Morgan v. Georgia Appendices to Petition for Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Georgia
Public Court Documents
March 24, 1979
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IN THE
&upmttr Court of tljr Imtrfc States
October Term, 1978
No. 78-6140
(A-697)
ALPHONSO MORGAN,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF GEORGIA,
Respondent.
APPENDICES TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA
F rederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr.,
One Chase Manhattan Plaza,
New York, N.Y. 10005
Counsel for Petitioner
Of Counsel:
J ohn H. P ickering,
1666 K Street N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20006
Thomas J. D ougherty,
M ark P. Schnapp,
Catherine M. R aymond,
F rancis P. Barron,
Cravath, Swaine & Moore,
One Chase Manhattan Plaza,
New York, N.Y. 10005
March 24, 1979
CONTENTS OF APPENDICES
Appendix Description Page
A Affidavit of Alphonso Morgan in Sup
port of His Motion to Proceed in
Forma Pauperis.................................. la
B Affidavit of Alphonso Morgan Regard
ing Timeliness of His Petition and
the State’s Denial of Counsel............. 3a
C Order of Mr. Justice Powell Staying
Petitioner’s Execution Pending Final
Disposition of His Petition for Cer
tiorari................................ 6a
D Correspondence Between the Clerk of
this Court and Petitioner’s Counsel
Letter of Petitioner’s Counsel to
the Clerk of this Court Request
ing Additional Time to Submit
the Substitute Petition................ 7a
Letter from the Clerk of this Court
to Petitioner’s Counsel Inform
ing Him that Additional Time
Had Been Granted to and In
cluding March 24, 1979....... 10a
E Opinions of the Majority and the Three
Dissenting Members of the Supreme
Court of Georgia in the Court Below
Majority.......................................... 11a
Dissent.......................... ................. 16a
F Transcript of the Trial Court’s Instruc
tions to the Jury and the Jury’s
Determinations
Instructions Prior to the Jury’s De
liberations on Guilt or In
nocence ....................................... 20a
The Jury’s Verdict.......................... 29a
ii
Appendix Description Page
Instructions Prior to the Jury’s De
liberations on Sentence........... . 30a
The Jury’s Sentence ........................ 33a
G Indictment of Petitioner, Jose High,
and Judson Ruffin, upon which the
Jury Recorded Its Verdict and Sen
tence ....................... 35a
H Order of the Trial Court Sentencing
Petitioner................................... 38a
I Petitioner’s Pro Se Notice of Appeal
Reconstructed Version................... 40a
Copy of Original Document.......... 41a
J Petitioner’s Pro Se Motion for Leave to
Proceed in Forma Pauperis, Request
for Appointment of Counsel, and
Certificate of Service
Reconstructed Version.... ............ 42a
Copy of Original Document.......... 44a
K Petitioner’s Attempts to Secure a Tran
script of the Proceedings at the Trial
Petition for Copy of Records
Reconstructed Version.... . 46a
Copy of Original Document.... 48a
Letter to the Clerk of the Trial
Court Requesting Transcript
Reconstructed Version ............ 50a
Copy of Original Document.... 51a
Letter from Presiding Judge to the
Prosecutor, with Copy Directed
to Petitioner...... .......................... 52a
L First Letter to Petitioner from the
Georgia Criminal Justice Council, an
Agency of the State, Advising Him
that It Cannot Represent Him........... 53a
Ill
M Letter to the Clerk of the Supreme
Court of Georgia from Petitioner In
quiring as to the Status of His Case,
and Notifying the Court that He Is
Appendix Description Page
Effectively Without Counsel
Reconstructed Version .................. 54a
Copy of Original Document 56a
N Letter from the Clerk of the Supreme
Court of Georgia to Petitioner’s Ap
pointed Counsel Informing Him that
He Must File a Brief on Behalf of
Petitioner Within Two Weeks, or
Risk Being Held in Contempt of
Court................................................... 59a
O State’s Brief on the Adequacy of the
Jury Instructions, Requested by the
Supreme Court of Georgia During
Oral Argument at which Only the
State Was Present.............................. 60a
P Second Letter from the Georgia Crimi
nal Justice Council, an Agency of the
State, to Petitioner Acknowledging
His Letter Concerning His Counsel’s
Failure to Communicate With Him,
and Advising Him that It Cannot
Represent Him................................... 64a
Q Letter from Judge Who Presided at
Trial to Petitioner Stating that Peti
tioner Has No Need for Additional
Counsel........................ 65a
R Trial Judge’s Order Denying Petitioner
a Copy of the Transcript of the Pro
ceedings at His Trial on the Ground
that His Counsel Already Has His
Papers..... ................ 66a
IV
Appendix Description
S Trial Judge’s Questionnaire Concerning
the Circumstances of the Petitioner’s
Trial, and the Characteristics of Peti
tioner, Completed Eight Months
after the Trial....................... ..............
T Summary of Capital Cases, Available
to the Supreme Court of Georgia For
Comparison Purposes At The End of
1977, In Which (1) Life Sentences
Were Imposed and (2) The Court’s
Assistant Reported Mitigating Cir
cumstances
Table 1: Cases in Which Youth
was Reported As a Mitigating
Circumstance...............................
Table 2: Cases in Which the Lack
of a Prior Criminal Record was
Reported as a Mitigating Cir
cumstance ...................................
Table 3: Cases in Which the Jury
was Instructed that it Could
Find One or More of The
Statutory Aggravating Circum
stances Charged in Petitioner’s
Case, and Where There Were
Mitigating Factors Reported
(Other Than Youth Or Lack Of
a Prior Criminal Record) ...........
Table 4: Cases Where Mitigating
Factors Other Than Youth Or
Lack Of a Prior Criminal
Record Were Reported..............
U Summary of Death Cases In Which
The Georgia Supreme Court Has Ex
plicitly Ruled On the Adequacy of
Jury Instructions
Explanation of Summary Chart.....
67a
77a
78a
79a
80a
81a
Page
V
Appendix Description Page
Summary Chart................. 82a
Table of Citations In Chart............ 86a
V Constitutional and Statutory Provi
sions, and Rules Involved in this
Petition
Constitutional Amendments.......... 88a
State Statutory Provisions.............. 89a
Rule 34 of Supreme Court of
Georgia........................................... 97a
la APPENDIX A
IN THE
g>itpn>mr (ta r t nf thr Mmtri) States
October Term, 1978
ALPHONSO MORGAN
Petitioner
V5. >■
STATE OF GEORGIA
Respondent
No. 78-6140
PAUPER’S AFFIDAVIT
Alphonso Morgan, being duly sworn, deposes and
says:
1.
I am a citizen of the United States and the petitioner
in the above entitled action.
2.
I desire to prosecute a review of the judgment entered
by the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia, on June 28,
1978, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3), but because of my
poverty, I am unable to pay the costs of such a review.
3.
I believe that I am entitled to the redress I seek by
such a review, and that such a review presents substantial
issues of deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution
of the United States.
The nature of the questions to be presented upon such
a review is as follows:
2a
1.
Whether the charge to the jury in the punishment
phase of the trial makes the infliction of death upon the
petitioner violative of his Fourteenth Amendment right to
a fair trial, equal protection and due process of law.
2.
Whether the imposition and carrying out of the
sentence of death in this case is consonant with this
Court’s holdings in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972), and Gregg v. Georgia, U.S. , 49 L.ED. 2d.
859, (1976) and whether such violates petitioner’s
Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair trial, equal protec
tion and due process of law, as well as the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punish
ment.
I contend that the Supreme Court of the State of
Georgia erred in upholding my conviction and sentence.
WHEREFORE, afflant prays that he may have leave
to proceed in this Court on Petition for Writ of Certiorari
in forma pauperis.
/ s / Alphonso Morgan
Alphonso Morgan
Petitioner
Sworn to and subscribed
before me this 9th day of
February, 1979.
/ s / Jo h n L. W oods
Notary Public
JOHN L. WOODS
Notary Public, Georgia State at Large
My Commission Expires May 9, 1980
3a APPENDIX B
IN THE
&ujirpmp Gkmrt of % InitPiH States
October Term, 1978
No. 78-6140
(A-697)
ALPHONSO MORGAN,
Petitioner,
GEORGIA,
Respondent.
AFFIDAVIT OF ALPHONSO MORGAN REGARDING
TIM ELINESS OF H IS PETITION
State of G eorgia,
County of Tatnell,
Alphonso Morgan, being duly sworn, deposes and
says:
1. I am a citizen of the United States and the
petitioner in this case.
2. My petition for certiorari is not on time because
the lawyer appointed by the trial court to take my case
abandoned me after my conviction and sentence had been
4a
affirmed by the Supreme Court of Georgia on June 28,
1978. He did not tell me what I could do to help myself or
how I could get legal help. He just said he was off my
case. I have no money and I am not well educated. I did
not understand how to appeal my case. In addition, it was
hard for me to get information about my case or to get
help because I have been in prison since August 28, 1976,
the day on which I was arrested.
3. I tried to get legal help, but was unsuccessful. I
sent letters to lawyers, but they said they could not help
me because I already had a lawyer. Without a lawyer, I
tried to help myself by sending a handwritten form to the
Federal court in Georgia in August of 1978. I never heard
anything about that until just recently, when I was told
that I had gone to the wrong court.
4. Then, sometime at the end of last January, I got a
paper from the State that said I would be killed on
February 7, 1979. Someone at the prison told me to send
the paper to Millard Farmer, and I did. Mr. Farmer wrote
back to me saying he would try to get the execution put off
and help me to get a lawyer so that I could ask this Court
to review my case. That was the first time any lawyer said
he would help me ask this Court to look at my case.
5. The lawyer appointed by the trial court to
represent me never showed interest in my case. He talked
to me only a few times before the trial and while it was
going on. He did not want to represent me any further
after I was convicted on July 14, 1977. I asked him to
appeal, but he said someone else would do it. I asked him
to get me a transcript of the trial. He said he would, but
never did.
6. On July 22, 1977, without a lawyer, I sent a
handwritten notice to the Superior Court in Richmond
County, saying that I was going to appeal and asking the
Court to appoint a lawyer for me.
5a
7. On August 10, 1977, again without a lawyer, I
wrote out and sent a petition for a copy of the record in
my case so that I could appeal. Judge Fulcher, who was
the Judge at my trial, sent my petition to Richard Allen,
the District Attorney. (Judge Fulcher sent me a copy of
his letter to Mr. Allen. He did not send a copy to the
lawyer who had represented me at trial.) I did not hear
anything, so I wrote a letter to the Clerk of the Superior
Court in Richmond on October 5, 1977, asking for a copy
of the record. I told her that my lawyer had not talked to
me since the trial and that I needed the papers so that I
could help myself.
9. On December 19, 1977, I wrote a letter to the
Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia telling her that I
had tried to get the transcript from my lawyer and that I
had heard nothing about my case. The Clerk told me that
she had received my letter and told me that my lawyer’s
brief would be studied carefully by the Supreme Court of
Georgia. Much later, I found out that my lawyer had not
even filed a brief and that he had to be asked by the State
to file one.
10. On April 21, 1978, over eight months after the
date that I asked for a copy of the record in my case,
Judge Fulcher said he would not give them to me because
my lawyer already had the papers.
/ s / Alphonso Morgan
Petitioner
Sworn to and sub
scribed before me this
38th day of March
1979.
/ s / M illard C. F armer, Jr.
N.P. State at large
6a APPENDIX C
Supreme Court of tlje Mmteb
No. A-697 (78-6140)
ALPHONSO MORGAN,
v.
Petitioner,
GEORGIA
O R D E R
Upon Consideration of the application of counsel
for the petitioner,
It Is Ordered that the execution and enforcement of
the sentence of death imposed upon the petitioner is
hereby stayed pending the disposition by this Court of a
petition for a writ of certiorari filed February 2, 1979.
Should the petition for a writ of certiorari be denied, this
stay is to terminate automatically. In the event the
petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, this stay is to
continue pending the issuance of the mandate of this
Court.
Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States
A true copy M ichael R odak, Jr.
Clerk of the Supreme Court of the
United States
By /s / F rancis J. Lorson
Deputy
Dated this 2nd day of
February, 1979.
7a APPENDIX D
February 21, 1979
Morgan v. Georgia
No. 78-6140 (A-697)
D ear Mr. R odak:
I am now appearing as counsel, pro bono publico, for
Alphonso Morgan, who is imprisoned in Georgia under
sentence of death.
On January 30, 1979, it came to the attention of Mr.
Millard Farmer, of Team Defense Project, Inc., that Mr.
Morgan was scheduled to be executed on February 7,
1979. Mr. Farmer also discovered that counsel who had
been appointed to represent Mr. Morgan at his trial and
appeal in Georgia (i) had not filed a certiorari petition,
and (ii) had not communicated with his client since the
decision by the Supreme Court of Georgia affirming
petitioner’s conviction and sentence of death.
Mr. Farmer was informed by Mr. Lorson of your
office that he could not apply for a stay of execution
without first filing a Petition for Certiorari. Accordingly,
without benefit of the full record, or an opportunity to
adequately research the issues, Mr. Farmer filed a pro
forma Petition on February 2, 1979, indicating that it was
to be followed by a petition which would adequately
present the important issues for the Court’s review.
On February 2, 1979, Mr. Justice Powell signed an
Order staying the execution of sentence.
Since my agreement to be substituted as counsel for
petitioner in all further proceedings in this Court, I have
attempted to assemble the complete record. While at the
8a
end of last week, I had obtained enough of the record to
be able to commence the research, l still do not have all
the relevant papers. As of this date I still have not
received necessary papers from appointed Georgia coun
sel, and still do not have the relevant court records in the
cases involving Morgan’s alleged codefendants.
Considering the seriousness of the matter, my associ
ate, Francis P. Barron, last week telephoned John W.
Dunsmore, Jr., the Assistant Attorney General of the State
of Georgia responsible for representing the State in this
matter, to discuss his position on the timing for the
submission of our Petition for Certiorari, i.e., the replace
ment for the petition hastily submitted, without benefit of
record or research. Mr. Dunsmore said that he had no
objection to our taking the time that is necessary in light of
the serious nature of the case, that he wanted to be certain
that the entire matter was adequately briefed, and that his
only concern was that the State would have its usual 30
days to respond after the submission of our Petition.
Having now just had an opportunity to focus on the
relevant material and to begin the necessary legal re
search, it seems to me that a reasonable target for filing
the Petition would be April 23, i.e., 60 days from the date
of this letter. Mr. Barron spoke to Mr. Dunsmore by
telephone today and he indicated that he would prefer
that I limit myself to 30 days. However, in light of the
seriousness of the matter, the unavailability of the record
until now (and the need to obtain still other necessary
documents), I represent that such a short time to prepare
might result in an injustice.
I would appreciate it if you would advise me whether
the proposed April 23 date is satisfactory. I recognize, of
course, that nothing was filed by Mr. Morgan within the
time required by the rules. However, considering Georgia
9a
counsel’s abandonment of petitioner, and, in particular,
considering that the case involves a death sentence, I
believe that the arrangement which I have suggested is
necessary in the interest of justice.
Sincerely yours,
/s / F rederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr.
Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr.
Hon. M ichael R odak,
Office of the Clerk,
Supreme Court of the United States,
Washington, D.C. 20543
Attention of Hon. Francis J. Lorson
By Hand
3N
Copy to John W. Dunsmore, Jr., Esq.,
132 State Judicial Building,
40 Capital Square, S.W.,
Atlanta, Georgia 30334.
