Morgan v. Georgia Appendices to Petition for Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Georgia
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March 24, 1979

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Morgan v. Georgia Appendices to Petition for Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Georgia, 1979. e3c9b6b4-be9a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/58af53d9-2749-4da3-8fea-fa144ec75c90/morgan-v-georgia-appendices-to-petition-for-certiorari-to-the-supreme-court-of-georgia. Accessed April 22, 2025.
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IN THE &upmttr Court of tljr Imtrfc States October Term, 1978 No. 78-6140 (A-697) ALPHONSO MORGAN, Petitioner, v. STATE OF GEORGIA, Respondent. APPENDICES TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA F rederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., One Chase Manhattan Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10005 Counsel for Petitioner Of Counsel: J ohn H. P ickering, 1666 K Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006 Thomas J. D ougherty, M ark P. Schnapp, Catherine M. R aymond, F rancis P. Barron, Cravath, Swaine & Moore, One Chase Manhattan Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10005 March 24, 1979 CONTENTS OF APPENDICES Appendix Description Page A Affidavit of Alphonso Morgan in Sup port of His Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis.................................. la B Affidavit of Alphonso Morgan Regard ing Timeliness of His Petition and the State’s Denial of Counsel............. 3a C Order of Mr. Justice Powell Staying Petitioner’s Execution Pending Final Disposition of His Petition for Cer tiorari................................ 6a D Correspondence Between the Clerk of this Court and Petitioner’s Counsel Letter of Petitioner’s Counsel to the Clerk of this Court Request ing Additional Time to Submit the Substitute Petition................ 7a Letter from the Clerk of this Court to Petitioner’s Counsel Inform ing Him that Additional Time Had Been Granted to and In cluding March 24, 1979....... 10a E Opinions of the Majority and the Three Dissenting Members of the Supreme Court of Georgia in the Court Below Majority.......................................... 11a Dissent.......................... ................. 16a F Transcript of the Trial Court’s Instruc tions to the Jury and the Jury’s Determinations Instructions Prior to the Jury’s De liberations on Guilt or In nocence ....................................... 20a The Jury’s Verdict.......................... 29a ii Appendix Description Page Instructions Prior to the Jury’s De liberations on Sentence........... . 30a The Jury’s Sentence ........................ 33a G Indictment of Petitioner, Jose High, and Judson Ruffin, upon which the Jury Recorded Its Verdict and Sen tence ....................... 35a H Order of the Trial Court Sentencing Petitioner................................... 38a I Petitioner’s Pro Se Notice of Appeal Reconstructed Version................... 40a Copy of Original Document.......... 41a J Petitioner’s Pro Se Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, Request for Appointment of Counsel, and Certificate of Service Reconstructed Version.... ............ 42a Copy of Original Document.......... 44a K Petitioner’s Attempts to Secure a Tran script of the Proceedings at the Trial Petition for Copy of Records Reconstructed Version.... . 46a Copy of Original Document.... 48a Letter to the Clerk of the Trial Court Requesting Transcript Reconstructed Version ............ 50a Copy of Original Document.... 51a Letter from Presiding Judge to the Prosecutor, with Copy Directed to Petitioner...... .......................... 52a L First Letter to Petitioner from the Georgia Criminal Justice Council, an Agency of the State, Advising Him that It Cannot Represent Him........... 53a Ill M Letter to the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia from Petitioner In quiring as to the Status of His Case, and Notifying the Court that He Is Appendix Description Page Effectively Without Counsel Reconstructed Version .................. 54a Copy of Original Document 56a N Letter from the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia to Petitioner’s Ap pointed Counsel Informing Him that He Must File a Brief on Behalf of Petitioner Within Two Weeks, or Risk Being Held in Contempt of Court................................................... 59a O State’s Brief on the Adequacy of the Jury Instructions, Requested by the Supreme Court of Georgia During Oral Argument at which Only the State Was Present.............................. 60a P Second Letter from the Georgia Crimi nal Justice Council, an Agency of the State, to Petitioner Acknowledging His Letter Concerning His Counsel’s Failure to Communicate With Him, and Advising Him that It Cannot Represent Him................................... 64a Q Letter from Judge Who Presided at Trial to Petitioner Stating that Peti tioner Has No Need for Additional Counsel........................ 65a R Trial Judge’s Order Denying Petitioner a Copy of the Transcript of the Pro ceedings at His Trial on the Ground that His Counsel Already Has His Papers..... ................ 66a IV Appendix Description S Trial Judge’s Questionnaire Concerning the Circumstances of the Petitioner’s Trial, and the Characteristics of Peti tioner, Completed Eight Months after the Trial....................... .............. T Summary of Capital Cases, Available to the Supreme Court of Georgia For Comparison Purposes At The End of 1977, In Which (1) Life Sentences Were Imposed and (2) The Court’s Assistant Reported Mitigating Cir cumstances Table 1: Cases in Which Youth was Reported As a Mitigating Circumstance............................... Table 2: Cases in Which the Lack of a Prior Criminal Record was Reported as a Mitigating Cir cumstance ................................... Table 3: Cases in Which the Jury was Instructed that it Could Find One or More of The Statutory Aggravating Circum stances Charged in Petitioner’s Case, and Where There Were Mitigating Factors Reported (Other Than Youth Or Lack Of a Prior Criminal Record) ........... Table 4: Cases Where Mitigating Factors Other Than Youth Or Lack Of a Prior Criminal Record Were Reported.............. U Summary of Death Cases In Which The Georgia Supreme Court Has Ex plicitly Ruled On the Adequacy of Jury Instructions Explanation of Summary Chart..... 67a 77a 78a 79a 80a 81a Page V Appendix Description Page Summary Chart................. 82a Table of Citations In Chart............ 86a V Constitutional and Statutory Provi sions, and Rules Involved in this Petition Constitutional Amendments.......... 88a State Statutory Provisions.............. 89a Rule 34 of Supreme Court of Georgia........................................... 97a la APPENDIX A IN THE g>itpn>mr (ta r t nf thr Mmtri) States October Term, 1978 ALPHONSO MORGAN Petitioner V5. >■ STATE OF GEORGIA Respondent No. 78-6140 PAUPER’S AFFIDAVIT Alphonso Morgan, being duly sworn, deposes and says: 1. I am a citizen of the United States and the petitioner in the above entitled action. 2. I desire to prosecute a review of the judgment entered by the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia, on June 28, 1978, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3), but because of my poverty, I am unable to pay the costs of such a review. 3. I believe that I am entitled to the redress I seek by such a review, and that such a review presents substantial issues of deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution of the United States. The nature of the questions to be presented upon such a review is as follows: 2a 1. Whether the charge to the jury in the punishment phase of the trial makes the infliction of death upon the petitioner violative of his Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial, equal protection and due process of law. 2. Whether the imposition and carrying out of the sentence of death in this case is consonant with this Court’s holdings in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and Gregg v. Georgia, U.S. , 49 L.ED. 2d. 859, (1976) and whether such violates petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair trial, equal protec tion and due process of law, as well as the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punish ment. I contend that the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia erred in upholding my conviction and sentence. WHEREFORE, afflant prays that he may have leave to proceed in this Court on Petition for Writ of Certiorari in forma pauperis. / s / Alphonso Morgan Alphonso Morgan Petitioner Sworn to and subscribed before me this 9th day of February, 1979. / s / Jo h n L. W oods Notary Public JOHN L. WOODS Notary Public, Georgia State at Large My Commission Expires May 9, 1980 3a APPENDIX B IN THE &ujirpmp Gkmrt of % InitPiH States October Term, 1978 No. 78-6140 (A-697) ALPHONSO MORGAN, Petitioner, GEORGIA, Respondent. AFFIDAVIT OF ALPHONSO MORGAN REGARDING TIM ELINESS OF H IS PETITION State of G eorgia, County of Tatnell, Alphonso Morgan, being duly sworn, deposes and says: 1. I am a citizen of the United States and the petitioner in this case. 2. My petition for certiorari is not on time because the lawyer appointed by the trial court to take my case abandoned me after my conviction and sentence had been 4a affirmed by the Supreme Court of Georgia on June 28, 1978. He did not tell me what I could do to help myself or how I could get legal help. He just said he was off my case. I have no money and I am not well educated. I did not understand how to appeal my case. In addition, it was hard for me to get information about my case or to get help because I have been in prison since August 28, 1976, the day on which I was arrested. 3. I tried to get legal help, but was unsuccessful. I sent letters to lawyers, but they said they could not help me because I already had a lawyer. Without a lawyer, I tried to help myself by sending a handwritten form to the Federal court in Georgia in August of 1978. I never heard anything about that until just recently, when I was told that I had gone to the wrong court. 4. Then, sometime at the end of last January, I got a paper from the State that said I would be killed on February 7, 1979. Someone at the prison told me to send the paper to Millard Farmer, and I did. Mr. Farmer wrote back to me saying he would try to get the execution put off and help me to get a lawyer so that I could ask this Court to review my case. That was the first time any lawyer said he would help me ask this Court to look at my case. 5. The lawyer appointed by the trial court to represent me never showed interest in my case. He talked to me only a few times before the trial and while it was going on. He did not want to represent me any further after I was convicted on July 14, 1977. I asked him to appeal, but he said someone else would do it. I asked him to get me a transcript of the trial. He said he would, but never did. 6. On July 22, 1977, without a lawyer, I sent a handwritten notice to the Superior Court in Richmond County, saying that I was going to appeal and asking the Court to appoint a lawyer for me. 5a 7. On August 10, 1977, again without a lawyer, I wrote out and sent a petition for a copy of the record in my case so that I could appeal. Judge Fulcher, who was the Judge at my trial, sent my petition to Richard Allen, the District Attorney. (Judge Fulcher sent me a copy of his letter to Mr. Allen. He did not send a copy to the lawyer who had represented me at trial.) I did not hear anything, so I wrote a letter to the Clerk of the Superior Court in Richmond on October 5, 1977, asking for a copy of the record. I told her that my lawyer had not talked to me since the trial and that I needed the papers so that I could help myself. 9. On December 19, 1977, I wrote a letter to the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia telling her that I had tried to get the transcript from my lawyer and that I had heard nothing about my case. The Clerk told me that she had received my letter and told me that my lawyer’s brief would be studied carefully by the Supreme Court of Georgia. Much later, I found out that my lawyer had not even filed a brief and that he had to be asked by the State to file one. 10. On April 21, 1978, over eight months after the date that I asked for a copy of the record in my case, Judge Fulcher said he would not give them to me because my lawyer already had the papers. / s / Alphonso Morgan Petitioner Sworn to and sub scribed before me this 38th day of March 1979. / s / M illard C. F armer, Jr. N.P. State at large 6a APPENDIX C Supreme Court of tlje Mmteb No. A-697 (78-6140) ALPHONSO MORGAN, v. Petitioner, GEORGIA O R D E R Upon Consideration of the application of counsel for the petitioner, It Is Ordered that the execution and enforcement of the sentence of death imposed upon the petitioner is hereby stayed pending the disposition by this Court of a petition for a writ of certiorari filed February 2, 1979. Should the petition for a writ of certiorari be denied, this stay is to terminate automatically. In the event the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, this stay is to continue pending the issuance of the mandate of this Court. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States A true copy M ichael R odak, Jr. Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States By /s / F rancis J. Lorson Deputy Dated this 2nd day of February, 1979. 7a APPENDIX D February 21, 1979 Morgan v. Georgia No. 78-6140 (A-697) D ear Mr. R odak: I am now appearing as counsel, pro bono publico, for Alphonso Morgan, who is imprisoned in Georgia under sentence of death. On January 30, 1979, it came to the attention of Mr. Millard Farmer, of Team Defense Project, Inc., that Mr. Morgan was scheduled to be executed on February 7, 1979. Mr. Farmer also discovered that counsel who had been appointed to represent Mr. Morgan at his trial and appeal in Georgia (i) had not filed a certiorari petition, and (ii) had not communicated with his client since the decision by the Supreme Court of Georgia affirming petitioner’s conviction and sentence of death. Mr. Farmer was informed by Mr. Lorson of your office that he could not apply for a stay of execution without first filing a Petition for Certiorari. Accordingly, without benefit of the full record, or an opportunity to adequately research the issues, Mr. Farmer filed a pro forma Petition on February 2, 1979, indicating that it was to be followed by a petition which would adequately present the important issues for the Court’s review. On February 2, 1979, Mr. Justice Powell signed an Order staying the execution of sentence. Since my agreement to be substituted as counsel for petitioner in all further proceedings in this Court, I have attempted to assemble the complete record. While at the 8a end of last week, I had obtained enough of the record to be able to commence the research, l still do not have all the relevant papers. As of this date I still have not received necessary papers from appointed Georgia coun sel, and still do not have the relevant court records in the cases involving Morgan’s alleged codefendants. Considering the seriousness of the matter, my associ ate, Francis P. Barron, last week telephoned John W. Dunsmore, Jr., the Assistant Attorney General of the State of Georgia responsible for representing the State in this matter, to discuss his position on the timing for the submission of our Petition for Certiorari, i.e., the replace ment for the petition hastily submitted, without benefit of record or research. Mr. Dunsmore said that he had no objection to our taking the time that is necessary in light of the serious nature of the case, that he wanted to be certain that the entire matter was adequately briefed, and that his only concern was that the State would have its usual 30 days to respond after the submission of our Petition. Having now just had an opportunity to focus on the relevant material and to begin the necessary legal re search, it seems to me that a reasonable target for filing the Petition would be April 23, i.e., 60 days from the date of this letter. Mr. Barron spoke to Mr. Dunsmore by telephone today and he indicated that he would prefer that I limit myself to 30 days. However, in light of the seriousness of the matter, the unavailability of the record until now (and the need to obtain still other necessary documents), I represent that such a short time to prepare might result in an injustice. I would appreciate it if you would advise me whether the proposed April 23 date is satisfactory. I recognize, of course, that nothing was filed by Mr. Morgan within the time required by the rules. However, considering Georgia 9a counsel’s abandonment of petitioner, and, in particular, considering that the case involves a death sentence, I believe that the arrangement which I have suggested is necessary in the interest of justice. Sincerely yours, /s / F rederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr. Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr. Hon. M ichael R odak, Office of the Clerk, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543 Attention of Hon. Francis J. Lorson By Hand 3N Copy to John W. Dunsmore, Jr., Esq., 132 State Judicial Building, 40 Capital Square, S.W., Atlanta, Georgia 30334. Express Mail 10a SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OFFICE OF THE CLERK WASHINGTON, D. C. 20543 February 26, 1979 Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Esquire Cravath, Swaine & Moore One Chase Manhattan Plaza New York, New York 10005 Re: Alphonso Morgan v. Georgia No. 78-6140 Dear Mr. Schwarz: Your request of February 21, 1979 for an extension of time in which to file a supplement to the petition has been granted, and the time to file such a supplement has been extended to and including only March 24, 1979. No further extension of time will be entertained. The time for the Attorney General to respond to the petition and the supplement thereto has been extended to and including April 23, 1979. Very truly yours, M ichael R odak, J r., Clerk By /s / F rancis J. Lorson Francis J. Lorson Deputy Clerk th cc: Millard C. Farmer, Jr., Esquire Suite 831, 15 Peachtree Street, N.E. Atlanta, Georgia 30303 John W. Dunsmore, Jr., Esquire 132 State Judicial Building 40 Capital Square, S.W. Atlanta, Georgia 30334 11a APPENDIX E In the SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA D ecided: June 28, 1978 Morgan v . The State 33046 Nicholson & Nicholson, Chris G. Nicholson, for appel lant. Alphonso Morgan, pro se. Richard E. Allen, District Attorney, Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, John W. Dunsmore, Jr., Assistant A t torney General, for appellee. Hall, Justice. This is the direct appeal of the conviction and death sentence of Alphonso Morgan, who was convicted in Richmond County Superior Court for the armed robbery, kidnapping and murder of James Gray. Appellant was given a twenty year sentence for kidnapping, a concurrent life sentence for armed robbery, and the death penalty for murder. I. SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE The State presented evidence from which the jury was entitled to find the following: On August 22, 1976, at 11:30 P.M., the victim James Gray was driving to his job as night superintendent at the Graniteville Company in South Carolina. When he stopped at an intersection, appellant Morgan, Jose High and Judson Ruffin approached Gray’s truck. One of the co-indictees got into the truck with Gray, and, pointing a sawed-off shotgun at him, forced the victim to follow Ruffin’s automobile. Somewhere in Georgia, the victim was taken out of his truck and put into the trunk of Ruffin’s automobile. The co-indictees then drove their victim to the south end of Bush Field in Richmond County. 12a Morgan and his companions pulled Gray out of the truck, took ninety dollars from his wallet and told him that they were going to kill him. They took off the victim’s shirt and tied it around his head like a blindfold. While Gray was begging for his life, Morgan pulled the sawed- off shotgun to his face and pulled the trigger. II. ENUMERATIONS OF ERROR 1. In his first enumeration of error, appellant com plains that the trial court erred in failing to have a hearing on a motion to suppress the oral confession of appellant, and in allowing the confession to be admitted into evi dence. The trial transcript shows that a Jackson v. Denno hearing was held to determine the admissibility of appel lant’s confession. The State called the arresting officer who testified that appellant was given the Miranda warn ings at the time of arrest. Before any more testimony was heard, the jury was excused and the judge heard evidence on the voluntariness of statements made by appellant to the arresting officer. Also considered at that time was the legality of appellant’s arrest. At the close of the hearing the judge ruled to allow introduction of the confession. This constituted a ruling that appellant’s arrest was legal as well as a decision that the confession was freely and voluntarily given. Appellant contends that his warrantless arrest was illegal because there was no probable cause to support it, and that his subsequent confession should have been excluded from the jury’s consideration on the basis that it was the product of an illegal arrest. See: Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 ( 1963). At the time of appellant’s arrest, police authorities were involved in the investigation of a number of homi- 13a rides, rapes, kidnappings and robberies in which the modus operandi was similar. The victims were placed in the trunk of a car and taken to an isolated area, the victims were blindfolded and a shotgun was used to threaten or kill the victims. Jose High was arrested on Friday evening, August 27, 1976, in connection with the investigation. He confessed to numerous crimes, including the murder of James Gray. High expressly named appellant as being responsible for Gray’s murder. This information was learned in the early morning hours of August 28, 1976. Police officers, fearing that appellant might flee if he learned of High’s arrest, immediately went to appellant’s address as furnished to them by High, and placed appellant under arrest. In view of the circumstances, we believe that appel lant’s arrest falls within the purview of Code Ann. §27-207 which authorizes a warrantless arrest of one where it appears that there is likely to be a failure of justice for want of an officer to issue a warrant. There appears to be no question that the police, at the time of arrest, had probable cause to arrest appellant. As the result of High’s confession, which incriminating statements were consistent with information the officers had gained from independent investigation, the officers had reasonably trustworthy in formation to conclude that appellant was involved in the murder of James Gray. “Whether [an] arrest [is] constitutionally valid de pends . . . upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause to make it—whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a pru dent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense.” Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) Brinegar v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1949). 14a Appellant attaches to his brief an order of the Superi or Court of Richmond County sustaining a motion to suppress filed on behalf of Jose High, appellant’s co indictee, challenging High’s arrest. This ruling was re versed on appeal to the Court of Appeals in State v. High, Ga. App. (Case No. 55212, Decided April 6, 1978), where the court found High’s arrest to be based on probable cause at the time it was made and to be legal even though made without a warrant. Therefore, no Wong Sun v. United States, supra, issue is presented by High’s confession implicating appellant. We conclude that the record clearly establishes that police officers had probable cause to arrest appellant, and that due to exigent circumstances there was a likelihood that there would have been a failure of justice had the police delayed in making the arrest of appellant. Appel lant’s subsequent confession was admissible and it was not error for the trial court to so rule. 2. There was sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict. The general grounds present no basis for reversal. Cunningham v. State, 235 Ga. 126 (218 SE2d 854) (1975); Fleming v. State, 240 Ga. 142 (240 SE2d 37) (1977). 3. We find no error in the trial court’s charge to the jury relating to the sentencing phase of the trial. Spivey v. State, Ga. ( SE2d ) (No. 33135, decided June 8, 1978). III. DEATH SENTENCE REVIEW 4. After reviewing the entire record and transcript and considering the foregoing enumerations of error, we conclude that the sentence of death imposed on Alphonso Morgan was not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor. 15a 5. The jury found the following statutory aggravating circumstance: “The offense of murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim.” Code Ann. §27-2534.1(b)(7). This aggravating circumstance is supported by the evidence. 6. In reviewing the death penalty in this case, we have considered the cases appealed to this court since January 1, 1970, in which a death or life sentence was imposed for murder, and we find the similar cases listed in the Appendix support affirmance of the death penalty. Alphonso Morgan’s sentence to death for murder is not excessive or disproportionate considering both the crime and the defendant. Code Ann. 27-2537(c)(3). The verdict is factually substantiated. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Hill, Bowles and Marshall, J.J., who dissent to Division 3 and the judgment. APPENDIX M organ v . The State 33046 House v. State, 232 Ga. 140 (205 SE2d 217)( 1974); McCorquodale v. State, 233 Ga. 369 (211 SE2d 577)(1974); Floyd v. State, 233 Ga. 280 (210 SE2d 810)( 1974); Jarrell v. State, 234 Ga. 410 (216 SE2d 258)( 1975); Berryhill v. State, 235 Ga. 549 (221 SE2d 185)( 1975); Birt v. State, 236 Ga. 815 (225 SE2d 248)(1976); Gibson v. State, 236 Ga. 874 (226 SE2d 63)( 1976); Harris v. State, 237 Ga. 718 (230 SE2d 1)(1976); Young v. State, 237 Ga. 852 (230 SE2d 287)(1976); Dix v. State, 238 Ga. 209 (232 SE2d 47)( 1976); Blake v. State, 239 Ga. 292 (236 SE2d 637)( 1977); Young v. State, 239 Ga. 53 (236 SE2d 1)( 1977); Stanley v. State, 240 Ga. 341 (241 SE2d 173)(1977); Thomas v. State, 240 Ga. 393 (242 SE2d 1)(1977). 16a In the SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA M organ v . State 33046 Bowles, J., dissenting I cannot agree with the majority that the trial court’s charge to the jury in the sentencing phase was sufficient under the rule we recently set forth in Spivey v. State, Ga. ( SE2d ) (Case No. 33135, decided June 8, 1978), and as first formulated in Fleming v. State, 240 Ga. 142, 147 (240 SE2d 37) (1977). In Fleming the following statements were given in the charge to the jury during the sentencing phase, “ [In] the event your verdict is life imprisonment the punishment the Defendant would receive would be imprisonment in the penitentiary for life. And, of course, if you found that there was evidence in extenuation or mitigation then you could fix his punishment at life imprisonment. . . . Now, if you do not find that there was one or more aggravating circumstances, which I’ve just read to you, then the form of your verdict would be, ‘We, the Jury, fix punishment at life.’ Now whatever your verdict is—or if you found that there was evidence in extenuation or mitigation, you could fix punishment at life.” We reversed Fleming’s death sentence because of a finding that the trial court failed to make clear to the jury that they could recommend a life sentence even if they found the existence of a statutory aggravating circum stance. In Spivey v. State, supra, we approved the following charge as making clear to the jury that it could recom mend a life sentence even though it found a statutory aggravating circumstance: “It is now your duty to deter 17a mine, within the limits prescribed by law, the penalty that shall be imposed as punishment for that offense. In reaching this determination you are authorized to consider all of the evidence received by you in open court, and both phases of the trial. You are authorized to consider all facts and circumstances of the case. . . You must first consider and find beyond a reasonable doubt that the . . . murder happen [ ed ] while in the perpetration of another capital felony . . . If you find that to exist, then you shall so indicate in writing, then you will determine whether or not you will impose the death penalty, and your verdict then will be one of two, ‘We the jury recommend the death penalty’ or ‘We the jury do not recommend the death penalty.’ This is a matter for your determination, ladies and gentlemen.” The majority has now gone so far as to approve the following charge given during the sentencing phase of Morgan’s trial: “Now, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you having found the defendant guilty of murder, and armed robbery, and kidnapping, the Court will im pose sentence with reference to the armed robbery and kidnapping, but you having found the defendant guilty of the offense of murder, it is now your duty to determine within the limits prescribed by law the penalty that shall be imposed as punishment for that offense. In reaching this determination, you should consider all of the evidence received by you in open court in both phases of the trial. You should consider all of the facts and circumstances of the case, in cluding any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. “Under the laws of this State, every person guilty of the offense of murder shall be punished by death by electrocution, or by life in the penitentiary. In the event that your verdict is life imprisonment, the 18a punishment the defendant would receive would be imprisonment in the penitentiary for and during the remainder of his natural life. If that be your verdict, you would add, following the verdict already found by you, an additional verdict as follows: We fix his punishment as life imprisonment for the offense of murder, to be served concurrently or consecutively with any other sentence, as you may determine. You may, however, if you see fit and if such be your verdict, fix his punishment as death, which would require a sentence by the Court of death by elec trocution. If that be your verdict, you would add following the verdict already found by you an addi tional verdict as follows: We recommend his punish ment as death for the offense of murder. “I charge you that before you would be author ized to find a verdict fixing a sentence of death by electrocution for the offense of murder, you must find upon the evidence statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances sufficient to authorize such penalty.” To my mind, the approval of this charge is to completely erase the standard for review we have set for ourselves in Fleming and Spivey, and to ignore the spirit of the law as formulated by the legislature in Code Ann. § 27-2534.1. In the instant case I find no suggestion given to the jury that they may nevertheless show mercy to the defendant even though they find a statutory aggravating circumstance. I cannot with clear conscience affirm the death sen tence in this case when the charge here is considered in the light of Fleming v. State, supra. Therefore, I respectfully dissent to the judgment of affirmance in the punishment phase of the majority opinion. I am authorized to say that Justice Marshall and Justice Hill concur in this dissent. 