Mapp v. Board of Education of the City of Chattanooga, Tennessee Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari

    In The

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM 1975

No. 75-1564

JAMES JONATHAN MAPP, et ah,
Petitioners,

vs.

THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY 
OF CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE,

Respondent.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR A 
WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES 

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

RAYMOND B. W ITT, JR.,
W ITT, GAITHER, RICHARDSON, 

HENNISS & WHITAKER

1100 American National Bank Building 
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402

Attorneys for Respondent

COURT INDEX PRESS, INC. —  809 Walnut Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 —  (513) 241-1450



INDEX

Page
COUNTER STATEMENT OF THE QUESTIONS 

PRESENTED .........................................................................  1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ...............................................  3

The Action Under Review Here .........................................  3

Factual Background ................................................................. 3

REASONS FOR DENYING THE W RIT ............................  10

CONCLUSION ..............................   16

APPENDIX A: Decision of Court of Appeals dated
October 20, 1975 and Order of 
January 27, 1976 ..................................  la-19a

APPENDIX B; Book entitled “Chattanooga Public 
Schools Chattanooga, Tennessee, 
Attendance Zones Pupil Enrollment 
Data, Part III, Summary Analysis 
of Enrollment Experience, Black- 
White Ratio Stability” ........................ 20a-27a



II.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka I,

374 U.S. 483 ................................................................... 3, 10, 11

Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka II,
394 U.S. 295 ..........................................................  3, 10, 11, 15

Green v. County School Board of New Kent County,
Virginia, 391 U.S. 430 (1968) .............................................  11

Mapp v. Board of Education of Chattanooga,
329 F.Supp. 1374 .................................................
aff’d 477 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1973) ...................
cert, denied 414 U.S. 1022 (1 9 7 3 )...................
373 F.2d 75 (1967) ...........................................
366 F.Supp. 1257 (1 9 7 3 )....................................

Pasadena City Board of Education, et al v. Nancy 
Anne Spangler, et al and United States of America,
44 U.S.L.W. 3271 ................................................................... 7, 8

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
402 U.S. 1 (1 9 7 1 )................................  4, 5, 7, 10, 11, 12, 15

Constitutional Provisions:

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution .............................................................................  11

2, 5 
2, 5 
. 2 
. 4 
. 14



In The

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM 1975

No. 75-1564

JAMES JONATHAN MAPP, et al.,
Petitioners,

vs.

THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY 
OF CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE,

Respondent.

BR IEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR A 
W RIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES 

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

Respondent accepts Petitioners’ statement of jurisdiction but 
cannot accept their statement of tire question presented or 
the statement of the case.

COUNTER STATEMENT OF THE 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The questions presented which were correctly resolved by 
the District Court and the Appellate Court are whether a 
formerly de jure dual school system is under a continuing 
annual responsibility to assign its white children throughout 
the school system in such a manner as to avoid having any 
schools with a racial balance disproportionate to the system- 
wide racial balance where such racial disproportion as may 
then exist in the system “is not the result of any present



Of past discrimination upon the part of the Board or other 
state agency,” but “rather is a consequence of demographic 
and other factors not within any reasonable responsibility of 
the Board.”1 * * * 5 The District Court and the Court of Appeals 
answer was in the negative and should be affirmed by a denial 
of the Petitioners’ petition for a writ of certiorari.

The second issue correctly decided by the District Court 
and the Appellate Court is as follows: whether once a de 
jure school system has implemented a desegregation plan, as 
approved by the District Court and the Court of Appeals, with 
petition having been denied by the United States Supreme 
Court, is there any Constitutional requirement that additional 
white students received into the school system through annex­
ation subsequent to the District Court order be dispersed 
throughout the system in order to achieve a racial balance 
system-wide? Both the District Court and the Court of Ap­
peals answered this question in the negative and should be 
affirmed by this court’s denial of the Petitioners’ petition for 
writ of certiorari.

The October 20, 1975 2-1 decision of the Court of Appeals 
affirms the District Court without any qualifications. A peti­
tion for rehearing and a suggestion of a rehearing en banc 
in said case was denied by the Court of Appeals on January 
27, 1976. A copy of said opinions appears as Appendix A to 
this brief in opposition.

1 Mapp v. Board of Education of Chattanooga, 329 F.Supp. 1374,
1384 (aff’d 477 F .2d  851) (6th Cir. 197 3 ), cert, denied, 414 U.S.
1022 (1 9 7 3 ). As to the Junior High Schools the District Court said:

“Rather, such limited racial imbalance as may remain is the conse­
quence of demographical, residential, or other factors which in 
no reasonable sense could be attributed to School Board action 
or inaction, past or present, nor to that of any other state agency.
The Court is accordingly of the opinion that the defendants’ plan 
for desegregation of the Chattanooga Junior High Schools will 
eliminate ‘all vestiges of state imposed segregation’ as required 
by the Swann decision.” (Emphasis added)



3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 

The Action Under Review Here

This petition seeks to review a judgment of the District 
Court in a school desegregation case affirmed by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, where the Dis­
trict Court refused to order the submission of a new desegrega­
tion plan when two high schools remained substantially all­
black in spite of affirmative efforts by the Chattanooga Board 
of Education (hereinafter referred to as C B E ) to desegregate 
said schools and where subsequent and proposed territorial 
annexation would appear to provide additional white students 
in the system. Such is the essence of respondent’s appeal, 
Case No. 74-2100, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

All of the testimony with reference to the subsequent and 
proposed annexation was introduced by the Petitioners in re­
buttal and response to a motion for further relief by CBE 
requesting amendment of the Amended Desegregation Plan of 
June 16, 1971. The motion of CBE was the reason for the 
evidentiary hearing in October of 1973.

The District Court’s opinion also refused to allow CBE to 
amend a previously approved desegregation plan involving 
decisions based upon race, contiguous busing, pairing, cluster­
ing, and racial gerrymandering of zones. The limited amend­
ment was sought by respondent (C B E) in order to receive 
the Court’s permission to implement changes in the desegrega­
tion plan designed to diminish the white withdrawal from the 
system. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court, No. 
74-2101.

Factual Background

On July 22, 1955, respondent issued its initial statement 
of policy in response to the decisions of this Court in Broum 
v. Board of Education of Topeka I, 347 U.S. 483, and Brown 
11, 349 U.S. 295, decided on May 17, 1954 and May 31, 1954, 
respectively, on the subject of student desegregation in public



4

schools. The opening paragraph of said statement read as 
follows:

“The Chattanooga Board of Education will comply with 
the decision of the United States Supreme Court on the 
matter of integration in the public schools.”2

The Board immediately undertook a process of elucida­
tion with the formation of an interracial advisory committee.3

The elucidation process was continued until this litigation 
was filed on April 6, 1960. A gradual desegregation plan was 
approved in 1962 with 16 selected elementary schools being 
desegregated in September of that year in grades one, two, and 
three. All dual zones would have been abolished by 1988. 
At that point in time all parties presumed such to be compli­
ance with the Constitution.

The pace of the desegregation was accelerated pursuant to 
District Court order following a motion for further relief by 
plaintiffs, filed March 29, 1965. The complete elimination of 
dual zones in all grades was effected by December, 1986. Sub­
sequent to affirmance by the Court of Appeals,4 the only 
issue remaining was that of faculty assignments until February 
of 1971 when the District Court dismissed a motion by Peti­
tioners for summary judgment, but set an evidentiary hearing 
classifying the issues for trial and placing the burden of proof 
upon Respondent to prove that the actions taken by Respon­
dent met the obligation to establish a unitary school system.

Shortly after this Court’s opinion in Swarm v. Charlotte- 
M ecklenburg Board o f Education, 402 U.S. 1 (4/20/71) in 
May, the evidentiary hearing was completed and a new de­
segregation plan was ordered to “maximize integration” re­

2 The complete text of this statement appears as Appendix C in a 
petition filed by CBE with this Court on January 29, 1975, No. 75-1077.

3 Said statement appears as Appendix D in petition No. 75-1077.

4 373 F.2d  75 (1967 ).



5

quiring for the first time decisions based upon race for the 
purpose of achieving an adequate constitutional remedy.5

Initial and partial implementation of the 1971 desegregation 
plan began in September of 1971 under the supervision of the 
District Court.

Petitioners took an appeal from this decision on the basis 
that the deviations from a racial balance in the approved plan 
were unacceptable and unconstitutional. A cross appeal was 
taken by CBE contending that remedial measures permitted 
by this Court in Swann were permissible, not required, and 
only in a school system found to be in default of its constitu­
tional obligation; and that CBE was not in default. CBE 
further contended that the District Court opinion in its refer­
ence to maximizing integration read the racial balance lan­
guage in Swann as being constitutionally mandatory' and not 
merely “a starting point.”

In a 2-1 Appellate Court decision rendered on October 11, 
1972 the case was remanded to the District Court. Following 
a motion for rehearing and suggestion of rehearing en banc 
by petitioners, a rehearing en banc was granted with oral 
argument taking place on December 14, 1972. On April 30, 
1973, 477 F,2d 851, an en banc decision of the Court of Ap­
peals reversed the 2-1 decision and affirmed the District Court s 
opinion.6

In the summer of 1973 and as a result of the experience of 
two years under the amended desegregation plan, CBE, having 
experienced substantial withdrawal of white students from the 
system, conducted a careful evaluation of the system and 
particularly the possible causes of the withdrawal from the 
schools. The 1971 amended desegregation plan had not been 
fully implemented in the elementary and junior high schools

5 329 F.Supp. 1374 (1 9 7 1 ).

6 477 F .2d  851, with Judges Weick and O’Sullivan dissenting and with 
a separate concurrence by Judge Miller,



6

during the two years experience under examination. CBE also 
made a projection of the possible impact upon the system of 
additional busing projected for full implementation of the 
plan. Recognizing the possible constitutional obligation upon 
a board to avoid inaction which might later be alleged to have 
contributed to student resegregation, CBE, on July 20, 1973, 
filed a Motion for Further Relief: to Adjust Amended Plan of 
Desegregation, as filed June 16, 1971. An extended evidentiary 
hearing was held in Gctber of 1973 in which the actual ex­
perience of CBE in September of 1971, September 1972, and 
September 1973 was presented to the District Court, as well 
as CBE’s plan for attempting to counter the white student 
withdrawal as reflected by the statistical data for the three 
years in question.

In rebuttal, Petitioners offered testimony with reference to 
the probable impact of the completion of annexation (then 
imminent) of certain areas contiguous to the Chattanooga 
system with said areas being populated predominately by white 
students.

CBE’s motion to amend the plan was denied in an opinion 
entered on November 16, 1973. Such opinion provided specific 
guidelines to CBE as to the creation of zones with reference 
to annexed schools, the adjustment of zones within the system, 
and further providing that any such creation or adjustment of 
zones would be required to be submitted to the federal court 
30 days prior to their effective date.

