Brown v. Rippy Transcript of Record
Public Court Documents
January 28, 1956

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Brown v. Rippy Transcript of Record, 1956. 1bad78ab-b69a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/581ea7eb-1817-4cf5-b4f8-07676706f522/brown-v-rippy-transcript-of-record. Accessed May 16, 2025.
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TRANSCRIPT OF RECORD. U N IT E D S T A T E S COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH CIRCUIT. No. 15,872 CHARLES BROWN, a minor, by his father and next friend, WALTER BROWN, JR., ET AL., Appellants, versus DR. EDWIN L. RIPPY, as President of the Board of Trustees of the Dallas Independent School District, Dallas County Texas, ET AL., Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. (ORIGINAL RECORD RECEIVED NOV. 25/55.) U. s. COURT OF APPEALS FILED JAN 2 8 1956 #oJU d ' & e e fa *h J CLERK INDEX PAGE C a p t io n ................................................................................. 1 Complaint ................................................................................... 4 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Prelim inary Injunction . . . . . . 25 Order to Show Cause, entered 9/12/55 .......................... 28 Motion of Defendants, Edwin L. Rippy, et al., to Dis miss Complaint ........................................................... 28 Answer of Defendants, Edwin L. Rippy, et al., to Complaint ..................................................................... 30 Transcript of Proceedings ................................................... 38 Case called for hearing, etc.......................................... 38 Colloquy between Court and Counsel .................... 38 Statem ent made by Mr. Thuss, Counsel for De fendants ............................................... 52 Statem ent made by Mr. M arshall, Counsel for Plaintiffs ............................................................... 56 Colloquy between Court and C o u n se l...................... 59 Statem ent made by the Court .................................. 59 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ...................... 63 Judgm ent, entered 9 /1 2 /5 5 ................................................... 66 Notice of Appeal ..................................................................... 67 Motion and O rder extending tim e to file Record in Appellate Court ......................................................... 70 A ppellants’ Designation as to Contents of Record on Appeal ............................................. 71 Clerk’s Certificate ................................................................... 75 CAPTION. BE IT REMEMBERED, th a t at a Special Term of the United S tates D istrict Court in and for the N orthern D istrict of Texas, begun and holden at Dallas, Texas, on the 12th day of September, A.D. 1955, and which said term of Court is now in session, the Hon. Wm. H. Atwell, United States D istrict Judge for the N orthern D istrict of Texas, presiding, the following proceedings w ere had and the following cause came on for tria l and was tried, to-wit: Civil Action No. 6165. ALBERT BELL, A MINOR, BY HIS STEP-FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, THEODORE D. DORSEY; SANDRA LYNETTA BERKINS, A MINOR, BY HER MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND, (MRS.) CHARLES BEKINS, A FEMME SOLE; HILDA RUTH BORDERS, A MINOR, BY HER FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, LOUIE BORDERS, JR.; SANDRA CRAIG BOSON, AND PAMELA BOSON, MINOR, BY THEIR FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, LAWRENCE C. BOSON; CHARLES BROWN, A MINOR, BY HIS FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, WALTER BROWN, JR .; WILLIAM C. BURTON, JR., A MINOR, BY HIS FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, WILLIAM C. BURTON; SHIRLEY ANN BUSH, A MINOR, BY HER FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, FRANKIE L. BUSH; RAYFORD COOKS, A MINOR, BY HIS FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, ROBERT COOKS; BILLIE MARIE COX, A MINOR, BY HER STEP FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, VELL SNOWDEN; HELEN JEAN GIPSON, A MINOR, BY HER 2 MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND, LUENDA GIPSON, A FEMME SOLE; CHARLENE GOLDSTEIN, A MINOR, BY HER MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND, W ILLIE MAE GOLDSTEIN, A FEMME SOLE; OSCAR W ILLIE HAWKINS, A MINOR, BY HIS FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, OSCAR HAWKINS; CAROL, CHEYEL AND RONALD HURDLE, MI NORS, BY THEIR FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, EL MER D. HURDLE; OLLIE PEARL IVY, A MINOR, BY HER MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND, IRENE IVY, A F E M M E SO LE; JO H N A R V IE LEW IS, A MINOR, BY HIS STEP-FATHER AND NEXT F R IE N D , G E O R G E F IE L D S ; M ILTON Mc- DANIEL, A MINOR, BY HIS FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, WILLIAM McDANIEL; DIANN MURPHY, A MINOR, BY HER GRANDMOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND, (MRS.) S. L. NEELY, A FEMME SOLE; L. LAWRENCE NELSON, II, A MINOR, BY HIS FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, CLYDE D. NELSON; ALONZO D. NICKERSON, JR., A MINOR, BY HIS FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, ALONZO D. NICK ERSON, SR.; ROSA SHARON AND MAUSE LOUIS SIMS, MINORS, BY THEIR FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, (REV) PAUL A. SIMS, MARY ANN SLIDER, A MINOR, BY HER FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, L. G. SLIDER; DAURITY G. SMITH, A MINOR, BY HIS FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, LEO M. SMITH; JU LIA ANN VICKERS, A MINOR, BY HER FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, SEARCY E. VUCKERS, AND JOE ARTHUR WILLIAMS, A MINOR, BY HIS FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, HERBERT WILLIAMS, P lain tiffs , 3 versus DR. EDWIN L. RIPPY, AS PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, DALLAS, DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS; W. A. BLAIR; ROBERT L. DILLARD, JR.; ROBERT B. GILMORE; ROUSE HOWELL; (MRS.) VERNON D. INGRAM; VAN M. LAMM; (MRS.) TRACY H. RUTHERFORD; FRANKLIN E. SPAF- FORD, DALLAS, DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS, AS MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIS TRICT, AND DR. W. T. WHITE, AS SUPERIN TENDENT OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF THE DAL LAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT; HOW ARD A. ALLEN, AS PRINCIPAL OF THE W. H. ADAMSON HIGH SCHOOL; J. H. GURLEY, AS PRINCIPAL OF THE MAPLE LAWN ELEMEN TARY SCHOOL; W. A. HAMILTON, AS PRINCI PAL OF THE MIRABEAU B. LAMAR ELEMEN TARY SCHOOL; ELLA E. PARKER, AS PRINCI PAL OF THE JOHN HENRY BROWN ELEMEN TARY SCHOOL; WILLIAM H. STANLEY, AS PRINCIPAL OF THE THOMAS A. EDISON ELE MENTARY SCHOOL; RICHARD E. STROUD, AS PRINCIPAL OF THE THOMAS J. RUSK JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL, AND, THE DALLAS INDEPEND ENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendants. 4 COMPLAINT. I. Jurisdiction. (a) The Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court is in voked under T itle 28, Section 1331, of the United States Code, this being a civil action in equity tha t arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States w herein the m atter in controversy exceeds the sum and value of Three Thousand ($3,000.00) Dollars, exclusive of interest and costs, (62 Stat. 930, June 25, 1948), and, T itle 28, Sections 1981 and 1983, of the United States Code, this being a civil action in equity w herein citizens of the United States contend th a t they have been, are now, and w ill in the fu ture be deprived under color of law, of their rights, privileges and im munities secured to them as citi zens of the United States, by the Constitution and laws thereof, (68 Stat. 960, A ugust 30, 1954). (b) The Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court is fu r th e r invoked under Title 28, Section 1343(3), of the United States Code, this being a civil action in equity to redress the deprivation, under color of a State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or im m unity secured by the Constitution of the United States, or by any act of Congress provid ing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons w ithin the jurisdiction of the United States, (62 Stat. c. 646, June 25, 1948). 5 II. Injunctive Relief. The Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court is also invoked under T itle 28, Sections 2281 and 2284, of th e United States Code, this being a civil action in equity for an in terlocutory or perm anent injunction to restra in the en forcement, operation or execution of certain statutes of the S tate of Texas, and of certain constitutional provisions of the S tate of Texas, upon the grounds of the unconstitu tionality of such statutes and constitutional provisions, (62 Stat. 968, c. 646, June 25, 1948). III. D eclaratory Judgm ent. This is a proceeding under Title 28, Sections 2201 and 2202, of the U nited States Code, for a declaratory judg ment. All of the parties to the controversy are subject to the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. P laintiffs seek a definition and declaration of the legal rights and re la tions of th e parties in the subject m atter of th is controver sy, to wit, the question: (a) W hether the enforcement, execution or operation of A rticle 2900 and Articles 2922-13 and 2922-15, of V er non’s Civil S tatutes of th e S tate of Texas, to th e extent tha t they require or sanction the segregation of students in th e public schools of Texas on the basis of race or color, by th e defendant Board of Education of the Dal las Independent School D istrict, and the adm inistrative officers of said defendant Board, against plaintiffs, and 6 the class of persons tha t they represent, because of their race and color deny to them their rights, privileges and im munities as citizens of the United States, and the equal protection of laws secured to them by the Fourteenth A m endm ent of the Constitution of th e United States, or of rights and privileges secured to them by Sections 1981 and 1983, of Title 42, United States Code, and are, for those reasons, unconstitutional and void? (b) W hether the enforcement, execution or operation of A rticle VII, Section 7, of the Constitution of Texas, by the defendant Board of Education of the Dallas In dependent School District, and the adm inistrative officers of said defendant Board, against plaintiffs, and the class of persons th a t they represent, because of their race and color deny to them their rights, privileges and im m uni ties as citizens of the United States, and the equal pro tection of laws secured to them by th e Fourteenth A m end m ent of the Constitution of the United States, or of rights and privileges secured to them by Sections 1981 and 1983, of Title 42, United States Code, and are, for these reasons, unconstitutional and void. IV. Facts. 1. Plaintiffs, and each of them, allege tha t they are citizens of the United States and of the State of Texas, domiciled in the City and County of Dallas, Texas, and w ithin th e Dallas Independent School District; tha t they are, each of them, members of the Negro, or “colored” race, as defined by Texas law. (Acts of 1905, p. 263, A r ticle 2900, Vernon’s Civil S tatutes of the S tate of Tex as, Annotated.) 7 2. The plaintiffs, and each of them, allege tha t they are m inors between the ages of six (6) and tw enty-one (21) years; tha t they have met all lawful health and medical requirem ents for admission to the public schools of the City of Dallas; tha t they are in all m aterial re spects eligible and entitled to attend the public schools of the City of Dallas and w ithin the Dallas Independent School District, and to register, enter classes and re ceive instruction in the particular schools set out in paragraph 12, hereinafter. 