Your
Honor, tha t th a t case is inform ative; it is not m an
datory th a t this Court follow it, bu t it does show the
in ten t of th a t Suprem e Court m andate, and it does show
the way tha t the Courts, these Federal Courts, are
looking a t this m atter which is a drastic change. I m en
tion tha t to Your Honor, tha t it is inform ative, and the
facts as you m ay know from reading the opinion in
th a t case, are much stronger than they are as shown in
this case here.
55
Your Honor, I th ink this, I th ink this Court can look
a t all of the facts, can take judicial knowledge of the
w ay th a t we have lived for a good m any years, w hat
would be the impact of try ing to change at this late
m inute the place to attend school for this large num ber
of scholastics; they have, for a large num ber of years,
gotten adequate education, they have agreed tha t they
are equal. W here is the irreparable damage tha t will occur
in this case? Gotten an education for a num ber of years,
and yet the impatience is as of this m inute, and I think
the ir impatience is not substantiated or supported by the
facts. They charge here—they charge here tha t there is
an attem pt to curcum vent the decree of the Federal Court.
These gentlem en are not guilty of anything of tha t kind
or character, and all we w ant is tim e to continue to give
the education to these children which have been re
ceiving the education, and which is a trem endous burden
to do so, w ithout undue—w ithout undue interruption. W hat
does one year am ount to when we have done so for some
ninety years? Added to it, the question and the showing,
which I think this pleading shows, tha t they have made
a good faith—made a good faith attem pt to comply, and
tha t they have to have tim e to make this change under
the circumstances, and unless they do, there will be
confusion. These negro scholastics w ill suffer, as well as
the w hite scholastics w ill suffer, if they have their way
about the relief for which they have asked.
I think, Your Honor, the facts which have agreed to, and
the facts which have been alleged and sworn to in
this answ er tha t they have agreed to, and all of the acts
which have been perform ed by the various members of
the Board and the staff shows th a t there is no necessity
for the issuance of this injunction.
56
Mr. Marshall:
May I in terrup t at this point? I th ink we should get
the record straight, and tha t is tha t we do not agree that
the negro children in Dallas are getting an equal educa
tion; we agreed tha t there are equal facilities, bu t the
Suprem e Court, in its May 17th decision, said tha t separa
tion of the races has, in and of itself, brought about
inequality. And the interesting thing about the argu
ment, and I th ink th a t we should explain the Prince
Edw ard case, if Your Honor would be interested in it.
The last ruling of the three judge Court, in the Prince
Edw ard case, there was a positive showing tha t the
County Commissioners of Prince Edw ard County had
refused to appropriate any money to run any schools, and
although I do not know exactly w hat influenced the
Court on this Septem ber point, I th ink tha t we should
understand tha t the injunction tha t was issued ordered
the School Board to desegregate as rapidly as possible and
m erely put the proviso in about September, and I think
w e should also bear in mind tha t in the South Carolina
case w ith Judge Dobie, Judge P arker presiding, w ith
Judge Dobie and Judge Timmerman, there was no m en
tion at all about September, and I th ink there is a perfect
exam ple of one D istrict Court and the other D istrict
Court, and I do not believe it is even persuasive here,
because as I read it, the Suprem e Court’s decision of
May 31, I th ink the only significance is the paragraph
th a t says, “W hile giving weight to these public and pri
vate considerations, the Courts”—speaking of D istrict
Courts—“w ill require tha t the Defendants make a prom pt
and reasonable start tow ard full compliance w ith our
M ay 17, 1954, ruling. Once such a start has been made,
the Court m ay find tha t additional time is necessary.”
57
The condition precedent to all of tha t is tha t a good
faith start be made. The answ er in this case points
out a 12 point program of study. It also points out that
under the present ruling of the Board, the Defendants
in this case, desegregation w ill not occur until this 12
point program is completed to the last m inute detail. Now,
as to exactly w hat the Supreme Court of the United
States said, I know the Suprem e Court did not say that.
The two points, as I understand them, ra th e r there are
th ree points tha t are made by the Defendants.