Express Mail
10a
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20543
February 26, 1979
Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Esquire
Cravath, Swaine & Moore
One Chase Manhattan Plaza
New York, New York 10005
Re: Alphonso Morgan v. Georgia
No. 78-6140
Dear Mr. Schwarz:
Your request of February 21, 1979 for an extension of
time in which to file a supplement to the petition has been
granted, and the time to file such a supplement has been
extended to and including only March 24, 1979. No
further extension of time will be entertained.
The time for the Attorney General to respond to the
petition and the supplement thereto has been extended to
and including April 23, 1979.
Very truly yours,
M ichael R odak, J r., Clerk
By /s / F rancis J. Lorson
Francis J. Lorson
Deputy Clerk
th
cc: Millard C. Farmer, Jr., Esquire
Suite 831, 15 Peachtree Street, N.E.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
John W. Dunsmore, Jr., Esquire
132 State Judicial Building
40 Capital Square, S.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30334
11a APPENDIX E
In the
SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA
D ecided: June 28, 1978
Morgan v . The State
33046
Nicholson & Nicholson, Chris G. Nicholson, for appel
lant.
Alphonso Morgan, pro se.
Richard E. Allen, District Attorney, Arthur K. Bolton,
Attorney General, John W. Dunsmore, Jr., Assistant A t
torney General, for appellee.
Hall, Justice.
This is the direct appeal of the conviction and death
sentence of Alphonso Morgan, who was convicted in
Richmond County Superior Court for the armed robbery,
kidnapping and murder of James Gray. Appellant was
given a twenty year sentence for kidnapping, a concurrent
life sentence for armed robbery, and the death penalty for
murder.
I. SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE
The State presented evidence from which the jury
was entitled to find the following:
On August 22, 1976, at 11:30 P.M., the victim James
Gray was driving to his job as night superintendent at the
Graniteville Company in South Carolina. When he
stopped at an intersection, appellant Morgan, Jose High
and Judson Ruffin approached Gray’s truck. One of the
co-indictees got into the truck with Gray, and, pointing a
sawed-off shotgun at him, forced the victim to follow
Ruffin’s automobile. Somewhere in Georgia, the victim
was taken out of his truck and put into the trunk of
Ruffin’s automobile. The co-indictees then drove their
victim to the south end of Bush Field in Richmond
County.
12a
Morgan and his companions pulled Gray out of the
truck, took ninety dollars from his wallet and told him that
they were going to kill him. They took off the victim’s
shirt and tied it around his head like a blindfold. While
Gray was begging for his life, Morgan pulled the sawed-
off shotgun to his face and pulled the trigger.
II. ENUMERATIONS OF ERROR
1. In his first enumeration of error, appellant com
plains that the trial court erred in failing to have a hearing
on a motion to suppress the oral confession of appellant,
and in allowing the confession to be admitted into evi
dence.
The trial transcript shows that a Jackson v. Denno
hearing was held to determine the admissibility of appel
lant’s confession. The State called the arresting officer
who testified that appellant was given the Miranda warn
ings at the time of arrest. Before any more testimony was
heard, the jury was excused and the judge heard evidence
on the voluntariness of statements made by appellant to
the arresting officer. Also considered at that time was the
legality of appellant’s arrest. At the close of the hearing
the judge ruled to allow introduction of the confession.
This constituted a ruling that appellant’s arrest was legal
as well as a decision that the confession was freely and
voluntarily given.
Appellant contends that his warrantless arrest was
illegal because there was no probable cause to support it,
and that his subsequent confession should have been
excluded from the jury’s consideration on the basis that it
was the product of an illegal arrest. See: Brown v. Illinois,
422 U.S. 590 (1975); Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U. S. 471 ( 1963).
At the time of appellant’s arrest, police authorities
were involved in the investigation of a number of homi-
13a
rides, rapes, kidnappings and robberies in which the
modus operandi was similar. The victims were placed in
the trunk of a car and taken to an isolated area, the
victims were blindfolded and a shotgun was used to
threaten or kill the victims.
Jose High was arrested on Friday evening, August 27,
1976, in connection with the investigation. He confessed
to numerous crimes, including the murder of James Gray.
High expressly named appellant as being responsible for
Gray’s murder. This information was learned in the early
morning hours of August 28, 1976. Police officers, fearing
that appellant might flee if he learned of High’s arrest,
immediately went to appellant’s address as furnished to
them by High, and placed appellant under arrest.
In view of the circumstances, we believe that appel
lant’s arrest falls within the purview of Code Ann. §27-207
which authorizes a warrantless arrest of one where it
appears that there is likely to be a failure of justice for
want of an officer to issue a warrant. There appears to be
no question that the police, at the time of arrest, had
probable cause to arrest appellant. As the result of High’s
confession, which incriminating statements were consistent
with information the officers had gained from independent
investigation, the officers had reasonably trustworthy in
formation to conclude that appellant was involved in the
murder of James Gray.
“Whether [an] arrest [is] constitutionally valid de
pends . . . upon whether, at the moment the arrest was
made, the officers had probable cause to make
it—whether at that moment the facts and circumstances
within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a pru
dent man in believing that the petitioner had committed
or was committing an offense.” Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89,
91 (1964) Brinegar v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1949).
14a
Appellant attaches to his brief an order of the Superi
or Court of Richmond County sustaining a motion to
suppress filed on behalf of Jose High, appellant’s co
indictee, challenging High’s arrest. This ruling was re
versed on appeal to the Court of Appeals in State v. High,
Ga. App. (Case No. 55212, Decided April 6,
1978), where the court found High’s arrest to be based on
probable cause at the time it was made and to be legal
even though made without a warrant. Therefore, no
Wong Sun v. United States, supra, issue is presented by
High’s confession implicating appellant.
We conclude that the record clearly establishes that
police officers had probable cause to arrest appellant, and
that due to exigent circumstances there was a likelihood
that there would have been a failure of justice had the
police delayed in making the arrest of appellant. Appel
lant’s subsequent confession was admissible and it was not
error for the trial court to so rule.
2. There was sufficient evidence to sustain the
verdict. The general grounds present no basis for reversal.
Cunningham v. State, 235 Ga. 126 (218 SE2d 854)
(1975); Fleming v. State, 240 Ga. 142 (240 SE2d 37)
(1977).
3. We find no error in the trial court’s charge to the
jury relating to the sentencing phase of the trial. Spivey v.
State, Ga. ( SE2d ) (No. 33135,
decided June 8, 1978).
III. DEATH SENTENCE REVIEW
4. After reviewing the entire record and transcript
and considering the foregoing enumerations of error, we
conclude that the sentence of death imposed on Alphonso
Morgan was not imposed under the influence of passion,
prejudice or any other arbitrary factor.
15a
5. The jury found the following statutory aggravating
circumstance: “The offense of murder was outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved
torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the
victim.” Code Ann. §27-2534.1(b)(7). This aggravating
circumstance is supported by the evidence.
6. In reviewing the death penalty in this case, we
have considered the cases appealed to this court since
January 1, 1970, in which a death or life sentence was
imposed for murder, and we find the similar cases listed in
the Appendix support affirmance of the death penalty.
Alphonso Morgan’s sentence to death for murder is
not excessive or disproportionate considering both the
crime and the defendant. Code Ann. 27-2537(c)(3).
The verdict is factually substantiated.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except
Hill, Bowles and Marshall, J.J., who dissent to Division 3
and the judgment.
APPENDIX
M organ v . The State
33046
House v. State, 232 Ga. 140 (205 SE2d 217)( 1974);
McCorquodale v. State, 233 Ga. 369 (211 SE2d
577)(1974); Floyd v. State, 233 Ga. 280 (210 SE2d
810)( 1974); Jarrell v. State, 234 Ga. 410 (216 SE2d
258)( 1975); Berryhill v. State, 235 Ga. 549 (221 SE2d
185)( 1975); Birt v. State, 236 Ga. 815 (225 SE2d
248)(1976); Gibson v. State, 236 Ga. 874 (226 SE2d
63)( 1976); Harris v. State, 237 Ga. 718 (230 SE2d
1)(1976); Young v. State, 237 Ga. 852 (230 SE2d
287)(1976); Dix v. State, 238 Ga. 209 (232 SE2d
47)( 1976); Blake v. State, 239 Ga. 292 (236 SE2d
637)( 1977); Young v. State, 239 Ga. 53 (236 SE2d
1)( 1977); Stanley v. State, 240 Ga. 341 (241 SE2d
173)(1977); Thomas v. State, 240 Ga. 393 (242 SE2d
1)(1977).
16a
In the
SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA
M organ v . State
33046
Bowles, J., dissenting
I cannot agree with the majority that the trial court’s
charge to the jury in the sentencing phase was sufficient
under the rule we recently set forth in Spivey v. State,
Ga. ( SE2d ) (Case No. 33135,
decided June 8, 1978), and as first formulated in Fleming
v. State, 240 Ga. 142, 147 (240 SE2d 37) (1977).
In Fleming the following statements were given in the
charge to the jury during the sentencing phase, “ [In] the
event your verdict is life imprisonment the punishment the
Defendant would receive would be imprisonment in the
penitentiary for life. And, of course, if you found that
there was evidence in extenuation or mitigation then you
could fix his punishment at life imprisonment. . . . Now,
if you do not find that there was one or more aggravating
circumstances, which I’ve just read to you, then the form
of your verdict would be, ‘We, the Jury, fix punishment at
life.’ Now whatever your verdict is—or if you found that
there was evidence in extenuation or mitigation, you could
fix punishment at life.”
We reversed Fleming’s death sentence because of a
finding that the trial court failed to make clear to the jury
that they could recommend a life sentence even if they
found the existence of a statutory aggravating circum
stance.
In Spivey v. State, supra, we approved the following
charge as making clear to the jury that it could recom
mend a life sentence even though it found a statutory
aggravating circumstance: “It is now your duty to deter
17a
mine, within the limits prescribed by law, the penalty that
shall be imposed as punishment for that offense. In
reaching this determination you are authorized to consider
all of the evidence received by you in open court, and both
phases of the trial. You are authorized to consider all
facts and circumstances of the case. . . You must first
consider and find beyond a reasonable doubt that the . . .
murder happen [ ed ] while in the perpetration of another
capital felony . . . If you find that to exist, then you shall so
indicate in writing, then you will determine whether or not
you will impose the death penalty, and your verdict then
will be one of two, ‘We the jury recommend the death
penalty’ or ‘We the jury do not recommend the death
penalty.’ This is a matter for your determination, ladies
and gentlemen.”
The majority has now gone so far as to approve the
following charge given during the sentencing phase of
Morgan’s trial:
“Now, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you
having found the defendant guilty of murder, and
armed robbery, and kidnapping, the Court will im
pose sentence with reference to the armed robbery
and kidnapping, but you having found the defendant
guilty of the offense of murder, it is now your duty to
determine within the limits prescribed by law the
penalty that shall be imposed as punishment for that
offense. In reaching this determination, you should
consider all of the evidence received by you in open
court in both phases of the trial. You should consider
all of the facts and circumstances of the case, in
cluding any mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
“Under the laws of this State, every person guilty
of the offense of murder shall be punished by death
by electrocution, or by life in the penitentiary. In the
event that your verdict is life imprisonment, the
18a
punishment the defendant would receive would be
imprisonment in the penitentiary for and during the
remainder of his natural life. If that be your verdict,
you would add, following the verdict already found
by you, an additional verdict as follows: We fix his
punishment as life imprisonment for the offense of
murder, to be served concurrently or consecutively
with any other sentence, as you may determine. You
may, however, if you see fit and if such be your
verdict, fix his punishment as death, which would
require a sentence by the Court of death by elec
trocution. If that be your verdict, you would add
following the verdict already found by you an addi
tional verdict as follows: We recommend his punish
ment as death for the offense of murder.
“I charge you that before you would be author
ized to find a verdict fixing a sentence of death by
electrocution for the offense of murder, you must find
upon the evidence statutory aggravating circumstance
or circumstances sufficient to authorize such penalty.”
To my mind, the approval of this charge is to
completely erase the standard for review we have set for
ourselves in Fleming and Spivey, and to ignore the spirit of
the law as formulated by the legislature in Code Ann.
§ 27-2534.1. In the instant case I find no suggestion given
to the jury that they may nevertheless show mercy to the
defendant even though they find a statutory aggravating
circumstance.
I cannot with clear conscience affirm the death sen
tence in this case when the charge here is considered in the
light of Fleming v. State, supra. Therefore, I respectfully
dissent to the judgment of affirmance in the punishment
phase of the majority opinion.
I am authorized to say that Justice Marshall and
Justice Hill concur in this dissent.
19a APPENDIX F
In The Superior Court of
R ichmond County, G eorgia
Second D ivision
State of G eorgia
v s — >
Alphonso M organ
MURDER, ARMED ROBBERY
and KIDNAPPING
Richmond County Courthouse
Augusta, Georgia
July 13-14, 1977
Proceedings of the trial of the above captioned case
held at the above stated time and place before the
Honorable Edwin D. Fulcher, Judge of Superior Court,
Augusta Judicial Circuit, and a jury.
APPEARANCES:
Mr. R ichard E. Allen, District Attorney, of Augusta,
Georgia, represented the State.
Mr. Chris G. N icholson, Attorney at Law, of Augusta,
Georgia, represented the Defendant.
L o is W. Story
Official Reporter
Certificate No. A-186
20a
CHARGE OF THE COURT
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the grand jury of
this county has returned a bill of indictment against the
defendant, Alphonso Morgan, charging him with the
offense of murder, for that the said accused in the County
of Richmond and State of Georgia on the 22nd day of
August, 1976, unlawfully did and with malice afore
thought kill one James Gray, a human being, by shooting
the said James Gray with a certain shotgun; and with the
further offense of armed robbery, for that the said accused
in the County of Richmond and State of Georgia on the
22nd day of August, 1976, with the intent to commit theft,
took from the person of James Gray the following proper
ty, to-wit, ninety dollars United States currency, of the
property of James Gray, of the value of ninety dollars, by
use of a shotgun, the same being a dangerous weapon—an
offensive weapon; and with the further offense of kidnap
ping, for that the said accused in the County of Richmond
and State of Georgia on the 22nd day of August, 1976, did
abduct James Gray, a person, without lawful authority,
and held such person against his will, contrary to the laws
of the State, the good order, peace, and dignity thereof.
Now, to this indictment, the defendant has entered a
plea of not guilty, and that makes up the issue which you
are now called upon to well and truly try.
Every person is presumed innocent until proved
guilty. No person shall be convicted of a crime unless
each element of such crime is proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. The defendant enters into the trial of this case with
the presumption of innocence in his favor, and that
presumption remains with him throughout the trial and
until his guilt is established by the evidence beyond all
reasonable doubt. The indictment is not evidence. It is
the charge of the State of Georgia against the defendant
made through the grand jury of Richmond County. The
21a
burden is upon the State to prove every material allega
tion in this bill of indictment against this defendant to a
moral and reasonable certainty and beyond all reasonable
doubt.
A reasonable doubt means just what it says. It is a
doubt of a fair-minded, impartial juror, honestly seeking
the truth. It is not a fanciful, arbitrary, or capricious
doubt; but is a doubt based upon a reason such as a
reasonable man would have and would act upon or
decline to act upon in a matter of importance to himself,
and which arises from a consideration of the evidence or
from the lack of evidence or from a conflict in the
evidence. If after considering all of the evidence, facts,
and circumstances of the case your minds are wavering,
unsettled, and unsatisfied, then that is a reasonable doubt
under the law. If such a doubt rests upon your minds, you
should give the defendant the benefit of that doubt and
acquit him. If no such doubt rests upon your minds and
you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
is guilty as charged, it would be equally your duty to
return a verdict of guilty. Moral and reasonable certainty
is all that can be expected in any legal investigation.