3. The plaintiff Charles Brown is a m inor and he brings this action by his father and next friend, W al te r Brown, Jr.; the plaintiff Rayford Cooks is a minor and he brings this action by his father and next friend, Robert Cooks; the plaintiff W illiam C. Burton, Jr., is a m inor and he brings this action by his fa ther and nex t friend, W illiam C. Burton; the plaintiff Alonzo D. Nick erson, Jr., is a m inor and he brings this action by his father and next friend, Alonzo D. Nickerson, Sr.; the plaintiffs Sandra Craig and Pam ela Boson are minors and they bring this action by their father and nex t friend, Lawrence C. Boson; the plaintiff L. Lawrence Nelson, II., is a minor and he brings this action by his father and next friend, Clyde D. Nelson; the plaintiff M ary Ann Slider is a minor and she brings this action by her fa ther and next friend, L. G. Slider; the plain tiff Diann M urphy is a minor and she brings this action by her grandm other and next friend, (Mrs.) S. L. Nee ly, a femme sole; the plaintiff Helen Jean Gipson is a minor and she brings this action by her m other and nex t friend, (Mrs.) Luenda Gipson, a femme sole; the plaintiff Joe A rthur Williams is a minor and he brings this action by his father and next friend, H erbert Wil- 8 liams; the plaintiffs Rosa Sharon and Maude Lois Sims are m inors and they bring this action by their father and next friend, (Rev.) Paul A. Sims; the plaintiff D aurity G. Sm ith is a minor and he brings this action by his father and next friend, Leo M. Smith; the plaintiff Ollie Pearl Ivy is a m inor and she brings this action by her m other and next friend, (Mrs.) Irene Ivy, a femme sole; the plaintiff Oscar Willie Hawkins is a minor and he brings this action by his father and next friend, Oscar Hawkins; the plaintiff Milton McDaniel is a minor and he brings this action by his fa ther and next friend, William McDaniel; the plaintiff Sandra Lynetta Berkins is a minor and she brings this action by her m other and next friend, (Mrs.) Charles Berkins, a femme sole; the plaintiffs Carol, Cheyel and Ronald H ur dle are minors and they bring this action by the ir father and next friend, Elmer D. Hurdle; the P laintiff Billie Marie Cox is a minor and she brings this action by her step-father and next friend, Yell Snowden; the plaintiff John A rvie Lewis is a minor and he brings this action by his step-father and next friend, George Fields; the plaintiff A lbert Bell is a minor and he brings this action by his step-father and next friend, Theodore D. Dorsey; the plaintiff Hilda Ruth Borders is a minor and she brings this action by her father and next friend, Louie Borders, Jr.; the plaintiff Charlene Goldstein is a m inor and she brings this ac tion by her m other and next friend, (Mrs.) Willie Mae Goldstein, a femme sole; the plaintiff Ju lia Ann Vickers is a minor and she brings this action by her fa ther and next friend, Searcy E. Vickers, and the plaintiff Shir ley Ann Bush is a minor and she brings this action by h e r fa ther and next friend, Frankie L. Bush, pursuant to Rule 17(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 9 4. Plaintiffs bring this action in their own behalf, and in behalf of all other Negro minors who are sim ilarly situated, because of their race and color, w ithin the Dallas Independent School District. Plaintiffs say tha t they are members of a class of persons who are segregated and discrim inated against by the defendants because of their race and color; tha t the members of the class are so num erous as to make it im practicable to bring all of them before this Honorable Court; tha t they, as members of the class, can and will fairly and ade quately represent all of the members of the class; tha t the character of the right sought to be protected and en forced for the class is several, and tha t there is a com mon question of law affecting the several rights of all, and a common relief is sought. They bring this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(a)(3), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 5. Plaintiffs allege tha t the defendant Board of Trus tees of the defendant Dallas Independent School District is a body corporate w ith powers and authority to sue and be sued in its corporate name. (Articles 2748 and 2772, Ibid.) 6. Plaintiffs allege tha t the defendant Board of T rus tees, sometimes referred to as Board of Education, is vested w ith power and authority to m anage and con trol the public schools under its supervision and control. (A rticle 2749, Ibid.) 7. Plaintiffs allege tha t the defendant Board of Trus tees of the defendant Dallas Independent School District has power and authority to adopt rules and regulations, and by-laws, including the admission of students to pub lic schools, to effectuate the policies of the said Board 10 w ith respect to the m anagem ent and control of the pub lic schools under its supervision. (A rticle 2780, Ibid.) 8. The plaintiffs allege tha t the defendant Dallas In dependent School District is a political sub-division and an instrum entality of the State, and tha t it exists p u r suant to an Act of the Legislature of the State of Tex as. (A rticle 2783, et seq., Ibid.) 9. Plaintiffs allege tha t the defendant (Dr.) Edwin L. Rippy is a citizen of the United States and of the State of Texas; tha t he is domiciled in the City and County of Dallas, Texas, and is subject to the jurisdic tion of this Honorable Court; tha t he is the duly elected, qualified and acting president of the defendant Board of Trustees of the Dallas Independent School District; th a t he is an agent and adm inistrative officer of the S tate of Texas, and tha t he is sued in his official capacity. 10. Plaintiffs say tha t the defendants W. A. Blair, Robert L. Dillard, Jr., Robert B. Gilmore, Rouse Howell, (Mrs.) Vernon D. Ingram, Van M. Lamm, (Mrs.) Tracy H. Rutherford and Franklin E. Spafford are, each of them, citizens of the United States and of the S tate of Texas; tha t they are domiciled in the City and County of Dallas, Texas; tha t they are subject to the jurisdic tion of this Honorable Court; tha t they are the duly elected, qualified and acting members of the defend ant Board of Trustees of the Dallas Independent School D istrict; tha t they are agents and adm inistrative offi cers of the State of Texas, and tha t they are sued in the ir official capacities. 11 11. The plaintiffs allege tha t the defendant (Dr.) W. T. W hite is a citizen of the United States and of the State of Texas; th a t he is domiciled in the City and County of Dallas, Texas; tha t he is subject to the ju ris diction of th is Honorable Court; tha t he is the only desig nated, qualified and acting Superintendent of the public schools w ithin the defendant Dallas Independent School D istrict; tha t he is an agent and adm inistrative officer of the State of Texas, and tha t he is sued in his official capacity. 12. P laintiffs allege tha t the defendant Howard A. Allen is the principal of the W. H. Adamson High School w ithin the Dallas Independent School District; tha t the defendant R. E. Stroud is the principal of the Thomas J. Rusk Jun ior High School w ith in the Dallas Independent School Dis trict; tha t the defendant Ella E. Parker is the principal of the John H enry Brown Elem entary School w ithin the Dallas Independent School District; tha t the defendant J. H. G urley is the principal of the Maple Lawn Elemen ta ry School w ith in the Dallas Independent School District; tha t the defendant W. A. Ham ilton is the principal of the M irabeau B. Lam ar E lem entary School w ithin the Dallas Independent School District; tha t the defendant W illiam H. Stanley is the principal of the Thomas A. Edison Ele m entary School w ithin the Dallas Independent School Dis trict, and tha t they are, each of them, citizens of the United States and of the S tate of Texas, domiciled in the City and County of Dallas; tha t they are, each of them, subject to the judisdiction of this Honorable Court; tha t they are, each of them, agents and employees of the defendant Board of Trustees of the Dallas Independent School Dis trict, and tha t they are agents and adm inistrative officer of the State of Texas. They are, each of them, sued in their respective official capacities. 12 13. The plaintiffs Charles Brown, Rayford Cooks, W il liam C. Burton, Jr., Alonzo D. Nickerson, J r . Sandra Craig and Pam ela Boson, and Lawrence Nelson, II., allege tha t on, to wit, the 5th day of September, A. D. 1955, they, and each of them, acting in the ir respective individual behalf, w ent in person w ith the ir respective parents, or w ith th e ir parents knowledge and consent, to the Maple Law n Elem entary School w ith in th e Dallas Independent School D istrict, during the regular period of registration and ad mission and made application for registration and ad mission to the said Maple Lawn E lem entary School; that the said Maple Lawn E lem entary School was then, and is now, the nearest public elem entary school to the ir respective homes; tha t they w ere ready and willing to submit to and abide by all law ful and reasonable rules and regulations of the defendant Board of Trustees of the Dallas Independent School District; they w ere in all m aterial respects eligible to register, enter classes, and receive instruction in the said elem entary school, but for the ir race and color, but tha t in spite of the foregoing facts, they w ere denied and refused admission to the said Maple Law n Elem entary School by its principal J. H. Gurley, w hile the said J. H. Gurley was acting in con cert, conspiracy and a common scheme w ith the defendant W. T. W hite, as superintendent of public schools in the Dallas Independent School District, and the defendant Board of Trustees of the Dallas Independent School Dis tric t to w ilfully and knowingly deprive plaintiffs and the members of the class of persons they represent, because of the ir race and color, of rights, privileges and im m uni ties secured and guaranteed to them by Section 1, of the Fourteenth Amendm ent of the Constitution of the United States. 13 14. The plaintiffs M ary Ann Slider, Diann M urphy, Helen Jean Gipson, John Arvie Lewis, A lbert Bell, Hilda Ruth Borders, Charlene Goldstein and Ju lia Ann Vickers allege tha t on, to wit, the 5th day of September, A. D. 1955, they, and each of them, while acting in their respective individual behalf w ent in person w ith their respective parents or w ith the ir paren ts’ knowledge and consent, to the W. H. Adamson High School w ithin the Dallas Independent School District during the regular period of registration and admission and made applica tion for registration and admission to the said W. H. Adamson High School; th a t the said W. H. Adamson High School was then, and is now, the nearest public high school to their respective homes; tha t they were ready and willing to submit to and abide by all lawful and reasonable rules and regulations of the defendant Board of Trustees of the Dallas Independent School Dis tric t; tha t they w ere in all m aterial respects eligible to register, en ter classes, and receive instructions in the said high school but for their race and color, but th a t in spite of the foregoing facts, they w ere denied and refused admission to the said W. H. Adamson High School by its principal Howard A. Allen, while the said Howard A. Allen was acting in concert, conspiracy and a common scheme w ith the defendant W. T. W hite, as superintendent of public schools in the Dallas Independent School Dis trict, and the defendant Board of Trustees of the Dallas Independent School District to w ilfully and knowingly deprive plaintiffs and the members of the class of persons they represent, because of their race and color, of rights, privileges and immunities secured and guaranteed to them by Section 1, of the Fourteenth Amendm ent of the Con stitution of the United States. 14 15. The plaintiffs Joe A rthu r Williams, Rose Sharon and Maude Lois Sims, D aurity G. Smith, Sandra Lynette Berkins, Carol, Cheyel and Ronald Hurdle, and Billie M arie Cox allege tha t on, to wit, the 5th day of Septem ber, A. D. 1955, they, and each of them acting in their respective individual behalf, w ent in person w ith their respective parents, or w ith the ir parents knowledge and consent to the John H enry Brown E lem entary School w ithin the Dallas Independent School D istrict, during the regular period of registration and admission and made application for registration and admission to the said John H enry Brown E lem entary School; tha t the said John H enry Brown Elem entary school was then, and is now, the nearest public elem entary school to their respective homes; tha t they w ere leady, and willing to subm it to and abide by all law ful and reasonable rules and regulations of the defendant Board of Trustees of the Dallas Independent School D istrict; tha t they w ere in all m aterial respects eligible to register, enter clas ses, and receive instruction in the said elem entary school bu t for the ir race and color, bu t th a t in spite of the fore going facts, they w ere denied and refused admission to the said John H enry Brown E lem entary School by its principal Ella E. Parker, while the said Ella E. P arker was acting in concert, conspiracy and a common scheme w ith the defendant W. T. W hite, as superintendent of public schools in the Dallas Independent School D istrict, and the defendant Board of Trustees of the Dallas Independent School D istrict to w ilfully and knowingly deprive plain tiffs and the members of the class of persons they represent, because of the ir race and color, of rights, privileges and im munities secured and guaranteed to them by Section 1, of the Fourteenth Amendm ent of the Constitution of the United States. 