One is tha t there are State Laws tha t will inconvenience
the transition, and I think in tha t case, we are rem inded
by the Suprem e Court’s May 31 decision th a t all S tate
Laws or m unicipal regulations to the contrary m ust yield,
so on the basis of that, w hatever the S tate Law is, if
it is based on race or color “m ust yield” and can have
no bearing on the decision at this time.
The next point is tha t there is a question of censusing
of children and boundary lines. Well, any school board
in the country can draw boundary lines and census
children, they do it every day, and in preparation for this
school term , the only thing they had to do is make a
census of the children, draw the district lines, and for
get race. I t is tha t easily done.
The th ird point is tha t we allege—we pray tha t our
children be adm itted to the nearest school. That is true,
bu t it is not necessary to our position. We take the
position tha t a negro child applies to the school nearest
to him, and they either accept him or te ll him that
th is is the wrong school, you should go to another school,
bu t they can’t say, “You m ust go to the negro school.”
These children w eren’t denied because they w ent to the
58
w rong school, they w ere denied because they w ent to
the wrong school, m eaning w hite school. That is the only
issue here.
We do not w ant to change any regulation, anything of
the School Board, except the question of race. That can
be done by one resolution of the Board, m eeting at any
time. Once tha t is done, tha t is the type of s ta rt tha t
I am sure the Suprem e Court m eant. That you take off
race; as to w hatever method of assigning teachers or
pupils the Defendants w ant to use, we would have no
objection as long as it is not based on race, all of
the involved step by step detail tha t is pointed out in
the ir answer, they could go on or leave, it could make
no difference, as they do as has been done in other
school systems, and I am not going outside of the ad
missible argum ent, because the record of the Supreme
Court is available and the D istrict of Columbia case, a
school system much more involved than this one, was
desegregated betw een May 17 of 1954 and September,
and it was desegregated very simply. They took the
word “race” off, tha t was the argum ent tha t appears in
the record, they w ent to work from there. If the D istrict
of Columbia can do it certainly the school district here
involved, and I do not believe tha t Your Honor misses
th a t there is any question in this case but th a t the
Plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction which does not
at all d isrupt the school system other than to say tha t
as you run the school system, you m ay use any yard
stick, you m ay use any plans, or you may use any
regulation; the only thing is tha t under the Constitution
of the United States, as in terpreted by the Supreme
Court, race or color cannot be used as a means for de
segregating.
59
Unless there are any questions, if Your Honor pleases,
w ith that, the P laintiffs submit, respectfully praying
tha t the injunction be issued as prayed for.
The Court:
All right. You have had your say, Counsel.
Mr. Thuss:
Your Honor, I do not w ant to say anything fu rther—
The Court:
How is that?
Mr.Thuss:
—except to correct a m isstatem ent tha t I th ink he made,
if I can m ake that, I would like to, if I can’t, all right.
The Court:
You see, he has his right to make his argum ent last,
P lain tiff opens and closes.
Mr. Thuss:
I understand it, Judge; I w anted to make the correction.
The Court:
The suit seeks an injunction against the Defendants
who are the principals and officers of the Dallas Public
Schools, for having refused to perm it the Plaintiffs, who
are negroes and who sought admission to several dif
feren t public schools, to m atriculate therein.
The facts, as such facts as are well pleaded in both the
original petition and the answer, are adm itted in open
Court, thus saving the introduction of a string of witnesses
which would take tim e and m ultiplied costs.
60
This suit contains a p rayer for the calling of a three-
judge Court and used as a basis for tha t call, the uncon
stitu tionality of segregation of the races, w hite and color
ed, in the schools of the U nited States.
. The tria l judge in the U nited S tates D istrict Court is
admonished against the expense and trouble of calling
tw o other judges to sit w ith him in a trial. There is
no consitutional provision of e ither the state or the na
tion, th a t is in controversy in this particular suit.
This same question was presented in the petition in
the case of Battle, et al vs. W ichita Falls Junior College
District, et al, tried before me on November 27, 1951, at
W ichita Falls. No attention was paid to the request
for a three-Judge Court, and the case was tried by
myself as the D istrict Judge, alone.