The true question in all criminal cases is not whether
it be possible that the conclusion to which the evidence
points may be false, but is whether the evidence is
sufficient to and does satisfy your minds and consciences
to a moral and reasonable certainty and beyond all
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty as charged.
The term “felony” as used in these instructions means
a crime punishable by death or by imprisonment for life or
by imprisonment for more than twelve months. A crime is
a violation of a statute of this State in which there shall be
a union of joint operation of act and intention. A person
will not be presumed to act with criminal intention, but
you may find such intention upon consideration of the
22a
words, conduct, demeanor, motive, and all other circum
stances connected with the act for which the defendant is
prosecuted.
I charge you that a person commits murder when he
unlawfully and with malice aforethought, either express or
implied, causes the death of another human being. Ex
press malice is that deliberate intention, unlawfully, to
take away the life of a fellow creature, which is manifested
by external circumstances capable of proof. Malice shall
be implied where no considerable provocation appears
and where all the circumstances of the killing show an
abandoned and malignant heart.
I charge you that a person commits armed robbery
when with intent to commit theft he takes property of
another from the person or the immediate presence of
another by use of an offensive weapon. The term “theft”
as used in these instructions is the taking or appropriating
unlawfully of any property of another with the intention of
depriving him of said property regardless of the manner in
which that property is taken or appropriated.
I charge you that a person commits kidnapping when
he abducts or steals away any person without lawful
authority or warrant and holds such person against his
will.
I charge you that every person concerned in the
commission of a crime is a party thereto and may be
charged with and convicted of commission of the crime. A
person is concerned in the commission of a crime only if
he directly commits the crime; or intentionally aids or
abets in the commission of the crime; or intentionally
advises, encourages, hires, counsels, or procures another to
commit the crime. Any party to a crime who did not
directly commit the crime may be indicted, tried, con
victed, and punished for commission of the crime upon
proof that the crime was committed and that he was a
23a
party thereto, although the person claimed to have directly
committed the crime has not been prosecuted or con
victed, or has been convicted of a different crime or degree
of crime, or is not amenable to justice, or has been
acquitted.
I charge you that a person is not guilty of a crime
except murder if the act upon which the supposed criminal
liability is based is performed under such coercion that the
person reasonably believes that performing the act is the
only way to prevent his imminent death or great bodily
injury.
I charge you that a person commits a conspiracy to
commit a crime when he together with one or more
persons conspires to commit any crime and any one or
more of such persons does an overt act to effect the object
of the conspiracy.
I charge you that when a person’s conduct would
otherwise constitute an attempt to commit a crime it is an
affirmative defense that he abandoned his effort to commit
such crime, or in any other manner performed its commis
sion under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and
complete renunciation of his criminal purpose.
I charge you that a person commits criminal attempt
when with intent to commit a specific crime be performs
any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the
commission of that crime.
I charge you that a confession is a voluntary state
ment made by a person charged with the commission of a
crime, wherein he acknowledges himself to be guilty of the
offense charged. All admissions shall be scanned with
care, and confessions of guilt shall be received with
caution. To make a confession admissible, it must have
been made voluntarily without being induced by another
by the slightest hope of benefit or the remotest fear of
24a
injury by one who was previously warned that he had the
right to remain silent; that anything he might say could
and would be used against him in a court of law; that he
had the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present
while he was being questioned; and if he could not afford
to hire a lawyer, one would be appointed to represent him
before any questioning, if he wished one. It is a question
for you to determine, first, whether a confession has been
made in this case; and, secondly, if made, was it made
voluntarily without being induced by another by the
slightest hope of benefit or the remotest fear of injury;
and, thirdly, if it was made only after the aforesaid
warning. If you find that a confession was made but that
it was not made voluntarily, or that it was induced by
another by the slightest hope of benefit or the most remote
fear of injury, or that it was made without the aforesaid
warning, you should not give it any consideration what
ever, either together with or independent of the other
evidence. A confession alone, uncorroborated by any
other evidence, shall not justify conviction. No definite
rule has been laid down as to how far or in what
particulars a confession must be corroborated. Each case
must stand on its own footing, and you, as honest, upright
jurors diligently seeking the truth, are by law made the
sole judges of whether or not a confession has been made
under these rules of law.
I charge you that direct evidence is that which
immediately points to the question at issue. Indirect or
circumstantial evidence is that which only tends to estab
lish the issue by proof of various facts, sustaining by their
consistency the hypothesis claimed. A strong suspicion of
guilt is not sufficient under the law to convict. To warrant
a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts
shall not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt but
shall exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that
of the guilt of the accused. Where the facts and evidence
25a
and all reasonable deductions therefrom present two
theories, one of guilt and the other consistent with in
nocence, the justice and humanity of the law compel the
acceptance of the theory which is consistent with in
nocence.
You are the judges both of the law and the facts. The
law is given you in these instructions; the facts are given
you in the evidence. To the facts as you find them to be,
you will apply the law as given in these instructions.
In any rulings the Court has made during the trial
and in these instructions, the Court has not intended to
express or intimate any opinion as to the guilt or in
nocence of the defendant. That is for your sole and
exclusive decision. Your verdict is solely for you to
determine and must be agreed to by all twelve of you.
Now, you are about to retire to consider a verdict of
guilty or not guilty. You are not called upon to fix any
punishment. The form of your verdict should be: “We,
the jury, find the defendant guilty as charged,” which
would have the effect of finding him guilty of each of the
three charges contained in the indictment in separate
counts, that of murder, armed robbery, and kidnapping;
or, “We, the jury, find the defendant not guilty,” which
would have the effect of acquitting the defendant of each
and every one of the three charges set forth in the
indictment; or, if you should find the defendant guilty of
some of the charges set forth in the different counts of the
indictment and not guilty of the other charges set forth in
the remaining counts set forth in the indictment, you
would say, “We, the jury, find the defendant guilty of
count one, count two, or count three,” whichever one it
might be, and, “We, the jury, find the defendant not guilty
of the counts on which you find him not guilty.” What
ever your verdict is, have one of your number that you
select as foreman or forelady complete the form of printed
26a
verdict here on the back of the indictment where I have
indicated by the letter “X,” and date it, and sign it as
foreman or forelady, and return it into court.
Now, you may retire now, but do not begin your
deliberations until the indictment is brought out to you by
the bailiff. And, Mrs. Becsi and Mrs. Andrews, if you all
would just stand aside please, and let the other jurors go
to the jury room.
(The jury retired to the jury room.)
(Conference at the bench.)
(Alternate jurors retired to another jury room at
this time.)
The Court: All right, now, are there any ex
ceptions, objections, or omissions which the State
wishes to suggest?
Mr. Allen: None, Your Honor.
The Court: Anything on behalf o f the defend
ant?
M r. N icholson: N o, Your Honor.
The Court: All right, sir.
(Evidence was checked here and along with the
indictment was sent out to the jury.)
The Court: All right, we’ll be in recess until we
hear from the jury.
( Recess.)
(The jury returned to the courtroom.)
The Court: Mr. Foreman, is there some ques
tion which the jury wishes to ask?
The F oreman: Yes, sir, Your Honor. We would
like for you to read the charges back to us on the
armed robbery and the kidnapping charge.
27a
RECHARGE OF THE COURT
A person commits armed robbery when with intent to
commit theft he takes property of another from the person
or the immediate presence of another by use of an
offensive weapon. The term “theft” as used in these
instructions is the taking or appropriating unlawfully of
any property of another with the intention of depriving
him of said property, regardless of the manner in which
said property is taken or appropriated.
A person commits kidnapping when he abducts or
steals away any person without lawful authority or war
rant and holds such person against his will.
The Court: Is that what the jury had in mind?
A J uror: Yes, sir.
The Court: The definition of those charges?
The F oreman: Yes, sir.
The Court: All right, you may retire to further
consider your verdict.
(The jury retired to the jury room.)
(Alternate jurors retired to another jury room.)
The Court: All right, we’ll be in recess until we
hear from the jury.
(Recess.)
(The jury and alternate jurors returned to the
courtroom.)
The Court: Was there some question you had,
Mr. Foreman?
The F oreman: Yes, sir, Your Honor. We’d like
for you to read all the charges on the kidnapping,
including the conspiracy and all parts of it.
The Court: All right, sir.
28a
RECHARGE OF THE COURT
A person commits kidnapping when he abducts or
steals away any person without lawful authority or war
rant and holds such person against his will.
Every person concerned in the commission of a crime
is a party thereto and may be charged with and convicted
of the commission of the crime. A person is concerned in
the commission of a crime only if he directly commits the
crime; or intentionally aids or abets in the commission of
the crime; or intentionally advises, encourages, hires,
counsels, or procures another to commit the crime.
Any party to a crime who did not directly commit the
crime may be indicted, tried, convicted, and punished for
commission of the crime upon proof that the crime was
committed and he was a party thereto, although the
person claimed to have directly committed the crime has
not been prosecuted or convicted, or has been convicted of
a different crime or degree of crime, or is not amenable to
justice, or has been acquitted.
I charge you that a person commits criminal attempt
when with the intent to commit a specific crime he
performs any act which constitutes a substantial step
toward the commission of that crime.
I charge you that when a person’s conduct would
otherwise constitute an attempt to commit a crime, it is an
affirmative defense that he abandoned his effort to commit
such crime, or in any other manner performed its commis
sion under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and
complete renunciation of his criminal purpose.
I charge you that a person commits a conspiracy to
commit a crime when he together with one or more
persons conspires to commit any crime and any one or
more of such persons does an overt act to effect the object
of the conspiracy.
29a
I charge you that a person is not guilty of a
crime—disregard that, that was not included in your
request.
The Court: Does that satisfactorily answer the
questions which the jury had in mind?
The F oreman: I believe it will. Thank you,
Judge.
The Court: All right, you may retire and further
consider your verdict.
(The jury retired to their jury room and the
alternate jurors retired to another jury room.)
( Interval.)
(The jury returned to the courtroom.)
The Court: Mr. Foreman, has the jury reached
a verdict?
The F oreman: We have, Your Honor.
The Court: All right, will you deliver it to the
bailiff, and, Mr. Bailiff, will you deliver it to the clerk,
and, Madam Clerk, will you publish the verdict.
(The clerk published the verdict as follows: We,
the jury, find the defendant guilty as charged. This
14th day of July, 1977. John T. Andrews, Foreman.)
The Court: D o you wish to poll the jury?
Mr. N icholson: N o, sir.
The Court: All right, well, let the verdict be
entered. Now, Mrs. Becsi and Mrs. Andrews, we’ll
excuse you at this time. Thank you very much. (To
counsel) Is there anything which you wish to show in
mitigation or aggravation?
Mr. Allen: Your Honor, the State has no fur
ther evidence. We’ll rely upon the evidence produced
in the first phase of the trial, but we would like to
argue a point.
30a
The Court: All right, sir. All right, is there
anything you wish to present on behalf o f the defend
ant?
Mr. N icholson: N o, Your Honor, except argu
ment.
The Court: all right, you may proceed with the
argument on behalf o f the State.
Mr. Allen: Thank you, Your Honor.
(Mr. Allen argued to the jury on punishment.)
(Mr. Nicholson argued to the jury on punish
ment. )
CHARGE OF THE COURT ON PUNISHMENT
Now, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you having
found the defendant guilty of murder, and armed robbery,
and kidnapping, the Court will impose sentence with
reference to the armed robbery and kidnapping, but you
having found the defendant guilty of the offense of
murder, it is now your duty to determine within the limits
prescribed by law the penalty that shall be imposed as
punishment for that offense. In reaching this determina
tion, you should consider all of the evidence received by
you in open court in both phases of the trial. You should
consider all of the facts and circumstances of the case,
including any mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
Under the laws of this State, every person guilty of
the offense of murder shall be punished by death by
electrocution, or by life in the penitentiary. In the event
that your verdict is life imprisonment, the punishment the
defendant would receive would be imprisonment in the
penitentiary for and during the remainder of his natural
life. If that be your verdict, you would add, following the
verdict already found by you, an additional verdict as
follows: We fix his punishment as life imprisonment for
31a
the offense of murder, to be served concurrently or
consecutively with any other sentence, as you may deter
mine. You may, however, if you see fit and if such be your
verdict, fix his punishment as death, which would require
a sentence by the Court of death by electrocution. If that
be your verdict, you would add following the verdict
already found by you an additional verdict as follows: We
recommend his punishment as death for the offense of
murder.
I charge you that before you would be authorized to
find a verdict fixing a sentence of death by electrocution
for the offense of murder, you must find upon the evidence
statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances
sufficient to authorize such penalty.
I charge you that a finding of statutory aggravating
circumstance or circumstances shall only be based upon
evidence convincing your minds beyond a reasonable
doubt—and reasonable doubt has previously been de
fined in the first phase of the trial—as to the existence of
one or more of the following factual conditions, in con
nection with the defendant’s perpetration of the offense
for which you found him guilty. With respect to the
offense of murder, they are: The offense of murder was
committed while the offender was engaged in the commis
sion of another capital felony, armed robbery; or the
offense of murder was outrageously or wantonly vile,
horrible, or inhuman in that it involved torture, or de
pravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim.
Now, an aggravated battery is when one maliciously
causes bodily harm to another by depriving him of a
member of his body, or by rendering a member of his
body useless, or by seriously disfiguring him, his body, or
a member thereof; or that the offender committed the
offense of murder for the purpose of receiving money.
32a
The statutory aggravating circumstance or circum
stances that you are authorized to consider will be sub
mitted to you in writing for your deliberations. You must
designate in writing in your verdict on the indictment the
aggravating circumstance or circumstances which you find
to have existed with respect to the offense for which you
recommend the death penalty.
Your verdict respecting punishment must be agreed
to by all twelve of you.
Now, you may retire to begin your deliberations—but
don’t begin your deliberations until the bailiff brings you
the indictment with your verdict of guilty on it, along with
the written statutory aggravating circumstances which you
may consider.
You may retire.
(The jury retired to the jury room.)
The Court: All right.
(Papers were sent out to the jury.)
The Court: All right, we’ll be in recess until we
hear from the jury.
(Recess.)
(The jury returned to the courtroom.)
The Court: Mr. Foreman, has the jury reached
a verdict?
The F oreman: We have, Your Honor.
The Court: Deliver it to the bailiff, please, sir.
Mr. Bailiff, hand it to the clerk. Madam Clerk,
publish the verdict.
(The clerk published the verdict as follows: We,
the jury, find the defendant guilty as charged. We
ask the death penalty. The offense of murder was
outrageously and wantonly—I can’t read it—horrible
and inhuman in that i t . . . )
33a
T he Court: Return it to the foreman and let the
foreman read it. Just hand it to him to read.
The F oreman: (Reading) “We ask the death
penalty for the offense of murder was outrageously
and wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it
involved torture, depravity of mind, and aggravated
battery to the victim. May God rest his soul.”
The Court: Is that dated?
The F oreman: Yes, sir.
The Court: And signed by you as foreman?
The F oreman: Yes, sir.
The Court: All right, do you wish to poll the
jury?
Mr. N icholson: N o, sir.