15 16. The plaintiffs Ollie Pearl Ivy and Oscar Willie Hawkins allege tha t on, to wit, the 5th day of September, A. D. 1955, they, and each of them, acting in their re spective individual behalf, w ent in person w ith their respective parents, or w ith their parents knowlelge and consent, to th e Thomas A. Edison Elem entary School w ithin the Dallas Independent School District, during the regular period of registration and admission and made application for registration and admission to the said Thomas A. Edison E lem entary School; tha t the said Thomas A. Edison Elem entary School was then and is now, the nearest public elem entary school to the ir respective homes; th a t they w ere ready and willing to submit to and abide by all law ful and reasonable rules and regulations of the defendant Board of T rus tees of the Dallas Independent School District; th a t they w ere in all m aterial respects eligible to register, enter classes, and receive instruction in the said elem entary school, bu t for their race and color, bu t th a t in spite of the foregoing facts, they w ere denied and refused admis sion to the said Thomas A. Edison E lem entary School by its principal W illiam H. Stanley, while the said William H. Stanley was acting in concert, conspiracy, and a com mon scheme w ith the defendant W. T. W hite, as super intendent of the public schools in the Dallas Independent School District, and the defendant Board of Trustees of the Dallas Independent School D istrict to W ilfully and knowingly deprive plaintiffs and the members of the class of persons they represent, because of the ir race and color, of rights, privileges and im m unities secured and guaranteed to them by Section 1, of the Fourteenth Amendm ent of the Constitution of the United States. 16 17. The plaintiff M ilton McDaniel alleges tha t on, to wit, the 5th day of September, A. D. 1955, he w ent in person w ith his father W illiam McDaniel, to the Mira- beau B. Lam ar E lem entary School w ithin the Dallas Independent School D istrict, during the regular period of registration and admission and made application for registration and admission to the said M irabeau B. Lam ar Elem entary School; tha t the M irabeau B. Lam ar Elemen ta ry School was then and is now, the nearest public elem entary school to his home; tha t he was ready and willing to submit to and abide by all lawful and reason able rules and regulations of the defendant Board of T rus tees of the Dallas Independent School District; tha t he was in all m aterial respects eligible to register, en ter classes, and receive instruction in the said elem entary school, bu t for his race and color, bu t tha t in spite of the foregoing facts, he was denied and refused admission to the said M irabeau B. Lam ar Elem entary School by its principal W. A. Hamilton, w hile the said W. A. Ham ilton, was acting in concert, conspiracy and a common scheme w ith the defendant W. T. W hite, as superinten dent of public schools of the Dallas Independent School D istrict, and the defendant Board of Trustees of the Dallas Independent School D istrict to w ilfully and know ingly deprive plaintiffs and the members of the class of persons they represent, because of their race and color, of rights, privileges and immunities secured and guaran teed to them by Section 1, of the Fourteenth Amendm ent of the United States. 18. The plaintiff Shirley Ann Bush alleges that on, to wit, the 5th day of September, A. D. 1955, she w ent in person with her m other Mae E. Bush, to the Thomas J. Rusk Jun ior High School w ithin the Dallas .17 Independent School D istrict, during the regular period of registration and admission and m ade application for registration and admission to the said Thomas J. Rusk Junior High School; tha t the said Thomas J. Rusk Junior High School was then and is now, the nearest public junior high school to her home; tha t she was ready and willing to submit to and abide by all lawful and reasonable rules and regulations of the defendant Board of Trus tees of the Dallas Independent School D istrict; tha t she was in all m aterial respects eligible to register, enter classes, and receive instruction in the said junior high school, bu t for her race and color, bu t tha t in spite of the foregoing facts, she was denied and refused admission to the said Thomas J. Rusk Junior High School by its principal R. E. Stroud, while the said R. E. Stroud was acting in concert, conspiracy and a common scheme w ith the defendant W. T. White, as superintendent of public schools in the Dallas Independent School District, and the defendant Board of Trustees of the Dallas In dependent School D istrict to w ilfully and knowingly de prive plaintiff and the members of the class of persons she represents, because of their race and color, of rights, privileges and im m unities secured and guaranteed to them by Section 1, of the Fourteenth Amendm ent of the Con stitution of the United States. 19. The State of Texas has unlaw fully made racial segregation in the public schools of the State a part of its public policy. By a constitutional provision, it is stated that: “Separate schools shall be provided for the white and colored children, and im partial provision shall be made for both.” (Art. VII, Sec. 7, Constitution of Texas.) 18 20. Acting pursuant to the aforesaid unlaw ful con stitu tional m andate in the organic law of the State, the Legislature illegally enacted laws to im plem ent the un law ful constitutional provision set out in paragraph 19 hereof. A rticle 2900, V ernon’s Civil S tatutes of the S tate of Texas provides: “All available public school funds of this state shall be appropriated in each county for the education alike of w hite and colored children, and im partial provisions shall be made for both races. No w hite child shall attend schools supported for colored children, nor shall colored children attend schools supported for w hite children. The term “colored race” or “colored children” as used in this Title, include all persons of mixed blood descending from Negro ancestry.” (Acts of 1905, p. 263.) 21. W hile acting in fu rth er deference to the illegal con stitutional provision set out in paragraph 19 hereof, the 51st Legislature of Texas, enacted the M inimum Founda tion School Program Act, sometimes called the Gilmer- A ikin Act which became effective June 8, 1949, the pertinent portions of the Act provide as follows: Article 2922-13: The num ber of professional units allotted for the purpose of this Act to each school dis trict, except as otherw ise provided herein, shall be based upon and determ ined by the average daily attendance for the district for the n ex t preceding year, separate for w hite and separate for negroes. Such allotm ents based upon w hite attendance shall be utilized in w hite schools, and allotm ents based on negro attendance shall be utilized in negro schools. 19 A rticle 2922-15: The to tal curren t operating cost for each school district, o ther than professional salaries and transportation, shall be based upon the num ber of ap proved classroom teacher units and such exceptional child ren teacher units as are utilized for convalescent classes, separate for w hite and separate for negroes, ***. 22. Plaintiffs allege th a t the purpose of the Foundation School program act is to guarantee to each child of school age in Texas the availability of a minimum foundation school program for nine m onths of the year, and to estab lish the eligibility requirem ents applicable to Texas public school districts in connection therew ith, and tha t the segregation of the races in th e enjoym ent of public school benefits was not its prim ary purpose. (Acts of 1949, 51st Leg., p. 625, ch. 334, Art. 1). 23. P laintiffs allege tha t only so much of th e Act as requires or places state sanction upon racial segregation is unconstitutional. 24. P laintiffs allege th a t the defendant Board of Trus tees of the Dallas Independent School D istrict while acting, or purporting to act, pursuant to the illegal laws of th e State of Texas set out in paragraphs 19, 20, and 21 hereof, has made adopted and prom ulgated certain rules and regulations for the managem ent and control of the public schools under its supervision, and specifically for the m anagem ent and control of the public schools men tioned hereinbefore in paragraphs 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18 hereof, which have been enforced against plaintiffs, and each of them, and which will be enforced against them in the future, because of th e ir race and color, tha t unlaw fully and wrongfully discrim inate against plaintiffs 20 and th e class of persons th a t they represent, because of the ir race and color and deprive them of rights, privileges and im m unities secured to them as citizens of the United S tates by the Constitution and laws of the U nited States. 25. P laintiffs allege tha t the defendant Board of Education of the Dallas Independent School D istrict, and the defendant W. T. W hite, w hile acting as Superin ten dent of public schools of the Dallas Independent School District, and the defendants H owerd A. Allen, Ella E. Parker, W illiam H. Stanley, Richard E. Stroud, J. H. Gurley, and W. A. Hamilton, as principals of public schools m entioned hereinbefore in paragraphs 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18, hereof, have conspired, acted in concert and common scheme jointly to w ilfully and knowingly deprive plaintiffs and the class of persons tha t they represent, because of the ir race and color, of rights and privileges secured to them by Section 1, of the Four teen th Amendm ent of the Constitution of the United States, and of rights secured to them by Sections 1981 and 1983, of Title 28, United States Code, by the enforce m ent and operation of the aforesaid rules and regulations, to the great and irreparable harm and in jury of plaintiffs and the class of persons tha t they represent. 26. Plaintiffs allege tha t they have no plain, efficient or adequate rem edy at law to redress the unlaw ful action of the defendants, and each of them, other than this action for declaratory judgm ent and injunctive relief; th a t any other rem edy to which they could be rem itted would be attended by such uncertainties and delays as to am ount to substantial denial of relief; would involve a m ultiplicity of suits and would cause plaintiffs fu rther irreparable harm and injury, and occasion undue hard ships, vexations and delay. 21 V. P ra y e r . W herefore , the p re m ise s considered , p la in tiffs , r e spectfu lly p ra y th a t upon th e filing of th is C om plaint, as m a y a p p e a r p ro p e r an d conven ien t to th e Court: 1. T h a t a S ta tu to ry T h ree -Ju d g e C ourt be convened p u rsu a n t to Sections 2281 and 2284, of T itle 28, U nited S ta te s Code; 2. T h a t th is cause be ad v an ced on th e docket of th is C ourt and a speedy h e a rin g be o rd e red acco rd in g to law , and upon such p re lim in a ry h ea rin g , th a t th is H onorab le C ourt issue a te m p o ra ry in junction to enjoin and re s tra in th e d efendan ts , and each of them , fro m denying or re fu s in g to p la in tiffs th e rig h t and p riv ileg e of en tering , and a tten d in g c lasses , and r e ceiv ing instruc tion a t th e pub lic school w ith in the D allas In d ep en d en t School D is tr ic t w hich is n e a re s t to th e ir hom e, w ithou t being ass ig n ed to any public school on th e b as is or c la ss ifica tio n of ra c e or color, and w ithou t any d istinctions being m ad e as to th em b ecau se of th e ir ra c e and color; 3. T h a t upon fin a l h e a rin g of th is cau se on its m erits , th is H onorab le Court: (a ) . E n te r a fina l ju d g m en t or d ec re e th a t w ill be d ec la ra tiv e and defin itive of th e leg a l r ig h ts and r e la tions of th e p a r tie s in th e su b jec t m a tte r of th is co n troversy ; 22 (b). E n te r a f in a l ju d g m en t, o rd e r and d ecree w hich w ill dec lare th a t Section 7, of A rtic le V II, of th e C onstitu tion of T exas is u n co n stitu tio n a l and void fo r the re a so n th a t it denies and d ep riv es p la in tiffs , and th e m e m b e rs of th e c la ss of persons w hom they re p re se n t, th e ir p riv ileg es and im m u n itie s as citizens of th e U nited S ta tes , and th e eq u a l p ro tec tio n of law s secu red to th em by th e C onstitu tion and law s of the U nited S ta te s and r ig h ts and p riv ileg es secu red to th e m by Section 1981 and 1983, of T itle 42, U nited S ta te s Code; (c). E n te r a f in a l ju d g m en t, o rd e r and d ec ree w hich w ill d ec la re th a t A rtic le 2900, of V ernon ’s Civil S ta t u te s of th e S ta te of T exas, is unconstitu tional and void, fo r the re a so n th a t it den ies and dep riv es p la in tiffs , and th e m e m b e rs of the c la ss of perso n s w hom th ey re p re se n t, th e ir p riv ileg es and im m u n i tie s as c itizens of the U nited S ta tes , and, th e equal p ro tec tion of law s secu red to th e m by the C onstitu tion and law s of the U nited S ta tes , and, r ig h ts and p riv ileg es secu red to th em by Sections 1981 and 1983, of T itle 42, U nited S ta tes Code; (d ). E n te r a f in a l ju d g m en t, o rd e r and d ecree w hich w ill d ec la re th a t so m u ch of A rtic les 2922-13, and 2922-15, of V ernon ’s Civil S ta tu te s of the S ta te of T exas, as m a y be in te rp re te d or co n stru ed to r e qu ire , or san c tio n the seg reg a tio n of s tu d en ts in the pub lic schools o p e ra ted by th e d efendan ts , or any of th em , acco rd ing to ra c e a re u n co n stitu tio n a l and void, fo r th e rea so n it den ies and d ep riv es p la in tiffs , and th e m e m b e rs of th e c lass of p erso n s w hom they re p re sen t, th e ir p riv ileges an d im m u n itie s as citizens 23 of the U nited S ta tes , and, the eq u a l p ro tec tio n of law s, secu red to th e m by the C onstitu tion and law s of th e U nited S ta tes , and, r ig h ts and p riv ileg es se cu red to th e m by Sections 1981 and 1983, of T itle 42, U nited S ta te s Code; (e). E n te r a p e rm a n e n t in junction to en jo in and re s tra in th e d e fen d an ts E dw in L. R ippy, W. A. B la ir, R o b ert L. D illard , J r . , R o b ert B. G ilm ore, R ouse Howell, (M rs.) V ernon In g ra m , V an M. L am m , (M rs.) T rac y H. R u th e rfo rd , and F ra n k lin E . Spafford , as officers and m e m b e rs of the B oard of T ru s tee s of the D allas Indep en d en t School D is tric t, and W. T. W hite, as S u p erin ten d en t of P ub lic Schools of the D allas In d ep en d en t School D istric t, th e ir ag en ts , th e ir s e r van ts, th e ir em ployees, th e ir a tto rn ey s , th e ir suc- cesors in office, and a ll o ther perso n s in concert w ith th em who sh a ll rece iv e a c tu a l no tice of th is jud g m en t, o rd e r and decree , fro m fu r th e r execu ting , or en fo rc ing a g a in s t p la in tiffs , or any m e m b e r of th e c lass of perso n s w hom th ey rep re sen t, any ru le o r regu la tion , or any o rd e r or o rd ers , m ade , p ro m u lg a ted , or issued p u rsu a n t to, or p u rp o rted ly issued p u rsu an t to e ith e r Section 7, of A rtic le VII, of the C onstitu tion of T exas, or A rtic le 2900 of V ernon ’s Civil S ta tu te s of the S ta te of T exas, or any portion of A rtic le 2922-13 or 2922-15, of V ernon ’s Civil S ta tu te s of th e S ta te of T exas th a t re q u ire s or sanctions th e seg reg a tio n of s tuden ts in the public schools o p e ra ted by the d efen d an t B oard of T ru s tee s of the D allas Indep en d en t School D istric t, acco rd ing to ra c e , or color. 