In tha t case, as shown in 101 F. (s.) 82, the Plaintiffs
w ere colored people who had no such facilities near at
hand as the W ichita Falls Junior College. That the
nearest college of sim ilar capacity and teaching was in
th e southern part of Texas, approxim ately th ree hundred
miles distant. The Court, therefore, entered a perem ptory
injunction requiring the defendant to allow to m atriculate
the plaintiffs in tha t institution. That case was af
firm ed by the Circuit Court of Appeals and certiorari
denied by the Suprem e Court of the United States. In
tha t case the same counsel appeared for the plaintiffs in
this case.
Since tha t tim e the Suprem e Court of the United
S tates has entered a general decision declaring all a t
tem pted separation of the races in the United States is
illegal and unconstitutional and directed the school
61
authorities and the low er Courts w ork out a desegretion
plan Bolling, et al vs. Sharp et al 347 U.S. 497.
The fact in the present case show that there are 78
elem entary w hite schools in the City of Dallas. That
there are 18 elem entary schools in the City of Dallas
for the negro population. I t appears from the facts, of
which the Court has judicial knowledge, th a t the premises,
conveniences, teaching, and efficiency for the colored
student is furnished by the same Texas and Independent
School funds as are furnished to the w hite students.
The num ber of schools for the colored population is a
slightly higher percentage than tha t furnished for the
w hite population.
All of the law as declared by the various Courts,
appellate and trial, in the United States, are agreed upon
the proposition tha t w hen sim ilar and convenient free
schools are furnished to both w hite and colored tha t there
then exists no reasonable ground for requiring desegre
gation. An interesting case is McKissick et al vs. Car
michael et al, 187 F. (snd) 949. That case cites Sw eatt vs.
Painter, 339 U. S. 629. Many other cases are also cited
in B attle vs. W ichita Falls Jun ior College, 101 F. (s) 82.
This is a suit in equity. The facts show, as I have
already recited, tha t equal school opportunities are fu r
nished to both colored and white. The direction from the
Suprem e Court of the U nited States requires tha t the
officers and principals of each institution, and the lower
Courts, shall do away w ith segregation after having w ork
ed out a proper plan. That direction does not mean that
a long tim e shall expire before tha t plan is agreed upon.
I t m ay be tha t the plan contemplates action by the
S tate legislature. It is not for this Court to say, other
62
than w hat has been said by the Suprem e Court in tha t
decision.
To gran t an injunction in this case would be to ignore
the equities th a t present themselves for recognition and to
determ ine w hat the Suprem e Court itself decided not to
determ ine. Therefore, I th ink it appropiate tha t this case
be dismissed w ithout prejudice to refile it a t some later
date.
Give them some tim e to see w hat they can w ork out,
and then we w ill pass upon tha t equity.
P repare an order, if you will, please gentlemen, to be
OK’d by each side, and if anybody w ants an exception,
th a t w ill be noted, too.
Now, Mrs. Hamilton, tha t is all we have today?
The Clerk:
That is all, Judge Atwell.
The Court:
C ourt is adjourned until 10:00 o’clock tom orrow m orn
ing.
63
SUIT FOR INJUNCTION.
(Title Omitted.
W. J. Durham, C. B. Bunkley, Jr., Louis Bedford, K en
neth Holbert, U. Simpson Tate, J. L. Turner, Jr.
Robert L. Carter all of Dallas, Texas and Thurgood
M arshall, New York City, N. Y. for the Plaintiffs;
A. J . Thuss, Jr., Dallas, Texas for the Defendants.
This suit seeks an injunction against the defendants who
are the principals and officers of the Dallas Public
Schools for having refused to perm it the plaintiffs, who
are negroes and who sought admission to several dif
feren t public schools, to m atriculate therein.
The facts, as such facts as are well pleaded in both
the original petition and the answer, are adm itted in
open Court, thus saving the introduction of a string of
witnesses w hich would take tim e and multiplied costs.
This suit contains a prayer for the calling of a three-
judge Court and uses as basis for th a t call, the uncon
stitutionality of segregation of the races, w hite and color
ed, in the schools of the United States.