The Court: Let me have that, please, Mr.
Foreman.
(The foreman gave the indictment to the Court.)
The Court: Is there anything which you wish to
say on behalf of the defendant before sentence is
imposed?
Mr. N icholson: N o, sir.
The Court: Anything which the defendant
wishes to say before the imposition of sentence?
The D efendant: Yes, sir.
The Court: All right, stand up and say it.
The D efendant: I think it was unfair the way
they did it—unfair trial—and I ask for a new trial.
T he Court: Well, you’ll have an automatic
appeal. Remain standing there. You having been
found guilty as charged in the indictment, it is
ordered that you be taken to the county jail to await
guard to be sent to the State penitentiary where you
34a
shall be confined at hard labor therein or elsewhere
as the Director of the State Department of Correc
tions or Offender Rehabilitations shall direct for the
remainder of your natural life consecutively with any
other sentence for armed robbery; and, in addition,
for twenty years consecutively with any other sen
tence for kidnapping. And it is further ordered that
you be delivered to the said director for electrocution
at such penal institution as may be designated by said
director on the 17th day of August, 1977, for murder.
That’s the sentence of the Court, and you may
take the defendant back to the jail.
Now, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, that will
conclude your services for this term, and you are now
excused with the thanks of the Court.
(This concluded the proceedings of this case.)
* * * * *
WITNESSES FOR THE STATE?
J. B, Dykes
Inv. Belcher
Marvin Woodward
Inv. J. T. Johnson
Jerry D. Chandler
Cpl. C. D. Smith
Lt. J. R. Holmes
Inv. L. D. Stevens
Dr. W. R. Murphy
Dr. J. W. Mitchener
#iv. E. J. Wilhelm
indictment No*
RICHMOND SUPERIOR COURT
------bias------- Term, 19-IZ_
THE STATE
vs.
ALPHONSO MORGAN_____
JOSE MARTINEZ HIGH
JUDSON RUFFIN
■Z43SSM
MURDER_____ ______ _
ARMED ROBBERY________
KIDNAPPING
________________Bill
_^£®.doy o f 197?
_____ , Foreman
W.Miy îALH ^ & i1a,^Uor,'cir
The Defendant
ALPHONSO M O R G A N - m u T f
6T 'loflicfrrtsnT̂TSt-̂ f-wieflesses-swo&o-
/l/£ ? r guilty.
Th iSJa M l a y of > & £>.$ ... 19'Ct>.
/ / -Defendant——•
2)/hAT<-
■ £ ^ .ja ^ c lfeU e = = _
Defendant's Attorney.
The DcfcndinK^J. . (V\.
in u r\{ Kill n fwaivc^ formal arraignment, copy of will of Ini
dictmeut, list o; witnesses sworn before the GranJ
Jury, and pleads .S^r£- ----------- Rudty.
T!<i 34gE&i nf J 2 i — , >25
RICH A n n E. ALLEN
District Attorney
RICHARD E. ALLEN, District A ttorney
W e fhe Ju ry find the DefendantDefendant
The Defendant *L
waives formal arraignment, copy ox Bill of In'
dictmcm, list of witnesses sworn before the Grand
d & t f U . Kuiity.
■S1.LJ/,., rK~L
ir̂c c
T h k / ^ An y nf 3 U L / 19 7 ? RICHA'iD E. AI.I.CN
Attorney
J L L Q (Z L d ,
FoiForeman
U>
Co
o
A
PPE
N
D
IX
In the
SUPERIOR COURT
of Said County.
36a
THE GRAND JURORS selected, chosen and sworn
for the County of Richmond, to-wit:
1 H. F. Elrod, Jr.. Foreman
2 Sarah L. Wideman
3 Lots Lamar
4 Maureen C. Gootee
5 Robert R. Howard
6 Particia E. Engvoidsen
7 Kenneth Labrack
8 Bonnie W. Cumbest
9 Mary A. Brown
10 Mrs. Anita D. Smalley
11 Patsy A. Eggers
12 Juanita Chavous
13 -Paula W. Washington
14 Mrs. Daisy P. Morgan
15 Mary F. Allen
16 Andrew J. Ziemba
17 Steve A. Cooper
18 Marian L. Purkey
19 Laura Brooks
20 Marie Covington
21 George H. Mitchell
22 Kenneth L. Harris
23 Carolyn Aaron
in the name and behalf of the citizens of Georgia, charge
and accuse Alphonso Morgan, Jose Martinez H igh
and Judson R uffin with the offense of: Murder for that
said accused, in the County of Richmond and State of
Georgia, on the 22nd day of August, 1976 unlawfully did
and with malice aforethought kill one James G ray, a
human being, by shooting the said James G ray with a
certain shotgun, contrary to the laws of said State, the
good order, peace and dignity thereof.
SECOND COUNT
The Grand Jurors aforesaid, in the name and behalf of the
citizens of Georgia, further charge and accuse Alphonso
Morgan, Jose Martinez H igh and Judson Ruffin with
the offense of: Armed R obbery, for that said accused, in
the County of Richmond and State of Georgia, on the
37a
22nd day of August, 1976, with the intent to commit theft,
took from the person of J ames G ray, the following
property, to-wit: $90.00 United States Currency of the
property of James G ray, of the value of $90.00, by use of
a shotgun, the same being an offensive weapon, contrary
to the laws of said State, the good order, peace and dignity
thereof.
THIRD COUNT
The Grand Jurors aforesaid, in the name and behalf of the
citizens of Georgia, further charge and accuse Alphonso
Morgan, Jose Martinez H igh and Judson R uffin with
the offense of: K idnapping, for that said accused in the
County of Richmond and State of Georgia, on the 22nd
day of August, 1976, did abduct J ames G ray, a person,
without lawful authority and held such person against his
will, contrary to the laws of said State, the good order,
peace and dignity thereof.
May Term, 1977 J. B. D ykes
Prosecutor
R ichard E. Allen,
District Attorney
38a APPENDIX H
In The
SUPERIOR COURT OF
R ichmond County, G eorgia
The State of G eorgia
vs. f INDICTMENT n o .
Alphonso Morgan MAY TERM, 1977
SENTENCE
W hereupon, the defendant, Alphonso Morgan, hav
ing been found guilty of the within charge of Murder,
Armed Robbery and Kidnapping at the present Term of
the Richmond Superior Court.
It is Considered, Ordered and Adjudged that he
be taken to the Jail of said county to await a guard to be
sent to the penitentiary of Georgia, where he shall be
taken and confined at hard labor therein or elsewhere, as
the State Department of Correction shall direct for the
space of natural life on the charge of Armed Robbery and
twenty years on the charge of Kidnapping, to be served
consecutively;
W hereupon, the Jury in the above stated case having
returned on the 14th day of July, 1977, a verdict of death
by electrocution for the charge of Murder:
It is Considered, Ordered and Adjudged by the
Court that the Defendant, Alphonso Morgan, be taken
from the Bar of this Court to the common jail of Rich
mond County or to some other safe and secure place
under such guard and protection as may be deemed
necessary where he shall be safely and securely kept until
his removal therefrom to the custody of the Director of the
State Department of Corrections, for the purpose of the
execution of this sentence in the manner prescribed by
law.
39a
It is F urther Ordered and Adjudged by the Court
that on the 2 17th day of August, 1977, the Defendant,
Alphonso Morgan, shall be executed by the Director of
the State Department of Corrections at such penal in
stitution as may be designated by said Director, and
witnessed only by the executing officer with such assistants
as the law requires as well as the defendant’s relatives,
counsel and such clergymen and friends as he may desire.
It is F urther Ordered that the Sheriff of Richmond
County together with such deputies as he may deem
necessary, the number of guards to be approved by the
presiding Judge, myself, or Ordinary of said County, shall
convey and deliver the said Alphonso Morgan to the
Director of the State Department of Corrections at such
penal institution as may be designated by said Director
not more than 20 days and not less than 2 days prior to the
time fixed herein for the execution of said condemned
person.
And there delivered into the custody of said Director.
And It Is F urther Ordered that the said Defendant,
Alphonso Morgan, on the day fixed herein between the
hours of 10:00 o’clock A.M. and 2:00 P.M. be by the
Director of the State Department of Corrections, elec
trocuted at the time and place and in the manner herein
provided by law.
And may God have mercy upon your soul.
Signed, this 14th day of July, 1977.
/ s / Edwin L. F ulcher
Judge, Superior Court,
Richmond County, Georgia
R ichard E. Allen
District Attorney,
Augusta Judicial Circuit
40a APPENDIX I
In the
SUPERIOR COURT
of R ichmond County, G eorgia
Alfonso M organ
vs. -
State of G eorgia
Civil Action
No.
No. 7244
Motion Docket
“NOTICE OF APPEAL”
Notice of Appeal is hereby given that Alfonso Mor
gan, Plaintiff above named appeals to the Georgia Su
preme Court from the conviction and sentencing of the
trial court of Richmond County, Georgia.
Convicting him of murder, kidnap and robbery and
sentencing him to die in the electric chair, life and (20)
twenty years. This action was entered by the Superior
Court of Richmond County, Augusta, Georgia, on the
13th day of July 1977.
Respectfully Submitted
/s / Alfonso Morgan
Alfonso Morgan Pro Se
R.C.C.I. 2-5
P. O. Box 5259
Augusta, GA 30906
Dated July 18, 1977
Notary Public
/s / James A. Price
My Commission Expires:
Notary Public, Richmond Co., Georgia
My Commission Expires Oct. 8, 1977
Reconstructed Version
(Original Follows)
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42a APPENDIX J
In the
SUPERIOR COURT
of R ichmond County, G eorgia
Alfonso Morgan
vs. >
State of G eorgia
Civil Action No.
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
AND APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
Plaintiff moves this honorable court for an order
appointing (Mr. Archie L. Gleason, 412 Greene Street,
Augusta, Ga.) a member of the Georgia Bar to represent
him on his appeal because he cannot afford to employ an
attorney at the present time.
This motion is based on plaintiff's affidavit in support
of his motion to proceed in forma pauperis and for
appointment of counsel. Legal authority for appointment
and compensation of counsel is 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d)
and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3006A(g) as interpreted in McClain v.
Manson, 343 F. Supp. 382 D. Conn. 1972.
Dated July 18, 1977
Respectfully submitted
/ s / Alfonso M organ
Alfonso Morgan Pro Se
R.C.C.I. 2-5
P. O. Box 5259
Augusta, GA 30906
Notary Public
/s / James A. Price
My Commission Expires:
Notary Public, Richmond Co., Georgia
My Commission Expires Oct. 8, 1977
Reconstructed Version
(Original Follows)
43a
IN THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF
R ichmond County, G eorgia
Alfonso M organ
vs. a
State of G eorgia * I
Civil Action
No.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that I have this date made the
proper and necessary service upon the offices of the Clerk
of Superior Court by placing a copy herein of notice of
appeal and for appointment of counsel and forwarding it
in the United States mail addressing it to the clerk of court
Miss Helen M. Speltz with sufficient postage affixed
thereto.
Respectfully submitted
/s / Alfonso Morgan
Sworn to and subscribed
before me this 18th day of July 1977
Notary Public
/ s / James A. Price
Notary Public Richmond Co., Georgia
My Commission Expires Oct. 8, 1977
Filed in office this 22nd day of
July, 1977
/ s / Helen M. Speltz
Clerk
Reconstructed Version
(Original Follows)
44a
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46a APPENDIX K
IN THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF
R ichmond County, G eorgia
Alfonso Morgan
Helen M. Speltz
Respondent
Criminal Case No.
Charges: Murder, Kidnap, Arm Robbery
Sentences: Death, life, 20 years
Date of Conviction: 7/15/77 * 1
PETITION FOR COPY OF RECORDS
Comes now the petitioner-defendant in the above styled
cause and moves this Honorable Court to issue an order
directed to the above named respondent and commanding
that the respondent supply the petitioner-defendant with
certain documents which have heretofore been filed by
him in his capacity officially as clerk of this court and
which are required by the petitioner-defendant for the
purpose of continuing litigation as good cause for issuing
such order he submits the following to wit:
1. ) The defendant now petitioner is an indigent
person unable to pay the respondent’s fees for such
documents.
2. ) As the defendant in a criminal case, peti
tioner is entitled to certified copies of the documents
below listed as a matter of law.
3.) Petitioner should have been, but has not
been served with a copy of
(A) The warrant in this cause.
(B) The indictment in this cause.
(C) Any transcript of any proceeding in
which petitioner was a defendant.
(D) The sentence as impose from the bench.
Reconstructed Version
(Original Follows)
47a
Whereas the defendant petitioner is entitled to the
foregoing documents described as a matter of law and,
whereas the cost of such documents may be taxed against
the state.
Wherefore the defendant now petitioner prays that
an order be issued as in hereinabove prayed, and this he
will ever pray.
Respectfully submitted
/ s / Alfonso Morgan
defendant petitioner
R.C.C.I. P. O. Box 5259
Augusta, GA 30906
Sworn to and subscribed before me
this 10th day of August 1977.
/s / James A. P rice
Notary Public
My commission expires:
Notary Public, Richmond Co., Georgia
My Commission Expires Oct. 8, 1977
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that I have this date made service
upon the opposite party by placing a copy of this fore
going petition for copy of Record and “Petition for Leave
to file and proceed” in forma pauperis in the United States
mail with sufficient postage attached thereto.
This Day of 197
/ s / Alfonso Morgan
Petitioner Pro Se
R.C.C.I. P. O. Box 5259
Reconstructed Version
(Original Follows)
48a
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50a
Inmate’s N ame: Alfonso Morgan
Institution: R.C.C.I.
D ate: Oct. 5, 1977
State Serial N umber:
C ity: Augusta, Georgia
I am presently confined at Richmond County Correc
tions Institution. I am writing you in request for the
transcript pertaining to my case, or any information you
can give me as to how I can obtain my transcript. I was
tried and sentenced August 22, 1977 and since then have
tried to obtain any transcript and indictment papers. My
attorney Chris Nicholson has not contacted me since my
trial and I have not been able to contact him. It is my
opinion that Mr. Nicholson does not intend to assist me in
any other legal matters, so it is imperative that I receive
my transcript and any other papers pertaining to my case
so that I may be able to help myself efficiently.
My mother, Betty Morgan will contact you soon and I
would appreciate it if you would cooperate with her in
helping me receive my legal papers.
Sincerely,
/ s / Alfonso Morgan
The transcript has not been filed. Court is in session
every week, therefore, the court reporter has not had time
to prepare it.
Reconstructed Version
(Original Follows)
51a
INMATE'S NAME:-
INSTITUTION
__ 7ft
A I o n z o Me>y- anr\
/?,C.Q. X._________
c. Qr-b. s~ /•> 7 -7
STATE SERIAL NUMBER:*-
CITY:. ZjjL&r
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t h e r e f o r e , t h e c o u r t r e p o r t e r h a s n o t h a d t im e t o p r e p a r e i t . ____________ i_
52a
EDWIN D. FULCHER
JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURTS
OF THE AUGUSTA JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
311 CITY-COUNTY BUILDING
AUGUSTA, GEORGIA 30902
August 17, 1977
Mr. Richard E. Allen
District Attorney
The 500 Building
Augusta, Georgia 30902
Re: State v. Alphonso Morgan
Dear Sir:
I enclose herewith Petition for Copy of Records in the
above matter for your handling and disposition.