24 4. T h a t th is H onorab le C ourt allow p la in tiffs th e ir costs h ere in , and, g ra n t such o th e r and fu r th e r re lie f as m a y a p p e a r equ itab le and ju s t in the p rem ises . W. J . DURHAM , (W. J . D u rh am ). 2600 F lo ra S tree t, D allas, T exas. C. B. BU N K LEY , JR ., (C. B. B unkley, J r . ) . 8141/2 N orth G ood-L atim er E x p ressw ay , D allas, T exas. LO U IS B E D FO R D , (K enneth H o lbert). 1807% S ingleton B oulevard , D allas, T exas. K E N N E T H H O LBERT, (L ouir B edfo rd ). 2531 F o re s t A venue, D allas, T exas. U. SIM PSO N TATE, (U. S im pson T a te ). 2600 F lo ra S tree t, D allas, T exas. J . L. T U R N E R , JR ., (J . L. T u rn e r, J r ) . 1723 R outh S tree t, D allas, T exas. R O B E R T L. C A RTER, (R o b ert L. C a rte r) . THURGOOD M ARSHALL, (T hurgood M arsh a ll) . 107 W est 43rd S tree t, N ew Y ork City, N ew Y ork. A tto rneys fo r P la in tiffs . 25 Certificate of Verification. County of Dallas State of Texas, ss. I, U. Simpson Tate, one of the A ttorneys for Plaintiffs herein, after having been first duly sworn according to law, on m y oath depose and say tha t I have read the foregoing Complaint by me subscribed and know the con tents thereof and tha t the same is true of m y own knowledge, except as to m atters stated to be alleged upon inform ation and belief, and as to that, I verily believe it to be true. U. SIMPSON TATE, (U. Simpson Tate). Subscribed and Sworn to before me this the 12th day of September, 1955. EDWIN C. WASHINGTON, JR., N otary Public in and for Dallas (Seal) County, Texas. PLA IN TIFFS’ MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY IN JU N C TION. (Title Omitted.) Come now the plaintiffs in the above num bered and styled cause, and respectfully move the Court for a prelim inary injunction to enjoin and restrain the defend ants W. T. W hite, as superintendent of public schools in the Dallas Independent School D istrict; Howard A. Allen, as principal of the W. H. Adamson High School; 26 Richard E. Stroud, as principal of the Thomas J. Rusk Jun io r High School; Ella E. Parker, as principal of the John H enry Brown Elem entary School; W. A. Hamilton, as principal of the M irabeau B. Lam ar Elem entary School, J. H. Gurley, as principal of the Maple Lawn Elemen ta ry School, and W illiam H. Stanley, as principal of the Thomas A. Edison E lem entary School, each of which schools are public free w ithin the Dallas Independent School District, and Edwin L. Rippy, as president of the Board of Trustees of the Dallas Independent School Dis trict, and W. A. Blair, Robert L. Dillard, Jr., Robert B. Gilmore, Rouse Howell, (Mrs.) Vernon D. Ingram, Van M. Lamm, (Mrs.) Tracy H. Rutherford, and Franklin E. Spafford, as members of the Board of Trustees of the Dallas Independent School D istrict, and the Board of Trustees of the Dallas Independent School District, a corporation, and each of them, the ir agents, their ser vants, the ir employees and their successors in office, their attorneys and all other persons in active concert or par ticipation w ith them, from assigning plaintiffs, or any m em ber of the class of Persons tha t they represent be cause of race and color, to any public free school w ithin the Dallas Independent School District, or from refusing and denying plaintiffs, or any m em ber of the class of persons th a t they represent, because of race or color, the right and privilege of registering at, entering and a t tending classes, and receiving instruction in the public free school nearest to the ir respective homes, at the same time, and under the same conditions and circumstances th a t all other public free school pupils register, en ter and attend classes and receive instruction w ithout any distinctions being made as to plaintiffs and the members of the class of persons tha t they represent, on the basis of race or color. 27 In support of this Motion, plaintiffs incorporate by reference the facts set out in the ir Complaint filed here in, in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 26, as though they w ere copied and made a p a rt hereof. P laintiffs would fu rther show to the Court th a t unless defendants, and each of them, are enjoined and restrained from continuing the unlaw ful action and conduct com plained of in th e Complaint filed herein, plaintiffs w ill suffer unlaw ful discrim ination because of the ir race and color, in tha t they will, each of them, be forced to travel disproportionate distances and suffer hazards and hard ships of inclement w eather, be away from the ir homes and the care, guidance and protection of the ir respective families for a longer period of time than children of the w hite or Caucasian race who live near them ; tha t such hardships thus placed upon the m inor plaintiffs and their parents is real and substantial; tha t plaintiffs have no efficient or adequate rem edy at law. If this prelim inary injunction be granted, defendants will suffer no financial loss, or other tangible harm or injury. Therefore, plaintiffs pray tha t no bond be set upon the granting of this motion. U. SIMPSON TATE, (U. Simpson Tate), One of the Attorneys for Plaintiffs. 2600 Flora Street, Dallas 4, Texas. 28 SHOW CAUSE ORDER. (Title Omitted.) The Court having considered the Complaint of P e ti tioners filed herein, and, the Application for Tem porary Injunction, is of the opinion th a t the same should be set for hearing, and the same is set for a hearing on a day certain on the Petitioners’ A pplication for Tem porary In junction on the 16 day of September, 1955, a t 10 o’clock, A. M., and the Clerk of this Court is directed to issue Notice to the Defendants as the law requires, to be, and appear before this Court at 10 o’clock, A. M., on the 16 day of September, 1955, in the Court Room of the U nited States Court House at Dallas, Texas, and show cause, if any they have, w hy said Tem porary Injunction should not be issued. Dated this 12 day of September, 1955. WM. H. ATWELL, United S tates D istrict Judge, for the N orthern D istrict of Texas. MOTION TO DISMISS. (Title Omitted.) 1 . The Defendants, Edwin L. Rippy, Robert L. Dillard, Franklin Spafford, Mrs. Tracy Rutherford, Van M. Lamm, Mrs. Vernon D. Ingram, Rouse Howell, Robert B. Gilmore, 29 W. A. Blair, Trustees of the Dallas Independent School D istrict, the Dallas Independent School District, an educa tional facility organized under the laws of the S tate of Texas, Richard E. Stroud, W. T. W hite, Ella Parker, W illiam Stanley, J. H. Gurley, Howard Allen, and W. A. Hamilton, file this their Motion to Dismiss P lain tiffs’ complaint. 2 . The Plaintiffs have failed to join as Defendants in dispensable parties hereinafter mentioned, such parties being necessary to obtain a final judgm ent and dis position of this case. The indispensable parties which Plaintiffs have failed to join are the State Comptroller of Public Accounts, R. S. Calvert, the State Board of Education, provided for in Article 2654-2 V. A. C. S., and the State Commissioner of Education, designated under the relevant provisions of Article 2654-5 V.A.C.S. The State Board of Education is the policy forming and planning body concerning all public education in the State of Texas, and the S tate Commissioner of Education is clothed w ith duties concerning the general adm inistra tion of school laws and the superintendency of business relating to public education. W herefore, said suit for the reasons set forth above should be dismissed. A. J. THUSS, JR., (A. J. Thuss, J r.) , A ttorney for Defendants. 1122 Davis Building, Dallas 2, Texas. 30 ANSWER. (Title Omitted.) The Defendants, Edwin L. Rippy, Robert L. Dillard, Franklin Spafford, Mrs. Tracy Rutherford, Van M. Lamm, Mrs. Vernon D. Ingram, Rouse, Howell, Robert B. Gilmore, W. A. Blair, Trustees of the Dallas Independant School D istrict, the Dallas Independent School District, an educational facility organized under the laws of the State of Texas, R ichard E. Stroud, W. T. W hite, Ella Parker, W illiam Stanley, J. H. Gurley, Howard Allen, and W. A. Hamilton file this the ir Answ er to P laintiffs’ Complaint. 1. All of the Defendants deny there is any scheme or conspiracy to circum vent or evade th e law or to deprive any child, student or other person of the ir civil rights. The principals of the various schools w ere following the instructions issued to them by the adm inistrative staff. The adm inistrative staff and the district trustees are now and have been m arking an honest, bona fide, realistic study of the facts to m eet the obligations the law has placed upon them to provide adequate public school education and to perfect, as soon as possible, a workable integrated system of public education. 2. The Dallas Public School System, under the m an date of State law and w ith th e approval of Federal Courts and Federal law, has for approxim ately ninety years operated as a segregated school system. This system 31 was regarded until May 31, 1955, by every Court in the land as a legal and valid system and under such system budget procedures have been installed for the purpose of arriving at the cost of operating said system and determ ining the am ount of funds to be raised by ta x ation, and also under such system a building program had been form ulated and bonds authorized and issued. The applicable laws required the taking of a yearly scholastic census and said census has been subdivided into a separate enum eration of negro students and white. Such subdivision is still required by S tate authorities. Such scholastic census fixes the basis for the alloca tion of funds from the S tate of Texas and the allocation of the num ber of students to the various school buildings and other facilities so tha t there will be a reasonable distribution and no overcrowding. 3. The Suprem e Court of the United States on May 31, 1955, entered a final order and decree announcing a drastic change in legal concept of school adm inistration and placed upon the D efendant trustees and officers the necessity of changing adm inistrative routine, rules, and procedures which had been in existence for m any years, certainly from the beginning of the organization of the Dallas School District. 4. The school budget and the method of collecting sup porting data is controlled by requirem ents both of S tate law and the Texas Education Agency of the State of 32 Texas. The budget requires such intensive study and the consideration of abundant supporting data requiring th a t statistical analysis be accum ulated commencing in Jan u ary of each year. The budget for the school year 1955-56 had reached an advanced state of preparation w hen it became finally determ ined in May of 1955 tha t a drastic change would be required so tha t it was im possible to make adequate re-analysis of the statistical data w ithout im pairing the system of public education. W ithin the short tim e available it was impossible to re-arrange the allocation of teachers and other expenses pertinent to a drastic change in the system, and any attem pt to do so would have resulted in financial chaos, confusion and in in terruption of public school education. 5. The distribution of students to school buildings is re lated both to the budget expenditures and estim ated costs and also to available physical facilities and calls for the study of m any other problems. Accordingly, on Ju ly 13, 1955, the President of the Board, issued a sta te m ent regarding desegregation and outlined twelve problems for study, which are: “In order to be prepared for eventualities in this con nection, this Board of Education months ago instructed Dr. W. T. W hite, the Superintendent of Schools of this District, to proceed w ith a detailed study of the problems inherent to desegregating a m ajor school system, and these studies are in progress in the following areas: 1. Scholastic boundaries of individual schools w ith relation to racial groups contained therein. 