On December 26, 1973, Petitioners filed a motion to amend 
the memorandum opinion of November 16, 1973 and for a 
new trial and further relief. Said motion was supplemented 
with an amendment on January 7, 1974. Said motion was 
denied by the District Court on June 20, 1974 and subsequent 
thereto on July 12, 1974 Petitioners filed a notice of appeal 
requesting a complete new desegregation plan for the Chatta­
nooga system. Subsequent thereto on July 22, CBE filed a cross 
appeal with reference to the District Court’s denial of its



7

motion to amend the plan. Both cases were docketed in the 
Appellate Court on September 30, 19747

The appellate oral argument was held on April 18, 1975 
resulting in a 2-1 decision affirming the District Court without 
qualifications, said opinion being filed on October 20, 1975.7 8 
Thereafter, the Petitioners filed “Motion for Rehearing or Re­
hearing en banc” on November 4, 1975 followed by an “Amend­
ed Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion of Rehearing en 
banc” on November 21, 1975, pursuant to a grant of extension 
in time in which to file said amendment, having been noted on 
November 4, 1975.

In the interim between the filing of the original motion for 
rehearing and the filing of the petition for rehearing, this Court 
granted certiorari in the case of Pasadena City Board of Educa­
tion, et al. v. Nancy Anne Spangler, et al. and United States 
of America, No. 75-164, on November 11, 1975.

In the amended petition of November 21, 1975 Petitioners 
brought to the attention of the Court of Appeals the second 
question presented in the petition for writ of certiorari filed on 
behalf of the Pasadena City Board of Education which read 
as follows:

“2) Is a school system required to amend its judicially 
validated desegregation plan to accommodate for annual 
demographic changes for which it is in no way respon­
sible? Id., at 3271.”

The Petitioners went on to suggest that this Court’s decision 
in Spangler might clarify the language of Swann with respect 
to the need for “year to year adjustments” and provide guid­
ance to the Court of Appeals in re-evaluating its decision in the 
Chattanooga case. In the conclusion to their petition of No­

7 For a more complete statement of the facts from July, 1955 foiwaid, 
see Appendix E  to CBE’s petition before this Court, No. 75-1077.

8 Pages 8 (a )  through 2 7 (a ) inclusive in Petitioners’ Appendix and 
pages 1 (a ) through 1 7 (a ) of Respondent’s petition in No. 75-1077.



8

vember 21, 1975, Petitioners went on to request that any 
action upon their motion for rehearing be stayed, pending this 
Court’s decision in Spangler, supra.

Upon receiving notification on November 11, 1975 of the 
action of this Court in granting certiorari in Spangler, CBE’s 
counsel requested and received a copy of the petition for writ 
of certiorari as filed on behalf of the Pasadena School Board. 
Following an analysis of this petition, CBE sought and received 
permission from counsel in the Spangler case to file an amicus 
curiae brief in that case. The brief was filed in the last week 
of December 1975.

On January 27, 1976 an order by the Appellate Court was 
filed denying Petitioners’ petition for a rehearing.9

The next day, Wednesday, January 28, 1976, a petition by 
CBE seeking a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the 
United States District Court, Eastern District of Tennessee, 
Southern Division, made and entered into this case pursuant 
to the memorandum opinion of November 16, 1973, and/or 
the affirmance of said opinion of the District Court affirmed 
by the United States District Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit on October 20, 1975, was placed in the mail from Cin­
cinnati, Ohio directed to the Clerk of the United States Su­
preme Court,

On the following day, Thursday, January 29, CBE received 
in the United States mail its first notice of the action of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in the 
form of a copy of an order denying the petition for rehearing 
of plaintiffs-appellants, James Jonathan Mapp, et al, in No. 
74-2100, as filed on Tuesday, January 27. Said petition by 
CBE was received and filed by the Clerk of this Court on 
Friday, January 30.

Petitioners herein did not respond to said petition by CBE. 
On Saturday, April 17, 1976, counsel for CBE received a copy 
of a letter addressed to counsel for Petitioners herein from the 
clerk of this court dated April 14, 1976, indicating this Court’s

9 Pages 2 8 (a ) ,  2 9 (a )  Petitioners’ Appendix, and pages 18a, 19a of 
Respondent’s Appendix hereto. ■



9

request that Petitioners herein respond to the January 30, 1976 
petition by CBE, No, 75-1077.

Subsequent thereto on Monday, April 26, 1976, this petition 
was filed with the Clerk of this Court and counsel for CBE 
received a copy thereof on April 28, 1976.

There are numerous inaccuracies reflected in the statement 
of the case by Petitioners. Illustrative is the reference on page 
three referring to the District Court order of February 4, 1972 
approving the Board’s plan to establish a system-wide voca­
tional technical high school. The record will indicate that 
CBE has maintained a system-wide vocational technical high 
school since 1966. In fact, counsel for Petitioners excluded 
consideration of the Kirkman Technical School from the scope 
of the desegregation plan by a statement in open court during 
the initial part of the hearing in 1971.

The initial appeal from the decision of November 16, 1973 
was that of the Petitioners after the District Court Judge de­
nied their motion to amend said order and for a new trial 
and/or further relief. It was subsequent to and as a result 
of this action by Petitioners that the decision was made by 
CBE to cross appeal from that part of the District Court 
opinion denying their request for permission to amend its 
plan.

A further inaccuracy is reflected on page six where it is 
indicated that the four high schools would be "utilized fully 
for academic programs.” All of the high schools have other 
than academic programs and the change was to make the 
programs in all four high schools substantially similar with 
regard to their educational content including the nonacademic 
area.

In 1971 the Board’s projections with reference to the affirm­
ative action to desegregate Riverside and Howard were in no 
part dependent upon current proposals for elementary and 
junior high school facilities. The initial projections were based 
upon students actually in the 9th grade, the 10th grade, and 
the 11th grade in the zones as redrawn at the direction of the 
Court.



10

An examination of Exhibit B would indicate that the follow­
ing references on page seven were inaccurate:

“Since the plan was not implemented in any meaningful 
sense in September 1971, . .

“No implementation of elementary provisions of the 
Board’s 1971 plan had occurred by the start of the 
1972-73 academic year.”

On page nine and ten the Petitioners state:

“It also approved the Board’s proposal to assign students 
from the newly annexed areas to over 80% white facilities.”

The proposal to the District Court by CBE in October 1973 
did not include any proposals with reference to student assign­
ment in newly annexed areas subsequent to the hearing.

SEASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

Certiorari should be denied because the decision of the 
Court of Appeals is consistent completely with applicable de­
cisions of this Court in Brown 1 and II  and its progeny, particu­
larly Swann.

Demographic changes and other changes within a school 
system, subsequent to district court approval of an amended 
plan of desegregation, when not caused either directly or in­
directly by such school system’s action or inaction, have no 
relevance to the affirmative desegregation constitutional duty 
of the school system even though undesirable racial propor­
tions in schools in the system are the result.

The argument of the Petitioners ignores cause. They con­
strue the constitution to require a school board to act affirma­
tively to eradicate racial segregation no matter what caused 
the racial segregation; and when their own statement of their 
interpretation of the Constitution is limited to “state-imposed 
segregation.”10

10 Petition, p. 14.



li

And further as primary support for such a constitutional con­
clusion, Petitioners proceed immediately to quote from this 
Court’s opinion in Swann v. Charlotte-M ecklenhurg Board of 
Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971). Such quotation utilizes “state- 
enforced discrimination” and “state-imposed segregation” indi­
cating with unquestioned clarity that this Court was not in 
any manner directing its attention to racial segregation caused 
by other than state action.

If the Petitioners’ constitutional interpretation is accepted, 
all of the states of the Union must then assume, as a consti­
tutional duty, the affirmative obligation to act to remove 
all racial segregation which may exist in the future, without 
any consideration of cause. This Court has not so construed 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Brown I and 11 were concerned 
solely with complete school segregation created solely by the 
state.11

Mr. Justice Brennan’s unanimous opinion in Green  v. Coun­
ty School Board o f Neiv Kent County, Virginia, 391 U.S. 430 
(1968), the repeated references to “state-imposed segregation” 
made it clear that this Court was not addressing its attention 
to racial segregation no matter what its cause.12 Swann, supra,

11 “In each instance they have been denied admission to schools 
attended by white children under laws requiring or permitting 
segregation according to race.” Brown 7, pp. 487-8. (Emphasis 
added)

1 2 Green, supra, included the following:
“. . . the State acting through the local school board and school 

officials, organized and operated a dual system, . . .” page 435.
“. . . in the context of the State-imposed segregated pattern . . .” 

page 432.
“. . . then operating State-compelled dual systems . . . ” page 

432.
“. . . toward disestablishing State-imposed segregation.” page 

439.
“. . . for dismantling the State-imposed dual system . . .” page 

439.
. . and the Court should retain jurisdiction until it is clear 

that State-imposed segregation has been completely removed.” 
page 439.

“A desegregation program to effectuate conversion of a State- 
imposed dual system to a unitary, non-racial system . . .” page 441.



was completely consistent with this constitutional concept 
re-enforcing it with eight or more direct references, in a 
manner such as to permit no suggestion of ambiguity.13

Petitioners’ theory is then supported by wholly inaccurate 
references to the racial changes since 1971 in an effort to 
convince this Court that defendant CBE has somehow misled 
the District Court and the Appellate Court by submitting a 
paper plan and then failing to implement such plan.

The pace and the scope of racial desegregation in the Chatta­
nooga School System (CSS) is reflected in the eight pages 
of Exhibit B to this opposition brief. Such is only a minute 
portion of the statistical facts submitted to the District Court 
during the evidentiary hearing in October of 1973.14

1 3 “We granted certiorari in this case to review important issues 
as to the duties of school authorities and the scope of powers of 
Federal Courts under this Court’s mandates to eliminate racially 
separate schools established and maintained by state action.” (Em ­
phasis added) Swann, supra, p. 5.