Yours very truly,
/s / Edwin D. Fulcher
Edwin D. Fulcher
edf/d
Enclosure
Copy to Alfonso Morgan
R. C. C. I.
P. O. Box 5259
Augusta, Georgia 30906
53a APPENDIX L
November 17, 1977
Mr. Alfonso Morgan
Richmond County C.I. 2-5
Post Office Box 5259
Augusta, Georgia 30906
Dear Mr. Morgan:
Thank you for your letter of last week.
I noted in your letter that you were anxious for your
trial court attorney to contact you concerning your appeal.
Generally, the attorney who is appointed to handle your
case at trial will also represent you on appeal. Our office
does not intervene in cases where a lawyer has already
been appointed in a case such as yours, and, moreover, we
do not have an office which covers the Richmond County
area. Therefore, we will not be able to assist you directly
at this time. However, if your attorney fails to contact you
after the time for appeal has elapsed, please contact us
again at that time, for then we may be able to assist you.
Yours truly,
/ s / Barry G. Sikes
Barry G. Sikes
Legal Assistant
BGS/dgl
54a APPENDIX M
Inmate’s N ame: ...........................
Institution: ...........................
D ate: ...........................
State Serial N umber: Rec. 12/19/77
C ity: ...........................
Mrs. J oline B. W illiams Clerk
Supreme Court of Georgia
I’am writing you to let you know that I have tried to
get my transcript from my lawer but I’ve had [no] resort
on my case, and I would like for you to check on some of
the evidence on me as they say, they say it was three of us
on the crime and I was the only one convicted for the
crime, and my lawer gave me no a cooperation and I
would like for you all to know that Fam not a wealth man
at the moment and I did not committ this crime, and the
evidence there was, was on someone else and I became
involve also, but the evidence was no good in Court and
this no one has been release I want you to know that I am
trying in all my ability to help myself on the case I would
like for you to investigate this case [first?] before any final
decision is made, because my like is in state of Death
[unclear word] was not meant for me as a human being,
and I have never commited a felony case in my life and
behalf of my like I feel that may case down here in
Georgia is taking my life for nothing I done and that why
I ask you to help me in every way you can, and when I got
convicted my lawer never gave me a report are never
answered any of my letter, and I know that he a stat
apointed, but I would like to know did he file my
complank, and never received this as a murder I did’nt
committ with 11 whites & 1 Black that could explain how I
got arrested, and the D.A. Richard Allend said that I
hated white folk so the jury and I would like for you to
check into it, and I have evidence on this, on my behalf I
55a
was railroad, and as of now they violated my rights on a
speedy trial because of no evidence and all that is being
introduced to you I would like to here from you on my
case and I was tortued and beating & they said I made
statement, but I did not say, and as arresting me they had
no warrant of my arrest. So please I am asking you to
help me, because I am a young man and care about my
life, and they keep asking me to cop out and I said no for
knowing I did’nt, not even a line up. They gave me, in my
way my lawer and Richard Allend sat me up, because
they hadno evidence, and also when I was arrest, the
Detective said I made a statement around five men had no
time to take it down and only one took the stand without
no statement, and a G.B.I. took the stand on behalf that I
had nothing to do with the case in Crawford Villi, and I
hope I could receive a letter from yoall for help.
Reconstructed Version
(Original Follows)
56a
INMATE’ S NAME
INSTITUTION:
D A T E ___________ ____
_ STATE SERIAL NUM9ER:_
CITY:
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59a APPENDIX N
December 16, 1977
Mr. Chris Nicholson
The 500 Building
Augusta, Georgia 30902
In re: Case No. 33046
Morgan v. The State
Dear Mr. Nicholson:
The Court has directed me to notify you that you are
required to file the appellant’s briefs in the above case in
this Court not later than 4:30 p.m., December 30, 1977, or
be subject to the sanctions of Rule 34 of this Court.
Yours truly,
Mrs. Joline B. Williams, Clerk
JBW.bc
cc: Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen.
Attn: John W. Dunsmore, Jr.
Richard Allen, Dist. Atty.
60a APPENDIX O
In The
SUPREME COURT
Of G eorgia
Alfonso Morgan,
Appellant,
v. >
Case No. 33046
On Appeal from the
Superior Court of
Richmond County
State of G eorgia,
Appellee.
Murder. Armed Robbery,
Kidnapping
(Death Case)
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF
ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLEE
BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Please serve:
John W. D unsmore, Jr.
132 State Judicial Bldg.
40 Capitol Square, S.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30334
(404) 656-3358
Arthur K. Bolton
Attorney General
R obert S. Stubbs, II
Executive Assistant
Attorney General
R ichard L. Chambers
First Assistant
Attorney General
John C. Walden
Senior Assistant
Attorney General
J ohn W. D unsmore, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
R ichard E. Allen
District Attorney
Augusta Judicial Circuit
61a
In The
SUPREME COURT
Of G eorgia
Alfonso Morgan,
Appellant,
v. >
Case No. 3.3046
On Appeal from the
Superior Court of
Richmond County
State of G eorgia,
Appellee.
Murder, Armed Robbery,
Kidnapping
(Death Case)
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF
ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLEE
BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
At the direction of the Court during oral argument
held on January 9, 1978, Appellee was requested to file a
supplemental brief addressing the adequacy of the lower
court’s instructions during the sentencing phase of the trial
in light of Hawes v. State, Ga. (Case No. 32167,
decided Nov. 28, 1977), and Fleming v. State, Ga.
(Case No. 32344, decided Nov. 8, 1977). Before
discussing this issue Appellee wishes to correct a statement
made during oral argument in which it stated that the
Court of Appeals had already heard oral argument
regarding an appeal filed on behalf of the State in
connection with the lower court’s ruling setting aside the
arrest of Appellant’s co-defendant. State v. High, Case
No. 55212. Appellee was in error insofar as informing the
Court that oral argument had been held before the Court
of Appeals in that matter. Oral argument has not been
6 2 a
held, but briefs for both sides have been submitted with
the Court. Appellee apologizes for this error and for
misleading the Court in this matter.
Recently this Court has been asked by various Appel
lants to look more closely at the trial court’s instructions
coming during the penalty phase in those cases in which
the state is seeking the death penalty under Ga. Laws
1973, pp. 163, Ga. Code Ann. § 27-2734.1, particularly as
to the sufficiency and clarity of those instructions on
mitigating and aggravating circumstances which the jurors
are to consider before imposing a death sentence. Ga.
Code Ann. § 27-2734.1 ( b )(c). In that connection this
Court has held that a jury must be instructed that they are
to consider in addition to aggravating circumstances, any
mitigating circumstances warranted by the evidence,
Hawes v. State, supra, but that the mitigating circum
stances need not be singled out and specifically listed, a
general charge on mitigating circumstances being
sufficient. Thomas v. State, Ga. (Case No. 32259,
Nov. 28, 1977). Further, a judge during the penalty
phase must also make it clear to the jurors that even if
they find a statutory aggravating circumstance they may
still recommend a life sentence. Fleming v. State, supra.
Sub judice, the trial judge specifically instructed the
jury:
“ . . . it is now your duty to determine within the limits
prescribed by law the penalty that shall be imposed
as punishment for that offense. In reaching this
determination, you should consider all of the evi
dence received by you in open court in both phases of
the trial. You should consider all the facts and
circumstances of the case, including any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances. ” (Emphasis added).
Hawes is not applicable in this instance, since the
lower court did instruct on mitigating circumstances,
63a
whereas in Hawes such an instruction was totally lacking.
Admittedly, while the lower court did not include in its
charge information to the jury that they could nevertheless
recommend a life sentence even if they found the existence
of a statutory aggravating circumstance. Fleming, supra.
This Court’s concern in Fleming and instructions similar to
that which it took issue with in Fleming, is that it is
possible for the judge to give too much emphasis on
aggravating circumstances, and that in doing so the
instruction may appear to the jury that if they find a
statutory aggravating circumstance it is mandatory for
them to return a sentence to death. In this instance, the
charge when taken as a whole permits a life sentence even
though an aggravating circumstance may be found. (T
229-231).
Respectively submitted,
Arthur K. Bolton
Attorney General
R obert S. Stubbs, II
Executive Assistant
Attorney General
/s / R ichard L. Chambers
Richard L. Chambers
First Assistant
Attorney General
/s / John C. Walden
John C. Walden
Senior Assistant
Attorney General
/s / John W. D unsmore, Jr.
John W. Dunsmore, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
/ s / R ichard E. Allen
Richard E. Allen
District Attorney
Augusta Judicial Circuit
Please serve:
J ohn W. D unsmore, J r.
132 State Judicial Bldg.
40 Capitol Square, S.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30334
(404) 656-3358
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that I have this
day served counsel for the oppos
ing party in the foregoing matter
with a copy of this pleading by
depositing in the United States
Mail a copy of same in a properly
addressed envelope with adequate
postage thereon.
THIS 16th day of Janaury, 1978
/ s / J ohn W. D unsmore, J r.
Counsel for Appellee
PERSON(s) SERVED
Mr. Chris G. Nicholson
The 500 Building
Augusta, Georgia 30902
64a APPENDIX P
February 15, 1978
Mr. Alfonso Morgan
Richmond County Correctional Institute
Post Office Box 5259
Augusta, Georgia 30906
Dear Mr. Morgan:
We have received your letter dated February 13,
1978. You indicated that you have an attorney assigned
to your case. We are unable to become involved in a case
where an attorney is presently active and representing his
client on appeal, so we will not be able to directly help you
at this time. I would suggest you try contacting your
attorney again for additional assistance.
If in the future we can be of help to you, please do not
hesitate to write.
Sincerely,
/ s / Barry Sikes
BGS/dgl
Barry G. Sikes
Legal Assistant
65a APPENDIX Q
April 18, 1978
Alphonso Morgan
R. C. C. I.
P. O. Box 5259
Augusta, Georgia 30906
Dear Sir:
I have your letter of April 13. Your case is presently
before the Supreme Court of Georgia and the appeal will
be prosecuted by Mr. Nicholson. There is no reason for
other or additional counsel.
Yours very truly,
/ s / Edwin D. F ulcher
Edwin D. Fulcher
edf/d
Copies to Mr. Richard E. Allen, District Attorney
Mr. Chris G. Nicholson, Attorney
66a APPENDIX R
In the
SUPERIOR COURT
Of R ichmond County, G eorgia
Alfonso Morgan
VS.
Clerk of Court
Petitioner
Respondent
Motion Docket
No. 7641
O R D E R
The Petitioner, Alfonso Morgan, having filed a “ Peti
tion for Copy of Records”, and it appearing to the
Court that:
Alfonso Morgan was found guilty of the offenses of
Murder, Armed Robbery and Kidnapping and on the
14th day of July, 1977, was sentenced to death on the
Murder conviction and life on the Armed Robbery con
viction and twenty years on the Kidnapping conviction, to
be served consecutively; and,
It further appearing to the Court that no justification
or necessity for transmittal of the requested documents is
alleged or shown as they are in the possession of Defend
ant’s (Petitioner’s) attorney, the Petitioner’s Motion is
hereby denied.
This 21st day of April, 1978.
/ s / Edwin D. F ulcher
J.S.C.A.C.
Presented By:
R ichard E. Allen
District Attorney
R ichard E. Allen
67a APPENDIX S
CODE
R e p o r t o f T h e T r - - a l Juc lg
S u p e r i o r C o u r t o f R i c h m o n d C o u n t y , G e o r g i a
1. £$\ame M o r g a n
T h e S t a t e v s . A l f o n z o M o r g a n
( A c a s e i n w h i c h t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y w a s i m p o s e d )
A . D a t a C o n c e r n i n g t h e D e f e n d a n t
A1 fn n ? .n '
10.
11.
L a s t , F i r s t
2 . D a t e o f E M r t h 0 1 01 5 8
M i d d l e M o . D ay Y e a
S o c i a l S e c u r i t y N u m b e r
S e x : LX ]
[ 1
5 . M a r i t a l S t a t u s : LX]r i
C h i l d r e n
( a ) N u m b e r o f c h i l d r e n
( b ) A g e s o f c h i l d r e n :
N e v e r H a r r
M a r r i e d
D i v o r c e d
S p o u s e D e c e a s e d [
F a t h e r l i v i n g : y e s . [ x ]
M o t h e r l i v i n g : y e s [ x]
N u m b e r o f c h i l d r e n b o r n t o p a r e n t s
E d u c a t i o n — H i g h e s t G r a d e C o m p l e t e d : 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 U 1 5 1 6 1 7
( C i r c l e a g e o f e a c h c h i l d )
n o [ ] I f d e c e a s e d , g i v e d a t e o f d e a t h
n o [ 1 i f d e c e a s e d , g i v e d a t e o f d e a t h
S i x ( 6 )
2 3 4 5 6 7 F 9 1 0 <Q) 12 1 3 1 4 15 16
I n t e l l i g e n c e L e v e l : ( I Q b e l o w 7 0 )
. ( I Q 7 0 t o 1 0 0 )
( I Q a b o v e 10? ;)
( C i r c l e o n e )
L o w [ ]
M e d iu m ? x ]
H i g h [ 1
[ c o l l e g e
r i
1 2 . ' P s y c h i a t r i c E v a l u a t i o n P e r f o r m e d ?
I f p e r f o r m e d i s d e f e n d a n t :
a . A b l e t o d i s t i n g u i s h r i g h t f r o m w r o n g ?
b . A b l e t o a d h e r e t o t h e r i g h t ? [
c . A b l e t o c o o p e r a t e i n t e l l i g e n t l y i n h i s ow n d e f e n s e ?
1 2 . I f e x a m i n e d , w e r e c h a r a c t e r o r b e h a v i o r d i s o r d e r s f o u n d ?
( I f a n s w e r i s y e s p l e a s e e l a b o r a t e ) _________________________________
Y e s [ ] N o [ x l
[
Y e s [ 1 N o [ ]
1 4 . W h a t o t h e r p e r t i n e n t p s y c h i a t r i c [ a n d p s y c h o l o g i c a l ! i n f o r m a t i o n w a s r e v e a l
N o n e
1 5 . P r i o r V’o r ’ : R e c o r d o f D e f e n d a n t :
T ’-"ne J o b T ' s v D a t e s He 1 d R e a s o n f o r T e r m * n a t ~ c n
a . T h e s u b j e c t s t a t e s t h a t h e h a s b e e n e m p l o y e d a t v a r i o u s t i m e s a s a b r i c k
b . M a s o n 1s a s s i s t a n t , a y a r d w o r k e r , a n d a c o n v e n i e n t s t o r e c l e r k . He d e -
c . d i n e d t o g i v e ' a n y p a r t i c u l a r e m p l o y e r s o r d a t e s o f e m p l o y m e n t . ____
*'v s e p a r a t e r e p o r t m u s t b e s u h n - t t e -1 f o r e a c h d e f e n d a n t s e n t e n c e d t o d e a t h .