33 2. Age-grade distribution of pupils. 3. Achievement and state of preparedness for grade- level assignment of different pupils. 4. Relative intelligence quotient scores. 5. A daptation of curriculum. 6. The over-all impact on individual pupils scholasti cally w hen all the above items are considered. 7. Appointm ent and assignment of principals. 8. The relative degree of preparedness of w hite and Negro teachers; the ir selection and assignment. 9. Social life of the children w ithin the school. 10. The problems of integration of the Parent- Teacher Association and the Dads Club organization. 11. The operation of the athletic program under an integrated system. 12. Fair and equitable methods of putting into effect the decree of the Suprem e Court. 6. A review of scholastic census was im mediately started and maps im m ediately prepared to fit the school building capacity to the area producing the students on the as sumption of a desegregated basis. 34 Time and study are necessary to properly allocate to each school building and facilities the num ber of students w hich can properly be taken care of at such locality. The distribution of inhabitants throughout the Dallas School D istric t is not uniform and is fu rth er complicated by the fact tha t certain areas, such as commercial and m anu facturing areas, produce no students, and it is therefore necessary to vary the area and th e lim its of the dis tric t w ith in which students shall be allocated to said schools. 7. The assignment of teachers, both w hite and negro, m ust be re-exam ined and no definite conclusion can be made until the re-alignm ent of district has been completed and the proportion of w hite and negro scholastics de term ined w ithin reasonable limits. 8 . W hite students are not as a m atter of routine policy perm itted to go to the nearest school. Assignm ent to schools is made upon a basis of population and available school facilities, and m ay result in a child going to a school other than the nearest. The Plaintiffs pray for an injunction requiring that negro students be perm itted to go to the nearest school. This, if perm itted, would resu lt in a discrimination against w hite students. 9. Thirty-five million dollars in bonds have recently been authorized to effectuate a school program for the con 35 struction of physical facilities such as school buildings and other capital improvements. This program w ill have to be re-exam ined and drastically changed in the light of desegregated system. 10. The problem is not a simple one of m erely decreeing tha t all negro and w hite children w ithin certain age limits and living w ith in presently existing school districts be directed to the school which now serves the particular district. Such order would result in overcrowding of school facilities or an unbalanced condition in which in certain schools there would be very few students, and the teacher personnel would be inadequate or over m anned in certain places. The Dallas D istrict m ain tains one hundred tw enty buildings at which instruction is given, and there is inherent in the problem tha t m any negro parents would p refer to send the ir children to schools w here there is no interm ingling of the w hite and negro children. This suit is brought for all negro children sim ilarly situated and not for the relatively few directly involved as P laintiffs through the ir next friend or parent, and means a complete wiping out of the statistical data which has heretofore concerned the allocation of num ber of students to each school building. 11. The allocation of State Aid is by law on a segregated basis and notw ithstanding the resolution of S tate Board of Education, the A ttorney General has ruled funds can be allocated only on a segregated basis. If it is assumed this law is invalid, there is nevertheless no authority for distribution of S tate Aid money on a non segregated basis. 36 12. Confusion, chaos and a complete breakdow n in public school education for both w hite and negro students would resu lt if the present system is not continued until the Board has had sufficient tim e to obtain adequate in form ation and statistical data to find a w ay to convert the system to an educational operation which protects the civil and educational rights of all citizens under a new concept just announced by the U nited States Supreme Court. 13. A review of the recent scholastic census now indicates there is taking place a m ovem ent of population w hereby the w hite population is moving out of certain areas in the Dallas School District, such m ovem ent being observable in those areas w here there is a fairly heavy density of negro inhabitants. The conclusion seems w arran ted at this tim e tha t such movement is caused by the m andate of desegregation in public schools. W hether or not the problem is going to be simplified by a continuation of this population movement or complicated is too early to make a definite statem ent. It is, however, a fact which m aterially enters into the operation of the Dallas Inde pendent School system and m ust be taken into considera tion in arriving a t the cost of operating the school system, both in the expenditures relating to m aintenance and for capital improvements. Prayer. W herefore, premises considered, the Defendants respect fully pray tha t the tem porary injunction as prayed for by 37 the P laintiffs be denied and tha t upon final hearing all perm anent injunctive relief be denied, and fu rther that no declaratory judgm ent of any kind or character be entered, and for such other and fu rth er relief to which the Defendants m ay show themselves entitled, and tha t the costs of this proceeding be charged to the Plaintiffs. A. J. THUSS, JR., (A. J. Thuss, J r.) , A ttorney for Defendants. 1122Davis Building, Dallas 2, Texas. Certificate of Verification. State of Texas County of Dallas, ss. I, A. J. Thuss, Jr., A ttorney for Defendants herein, after having been first duly sworn according to law, on my oath depose and say tha t I have read the foregoing Com plaint subscribed by me and know the contents thereof and tha t the same is true of m y own knowledge, except as to m atters stated to be alleged upon inform ation or belief, and as to that, I verily believe it to be true. A. J. THUSS, JR., (A. J. Thuss, J r.) , Subscribed and Sworn to before me this the 15th day of September, A. D. 1955. NORA REVELLE, (Seal) N otary Public in and for Dallas County, Texas. Filed Sep. 15, 1955. 38 SUIT FOR INJUNCTION. In th e District Court of the United States, for the N orthern D istrict of Texas, Dallas Division. A lbert Bell, a minor, by his step-father and Next Friend, Theodore D. Dorsey, and 23 other Plaintiffs, vs. Civil No. 6165 Dr. Edw in L. Rippy, as President of th e Board of Trustees of the Dallas Independent School D istrict, Dallas County, Texas, and 16 other Defendants. Appearances: W. J. Durham, C. B. Bunkley, Jr., Louis Bedford, K enneth H olbert, U. Simpson Tate, J. L. Turner, Jr., Robert L. Carter, all of Dallas, Texas and Thurgood M arshall, New York City, No. Y. Fof the Plaintiffs; A. J. Thuss, Jr., Dallas, Texas, For the Defendants. Be It Rem embered That on the 16th day of September, A. D., 1955, the above styled and num bered cause came on to be heard before the Honorable W illiam H. Atwell, United S tates D istrict Judge, and the following proceed ings w ere had: Proceedings. The Court: A re there form al orders desired by members of the Bar? 39 Mr. Durham: Your Honor, I desire to introduce Mr. Thurgood M ar shall, a m em ber of the M aryland Bar, and request he he given leave to assist me in the tria l of this case. The Court: I don’t know w hat you are saying, Counsel, Mr. Durham: Your Honor, I desire at this tim e to introduce Mr. Thurgood M arshall who is a m em ber of the M aryland Bar. The Court: Member of the w hat? Mr. Durham: Of the United States Court, Bar, S tate of M aryland, and request tha t he be given leave— The Court: We don’t adm it here unless adm itted to the Suprem e Court of the S tate of Texas, bu t we w ill be very glad to allow him to appear in this case. Mr. Marshall: Thank you. The Clerk: 6165, A lbert Bell, a minor, by his step-father and Next Friend, Theodore D. Dorsey, and 23 other Plaintiffs, versus Edwin L. Rippy, as President of the Board of Trustees of the Dallas Independent School District, and 17 other Defendants; U. Simpson Tate for the Plaintiffs; A. J. Thuss, Jr., for the Defendants. 40 The Court: W hat says the Plaintiffs? Mr. Durham: Your Honor, the Plaintiffs are ready, and if the Court w ill perm it me to make this statem ent: we have sub m itted a certain stipulation of fact to Mr. Thuss which we— The Court: I will get to th a t in a minute. W hat say the defend ants? Mr. Thuss: The D efendants are ready, Your Honor. The Court: All right. Mr. Thuss: W e have a motion to dismiss for w ant of indispensable parties having been joined. The Court: You w ant to what? Mr. Thuss: Motion to dismiss because of the failure to nam e and join certain indispensable parties. The Court: Who are they? 41 Mr. Thuss: They are the State Comptroller of Public Accounts, Mr. Calvert, the State Commissioner of Education, and the State Board of Education. The Court: You have a right under the Rules to have made them parties if you wished; I don’t th ink they are indispensable parties, and I overrule your motion to dismiss. Mr. Thuss: All right. Note our exception. The Court: All right. Have you agreed upon your facts, gentlemen? Mr. Durham: Your Honor, we have subm itted to Counsel for the D efendant and he has exam ined them, and he has agreed to p a rt of them . I think w e could save considerable tim e if the Court would give us about th irty minutes, and I th ink we can agree— The Court: About how many minutes? Mr. Durham: About th irty . The Court: Oh, lets go on w ith this case, gentlemen, we have had a week or so, I set this case for you last Monday. Mr. Durham: All right, Your Honor. 42 The Court: I w ant to ask these questions of you. Do the D efendants adm it th a t all of the P laintiffs— I believe the P laintiffs nam ed are the students, aren’t they? Mr. Durham: Yes, Your Honor. The Court: —sought admission and w ere denied, is tha t adm itted by the Defendants? Mr. Thuss: Yes, Your Honor, I— The Court: All right, tha t is all I am asking. Mr. Thuss: That is all—I don’t know tha t those particular ones have. The Court: Well, do you w ant to put on the proofs for tha t foolish ness? Mr. Thuss: I don’t w ant the proof, Your Honor, and I am adm itting th a t some students w ere denied, th a t negro students applied and w ere denied, w hether they lived at the address which was alleged, I do not know. 43 The Court: This is your case, somebody m ight w ant to appeal, and the Court is try ing to save you costs. Mr. Thuss: Yes, I w ant to conserve all of the time, it is a ra ther serious m atter. The Court: All I asked of you is do you— Mr. Thuss: I w ant to agree to everything th a t is possible. The Court: You have to answ er under the Rules of the Court. Do you agree to tha t allegation? Mr. Thuss: Yes I agreed tha t they w ere denied. The Court: That is all right, the Rules require that. Now, gentle men, do you agree tha t there is substantially 78 schools for w hite people and substantially 18 schools for colored people? Mr. Durham: We agree, Your Honor. Mr. Thuss: Is tha t correct, Mr. W hite? Mr. White: Yes, sir. 44 The Court: I m ay have the figures a little b it wrong. Mr. Thuss: I w ant to get them absolutely accurate, Your Honor. W hat is it? Your Honor, we can state this: th a t there are a total of 128 schools, 9 w hite high schools, 1 Junior- senior high school; tha t is right? Mr. White: Yes. Mr. Thuss: 9 w hite junior high schools, 1 vocational w hite school. Mr. White: W hite school. Mr. Thuss: 86 w hite elem entary, 2 negro high schools, 19 negro elem entary, and 1 evening school, negro. Mr. White: Yes. The Court: Now, have you any agreem ent among yourselves about the num ber of w hite people in Dallas, students, and the num ber of colored people in Dallas? Mr. Thuss: You mean to tal population, Your Honor, or scholastics? 45 The Court: Now, can you agree, gentlemen, on the substantial equality, I m ean the teachers and the physical impedi m enta of these schools? You see, I have been in the schools, I know— Mr. Thuss: I can state as a fact— The Court: I judicially know tha t they are about the same in ex perience,*good teachers in each, good buildings in each, and libraries, and things, seats, and all of tha t sort of thing. That is substantially correct, isn’t it? Mr. Thuss: I th ink tha t is substantially correct. Mr. Durham: We agree, Your Honor, we agree, Your Honor. The Court: Substantially correct. All right. Now, I believe tha t covers all of the facts, and I would like to hear your argum ents now, gentlemen. If you can—about how long do you w ant to argue for the Plaintiff? Mr. Durham: Your Honor, I don’t th ink we need over tw enty minutes. The Court: How is that? Mr. Durham: Your Honor, I don’t th ink the P laintiff needs over tw enty minutes. 