19a APPENDIX F In The Superior Court of R ichmond County, G eorgia Second D ivision State of G eorgia v s — > Alphonso M organ MURDER, ARMED ROBBERY and KIDNAPPING Richmond County Courthouse Augusta, Georgia July 13-14, 1977 Proceedings of the trial of the above captioned case held at the above stated time and place before the Honorable Edwin D. Fulcher, Judge of Superior Court, Augusta Judicial Circuit, and a jury. APPEARANCES: Mr. R ichard E. Allen, District Attorney, of Augusta, Georgia, represented the State. Mr. Chris G. N icholson, Attorney at Law, of Augusta, Georgia, represented the Defendant. L o is W. Story Official Reporter Certificate No. A-186 20a CHARGE OF THE COURT Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the grand jury of this county has returned a bill of indictment against the defendant, Alphonso Morgan, charging him with the offense of murder, for that the said accused in the County of Richmond and State of Georgia on the 22nd day of August, 1976, unlawfully did and with malice afore thought kill one James Gray, a human being, by shooting the said James Gray with a certain shotgun; and with the further offense of armed robbery, for that the said accused in the County of Richmond and State of Georgia on the 22nd day of August, 1976, with the intent to commit theft, took from the person of James Gray the following proper ty, to-wit, ninety dollars United States currency, of the property of James Gray, of the value of ninety dollars, by use of a shotgun, the same being a dangerous weapon—an offensive weapon; and with the further offense of kidnap ping, for that the said accused in the County of Richmond and State of Georgia on the 22nd day of August, 1976, did abduct James Gray, a person, without lawful authority, and held such person against his will, contrary to the laws of the State, the good order, peace, and dignity thereof. Now, to this indictment, the defendant has entered a plea of not guilty, and that makes up the issue which you are now called upon to well and truly try. Every person is presumed innocent until proved guilty. No person shall be convicted of a crime unless each element of such crime is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant enters into the trial of this case with the presumption of innocence in his favor, and that presumption remains with him throughout the trial and until his guilt is established by the evidence beyond all reasonable doubt. The indictment is not evidence. It is the charge of the State of Georgia against the defendant made through the grand jury of Richmond County. The 21a burden is upon the State to prove every material allega tion in this bill of indictment against this defendant to a moral and reasonable certainty and beyond all reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt means just what it says. It is a doubt of a fair-minded, impartial juror, honestly seeking the truth. It is not a fanciful, arbitrary, or capricious doubt; but is a doubt based upon a reason such as a reasonable man would have and would act upon or decline to act upon in a matter of importance to himself, and which arises from a consideration of the evidence or from the lack of evidence or from a conflict in the evidence. If after considering all of the evidence, facts, and circumstances of the case your minds are wavering, unsettled, and unsatisfied, then that is a reasonable doubt under the law. If such a doubt rests upon your minds, you should give the defendant the benefit of that doubt and acquit him. If no such doubt rests upon your minds and you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty as charged, it would be equally your duty to return a verdict of guilty. Moral and reasonable certainty is all that can be expected in any legal investigation. The true question in all criminal cases is not whether it be possible that the conclusion to which the evidence points may be false, but is whether the evidence is sufficient to and does satisfy your minds and consciences to a moral and reasonable certainty and beyond all reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty as charged. The term “felony” as used in these instructions means a crime punishable by death or by imprisonment for life or by imprisonment for more than twelve months. A crime is a violation of a statute of this State in which there shall be a union of joint operation of act and intention. A person will not be presumed to act with criminal intention, but you may find such intention upon consideration of the 22a words, conduct, demeanor, motive, and all other circum stances connected with the act for which the defendant is prosecuted. I charge you that a person commits murder when he unlawfully and with malice aforethought, either express or implied, causes the death of another human being. Ex press malice is that deliberate intention, unlawfully, to take away the life of a fellow creature, which is manifested by external circumstances capable of proof. Malice shall be implied where no considerable provocation appears and where all the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart. I charge you that a person commits armed robbery when with intent to commit theft he takes property of another from the person or the immediate presence of another by use of an offensive weapon. The term “theft” as used in these instructions is the taking or appropriating unlawfully of any property of another with the intention of depriving him of said property regardless of the manner in which that property is taken or appropriated. I charge you that a person commits kidnapping when he abducts or steals away any person without lawful authority or warrant and holds such person against his will. I charge you that every person concerned in the commission of a crime is a party thereto and may be charged with and convicted of commission of the crime. A person is concerned in the commission of a crime only if he directly commits the crime; or intentionally aids or abets in the commission of the crime; or intentionally advises, encourages, hires, counsels, or procures another to commit the crime. Any party to a crime who did not directly commit the crime may be indicted, tried, con victed, and punished for commission of the crime upon proof that the crime was committed and that he was a 23a party thereto, although the person claimed to have directly committed the crime has not been prosecuted or con victed, or has been convicted of a different crime or degree of crime, or is not amenable to justice, or has been acquitted. I charge you that a person is not guilty of a crime except murder if the act upon which the supposed criminal liability is based is performed under such coercion that the person reasonably believes that performing the act is the only way to prevent his imminent death or great bodily injury. I charge you that a person commits a conspiracy to commit a crime when he together with one or more persons conspires to commit any crime and any one or more of such persons does an overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy. I charge you that when a person’s conduct would otherwise constitute an attempt to commit a crime it is an affirmative defense that he abandoned his effort to commit such crime, or in any other manner performed its commis sion under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal purpose. I charge you that a person commits criminal attempt when with intent to commit a specific crime be performs any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that crime. I charge you that a confession is a voluntary state ment made by a person charged with the commission of a crime, wherein he acknowledges himself to be guilty of the offense charged. All admissions shall be scanned with care, and confessions of guilt shall be received with caution. To make a confession admissible, it must have been made voluntarily without being induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit or the remotest fear of 24a injury by one who was previously warned that he had the right to remain silent; that anything he might say could and would be used against him in a court of law; that he had the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present while he was being questioned; and if he could not afford to hire a lawyer, one would be appointed to represent him before any questioning, if he wished one. It is a question for you to determine, first, whether a confession has been made in this case; and, secondly, if made, was it made voluntarily without being induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit or the remotest fear of injury; and, thirdly, if it was made only after the aforesaid warning. If you find that a confession was made but that it was not made voluntarily, or that it was induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit or the most remote fear of injury, or that it was made without the aforesaid warning, you should not give it any consideration what ever, either together with or independent of the other evidence. A confession alone, uncorroborated by any other evidence, shall not justify conviction. No definite rule has been laid down as to how far or in what particulars a confession must be corroborated. Each case must stand on its own footing, and you, as honest, upright jurors diligently seeking the truth, are by law made the sole judges of whether or not a confession has been made under these rules of law. I charge you that direct evidence is that which immediately points to the question at issue. Indirect or circumstantial evidence is that which only tends to estab lish the issue by proof of various facts, sustaining by their consistency the hypothesis claimed. A strong suspicion of guilt is not sufficient under the law to convict. To warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt but shall exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused. Where the facts and evidence 25a and all reasonable deductions therefrom present two theories, one of guilt and the other consistent with in nocence, the justice and humanity of the law compel the acceptance of the theory which is consistent with in nocence. You are the judges both of the law and the facts. The law is given you in these instructions; the facts are given you in the evidence. To the facts as you find them to be, you will apply the law as given in these instructions. In any rulings the Court has made during the trial and in these instructions, the Court has not intended to express or intimate any opinion as to the guilt or in nocence of the defendant. That is for your sole and exclusive decision. Your verdict is solely for you to determine and must be agreed to by all twelve of you. Now, you are about to retire to consider a verdict of guilty or not guilty. You are not called upon to fix any punishment. The form of your verdict should be: “We, the jury, find the defendant guilty as charged,” which would have the effect of finding him guilty of each of the three charges contained in the indictment in separate counts, that of murder, armed robbery, and kidnapping; or, “We, the jury, find the defendant not guilty,” which would have the effect of acquitting the defendant of each and every one of the three charges set forth in the indictment; or, if you should find the defendant guilty of some of the charges set forth in the different counts of the indictment and not guilty of the other charges set forth in the remaining counts set forth in the indictment, you would say, “We, the jury, find the defendant guilty of count one, count two, or count three,” whichever one it might be, and, “We, the jury, find the defendant not guilty of the counts on which you find him not guilty.” What ever your verdict is, have one of your number that you select as foreman or forelady complete the form of printed 26a verdict here on the back of the indictment where I have indicated by the letter “X,” and date it, and sign it as foreman or forelady, and return it into court. Now, you may retire now, but do not begin your deliberations until the indictment is brought out to you by the bailiff. And, Mrs. Becsi and Mrs. Andrews, if you all would just stand aside please, and let the other jurors go to the jury room. (The jury retired to the jury room.) (Conference at the bench.) (Alternate jurors retired to another jury room at this time.) The Court: All right, now, are there any ex ceptions, objections, or omissions which the State wishes to suggest? Mr. Allen: None, Your Honor. The Court: Anything on behalf o f the defend ant? M r. N icholson: N o, Your Honor. The Court: All right, sir. (Evidence was checked here and along with the indictment was sent out to the jury.) The Court: All right, we’ll be in recess until we hear from the jury. ( Recess.) (The jury returned to the courtroom.) The Court: Mr. Foreman, is there some ques tion which the jury wishes to ask? The F oreman: Yes, sir, Your Honor. We would like for you to read the charges back to us on the armed robbery and the kidnapping charge. 27a RECHARGE OF THE COURT A person commits armed robbery when with intent to commit theft he takes property of another from the person or the immediate presence of another by use of an offensive weapon. The term “theft” as used in these instructions is the taking or appropriating unlawfully of any property of another with the intention of depriving him of said property, regardless of the manner in which said property is taken or appropriated. A person commits kidnapping when he abducts or steals away any person without lawful authority or war rant and holds such person against his will. The Court: Is that what the jury had in mind? A J uror: Yes, sir. The Court: The definition of those charges? The F oreman: Yes, sir. The Court: All right, you may retire to further consider your verdict. (The jury retired to the jury room.) (Alternate jurors retired to another jury room.) The Court: All right, we’ll be in recess until we hear from the jury. (Recess.) (The jury and alternate jurors returned to the courtroom.) The Court: Was there some question you had, Mr. Foreman? The F oreman: Yes, sir, Your Honor. We’d like for you to read all the charges on the kidnapping, including the conspiracy and all parts of it. The Court: All right, sir. 28a RECHARGE OF THE COURT A person commits kidnapping when he abducts or steals away any person without lawful authority or war rant and holds such person against his will. Every person concerned in the commission of a crime is a party thereto and may be charged with and convicted of the commission of the crime. A person is concerned in the commission of a crime only if he directly commits the crime; or intentionally aids or abets in the commission of the crime; or intentionally advises, encourages, hires, counsels, or procures another to commit the crime. Any party to a crime who did not directly commit the crime may be indicted, tried, convicted, and punished for commission of the crime upon proof that the crime was committed and he was a party thereto, although the person claimed to have directly committed the crime has not been prosecuted or convicted, or has been convicted of a different crime or degree of crime, or is not amenable to justice, or has been acquitted. I charge you that a person commits criminal attempt when with the intent to commit a specific crime he performs any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that crime. I charge you that when a person’s conduct would otherwise constitute an attempt to commit a crime, it is an affirmative defense that he abandoned his effort to commit such crime, or in any other manner performed its commis sion under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal purpose. I charge you that a person commits a conspiracy to commit a crime when he together with one or more persons conspires to commit any crime and any one or more of such persons does an overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy. 29a I charge you that a person is not guilty of a crime—disregard that, that was not included in your request. The Court: Does that satisfactorily answer the questions which the jury had in mind? The F oreman: I believe it will. Thank you, Judge. The Court: All right, you may retire and further consider your verdict. (The jury retired to their jury room and the alternate jurors retired to another jury room.) ( Interval.) (The jury returned to the courtroom.) The Court: Mr. Foreman, has the jury reached a verdict? The F oreman: We have, Your Honor. The Court: All right, will you deliver it to the bailiff, and, Mr. Bailiff, will you deliver it to the clerk, and, Madam Clerk, will you publish the verdict. (The clerk published the verdict as follows: We, the jury, find the defendant guilty as charged. This 14th day of July, 1977. John T. Andrews, Foreman.) The Court: D o you wish to poll the jury? Mr. N icholson: N o, sir. The Court: All right, well, let the verdict be entered. Now, Mrs. Becsi and Mrs. Andrews, we’ll excuse you at this time. Thank you very much. (To counsel) Is there anything which you wish to show in mitigation or aggravation? Mr. Allen: Your Honor, the State has no fur ther evidence. We’ll rely upon the evidence produced in the first phase of the trial, but we would like to argue a point. 