The Trial Judge in the U nited States D istrict Court
is admonished against the expense and trouble of calling
two other judges to sit w ith him in a trial. There is no
constitutional provision of either the state, or, the nation,
tha t is in controversy in this particular suit.
This same question was presented in the petition in the
case of Battle, et al vs. W ichita Falls Junior College
64
District, et al., tried before me on November 27th, 1951
at W ichita Falls. No attention was paid to the request
for a three-judge Court, and the case was tried by m y
self as the District Judge, alone.
In th a t case, as shown in 101 F. (s) 82, the plaintiffs
w ere colored people who had no such facilities near at
hand as the W ichita Falls Jun ior College. That the
nearest college of sim ilar capacity and teaching, was in the
southern part of Texas, approxim ately three hundred
miles distant. The Court, therefore, entered a perem ptory
injunction requiring the defendant to allow to m atriculate
the plaintiffs in tha t institu tion That case was offirmed
by the Circuit Court of Appeals and certiorari denied by
the Suprem e Court of the United States. In tha t case
the same counsel appeared for the plaintiffs as in this
case.
Since tha t tim e the Suprem e Court of the United States
has entered a general decision declaring all attem pted
separation of the races in the United States is illegal and
unconstitutional directed tha t the school authorities and
the lower Courts w ork out a desegregation plan. Bolling,
et al vs. Sharpe, et al, 347 U. S. 497.
The facts in the present case show th a t there are 78
elem entary w hite schools in the City of Dallas. That
there are 18 elem entary schools in the City of Dallas for
the negro population. I t appears from the facts, of which
the Court has judicial knowledge, tha t the premises,
conveniences, teaching, and efficiency for the colored
student is furnished by the same Texas and Independent
School funds as are furnished to the w hite students. The
num ber of schools for the colored population is a slightly
65
higher percentage than th a t furnished for the w hite
population.
All of the law as declared by the various Courts, ap
pellate and trial, in the United States, are agreed upon
the proposition tha t w hen sim ilar and convenient free
schools are furnished to both w hite and colored tha t
there then exists no reasonable ground for requiring
desegregation. An in teresting case is McKissick et al vs.
Carmichael et al, 187 F. (2d) 949. That case cites
Sw eatt vs. Painter, 339 U. S. 629. M any o ther cases are
also cited in B attle vs. W ichita Falls Junior College, 101
F. (s) 82.
This is a suit in equity. The facts show, as I have
already recited, th a t equal school opportunities are fu r
nished to both colored and w hite. The direction from the
Suprem e Court of the United States requires tha t the
officers and principals of each institution, and th e low er
Courts, shall do aw ay w ith segregation after having
w orked out a proper plan. That direction does not m ean
th a t a long tim e shall expire before th a t plan is agreed
upon. I t m ay be th a t the p lan contem plates action by
the state legislature. I t is not for th is Court to say, other
than w hat has been said by the Suprem e C ourt in tha t
decision.
To gran t an injunction in th is case would be to ignore
the equities tha t present themselves for recognition and
to determ ine w hat the Suprem e Court itself decided not
to determine. Therefore, I th ink it appropriate tha t
this case be dismissed w ithout prejudice to refile it a t
some la ter date.
66
Done at Dallas, Texas, on this the 16th day of Septem
ber, 1955.
WM. H. ATWELL,
U nited States D istrict Judge.
On th is th e 16th day of September, 1955, appeared
the P laintiffs in person and by the ir attorneys of record
and also appeared all of the D efendants in person and
by the ir attorneys of record, and th e Motion of the De
fendants to dismiss the ir cause of action for w ant of neces
sary and indispensable parties, having been called to the
atten tion of the Court, w as overruled.
The Court having considered the pleadings of the
parties and the admissions of fact made in open Court
relative to this controversy is of the opinion th a t the re is
no cause for an injunction as prayed for by the Plaintiffs
and th a t the same should be denied.
It Is, Therefore, The Order, Judgm ent and Decree of
the Court th a t the injunctive relief as prayed for by the
P laintiffs is hereby denied and the case is dismissed w ith
out prejudice to the Plaintiffs, and th a t all costs be charg
ed to said Plaintiffs.