“. . . state-imposed segregation by race in public schools denies 
equal protection of the laws.” p. 11

“. . . where dual school systems had historically been maintained 
by operation of state laws.” Such is followed by a quote from 
Green which includes the term ‘state-imposed segregation.’ p. 13 

“. . . the massive problem of converting from the state-enforced 
discrimination . . .” p. 14

“. . . to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state- 
imposed segregation . . .” p. 15

“. . . the responsibilities of school authorities in desegregating 
a state-enforced dual school system . . .” p. 18

“. . . a potent weapon for creating or maintaining a state- 
segregated school system . . .” p. 21

l 4 Exhibit No. 3, Book entitled, “Chattanooga Public Schools, Chatta­
nooga, Tennessee, Attendance Zones. Pupil Enrollment Data, Part III, 
Summary Analysis of Enrollment Experience, Black-White Ratio Sta­
bility” introduced as evidence (with a copy handed to local counsel, 
Mr. Williams) on October 3, 1973, Volume I, page 148 of the trial 
transcriot. Such data was prepared from school system summary reports 
Form O S/CR 102, entitled “Elementary and Secondary School Civil



13

Petitioners represent to this Court (p. 15) that ‘ By the
end of the 1972-73 academic year, however, little of the 1971 
desegregation plan had advanced beyond the drawing board. 
(It  should be remembered that dual zones had been en­
tirely disestablished in this system in 1988.) Twenty-three 
(23) of the twenty-nine (29) elementary schools were then 
desegregated. One all-black elementary school, Avondale, had 
shifted from all-white in 1962-63, to all-black in 1971-72 with­
out any action  upon the part of CBE. Bell, Donaldson, Pine- 
ville, Piney Woods, and Trotter had not been desegregated 
because of the lack of transportation needed to implement the 
1971 amended plan. East Lake, Highland Park, Howard, 
Normal Park, Orchard Knob, Pineville and Smith were not 
substantially desegregated because of the same reason. How­
ever, such implementation was ordered by the District Court s 
opinion of November 16, 1973, which is the subject of this 
appeal. Since such final compliance transpired subsequent 
to the October 1973 hearing, these facts are not in the record 
on appeal as it was fully implemented in January-February 
of 1974. The statistical and other evidence of such imple­
mentation is now a part of the District Court record as an 
exhibit to an affidavit of the School Superintendent, Dr. James 
W. Plenry, filed on August 2, 1974. Such facts were made 
available to the Court of Appeals prior to or during the oral 
argument of April 18, 1975.

The tone and detail of the Petitioners’ argument is designed 
to convince this Court that CBE has somehow hoodwinked 
both the District and the Appellate Court. The facts reflected 
in Exhibit B considered alone negate any such conclusion or 
inference. The respondent suggests that judicial notice of 
these facts is necessary for the Court s evaluation of factual 
inaccuracies which appear throughout the petition.

In the first full paragraph on page 16, the petition com-

Rights Survey” filed each year by CBE as required under Title VI of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S. Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare, Office of Civil Rights, Washington, D. C.



14

plains that the action of the District Court Judge character­
izes “the situation as one in which a . . . plan . . . had been 
implemented fully . . The record is that the District Court 
in 1973 ordered full implementation of the elementary and 
junior high schools but recognized that the high school part 
of the plan had been fully implemented by the introduction 
of zoning at the high school level.15 Freedom of choice for the 
high schools only had been in effect since 1968 since the dual 
zones had been abolished. The three formerly all-white high 
schools had been substantially desegregated voluntarily by 
1971. (See Exhibit B, p. 27a).

The dissent at the Appellate level confirms the above 
analysis with reference to elementary and junior high schools 
with the opening sentence of his dissent from the denial of 
the petition to rehear:

“Although the Board of Education of the City of Chatta­
nooga has at long last, under orders of the Supreme 
Court, and the United States District Court, proceeded 
to bring its grade schools and junior high schools into 
com pliance with the Constitution o f the United States, 
as to two of its high schools it has signally failed to do 
so.” (emphasis added)

Petitioners confusion is further reflected on page 18 where 
it states that the Court of Appeals, “. . . operated on the in­
correct assumption that the 1971 (high school) provisions 
had been fully implemented in September of 1971.” Such was 
a fact, and not an incorrect assumption, evident from the 
record, not challenged in the trial court.56 The plan did not

5 5 Mapp v. Board of Education, 366 F.Supp. 1257 (1973) p. 1261:

‘It further appears from the testimony given upon the recent trial 
of this cause that the defendants are prepared to promptly effect 
implementation of the final school desegregation plan herein ap­
proved. Such implementation shall be effected no later than the 
commencement of the midyear school semester.”

56 p- 27a of Appendix B, hereto.



15

produce its desired result as to high schools, but such was 
not due to failure to implement, but for other reasons be­
yond the control of CBE and so found to be a fact by the 
District Court; a fact found by the Court of Appeals not 
to be clearly erroneous.17

The allegation that CBE has immunized its system “from 
effecting any meaningful desegregation” is in stark contrast 
to the results. So is the charge that it pursued “every tactical 
advantage to postpone the day when its implementation is 
actually required.” (p. 19)

17 pp. 5a, 6a of Appendix A hereto:

Having implemented the plan for desegregating the high schools 
by establishing zones for attendances which were designed to 
achieve a high degree of racial balance throughout the system, 
and having provided further for continuance of a majority-to- 
minority transfer policy, the district judge conceived that he had 
obeyed the mandate of Brown v. Board of Education of 2 opeka 
II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II) and more particularly of 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 
(1971). So do we. Presumably, the district judge might have or­
dered a further realignment when the first plan did not achieve the 
proper balance ratio, and yet another if that did not hold. Indeed 
if such were found to have been required to carry out the constitu­
tional mandate to eliminate the vestiges of a dual system, it would 
simply have to be done, and we have no doubt the district judge 
would faithfully have carried out that duty. What he was finally 
faced with here, however, was rather a more subtle and lingering 
malaise of fear and bias in the private sector which persisted after 
curative action had been taken to eliminate the dual system itself. 
Swann v. Board of Education recognizes that this latter may be 
beyond the effective reach of the Equal Protection Clause:

“Our objective in dealing with the issues presented by these 
cases is to see that school authorities exclude no pupil of a 
racial minority from any school, directly or indirectly, on 
account of race; it does not and cannot embrace all the 
problems of racial prejudice, even when those problems 
contribute to disportionate racial concentrations in some 
schools.”

Swann v. Board of Education, supra, 402 U.S. at 23



16

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons it is respectfully submitted: (1) 
that the petition should be denied and that a Writ of Certi­
orari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit should not issue in case No. 74-2100, Petitioners’ ap­
peal to the Appellate Court; and (2) as the petition by CBE 
to this Court, No. 75-1077, requests an affirmance of the Ap­
pellate Court decision and that of the District Court, that 
the petition of CBE No. 75-1077, also be denied, including 
No. 74-2101.

Respectfully submitted,

W ITT, GAITHER, RICHARDSON, 
HENNISS & WHITAKER

RAYMOND B. W ITT, JR.

Attorneys for Respondent 
Chattanooga Board of Education 

1100 American National Bank 
Building

Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402

Date: May 13, 1976



APPENDIX A

Nos. 74-2100 and 74-2101

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

J ames J onathan Mapp, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants (74-2100), 
Plaintiffs-Appellees (74-2101),

v.

T he B oard of E ducation of the 
C ity of Chattanooga, T ennessee, 
et a l,

Defendants-Appellees (74-2100), 
Defendants-Appellants (74-2101).

A p p e a l  from the 
United States District 
Court for the Eastern 
District of Tennessee.

Decided and Filed October 20, 1975.

Before: W eick, E dwards and E ngel, Circuit Judges.

E ngel, Circuit Judge, delivered the opinion of the Court in 
which W eick, Circuit Judge, joined. E dwards, Circuit Judge 
(pp. 7a-17a), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

E ngel, Circuit Judge. This desegregation case is once more 
before the court,' this time on cross-appeals from an order of 
the district court entered June 24, 1974. That order denied 
motions filed by both parties to modify or amend an earlier 
order of the court entered December 18, 1973, directed imple-

'  For previous decisions of this court in this litigation see Mapp v. 
Board of Education of Chattanooga, 295  F . 2d 617 (6th Cir 1961) 
319 F. 2d 571 (6th Cir. 1963 ), 373 F . 2d 75 (6th Cir. 1967). 477  
F. 2d 851 (6th Cir. 1973), cert, denied 414 U.S. 1022,

la



2a

mentation of the final school desegregation plan previously ap­
proved by the court with certain modifications. The December 
18, 1973 order provided as well that “[To] the extent the 
Court has previously given only tentative approval to the High 
School Zoning Plan, the same is now approved finally.”

Both appeals in effect seek to relitigate all of those same 
issues which we decided in an en banc decision in this court, 
reported in Mapp v. Board of Education o f Chattanooga, 477 
F. 2d 851 (6th Cir. 1973), cert, denied, 414 U.S. 1022 (1973). 
We there affirmed a final plan of desegregation in all respects 
except as to the high schools in Chattanooga.

While the district judge had at that time approved the plan 
as to Kirkman Technical High School, and our affirmance made 
the same final, District Judge Frank W. Wilson had given only 
tentative approval to the plan for desegregation for other high 
schools in the City of Chattanooga, see Mapp v. Board of 
Education of Chattanooga, 341 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Tenn. 
1972), being uncertain particularly whether three rather than 
four general purpose high schools would be feasible or desir­
able in Chattanooga.

With respect to Judge Wilson’s refusal to modify the previ­
ous final plan of desegregation, we find that he did not abuse 
his discretion in so doing, particularly since this court has given 
its approval of that plan.

Accordingly, we see as the sole issue remaining on this 
appeal the question of whether the district judge erred in or­
dering final approval of the tentative plan of desegregation for 
the Chattanooga high schools.

At the time the tentative plan was proposed, it was an­
ticipated that the zoning for the four high schools would 
produce a racial balance approximately as follows:

Black Students White Students

Brainerd High School 32% 68%
Chattanooga High School 44% 56%
Howard High School 75% 25%
Riverside High School 75% 25%



3a

When, however, the plan was placed into effect in the fall 
of 1971 rather than having the attendance anticipated, the four 
high schools experienced the following racial balance:

Black Students White Students

Brainerd High School 39% 61%
Chattanooga High School 43% 57%
Howard High School 99% 1%
Riverside High School 99% 1%

While an actual head count had showed that as late
July 1971 there were 393 (29%) white high school students 
in the Howard High School zone and 311 (29%) white students 
in the Riverside zone, only ten reported that September to 
Howard and three to Riverside.

It is the contention of the plaintiffs that a school board’s 
duty in a previously dual and segregated school system cannot 
be said to have been performed where, after implementation 
of a plan of desegregation, such an imbalance in the racial mix 
of the students yet remains. After taking extensive testimony 
on this issue and on the other issues raised by the parties’ mo­
tions to amend the earlier judgment, Judge Wilson, in his 
Memorandum Opinion of November 16, 1973, made the follow­
ing findings of fact:

To the extent that the Court has previously given only 
tentative approval to the high school zoning plan, final 
approval will now be given that plan. Two high schools, 
Howard High School and Riverside High School, have not 
acquired an enrollment of white students as projected by 
the Board when the plan was proposed in 1971, but rather 
have remained substantially all black. It was a concern 
for the accuracy of these projections that caused the 
Court to initially give only tentative approval to the high 
school zoning plan. However, subsequent evidence has 
now demonstrated that changing demographic conditions 
within the City and other de facto  conditions beyond the 
control and responsibility of the School Board, including



4a

the voluntary withdrawal of white students from the sys­
tem, have become the causative factors for the present 
racial composition of the student body in those schools 
and not the original action of the Board in creating seg­
regated schools at these locations. It should be recalled in 
this connection that the plan previously approved in­
cluded provision for students to elect to transfer from a 
school in which they were in a majority to a school in 
which they would be in a minority.