68a
B . D a t a C o n c e r n i n g t h e T r ; a1
1 . Was t h e c a s e t r i e d w i t h o r w i t h o u t j u r y ? W i t h [x ) W i t h o u t [ ]
2 . How d i d t h e d e f e n d a n t p l e a d ? G u i l t y [ ] N o t g u i l t y &;xl
C . O f f e n s e R e l a t e d D a t a
1 . C a p i t a l O f f e n s e f o r W h i c h P e n a l t y I m p o s e d :
a . T r e a s o n ...................................................................................]
b . M u r d e r ...................................................................... jx j
c . K i d n a p p i n g f o r R a n s o m ..................................................... [ ]
d . K i d n a p p i n g w h e r e I n j u r y R e s u l t s . . . . . . pc ]
e . A i r c r a f t Hi j a c k i n g ................................................ .. . [ ]
f . R a p e ................................................................................................... £ -j
g . A r m e d R o b b e r y ......................................................................... [ x ]
2 . W e r e o t h e r o f f e n s e s t r i e d i n t h e sa m e t r i a l ? y e s [ ] no [ x]
I f o t h e r o f f e n s e s w e r e t r i e d i n t h e sa m e t r i a l l i s t t h o s e o f f e n s e s .
d . _______ _______________
I r t r i e d w i t h j u r y , d i d t h e j u r y r e c o m m e n d t h e d e a t h s e n t e n c e ?
Y e s fo 1 N o [ ]
S t a t u t o r y a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s f o u n d : Y e s [ x ] No
W h i c h o f t h e f o l l o w i n g s t a t u t o r y
a n d w h i c h w e r e f o u n d ?
g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s w e r e i n s t r u c t e d
( 1 ) T h e o f f e n s e o f m u r d e r , r a p e , a r m e d r o b b e r y , o r
k i d n a p p i n g w a s c o m m i t t e d b y a p e r s o n w i t h a p r i o r
r e c o r d o f c o n v i c t i o n f o r a c a p i t a l f e l o n y , o r
( 2 ) T h e o f f e n s e o f m u r d e r w a s c o m m i t t e d b y a p e r
s o n w h o h a s a s u b s t a n t i a l h i s t o r y o f s e r i o u s a s
s a u l t i v e c r i m i n a l c o n v i c t i o n s .
( 1 ) T h e o f f e n s e o f m u r d e r , r a p e , a r m e d r o b b e r y , o r
d n a p p i r . g w a s c o m m i t t e d w h i l e t h e o f f e n d e r w a s e n
g a g e d i n t h e c o m m i s s i o n o f a n o t h e r c a p i t a l f e l o n v .
o r a g g r a v a t e d b a t t e r y o r
( 2 ) T h e o f f e n s e o f m u r d e r w a s c o m m i t t e d w h i l e t h e
f e n d e r w a s e n g a g e d •f n t h e c o m m i s s i o n o f b u r g l a r y o r
a r s o n ‘ n t h e f i r s t d e g r e e .
I n s t r u c t e d F ound
L 1 C 2
[ 1 [ ]
T h e o f f e n d e r b y h ’ s a c t o f m u r d e r , a r m e d r o b b e r y , o r
’ w c n a p r r r . g k n o w i n g l y c r e a t e d a g r e a t r i s k o f d e a t h
t o m o r e t h a n o n e p e r s o n i n a p u b l i c p l a c e b y m e a n s
o r a w e a p o n o r d e v i c e w hm ch w o u l d n o r m a l l y b e h a ? . -
a r o o u s t o t h e l i v e s o f m o r e t h a n o n e o e r s o r . .
69a
I n s t r u c t e d F o u n d
d . T h e o f f e n d e r c o m m i t t e d t h e o f f e n s e o f m u r d e r f o r [ ] {■ -j
h i m s e l f o r a n o t h e r , f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f r e c e i v i n g
m o n e y o r a n y o t h e r t h i n g o f m o n e t a r y v a l u e .
e . T h e m u r d e r o f a j u d i c i a l o f f i c e r , f o r m e r j u d i c i a l [ 1
o f f i c e r , d i s t r i c t a t t o r n e y o r s o l i c i t o r o r f o r m e r
d i s t r i c t a t t o r n e y o r s o l i c i t o r d u r i n g o r b e c a u s e o f
t h e e x e r c i s e o f h i s o f f i c i a l d u t y .
f . T h e o f f e n d e r c a u s e d o r d i r e c t e d a n o t h e r t o c o m m i t [ }
m u r d e r o r c o m m i t t e d m u r d e r a s a n a g e n t o r e m p l o y e e
o f a n o t h e r p e r s o n .
©• T h e o f f e n s e o f m u r d e r , r a p e , a r m e d r o b b e r y , o r k i d - [ ]
n a p p i n g w a s o u t r a g e o u s l y o r w a n t o n l y v i l e , h o r r i b l e
o r in h u m a n i n t h a t i t i n v o l v e d t o r t u r e , d e p r a v i t y o f
m i n d , o r a n a g g r a v a t e d b a t t e r y t o t h e v i c t i m .
h . T h e o f f e n s e o f m u r d e r w a s c o m m i t t e d a g a i n s t a n y p e a c e [ ]
o f f i c e r , c o r r e c t i o n s e m p l o y e e o r f i r e m a n w h i l e e n
g a g e d i n t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f h i s o f f i c i a l d u t i e s .
i . T h e o f f e n s e o f m u r d e r w a s c o m m i t t e d b y a p e r s o n i n , [ ]
o r w h o h a s e s c a p e d f r o m , t h e l a w f u l c u s t o d y o f a
p e a c e o f f i c e r o r p l a c e o f l a w f u l c o n f i n e m e n t .
j . T h e m u r d e r w a s c o m m i t t e d f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f a v o i d - [ 1
i n g , i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h , o r p r e v e n t i n g a l a w f u l a r r e s t
o r c u s t o d y i n a . p l a c e o f l a w f u l c o n f i n e m e n t , o f h i m
s e l f o r a n o t h e r .
[ 1
f 1
hd
[ i
[ i
t ]
L i s t n o n s t a t u t o r y a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n d i c a t e d b y t h e e v i d e n c e ,
i f a n y .
V.’a s t h e r e e v i d e n c e o f m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s ? Y e s [ ] N o [ x ]
I f s o , w h i c h o f t h e f o l l o w i n g m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s w a s i n e v i d e n c e ?
a . T h e d e f e n d a n t h a s n o s i g n i f i c a n t h i s t o r y o f p r i o r [ ]
c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y .
b . T h e m u r d e r w a s c o m m i t t e d w h i l e t h e d e f e n d a n t w a s [ ]
u n d e r t h e i r f l u e n c e ' - ' o f e x t r e m e m e n t a l o r e m o t i o n a l
d i s t u r b a n c e .
c . T h e v i c t i m w a s a p a r t i c i p a n t i n t h e d e f e n d a n t ’ s [ ;
h o m i c i d a l c o n d u c t o r c o n s e n t e d t o t h e h o m i c i d a l
a c t .
c . T h e m u r d e r w a s c o m m i t t e d u n d e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s w h i c h { ]
t h e d e f e n d a n t b e l i e v e d t o p r o v i d e a m o r a l j u s t i f i
c a t i o n o r e x t e n u a t i o n f o r h i s c o n d u c t .
c . T h e d e f e n d a n t w a s a n a c c o m p l i c e i n a m u r d e r c o m - [ 1
m i t t e d b y a n o t h e r p e r s o n a n d h i s p a r t i c i p a t i o r .
i n t h e horn - c ’ d a ] a c t w a s r e l a t i v e l y m i n o r .
3
70a
f . T h e d e f e n d a n t a c t e d u n d e r d u r e s s o r u n d e r t h e d o m -
’ n a t o n o f a n o t h e r p e r s o n .
g . A t t h e t i m e o f t h e m u r d e r , t h e c a p a c i t y o f t h e [ ]
d e f e n d a n t t o a p p r e c i a t e t h e c r i m i n a l i t y [ w r o n g
f u l n e s s i o f h i s c o n d u c t o r t o c o n f o r m h i s c o n -
r> d u c t o r t o c o n f o r m h i s c o n d u c t t o t h e r e q u i r e -
Q0 m e n t s o f l a w w a s i m p a i r e d a s a r e s u l t o f m e n t a l
W d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t o r i n t o x i c a t i o n .
C
h . T h e y o u t h o f t h e d e f e n d a n t a t t h e t i m e o f t h e c r i m e . [ ]
i . O t h e r . ̂ -j
P l e a s e e x p l a i n i f ( i ) i s c h e c k e d _____________ * 11
9 . I f t r i e d w i t h a j u r y , w a s t h e j u r y i n s t r u c t e d t o c o n s i d e r t h e c i r c u m
s t a n c e s i n d i c a t e d i n 8. a s m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s ? Y e s [ ] N o [ x ]
1 0 . D o e s t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s p h y s i c a l o r m e n t a l c o n d i t i o n c a l l f o r s p e c i a l
c o n s i d e r a t i o n ? Y e s { f K q ^
1 1 . A l t h o u g h t h e e v i d e n c e s u f f i c e s t o s u s t a i n t h e v e r d i c t , d o e s i t f o r e
c l o s e a l l d o u b t r e s p e c t i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s g u i l t ? Y e s [ x ] N o [ ]
1 2 . W as t h e v i c t i m r e l a t e d b y b l o o d o r m a r r i a g e t o d e f e n d a n t ? Y e s T 1 No fx 1
1 3 . I f a n s w e r i s y e s , w h a t w a s t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p ? ____________ ‘ ' J
14- . \V 3 S
1 5 . V:as
1 6 . Was
t h e
1 7 . V’a s
ID. VJas
1 9 . Was
t h e v i c t i m a n e m p l o y e r o r e m p l o y e e o f d e f e n d a n t ? K o
E m p l o y e r
E m p l o y e e
t h e v i c t i m a c q u a i n t e d w i t h t h e d e f e n d a n t ? K o
C a s u a l A c q u a i n t a n c e
F r i e n d
t h e v i c t i m l o c a l r e s i d e n t o r t r a n s i e n t i n
c o m m u n i t y ?
t h e v i c t i m t h e sa m e r a c e a s d e f e n d a n t ?
t h e v i c t i m t h e sa m e s e x a s t h e d e f e n d a n t ?
t h e v i c t i m h e l d H o s t a g e d u r i n g t h e c r ^ r a e ?
R e s i d e n t
T r a n s i e n t
Y e s [ 1 K o
Y e s [ X 1 Ko
K o
Y e s - L e s s t h a n a n h o u r
Y e s - M o r e t h a n a n h o u r
[X]
C 1 [ ]
[xl
C i [ }
[xl
[ ]
f 1
r 1
Ex1
2 D . Was t h e v i c t - m ’ s r e p u t a t i o n i n t h e c o m m u n i t y : G o o d [x "l
Ba d [ ;
U n k n o w n [ 1
V.'as t h e v i c t i m p h y s i c a l l y h a r m e d o r t o r t u r e d ? Y e s f K o r 1
I ” y e s , s t a t e e x t e n t o f h a rm o r t o r t u r e : D e a t h ______________
01
65
4
71a
2 2 . V ;h a t w a s t h e a g e o f t h e v i c t i m ?
2 3 . I f a w e a p o n w a s u s e d i n c o m m i s s i o n o f t h e c r i m e w a s i t ?
N o w e a p o n u s e d
P o i s o n f
M o t o r V e h i c l e {
B l u n t I n s t r u m e n t f
S h a r p I n s t r u m e n t [
F i r e a r m [x
O t h e r [
2 4 . D o e s t h e d e f e n d a n t h a v e a r e c o r d o f p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n s ? Y e s [ ) N o (XjQ
2 5 . I f a n s w e r i s y e s , l i s t t h e o f f e n s e s , t h e d a t e s o f t h e o f f e n s e s a n d
t h e s e n t e n c e s i m p o s e d :
O f f e n s e P 3 t e o f O f f e n s e S e n t e n c e I m p o s e d
a . ___________________________________________________________________ _______________
2 6 . W as t h e r e e v i d e n c e t h e d e f e n d a n t w a s u n d e r - t h e i n f l u e n c e o f n a r c o t i c s
o r d a n g e r o u s d r u g s a t t h e t i m e o f t h e o f f e n s e ? Y e s [ ] No [XX]
2 7 . W a s t h e d e f e n d a n t a l o c a l r e s i d e n t o r t r a n s i e n t i n t h e c o m m u n i t y ?
R e s i d e n t [X 1
T r a n s i e n t [ ]
D . R e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f D e f e n d a n t *
1 . D a t e c o u n s e l s e c u r e d A u g u s t 3 0 . 1 9 7 7 _____________________
2 . How w a s c o u n s e l s e c u r e d ? a . R e t a i n e d b y d e f e n d a n t [ ]
b . A p p o i n t e d b y C o u r t [XX]
3 . I f c o u n s e l w a s a p p o i n t e d b y c o u r t w a s i t b e c a u s e
a . D e f e n d a n t u n a b l e t o a f f o r d c o u n s e l ? [ x]
b . D e f e n d a n t r e f u s e d t o s e c u r e c o u n s e l ? [ ]
c . O t h e r ( e x p l a i n ) ______________________________ [ ]
4 . How m a nv y e a r s h a s c o u n s e l p r a c t i c e d l a w ? a . 0 t o 5 f x ]
b . 5 t o 1 0 [
c , o v e r 1 0 T
5 . W h a t • s t h e n a t u r e o f c o u n s e l ' s p r a c t i c e ? a . M o s t l y c i v i 1 f ;
* b . G e n e r a l [ Xl
c . M o s t l y c r i m i n a l [
6 . D ' d t h e sa m e c o u n s e l s e r v e t h r o u g h o u t t h e t r i a l ? Y e s LXX5 [
I f n o t e x p l a i n n d e t a i l .
( I f m o r e t h a n o n e c o u n s e l s e r v e d a n s w e r t h e a b o v e c u e s t i o n s a s t o e a c :
c o u n s e l a n d a t t a c h t o t h i s r e p o r t . )
01
68
5
72a
E . G e n e r a l C o n s ? d e r a t i o n s
1 . W as r a c e r a i s e d b y t h e d e f e n s e a s a n i s s u e i n t h e t r i a l ? Y e s [ ] No f x ]
2 ; D i d r a c e o t h e r w i s e a p p e a r a s a n i s s u e i n t h e t r - ' a l ? Y e s [ ] No [ x 1
3 . W h a t p e r c e n t a g e o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n o f y o u r c o u n t y i s t h e s a m e r a c e a s
t h e d e f e n d a n t ?
a . U n d e r 1 0 % ..................... ]
b . 1 0 t o 2 5 % ................j
c . 2 5 t o 5 0 % ............................ [ x ]
d . 5 0 t o 7 5 % .............................[ ]
e . 7 5 t o 9 0 % ............................ [ }
f . O v e r 9 0 % .............................. [ ]
4 . W e r e m e m b e r s o f d e f e n d a n t ' s r a c e r e p r e s e n t e d o n t h e j u r y ? Y e s f x ) N o [ j
5 . I f n o t , w a s t h e r e a n y e v i d e n c e t h e y w e r e s y s t e m a t i c a l l y e x c l u d e d f r o m
t h e j u r y ? Y e s £ ] No £x 1
6 . W as t h e j u r y i n s t r u c t e d t o e x c l u d e r a c e a s a n i s s u e ? Y e s [ ] N o [ x ]
7 . W as t h e r e e x t e n s i v e p u b l i c i t y i n t h e c o m m u n i t y c o n c e r n i n g t h i s
c a s e ? Y e s t x 3 N o [ ]
8 . W as t h e j u r y i n s t r u c t e d t o d i s r e g a r d s u c h p u b l i c i t y ? Y e s [ 3 No [ x 3
9 . Was t h e j u r y i n s t r u c t e d t o a v o i d a n y i n f l u e n c e o f p a s s i o n , p r e j u d i c e ,
o r a n y o t h e r a r b i t r a r y f a c t o r w h e n i m p o s i n g s e n t e n c e ? Y e s [ 3 N o [ x ]
1 0 . W as t h e r e a n y e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e j u r y w a s i n f l u e n c e d b y p a s s i o n ,
p r e j u d i c e , o r a n y o t h e r a r b i t r a r y f a c t o r w h e n i m p o s i n g s e n t e n c e ?