Entered the 17th day of Septem ber, 1955.
WM. H. ATWELL,
Judge of the United States
D istrict Court for the
N orthern D istrict of Texas.
Approved As To Form:
(S.) U. SIMPSON TATE,
A ttorney for Plaintiffs,
(S.) A. J. THUSS, JR.,
A ttorney for Defendants.
67
NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS, FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT,
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA.
Filed: October 4, 1955.
In The D istrict Court Of The U nited States For The
N orthern D istrict Of Texas Dallas Division.
A lbert Bell, A Minor, by his Step Father and N ext
Friend, Theodore D. Dorsey, et al, Plaintiffs,
vs. Civil Action N um ber 6165
Edw in L. Rippy, Dr., As President of the Board of
Trustees of the Dallas Independent School District,
Dallas, Dallas County, Texas, et al., Defendants.
Notice is hereby given th a t Charles Brown, a
minor, by his fa th e r and next friend, W alter Brown, Jr,;
Rayford Cooks, a minor, by his father and nex t friend,
Robert Cooks; W illiam C. Burton, Jr., a minor, by his
fa ther and next friend, William C. Burton; Alonzo D.
Nickerson, Jr., a minor, by his father and next friend,
Alonzo D. Nickerson, Sr.,; Sandra Craig and Pam ela Bo
son, minors, by the ir fa ther and next friend, Lawrence
C. Boson; L. Lawrence Nelson, II a minor, by his father
and next friend, Clyde D. Nelson; M ary Ann Slider, a
minor, by her father and nex t friend, L. G. Slider;
Diann M urphy, a minor, by her grandm other and next
friend, (Mrs.) S. L, Neely, a feme sole; Helen Jean Gipson,
a minor, by her m other and n ex t friend, (Mrs.) Luenda
Gipson, a feme sole; Jos A rthu r Williams a minor, by
his father and nex t friend, H erbert W illiams; Rosa Sharon
and Maude Lois Sims, minors, by the ir fa ther and next
friend, (Rev.) Paul A. Sims; D aurity G. Smith, a minor,
68
by his father and nex t friend, Leo M. Sm ith; Ollie Pearl
Ivy, a minor, by her m other and nex t friend, (Mrs.)
Irene Ivy, a feme sole; W illie Hawkins, a minor, by his
fa ther and nex t friend, Oscar Hawkins; M ilton McDaniel,
a minor, by his father and nex t friend, W illiam McDaniel;
Sandra L ynetta Berkins, a minor, by her m other and
next friend, (M rs.) Charles Berkins a feme sole; Carol,
Cheyel and Ronald H urdle, minors, by their fa ther and
next friend, Elm er D. H urdle; Billie M arie Cox, a minor,
by her step-father and nex t friend, Veil Snowden; John
A rvie Lewis, a minor, by his step-father and nex t friend,
George Fields; A lbert Bell, a minor, by his step-father and
next friend, Theodore D. Dorsey; Hilda R uth Borders,
a minor, by her father and nex t friend, Louis Borders,
Jr.,; Charlene Goldstein, a minor, by her m other and
next friend, (Mrs.) W illie Mae Goldstein, a feme sale;
Ju lia A nn Vickers, a minor, by her fa ther and next
friend, Searcy E. Vickers, and Shirley A nn Bush, a minor,
by her father and nex t friend, F rankie L. Bush, plaintiffs
in the above num bered and styled cause hereby appeal
to the U nited S tates Court of Appeals for the F ifth
Circuit from the following judgm ent:
To grant an injunction in this case would be to ignore
the equities tha t present them selves for recognition and
to determ ine w hat the Suprem e Court itself decided not
to determine. Therefore, I think it appropiate th a t this
case be dismissed w ithout prejudice to refile it at some
la ter date.
Done at Dallas, Texas, on this the 16th day of Septem
ber, 1955.
(S.) United S tates D istrict Judge.
69
Dated this the 1st day of October, 1955.
W. J. DURHAM,
2600 Flora S treet,
Dallas, Texas.