While the cause of the departure of white students was 
disputed, there can be little doubt upon the record that the 
difference between the anticipated mix and the actual atten­
dance of the high schools when the plan was put into effect 
was due to a substantial departure of white students from the 
public schools in Chattanooga, a circumstance which the dis­
trict judge found to have occurred beyond the control and 
responsibility of the School Board.

No one who firmly believes in the social and educational 
value of racial balance in a desegregated school system can 
help being seriously concerned when such a plan for achieving 
racial balance does not achieve its objectives on implementa­
tion. That such a concern was shared by the district judge is 
manifest throughout the entire record upon appeal. Neverthe­
less, the district judge concluded that the demographic changes 
in the city itself were the cause of the remaining imbalance, a 
finding which finds support in the record and which we hold 
is not clearly erroneous.

We are satisfied that, in giving final approval to the high 
school desegregation plan, Judge Wilson was by no means 
yielding to irrational concerns over white flight which merely 
masked inherent Board resistance to integration. To the con­
trary, he carried out the plan in spite of the apprehended re­
sult, and beyond that resisted the defendant board s further 
efforts to modify the earlier approved plan for the remainder 
of the system with this language in his November 27, 1973 
opinion:



5a

“The Court is not unsympathetic to the concern expressed 
by the Board for minimizing the voluntary departure of 
white students from the system. It must be apparent, 
however, that this objective cannot serve as a limiting 
factor on the constitutional requirement of equal protec­
tion of the laws, nor as a justification for retaining cle jure 
segregation. Concern over ‘white flight’, as the phenom­
enon was often referred to in the record, cannot become 
the higher value at the expense of rendering equal pro­
tection of the laws the lower value. As stated by the 
United States Supreme Court in the case of Monroe v. 
Board of Commissioners, 391 U.S. 450 . . . :

“We are frankly told in the Brief that without the 
transfer option it is apprehended that white students 
will flee the school system altogether. ‘But it should 
go without saying that the vitality of these constitu­
tional principles cannot be allowed to yield simply 
because of the disagreement with them.’ ” Brown 11 
at 300, . . .

“Moreover, it is the ‘effective disestablishment of a dual 
racially segregated school system’ that is required, Wright 
v. Council o f City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 . . . not, as 
seems to be contended by the defendants, the most ‘effec­
tive’ level of voluntarily acceptable ‘mixing’ of the races.” 
(Footnote omitted)

Having implemented the plan for desegregating the high 
schools by establishing zones for attendances which were de­
signed to achieve a high degree of racial balance throughout 
the system, and having provided further for continuance of a 
majority-to-minority transfer policy, the district judge con­
ceived that he had obeyed the mandate of Brown v. Board of 
Education of Topeka II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II) and 
more particularly of Swann v. Charlotte-M ecklinburg of Edu­
cation, 402 U.S. "l (1971). So do we. Presumably, the district 
judge might have ordered a further realignment when the 
first plan did not achieve the proper balance ratio, and yet



6a

another if that did not hold. Indeed if such were found to have 
been required to carry out the constitutional mandate to elim­
inate the vestiges of a dual system, it would simply have to be 
done, and we have no doubt the district judge would faithfully 
have carried out that duty. What he was finally faced with 
here, however, was rather a more subtle and lingering malaise 
of fear and bias in the private sector which persisted after 
curative action had been taken to eliminate the dual system 
itself. Swann v. Board of Education  recognizes that this latter 
may be beyond the effective reach of the Equal Protection 
Clause:

Our objective in dealing with the issues presented by 
these cases is to see that school authorities exclude no 
pupil of a racial minority from any school, directly or in­
directly, on account of race; it does not and cannot em­
brace all the problems of racial prejudice, even when 
those problems contribute to disproportionate racial con­
centrations in some schools.”

Swann v. Board o f Education, supra, 402 U.S. at 23

Affirmed.



E dwards, Circuit Judge, dissenting. This appeal presents 
just one significant question: Should we now, under applicable 
Supreme Court precedent, affirm the District Judge’s final 
order of December 18, 1973, approving a final desegregation 
order applicable to the Chattanooga high schools?

With all respect for the sincerity of my colleagues, I can­
not join the majority opinion, or approve its result. If the 
majority opinion prevails in this court and in the Supreme 
Court, it will establish as law the proposition that approxi­
mately 60% of the black children in the high schools of the 
Chattanooga public school system may be continued forever 
in complete racial segregation in all black schools which were 
built as such under state law which required a racially dual 
school system and which have been continuously segregated 
as such down to this very moment. I cannot square this propo­
sition with the great command of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to provide all American citizens “the equal protection of the 
laws.”

The rule of this case is all the more significant because the 
smaller numbers, the maturity, and the greater mobility of 
high school students tend to make practical accomplishment 
of high school desegregation the least difficult part of the task 
mandated by Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka , 347 
U.S. 483 (1954); Green v. County School Board of New Kent 
County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968) and Sivann v. Charlotte-M eck- 
lenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971).

The en banc per curiam opinion of the Sixth Circuit ( Mapp 
v. Board of Education of the City o f Chattanooga, Tennessee, 
477 F.2d 851 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 414 U.S. 1022 (1973)) 
constituted unqualified approval of two previously entered 
opinions and judgments of Judge Wilson, Mapp v. Board of 
Education of the City of Chattanooga, 329 F. Supp. 1374 ( E.D. 
Tenn. 1971); Mapp. v. Board of Education of the City of Chat­
tanooga, 341 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Tenn. 1972). In these two 
cases Judge Wilson had approved final desegregation orders 
concerning the grade schools and junior high schools. Equally

7a



8a

clearly, he had not approved any final desegregation plan for 
the high schools. As to the high schools, in his first opinion 
he said:

High Schools

During the school year 1970-71, the Chattanooga School 
System operated five high schools. These included four 
general curricula high schools and one technical high 
school. Kirkman Technical High School offers a special­
ized curricula in the technical and vocational field and is 
the only school of its kind in the system. It draws its stu­
dents from all areas of the City and is open to all students 
in the City on a wholly non-discriminatory basis pursuant 
to prior orders of this Court. Last year Kirkman Technical 
High School had an enrollment of 1218 students, of which 
129 were black and 1089 were white. The relatively low 
enrollment of black students was due in part to the fact 
that Howard High School and Riverside High School, 
both of which were all black high schools last year, 
offered many of the same technical and vocational courses 
as were offered at Kirkman. Under the defendants’ plan 
these programs will be concentrated at Kirkman with the 
result that the enrollment at Kirkman is expected to rise 
to 1646 students, with a racial composition of 45% black 
students and 55% white students. No issue exists in the 
case but that Kirkman Technical High School is a special­
ized school, that it is fully desegregated, and that it is a 
unitary school.

While some variation in the curricula exists, the remain­
ing four high schools, City High School, Brainerd High 
School, Howard High School, and Riverside High School, 
each offer a similar general high school curriculum. At the 
time when a dual school system was operated by the 
School Board, City High School and Brainerd High School 
were operated as white schools and Howard High School 
and Riverside High School were operated as black schools. 
At that time the black high schools were zoned, but the 
white high schools were not. When the dual school sys-



9a

tem was abolished by order of the Court in 1962, the 
defendants proposed and the Court approved a free­
dom of choice plan with regard to the high schools. 
The plan accomplished some desegregation of the 
former white high schools, with City having 141 black 
students out of an enrollment of 1435 and Brainerd 
having 184 black students out of an enrollment of 
1344 during the 1970-71 school year. However, both 
Howard, with an enrollment of 1313, and Riverside, with 
an enrollment of 1057, remained all black. The freedom 
of choice plan “having failed to undo segregation * * * 
freedom of choice must be held unacceptable.” Green v. 
County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 
88 S.Ct. 1689, 20 L.Ed.2d 716 (1968).

The School Board proposes to accomplish a unitary 
school system within the high schools by zoning the four 
general curricula high schools with the following results 
in terms of student ratios:

Black Students White Students

Brainerd High School 32% 68%
Chattanooga High School 44% 56%
Howard High School 75% 25%
Riverside High School 75% 25%

The plaintiffs have interposed objections to the defen­
dants’ high school plan upon the ground that it does not 
achieve a racial balance in each school. To some extent 
these objections are based upon matters of educational 
policy rather than legal requirements. It is of course ap­
parent that the former white high schools, particularly 
Brainerd High School, remain predominantly white and 
that the former black high schools remain predominant­
ly black. However, the defendants offer some evidence 
in support of the burden cast upon them to justify the 
remaining imbalance. The need for tying the high school 
zones to feeder junior high schools is part of the defen­
dants’ explanation. Residential patterns, natural geograph­
ical features, arterial highways, and other factors are also 
part of the defendants’ explanation.



10a

A matter that has given concern to the Court, however, 
and which the Court feels is not adequately covered in the 
present record, is the extent to which the statistical data 
upon which the defendants’ plan is based will correspond 
with actual experience. Among other matters there ap­
pears to be substantial unused capacity in one or more of 
the city high schools. Before the Court can properly 
evaluate the reliability of the statistical data regarding the 
high schools, the Court needs to know whether the un­
used capacity does in fact exist and, if so, where it exists, 
whether it will be used and, if so, how it will be used. 
It would be unfortunate indeed if experience shortly 
proved the statistical data inadequate and inaccurate and 
this Court was deprived of the opportunity of considering 
those matters until on some appellate remand, as occurred 
in the recent case of Davis v. Board of School Commis­
sioners of Mobile, 402 U.S. 33, 91 S.Ct. 1289, 28 L.Ed.2d 
577.

The plaintiff has submitted a high school plan with high 
school zones which the plaintiff’s witness has testified will 
achieve a racial balance in each high school. However, 
this plan is not tied into the junior high school plan here­
inabove approved and the Court is unable to say whether 
it could be so tied it. Furthermore, the same statistical 
problem discussed above would appear to exist with re­
gard to the plaintiff’s plan.