Y e s [ ] N o [x ]
1 1 . I f a n s w e r i s y e s , w h a t w a s t h a t e v i d e n c e ? _________________________________________________
1 2 . G e n e r a l c o m m e n t s o f t h e T r i a l J u d g e c o n c e r n i n g t h e a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s o f
t h e s e n t e n c e i m p o s e d j .n t h i s c a s e T h i s m u r d e r w a s i n e x c u s a b l e a n d
t h e v i l e a n d h o r r i b l e m a n n e r o f d e a t h r e n d e r s t h e s e n t e n c e a p p r o p r i a t e . * 1 2 3
F . C h r o n o l o g y o f C a s e
E la o s e d Davs
1 . D3te o f O ffe n se August 22 , 1976______________________ 0
2 . Date o f A rre s t August 28, 1976 ________________________________________ 6
3 . Date T r ia l Began J u ly 11/ 1977 ________________________ 315
^ . Date Sentence Imposed J u ly 14. 1977__________________ n a
6
73a
6 . D a c e T r i a l J u d g e ' s R e p o r t C o m p l e t e d 3 / 2 7 / 7 8
7 . * * D a t e R e c e i v e d b y S u p r e m e C o u r t
C*D<p-------------------------------
C . . ^ * D a t e S e n t e n c e R e v i e w C o m p l e t e d
9 . * T o t a l E l a p s e d D a y s _____________
* T o b e c o m p l e t e d b y S u p r e m e C o u r t
T h i s r e p o r t w a s s u b m i t t e d t o t h e d e f e n d a n t ’ s c o u n s e l f o r s u c h c o m m e n t s a s
h e d e s i r e d t o m ake c o n c e r n i n g t h e f a c t u a l a c c u r a c y o f t h e r e p o r t , a n d
O
1 . H i s c o m m e n t s a r e a t t a c h e d { )
2 He s t a t e d h e h a d n o c o m m e n t s ( x )
3 . He h a s n o t r e s p o n d e d ( )
March 27 1978
Date J u d g e , S u p e r i o r C o u r t o f
Richmond C o u n t y
7
74
a
/fc . u w -
0i
6S
7
75a
ST ATE OF GEORGIA
VS
ALFONZO MORGAN
STATE OF GEORGIA C L E R K 'S OFF ICE
RICHMOND COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT
I , H e l e n M. S p e l t z , C l e r k o f t h e S u p e r i o r C o u r t o f R i c h m o n d
C o u n t y , G e o r g i a , h e r e b y c e r t i f y t h a t t h e f o r e g o i n g T r i a l J u d g e ' s
R e p o r t i s t h e o r i g i n a l t a k e n f r o m t h e f i l e s o f t h i s o f f i c e , i n
t h e a b o v e s t a t e d c a s e .
W i t n e s s my s i g n a t u r e a n d t h e s e a l o f s a i d C o u r t h e r e t o a f f i x e d
a t A u g u s t a , G e o r g i a , t h i s 3 1 s t d a y o f M a r c h . 1 9 7 8 .
(u. Vn /2 "
76a
lid,
APPENDIX T
SUMMARY OF CAPITAL CASES AVAILABLE TO
THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA FOR COM
PARISON PURPOSES AT THE END OF 1977, IN
WHICH (1) LIFE SENTENCES WERE IMPOSED
AND (2) THE COURT’S ASSISTANT REPORTED
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES*
Table 1
Cases in which Youth was Reported as a Mitigating
Circumstance
Sanders v. State, 235 Ga. 425, 219 S.E.2d 768
(1975)**
Tarpkin [Johnny] v. State, 236 Ga. 67, 222 S.E.2d
364 ( 1976)**
Tarpkin [Robert] v. State, 236 Ga. 67, 222 S.E.2d
364 ( 1976)**
Fuller v. State, 231 Ga. 818, 204 S.E.2d 592
(1974)**
Sims v. State, 229 Ga. 33, 189 S.E.2d 68 ( 1972)**
Stovall v. State, 236 Ga. 840, 225 S.E.2d 292 (1976)
Riley v. State, 237 Ga. 124, 226 S.E.2d 922 (1976)
Gibson v. State, 236 Ga. 175, 223 S.E.2d 150 ( 1976)
Davis v. State, 233 Ga. 638, 212 S.E.2d 814 ( 1975)
* Counsel for Petitioner have examined the trial judge’s question
naires in the cases summarized in this Appendix. The questionnaires
are on file in the Supreme Court of Georgia under the custody of the
Assistant to the Georgia Supreme Court {see Ga. Code Ann. §27-2537
(f)-(h )). If the Court desires, Counsel for Petitioner will supply the
Court with copies of the questionnaires.
** Jury instructed that it could find one or more of the statutory
aggravating circumstances charged in petitioner’s case.
78a
Table 2
Cases in which the Lack of a Prior Criminal Record was Reported as a
Mitigating Circumstance
Sanders v. State, 235 Ga. 425, 219 S.E.2d 768
(1975)**
Burke v. State, 234 Ga. 512, 216 S.E.2d 812
(1975)**
English v. State, 234 Ga. 602, 216 S.E.2d 851
(1975)**
Stovall v. State, 236 Ga. 840, 225 S.E.2d 292 (1976)
Jackson v. State, 234 Ga. 602, 216 S.E.2d 851 ( 1975)
Henderson v. State, 234 Ga. 893, 218 S.E.2d 622
(1975)
Cooper v. State, 229 Ga. 277, 191 S.E.2d 27 (1972)
Coffee v. State, 230 Ga. 123, 195 S.E.2d 897 (1973)
Brown v. State, 228 S.E.2d 215, 184 S.E.2d 655
(1971)
Chandle v. State, 230 Ga. 574, 198 S.E.2d 289
(1973)
Reese v. State, 231 Ga. 799, 204 S.E.2d 152 ( 1974)
Spencer v. State, 231 Ga. 705, 203 S.E.2d 856 (1974)
Gaines v. State, 232 Ga. 727, 208 S.E.2d 798 ( 1974)
Johnson v. State, 231 Ga. 138, 200 S.E.2d 734 (1973)
Butler v. State, 231 Ga. 276, 201 S.E.2d 448 (1973)
McClendon v. State, 231 Ga. 47, 199 S.E.2d 904
(1973)
Allen v. State, 230 Ga. 772, 199 S.E.2d 246 (1973)
York v. State, 226 Ga. 281, 174 S.E.2d 418 (1970)
Griffin v. State, 237 Ga. 532, 228 S.E.2d 908 (1976)
Banks v. State, 227 Ga. 578, 182 S.E.2d 106 (1971)
Page v. State, 237 Ga. 20, 227 S.E.2d 8 ( 1976)
** Jury instructed that it could find one or more of the statutory
aggravating circumstances charged in petitioner’s case.
79a
Rini v. State, 236 Ga. 715, 225 S.E.2d 234 (1976)
Herlong v. State, 236 Ga. 326, 223 S.E.2d 672 (1976)
Glass v. State, 235 Ga. 17, 218 S.E.2d 776 (1975)
Lavender v. State, 234 Ga. 608, 216 S.E.2d 855
(1975)
Shy v. State, 234 Ga. 816, 218 S.E.2d 599 (1975)
Jones v. State, 234 Ga. 108, 214 S.E.2d 544 (1975)
Table 3
Cases in which the jury was instructed that it could find one
or more of the statutory aggravating circumstances charged
in petitioner’s case, and where there were mitigating factors
reported (other than youth or lack of a prior criminal
record)
Brooks v. State, 233 Ga. 524, 212 S.E.2d 355 (1975)
Scott v. State, 230 Ga. 413, 197 S.E.2d 338 ( 1973)
Jackson v. State, 234 Ga. 153, 210 S.E.2d 673 (1975)
Owens v. State, 233 Ga. 905, 213 S.E.2d 860 ( 1975)
Gaither v. State, 234 Ga. 465, 216 S.E.2d 324 (1975)
Stamper v. State, 235 Ga. 165, 219 S.E.2d 140
(1975)
80a
Table 4
Cases Where Mitigating Factors Other Than Youth Or
Lack of Prior Record Were Reported
Stewart v. State, 234 Ga. 3, 214 S.E.2d 509 (1975)
Wood v. State, 234 Ga. 623, 216 S,E.2d 865 ( 1975)
Graham v. State, 234 Ga. 520, 216 S.E.2d 817
(1975)
Battle v. State, 234 Ga. 637, 217 S.E.2d 255 ( 1975)
Lindsey v. State, 234 Ga. 874, 218 S.E.2d 585 ( 1975)
Henderson v. State, 234 Ga. 827, 218 S.E.2d 612
(1975)
Jones v. State, 234 Ga. 648, 217 S.E.2d 597 (1975)
Harrison v. State, 236 Ga. 355, 223 S.E.2d 715
(1976)
Wessner v. State, 236 Ga. 162, 223 S.E.2d 141
(1976)
Graham v. State, 236 Ga. 378, 223 S„E.2d 803
(1976)
Brannen v. State, 235 Ga. 505, 220 S.E.2d 264
(1975)
Williams v. State, 232 Ga. 203, 206 S.E.2d 37 (1974)
Young v. State, 232 Ga. 285, 206 S.E.2d 439 (1974)
Coats v. State, 234 Ga. 659, 217 S.E.2d 260 ( 1975)
Teasley v. State, 228 Ga. 107, 184 S.E.2d 179 (1971)
81a APPENDIX U
OTHER DEATH CASES IN WHICH THE GEORGIA SUPREME
COURT HAS CONSIDERED THE ADEQUACY
OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS
EXPLANATION OF SUMMARY CHART
The following chart summarizes the characteristics of
the jury charges in the 29 cases (other than petitioner’s) in
which the Georgia Supreme Court has explicitly dealt with
the adequacy of jury instructions.*
For each case, the chart indicates in the first column
whether or not the Georgia Supreme Court approved the
trial court’s charge. In columns 2-5, the chart indicates,
for each case, whether or not the charge included distinct
characteristics necessary to make a death penalty charge
under the Georgia statute, and this Court’s decisions,
accurate and clear:
1. An instruction that the jury was authorized to
consider mitigating circumstances.
2. A definition of the legal term “mitigation”.
3. Particular mitigating circumstances which the
jury could consider.
4. An instruction that, even if it found statutory
aggravating circumstances, the jury could nevertheless
return a sentence of life imprisonment.
* The jury charges are part of the records of the Supreme Court
of Georgia. Counsel for petitioner has examined the instructions, and
will, if the Court desires, make copies available for its use.
82a
OTHER DEATH CASES IN WHICH THE GEORGIA SUPREME
COURT HAS CONSIDERED THE ADEQUACY
OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Case*
i
Charge
Approved
by State
Sup. Ct.
2
Instructed
to Consider
Mitigating
Circum
stances
3
Definition
of the Term
“Mitigation”
4
Particular
Mitigating
Circum
stances
Suggested
5
Authorized
to Return
Life Sen
tence Even if Aggravat
ing Circum
stances
Found
1. Street............... Yes Yes No No
2. Fleming........... ....... No Yes No( 1) No No(2)
3. Hawes.............. ..... . No No No No Yes(3)
4. Spraggins......... ..... . No No No No No
5. Redd(4).......... ....... No No No No No(5)
* A list of citations by line number appears at 86a.
(1) The court twice used the term “extenuation” along with “mitigation”.
(2) But the court did state that “if you find . . . aggravating circumstances, you
may fix the punishment at death.” (emphasis supplied)
(3) At first, the court did not so charge, but a colloquy between the court and
defense counsel in the presence of the jury made this clear.
(4) Judge Fulcher gave precisely the same instruction in petitioner’s case as he
gave in Redd, except: (i) the state did not seek the death penalty for
kidnapping in petitioner’s case, so he did not charge on that offense; (2) in
petitioners case, he defined “aggravated battery”; and (3) in petitioner’s
case, he added to his general instruction that the jury should consider all
the facts and circumstances, the phrase: “including any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances”.
(5) Defense counsel specifically requested such a charge. Judge Fulcher noted
the objection, but did not recharge.
83a
t 2 3 4 5
Case
Charge
Approved by
State
Sup. Ct.
Instructed
to Consider
Mitigating
Circum
stances
Definition
of the Term
“Mitigation”
Particular
Mitigating
Circum
stances
Suggested
Authorized
to Return Life
Sentence Even
if Aggravating
Circum
stances
Found
6 . L a m b ................. ...... N o Y e s ( 6 ) N o N o N o
7. D a v i s .................. ...... N o N o N o N o N o
8. T h o m a s ............ ...... Y e s Y e s Y e s N o Y e s
9. P r e s n e l l ............ Y e s Y e s Y e s N o Y e s
10. P o t t s ( 7 ) ........... Y e s N o ( 8 ) Y e s N o Y e s
11. P o t t s ( 7 ) ........... ...... Y e s Y e s Y e s N o Y e s
12. S p i v e y . . . . . ...... . ...... Y e s N o N o N o N o
13. D r a k e ................. ...... Y e s Y e s Y e s N o Y e s
14. B o w e n ............... ...... N o Y e s N o N o N o
15 . A l d e r m a n ........ Y e s Y e s Y e s N o Y e s
16 . S t e v e n s .............. . . . . . N o N o N o N o N o
17. B u r g e r ............... ...... N o N o N o N o N o
(6) The jury was instructed that it could consider the evidence adduced by
defendant during the sentencing phase of the trial.
(7) Defendant was tried and sentenced on separate charges by two separate
courts. Thus, there were two charges reviewed by the Supreme Court of
Georgia.
(8) The court did not explicitly direct the jury to consider mitigating
circumstances, but it did direct the jury to consider all the facts and
circumstances, defined “mitigation”, and informed the jury that it could
“recommend mercy” with or without reason, and that such “recommen
dation” would be binding upon the court.
84a
l 2 3 4 5
Case
Charge
approved
by State
Sup. Ct.
Instructed
to consider
Mitigating
Circum
stances?
Definition
of the Term
“Mitigation”
Particular
Mitigating
Circum
stances
Suggested
Authorized to
Return Life
Sentence
Even if
Aggravating
Circum
stances
Found
18. Stephens......... ..... Yes(9) Yes(10) No No Yes( 11)
19. Westbrook...... ...... Yes Yes No No( 12) Yes( 13)
20. Berry hill......... . ..... Yes(9) No No No No
21. Banks.............. ...... Yes(9) Yes Yes Yes( 14) No
22. Young............. ..... Yes(9) Yes Yes No Yes
23. Johnson ........... ..... Yes Yes Yes No Yes
24. Finney............. ..... Yes Yes No No Yes( 13)
(9) The charge was implicitly approved during the mandatory direct sentence
review, and explicitly approved when the State Supreme Court affirmed the
denial of defendant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
(10) The jury was instructed twice, in the proper context, that they should consider
mitigating circumstances.
(11) Though it was not made explicit.
(12) But court calls jury’s attention to evidence brought out by defendant during
presentencing hearing.
(13) But there is some confusion in the charge.
(14) The defendant’s youth (he was 23 at the time of the offense).
85a
i 2 3 4 5
Case
Charge
Approved
by
State
Sup. Ct.