30a The Court: All right, sir. All right, is there anything you wish to present on behalf o f the defend ant? Mr. N icholson: N o, Your Honor, except argu ment. The Court: all right, you may proceed with the argument on behalf o f the State. Mr. Allen: Thank you, Your Honor. (Mr. Allen argued to the jury on punishment.) (Mr. Nicholson argued to the jury on punish ment. ) CHARGE OF THE COURT ON PUNISHMENT Now, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you having found the defendant guilty of murder, and armed robbery, and kidnapping, the Court will impose sentence with reference to the armed robbery and kidnapping, but you having found the defendant guilty of the offense of murder, it is now your duty to determine within the limits prescribed by law the penalty that shall be imposed as punishment for that offense. In reaching this determina tion, you should consider all of the evidence received by you in open court in both phases of the trial. You should consider all of the facts and circumstances of the case, including any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Under the laws of this State, every person guilty of the offense of murder shall be punished by death by electrocution, or by life in the penitentiary. In the event that your verdict is life imprisonment, the punishment the defendant would receive would be imprisonment in the penitentiary for and during the remainder of his natural life. If that be your verdict, you would add, following the verdict already found by you, an additional verdict as follows: We fix his punishment as life imprisonment for 31a the offense of murder, to be served concurrently or consecutively with any other sentence, as you may deter mine. You may, however, if you see fit and if such be your verdict, fix his punishment as death, which would require a sentence by the Court of death by electrocution. If that be your verdict, you would add following the verdict already found by you an additional verdict as follows: We recommend his punishment as death for the offense of murder. I charge you that before you would be authorized to find a verdict fixing a sentence of death by electrocution for the offense of murder, you must find upon the evidence statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances sufficient to authorize such penalty. I charge you that a finding of statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances shall only be based upon evidence convincing your minds beyond a reasonable doubt—and reasonable doubt has previously been de fined in the first phase of the trial—as to the existence of one or more of the following factual conditions, in con nection with the defendant’s perpetration of the offense for which you found him guilty. With respect to the offense of murder, they are: The offense of murder was committed while the offender was engaged in the commis sion of another capital felony, armed robbery; or the offense of murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved torture, or de pravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim. Now, an aggravated battery is when one maliciously causes bodily harm to another by depriving him of a member of his body, or by rendering a member of his body useless, or by seriously disfiguring him, his body, or a member thereof; or that the offender committed the offense of murder for the purpose of receiving money. 32a The statutory aggravating circumstance or circum stances that you are authorized to consider will be sub mitted to you in writing for your deliberations. You must designate in writing in your verdict on the indictment the aggravating circumstance or circumstances which you find to have existed with respect to the offense for which you recommend the death penalty. Your verdict respecting punishment must be agreed to by all twelve of you. Now, you may retire to begin your deliberations—but don’t begin your deliberations until the bailiff brings you the indictment with your verdict of guilty on it, along with the written statutory aggravating circumstances which you may consider. You may retire. (The jury retired to the jury room.) The Court: All right. (Papers were sent out to the jury.) The Court: All right, we’ll be in recess until we hear from the jury. (Recess.) (The jury returned to the courtroom.) The Court: Mr. Foreman, has the jury reached a verdict? The F oreman: We have, Your Honor. The Court: Deliver it to the bailiff, please, sir. Mr. Bailiff, hand it to the clerk. Madam Clerk, publish the verdict. (The clerk published the verdict as follows: We, the jury, find the defendant guilty as charged. We ask the death penalty. The offense of murder was outrageously and wantonly—I can’t read it—horrible and inhuman in that i t . . . ) 33a T he Court: Return it to the foreman and let the foreman read it. Just hand it to him to read. The F oreman: (Reading) “We ask the death penalty for the offense of murder was outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, and aggravated battery to the victim. May God rest his soul.” The Court: Is that dated? The F oreman: Yes, sir. The Court: And signed by you as foreman? The F oreman: Yes, sir. The Court: All right, do you wish to poll the jury? Mr. N icholson: N o, sir. The Court: Let me have that, please, Mr. Foreman. (The foreman gave the indictment to the Court.) The Court: Is there anything which you wish to say on behalf of the defendant before sentence is imposed? Mr. N icholson: N o, sir. The Court: Anything which the defendant wishes to say before the imposition of sentence? The D efendant: Yes, sir. The Court: All right, stand up and say it. The D efendant: I think it was unfair the way they did it—unfair trial—and I ask for a new trial. T he Court: Well, you’ll have an automatic appeal. Remain standing there. You having been found guilty as charged in the indictment, it is ordered that you be taken to the county jail to await guard to be sent to the State penitentiary where you 34a shall be confined at hard labor therein or elsewhere as the Director of the State Department of Correc tions or Offender Rehabilitations shall direct for the remainder of your natural life consecutively with any other sentence for armed robbery; and, in addition, for twenty years consecutively with any other sen tence for kidnapping. And it is further ordered that you be delivered to the said director for electrocution at such penal institution as may be designated by said director on the 17th day of August, 1977, for murder. That’s the sentence of the Court, and you may take the defendant back to the jail. Now, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, that will conclude your services for this term, and you are now excused with the thanks of the Court. (This concluded the proceedings of this case.) * * * * * WITNESSES FOR THE STATE? J. B, Dykes Inv. Belcher Marvin Woodward Inv. J. T. Johnson Jerry D. Chandler Cpl. C. D. Smith Lt. J. R. Holmes Inv. L. D. Stevens Dr. W. R. Murphy Dr. J. W. Mitchener #iv. E. J. Wilhelm indictment No* RICHMOND SUPERIOR COURT ------bias------- Term, 19-IZ_ THE STATE vs. ALPHONSO MORGAN_____ JOSE MARTINEZ HIGH JUDSON RUFFIN ■Z43SSM MURDER_____ ______ _ ARMED ROBBERY________ KIDNAPPING ________________Bill _^£®.doy o f 197? _____ , Foreman W.Miy îALH ^ & i1a,^Uor,'cir The Defendant ALPHONSO M O R G A N - m u T f 6T 'loflicfrrtsnT̂TSt-̂ f-wieflesses-swo&o- /l/£ ? r guilty. Th iSJa M l a y of > & £>.$ ... 19'Ct>. / / -Defendant——• 2)/hAT<- ■ £ ^ .ja ^ c lfeU e = = _ Defendant's Attorney. The DcfcndinK^J. . (V\. in u r\{ Kill n fwaivc^ formal arraignment, copy of will of Ini dictmeut, list o; witnesses sworn before the GranJ Jury, and pleads .S^r£- ----------- Rudty. T!<i 34gE&i nf J 2 i — , >25 RICH A n n E. ALLEN District Attorney RICHARD E. ALLEN, District A ttorney W e fhe Ju ry find the DefendantDefendant The Defendant *L waives formal arraignment, copy ox Bill of In' dictmcm, list of witnesses sworn before the Grand d & t f U . Kuiity. ■S1.LJ/,., rK~L ir̂c c T h k / ^ An y nf 3 U L / 19 7 ? RICHA'iD E. AI.I.CN Attorney J L L Q (Z L d , FoiForeman U> Co o A PPE N D IX In the SUPERIOR COURT of Said County. 36a THE GRAND JURORS selected, chosen and sworn for the County of Richmond, to-wit: 1 H. F. Elrod, Jr.. Foreman 2 Sarah L. Wideman 3 Lots Lamar 4 Maureen C. Gootee 5 Robert R. Howard 6 Particia E. Engvoidsen 7 Kenneth Labrack 8 Bonnie W. Cumbest 9 Mary A. Brown 10 Mrs. Anita D. Smalley 11 Patsy A. Eggers 12 Juanita Chavous 13 -Paula W. Washington 14 Mrs. Daisy P. Morgan 15 Mary F. Allen 16 Andrew J. Ziemba 17 Steve A. Cooper 18 Marian L. Purkey 19 Laura Brooks 20 Marie Covington 21 George H. Mitchell 22 Kenneth L. Harris 23 Carolyn Aaron in the name and behalf of the citizens of Georgia, charge and accuse Alphonso Morgan, Jose Martinez H igh and Judson R uffin with the offense of: Murder for that said accused, in the County of Richmond and State of Georgia, on the 22nd day of August, 1976 unlawfully did and with malice aforethought kill one James G ray, a human being, by shooting the said James G ray with a certain shotgun, contrary to the laws of said State, the good order, peace and dignity thereof. SECOND COUNT The Grand Jurors aforesaid, in the name and behalf of the citizens of Georgia, further charge and accuse Alphonso Morgan, Jose Martinez H igh and Judson Ruffin with the offense of: Armed R obbery, for that said accused, in the County of Richmond and State of Georgia, on the 37a 22nd day of August, 1976, with the intent to commit theft, took from the person of J ames G ray, the following property, to-wit: $90.00 United States Currency of the property of James G ray, of the value of $90.00, by use of a shotgun, the same being an offensive weapon, contrary to the laws of said State, the good order, peace and dignity thereof. THIRD COUNT The Grand Jurors aforesaid, in the name and behalf of the citizens of Georgia, further charge and accuse Alphonso Morgan, Jose Martinez H igh and Judson R uffin with the offense of: K idnapping, for that said accused in the County of Richmond and State of Georgia, on the 22nd day of August, 1976, did abduct J ames G ray, a person, without lawful authority and held such person against his will, contrary to the laws of said State, the good order, peace and dignity thereof. May Term, 1977 J. B. D ykes Prosecutor R ichard E. Allen, District Attorney 38a APPENDIX H In The SUPERIOR COURT OF R ichmond County, G eorgia The State of G eorgia vs. f INDICTMENT n o . Alphonso Morgan MAY TERM, 1977 SENTENCE W hereupon, the defendant, Alphonso Morgan, hav ing been found guilty of the within charge of Murder, Armed Robbery and Kidnapping at the present Term of the Richmond Superior Court. It is Considered, Ordered and Adjudged that he be taken to the Jail of said county to await a guard to be sent to the penitentiary of Georgia, where he shall be taken and confined at hard labor therein or elsewhere, as the State Department of Correction shall direct for the space of natural life on the charge of Armed Robbery and twenty years on the charge of Kidnapping, to be served consecutively; W hereupon, the Jury in the above stated case having returned on the 14th day of July, 1977, a verdict of death by electrocution for the charge of Murder: It is Considered, Ordered and Adjudged by the Court that the Defendant, Alphonso Morgan, be taken from the Bar of this Court to the common jail of Rich mond County or to some other safe and secure place under such guard and protection as may be deemed necessary where he shall be safely and securely kept until his removal therefrom to the custody of the Director of the State Department of Corrections, for the purpose of the execution of this sentence in the manner prescribed by law. 39a It is F urther Ordered and Adjudged by the Court that on the 2 17th day of August, 1977, the Defendant, Alphonso Morgan, shall be executed by the Director of the State Department of Corrections at such penal in stitution as may be designated by said Director, and witnessed only by the executing officer with such assistants as the law requires as well as the defendant’s relatives, counsel and such clergymen and friends as he may desire. It is F urther Ordered that the Sheriff of Richmond County together with such deputies as he may deem necessary, the number of guards to be approved by the presiding Judge, myself, or Ordinary of said County, shall convey and deliver the said Alphonso Morgan to the Director of the State Department of Corrections at such penal institution as may be designated by said Director not more than 20 days and not less than 2 days prior to the time fixed herein for the execution of said condemned person. And there delivered into the custody of said Director. And It Is F urther Ordered that the said Defendant, Alphonso Morgan, on the day fixed herein between the hours of 10:00 o’clock A.M. and 2:00 P.M. be by the Director of the State Department of Corrections, elec trocuted at the time and place and in the manner herein provided by law. And may God have mercy upon your soul. Signed, this 14th day of July, 1977. / s / Edwin L. F ulcher Judge, Superior Court, Richmond County, Georgia R ichard E. Allen District Attorney, Augusta Judicial Circuit 40a APPENDIX I In the SUPERIOR COURT of R ichmond County, G eorgia Alfonso M organ vs. - State of G eorgia Civil Action No. No. 7244 Motion Docket “NOTICE OF APPEAL” Notice of Appeal is hereby given that Alfonso Mor gan, Plaintiff above named appeals to the Georgia Su preme Court from the conviction and sentencing of the trial court of Richmond County, Georgia. Convicting him of murder, kidnap and robbery and sentencing him to die in the electric chair, life and (20) twenty years. This action was entered by the Superior Court of Richmond County, Augusta, Georgia, on the 13th day of July 1977. Respectfully Submitted /s / Alfonso Morgan Alfonso Morgan Pro Se R.C.C.I. 2-5 P. O. Box 5259 Augusta, GA 30906 Dated July 18, 1977 Notary Public /s / James A. Price My Commission Expires: Notary Public, Richmond Co., Georgia My Commission Expires Oct. 8, 1977 Reconstructed Version (Original Follows) 41a -------------— i-— i i __-Z / ) f~ ''-'n.'O /Z.A/iyr'.. ( ' . ,r-.uikt o f 4 7 Oy.nA $ 1 1 ^ ~ r / — 1 _______J . l-l-iAhlS 0 /V tO R c jA hi _ __ i ' M a r i e . L O f M!»pp.4L ..N r c i^ g , - } { - Pt i i \ ' . z , M i ;y. u a J- A i f a s r Y / t k ' j M . 1 ,-■--,-/• •Z-iV-_-v.'-h /<- ■</•••/ • , , I ■~S.l 'l* £f-- r.̂ f ̂ f.,yV: >■ * '/.‘A .. A .'f/ ZlAi h^ML̂UZu y ■; ; Af? £ of <.//;,V 'i\A.K \:{-'e'" /■ .' 1 / ̂ • y'Jf’ ./ I »* r'.*! / / ^ **■/ /^ — i.Ii4j|L/&Yt ■ 4//:— Z.~. I'— L J-.U : .i'JLl.-J M L. f / X / ". r* ~ ̂ >7. ̂t -+U-L. /'■ /■ }/.. iA ± * ± i .__JL i y , /% . I T r i l ' , ./>£- » £ * ': UY >.x : i h i'y.'>rk\i JUCsn ĉ . HhUcAf)^___ u<.., - a .vie.,'.. ■> / r>. c»>.l ■. •» -.1 U:--L_|— :*. v >• ' 'V-- XylA^c-- \y), I. C. v haejjC. 6L A i „> T . ■ Hr A . 42a APPENDIX J In the SUPERIOR COURT of R ichmond County, G eorgia Alfonso Morgan vs. > State of G eorgia Civil Action No. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL Plaintiff moves this honorable court for an order appointing (Mr. Archie L. Gleason, 412 Greene Street, Augusta, Ga.) a member of the Georgia Bar to represent him on his appeal because he cannot afford to employ an attorney at the present time. This motion is based on plaintiff's affidavit in support of his motion to proceed in forma pauperis and for appointment of counsel. Legal authority for appointment and compensation of counsel is 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d) and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3006A(g) as interpreted in McClain v. Manson, 343 F. Supp. 382 D. Conn. 1972. Dated July 18, 1977 Respectfully submitted / s / Alfonso M organ Alfonso Morgan Pro Se R.C.C.I. 2-5 P. O. Box 5259 Augusta, GA 30906 Notary Public /s / James A. Price My Commission Expires: Notary Public, Richmond Co., Georgia My Commission Expires Oct. 8, 1977 Reconstructed Version (Original Follows) 43a IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF R ichmond County, G eorgia Alfonso M organ vs. a State of G eorgia * I Civil Action No. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I do hereby certify that I have this date made the proper and necessary service upon the offices of the Clerk of Superior Court by placing a copy herein of notice of appeal and for appointment of counsel and forwarding it in the United States mail addressing it to the clerk of court Miss Helen M. Speltz with sufficient postage affixed thereto. Respectfully submitted /s / Alfonso Morgan Sworn to and subscribed before me this 18th day of July 1977 Notary Public / s / James A. Price Notary Public Richmond Co., Georgia My Commission Expires Oct. 8, 1977 Filed in office this 22nd day of July, 1977 / s / Helen M. Speltz Clerk Reconstructed Version (Original Follows) 44a «* . . 