46 The Court: Tw enty m inutes for the Plaintiffs. How much for the Defendants? Mr. Thuss: Your Honor, I don’t need any m ore tim e than the P laintiffs need, take the same time. The Court: Well, suppose you take th irty m inutes on the side, if you wish; you don’t have to take it, if tha t is satisfactory. Is th a t satisfactory to both sides? All right, gentlemen. Mr. Durham: Your Honor, the facts are p re tty clear here; they are agreed upon— The Court: Well, I have to ask you to speak out because the acoustics in th is building, this Courtroom, are not satis factory like I would like to have them. Mr. Durham: Your Honor, w e are not going to burden the Court w ith m uch argum ent. The facts are undisputed tha t these m inor plaintiffs w ere denied on the account of race and color, and th a t there are no efforts being made and no sta rt to desegregation in the public schools of Dallas, so we th ink it is ju st a question of an arb itrary refusal to even s ta rt on desegregation. I t isn’t a question of w here the kid lives, or—the only thing th a t he was denied upon was his race. 47 The Court: Was his w hat? Mr. Durham: W as his race and color. They adm it tha t; there is no other claim by the Defendants, even in the answer, that the denial was based upon any other proposition than the race and color of the child. There is no testimony and there is an admission inferentially tha t there is no sta rt even made, bu t on the contrary, the Board has re declared the policy of segregation and efforts would be made in the light and for the sole purpose of m aintaining segregation on the account of race and color; so, Your Honor, I don’t th ink there is much argum ent to it; the Court, Your Honor, is fam iliar w ith the decision tha t segregation on th e basis of race and color is unconstitu tional, and there is a m andate th a t desegregation be started forthw ith, and in this case, they adm it tha t since May 17, 1954, they w ere cognizant of tha t fact, bu t they have made no effort w hatever, but on the contrary, they have—and it is pleaded—they have sent out a declara tion declaring th a t segregation w ill continue on the basis of race and color. Mr. Thuss: Your Honor, we have Dr. Rippy here and the Court m ight be interested in hearing from Dr. Rippy as to w hat acts w ere actually perform ed by Dr. Rippy and the Board. The conclusion tha t Mr. D urham makes is not w arranted by any of the facts which we can show to the Court. The Court is fam iliar w ith the fact, of course, the tim e elem ent involved in the Supreme Court’s de cision. The answ er sets up, and we can prove, tha t Dr. Rippy im mediately w ent to A ustin following th e May 48 31, 1955, statem ent of the Suprem e Court. He talked to the S tate Superintendent of Education— The Court: Now, Counsel, you know tha t tha t is not a legitim ate argum ent. I asked you if you had any testimony. You are telling me now something about testimony. Mr. Thuss: I w ant to put on testimony, Your Honor. The Court: W hat? Mr. Thuss: I w ant to put on testim ony as to w hat has been done, and w hat the Board has done, and w ant the Court to know w hat has been done in good faith in an attem pt to follow the m andate of the Suprem e Court. The Court: Suppose you state w hat Dr. Rippy has done and then see if the other side w ill agree to it w ithout putting a witness on. Mr. Thuss: All right, Your Honor. In making these prelim inary agreements, I didn’t w ant the Court to understand tha t tha t was all tha t we considered to be in the case. I was m aking at the outset those admissions which I thought would shorten the trial. W ith reference to Dr. Rippy, Dr. Rippy w ent to A ustin in the spring of this year, and talked to Mr. Edgar, the State Superintendent. He also talked to the A ttorney G eneral of this State, and 49 outlined w hat the problem was in Dallas tha t there are this large num ber of schools which we have entered in the record here, tha t the areas tha t the districts and schools from which the students go to the schools is ra th e r irregular, tha t the S tate Law has up to now re quired the enum eration to be upon a segregated basis. The State Law still requires an allocation—an allotm ent of the funds on a segregated basis. The Gilmer-Akin Act is a very complicated feature, and it requires—it is a State Law th a t requires certain credits for teacher units, and so forth, and so on, to make education gener ally available to all children in Texas. And he was advised at tha t tim e under all of the problems involved, and also the S tate Board was requested in June of this year to make their request for allotm ent on a segregated basis, and after all of those conferences they w ere advised tha t it was better required to continue the schools on the basis in which they had continued them and make the change, if at all, la ter on. That is w hat Dr. Rippy would testify to. The Court: Well, now, Counsel, you are a practicing lawyer, you know you can’t do that. I am asking you, we passed the testimony, we agreed on our facts, and the argum ent has been entered into. Mr. Thuss: Your Honor, I don’t understand. The Court: I w ill a sk th e o th e r side if you a g re e to the s ta te m en t th a t th e a tto rn e y m ad e th a t D r. R ippy did do these th ings? 50 M r. D urh am ; Y our H onor, th e P la in tiffs w ill a g re e to a ll of th e s ta te m e n t excep t th e po rtion th a t th e re is a va lid law in the S ta te of T ex as p rov id ing fo r seg reg a tio n . W e w ill a g re e th a t th e re is a law . The C ourt: Of C ourse, th a t is in issue h ere . M r. D urh am : Y es. The C ourt: All right, go ahead now. M r. Thuss: All right, sir. The C ourt: L e t’s try th e case acco rd in g to law , now, gen tlem en . M r. Thuss: Y our H onor— T he C ourt: Do you w an t to a rg u e —do you w an t to a rg u e your ca se now ? M r. T huss: No, s ir, I w an t to pu t m y ev idence on. T he Court: W hat ev idence? 51 M r. Thuss: The evidence tha t th e Board—the evidence of good fa ith on th e p a r t of th e B oard . The C ourt: W ell, th ey h av e ag re e d w ith you th a t D r. R ippy did th a t. Mr. Thuss: Well, I have other evidence than that, Your Honor; I have other things th a t the Board had done. W hat Dr. W hite has done. The Court: Do you plead tha t in your pleading? Mr. Thuss: Yes, sir, we set it out step by step in our pleading. The Court: Well, do you agree, gentlemen, tha t those facts are all right? Mr. Durham: Your Honor, we can’t agree to his pleadings. The Court: All right. Thank you. Now, le t’s go on w ith your case. Mr. Thuss: Well, I would like to know w here I am. I didn’t intend— 52 The Court: Your are going on w ith your pleadings as you pleaded it. Now, you can understand that, can’t you? Mr. Thuss: Well, Judge, if you just tell me w hat you w ant me to do, I will be glad to do it, I have certain evidence which I th ink— The Court: You have an opportunity, now, to argue your case, your statem ent of fact, and your pleadings are considered, are agreed to. Mr. Thuss: Do they adm it my pleadings? That is fine, tha t is fine. The Court: All right. Mr. Thuss: Now, Dr. Rippy, in Ju ly—this is in my pleadings, Your Honor—in order to prepare, issued this order to all personnel: “In order to be prepared for the eventuali ties in connection, this Board of Education m onths ago instructed Dr. W hite, the Superintendent of Schools of this D istrict, to proceed to make a detailed study of the problem inherent to desegregation of a m ajor school system, and these studies are in progress in the following areas:” They then set out, Your Honor, and I w on’t read to you, 12 areas of investigation, the scholastic boundaries, and the re-arrangem ents of the scholastic boundaries, the location of the building, the personnel, the relative—the relative population comparison as to negroes and w hite, in some districts, there are con 53 siderably m ore negroes than whites and vice versa, that had to be investigated. The m atter of the budget was also pled here, and sixty percent, sixty percent of the school money spent in the Dallas D istrict comes from the state. As I had mentioned, and as agreed to, they w ere authorized to ask for this state money on a segregated basis, and w ere told by the state to do so. And the whole m atter has been gone into thoroughly, honestly, and fairly, to comply w ith the m andate of the Suprem e Court. There has, the enrollm ent, I don’t know w hether we agreed to this, bu t I th ink the Court asked for it, is 78,000 white, 78691, and 14,593 negro. That is as of Septem ber 12. Now, this required the re-arrangem ent of all of these scholastics at various places and w here they would be pulled up and should go. They have asked in this case, Your Honor, tha t the—tha t these negro children be allowed to go to the school which is closest to the ir home. Well, th a t is a rule th a t is not in variably followed as to w hite children, because the topography and arrangem ent of the school district might be such and the population density m ight be such that to provide a uniform or provide a reasonable num ber of scholastics in relation to the size of the building, that they would have to go—w hite children would have to go to a school fa rther from their home, tha t is not unusual. So even w hat they ask for in this case, tha t these negro scholastics go to the school closest to the ir home, is not a ru le which is followed as to the w hite scholastics. So w ith reference to the facts, good faith, the honesty, these good men have been charged, and charged either directly or by implication tha t they have made no honest effort. In this pleading which is agreed to, it shows throughout, Your Honor, tha t they have done everything reasonable under the trem endous impact of the ir new concept of education, tha t could be done by any Board. 54 Now, it is interesting to note, Your Honor, and while it is not m andatory on this Court to follow it, is w hat has been done in another case. I th ink it is interesting to note tha t in the case tha t w ent to the Suprem e Court th a t arose in Virginia, one of the cases which was de cided by the Suprem e Court in October of 1954, and the decision which was last w ritten in May of 1955, shortly before this Septem ber of 1955. These same lawyers appeared before the Federal Court up there in tha t case. I t was before the Suprem e Court th a t had been reversed and sent back, and said tha t in tha t case there had been no effort to desegregate and tha t it was entirely too slow, and they asked tha t it be desegregated as of the be ginning of this te rm of Septem ber 19, 1955. A three judge Court, composed of Joe Bell, Circuit Judge and two other D istrict Judges, in the case tha t had been before the Suprem e Court, held tha t under the fact in tha t case, and they charge—and they charge here tha t those m em bers of this School D istrict had adequate time, it was more tim e there was more notice given to those school trustees in the Virginia case. The Court held in tha t case th a t it was not consistent w ith the public interest to desegregate tha t Virginia school th a t was involved in th is Suprem e Court case for the year 1955. I say, Your Honor, tha t th a t case is inform ative; it is not m an datory th a t this Court follow it, bu t it does show the in ten t of th a t Suprem e Court m andate, and it does show the way tha t the Courts, these Federal Courts, are looking a t this m atter which is a drastic change. I m en tion tha t to Your Honor, tha t it is inform ative, and the facts as you m ay know from reading the opinion in th a t case, are much stronger than they are as shown in this case here. 55 Your Honor, I th ink this, I th ink this Court can look a t all of the facts, can take judicial knowledge of the w ay th a t we have lived for a good m any years, w hat would be the impact of try ing to change at this late m inute the place to attend school for this large num ber of scholastics; they have, for a large num ber of years, gotten adequate education, they have agreed tha t they are equal. W here is the irreparable damage tha t will occur in this case? Gotten an education for a num ber of years, and yet the impatience is as of this m inute, and I think the ir impatience is not substantiated or supported by the facts. They charge here—they charge here tha t there is an attem pt to curcum vent the decree of the Federal Court. These gentlem en are not guilty of anything of tha t kind or character, and all we w ant is tim e to continue to give the education to these children which have been re ceiving the education, and which is a trem endous burden to do so, w ithout undue—w ithout undue interruption. W hat does one year am ount to when we have done so for some ninety years? Added to it, the question and the showing, which I think this pleading shows, tha t they have made a good faith—made a good faith attem pt to comply, and tha t they have to have tim e to make this change under the circumstances, and unless they do, there will be confusion. These negro scholastics w ill suffer, as well as the w hite scholastics w ill suffer, if they have their way about the relief for which they have asked. I think, Your Honor, the facts which have agreed to, and the facts which have been alleged and sworn to in this answ er tha t they have agreed to, and all of the acts which have been perform ed by the various members of the Board and the staff shows th a t there is no necessity for the issuance of this injunction. 