The Court accordingly is unable to give final approval 
to a high school desegregation plan at this time. Time, 
however, is a pressing factor. Pre-school activities will 
commence at each high school within less than a week, 
if in fact they have not already commenced. Full com­
mencement of the fall term is only one month away. It 
is clear that the high schools must move at least as far as 
is proposed in the defendants high school plan. Accord­
ingly, the Court will give tentative approval only at this 
time to the defendants’ high school plan in order that at 
least as much as is therein proposed may be placed into 
operation at the commencement of the September 1971 
term of school. Further prompt but orderly judicial pro­



11a

ceedings must ensue before the Court can decide upon a 
final plan for desegregation of the high schools.

In the meanwhile, the defendants will be required to 
promptly provide the Court with information upon the 
student capacity of each of the four high schools under 
discussion, upon the amount of unused space in each of 
the four high schools, the suitability of such space for 
use in high school programs, and the proposed use to be 
made of such space, if any. In this connection the de­
fendants should likewise advise the Court regarding its 
plan as to tuition students. Last year almost one-third of 
the total student body at City High School were non­
resident tuition paying students. There is no information 
in the present record as to the extent the Board proposes 
to admit tuition students nor the effect this might have on 
the racial composition of the student body. The Court 
has no disapproval of the admission of tuition students 
nor to the giving of preference to senior students in this 
regard, provided that the same does not materially and 
unfavorably distort the student racial ratios in the respec­
tive schools. Otherwise, the matter of admitting tuition 
students addresses itself solely to the discretion of the 
Board. No later than the 10th day of enrollment the de­
fendants will provide the Court with actual enrollment 
data upon each of the four high schools here under dis­
cussion.

Mapp v. Board of Education of the Citu of Chattanooga, 
supra at 1384-86.

In his second opinion he said:

Tentative approval only having heretofore been given 
to the School Board plan for desegregation of the Chatta­
nooga high schools other than Kirkman Technical High 
School (to which final approval has been given). Further 
consideration must be given to this phase of the plan. At 
the time that the Court gave its tentative approval to the 
high school desegregation plan, the Court desired addi­
tional information from the Board of Education as to



12a

whether three, rather than four, general purpose high 
schools would be feasible or desirable in Chattanooga. It 
now appears, and in this both parties are in agreement, 
that three general purpose high schools rather than four 
is not feasible or desirable, at least for the present school 
year. Having resolved this matter to the satisfaction of 
the Court, the defendant Board of Education will accord­
ingly submit a further report on or before June 15, 1972, 
in which they either demonstrate that any racial imbal­
ance remaining in the four general purpose high schools is 
not the result of “present or past discriminatory action on 
their part” Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of 
Education, 402 U.S. at 26, 91 S.Ct. at 1281, 28 L.Ed.2d 
554 at 572, or otherwise, and to the extent that the Board 
is unable to demonstrate that such racial imbalance which 
remains is not the result of past or present discriminatory 
action, they should submit a further plan for removal of all 
such remaining racial discrimination, the further plan 
likewise to be submitted on or before June 15, 1972.

Mapp v. Board of Education of the City o f Chattanooga, 
supra at 200,

The opinion and order we now review are quite different, 
and if approved by this Court and the Supreme Court, would 
represent both a final approval of the school boards current 
“plan” for operation of the high schools and holding that the 
present operation represents desegregation of the previously 
legally segregated dual high school system.

In the opinion we now review Judge Wilson said:

The Court is accordingly of the opinion that the de­
fendants have failed to establish either such changed con­
ditions as would render its formerly court-approved plan 
of school desegregation inadequate or improper to remove 
“all remaining vestiges of state imposed segregation or 
that its newly proposed plan would accomplish that result.

To the extent that the Court has previously given only 
tentative approval to the high school zoning plan, final



13a

approval will now be given that plan. Two high schools, 
Howard High School and Riverside High School, have not 
acquired an enrollment of white students as projected by 
the Board when the plan was proposed in 1971, but 
rather have remained substantially all black. It was a 
concern for the accuracy of these projections that caused 
the Court to initially give only tentative approval to the 
high school zoning plan. However, subsequent evidence 
has now demonstrated that changing demographic con­
ditions within the City and other de facto  conditions 
beyond the control and responsibility of the School Board, 
including the voluntary withdrawal of white students 
from the system, have become the causative factors for the 
present racial composition of the student body in those 
schools and not the original action of the Board in creating 
segregated schools at these locations. It should be re­
called in this connection that the plan previously ap­
proved included provision for students to elect to transfer 
from a school in which they were in a majority to a 
school in which they would be in a minority.

Mapp v. Board of Education of the City o f Chattanooga, 
366 F. Supp. 1257, 1260-61 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).

Thus, clearly, we now have before us the issue as to whether 
or not in the Chattanooga high schools previous unconstitu­
tional segregation has been eliminated root and branch. 
Green  v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 
430 (1968).

Defendant-appellees accept (as they must) the responsi­
bility of meeting the standard of Green  v. County School 
Board of Kent County, supra-.

It is against this background that 13 years after Brown 
II  commanded the abolition of dual systems we must 
measure the effectiveness of respondent School Board s 
“freedom-of-choice” plan to achieve that end. The School 
Board contends that it has fully discharged its obligation 
by adopting a plan by which every student, regardless of 
race, may ^freely” choose the school he will attend. The



14a

Board attempts to cast the issue in its broadest form by 
arguing that its “freedom-of-choice” plan may be faulted 
only by reading the Fourteenth Amendment as universally 
requiring “compulsory integration,” a reading it insists the 
wording of the Amendment will not support. But that 
argument ignores the thrust of Brown II. In the light of 
the command of that case, what is involved here is the 
question whether the Board has achieved the “racially 
nondiscriminatory school system” Brown II  held must be 
effectuated in order to remedy the established unconsti­
tutional deficiencies of its segregated system. In the 
context of the state-imposed segregated pattern of long 
standing, the fact that in 1965 the Board opened the doors 
of the former “white” school to Negro children and of the 
Negro ’ school to white children merely begins, not 

ends, our inquiry whether the Board has taken steps ade­
quate to abolish its dual, segregated system. Brown II  
was a call for the dismantling of well-entrenched dual 
systems tempered by an awareness that complex and 
multifaceted problems would arise which would require 
time and flexibility for a successful resolution. School 
boards such as the respondent then operating state-com­
pelled dual systems were nevertheless clearly charged 
with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be 
necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial 
discrimination would be eliminated root and branch. See 
Cooper v. Aaron, supra, at 7; Bradley v. School Board, 
382 U.S. 103; cf. W atson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 
526. The constitutional rights of Negro school children 
articulated in Brown I  permit no less than this; and it was 
to this end that Brown I I  commanded school boards to 
bend their efforts.4

4 “W e bear in mind that the court has not merely the power 
but the duty to render a decree which will so far as possible elimin- 
nate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like 
discrimination in the future.” Louisiana v. United States, 380 U. S. 
145, 154. Compare the remedies discussed in, e. g., NLRB v. 
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 308 U. S. 241;



15a

In determining whether respondent School Board met 
that command by adopting its “freedom-of-choice” plan, 
it is relevant that this first step did not come until some 
11 years after Brown I  was decided and 10 years after 
Brown I I  directed the making of a “prompt and reason­
able start.” This delibei-ate perpetuation of the unconsti­
tutional dual system can only have compounded the harm 
of such a system. Such delays are no longer tolerable, 
for “the governing constitutional principles no longer bear 
the imprint of newly enunciated doctrine.” Watson v. 
City of Memphis, supra, at 529; see Bradley v. School 
Board , supra; Rogers v. Paul, 382 U.S. 198. Moreover, a 
plan that at this late date fails to provide meaningful as­
surance of prompt and effective disestablishment of a 
dual system is also intolerable. “The time for mere ‘de­
liberate speed’ has run out,” Griffin v. County School 
Board, 377 U.S. 218, 234; “the context in which we must 
interpret and apply this language [of Brown II]  to plans 
for desegregation has been significantly altered.” Goss 
v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 683, 689. See Calhoun 
v. Latimer, 377 U.S. 263. The burden on a school board 
today is to come forward with a plan that promises real­
istically to work, and promises realistically to work now.

Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 
supra at 437-39.

At the outset we note that we deal with a school district 
which at the time of the beginning of this litigation was 
clearly and concededly a dual school system segregated by 
race according to state statute. We therefore are required to 
determine whether or not a public school system (racially 
constituted during the 1973-74 school year as follows) can be 
held by this court to have been desegregated “root and 
branch”:

United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U. S. 173; Standard 
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1. See also Griffin v. County 
School Board, 377 U. S. 218, 232-234.



16a

White Black % White % Black
Howard 10 999 1 99
Riverside 3 721 1 99
Chattanooga 439 330 57 43
Brainerd 646 404 61 39

There can, of course, be no doubt that Howard and River­
side High Schools are “racially separate public schools estab­
lished and maintained by state action.” Swann v. Charlotte- 
M ecklenburg Board of Education , 402 U.S. 1, 5 (1971). Both 
were built as Negro schools under state law which required a 
dual school system. T.C.A. §§2377, 2393.9 (Williams 1934). 
Twenty-one years after decision of Brown v. Board of Educa­
tion o f Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), both high schools (en­
compassing 60% of the black high school population of Chatta­
nooga) are still (and always have been) essentially 100% 
black. As to these schools and students, there has been no 
desegregation at all.

Defendants-Appellees contend that two measures which they 
took should be accepted as the equivalent of desegregation. 
They are: 1) the inauguration of a freedom of choice plan, and 
2) a change in zone boundaries which was calculated (it is 
claimed) to introduce 25% of white students into both high 
schools. Defendants-appellees freely admit that neither mea­
sure was effective in changing the segregated character of the 
Howard and Riverside High Schools.

At to the freedom of choice plans, the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly held that ineffective freedom of choice plans 
are not a substitute for desegregation in fact. See Green v. 
County School Board of New Kent County, supra; Monroe v. 
Board o f Commissioners o f the City o f Jackson, 391 U.S. 450 
(1968).

Defendants-appellees’ strongest reliance is upon the second 
contention that they “zoned” 25% white students into Howard 
and Riverside but that the white students thus assigned avoided 
the assignment by “white-flight.” As to this measure, we have



17a

no findings of fact concerning defendants-appellees’ conten­
tion. But if we assumed their truth, we clearly would not have 
exhausted the possibilities for successful desegregation nor 
satisfied the constitutional command. Many possibilities for 
desegregation remain, including pairing of white and black 
schools and high school construction which would make de­
segregated zones more feasible. In any instance, the defen­
dant school board should be required to propose a new and 
realistic plan to meet its constitutional duty. See Swann v. 
Charlotte-M ecklenbiirg Board of Education , supra, at 15-21;
Brinkman v. G illigan ,---- F .2 d ------(6th Cir. 1975) ( Decided
June 24, 1975, No. 75-1410).

In my judgment the case should be affirmed as to the grade 
schools and junior high schools. The judgment should be 
vacated and remanded as to the high schools. All other issues 
presented by either party should be summarily denied.