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Speltz Respondent Criminal Case No. Charges: Murder, Kidnap, Arm Robbery Sentences: Death, life, 20 years Date of Conviction: 7/15/77 * 1 PETITION FOR COPY OF RECORDS Comes now the petitioner-defendant in the above styled cause and moves this Honorable Court to issue an order directed to the above named respondent and commanding that the respondent supply the petitioner-defendant with certain documents which have heretofore been filed by him in his capacity officially as clerk of this court and which are required by the petitioner-defendant for the purpose of continuing litigation as good cause for issuing such order he submits the following to wit: 1. ) The defendant now petitioner is an indigent person unable to pay the respondent’s fees for such documents. 2. ) As the defendant in a criminal case, peti tioner is entitled to certified copies of the documents below listed as a matter of law. 3.) Petitioner should have been, but has not been served with a copy of (A) The warrant in this cause. (B) The indictment in this cause. (C) Any transcript of any proceeding in which petitioner was a defendant. (D) The sentence as impose from the bench. Reconstructed Version (Original Follows) 47a Whereas the defendant petitioner is entitled to the foregoing documents described as a matter of law and, whereas the cost of such documents may be taxed against the state. Wherefore the defendant now petitioner prays that an order be issued as in hereinabove prayed, and this he will ever pray. Respectfully submitted / s / Alfonso Morgan defendant petitioner R.C.C.I. P. O. Box 5259 Augusta, GA 30906 Sworn to and subscribed before me this 10th day of August 1977. /s / James A. P rice Notary Public My commission expires: Notary Public, Richmond Co., Georgia My Commission Expires Oct. 8, 1977 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I do hereby certify that I have this date made service upon the opposite party by placing a copy of this fore going petition for copy of Record and “Petition for Leave to file and proceed” in forma pauperis in the United States mail with sufficient postage attached thereto. This Day of 197 / s / Alfonso Morgan Petitioner Pro Se R.C.C.I. P. O. Box 5259 Reconstructed Version (Original Follows) 48a J r V THtz >s/».o<Y C -i-ju '!7" o - f S.CW/floVj t>) ̂ 'l.StO^q MLLqsL4° -y-iou- *! 7 . /7 - -1. oV > / -, /? -C+.l-Ux'd. alu.I i„ r«.,,: _<̂ o_ _i______ SLdiisŜ i -^&SSb- ,ioH,1,'- '■ l----- ---------- -?■■•■'•* Ziigl—JLSitLJ£* r£ x -Cr ° -•> 41 i_V O 7- u. -il'.C t-, r ■ n ^ . jJLJLxL ̂. .-r-t imst-+ S-F̂rJr-4- - <k .V. 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'-CA/„k s - d — - i i C. j 0 4 ...X. ----- a W f i - r ------------------------------------- - —( c .o .s -~ H ci a c. g .*| ̂ * / T o ■» T .. x ><. w -7 -~3 ,■ -/ y r ---------- --"rf<! &~r.Ta.,---------------------------- 1--------------------------------------------------------------- ---------ujK~it'L-t.mstTtfr. ^ef 7V‘'.-— - --------------- n t J r l 9 * f a g I s i j t j j a S .V */.*<; a - V g f e o v e ----- --------<fe. uUJLL tZ-vSii PtsLâ ------------------------- .------------- —----- ________________________ )?• -.5 iJ -. .. T~ /’qi-'- ̂ _> u 6̂ 1' TTcJ_____ ■ S.r.Jflf f n/ T o .. t W d S o f a s . - . . ; / b ^ J Cfc- fcVfe rt 7 ~7_______ __________ w.p«v NgtHT B AIk, Bidimoml Co., GfrftgiT Commission Expires Oct. 8, 1977 _____________________ __________C . < 2 R ~ i 4 ‘ > V . c< T ^ (-? - r /<’ vf » '« . ^ ______________________ __________________ - T d n / / < p . ? g b ^ c ^ i ' r r ’̂ -T H e, ~T ■’ - r y . V d < - r < e > a a - <i _____ ±jpari T-Mv n ^ n i . W ' If T i j , O ^ ' - ' i - - . . . ' * ’ '. 0 C o ^ ^ i o j T H \ - f c < j c » , « ^ . < , r . o y l t , « o « i l . ' j . . ' - l ' l \ ~ > . W A ' , - U a / t T o t . J . i , '•'<>' •"■ ~— ^ fc> . / -X V o /^ .iJ r , ! J rJ u h ' i V T A . J A J. ~ v. v/ T<3 7 ^ 3 . ’ ■*__ 'zrfT T / V ^ > v ^ - r o . ___________________________ ______________________________________ v //.'s 1 c f a ^ a f / = , ? - __________ ;______________________ ______________ _______________________________W\Wm__ ---------------- _______________ ' ___ .______________ > - /-v r/nŴ .^ ... ............ ...... .................................... /f̂ Ĉ T. ^ (?■ C ° A •- ^ ’V___ '____________________________________ //y>s ^ - v ? c<~> ^ 4._ _______ 50a Inmate’s N ame: Alfonso Morgan Institution: R.C.C.I. D ate: Oct. 5, 1977 State Serial N umber: C ity: Augusta, Georgia I am presently confined at Richmond County Correc tions Institution. I am writing you in request for the transcript pertaining to my case, or any information you can give me as to how I can obtain my transcript. I was tried and sentenced August 22, 1977 and since then have tried to obtain any transcript and indictment papers. My attorney Chris Nicholson has not contacted me since my trial and I have not been able to contact him. It is my opinion that Mr. Nicholson does not intend to assist me in any other legal matters, so it is imperative that I receive my transcript and any other papers pertaining to my case so that I may be able to help myself efficiently. My mother, Betty Morgan will contact you soon and I would appreciate it if you would cooperate with her in helping me receive my legal papers. Sincerely, / s / Alfonso Morgan The transcript has not been filed. Court is in session every week, therefore, the court reporter has not had time to prepare it. Reconstructed Version (Original Follows) 51a INMATE'S NAME:- INSTITUTION __ 7ft A I o n z o Me>y- anr\ /?,C.Q. X._________ c. Qr-b. s~ /•> 7 -7 STATE SERIAL NUMBER:*- CITY:. ZjjL&r ___ 1___ Ĝ~_^ ____ _Sk5 , 1 . J U^-v^— _4g3aAcfes—tftgu. _JL iXyt̂ y **-?. /̂ -7_-?__ - f̂cl̂ jê dl J&- Cf-Jt̂ L̂ry----------- ><Ŵ— dd/tsv**̂ w~~ ylvo- --=«feieac*£l*L-* *STŜ Jl d  d-dj?-------------- , g/y ady-êg— ^yj£zs^J! J&-' — Xo—- L - j Xt— _—ĝ- ■ * 2 * <Kst~di —cd̂ L̂ -̂̂ dŝ /cA ^L *A â—j &- _- iC-«a—«a~g ^^a—dfidgjd cP ê-~d (d _Afea _^ZJ=fc*3̂ X/U. . T h e t r a n s c r i p t h a s n o t b e e n f i l e d . C o u r t i s i n s e s s i o n e v e r y w e e k * . vl t h e r e f o r e , t h e c o u r t r e p o r t e r h a s n o t h a d t im e t o p r e p a r e i t . ____________ i_ 52a EDWIN D. FULCHER JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURTS OF THE AUGUSTA JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 311 CITY-COUNTY BUILDING AUGUSTA, GEORGIA 30902 August 17, 1977 Mr. Richard E. Allen District Attorney The 500 Building Augusta, Georgia 30902 Re: State v. Alphonso Morgan Dear Sir: I enclose herewith Petition for Copy of Records in the above matter for your handling and disposition. Yours very truly, /s / Edwin D. Fulcher Edwin D. Fulcher edf/d Enclosure Copy to Alfonso Morgan R. C. C. I. P. O. Box 5259 Augusta, Georgia 30906 53a APPENDIX L November 17, 1977 Mr. Alfonso Morgan Richmond County C.I. 2-5 Post Office Box 5259 Augusta, Georgia 30906 Dear Mr. Morgan: Thank you for your letter of last week. I noted in your letter that you were anxious for your trial court attorney to contact you concerning your appeal. Generally, the attorney who is appointed to handle your case at trial will also represent you on appeal. Our office does not intervene in cases where a lawyer has already been appointed in a case such as yours, and, moreover, we do not have an office which covers the Richmond County area. Therefore, we will not be able to assist you directly at this time. However, if your attorney fails to contact you after the time for appeal has elapsed, please contact us again at that time, for then we may be able to assist you. Yours truly, / s / Barry G. Sikes Barry G. Sikes Legal Assistant BGS/dgl 54a APPENDIX M Inmate’s N ame: ........................... Institution: ........................... D ate: ........................... State Serial N umber: Rec. 12/19/77 C ity: ........................... Mrs. J oline B. W illiams Clerk Supreme Court of Georgia I’am writing you to let you know that I have tried to get my transcript from my lawer but I’ve had [no] resort on my case, and I would like for you to check on some of the evidence on me as they say, they say it was three of us on the crime and I was the only one convicted for the crime, and my lawer gave me no a cooperation and I would like for you all to know that Fam not a wealth man at the moment and I did not committ this crime, and the evidence there was, was on someone else and I became involve also, but the evidence was no good in Court and this no one has been release I want you to know that I am trying in all my ability to help myself on the case I would like for you to investigate this case [first?] before any final decision is made, because my like is in state of Death [unclear word] was not meant for me as a human being, and I have never commited a felony case in my life and behalf of my like I feel that may case down here in Georgia is taking my life for nothing I done and that why I ask you to help me in every way you can, and when I got convicted my lawer never gave me a report are never answered any of my letter, and I know that he a stat apointed, but I would like to know did he file my complank, and never received this as a murder I did’nt committ with 11 whites & 1 Black that could explain how I got arrested, and the D.A. Richard Allend said that I hated white folk so the jury and I would like for you to check into it, and I have evidence on this, on my behalf I 55a was railroad, and as of now they violated my rights on a speedy trial because of no evidence and all that is being introduced to you I would like to here from you on my case and I was tortued and beating & they said I made statement, but I did not say, and as arresting me they had no warrant of my arrest. So please I am asking you to help me, because I am a young man and care about my life, and they keep asking me to cop out and I said no for knowing I did’nt, not even a line up. They gave me, in my way my lawer and Richard Allend sat me up, because they hadno evidence, and also when I was arrest, the Detective said I made a statement around five men had no time to take it down and only one took the stand without no statement, and a G.B.I. took the stand on behalf that I had nothing to do with the case in Crawford Villi, and I hope I could receive a letter from yoall for help. Reconstructed Version (Original Follows) 56a INMATE’ S NAME INSTITUTION: D A T E ___________ ____ _ STATE SERIAL NUM9ER:_ CITY: f i^ iM ^ L U m A (*»*£> tj._i _ JMuAm -Z~ ĥ iil_A .̂ JL-O^sî jkiutkc UL̂ Aaa&-_____________ _._ ĉ a&xLL_ILllC^juAs,__jladL . uZ&oazAl iJ"‘ &QX&j &X/£, .r. //%<?. Jr* - - ^ ---zLIlcJLl fa, MW}, J frC///sX-rZ, Mr.MHr. M-JAtu, M /i , sitU, ,/# J?-rMU: AA6, /uu, ,/. -OMM /},//>.* cAA- Att/ m JTUl. 4#t Al/p A/?/.%?& /&X/-1? 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A Xo£. ^r>, '-/v,ai AA A" T 57a DATE: INMATE'S NAME:_ INSTITUTION: _ STATE SERIAL NUMBER CITY: (jO.ce, d/ruX VM,.. & .-X:- ’■d «■_ 44^^/L -juytpA' \gJse'X*> < J L •iJfy M. <0zê MU-J2A&2p-&Û rth 6aâ . /Zudn*~- J; e>J&KAi d n .iu i& ‘rt& W iC k̂u»e VW n . rt/? u -?2!Lai2/L .MUUUSAjid Ogt̂ j ±OL X /aS J o. a_ \ gjrv̂ rtZu?, 'XzS J j St,//n,M:. a c~ - s o. /> o.s£hk. s.h:_*jb/rfAui (A(id? .At . -fa1*? ~'n%- . tf/xd- ./??MsM-d XXlX OJk_dM L _ 4 L _ d.ujL/-fi6 (‘’.fsw'dt/D auXc/ U /LuJ-ttL* t.J__ " ' " C'L, J j r i t . 3 ' ,\#f) (MtojG&dL , dwct/. £A q.. d ) / j .^ A u d M u J .xsOj ? d/W-.& j d ^ £p /1,/J^. ..jiiZ 'j?.— '0/^^.j'ia^.. m f - 1 . .GumM -.Jjc __ Jc- ,'L . \ w lZ - y / & 4/ )L . j . ./ A 'V . .^ t - c X s c i- ...i&*=■_ .1̂: jQ . /AVi MMa&cL, :/m.. y2tjd6 &u <*_ VA-XfiaX j.u .d^.M \h Ojli-.Uu .... /.v Ai. t a4T. j„,„ -w u /OWfuM-. JjlL j , J l A J lM -. OrfiL. (li. Aj-AS- ./LiUU. Xlj£tIiuA^o~idL ..-hidutt- cr. y.— 'Xikir̂ ^QajdL- __JT_ -s>uid y?UZi*mJb r%jJ: Xu J X X _____ p' < r9. ft 1 ___ DlMJL&S^uJdWL- " h a d ) Ai l }._ CirU & iX i j t lX - ____ -‘7l ^ OXZ* j f ; .ffr. .h llU xlii.. X . a n , . . . .C u k Vj / ,• id c _ _ _ _ A j!ip j r fh o - . . X lO '/U J ..^ J k L i t :X A jMUMi -fKajk*-. t___LA XlLu. 5 - i f f cujLLius- r~ 58a YsMrjhf <f w j& i. J - 4d/-K' o s r v Y 'L X ,— i ^ / s Y s Y M in <£̂ ~$Z<!LkJL̂ ai ' a *YtL--^MA*^U3Y-j£&& .âZ/f̂ sŷ?- Y/sjj?, {/rjQs* , &3kYL—jtzdL̂ ĥ$g. & /—j-'̂ ' Y~'— YYn- &Yeii*.<Y Y^JnJJ J-j sY* - 4 tu £ L 3 L - £ i~ B' ~ 59a APPENDIX N December 16, 1977 Mr. Chris Nicholson The 500 Building Augusta, Georgia 30902 In re: Case No. 33046 Morgan v. The State Dear Mr. Nicholson: The Court has directed me to notify you that you are required to file the appellant’s briefs in the above case in this Court not later than 4:30 p.m., December 30, 1977, or be subject to the sanctions of Rule 34 of this Court. Yours truly, Mrs. Joline B. Williams, Clerk JBW.bc cc: Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen. Attn: John W. Dunsmore, Jr. Richard Allen, Dist. Atty. 60a APPENDIX O In The SUPREME COURT Of G eorgia Alfonso Morgan, Appellant, v. > Case No. 33046 On Appeal from the Superior Court of Richmond County State of G eorgia, Appellee. Murder. Armed Robbery, Kidnapping (Death Case) SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLEE BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Please serve: John W. D unsmore, Jr. 132 State Judicial Bldg. 40 Capitol Square, S.W. Atlanta, Georgia 30334 (404) 656-3358 Arthur K. Bolton Attorney General R obert S. Stubbs, II Executive Assistant Attorney General R ichard L. Chambers First Assistant Attorney General John C. Walden Senior Assistant Attorney General J ohn W. D unsmore, Jr. Assistant Attorney General R ichard E. Allen District Attorney Augusta Judicial Circuit 61a In The SUPREME COURT Of G eorgia Alfonso Morgan, Appellant, v. > Case No. 3.3046 On Appeal from the Superior Court of Richmond County State of G eorgia, Appellee. Murder, Armed Robbery, Kidnapping (Death Case) SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLEE BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL At the direction of the Court during oral argument held on January 9, 1978, Appellee was requested to file a supplemental brief addressing the adequacy of the lower court’s instructions during the sentencing phase of the trial in light of Hawes v. State, Ga. (Case No. 32167, decided Nov. 28, 1977), and Fleming v. State, Ga. (Case No. 32344, decided Nov. 8, 1977). Before discussing this issue Appellee wishes to correct a statement made during oral argument in which it stated that the Court of Appeals had already heard oral argument regarding an appeal filed on behalf of the State in connection with the lower court’s ruling setting aside the arrest of Appellant’s co-defendant. State v. High, Case No. 55212. Appellee was in error insofar as informing the Court that oral argument had been held before the Court of Appeals in that matter. Oral argument has not been 6 2 a held, but briefs for both sides have been submitted with the Court. Appellee apologizes for this error and for misleading the Court in this matter. Recently this Court has been asked by various Appel lants to look more closely at the trial court’s instructions coming during the penalty phase in those cases in which the state is seeking the death penalty under Ga. Laws 1973, pp. 163, Ga. Code Ann. § 27-2734.1, particularly as to the sufficiency and clarity of those instructions on mitigating and aggravating circumstances which the jurors are to consider before imposing a death sentence. Ga. Code Ann. § 27-2734.1 ( b )(c). In that connection this Court has held that a jury must be instructed that they are to consider in addition to aggravating circumstances, any mitigating circumstances warranted by the evidence, Hawes v. State, supra, but that the mitigating circum stances need not be singled out and specifically listed, a general charge on mitigating circumstances being sufficient. Thomas v. State, Ga. (Case No. 32259, Nov. 28, 1977). Further, a judge during the penalty phase must also make it clear to the jurors that even if they find a statutory aggravating circumstance they may still recommend a life sentence. Fleming v. State, supra. Sub judice, the trial judge specifically instructed the jury: “ . . . it is now your duty to determine within the limits prescribed by law the penalty that shall be imposed as punishment for that offense. In reaching this determination, you should consider all of the evi dence received by you in open court in both phases of the trial. You should consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, including any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. ” (Emphasis added). Hawes is not applicable in this instance, since the lower court did instruct on mitigating circumstances, 63a whereas in Hawes such an instruction was totally lacking. Admittedly, while the lower court did not include in its charge information to the jury that they could nevertheless recommend a life sentence even if they found