(W. J. D urham ),
LOUIS BEDFORD,
(Louis Bedford),
1807% Singleton Boulevard,
Dallas, Texas.
2600 Flora S treet,
Dallas, Texas.
U. SIMPSON TATE,
(U. Simpson Tate),
ROBERT L. CARTER,
(Robert L. C arter),
107 W est 43rd Street,
New York, N. Y.
C. B. BUNKLEY, JR.,
(C. B. Bunkley, J r .) ,
814% N. Good-Latimer Expressway,
Dallas, Texas.
KENNETH F. HOLBERT,
2531 Forest Avenue,
Dallas, Texas.
(K enneth F. H olbert),
J. L. TURNER, JR.,
(J. L. Turner, J r.) ,
1723 Routh Street,
Dallas, Texas.
THURGOOD MARSHALL,
(Thurgood M arshall),
A ttorney for Plaintiffs.
107 W est 43rd Street,
New York, N. Y.
70
PLA IN TIFFS’ MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME IN
W HICH TO BRING UP RECORD ON APPEAL.
Filed November 16, 1955.
Come Now A lbert Bell, a minor, and tw enty-three other
plaintiffs and respectfully move th e Court to extend
until the 30th day of November, 1955, the tim e w ith in
w hich plaintiffs m ay complete the record on appeal on
th e grounds th a t plaintiffs w ere delayed in getting the
transcrip t of th e record typed and for the fu rther reason
th a t no previous extension of such tim e has been obtained
from the adverse party or granted by this Court.
U. SIMPSON TATE,
(U. Simpson Tate),
One of the A ttorneys for the
Plaintiffs.
ORDER GRANTING EXTENSION OF TIME IN WHICH
TO BRING UP RECORD ON APPEAL.
Filed November 16, 1955.
The motion of plaintiffs for extension of tim e in
which to bring up record on appeal having come before
the Court and the Court being of the opinion tha t such
motion is in order and th a t no previous extension of
such tim e has been obtained from the adverse party
or granted by this Court;
I t Is Ordered, th a t the tim e be, and the tim e is ex
tended until the 30th day of November, 1955, w ith in
71
which plaintiffs may complete the record in this cause
on appeal.
WM. H. ATWELL,
D istrict Judge for the
N orthern D istrict of Texas.
APPELLANTS’ DESIGNATION OF CONTENTS OF
RECORD ON APPEAL.
(Title Omitted.)
Come Now A lbert Bell, a minor, by his step-father and
next friend, Theodore D. Dorsey; Charles Brown, a minor,
by his fa ther and next friend, W alter Brown, Jr.;
Rayford Cooks, a minor, by his father and nex t friend,
R obert Cooks; W illiam C. Burton, Jr., a minor,
by his fa ther and next friend, W illiam C. Burton; Alonzo
D. Nickerson, J r. a minor, by his father and next friend,
Alonzo D. Nickerson, Sr.; Sandra Craig and Pam ela
Boson, minors, by th e ir fa ther and nex t friend, Law rence
C. Boson; L. Law rence Nelson, II, a minor, by his fa ther
and next friend, Clyde D. Nelson; M ary A nn Slider, a
minor, by her fa ther and nex t friend, L. G. Slider; Diann
M urphy, a minor, by her grandm other and nex t friend,
(Mrs.) S. L. Neely, a feme sole; Helen Jean Gipson, a
minor, by her m other and nex t friend, (Mrs.) Luenda
Gipson, a feme sole; Joe A rthu r Williams, a minor, by
his fa ther and next friend, H erbert Williams; Rosa Sharon
and Maude Lois Sims, minors, by th e ir fa ther and nex t
friend, (Rev.) Paul A. Sims; D aurity G. Smith, a minor,
by his fa ther and next friend, Leo M. Sm ith; Ollie Pearl
Ivy, a m inor by her m other and nex t friend, (Mrs.) Irene
72
Ivey, a feme sole; W illie Hawkins, a minor, by his fa ther
adn n ex t friend, Oscar Hawkins; M ilton McDaniel, a
minor, by his fa ther and nex t friend, W illiam McDaniel;
Sandra L ynetta Berkins, a minor, by her m other and
nex t friend, (Mrs.) Charles Berkins, a feme sole; Carol,
Cheyel and Ronald Hurdle, m inors, by the ir fa ther and
nex t friend, Elem er D. H urdle; Billie M arie Cox, a minor,
by her step-father and next friend, Veil Snowden; John
A rvie Lewis, a minor, by his step-father and nex t friend,
George Fields; Hilda R uth Borders, a minor, by
her fa ther and nex t friend, Louie Borders, Jr.,
Charlene Goldstein, a minor, by her m other and next
friend, (Mrs.) W illie Mae Goldstein, a feme sole; Ju lia
Ann Vickers, a minor, by her fa ther and nex t friend,
Searcy E. Vickers, and Shirley A nn Bush, a minor, by her
fa ther and next friend Frankie L. Bush, A ppellants here
in, pursuant to Rule 75(a), Federal Rules of Civil Proce
dure, by and through the ir A ttorneys of Record, and
designate the following portions of the record, proceedings
and evidence adduced at tria l of this case to be placed
in the record of appeal:
1. P lain tiffs’ Complaint.
2. P laintiffs’ Motion for Prelim inary Injunction.
3. P lain tiff’s Show Cause Order.
4. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
5. D efendants’ Answer.
6. The E ntire Proceedings in Open Court.
7. The Court’s Finding of Feet and Conclusions of Law.
73
8. The Judgm ent and O rder of the Court Dismissing
th e cause.
9. Notice of Appeal.
Respectfully Subm itted,
W. J. DURHAM,
(W. J. D urham ),
2600 Flora Street,
Dallas, Texas.
LOUIS BEDFORD,
(Louis Bedford),
1807% Singleton Boulevard,
Dallas, Texas.
U. SIMPSON TATE,
(U. Simpson Tate),
2600 Flora S treet,
Dallas, Texas.
ROBERT L. CARTER,
(Robert L. C arter),
107 W est 43rd Street,
New York, N. Y.
C. B. BUNKLEY, JR.,
(C. B. Bunkley, J r.) ,
814% N. Good-Latimer Expressway,
Dallas, Texas.
KENNETH F. HOLBERT,
(K enneth F. H olbert),
2531 Forest Avenue,
Dallas, Texas.
J. L. TURNER, J R ,
(J. L. Turner, J r.) ,
1723 Routh Street,
Dallas,Texas.
74
THURGOOD MARSHALL,
(Thurgood M arshall),
A ttorney for Plaintiffs.
107 W est 43rd Street,
New York, N. Y.
Certificate of Service.
This is to certify th a t on this day a copy of the fore
going A ppellants’ Designation of Contents of Record on
A ppeal has been m ailed to Honorable A. J. Thuss, Jr.,
A ttorney for Defendants, at his office in the Davis Build
ing, Dallas, Texas, postage prepaid.
Dated this the 27th day of October, 1955.
U. SIMPSON TATE,
(U. Simpson Tate),
One of the A ttorneys for
Appellants.
75
CLERK’S CERTIFICATE.
I, GEO. W. PARKER, Clerk of the United States
D istrict Court for the N orthern D istrict of Texas, do
hereby certify th a t the foregoing is a true and correct
transcrip t of th e Record, and all proceedings in Cause
No. 6165-Civil, W herein, A lbert Bell, A Minor, by his
S tep-Father and N ext Friend, Theodore D. Dorsey, et al
are Plaintiffs, and Dr. Edw in L. Rippy, As President of
the Board of Trustees of the Dallas Independent School
District, Dallas, Dallas County, Texas, et al, are Defend
ants, as fu lly as the same now rem ain on file and of
record in m y office a t Dallas, Texas.
W itness m y hand officially and the seal of said Court
at Dallas, Texas, this the ----- day of November, A. D.
1955.
GEO. W. PARKER,
Clerk.
By LILLIAN HAMILTON,
(Seal) Deputy.
E. S. UPTON PRINTING CO., NEW ORLEANS — 22310