18a

UNITED ST A T E S C O U R T  O F  A PPEA LS 
F O R  T H E  S IX T H  C IR C U IT

No. 74-2100

JA M ES JONATH AN  MAPP, et a!.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

T H E  BO A R D  O F  E D U C A T IO N  O F  TPIE  C IT Y  
O F  CHATTAN OOGA, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

O R D E R

(Filed January 27, 1976)

Before: WEICK, EDWARDS and ENGEL, Circuit Judges.

This cause came on for hearing on the petition for re­
hearing with a suggestion that it be reheard en banc.

Judges Edwards and McCree having requested en banc 
rehearing for the reasons set forth in Judge Edwards’ dis­
senting opinion, but it appearing to the court that less than 
a majority of the court has voted in favor thereof, the petition 
for rehearing was referred to the panel which originally heard 
the appeal and was determined not to be well taken, Judge 
Edwards dissenting.

It is therefore ordered that the petition for rehearing be 
denied.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

/s/ JOHN P. HERMAN 
Clerk



19a

Re: James Jonathan Mapp v.
The Board of Education of the City 

of Chattanooga, Tennessee

No. 74-2100

EDWARDS, Circuit Judge, dissenting. Although the Board 
of Education of the City of Chattanooga has at long last, un­
der orders of the Supreme Court of the United States, this 
court, and the United States District Court, proceeded to 
bring both its grade schools and junior high schools into com­
pliance with the Constitution of the United States, as to two 
of its high schools it has signally failed to do so. The ma­
jority opinion of this court would establish as law the propo­
sition that approximately 60% of the black children of the 
Chattanooga high school system may be continued forever 
in complete segregation in ail black high schools. The two 
black high schools at issue were built as such under state law 
that required a racially dual school system and have been con­
tinuously segregated as such down to this very moment.

There can be no doubt that the two black high schools 
are racially separate public schools established and main­
tained by state action and that as to these schools there has 
been no desegregation at all. In my judgment it simply can­
not be said with any accuracy that the possibilities for success­
ful desegregation have been exhausted. As to these schools the 
School Board should be required to propose a new and realistic 
and effective plan to meet its constitutional duty.



Report #5-A Elementary Schools chattahooga p u b l i c  schools
C h a t t a n o o g a ,  T e n n e s s e e

COMPARISON OF TENTH DAY PUPIL ENROLLMENT FOR EACH SCHOOL BY YEAR AND BY RACE 
FROM 1 9 6 2 - 6 3  TO PRESENT

E l e m e n t a r y  S c h o o l s
1 0 t h  Day E n r o l l m e n t  ( R e s i d e n t  and N o n r e s i d e n t  P u n i l s )

Ainnicol
( 1 - 6 )

Avondale
( 1 - 6 )

B a r g e r
( 1 - 6 )

B e l l
( 1 - 6 )

Brown
( 1 - 6 )

C a r p e n t e r
( 1 - 6 )

C h a t t a .  Avenue

_______ O z S ) _________

Ce da r  H i l l  
_______ ________________

Y ea r B W T B W T B W T B W T B W T B W T B W T B W T

*
1 9 6 2 - 6 3 0 317 317 0 561 561 62 2 0 622 0 368 361 501 0 501 524 0 524 0 171 171

* *
1 9 6 3 - 6 4 . . . 31 8 1 70 4 88 0 543 5 43 5 9 2 0 592 0 332 332

Cloi
F i f t

ed -  I 
h S t r i

a s t
e t 481 0 481 0 148 148

)V**
1 9 6 4 - 6 5 . . . . . . 6 39 6 57 0 569 5 69 5 7 3 0 5 7 3 1 319 32C . . . - - - 372 0 372 0 139 139

* * * *
1 9 6 5 - 6 6 . . . . . . 6 2 9 27 6 56 0 547 547 5 6 4 0 564 • 2 3 06 308 ___ ___

Close
R a i l r c

d -  He 
ad Rel

ward
o c a t i ( n 0 1 96 196

■ k k k k k
1 9 6 6 - 6 7 _ _ _ . . . _ 64 1 18 6 59 0 5 1 8 5 1 8 54 5 0 545 114 2 88 4 0 2

C
Midi

pened 
l e  Sc\ o o l ___ ___ ___ 0 210 2 10

1 9 6 7 - 6 8 _ _ _ 6 4 8 17 6 65 0 4 7 8 4 7 8 57 6 0 5 76 112. 2 64 37 6 373
( 1 - 4 )

19 392 . . . ___ ___ 0 187 187

1 9 6 8 - 6 9
Am cjied i 

Count}
rom

6 83 7 6 9 0 0 4 9 4 49 4 574 0 574 125 243 368 331 26 357 ___ ___ ___ 0 162 162

1 9 6 9 - 7 0 69 63 132 6 72 5 6 77 2 4 3 2 43 4 561 6 567 122 2 36 3 58 344 10 354 _ _ _ 0 176 176

1 9 7 0 - 7 1 75 35 110 6 4 0 1 641 2 4 5 3 4 5 5 5 14 9 5 23 121 2 16 337 301 8 3 09 _ _ _ 0 174 174

1 9 7 1 - 7 2
C lo s e

and
d-C arp
R i ve nr

e n t e r
ont 669 0 66 9 71

( 4 - 6 )
258 3 29 4 1 6 2 4 1 8 106 205 311 4 0 6

( 1 - 6 )
46 4 52 _ _ __ E

Cl ose d  
a s t  La ke

1 9 7 2 - 7 3 ... _ _ 6 6 0 0 6 60 9 0
( 4 - 6 )

222 312 421 2 4 2 3 108 2 10 3 18 337 27 364 _ _ _ _ _ _
1 5 7 3 - 7 4 _ ... _ 6 2 9 0 629 93 20 8 301 3 80 2 382 101 199 3 0 0 3 10 13 323 _ _ ... ...
1 9 7 4 - 7 5

1 9 7 5 - 7 6

1 9 7 6 - 7 7

1 5 7 7 - 7 8

1 9 7 8 - 7 9

1 9 7 9 - 8 0
Desegregation Schedule: *16 Schools (1-3) **A11 Schools (1-4) ***A11 Schools (1-6) ****A11 Schools (1-7) *****A11-Schools (1.-12)

APPEN
DIX B



Elementary Schools (Continued)
1 0 t h  Day E n r o l l m e n t  ( R e s i d e n t  and N o n r e s i d e n t  P u p i l s )

S c h oo l
C l i f t o n  H i l l s  

( 1 - 6 )
Davenport

( 1 - 6 )
Donaldson

( 1 - 6 )
E a s t  C h a t t a .

_  _ ( 1 - 6 ) ________
E a s t  F i f t h  

( 1 - 6 )
E a s t  Lake  

( 1 - 6 1
Ea s t d a l e

1 - 6 )
F o r t Che at

( 1 - 6 )
lam

Y e a r B . W T B W 1 T B W T B W T B W T B W xr B w T B w T

*
1 9 6 2 - 6 3 0 49C 4 9 6 394 J 394 562 0 5 6 : 0 4 84 484 71C 0 71C 0 6 96 6 96 1 48 4 4 8 5 155 0 155

* *
1 9 6 3 - 6 4 0 513 5 1 3 397 3 4 0 0 5 4 3 0 5 43 3 5 40 543 862

( 1 - 6 )
1 862 0 744 744 20 506 52 6 87 0 87

* * *
1 9 6 4 - 6 5 0 514 51 4 355 7 362 5 33 0 5 33 20 5 23 5 4 3 609 41 650 0 6 99 6 99 37 4 5 3 4 9 0

d o s t
{

d Nov. 
Freewa

19 63
y)

* * * *
1 9 6 5 - 6 6 0 5 16 5 16 354 14 3 68 5 36 0 536 21 4 7 7 4 9 8 6 0 3 32 6 35 0 6 23 6 23 51 4 4 0 4 91 ___ ___ _

* * * * *
1 9 6 6 - 6 7 11 5 18 529 30 8 16 3 24 5 19 0 5 19 23 4 6 5 4 8 8 6 10 24 634 0 601 601 50 44 4 4 94 ___ ___

1 9 6 7 - 6 8 19 4 6 5 4 8 4 284 19 3 0 3 5 02 0 502 16 4 4 8 4 64 2 0 8
( 5 - 6 )

3 211 1 5 62 5 63 71 3 60 4 31 ___ ___ ___

1 9 6 8 - 6 9 17 4 4 7 4 64 275 18 293 541 0 541 8 4 22 4 3 0 2 0 0 10 210 1 5 4 0 541 1 08 315 4 2 3 ___ ___ ___

1 9 6 9 - 7 0 18 4 4 6 4 64 255 9 264 5 12 0 5 12 7 4 1 0 4 1 7 152 4 156 1 4 7 0 471 1 50 261 4 11 ...... ___ ___

1 9 7 0 - 7 1 17 4 1 1 4 2 8 2 34 9 243 471 0 47 1 12 382 394 146 7 153 3 4 3 9 4 42 234 1 80 4 14 ___ - - -

1 9 7 1 - 7 2 27 311 338
C l os e

H
i -  Ho 
jmlock

vard
4 6 2 • 0 4 6 2 41 381 4 2 2

Clos ec
3 5 30 5 33 169

( 4 - 6 )
170 339 ___ ___ ___

1 9 7 2 - 7 3 39 3 59 3 98 . . . . . . 4 37 0 4 37 91 37 4 4 6 5 ___ ___ 2 512 514 244 142 3 86 ___ ___ ___

1 9 7 3 - 7 4 31 3 49 3 8 0 ___ ___ ___ 4 1 9 0 4 1 9 1 06 2 80 3 86 ___ ___ ___ 4 4 5 5 ' 4 5 9 3 36 111 4 4 7 _ . . .