the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance. Fleming, supra. This Court’s concern in Fleming and instructions similar to that which it took issue with in Fleming, is that it is possible for the judge to give too much emphasis on aggravating circumstances, and that in doing so the instruction may appear to the jury that if they find a statutory aggravating circumstance it is mandatory for them to return a sentence to death. In this instance, the charge when taken as a whole permits a life sentence even though an aggravating circumstance may be found. (T 229-231). Respectively submitted, Arthur K. Bolton Attorney General R obert S. Stubbs, II Executive Assistant Attorney General /s / R ichard L. Chambers Richard L. Chambers First Assistant Attorney General /s / John C. Walden John C. Walden Senior Assistant Attorney General /s / John W. D unsmore, Jr. John W. Dunsmore, Jr. Assistant Attorney General / s / R ichard E. Allen Richard E. Allen District Attorney Augusta Judicial Circuit Please serve: J ohn W. D unsmore, J r. 132 State Judicial Bldg. 40 Capitol Square, S.W. Atlanta, Georgia 30334 (404) 656-3358 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This is to certify that I have this day served counsel for the oppos ing party in the foregoing matter with a copy of this pleading by depositing in the United States Mail a copy of same in a properly addressed envelope with adequate postage thereon. THIS 16th day of Janaury, 1978 / s / J ohn W. D unsmore, J r. Counsel for Appellee PERSON(s) SERVED Mr. Chris G. Nicholson The 500 Building Augusta, Georgia 30902 64a APPENDIX P February 15, 1978 Mr. Alfonso Morgan Richmond County Correctional Institute Post Office Box 5259 Augusta, Georgia 30906 Dear Mr. Morgan: We have received your letter dated February 13, 1978. You indicated that you have an attorney assigned to your case. We are unable to become involved in a case where an attorney is presently active and representing his client on appeal, so we will not be able to directly help you at this time. I would suggest you try contacting your attorney again for additional assistance. If in the future we can be of help to you, please do not hesitate to write. Sincerely, / s / Barry Sikes BGS/dgl Barry G. Sikes Legal Assistant 65a APPENDIX Q April 18, 1978 Alphonso Morgan R. C. C. I. P. O. Box 5259 Augusta, Georgia 30906 Dear Sir: I have your letter of April 13. Your case is presently before the Supreme Court of Georgia and the appeal will be prosecuted by Mr. Nicholson. There is no reason for other or additional counsel. Yours very truly, / s / Edwin D. F ulcher Edwin D. Fulcher edf/d Copies to Mr. Richard E. Allen, District Attorney Mr. Chris G. Nicholson, Attorney 66a APPENDIX R In the SUPERIOR COURT Of R ichmond County, G eorgia Alfonso Morgan VS. Clerk of Court Petitioner Respondent Motion Docket No. 7641 O R D E R The Petitioner, Alfonso Morgan, having filed a “ Peti tion for Copy of Records”, and it appearing to the Court that: Alfonso Morgan was found guilty of the offenses of Murder, Armed Robbery and Kidnapping and on the 14th day of July, 1977, was sentenced to death on the Murder conviction and life on the Armed Robbery con viction and twenty years on the Kidnapping conviction, to be served consecutively; and, It further appearing to the Court that no justification or necessity for transmittal of the requested documents is alleged or shown as they are in the possession of Defend ant’s (Petitioner’s) attorney, the Petitioner’s Motion is hereby denied. This 21st day of April, 1978. / s / Edwin D. F ulcher J.S.C.A.C. Presented By: R ichard E. Allen District Attorney R ichard E. Allen 67a APPENDIX S CODE R e p o r t o f T h e T r - - a l Juc lg S u p e r i o r C o u r t o f R i c h m o n d C o u n t y , G e o r g i a 1. £$\ame M o r g a n T h e S t a t e v s . A l f o n z o M o r g a n ( A c a s e i n w h i c h t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y w a s i m p o s e d ) A . D a t a C o n c e r n i n g t h e D e f e n d a n t A1 fn n ? .n ' 10. 11. L a s t , F i r s t 2 . D a t e o f E M r t h 0 1 01 5 8 M i d d l e M o . D ay Y e a S o c i a l S e c u r i t y N u m b e r S e x : LX ] [ 1 5 . M a r i t a l S t a t u s : LX]r i C h i l d r e n ( a ) N u m b e r o f c h i l d r e n ( b ) A g e s o f c h i l d r e n : N e v e r H a r r M a r r i e d D i v o r c e d S p o u s e D e c e a s e d [ F a t h e r l i v i n g : y e s . [ x ] M o t h e r l i v i n g : y e s [ x] N u m b e r o f c h i l d r e n b o r n t o p a r e n t s E d u c a t i o n — H i g h e s t G r a d e C o m p l e t e d : 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 U 1 5 1 6 1 7 ( C i r c l e a g e o f e a c h c h i l d ) n o [ ] I f d e c e a s e d , g i v e d a t e o f d e a t h n o [ 1 i f d e c e a s e d , g i v e d a t e o f d e a t h S i x ( 6 ) 2 3 4 5 6 7 F 9 1 0 <Q) 12 1 3 1 4 15 16 I n t e l l i g e n c e L e v e l : ( I Q b e l o w 7 0 ) . ( I Q 7 0 t o 1 0 0 ) ( I Q a b o v e 10? ;) ( C i r c l e o n e ) L o w [ ] M e d iu m ? x ] H i g h [ 1 [ c o l l e g e r i 1 2 . ' P s y c h i a t r i c E v a l u a t i o n P e r f o r m e d ? I f p e r f o r m e d i s d e f e n d a n t : a . A b l e t o d i s t i n g u i s h r i g h t f r o m w r o n g ? b . A b l e t o a d h e r e t o t h e r i g h t ? [ c . A b l e t o c o o p e r a t e i n t e l l i g e n t l y i n h i s ow n d e f e n s e ? 1 2 . I f e x a m i n e d , w e r e c h a r a c t e r o r b e h a v i o r d i s o r d e r s f o u n d ? ( I f a n s w e r i s y e s p l e a s e e l a b o r a t e ) _________________________________ Y e s [ ] N o [ x l [ Y e s [ 1 N o [ ] 1 4 . W h a t o t h e r p e r t i n e n t p s y c h i a t r i c [ a n d p s y c h o l o g i c a l ! i n f o r m a t i o n w a s r e v e a l N o n e 1 5 . P r i o r V’o r ’ : R e c o r d o f D e f e n d a n t : T ’-"ne J o b T ' s v D a t e s He 1 d R e a s o n f o r T e r m * n a t ~ c n a . T h e s u b j e c t s t a t e s t h a t h e h a s b e e n e m p l o y e d a t v a r i o u s t i m e s a s a b r i c k b . M a s o n 1s a s s i s t a n t , a y a r d w o r k e r , a n d a c o n v e n i e n t s t o r e c l e r k . He d e - c . d i n e d t o g i v e ' a n y p a r t i c u l a r e m p l o y e r s o r d a t e s o f e m p l o y m e n t . ____ *'v s e p a r a t e r e p o r t m u s t b e s u h n - t t e -1 f o r e a c h d e f e n d a n t s e n t e n c e d t o d e a t h . 68a B . D a t a C o n c e r n i n g t h e T r ; a1 1 . Was t h e c a s e t r i e d w i t h o r w i t h o u t j u r y ? W i t h [x ) W i t h o u t [ ] 2 . How d i d t h e d e f e n d a n t p l e a d ? G u i l t y [ ] N o t g u i l t y &;xl C . O f f e n s e R e l a t e d D a t a 1 . C a p i t a l O f f e n s e f o r W h i c h P e n a l t y I m p o s e d : a . T r e a s o n ...................................................................................] b . M u r d e r ...................................................................... jx j c . K i d n a p p i n g f o r R a n s o m ..................................................... [ ] d . K i d n a p p i n g w h e r e I n j u r y R e s u l t s . . . . . . pc ] e . A i r c r a f t Hi j a c k i n g ................................................ .. . [ ] f . R a p e ................................................................................................... £ -j g . A r m e d R o b b e r y ......................................................................... [ x ] 2 . W e r e o t h e r o f f e n s e s t r i e d i n t h e sa m e t r i a l ? y e s [ ] no [ x] I f o t h e r o f f e n s e s w e r e t r i e d i n t h e sa m e t r i a l l i s t t h o s e o f f e n s e s . d . _______ _______________ I r t r i e d w i t h j u r y , d i d t h e j u r y r e c o m m e n d t h e d e a t h s e n t e n c e ? Y e s fo 1 N o [ ] S t a t u t o r y a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s f o u n d : Y e s [ x ] No W h i c h o f t h e f o l l o w i n g s t a t u t o r y a n d w h i c h w e r e f o u n d ? g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s w e r e i n s t r u c t e d ( 1 ) T h e o f f e n s e o f m u r d e r , r a p e , a r m e d r o b b e r y , o r k i d n a p p i n g w a s c o m m i t t e d b y a p e r s o n w i t h a p r i o r r e c o r d o f c o n v i c t i o n f o r a c a p i t a l f e l o n y , o r ( 2 ) T h e o f f e n s e o f m u r d e r w a s c o m m i t t e d b y a p e r s o n w h o h a s a s u b s t a n t i a l h i s t o r y o f s e r i o u s a s s a u l t i v e c r i m i n a l c o n v i c t i o n s . ( 1 ) T h e o f f e n s e o f m u r d e r , r a p e , a r m e d r o b b e r y , o r d n a p p i r . g w a s c o m m i t t e d w h i l e t h e o f f e n d e r w a s e n g a g e d i n t h e c o m m i s s i o n o f a n o t h e r c a p i t a l f e l o n v . o r a g g r a v a t e d b a t t e r y o r ( 2 ) T h e o f f e n s e o f m u r d e r w a s c o m m i t t e d w h i l e t h e f e n d e r w a s e n g a g e d •f n t h e c o m m i s s i o n o f b u r g l a r y o r a r s o n ‘ n t h e f i r s t d e g r e e . I n s t r u c t e d F ound L 1 C 2 [ 1 [ ] T h e o f f e n d e r b y h ’ s a c t o f m u r d e r , a r m e d r o b b e r y , o r ’ w c n a p r r r . g k n o w i n g l y c r e a t e d a g r e a t r i s k o f d e a t h t o m o r e t h a n o n e p e r s o n i n a p u b l i c p l a c e b y m e a n s o r a w e a p o n o r d e v i c e w hm ch w o u l d n o r m a l l y b e h a ? . - a r o o u s t o t h e l i v e s o f m o r e t h a n o n e o e r s o r . . 69a I n s t r u c t e d F o u n d d . T h e o f f e n d e r c o m m i t t e d t h e o f f e n s e o f m u r d e r f o r [ ] {■ -j h i m s e l f o r a n o t h e r , f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f r e c e i v i n g m o n e y o r a n y o t h e r t h i n g o f m o n e t a r y v a l u e . e . T h e m u r d e r o f a j u d i c i a l o f f i c e r , f o r m e r j u d i c i a l [ 1 o f f i c e r , d i s t r i c t a t t o r n e y o r s o l i c i t o r o r f o r m e r d i s t r i c t a t t o r n e y o r s o l i c i t o r d u r i n g o r b e c a u s e o f t h e e x e r c i s e o f h i s o f f i c i a l d u t y . f . T h e o f f e n d e r c a u s e d o r d i r e c t e d a n o t h e r t o c o m m i t [ } m u r d e r o r c o m m i t t e d m u r d e r a s a n a g e n t o r e m p l o y e e o f a n o t h e r p e r s o n . ©• T h e o f f e n s e o f m u r d e r , r a p e , a r m e d r o b b e r y , o r k i d - [ ] n a p p i n g w a s o u t r a g e o u s l y o r w a n t o n l y v i l e , h o r r i b l e o r in h u m a n i n t h a t i t i n v o l v e d t o r t u r e , d e p r a v i t y o f m i n d , o r a n a g g r a v a t e d b a t t e r y t o t h e v i c t i m . h . T h e o f f e n s e o f m u r d e r w a s c o m m i t t e d a g a i n s t a n y p e a c e [ ] o f f i c e r , c o r r e c t i o n s e m p l o y e e o r f i r e m a n w h i l e e n g a g e d i n t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f h i s o f f i c i a l d u t i e s . i . T h e o f f e n s e o f m u r d e r w a s c o m m i t t e d b y a p e r s o n i n , [ ] o r w h o h a s e s c a p e d f r o m , t h e l a w f u l c u s t o d y o f a p e a c e o f f i c e r o r p l a c e o f l a w f u l c o n f i n e m e n t . j . T h e m u r d e r w a s c o m m i t t e d f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f a v o i d - [ 1 i n g , i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h , o r p r e v e n t i n g a l a w f u l a r r e s t o r c u s t o d y i n a . p l a c e o f l a w f u l c o n f i n e m e n t , o f h i m s e l f o r a n o t h e r . [ 1 f 1 hd [ i [ i t ] L i s t n o n s t a t u t o r y a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n d i c a t e d b y t h e e v i d e n c e , i f a n y . V.’a s t h e r e e v i d e n c e o f m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s ? Y e s [ ] N o [ x ] I f s o , w h i c h o f t h e f o l l o w i n g m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s w a s i n e v i d e n c e ? a . T h e d e f e n d a n t h a s n o s i g n i f i c a n t h i s t o r y o f p r i o r [ ] c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y . b . T h e m u r d e r w a s c o m m i t t e d w h i l e t h e d e f e n d a n t w a s [ ] u n d e r t h e i r f l u e n c e ' - ' o f e x t r e m e m e n t a l o r e m o t i o n a l d i s t u r b a n c e . c . T h e v i c t i m w a s a p a r t i c i p a n t i n t h e d e f e n d a n t ’ s [ ; h o m i c i d a l c o n d u c t o r c o n s e n t e d t o t h e h o m i c i d a l a c t . c . T h e m u r d e r w a s c o m m i t t e d u n d e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s w h i c h { ] t h e d e f e n d a n t b e l i e v e d t o p r o v i d e a m o r a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n o r e x t e n u a t i o n f o r h i s c o n d u c t . c . T h e d e f e n d a n t w a s a n a c c o m p l i c e i n a m u r d e r c o m - [ 1 m i t t e d b y a n o t h e r p e r s o n a n d h i s p a r t i c i p a t i o r . i n t h e horn - c ’ d a ] a c t w a s r e l a t i v e l y m i n o r . 3 70a f . T h e d e f e n d a n t a c t e d u n d e r d u r e s s o r u n d e r t h e d o m - ’ n a t o n o f a n o t h e r p e r s o n . g . A t t h e t i m e o f t h e m u r d e r , t h e c a p a c i t y o f t h e [ ] d e f e n d a n t t o a p p r e c i a t e t h e c r i m i n a l i t y [ w r o n g f u l n e s s i o f h i s c o n d u c t o r t o c o n f o r m h i s c o n - r> d u c t o r t o c o n f o r m h i s c o n d u c t t o t h e r e q u i r e - Q0 m e n t s o f l a w w a s i m p a i r e d a s a r e s u l t o f m e n t a l W d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t o r i n t o x i c a t i o n . C h . T h e y o u t h o f t h e d e f e n d a n t a t t h e t i m e o f t h e c r i m e . [ ] i . O t h e r . ̂ -j P l e a s e e x p l a i n i f ( i ) i s c h e c k e d _____________ * 11 9 . I f t r i e d w i t h a j u r y , w a s t h e j u r y i n s t r u c t e d t o c o n s i d e r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n d i c a t e d i n 8. a s m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s ? Y e s [ ] N o [ x ] 1 0 . D o e s t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s p h y s i c a l o r m e n t a l c o n d i t i o n c a l l f o r s p e c i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n ? Y e s { f K q ^ 1 1 . A l t h o u g h t h e e v i d e n c e s u f f i c e s t o s u s t a i n t h e v e r d i c t , d o e s i t f o r e c l o s e a l l d o u b t r e s p e c t i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s g u i l t ? Y e s [ x ] N o [ ] 1 2 . W as t h e v i c t i m r e l a t e d b y b l o o d o r m a r r i a g e t o d e f e n d a n t ? Y e s T 1 No fx 1 1 3 . I f a n s w e r i s y e s , w h a t w a s t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p ? ____________ ‘ ' J 14- . \V 3 S 1 5 . V:as 1 6 . Was t h e 1 7 . V’a s ID. VJas 1 9 . Was t h e v i c t i m a n e m p l o y e r o r e m p l o y e e o f d e f e n d a n t ? K o E m p l o y e r E m p l o y e e t h e v i c t i m a c q u a i n t e d w i t h t h e d e f e n d a n t ? K o C a s u a l A c q u a i n t a n c e F r i e n d t h e v i c t i m l o c a l r e s i d e n t o r t r a n s i e n t i n c o m m u n i t y ? t h e v i c t i m t h e sa m e r a c e a s d e f e n d a n t ? t h e v i c t i m t h e sa m e s e x a s t h e d e f e n d a n t ? t h e v i c t i m h e l d H o s t a g e d u r i n g t h e c r ^ r a e ? R e s i d e n t T r a n s i e n t Y e s [ 1 K o Y e s [ X 1 Ko K o Y e s - L e s s t h a n a n h o u r Y e s - M o r e t h a n a n h o u r [X] C 1 [ ] [xl C i [ } [xl [ ] f 1 r 1 Ex1 2 D . Was t h e v i c t - m ’ s r e p u t a t i o n i n t h e c o m m u n i t y : G o o d [x "l Ba d [ ; U n k n o w n [ 1 V.'as t h e v i c t i m p h y s i c a l l y h a r m e d o r t o r t u r e d ? Y e s f K o r 1 I ” y e s , s t a t e e x t e n t o f h a rm o r t o r t u r e : D e a t h ______________ 01 65 4 71a 2 2 . V ;h a t w a s t h e a g e o f t h e v i c t i m ? 2 3 . I f a w e a p o n w a s u s e d i n c o m m i s s i o n o f t h e c r i m e w a s i t ? N o w e a p o n u s e d P o i s o n f M o t o r V e h i c l e { B l u n t I n s t r u m e n t f S h a r p I n s t r u m e n t [ F i r e a r m [x O t h e r [ 2 4 . D o e s t h e d e f e n d a n t h a v e a r e c o r d o f p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n s ? Y e s [ ) N o (XjQ 2 5 . I f a n s w e r i s y e s , l i s t t h e o f f e n s e s , t h e d a t e s o f t h e o f f e n s e s a n d t h e s e n t e n c e s i m p o s e d : O f f e n s e P 3 t e o f O f f e n s e S e n t e n c e I m p o s e d a . ___________________________________________________________________ _______________ 2 6 . W as t h e r e e v i d e n c e t h e d e f e n d a n t w a s u n d e r - t h e i n f l u e n c e o f n a r c o t i c s o r d a n g e r o u s d r u g s a t t h e t i m e o f t h e o f f e n s e ? Y e s [ ] No [XX] 2 7 . W a s t h e d e f e n d a n t a l o c a l r e s i d e n t o r t r a n s i e n t i n t h e c o m m u n i t y ? R e s i d e n t [X 1 T r a n s i e n t [ ] D . R e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f D e f e n d a n t * 1 . D a t e c o u n s e l s e c u r e d A u g u s t 3 0 . 