56 Mr. Marshall: May I in terrup t at this point? I th ink we should get the record straight, and tha t is tha t we do not agree that the negro children in Dallas are getting an equal educa tion; we agreed tha t there are equal facilities, bu t the Suprem e Court, in its May 17th decision, said tha t separa tion of the races has, in and of itself, brought about inequality. And the interesting thing about the argu ment, and I th ink th a t we should explain the Prince Edw ard case, if Your Honor would be interested in it. The last ruling of the three judge Court, in the Prince Edw ard case, there was a positive showing tha t the County Commissioners of Prince Edw ard County had refused to appropriate any money to run any schools, and although I do not know exactly w hat influenced the Court on this Septem ber point, I th ink tha t we should understand tha t the injunction tha t was issued ordered the School Board to desegregate as rapidly as possible and m erely put the proviso in about September, and I think w e should also bear in mind tha t in the South Carolina case w ith Judge Dobie, Judge P arker presiding, w ith Judge Dobie and Judge Timmerman, there was no m en tion at all about September, and I th ink there is a perfect exam ple of one D istrict Court and the other D istrict Court, and I do not believe it is even persuasive here, because as I read it, the Suprem e Court’s decision of May 31, I th ink the only significance is the paragraph th a t says, “W hile giving weight to these public and pri vate considerations, the Courts”—speaking of D istrict Courts—“w ill require tha t the Defendants make a prom pt and reasonable start tow ard full compliance w ith our M ay 17, 1954, ruling. Once such a start has been made, the Court m ay find tha t additional time is necessary.” 57 The condition precedent to all of tha t is tha t a good faith start be made. The answ er in this case points out a 12 point program of study. It also points out that under the present ruling of the Board, the Defendants in this case, desegregation w ill not occur until this 12 point program is completed to the last m inute detail. Now, as to exactly w hat the Supreme Court of the United States said, I know the Suprem e Court did not say that. The two points, as I understand them, ra th e r there are th ree points tha t are made by the Defendants. One is tha t there are State Laws tha t will inconvenience the transition, and I think in tha t case, we are rem inded by the Suprem e Court’s May 31 decision th a t all S tate Laws or m unicipal regulations to the contrary m ust yield, so on the basis of that, w hatever the S tate Law is, if it is based on race or color “m ust yield” and can have no bearing on the decision at this time. The next point is tha t there is a question of censusing of children and boundary lines. Well, any school board in the country can draw boundary lines and census children, they do it every day, and in preparation for this school term , the only thing they had to do is make a census of the children, draw the district lines, and for get race. I t is tha t easily done. The th ird point is tha t we allege—we pray tha t our children be adm itted to the nearest school. That is true, bu t it is not necessary to our position. We take the position tha t a negro child applies to the school nearest to him, and they either accept him or te ll him that th is is the wrong school, you should go to another school, bu t they can’t say, “You m ust go to the negro school.” These children w eren’t denied because they w ent to the 58 w rong school, they w ere denied because they w ent to the wrong school, m eaning w hite school. That is the only issue here. We do not w ant to change any regulation, anything of the School Board, except the question of race. That can be done by one resolution of the Board, m eeting at any time. Once tha t is done, tha t is the type of s ta rt tha t I am sure the Suprem e Court m eant. That you take off race; as to w hatever method of assigning teachers or pupils the Defendants w ant to use, we would have no objection as long as it is not based on race, all of the involved step by step detail tha t is pointed out in the ir answer, they could go on or leave, it could make no difference, as they do as has been done in other school systems, and I am not going outside of the ad missible argum ent, because the record of the Supreme Court is available and the D istrict of Columbia case, a school system much more involved than this one, was desegregated betw een May 17 of 1954 and September, and it was desegregated very simply. They took the word “race” off, tha t was the argum ent tha t appears in the record, they w ent to work from there. If the D istrict of Columbia can do it certainly the school district here involved, and I do not believe tha t Your Honor misses th a t there is any question in this case but th a t the Plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction which does not at all d isrupt the school system other than to say tha t as you run the school system, you m ay use any yard stick, you m ay use any plans, or you may use any regulation; the only thing is tha t under the Constitution of the United States, as in terpreted by the Supreme Court, race or color cannot be used as a means for de segregating. 59 Unless there are any questions, if Your Honor pleases, w ith that, the P laintiffs submit, respectfully praying tha t the injunction be issued as prayed for. The Court: All right. You have had your say, Counsel. Mr. Thuss: Your Honor, I do not w ant to say anything fu rther— The Court: How is that? Mr.Thuss: —except to correct a m isstatem ent tha t I th ink he made, if I can m ake that, I would like to, if I can’t, all right. The Court: You see, he has his right to make his argum ent last, P lain tiff opens and closes. Mr. Thuss: I understand it, Judge; I w anted to make the correction. The Court: The suit seeks an injunction against the Defendants who are the principals and officers of the Dallas Public Schools, for having refused to perm it the Plaintiffs, who are negroes and who sought admission to several dif feren t public schools, to m atriculate therein. The facts, as such facts as are well pleaded in both the original petition and the answer, are adm itted in open Court, thus saving the introduction of a string of witnesses which would take tim e and m ultiplied costs. 60 This suit contains a p rayer for the calling of a three- judge Court and used as a basis for tha t call, the uncon stitu tionality of segregation of the races, w hite and color ed, in the schools of the U nited States. . The tria l judge in the U nited S tates D istrict Court is admonished against the expense and trouble of calling tw o other judges to sit w ith him in a trial. There is no consitutional provision of e ither the state or the na tion, th a t is in controversy in this particular suit. This same question was presented in the petition in the case of Battle, et al vs. W ichita Falls Junior College District, et al, tried before me on November 27, 1951, at W ichita Falls. No attention was paid to the request for a three-Judge Court, and the case was tried by myself as the D istrict Judge, alone. In tha t case, as shown in 101 F. (s.) 82, the Plaintiffs w ere colored people who had no such facilities near at hand as the W ichita Falls Junior College. That the nearest college of sim ilar capacity and teaching was in th e southern part of Texas, approxim ately th ree hundred miles distant. The Court, therefore, entered a perem ptory injunction requiring the defendant to allow to m atriculate the plaintiffs in tha t institution. That case was af firm ed by the Circuit Court of Appeals and certiorari denied by the Suprem e Court of the United States. In tha t case the same counsel appeared for the plaintiffs in this case. Since tha t tim e the Suprem e Court of the United S tates has entered a general decision declaring all a t tem pted separation of the races in the United States is illegal and unconstitutional and directed the school 61 authorities and the low er Courts w ork out a desegretion plan Bolling, et al vs. Sharp et al 347 U.S. 497. The fact in the present case show that there are 78 elem entary w hite schools in the City of Dallas. That there are 18 elem entary schools in the City of Dallas for the negro population. I t appears from the facts, of which the Court has judicial knowledge, th a t the premises, conveniences, teaching, and efficiency for the colored student is furnished by the same Texas and Independent School funds as are furnished to the w hite students. The num ber of schools for the colored population is a slightly higher percentage than tha t furnished for the w hite population. All of the law as declared by the various Courts, appellate and trial, in the United States, are agreed upon the proposition tha t w hen sim ilar and convenient free schools are furnished to both w hite and colored tha t there then exists no reasonable ground for requiring desegre gation. An interesting case is McKissick et al vs. Car michael et al, 187 F. (snd) 949. That case cites Sw eatt vs. Painter, 339 U. S. 629. Many other cases are also cited in B attle vs. W ichita Falls Jun ior College, 101 F. (s) 82. This is a suit in equity. The facts show, as I have already recited, tha t equal school opportunities are fu r nished to both colored and white. The direction from the Suprem e Court of the U nited States requires tha t the officers and principals of each institution, and the lower Courts, shall do away w ith segregation after having w ork ed out a proper plan. That direction does not mean that a long tim e shall expire before tha t plan is agreed upon. I t m ay be tha t the plan contemplates action by the S tate legislature. It is not for this Court to say, other 62 than w hat has been said by the Suprem e Court in tha t decision. To gran t an injunction in this case would be to ignore the equities th a t present themselves for recognition and to determ ine w hat the Suprem e Court itself decided not to determ ine. Therefore, I th ink it appropiate tha t this case be dismissed w ithout prejudice to refile it a t some later date. Give them some tim e to see w hat they can w ork out, and then we w ill pass upon tha t equity. P repare an order, if you will, please gentlemen, to be OK’d by each side, and if anybody w ants an exception, th a t w ill be noted, too. Now, Mrs. Hamilton, tha t is all we have today? The Clerk: That is all, Judge Atwell. The Court: C ourt is adjourned until 10:00 o’clock tom orrow m orn ing. 63 SUIT FOR INJUNCTION. (Title Omitted. W. J. Durham, C. B. Bunkley, Jr., Louis Bedford, K en neth Holbert, U. Simpson Tate, J. L. Turner, Jr. Robert L. Carter all of Dallas, Texas and Thurgood M arshall, New York City, N. Y. for the Plaintiffs; A. J . Thuss, Jr., Dallas, Texas for the Defendants. This suit seeks an injunction against the defendants who are the principals and officers of the Dallas Public Schools for having refused to perm it the plaintiffs, who are negroes and who sought admission to several dif feren t public schools, to m atriculate therein. The facts, as such facts as are well pleaded in both the original petition and the answer, are adm itted in open Court, thus saving the introduction of a string of witnesses w hich would take tim e and multiplied costs. This suit contains a prayer for the calling of a three- judge Court and uses as basis for th a t call, the uncon stitutionality of segregation of the races, w hite and color ed, in the schools of the United States. The Trial Judge in the U nited States D istrict Court is admonished against the expense and trouble of calling two other judges to sit w ith him in a trial. There is no constitutional provision of either the state, or, the nation, tha t is in controversy in this particular suit. This same question was presented in the petition in the case of Battle, et al vs. W ichita Falls Junior College 64 District, et al., tried before me on November 27th, 1951 at W ichita Falls. No attention was paid to the request for a three-judge Court, and the case was tried by m y self as the District Judge, alone. In th a t case, as shown in 101 F. (s) 82, the plaintiffs w ere colored people who had no such facilities near at hand as the W ichita Falls Jun ior College. That the nearest college of sim ilar capacity and teaching, was in the southern part of Texas, approxim ately three hundred miles distant. The Court, therefore, entered a perem ptory injunction requiring the defendant to allow to m atriculate the plaintiffs in tha t institu tion That case was offirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals and certiorari denied by the Suprem e Court of the United States. In tha t case the same counsel appeared for the plaintiffs as in this case. Since tha t tim e the Suprem e Court of the United States has entered a general decision declaring all attem pted separation of the races in the United States is illegal