1 9 7 4 - 7 5

1 9 7 5 - 7 6

1 9 7 6 - 7 7

1 9 7 7 - 7 8

1 9 7 8 - 7 9

1 9 7 9 - 8 0
Desegregation Schedule: *16 Schools (1-3) **A11 Schools (1-4) ***A11 Schools (1-6) ****A11 Schools (1-7) *****A11-Schools (hl2)



_________________  pay Enrollment; (Resident and Nonresident Pupil s)
Elementary Schools (Continued) ... . .....  . --

Ga rbe r
( 1 - 6 )

Glenwood
( 1 - 6 )

Henry
( 1 - 6 )

O '•O

H i gh l an d P a r k  
U - 6 )

Howard
( 1 - 6 )

Long
( 1 - 6 )

M i s s i o n a r y
( 1 - 6 )

U d g e

Y ea r B W T B W T B W T B W T B W T B W T B W T B W T

*
1 9 6 2 - 6 3 0 338 338 19 175 194 32 8 0 328 0 324 324 0 4 1 5 4 15 684 0 684 1 3 20 321 5 380 385

■**
1 9 6 3 - 6 4 0 34 7 347 60 125 185 285 0 285 0 2 88 288 0 377 377 6 62 0 662 3 301 304 5 3 76 381

■frk-fi
1 9 6 4 - 6 5 0 353 3 53 1 03 87 1 90 250 0 2 50 19 281 300 0 4 0 5 4 0 5 6 0 6 0 606 0 3 36 3 3 6 4 3 76 3 8 0

1<4e-kie
1 9 6 5 - 6 6 0 3 96 3 96 1 06 63 169 294 0 294 37 262 299 0 4 1 4 4 14 8 06 2 808 1 35 8 3 59 5 3 74 379

* * * * *
1 9 6 6 - 6 7 1 319 32 0 1 30 28 1 58 3 36 0 3 36 54 2 42 2 96 0 4 0 4 4 04 7 83 0 783 5 331 3 36 6 3 58 3 64

1 9 6 7 - 6 8 5 317 322 141 14 1 55 3 59 0 359 89 224 3 13 ■ 0 364 364 7 26 0 7 26 8 38 4 392 5 335 3 40

1 9 6 8 - 6 9 65 2 53 318 16 0 17 177 351 1 3 52 110 204 314 0 37 8 3 78 6 73 0 673 14 4 4 9 4 6 3 5 3 30 3 35

1 9 6 9 - 7 0 155 188 3 43 20 8 7 215 4 0 8 0 4 0 8 83 184 267 0 38 2 382 6 36 0 6 36 29 4 0 8 4 37 7 327 3 3 4

1 9 7 0 - 7 1 242 135 377 246 2 2 48 3 76 0 376 66 195 261 4 35 1 3 55 617 0 617 52 367 4 1 5 11 3 19 3 3 0

1 9 7 1 - 7 2 296 91 387
Close*
Ridge*

i-M. R 
l a l e - 0

dge
Knob 371 0 371 15 8 175 333 24 264 28 8 615 4 6 19 54 31 7 371 15 8 146 3 04

1 9 7 2 - 7 3 31 0 49 359 . . . . . . 3 39 0 339 15 8 159 317 17 2 33 25 0 5 2 2 4 5 26 4 2 279 321 1 5 3 92 245

1 9 7 3 - 7 4 3 43 33 376 - - - _ _ 2 98 0 291 142 139 2 81 24 18 0 2 0 ' 4 6 6 3 4 6 9 55 2 99 354 1 59 65 224

1 9 7 4 - 7 5

1 9 7 5 - 7 6

1 9 7 6 - 7 7

1 9 7 7 - 7 8

1 9 7 8 - 7 9

1 9 7 9 - 3 0
Desegregation Schedule; *16 Schools (1-3) **A11 Schools (1-4) ***A11 Schools (1-6) ****A11 Schools (1-7) *****A11-Schools (Lrl2)



Elementary Schools (Continued)
1 0 t h  Day E n r o l l m e n t  ( R e s i d e n t  and N o n r e s i d e n t  P u p i l s )

Normal Pa rk  
( 1 - 6 )

Oak Grove  
( 1 - 6 )

O rc h a r d  Knob 
( 1 - 6 )

P i n e v i l l e  
( 1 - 6 )

P i n e y  Woods 
( 1 - 6 )

R i d g e d a l e
d - 6 )

Rivennon
( 1 - 6 )

S in de rs c
( 1 - 6 )

>n

Yea r B . W T B W T B W T B W T B W T B W 'T B W T. B W T

*
1 9 6 2 - 6 3 0 5 52 5 52 0 4 44 4 4 4 118 9 0 1189 . . . . . . . . . _ _ _ 0 344 344 _ _ — 145 0 14 5

1 9 6 3 - 6 4 0 531 531 42 4 3 0 4 72 118 5 0 1185 . . . . . .
Ope i 

IS
cd J a r  
64 (Nt

u a r y
w) 7 35 4 361 _ _ _ 164 0 164

Stick .
1 9 6 4 - 6 5 0 541 541 77 4 0 6 4 8 3 104 8 0 1 048 3 70 0 3 70 46 3 6 8 4 14 „ __ 1 36 3 139

icitick
1 9 6 5 - 6 6 0 5 63 5 63 72 393 4 65 1057 0 1057 3 69 0 369 45 383 4 2 8 ___ ___ ___ 168 0 1 68

* * * * *
1 9 6 6 - 6 7 0 574 5 74 71 354 4 25 1 0 3 3 0 1033 . . . . . . 3 65 0 365 76 339 4 15 ___ ___ ___ 154 0 1 54

1 9 6 7 - 6 8 2 58 6 588 67 331 3 98 101 8 0 101 8
Ann e x e d  £ 

County
rom

358 0 358 68 3 03 371 ___ ___ ___ 140 0 1 40

1 9 6 8 - 6 9 4 5 65 569 61 328 389 95 5 0 955 0 131 131 35 5 4 359 83 2 70 3 53
Anti exed  i 

County
rom C l o s e t  

. j i t h  1
-Congo 
o w a r d ,

L i d a t e d
S t .

1 9 6 9 - 7 0 0 5 35 535 66 301 367 9 26 0 9 2 6 0 152 1 52 33 4 4 338 93 252 345 0 55 4 554
Elmo 6 DonaLdson

1 9 7 0 - 7 1 0 5 35 5 35 67 257 324 7 88 3 791 0 153 1 53 307 1 308 82 252 334 0 561 561 — — . . .

1 9 7 1 - 7 2 2 365 367 71 226 297 731 ■ 4 735 0 153 '  1 53 277 2 279 92 201 293 73 532 6 05 ___ — ___

1 9 7 2 - 7 3 4 3 6 6 3 70 104 199 303 6 94 2 69 6 0 157 157 271 0 271 98 2 04 302 65 50 5 57 0 ___ ___ ___

1 9 7 3 - 7 4 4 4 0 6 4 1 0 119 1 80 299 702 1 703 1 174 175 272 0 272 98 188 286 47 4 5 5 502 __ _ _
1 9 7 4 - 7 5

1 9 7 5 - 7 6

1 9 7 6 - 7 7

1 9 7 7 - 7 8

1 9 7 8 - 7 9

1 9 7 9 - 8 0
Desegregation Schedule: *16 Schools (1-3) **A11 Schools (1-4) ***A11 Schools (1-6) ****A11 Schools (1-7) *****A11-Schools (1-12)



Elementary Schools (Continued)
10ch  Day E n r o l l m e n t  ( Res i d e n t  and N o n r e s i d e n t  P u p i l s ’)

S c h o o l
S t .  Elmo 

( 1 - 6 )
Smith
( 1 - 6 )

S p e a r s  Avenue  
( 1 - 6 )

Su nn yside  
( 1 - 6 )

T r o t t e r  
.......... ( 1 - 6 )

Woodmore
( 1 - 6 )

H i l l c r e s t  
_______ Q = 6 ) _________

T o t a l  E l e m e n t a r y  
( 1 - 6 )

Y e a r B W T B W T B W T B W T B W T B W T B W T B W T
*

1 9 6 2 - 6 3 6 3 33 344 601 0 601 99 0 99 14 3 09 323 5 55 0 555 0 5 62 562 7115 8 0 7 8 1 5 1 9 3
* *

1 9 6 3 - 6 4 9 351 3 60 5 5 8 0 5 58 98 0 98 38 284 322 5 1 3 0 513 0 5 4 6 546 693 2 7 8 1 0 1 4 7 4 2
* * *

1 9 6 4 - 6 5 15 344 359 4 8 8 0 4 8 8 97 0 97 70 29 8 3 68 4 3 4 0 434 0 5 49 549 690 2 76 2 9 1 4 531
* * * *

1 9 6 5 - 6 6 17 359 3 76 4 4 3 0 4 4 3 1 00 0 1 00 72 2 69 341 4 3 1 0 431 0 5 6 6 5 6 6 6 7 8 3 7 5 8 0 1 4 3 6 3
*•***■*

1 9 6 6 - 6 7 18 346 364 4 0 5 0 4 0 5
Cl osed

wi
-Conso  
th  Bro

l i d a t e
vm

d
80 28 6 3 66 3 8 8 0 3 88 0 53 8 5 38 672 6 7221 1 3 9 4 7

1 9 6 7 - 6 8 19 3 06 325 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 - - - 102 24 6 3 48 347 0 347 0 4 9 7 4 97 6 6 6 8 6 7 2 9 1 3 3 9 7

1 9 6 8 - 6 9 54 3 16 3 70 352 0 352 ___ ___ . . . 137 192 329 3 49 0 3 49 2 4 9 0 4 92 6 5 9 3 66 1 2 1 3 205

1 9 6 9 - 7 0 47 294 341 3 23 0 32 3 ___ ___ . . . 1 32 20 2 334 3 28 0 3 28 18 5 05 5 23 6 6 5 8 68 2 3 1 3 481

1 9 7 0 - 7 1 54 3 22 376 297 1 29 8 ___ — ___ 134 175 3 09 311 0 311 22 4 51 4 73 644 6 6 4 0 4 1 2 8 5 0

1 9 7 1 - 7 2 62 245 307 285 0 285 ___ ___ ___ 58
( 1 - 3 )

25 0 3 08 304 0 304 195
( 1 - 3 )

22 0 4 15 6 1 9 6 50 9 8 1 1 2 9 4

1 9 7 2 - 7 3 63 245 3 08 241 1 2 4 2 __ ___ _ . . . 61
( 1 - 3 )

20 9 2 70 245 0 2 45 227
( 1 - 3 )

173 4 0 0
Ann ;xed  f 

bounty
rom

604 3 4 7 2 5 1 0 7 6 8

1 9 7 3 - 7 4 67 2 21 2 88 224 3 227 ___ ___ . . . 53 172 225 23 0 0 23C 2 4 8 144 3 92 56 374 4 3 0 6 017 4 6 5 4 1 0 671

1 9 7 4 - 7 5

1 9 7 5 - 7 6

1 9 7 6 - 7 7

1 9 7 7 - 7 8

1 9 7 8 - 7 9

1 9 7 9 - 8 0

Desegregation Schedule: *16 Schools (1-3) **A11 Schools (1-4) ***A11 Schools (1-6) ****A11 Schools (1-7) *****All- Schools (Lrl2)



Report #5-B Junior High Schools

J u n i o r  High S c h o o l s
1 0 t h  Day E n r o l l m e n t  ( R e s i d e n t :  and N o n re s id e n t :  P u p i l s )

A l t o n  P a r k  
( 7 - 9 )

B r a l n c r a
( 7 - 9 )