1 9 7 7 _____________________ 2 . How w a s c o u n s e l s e c u r e d ? a . R e t a i n e d b y d e f e n d a n t [ ] b . A p p o i n t e d b y C o u r t [XX] 3 . I f c o u n s e l w a s a p p o i n t e d b y c o u r t w a s i t b e c a u s e a . D e f e n d a n t u n a b l e t o a f f o r d c o u n s e l ? [ x] b . D e f e n d a n t r e f u s e d t o s e c u r e c o u n s e l ? [ ] c . O t h e r ( e x p l a i n ) ______________________________ [ ] 4 . How m a nv y e a r s h a s c o u n s e l p r a c t i c e d l a w ? a . 0 t o 5 f x ] b . 5 t o 1 0 [ c , o v e r 1 0 T 5 . W h a t • s t h e n a t u r e o f c o u n s e l ' s p r a c t i c e ? a . M o s t l y c i v i 1 f ; * b . G e n e r a l [ Xl c . M o s t l y c r i m i n a l [ 6 . D ' d t h e sa m e c o u n s e l s e r v e t h r o u g h o u t t h e t r i a l ? Y e s LXX5 [ I f n o t e x p l a i n n d e t a i l . ( I f m o r e t h a n o n e c o u n s e l s e r v e d a n s w e r t h e a b o v e c u e s t i o n s a s t o e a c : c o u n s e l a n d a t t a c h t o t h i s r e p o r t . ) 01 68 5 72a E . G e n e r a l C o n s ? d e r a t i o n s 1 . W as r a c e r a i s e d b y t h e d e f e n s e a s a n i s s u e i n t h e t r i a l ? Y e s [ ] No f x ] 2 ; D i d r a c e o t h e r w i s e a p p e a r a s a n i s s u e i n t h e t r - ' a l ? Y e s [ ] No [ x 1 3 . W h a t p e r c e n t a g e o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n o f y o u r c o u n t y i s t h e s a m e r a c e a s t h e d e f e n d a n t ? a . U n d e r 1 0 % ..................... ] b . 1 0 t o 2 5 % ................j c . 2 5 t o 5 0 % ............................ [ x ] d . 5 0 t o 7 5 % .............................[ ] e . 7 5 t o 9 0 % ............................ [ } f . O v e r 9 0 % .............................. [ ] 4 . W e r e m e m b e r s o f d e f e n d a n t ' s r a c e r e p r e s e n t e d o n t h e j u r y ? Y e s f x ) N o [ j 5 . I f n o t , w a s t h e r e a n y e v i d e n c e t h e y w e r e s y s t e m a t i c a l l y e x c l u d e d f r o m t h e j u r y ? Y e s £ ] No £x 1 6 . W as t h e j u r y i n s t r u c t e d t o e x c l u d e r a c e a s a n i s s u e ? Y e s [ ] N o [ x ] 7 . W as t h e r e e x t e n s i v e p u b l i c i t y i n t h e c o m m u n i t y c o n c e r n i n g t h i s c a s e ? Y e s t x 3 N o [ ] 8 . W as t h e j u r y i n s t r u c t e d t o d i s r e g a r d s u c h p u b l i c i t y ? Y e s [ 3 No [ x 3 9 . Was t h e j u r y i n s t r u c t e d t o a v o i d a n y i n f l u e n c e o f p a s s i o n , p r e j u d i c e , o r a n y o t h e r a r b i t r a r y f a c t o r w h e n i m p o s i n g s e n t e n c e ? Y e s [ 3 N o [ x ] 1 0 . W as t h e r e a n y e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e j u r y w a s i n f l u e n c e d b y p a s s i o n , p r e j u d i c e , o r a n y o t h e r a r b i t r a r y f a c t o r w h e n i m p o s i n g s e n t e n c e ? Y e s [ ] N o [x ] 1 1 . I f a n s w e r i s y e s , w h a t w a s t h a t e v i d e n c e ? _________________________________________________ 1 2 . G e n e r a l c o m m e n t s o f t h e T r i a l J u d g e c o n c e r n i n g t h e a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s o f t h e s e n t e n c e i m p o s e d j .n t h i s c a s e T h i s m u r d e r w a s i n e x c u s a b l e a n d t h e v i l e a n d h o r r i b l e m a n n e r o f d e a t h r e n d e r s t h e s e n t e n c e a p p r o p r i a t e . * 1 2 3 F . C h r o n o l o g y o f C a s e E la o s e d Davs 1 . D3te o f O ffe n se August 22 , 1976______________________ 0 2 . Date o f A rre s t August 28, 1976 ________________________________________ 6 3 . Date T r ia l Began J u ly 11/ 1977 ________________________ 315 ^ . Date Sentence Imposed J u ly 14. 1977__________________ n a 6 73a 6 . D a c e T r i a l J u d g e ' s R e p o r t C o m p l e t e d 3 / 2 7 / 7 8 7 . * * D a t e R e c e i v e d b y S u p r e m e C o u r t C*D<p------------------------------- C . . ^ * D a t e S e n t e n c e R e v i e w C o m p l e t e d 9 . * T o t a l E l a p s e d D a y s _____________ * T o b e c o m p l e t e d b y S u p r e m e C o u r t T h i s r e p o r t w a s s u b m i t t e d t o t h e d e f e n d a n t ’ s c o u n s e l f o r s u c h c o m m e n t s a s h e d e s i r e d t o m ake c o n c e r n i n g t h e f a c t u a l a c c u r a c y o f t h e r e p o r t , a n d O 1 . H i s c o m m e n t s a r e a t t a c h e d { ) 2 He s t a t e d h e h a d n o c o m m e n t s ( x ) 3 . He h a s n o t r e s p o n d e d ( ) March 27 1978 Date J u d g e , S u p e r i o r C o u r t o f Richmond C o u n t y 7 74 a /fc . u w - 0i 6S 7 75a ST ATE OF GEORGIA VS ALFONZO MORGAN STATE OF GEORGIA C L E R K 'S OFF ICE RICHMOND COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT I , H e l e n M. S p e l t z , C l e r k o f t h e S u p e r i o r C o u r t o f R i c h m o n d C o u n t y , G e o r g i a , h e r e b y c e r t i f y t h a t t h e f o r e g o i n g T r i a l J u d g e ' s R e p o r t i s t h e o r i g i n a l t a k e n f r o m t h e f i l e s o f t h i s o f f i c e , i n t h e a b o v e s t a t e d c a s e . W i t n e s s my s i g n a t u r e a n d t h e s e a l o f s a i d C o u r t h e r e t o a f f i x e d a t A u g u s t a , G e o r g i a , t h i s 3 1 s t d a y o f M a r c h . 1 9 7 8 . (u. Vn /2 " 76a lid, APPENDIX T SUMMARY OF CAPITAL CASES AVAILABLE TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA FOR COM PARISON PURPOSES AT THE END OF 1977, IN WHICH (1) LIFE SENTENCES WERE IMPOSED AND (2) THE COURT’S ASSISTANT REPORTED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES* Table 1 Cases in which Youth was Reported as a Mitigating Circumstance Sanders v. State, 235 Ga. 425, 219 S.E.2d 768 (1975)** Tarpkin [Johnny] v. State, 236 Ga. 67, 222 S.E.2d 364 ( 1976)** Tarpkin [Robert] v. State, 236 Ga. 67, 222 S.E.2d 364 ( 1976)** Fuller v. State, 231 Ga. 818, 204 S.E.2d 592 (1974)** Sims v. State, 229 Ga. 33, 189 S.E.2d 68 ( 1972)** Stovall v. State, 236 Ga. 840, 225 S.E.2d 292 (1976) Riley v. State, 237 Ga. 124, 226 S.E.2d 922 (1976) Gibson v. State, 236 Ga. 175, 223 S.E.2d 150 ( 1976) Davis v. State, 233 Ga. 638, 212 S.E.2d 814 ( 1975) * Counsel for Petitioner have examined the trial judge’s question naires in the cases summarized in this Appendix. The questionnaires are on file in the Supreme Court of Georgia under the custody of the Assistant to the Georgia Supreme Court {see Ga. Code Ann. §27-2537 (f)-(h )). If the Court desires, Counsel for Petitioner will supply the Court with copies of the questionnaires. ** Jury instructed that it could find one or more of the statutory aggravating circumstances charged in petitioner’s case. 78a Table 2 Cases in which the Lack of a Prior Criminal Record was Reported as a Mitigating Circumstance Sanders v. State, 235 Ga. 425, 219 S.E.2d 768 (1975)** Burke v. State, 234 Ga. 512, 216 S.E.2d 812 (1975)** English v. State, 234 Ga. 602, 216 S.E.2d 851 (1975)** Stovall v. State, 236 Ga. 840, 225 S.E.2d 292 (1976) Jackson v. State, 234 Ga. 602, 216 S.E.2d 851 ( 1975) Henderson v. State, 234 Ga. 893, 218 S.E.2d 622 (1975) Cooper v. State, 229 Ga. 277, 191 S.E.2d 27 (1972) Coffee v. State, 230 Ga. 123, 195 S.E.2d 897 (1973) Brown v. State, 228 S.E.2d 215, 184 S.E.2d 655 (1971) Chandle v. State, 230 Ga. 574, 198 S.E.2d 289 (1973) Reese v. State, 231 Ga. 799, 204 S.E.2d 152 ( 1974) Spencer v. State, 231 Ga. 705, 203 S.E.2d 856 (1974) Gaines v. State, 232 Ga. 727, 208 S.E.2d 798 ( 1974) Johnson v. State, 231 Ga. 138, 200 S.E.2d 734 (1973) Butler v. State, 231 Ga. 276, 201 S.E.2d 448 (1973) McClendon v. State, 231 Ga. 47, 199 S.E.2d 904 (1973) Allen v. State, 230 Ga. 772, 199 S.E.2d 246 (1973) York v. State, 226 Ga. 281, 174 S.E.2d 418 (1970) Griffin v. State, 237 Ga. 532, 228 S.E.2d 908 (1976) Banks v. State, 227 Ga. 578, 182 S.E.2d 106 (1971) Page v. State, 237 Ga. 20, 227 S.E.2d 8 ( 1976) ** Jury instructed that it could find one or more of the statutory aggravating circumstances charged in petitioner’s case. 79a Rini v. State, 236 Ga. 715, 225 S.E.2d 234 (1976) Herlong v. State, 236 Ga. 326, 223 S.E.2d 672 (1976) Glass v. State, 235 Ga. 17, 218 S.E.2d 776 (1975) Lavender v. State, 234 Ga. 608, 216 S.E.2d 855 (1975) Shy v. State, 234 Ga. 816, 218 S.E.2d 599 (1975) Jones v. State, 234 Ga. 108, 214 S.E.2d 544 (1975) Table 3 Cases in which the jury was instructed that it could find one or more of the statutory aggravating circumstances charged in petitioner’s case, and where there were mitigating factors reported (other than youth or lack of a prior criminal record) Brooks v. State, 233 Ga. 524, 212 S.E.2d 355 (1975) Scott v. State, 230 Ga. 413, 197 S.E.2d 338 ( 1973) Jackson v. State, 234 Ga. 153, 210 S.E.2d 673 (1975) Owens v. State, 233 Ga. 905, 213 S.E.2d 860 ( 1975) Gaither v. State, 234 Ga. 465, 216 S.E.2d 324 (1975) Stamper v. State, 235 Ga. 165, 219 S.E.2d 140 (1975) 80a Table 4 Cases Where Mitigating Factors Other Than Youth Or Lack of Prior Record Were Reported Stewart v. State, 234 Ga. 3, 214 S.E.2d 509 (1975) Wood v. State, 234 Ga. 623, 216 S,E.2d 865 ( 1975) Graham v. State, 234 Ga. 520, 216 S.E.2d 817 (1975) Battle v. State, 234 Ga. 637, 217 S.E.2d 255 ( 1975) Lindsey v. State, 234 Ga. 874, 218 S.E.2d 585 ( 1975) Henderson v. State, 234 Ga. 827, 218 S.E.2d 612 (1975) Jones v. State, 234 Ga. 648, 217 S.E.2d 597 (1975) Harrison v. State, 236 Ga. 355, 223 S.E.2d 715 (1976) Wessner v. State, 236 Ga. 162, 223 S.E.2d 141 (1976) Graham v. State, 236 Ga. 378, 223 S„E.2d 803 (1976) Brannen v. State, 235 Ga. 505, 220 S.E.2d 264 (1975) Williams v. State, 232 Ga. 203, 206 S.E.2d 37 (1974) Young v. State, 232 Ga. 285, 206 S.E.2d 439 (1974) Coats v. State, 234 Ga. 659, 217 S.E.2d 260 ( 1975) Teasley v. State, 228 Ga. 107, 184 S.E.2d 179 (1971) 81a APPENDIX U OTHER DEATH CASES IN WHICH THE GEORGIA SUPREME COURT HAS CONSIDERED THE ADEQUACY OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS EXPLANATION OF SUMMARY CHART The following chart summarizes the characteristics of the jury charges in the 29 cases (other than petitioner’s) in which the Georgia Supreme Court has explicitly dealt with the adequacy of jury instructions.* For each case, the chart indicates in the first column whether or not the Georgia Supreme Court approved the trial court’s charge. In columns 2-5, the chart indicates, for each case, whether or not the charge included distinct characteristics necessary to make a death penalty charge under the Georgia statute, and this Court’s decisions, accurate and clear: 1. An instruction that the jury was authorized to consider mitigating circumstances. 2. A definition of the legal term “mitigation”. 3. Particular mitigating circumstances which the jury could consider. 4. An instruction that, even if it found statutory aggravating circumstances, the jury could nevertheless return a sentence of life imprisonment. * The jury charges are part of the records of the Supreme Court of Georgia. Counsel for petitioner has examined the instructions, and will, if the Court desires, make copies available for its use. 82a OTHER DEATH CASES IN WHICH THE GEORGIA SUPREME COURT HAS CONSIDERED THE ADEQUACY OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS Case* i Charge Approved by State Sup. Ct. 2 Instructed to Consider Mitigating Circum stances 3 Definition of the Term “Mitigation” 4 Particular Mitigating Circum stances Suggested 5 Authorized to Return Life Sen tence Even if Aggravat ing Circum stances Found 1. Street............... Yes Yes No No 2. Fleming........... ....... No Yes No( 1) No No(2) 3. Hawes.............. ..... . No No No No Yes(3) 4. Spraggins......... ..... . No No No No No 5. Redd(4).......... ....... No No No No No(5) * A list of citations by line number appears at 86a. (1) The court twice used the term “extenuation” along with “mitigation”. (2) But the court did state that “if you find . . . aggravating circumstances, you may fix the punishment at death.” (emphasis supplied) (3) At first, the court did not so charge, but a colloquy between the court and defense counsel in the presence of the jury made this clear. (4) Judge Fulcher gave precisely the same instruction in petitioner’s case as he gave in Redd, except: (i) the state did not seek the death penalty for kidnapping in petitioner’s case, so he did not charge on that offense; (2) in petitioners case, he defined “aggravated battery”; and (3) in petitioner’s case, he added to his general instruction that the jury should consider all the facts and circumstances, the phrase: “including any mitigating or aggravating circumstances”. (5) Defense counsel specifically requested such a charge. Judge Fulcher noted the objection, but did not recharge. 83a t 2 3 4 5 Case Charge Approved by State Sup. Ct. Instructed to Consider Mitigating Circum stances Definition of the Term “Mitigation” Particular Mitigating Circum stances Suggested Authorized to Return Life Sentence Even if Aggravating Circum stances Found 6 . L a m b ................. ...... N o Y e s ( 6 ) N o N o N o 7. D a v i s .................. ...... N o N o N o N o N o 8. T h o m a s ............ ...... Y e s Y e s Y e s N o Y e s 9. P r e s n e l l ............ Y e s Y e s Y e s N o Y e s 10. P o t t s ( 7 ) ........... Y e s N o ( 8 ) Y e s N o Y e s 11. P o t t s ( 7 ) ........... ...... Y e s Y e s Y e s N o Y e s 12. S p i v e y . . . . . ...... . ...... Y e s N o N o N o N o 13. D r a k e ................. ...... Y e s Y e s Y e s N o Y e s 14. B o w e n ............... ...... N o Y e s N o N o N o 15 . A l d e r m a n ........ Y e s Y e s Y e s N o Y e s 16 . S t e v e n s .............. . . . . . N o N o N o N o N o 17. B u r g e r ............... ...... N o N o N o N o N o (6) The jury was instructed that it could consider the evidence adduced by defendant during the sentencing phase of the trial. (7) Defendant was tried and sentenced on separate charges by two separate courts. Thus, there were two charges reviewed by the Supreme Court of Georgia. (8) The court did not explicitly direct the jury to consider mitigating circumstances, but it did direct the jury to consider all the facts and circumstances, defined “mitigation”, and informed the jury that it could “recommend mercy” with or without reason, and that such “recommen dation” would be binding upon the court. 84a l 2 3 4 5 Case Charge approved by State Sup. Ct. Instructed to consider Mitigating Circum stances? Definition of the Term “Mitigation” Particular Mitigating Circum stances Suggested Authorized to Return Life Sentence Even if Aggravating Circum stances Found 18. Stephens......... ..... Yes(9) Yes(10) No No Yes( 11) 19. Westbrook...... ...... Yes Yes No No( 12) Yes( 13) 20. Berry hill......... . ..... Yes(9) No No No No 21. Banks.............. ...... Yes(9) Yes Yes Yes( 14) No 22. Young............. ..... Yes(9) Yes Yes No Yes 23. Johnson ........... ..... Yes Yes Yes No Yes 24. Finney............. ..... Yes Yes No No Yes( 13) (9) The charge was implicitly approved during the mandatory direct sentence review, and explicitly approved when the State Supreme Court affirmed the denial of defendant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. (10) The jury was instructed twice, in the proper context, that they should consider mitigating circumstances. (11) Though it was not made explicit. (12) But court calls jury’s attention to evidence brought out by defendant during presentencing hearing. (13) But there is some confusion in the charge. (14) The defendant’s youth (he was 23 at the time of the offense). 85a i 2 3 4 5 Case Charge Approved by State Sup. Ct. Instructed to Con sider Miti gating Circum stances Definition of the Term “Mitiga tion” Particular Mitigating Circum stances Suggested Authorized to Return Life Sentence Even if Aggravat ing Cir cumstances Found 25. Goodwin.......... ..... Yes( 15) No No No No 26. Ruffin............ . Yes No No No No 27. Godfrey........... Yes Yes Yes No Yes 28. Harris............. . ...... Yes/No( 16) No No No No 29. Holton( 17)............. No No No No No (15) The charge was implicitly approved during the mandatory direct sentence review, and explicitly approved when the State Supreme Court affirmed the denial of defendant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. (16) The charge was explicitly approved during the mandatory sentence review, and explicitly disapproved when the State Supreme Court reversed the denial of defendant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. (17) Both the prosecutor and the trial court conceded that the charge was inadequate, and the State Supreme Court agreed. 86a Citations for Death Cases in Which the Georgia Supreme Court has Considered the Adequacy of Jury Instructions No. on Chart Case 1. Street v. State, 237 Ga. 84, 226 S.E.2d 911 (1976) . 2. Fleming v. State, 240 Ga. 142, 240 S.E.2d 37 ( 1977). 3. Hawes v. State, 240 Ga. 327, 240 S.E.2d 833 (1977) . 4. Spraggins v. State, 240 Ga. 759, 243 S.E.2d 20 ( 1978). 5. Redd v. State, 240 Ga. 753, 242 S.E.2d 628 ( 1978). 6. Lamb v. State, 241 Ga. 10, 243 S.E.2d 59, cert. denied, 436 U.S. 914 (1978). 7. Davis v. State, 241 Ga. 376, 243 S.E.2d 12 ( 1978). 8. Thomas v. State, 240 Ga. 393, 242 S.E.2d 1 (1977) . 9. Presnell v. State, 241 Ga. 49, 243 S.E.2d 496 (1978) . 10. Potts v. State (first trial), 241 Ga. 67, 243 S.E.2d 510 ( 1978). 11. Potts v. State (2nd trial), 241 Ga. 67, 243 S.E.2d 510 ( 1978). 12. Spivey v. State, 241 Ga. 477, 240 S.E.2d 37, cert. denied, No. 78-5460, slip op. (Ga. Sup. Ct., Dec. 4, 1978). 13. Drake v. State, 241 Ga. 583, 247 S.E.2d 57 ( 1978). 14. Bowen v. State, 241 Ga. 492, 246 S.E.2d 322 (1978). Alderman v. State, 241 Ga. 496, 246 S.E.2d 642, cert, denied, No. 78-5490, slip op. (Ga. Sup. Ct., Nov. 27, 1978). 15. 87a No. on Chart Case 16. Stevens v. State, 242 Ga. 34, 247 S.E.2d 838 (1978). 17. Burger v. State, 242 Ga. 28, 274 S.E.2d 834 (1978). 18. Stephens v. State, 237 Ga. 259, 227 S.E.2d 261 (1976); Stephens v. Hopper, 241 Ga. 596, 247 S.E.2d 92 (1978), cert, denied, No. 78-5544, slip op. (Nov. 27, 1978). 19. Westbrook v. State, 242 Ga. 151, 249 S.E.2d 524 (1978). 20. Berryhill v. State, 235 Ga. 549, 221 S.E.2d 185 (1975) , cert, denied, 429 U.S. 1054 (1977). Berryhill v. Ricketts, .... Ga........, 249 S.E.2d 197 (1978). 21. Banks v. State, 237 Ga. 325, 227 S.E.2d 380 (1976) , cert, denied, 430 U.S. 975 (1977); Banks v. Glass, No. 33786, slip op. (Ga. Sup. Ct., Nov. 7, 1978). 22. Young v. State, 237 Ga. 852, 230 S.E.2d 287 (1976); Young v. Ricketts, .... Ga....... , 250 S.E.2d 404 (1978). 23. Johnson v. State, 242 Ga. 649 (1978). 24. Finney v. State, 242 Ga. 583, 250 S.E.2d 388 (1978). 25. Goodwin v. State, 236 Ga. 339, 223 S.E.2d 703 (1976), cert, denied, 431 U.S. 909 (1977); Goodwin v. Hopper, No. 34234, slip op. (Ga. Sup. Ct., Feb. 6, 1979). 26. Ruffin v. State, No. 33865, slip op. (Ga. Sup. Ct., Jan. 24, 1979). 27. Godfrey v. State, No. 34256, slip op. (Ga. Sup. Ct., Feb. 24, 1979). 28. Harris v. State, 237 Ga. 718, 230 S.E.2d 1 (1976); Harris v. Hopper, No. 34567, slip op. (Ga. Sup. Ct. Feb. 27, 1979). 29. Holton v. State, No. 34272, slip op. (Ga. Sup. Ct., March 6, 1979). 88a APPENDIX V CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS United States Constitution Fourth Amendment “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Fifth Amendment “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” Sixth Amendment “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the wit nesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtain ing witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” 89a Eighth Amendment “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments in flicted.” Fourteenth Amendment: Section 1 “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Georgia Code Annotated § 26-1101 Murder “ (a) A person commits murder when he unlawfully and with malice aforethought, either express or implied, causes the death of another human being. Express malice is that deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature, which is manifested by external circumstances capable of proof. Malice shall be implied where no considerable provocation appears, and where all the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart. “ (b) A person also commits the crime of murder when in the commission of a felony he causes the death of another human being, irrespective of malice. “ (c) A person convicted of murder shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for life.” 90a § 26-1311 Kidnapping “ (a) A person commits kidnapping when he abducts or steals away any person without lawful authority or warrant and holds such person against his will. “ (b) A person over the age of 17 commits kidnap ping when he forcibly, maliciously, or fraudulently leads, takes, or carries away, or decoys or entices away, any child under the age of 16 years against the will of the child’s parents or other person having lawful custody. “A person convicted of kidnapping shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years: Provided that a person convicted of kidnapping for ransom shall be punished by life imprisonment or by death; and Provided, further, that if the person kidnapped shall have received bodily injury, the person convicted shall be punished by life imprisonment or by death.” § 26-1901 Robbery “A person commits robbery when, with intent to commit theft, he takes property of another from the person or the immediate presence of another (a) by use of force; or (b) by intimidation, by the use of threat or coercion, or by placing such person in fear of immediate serious bodily injury to himself or to another; or (c) by sudden snatching. A person convicted of robbery shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years.” § 27-2503 Presentence hearing in felony cases “ (a) Except in cases in which the death penalty may be imposed, upon the return of a verdict o f ‘guilty’ by the jury in any felony case, the judge shall dismiss the jury and shall conduct a presentence hearing at which the only issue shall be the determination of punishment to be imposed. In such hearing the judge shall hear additional 91a evidence in extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation of punishment, including the record of any prior criminal convictions and pleas of guilty or pleas of nolo contendere of the defendant, or the absence of any prior conviction and pleas: Provided, however, that only such evidence in aggravation as the State has made known to the defendant prior to his trial shall be admissible. The judge shall also hear argument by the defendant or his counsel and the prosecuting attorney, as provided by law, regarding the punishment to be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall open and the defendant shall conclude the argument. In cases in which the death penalty may be imposed, the judge when sitting without a jury shall follow the addi tional procedure provided in section 27-2534.1. Upon the conclusion of the evidence and arguments the judge shall impose the sentence or shall recess the trial for the purpose of taking the sentence to be imposed under advisement. The judge shall fix a sentence within the limits prescribed by law. If the trial court is reversed on appeal because of error only in the presentence hearing, the new trial which may be ordered shall apply only to the issue of punish ment. “ (b) In all cases in which the death penalty may be imposed and which are tried by a jury, upon a return of a verdict of guilty by the jury, the court shall resume the trial and conduct a presentence hearing before the jury. Such hearing shall be conducted in the same manner as presentence hearings conducted before the judge as pro vided in subsection (a) of this section. Upon the con clusion of the evidence and arguments, the judge shall give the jury appropriate instructions, and the jury shall retire to determine whether any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, as defined in section 27-2534.1, exist and whether to recommend mercy for the defendant. Upon the findings of the jury, the judge shall fix a sentence within the limits prescribed by law.” 92a § 27-2514 Sentence of death; copy for penitentiary superintendent. Time and mode of conveying prisoner to penitentiary. Expenses “Upon a verdict or judgment of death made by a jury or a judge, it shall be the duty of the presiding judge to sentence such convicted person to death and to make such sentence in writing, which shall be filed with the papers in the case against such convicted person, and a certified copy thereof shall be sent by the clerk of the court in which said sentence is pronounced to the superintendent of the State penitentiary, not less than 10 days prior to the time fixed in the sentence of the court for the execution of the same; and in all cases it shall be the duty of the sheriff of the county in which such convicted person is so sentenced, together with one deputy or more, if in his judgment it is necessary, and provided that in all cases the number of guards shall be approved by the trial judge, or if he is not available, by the ordinary of said county in which such prisoner is sentenced, to convey such convicted person to said penitentiary, not more than 20 days nor less than two days prior to the time fixed in the judgment for the execution of such condemned person, unless otherwise directed by the Governor, or unless a stay of execution has been caused by appeal, granting of a new trial, or other order of a court of competent jurisdiction, and the expense for transporting of said person to the penitentiary for the purpose of electrocution shall be paid by the ordinary of the county wherein the conviction was had, or the board of county commissioners, the county commissioner, or other person or persons having charge of the county funds, out of any funds on hand in the treasury7 of such county. § 27-2534.1 Mitigating and aggravating circum stances; death penalty “(a) The death penalty may be imposed for the offenses of aircraft hijacking or treason, in any case. 93a “ (b) In all cases of other offenses for which the death penalty may be authorized, the judge shall consider, or he shall include in his instructions to the jury for it to consider, any mitigating circumstances or aggravating circumstances otherwise authorized by law and any of the following statutory aggravating circumstances which may be supported by the evidence: “ (1) The offense of murder, rape, armed rob bery, or kidnapping was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony, or the offense of murder was committed by a person who has a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions. “ (2) The offense of murder, rape, armed rob bery, or kidnapping was committed while the offend er was engaged in the commission of another capital felony, or aggravated battery, or the offense of mur der was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of burglary or arson in the first degree. “ (3) The offender by his act of murder, armed robbery, or kidnapping knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person in a public place by means of a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person. “ (4) The offender committed the offense of murder for himself or another, for the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value. “ (5) The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, district attorney or solicitor or former district attorney or solicitor during or because of the exercise of his official duty. 94a “ (6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or committed murder as an agent or employee of another person. “ (7) The offense of murder, rape, armed rob bery, or kidnapping was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim. “ (8) The offense of murder was committed against any peace officer, corrections employee or fireman while engaged in the performance of his official duties. “ (9) The offense of murder was committed by a person in, or who has escaped from, the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful con finement. “ (10) The murder was committed for the pur pose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful con finement, of himself or another. “ (c) The statutory instructions as determined by the trial judge to be warranted by the evidence shall be given in charge and in writing to the jury for its deliberation. The jury, if its verdict be a recommendation of death, shall designate in writing, signed by the foreman of the jury, the aggravating circumstance or circumstances which it found beyond a reasonable doubt. In non-jury cases the judge shall make such designation. Except in cases of treason or aircraft hijacking, unless at least one of the statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in section 27-2534.1(b) is so found, the death penalty shall not be imposed.” 95a § 27-2537 Review of death sentences “ (a) Whenever the death penalty is imposed, and upon the judgment becoming final in the trial court, the sentence shall be reviewed on the record by the Supreme Court of Georgia. The clerk of the trial court, within 10 days after receiving the transcript, shall transmit the entire record and transcript to the Supreme Court of Georgia together with a notice prepared by the clerk and a report prepared by the trial judge. The notice shall set forth the title and docket number of the case, the name of the defendant and the name and address of his attorney, a narrative statement of the judgment, the offense, and the punishment prescribed. The report shall be in the form of a standard questionnaire prepared and supplied by the Supreme Court of Georgia. “ (b) The Supreme Court of Georgia shall consider the punishment as well as any errors enumerated by way of appeal. “ (c) With regard to the sentence, the court shall determine: “ (1) Whether the sentence of death was im posed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, and “(2) Whether, in cases other than treason or aircraft hijacking, the evidence supports the jury’s or judge’s finding of a statutory aggravating circum stance as enumerated in section 27-2534.1(b), and “ (3) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. “ (d) Both the defendant and the State shall have the right to submit briefs within the time provided by the court, and to present oral argument to the court. 96a “ (e) The court shall include in its decision a reference to those similar cases which it took into consideration. In addition to its authority regarding correction of errors, the court, with regard to review of death sentences, shall be authorized to: “ (1) Affirm the sentence of death; or “ (2) Set the sentence aside and remand the case for resentencing by the trial judge based on the record and argument of counsel. The records of those similar cases referred to by the Supreme Court of Georgia in its decision, and the extracts prepared as hereinafter provided for, shall be provided to the resentencing judge for his consideration. “ (f) There shall be an Assistant to the Supreme Court, who shall be an attorney appointed by the Chief Justice of Georgia and who shall serve at the pleasure of the court. The court shall accumulate the records of all capital felony cases in which sentence was imposed after January 1, 1970, or such earlier date as the court may deem appropriate. The Assistant shall provide the court with whatever extracted information it desires with respect thereto, including but not limited to a synopsis or brief of the facts in the record concerning the crime and the defendant. “ (g) The court shall be authorized to employ an appropriate staff and such methods to compile such data as are deemed by the Chief Justice to be appropriate and relevant to the statutory questions concerning the validity of the sentence. “ (h) The office of the Assistant shall be attached to the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia for administrative purposes. “ (i) The sentence review shall be in addition to direct appeal, if taken, and the review and appeal 97a shall be consolidated for consideration. The court shall render its decision on legal errors enumerated, the factual substantiation of the verdict, and the validity of the sentence.” Rules of the Supreme Court of Georgia Rule 34. (Codified at Ga. Code Ann. §24-4534) (a) Any breach of one or more of these rules, whether intentionally or by inexcusable negligence, will subject the offender to be dealt with for contempt or by revocation of the privilege of practicing before this court. ( b ) The court considers it the duty of counsel for the appellee as well as the appellant to timely comply with these rules.