and unconstitutional directed tha t the school authorities and the lower Courts w ork out a desegregation plan. Bolling, et al vs. Sharpe, et al, 347 U. S. 497. The facts in the present case show th a t there are 78 elem entary w hite schools in the City of Dallas. That there are 18 elem entary schools in the City of Dallas for the negro population. I t appears from the facts, of which the Court has judicial knowledge, tha t the premises, conveniences, teaching, and efficiency for the colored student is furnished by the same Texas and Independent School funds as are furnished to the w hite students. The num ber of schools for the colored population is a slightly 65 higher percentage than th a t furnished for the w hite population. All of the law as declared by the various Courts, ap pellate and trial, in the United States, are agreed upon the proposition tha t w hen sim ilar and convenient free schools are furnished to both w hite and colored tha t there then exists no reasonable ground for requiring desegregation. An in teresting case is McKissick et al vs. Carmichael et al, 187 F. (2d) 949. That case cites Sw eatt vs. Painter, 339 U. S. 629. M any o ther cases are also cited in B attle vs. W ichita Falls Junior College, 101 F. (s) 82. This is a suit in equity. The facts show, as I have already recited, th a t equal school opportunities are fu r nished to both colored and w hite. The direction from the Suprem e Court of the United States requires tha t the officers and principals of each institution, and th e low er Courts, shall do aw ay w ith segregation after having w orked out a proper plan. That direction does not m ean th a t a long tim e shall expire before th a t plan is agreed upon. I t m ay be th a t the p lan contem plates action by the state legislature. I t is not for th is Court to say, other than w hat has been said by the Suprem e C ourt in tha t decision. To gran t an injunction in th is case would be to ignore the equities tha t present themselves for recognition and to determ ine w hat the Suprem e Court itself decided not to determine. Therefore, I th ink it appropriate tha t this case be dismissed w ithout prejudice to refile it a t some la ter date. 66 Done at Dallas, Texas, on this the 16th day of Septem ber, 1955. WM. H. ATWELL, U nited States D istrict Judge. On th is th e 16th day of September, 1955, appeared the P laintiffs in person and by the ir attorneys of record and also appeared all of the D efendants in person and by the ir attorneys of record, and th e Motion of the De fendants to dismiss the ir cause of action for w ant of neces sary and indispensable parties, having been called to the atten tion of the Court, w as overruled. The Court having considered the pleadings of the parties and the admissions of fact made in open Court relative to this controversy is of the opinion th a t the re is no cause for an injunction as prayed for by the Plaintiffs and th a t the same should be denied. It Is, Therefore, The Order, Judgm ent and Decree of the Court th a t the injunctive relief as prayed for by the P laintiffs is hereby denied and the case is dismissed w ith out prejudice to the Plaintiffs, and th a t all costs be charg ed to said Plaintiffs. Entered the 17th day of Septem ber, 1955. WM. H. ATWELL, Judge of the United States D istrict Court for the N orthern D istrict of Texas. Approved As To Form: (S.) U. SIMPSON TATE, A ttorney for Plaintiffs, (S.) A. J. THUSS, JR., A ttorney for Defendants. 67 NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT, NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA. Filed: October 4, 1955. In The D istrict Court Of The U nited States For The N orthern D istrict Of Texas Dallas Division. A lbert Bell, A Minor, by his Step Father and N ext Friend, Theodore D. Dorsey, et al, Plaintiffs, vs. Civil Action N um ber 6165 Edw in L. Rippy, Dr., As President of the Board of Trustees of the Dallas Independent School District, Dallas, Dallas County, Texas, et al., Defendants. Notice is hereby given th a t Charles Brown, a minor, by his fa th e r and next friend, W alter Brown, Jr,; Rayford Cooks, a minor, by his father and nex t friend, Robert Cooks; W illiam C. Burton, Jr., a minor, by his fa ther and next friend, William C. Burton; Alonzo D. Nickerson, Jr., a minor, by his father and next friend, Alonzo D. Nickerson, Sr.,; Sandra Craig and Pam ela Bo son, minors, by the ir fa ther and next friend, Lawrence C. Boson; L. Lawrence Nelson, II a minor, by his father and next friend, Clyde D. Nelson; M ary Ann Slider, a minor, by her father and nex t friend, L. G. Slider; Diann M urphy, a minor, by her grandm other and next friend, (Mrs.) S. L, Neely, a feme sole; Helen Jean Gipson, a minor, by her m other and n ex t friend, (Mrs.) Luenda Gipson, a feme sole; Jos A rthu r Williams a minor, by his father and nex t friend, H erbert W illiams; Rosa Sharon and Maude Lois Sims, minors, by the ir fa ther and next friend, (Rev.) Paul A. Sims; D aurity G. Smith, a minor, 68 by his father and nex t friend, Leo M. Sm ith; Ollie Pearl Ivy, a minor, by her m other and nex t friend, (Mrs.) Irene Ivy, a feme sole; W illie Hawkins, a minor, by his fa ther and nex t friend, Oscar Hawkins; M ilton McDaniel, a minor, by his father and nex t friend, W illiam McDaniel; Sandra L ynetta Berkins, a minor, by her m other and next friend, (M rs.) Charles Berkins a feme sole; Carol, Cheyel and Ronald H urdle, minors, by their fa ther and next friend, Elm er D. H urdle; Billie M arie Cox, a minor, by her step-father and nex t friend, Veil Snowden; John A rvie Lewis, a minor, by his step-father and nex t friend, George Fields; A lbert Bell, a minor, by his step-father and next friend, Theodore D. Dorsey; Hilda R uth Borders, a minor, by her father and nex t friend, Louis Borders, Jr.,; Charlene Goldstein, a minor, by her m other and next friend, (Mrs.) W illie Mae Goldstein, a feme sale; Ju lia A nn Vickers, a minor, by her fa ther and next friend, Searcy E. Vickers, and Shirley A nn Bush, a minor, by her father and nex t friend, F rankie L. Bush, plaintiffs in the above num bered and styled cause hereby appeal to the U nited S tates Court of Appeals for the F ifth Circuit from the following judgm ent: To grant an injunction in this case would be to ignore the equities tha t present them selves for recognition and to determ ine w hat the Suprem e Court itself decided not to determine. Therefore, I think it appropiate th a t this case be dismissed w ithout prejudice to refile it at some la ter date. Done at Dallas, Texas, on this the 16th day of Septem ber, 1955. (S.) United S tates D istrict Judge. 69 Dated this the 1st day of October, 1955. W. J. DURHAM, 2600 Flora S treet, Dallas, Texas. (W. J. D urham ), LOUIS BEDFORD, (Louis Bedford), 1807% Singleton Boulevard, Dallas, Texas. 2600 Flora S treet, Dallas, Texas. U. SIMPSON TATE, (U. Simpson Tate), ROBERT L. CARTER, (Robert L. C arter), 107 W est 43rd Street, New York, N. Y. C. B. BUNKLEY, JR., (C. B. Bunkley, J r .) , 814% N. Good-Latimer Expressway, Dallas, Texas. KENNETH F. HOLBERT, 2531 Forest Avenue, Dallas, Texas. (K enneth F. H olbert), J. L. TURNER, JR., (J. L. Turner, J r.) , 1723 Routh Street, Dallas, Texas. THURGOOD MARSHALL, (Thurgood M arshall), A ttorney for Plaintiffs. 107 W est 43rd Street, New York, N. Y. 70 PLA IN TIFFS’ MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME IN W HICH TO BRING UP RECORD ON APPEAL. Filed November 16, 1955. Come Now A lbert Bell, a minor, and tw enty-three other plaintiffs and respectfully move th e Court to extend until the 30th day of November, 1955, the tim e w ith in w hich plaintiffs m ay complete the record on appeal on th e grounds th a t plaintiffs w ere delayed in getting the transcrip t of th e record typed and for the fu rther reason th a t no previous extension of such tim e has been obtained from the adverse party or granted by this Court. U. SIMPSON TATE, (U. Simpson Tate), One of the A ttorneys for the Plaintiffs. ORDER GRANTING EXTENSION OF TIME IN WHICH TO BRING UP RECORD ON APPEAL. Filed November 16, 1955. The motion of plaintiffs for extension of tim e in which to bring up record on appeal having come before the Court and the Court being of the opinion tha t such motion is in order and th a t no previous extension of such tim e has been obtained from the adverse party or granted by this Court; I t Is Ordered, th a t the tim e be, and the tim e is ex tended until the 30th day of November, 1955, w ith in 71 which plaintiffs may complete the record in this cause on appeal. WM. H. ATWELL, D istrict Judge for the N orthern D istrict of Texas. APPELLANTS’ DESIGNATION OF CONTENTS OF RECORD ON APPEAL. (Title Omitted.) Come Now A lbert Bell, a minor, by his step-father and next friend, Theodore D. Dorsey; Charles Brown, a minor, by his fa ther and next friend, W alter Brown, Jr.; Rayford Cooks, a minor, by his father and nex t friend, R obert Cooks; W illiam C. Burton, Jr., a minor, by his fa ther and next friend, W illiam C. Burton; Alonzo D. Nickerson, J r. a minor, by his father and next friend, Alonzo D. Nickerson, Sr.; Sandra Craig and Pam ela Boson, minors, by th e ir fa ther and nex t friend, Law rence C. Boson; L. Law rence Nelson, II, a minor, by his fa ther and next friend, Clyde D. Nelson; M ary A nn Slider, a minor, by her fa ther and nex t friend, L. G. Slider; Diann M urphy, a minor, by her grandm other and nex t friend, (Mrs.) S. L. Neely, a feme sole; Helen Jean Gipson, a minor, by her m other and nex t friend, (Mrs.) Luenda Gipson, a feme sole; Joe A rthu r Williams, a minor, by his fa ther and next friend, H erbert Williams; Rosa Sharon and Maude Lois Sims, minors, by th e ir fa ther and nex t friend, (Rev.) Paul A. Sims; D aurity G. Smith, a minor, by his fa ther and next friend, Leo M. Sm ith; Ollie Pearl Ivy, a m inor by her m other and nex t friend, (Mrs.) Irene 72 Ivey, a feme sole; W illie Hawkins, a minor, by his fa ther adn n ex t friend, Oscar Hawkins; M ilton McDaniel, a minor, by his fa ther and nex t friend, W illiam McDaniel; Sandra L ynetta Berkins, a minor, by her m other and nex t friend, (Mrs.) Charles Berkins, a feme sole; Carol, Cheyel and Ronald Hurdle, m inors, by the ir fa ther and nex t friend, Elem er D. H urdle; Billie M arie Cox, a minor, by her step-father and next friend, Veil Snowden; John A rvie Lewis, a minor, by his step-father and nex t friend, George Fields; Hilda R uth Borders, a minor, by her fa ther and nex t friend, Louie Borders, Jr., Charlene Goldstein, a minor, by her m other and next friend, (Mrs.) W illie Mae Goldstein, a feme sole; Ju lia Ann Vickers, a minor, by her fa ther and nex t friend, Searcy E. Vickers, and Shirley A nn Bush, a minor, by her fa ther and next friend Frankie L. Bush, A ppellants here in, pursuant to Rule 75(a), Federal Rules of Civil Proce dure, by and through the ir A ttorneys of Record, and designate the following portions of the record, proceedings and evidence adduced at tria l of this case to be placed in the record of appeal: 1. P lain tiffs’ Complaint. 2. P laintiffs’ Motion for Prelim inary Injunction. 3. P lain tiff’s Show Cause Order. 4. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 5. D efendants’ Answer. 6. The E ntire Proceedings in Open Court. 7. The Court’s Finding of Feet and Conclusions of Law. 73 8. The Judgm ent and O rder of the Court Dismissing th e cause. 9. Notice of Appeal. Respectfully Subm itted, W. J. DURHAM, (W. J. D urham ), 2600 Flora Street, Dallas, Texas. LOUIS BEDFORD, (Louis Bedford), 1807% Singleton Boulevard, Dallas, Texas. U. SIMPSON TATE, (U. Simpson Tate), 2600 Flora S treet, Dallas, Texas. ROBERT L. CARTER, (Robert L. C arter), 107 W est 43rd Street, New York, N. Y. C. B. BUNKLEY, JR., (C. B. Bunkley, J r.) , 814% N. Good-Latimer Expressway, Dallas, Texas. KENNETH F. HOLBERT, (K enneth F. H olbert), 2531 Forest Avenue, Dallas, Texas. J. L. TURNER, J R , (J. L. Turner, J r.) , 1723 Routh Street, Dallas,Texas. 74 THURGOOD MARSHALL, (Thurgood M arshall), A ttorney for Plaintiffs. 107 W est 43rd Street, New York, N. Y. Certificate of Service. This is to certify th a t on this day a copy of the fore going A ppellants’ Designation of Contents of Record on A ppeal has been m ailed to Honorable A. J. Thuss, Jr., A ttorney for Defendants, at his office in the Davis Build ing, Dallas, Texas, postage prepaid. Dated this the 27th day of October, 1955. U. SIMPSON TATE, (U. Simpson Tate), One of the A ttorneys for Appellants. 75 CLERK’S CERTIFICATE. I, GEO. W. PARKER, Clerk of the United States D istrict Court for the N orthern D istrict of Texas, do hereby certify th a t the foregoing is a true and correct transcrip t of th e Record, and all proceedings in Cause No. 6165-Civil, W herein, A lbert Bell, A Minor, by his S tep-Father and N ext Friend, Theodore D. Dorsey, et al are Plaintiffs, and Dr. Edw in L. Rippy, As President of the Board of Trustees of the Dallas Independent School District, Dallas, Dallas County, Texas, et al, are Defend ants, as fu lly as the same now rem ain on file and of record in m y office a t Dallas, Texas. W itness m y hand officially and the seal of said Court at Dallas, Texas, this the ----- day of November, A. D. 1955. GEO. W. PARKER, Clerk. By LILLIAN HAMILTON, (Seal) Deputy. E. S. UPTON PRINTING CO., NEW ORLEANS — 22310