Instructed
to Con
sider Miti
gating
Circum
stances
Definition
of the
Term
“Mitiga
tion”
Particular
Mitigating
Circum
stances
Suggested
Authorized
to Return
Life
Sentence
Even if
Aggravat
ing Cir
cumstances
Found
25. Goodwin.......... ..... Yes( 15) No No No No
26. Ruffin............ . Yes No No No No
27. Godfrey........... Yes Yes Yes No Yes
28. Harris............. . ...... Yes/No( 16) No No No No
29. Holton( 17)............. No No No No No
(15) The charge was implicitly approved during the mandatory direct sentence
review, and explicitly approved when the State Supreme Court affirmed
the denial of defendant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
(16) The charge was explicitly approved during the mandatory sentence
review, and explicitly disapproved when the State Supreme Court
reversed the denial of defendant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
(17) Both the prosecutor and the trial court conceded that the charge was
inadequate, and the State Supreme Court agreed.
86a
Citations for Death Cases in Which the
Georgia Supreme Court has Considered
the Adequacy of Jury Instructions
No.
on Chart Case
1. Street v. State, 237 Ga. 84, 226 S.E.2d 911
(1976) .
2. Fleming v. State, 240 Ga. 142, 240 S.E.2d 37
( 1977).
3. Hawes v. State, 240 Ga. 327, 240 S.E.2d 833
(1977) .
4. Spraggins v. State, 240 Ga. 759, 243 S.E.2d 20
( 1978).
5. Redd v. State, 240 Ga. 753, 242 S.E.2d 628
( 1978).
6. Lamb v. State, 241 Ga. 10, 243 S.E.2d 59, cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 914 (1978).
7. Davis v. State, 241 Ga. 376, 243 S.E.2d 12
( 1978).
8. Thomas v. State, 240 Ga. 393, 242 S.E.2d 1
(1977) .
9. Presnell v. State, 241 Ga. 49, 243 S.E.2d 496
(1978) .
10. Potts v. State (first trial), 241 Ga. 67, 243 S.E.2d
510 ( 1978).
11. Potts v. State (2nd trial), 241 Ga. 67, 243 S.E.2d
510 ( 1978).
12. Spivey v. State, 241 Ga. 477, 240 S.E.2d 37, cert.
denied, No. 78-5460, slip op. (Ga. Sup. Ct.,
Dec. 4, 1978).
13. Drake v. State, 241 Ga. 583, 247 S.E.2d 57
( 1978).
14. Bowen v. State, 241 Ga. 492, 246 S.E.2d 322
(1978).
Alderman v. State, 241 Ga. 496, 246 S.E.2d 642,
cert, denied, No. 78-5490, slip op. (Ga. Sup.
Ct., Nov. 27, 1978).
15.
87a
No.
on Chart Case
16. Stevens v. State, 242 Ga. 34, 247 S.E.2d 838
(1978).
17. Burger v. State, 242 Ga. 28, 274 S.E.2d 834
(1978).
18. Stephens v. State, 237 Ga. 259, 227 S.E.2d 261
(1976);
Stephens v. Hopper, 241 Ga. 596, 247 S.E.2d 92
(1978), cert, denied, No. 78-5544, slip op.
(Nov. 27, 1978).
19. Westbrook v. State, 242 Ga. 151, 249 S.E.2d 524
(1978).
20. Berryhill v. State, 235 Ga. 549, 221 S.E.2d 185
(1975) , cert, denied, 429 U.S. 1054 (1977).
Berryhill v. Ricketts, .... Ga........, 249 S.E.2d
197 (1978).
21. Banks v. State, 237 Ga. 325, 227 S.E.2d 380
(1976) , cert, denied, 430 U.S. 975 (1977);
Banks v. Glass, No. 33786, slip op. (Ga. Sup.
Ct., Nov. 7, 1978).
22. Young v. State, 237 Ga. 852, 230 S.E.2d 287
(1976); Young v. Ricketts, .... Ga....... , 250
S.E.2d 404 (1978).
23. Johnson v. State, 242 Ga. 649 (1978).
24. Finney v. State, 242 Ga. 583, 250 S.E.2d 388
(1978).
25. Goodwin v. State, 236 Ga. 339, 223 S.E.2d 703
(1976), cert, denied, 431 U.S. 909 (1977);
Goodwin v. Hopper, No. 34234, slip op. (Ga.
Sup. Ct., Feb. 6, 1979).
26. Ruffin v. State, No. 33865, slip op. (Ga. Sup. Ct.,
Jan. 24, 1979).
27. Godfrey v. State, No. 34256, slip op. (Ga. Sup.
Ct., Feb. 24, 1979).
28. Harris v. State, 237 Ga. 718, 230 S.E.2d 1
(1976); Harris v. Hopper, No. 34567, slip op.
(Ga. Sup. Ct. Feb. 27, 1979).
29. Holton v. State, No. 34272, slip op. (Ga. Sup.
Ct., March 6, 1979).
88a APPENDIX V
CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
United States Constitution
Fourth Amendment
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
Fifth Amendment
“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the
land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any
person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.”
Sixth Amendment
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury
of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the wit
nesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtain
ing witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence.”
89a
Eighth Amendment
“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments in
flicted.”
Fourteenth Amendment: Section 1
“All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.”
Georgia Code Annotated
§ 26-1101 Murder
“ (a) A person commits murder when he unlawfully
and with malice aforethought, either express or implied,
causes the death of another human being. Express malice
is that deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life
of a fellow creature, which is manifested by external
circumstances capable of proof. Malice shall be implied
where no considerable provocation appears, and where all
the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and
malignant heart.
“ (b) A person also commits the crime of murder
when in the commission of a felony he causes the death of
another human being, irrespective of malice.
“ (c) A person convicted of murder shall be punished
by death or by imprisonment for life.”
90a
§ 26-1311 Kidnapping
“ (a) A person commits kidnapping when he abducts
or steals away any person without lawful authority or
warrant and holds such person against his will.
“ (b) A person over the age of 17 commits kidnap
ping when he forcibly, maliciously, or fraudulently leads,
takes, or carries away, or decoys or entices away, any child
under the age of 16 years against the will of the child’s
parents or other person having lawful custody.
“A person convicted of kidnapping shall be punished
by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20
years: Provided that a person convicted of kidnapping for
ransom shall be punished by life imprisonment or by
death; and Provided, further, that if the person kidnapped
shall have received bodily injury, the person convicted
shall be punished by life imprisonment or by death.”
§ 26-1901 Robbery
“A person commits robbery when, with intent to
commit theft, he takes property of another from the
person or the immediate presence of another (a) by use of
force; or (b) by intimidation, by the use of threat or
coercion, or by placing such person in fear of immediate
serious bodily injury to himself or to another; or (c) by
sudden snatching. A person convicted of robbery shall be
punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more
than 20 years.”
§ 27-2503 Presentence hearing in felony cases
“ (a) Except in cases in which the death penalty may
be imposed, upon the return of a verdict o f ‘guilty’ by the
jury in any felony case, the judge shall dismiss the jury
and shall conduct a presentence hearing at which the only
issue shall be the determination of punishment to be
imposed. In such hearing the judge shall hear additional
91a
evidence in extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation of
punishment, including the record of any prior criminal
convictions and pleas of guilty or pleas of nolo contendere
of the defendant, or the absence of any prior conviction
and pleas: Provided, however, that only such evidence in
aggravation as the State has made known to the defendant
prior to his trial shall be admissible. The judge shall also
hear argument by the defendant or his counsel and the
prosecuting attorney, as provided by law, regarding the
punishment to be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall
open and the defendant shall conclude the argument. In
cases in which the death penalty may be imposed, the
judge when sitting without a jury shall follow the addi
tional procedure provided in section 27-2534.1. Upon the
conclusion of the evidence and arguments the judge shall
impose the sentence or shall recess the trial for the purpose
of taking the sentence to be imposed under advisement.
The judge shall fix a sentence within the limits prescribed
by law. If the trial court is reversed on appeal because of
error only in the presentence hearing, the new trial which
may be ordered shall apply only to the issue of punish
ment.
“ (b) In all cases in which the death penalty may be
imposed and which are tried by a jury, upon a return of a
verdict of guilty by the jury, the court shall resume the
trial and conduct a presentence hearing before the jury.
Such hearing shall be conducted in the same manner as
presentence hearings conducted before the judge as pro
vided in subsection (a) of this section. Upon the con
clusion of the evidence and arguments, the judge shall
give the jury appropriate instructions, and the jury shall
retire to determine whether any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, as defined in section 27-2534.1, exist and
whether to recommend mercy for the defendant. Upon
the findings of the jury, the judge shall fix a sentence
within the limits prescribed by law.”
92a
§ 27-2514 Sentence of death; copy for penitentiary
superintendent. Time and mode of conveying prisoner to
penitentiary. Expenses
“Upon a verdict or judgment of death made by a jury
or a judge, it shall be the duty of the presiding judge to
sentence such convicted person to death and to make such
sentence in writing, which shall be filed with the papers in
the case against such convicted person, and a certified
copy thereof shall be sent by the clerk of the court in
which said sentence is pronounced to the superintendent
of the State penitentiary, not less than 10 days prior to the
time fixed in the sentence of the court for the execution of
the same; and in all cases it shall be the duty of the sheriff
of the county in which such convicted person is so
sentenced, together with one deputy or more, if in his
judgment it is necessary, and provided that in all cases the
number of guards shall be approved by the trial judge, or
if he is not available, by the ordinary of said county in
which such prisoner is sentenced, to convey such convicted
person to said penitentiary, not more than 20 days nor less
than two days prior to the time fixed in the judgment for
the execution of such condemned person, unless otherwise
directed by the Governor, or unless a stay of execution has
been caused by appeal, granting of a new trial, or other
order of a court of competent jurisdiction, and the expense
for transporting of said person to the penitentiary for the
purpose of electrocution shall be paid by the ordinary of
the county wherein the conviction was had, or the board
of county commissioners, the county commissioner, or
other person or persons having charge of the county funds,
out of any funds on hand in the treasury7 of such county.
§ 27-2534.1 Mitigating and aggravating circum
stances; death penalty
“(a) The death penalty may be imposed for the
offenses of aircraft hijacking or treason, in any case.
93a
“ (b) In all cases of other offenses for which the death
penalty may be authorized, the judge shall consider, or he
shall include in his instructions to the jury for it to
consider, any mitigating circumstances or aggravating
circumstances otherwise authorized by law and any of the
following statutory aggravating circumstances which may
be supported by the evidence:
“ (1) The offense of murder, rape, armed rob
bery, or kidnapping was committed by a person with
a prior record of conviction for a capital felony, or the
offense of murder was committed by a person who
has a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal
convictions.
“ (2) The offense of murder, rape, armed rob
bery, or kidnapping was committed while the offend
er was engaged in the commission of another capital
felony, or aggravated battery, or the offense of mur
der was committed while the offender was engaged in
the commission of burglary or arson in the first
degree.
“ (3) The offender by his act of murder, armed
robbery, or kidnapping knowingly created a great
risk of death to more than one person in a public
place by means of a weapon or device which would
normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one
person.
“ (4) The offender committed the offense of
murder for himself or another, for the purpose of
receiving money or any other thing of monetary
value.
“ (5) The murder of a judicial officer, former
judicial officer, district attorney or solicitor or former
district attorney or solicitor during or because of the
exercise of his official duty.
94a
“ (6) The offender caused or directed another to
commit murder or committed murder as an agent or
employee of another person.
“ (7) The offense of murder, rape, armed rob
bery, or kidnapping was outrageously or wantonly
vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture,
depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the
victim.
“ (8) The offense of murder was committed
against any peace officer, corrections employee or
fireman while engaged in the performance of his
official duties.
“ (9) The offense of murder was committed by a
person in, or who has escaped from, the lawful
custody of a peace officer or place of lawful con
finement.
“ (10) The murder was committed for the pur
pose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a
lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful con
finement, of himself or another.
“ (c) The statutory instructions as determined by the
trial judge to be warranted by the evidence shall be given
in charge and in writing to the jury for its deliberation.
The jury, if its verdict be a recommendation of death,
shall designate in writing, signed by the foreman of the
jury, the aggravating circumstance or circumstances which
it found beyond a reasonable doubt. In non-jury cases the
judge shall make such designation. Except in cases of
treason or aircraft hijacking, unless at least one of the
statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in section
27-2534.1(b) is so found, the death penalty shall not be
imposed.”
95a
§ 27-2537 Review of death sentences
“ (a) Whenever the death penalty is imposed, and
upon the judgment becoming final in the trial court, the
sentence shall be reviewed on the record by the Supreme
Court of Georgia. The clerk of the trial court, within 10
days after receiving the transcript, shall transmit the entire
record and transcript to the Supreme Court of Georgia
together with a notice prepared by the clerk and a report
prepared by the trial judge. The notice shall set forth the
title and docket number of the case, the name of the
defendant and the name and address of his attorney, a
narrative statement of the judgment, the offense, and the
punishment prescribed. The report shall be in the form of
a standard questionnaire prepared and supplied by the
Supreme Court of Georgia.
“ (b) The Supreme Court of Georgia shall consider
the punishment as well as any errors enumerated by way
of appeal.
“ (c) With regard to the sentence, the court shall
determine:
“ (1) Whether the sentence of death was im
posed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or
any other arbitrary factor, and
“(2) Whether, in cases other than treason or
aircraft hijacking, the evidence supports the jury’s or
judge’s finding of a statutory aggravating circum
stance as enumerated in section 27-2534.1(b), and
“ (3) Whether the sentence of death is excessive
or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar
cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.
“ (d) Both the defendant and the State shall have the
right to submit briefs within the time provided by the
court, and to present oral argument to the court.
96a
“ (e) The court shall include in its decision a reference
to those similar cases which it took into consideration. In
addition to its authority regarding correction of errors, the
court, with regard to review of death sentences, shall be
authorized to:
“ (1) Affirm the sentence of death; or
“ (2) Set the sentence aside and remand the case
for resentencing by the trial judge based on the
record and argument of counsel. The records of those
similar cases referred to by the Supreme Court of
Georgia in its decision, and the extracts prepared as
hereinafter provided for, shall be provided to the
resentencing judge for his consideration.
“ (f) There shall be an Assistant to the Supreme
Court, who shall be an attorney appointed by the Chief
Justice of Georgia and who shall serve at the pleasure of
the court. The court shall accumulate the records of all
capital felony cases in which sentence was imposed after
January 1, 1970, or such earlier date as the court may
deem appropriate. The Assistant shall provide the court
with whatever extracted information it desires with respect
thereto, including but not limited to a synopsis or brief of
the facts in the record concerning the crime and the
defendant.
“ (g) The court shall be authorized to employ an
appropriate staff and such methods to compile such data
as are deemed by the Chief Justice to be appropriate and
relevant to the statutory questions concerning the validity
of the sentence.
“ (h) The office of the Assistant shall be attached to
the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia for
administrative purposes.
“ (i) The sentence review shall be in addition to
direct appeal, if taken, and the review and appeal
97a
shall be consolidated for consideration. The court
shall render its decision on legal errors enumerated,
the factual substantiation of the verdict, and the
validity of the sentence.”
Rules of the Supreme Court of Georgia
Rule 34. (Codified at Ga. Code Ann. §24-4534)
(a) Any breach of one or more of these rules,
whether intentionally or by inexcusable negligence,
will subject the offender to be dealt with for contempt
or by revocation of the privilege of practicing before
this court.
( b ) The court considers it the duty of counsel for
the appellee as well as the appellant to timely comply
with these rules.