Dalewood
( 7 - 9 )

F a s t  F i f t h  
( -  >

E a s t  Lake
( 7 - 9 )

E a s t  S id e
_______ ( 1 - 9 ) _________

Hardy
( 7 - 9 )

Howard
( 7 - 9 )

Y e a r B W T B W T B W T B W T B w T B W . 'T B W T B W T

*
1 9 6 2 - 6 3 8 18 0 816 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0

0
F a l l

>ened
>3-64 New) 329 0 32( C 637 637 0 6 10 61C 0 611 611 887 0 887

* *
1 9 6 3 - 6 4 8 37 0 837 0 5 9 0 5 90 0 4 67 4 67

C l os e d
t o

-T ra n s
R i ve rs

f e r r e t
id e 0 6 05 60 ! 0 55 9 559 0 546 546 8 79 0 8 79

* * *
1 9 6 4 - 6 5 905 0 905 0 6 00 6 00 0 49 1 491 ___ _ ___ 0 5 89 589 0 58 7 587 0 4 7 3 4 7 3 853 0 8 53

****•
1 9 6 5 - 6 6 9 1 3 0 91 3 7 607 6 14 9 5 2 2 531 . . . ___ 0 5 8 0 5 80 27 6 27 654 99 4 4 0 539 7 40 1 7 41

Hr hfrfcit
1 9 6 6 - 6 7 893 0 8 93 33 649 6 82 28 5 79 607 . . . . . . . . . 0 621 621 91 6 18 709 217 356 5 73 6 52 0 6 52

1 9 6 7 - 6 8 8 88 0 88S 53 661 714 37 6 13 6 5 0 3 39
( 7 - 8 )

6 345 . 1 6 02 603 112 6 46 7 58 3 31 292 6 23 6 19 0 6 19

1 9 6 8 - 6 9 8 89 4 8 93 58 621 679 55 5 9 0 6 45 296 8 304 1 5 95 5 96 119 6 2 9 7 48 30 4 305 6 0 9 612 1 6 13

1 9 6 9 - 7 0 84 3 7 8 50 61 565 626 72 5 4 2 614 2 9 0 1 291 0 5 65 5 65 1 18 6 06 724 38 4 26 8 652 642 0 6 4 2

1 9 7 0 - 7 1 835 7 842 67 521 5 8 8 105 4 7 0 5 75 2 4 3 2 245 1 531 5 3 2 1 30 5 9 3 7 23 4 2 6 1 9 0 6 1 6 62  2 0 6 2 2

1 9 7 1 - 7 2 781 3 784 115 370 48 5 2 00 326 526 3 35
( 7 - 9 )

1 336 1 4 4 7 4 4 8 1 48 4 7 6 624 5 5 0 16 6 7 16 5 52 0 5 52

1 9 7 2 - 7 3 741 2 743 145 3 06 451 245 219 4 64 309
( 7 - 9 )

1 3 1 0 3 4 3 8 4 41 1 13 389 5 02 5 0 8 139 647 513 0 5 13

1 9 7 3 - 7 4 6 55 2 657 157 2 50 4 0 7 3 48 197 545 2 79 1 2 80 1 3 8 0 381 1 26 3 65 4 91 5 05 96 601 4 7 3 1 4 7 4

1 9 7 4 - 7 5

1 9 7 5 - 7 6

1 9 7 6 - 7 7

1 9 7 7 - 7 8

1 9 7 8 - 7 9

1 9 7 9 - 8 0

bOpi
P

Desegregation Schedule: *16 Schools (1-3) **A11 Schools (1-4) Schools (1.-6) ****A11 Schools (1-7) *****Ail Schools (L-12)



Junior High Schools (Continued)
10 th  Day E n r o l l m e n t  ( R e s i d e n t  and N o n r e s i d e n t  P u p i l s )

Kirlauau
(91

Long
( 7 - 9 )

Lo oko ut 1 
( 7 - 9 )

t o r t h  C h a t t a n o o g a  
( 7 - 9 )

O rc h a r d  Knob 
... ( 7 - g ) _________

P a r k  P l a c e  
( 7 - 9 )

R i v e r s i d
( 7 - 9 )

l ' o ta l
(

J u n i o r
7 - 9 )

High

Y ea r B w T B W T B W T B W T B W T B W T R W T B W T

*
1 9 6 2 - 6 3 0 177 177 0 134 134 0 1 86 181 0 530 536 762 0 76 ; 247 0 247 . . . — . . . 3043 398 5 7 0 2 8

* *
1 9 6 3 - 6 4 0 165 165 0 1 18 118 0 165 165 0 5 39 589 752 0 752 R

Closed
L v e r s l de 8 5 0 0 850 3318 38 0 4 7 12 2

4.*+.
1 9 6 4 - 6 5 0 1 53 1 53 0 125 125 0 148 148 0 6 03 603 797 0 797 - - - — - - - 8 94 0 894 344 9 3 7 6 9 7 2 1 8

★ * * *
1 9 6 5 - 6 6

Closed
__ _ 4 135 139 37 149 186 12 6 25 6 37 798 0 798 — - - - 7 85 0 785 343 1 36 8 6 7 11 7

* * * * *
1 9 6 6 - 6 7 . . . - - - 7 134 141 54 1 56 210 36 5 81 617 745 0 745 - - - - - - 5 9 8 2 6 00 335 4 36 9 6 7 0 5 0

1 9 6 7 - 6 8 . . . . . . _ 10 141 151 71 165 2 36 54 6 05 659 6 96 0 691 — 181
( 9 )

0 181 3 3 9 2 37 3 1 7 1 2 3

1 9 6 8 - 6 9 . . . _ 33 185 21 8 77 161 238 61 674 735 6 75 0 675 - - - 1 84 0 184 336 4 37 7 3 7 1 3 7

1 9 6 9 - 7 0 35 175 210 70 147 217 63 744 807 6 23 0 623 _ _ 165 0 165 3 366 3 62 0 69 8 6

1 9 7 0 - 7 1 28 165 193 89 1 48 237 62 7 23 785 6 53 0 652 ___ _ _ 138 0 138 3399 3 3 5 0 6 7 4 9

1 9 7 1 - 7 2 21 151 172 84 115 1 99 57 651 708 4 9 3 0 4 9 3 ...... _ Tran
E a s t

s f e r r , ;
F i f t h

i t o  
S t . 3337 2 70 6 6 0 4 3

1 9 7 2 - 7 3 28 149 177 83 1 23 2 0 6 63 5 89 65 2 4 57 0 4 57 _ _ _ _ _ 3 2 0 8 2 35 5 5 5 6 3

1 9 7 3 - 7 4 28 165 193 87 102 186 78 567 645 38 5 0 385 _ ___ - - - - - - 3 1 2 2 21 26 5 2 4 8

1 9 7 4 - 7 5

1 9 7 5 - 7 6

1 9 7 6 - 7 7

1 9 7 7 - 7 8

1 9 7 8 - 7 9

1 9 7 9 - 8 0
Desegregation Schedule: *16 Schools (1-3) **All Schools (1-4) ***All Schools (1-6) ****A11 Schools (1-7) *****A11- Schools (Lr*12)



Report #5-C Senior High Schools 

S e n i o r  High S c h o o l s  _____________ ___________________________________
lOt-li Day E n r o l l m e n t  ( R e s i d e n t  and N o n r e s i d e n t  P u p i l s )

Sc h oo l
Yea r

B r a i n e r d  High
a o - i 2V

C h a t t a n o o g a  High 
( 1 0 - 1 2 )

Howard High
a o - 1 2 1

Kirkman T e c h n i c a l  
( 1 0 - 1 2 )

R i v e r s i d e  High 
( 1 0 - 1 2 )

T o t a l S e n i o r  High 
1 0 - 1 2 )

B . W T B W T B W T B W T B W T B W T B W T B K 1 T
*

1 9 6 2 - 6 3 0 8 96 896 0 1059 1059 1 5 8 0 0 1586 0 9 8 9 98< ___ ___ 158C 2 9 4 4 4 5 2 4
* *

1 9 6 3 - 6 4 0 10 01 1001 0 118 9 1189 103 3 0 1032 0 1 0 3 7 1037 944 0 94 ' 1977 32 2 7 5 2 0 4
* *  *  

1 9 6 4 - 6 5 0 10 7 0 1 0 7 0 0 1295 1295 1177 0 1177 0 105 1 1051 m i 0 1 1 1 ! 2 288 34 1 6 5 7 0 4
* * * *

1 9 6 5 - 6 6 0 11 03 11 03 0 1 253 1253 130 4 0 1304 0 1 0 8 0 108C 1 2 6 0 0 1 26C 2 5 6 ' 3 4 3 6 6 0 0 0
* * * * *

1 9 6 6 - 6 7 26 10 8 5 m i 35 1225 126 0 1 3 4 8 0 1346 1 1057 1056 1389 0 1 38 ' 2 799 33 67 6 1 6 6

1 9 6 7 - 6 8 54 10 8 9 11 4 3 57 1227 1284 1407 0 1407 1 0 6 9 107' , 1341 1 1342 2 862 33 8 6 6 2 4 8

1 9 6 8 - 6 9 88 11 31 12 19 66 126 4 133 0 1427 0 1427 29 1 0 7 9 1108 1267 0 1 267 2877 3 4 7 4 63 5 1

1 9 6 9 - 7 0 1 70 1224 1394 83 1359 1442 1415 0 1 4 1 ! 64 111 8 1182 1 124 0 1 1 2 ' 285 6 37 01 65 5 7

1 9 7 0 - 7 1 184 11 6 0 1344 141 1294 1435 131 3 0 1 3 1 3 129 1089 1218 1057 1 1058 2 8 2 4 35 4 4 6 3 6 3

1 9 7 1 - 7 2 4 6 3 9 33 13 9 6 369 733 1102 1 0 8 9 44 1133 27 4 81 8 1092 6 93 25 716 2 8 8 8 2 5 5 3 5 44 1

1 9 7 2 - 7 3 5 09 7 66 12 75 3 94 611 1005 9 41 7 948 3 66 761 1127 6 40 4 6 4 ' 2 8 5 0 21 4 9 4 9 9 9

1 9 7 3 - 7 4 5 28 6 39 11 67 3 69 502 871 887 5 892 4 2 4 6 6 0 1084 615 4 618 2 8 2 3 18 1 0 4 6 3 3

1 9 7 4 - 7 5

1 9 7 5 - 7 6

1 9 7 6 - 7 7

1 9 7 7 - 7 8

1 9 7 8 - 7 9

1 9 7 9 - 8 0

Desegregation Schedule; *16 Schools (1-3) **A11 Schools (1-6) ***A11 Schools (1-6) ****A11 Schools (1-7) *****A11 Schools (1-12)