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Northern District of Georgia, No. C87-1517A - Attorney's Transcript Files - Annotated Petition
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July 6, 1987
177 pages
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Case Files, McCleskey Background Materials. Northern District of Georgia, No. C87-1517A - Attorney's Transcript Files - Annotated Petition, 1987. 9a6a6efc-62a7-ef11-8a69-7c1e5266b018. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/592fb35e-2975-4824-8922-52611ae7509a/northern-district-of-georgia-no-c87-1517a-attorneys-transcript-files-annotated-petition. Accessed November 23, 2025.
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Name: Warren McCleskey MASEL
Prison Number: D-003935
Place of Confinement: Georgia Diagnostic & Classification
Center, Jackson, Georgia
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
WARREN McCLESKEY,
Petitioner,
vs. HABE CORPUS
No. ¥7- 1517
RALPH M. KEMP, Superintendent,
Georgia Diagnostic and
Classification Center,
~ Respondent.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
I. HISTORY OF PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
1. The name and location of the court which entered
the judgment of conviction and sentence under atiack are:
Superior Court of Fulton County
Atlanta, Georgia
2, The date of the judgment and sentence was October
12,1978.
3. The sentences were that petitimmor be put to death
for murder, and that he serve life sentences for two counts
of armed robbery. (=
® *
2
4, Petitioner was convicted of one count of murder, in
violation of 0.C.G.A. §16-5-1(a), and of two counts of armed
robbery, in violation of 0.C.G.A. §16-8-2.
5. At his trial, petitioner pled not guilty.
6. -The trial on the issues of guilt or innocence and
of sentence was held before a jury.
7 Petitioner testified during the guilt phase of his
trial, but he did not testify during the sentencing phase.
8. Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentence of
death.
9. The facts of petitioner’s appeal are as follows:
(a) The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed
: petitioner’s convictions and sentences on January 24, 1980.
McClesky v. State, 245 Ga. 108, 263 S.E.2d 146 (1980).
(b) On October 6, 1980, the Supreme Court of the
United States denied a petition for certiorari, with Justices
Brennan & Marshall dissenting. McCleskey Vv. Georgia, 449
0.85. 891" (19580).
(C) On December 19, 1980, petitioner filed an
extraordinary motion for a new trial in the Superior Court of
Fulton County. No hearing has ever been held on that motion.
(Ad) On January 35, 1981, petitioner filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court of
Butts County. (A copy of that petition is annexed as Exhibit
A). On April 8, 1981, the Superior Court of Butts County
denied all relief. (A copy of that order is annexed as
Exhibit B).
(e) On June 17, 1981, the Supreme Court of Georgia
denied petitioner’s application for a certificate of probable
cause to appeal. (A copy of that order is annexed as Exhibit
C).
(£) Petitioner then sought a writ of certiorari in
the Supreme Court of the United States. On November 30,
1981, that Court denied his petition, with Justices Brennan &
Marshall dissenting. McCleskey vv. Zant, 454 U.S. 1093
(1981). |
(g) On December. 30, 1981, petitioner filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court. After an
“evidentiary hearing in August. and October of 1983, the Court
entered an order on February 1, 1984, granting habeas corpus
relief on one issue. McClegkey vv. Zant, 580 PF, Supp. 338
(N.D.Ga. 1984).
(h) On January 29, 1985, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc,
announced a judgment reversing the grant of habeas corpus
relief and denying the habeas petition. McCleskey v. Kemp
753 F.2d 877 (11th Cir. 1935) (en banc).
(i) The Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari and, on April 22, 1987, affirmed the judgment of
the Court of Appeals. McCleskey v. Kemp, U.S. 95 —
1.BEd.24 282. (1987).
(J) On June 8, 1987, petitioner’s petition for
rehearing was denied.
(k) On June 9, 1987, petitioner filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court of Butts
County, and, on June 22, 1987, filed a First Amendment to the
petition.
(1) On June 29, 1987, the Superior Court heard
argument on respondent’s motion to dismiss, and on July 1,
1987, entered an order granting the motion and dismissing the
petition. (A copy of that order is annexed as Exhibit D.)
(m) Petitioner filed - an application for =a
certificate of probable cause in the Supreme Court of Georgia
on July 2, 1987. That Court denied the application on July
ITI. INTRODUCTORY FACTS
10. Petitioner Warren McCleskey was one of four men who
robbed the Dixie Furniture Store in Atlanta on May 13, 1978.
Of the four, he alone was sentenced to death, because the
State alleged and the jury believed that McCleskey was the
triggerman who had shot police officer Frank Schlatt during
the robbery. Prosecutor Russell Parker explicitly argued to
petitioner’s jury that "the person that ought to get the
chair, if anybody gets the chair, is the man that pulled the
trigger ... It is important, ladies and gentlemen, who pulled
the trigger. I don’t think there should be any doubt in your
5
nind." (Tr. T. 973). .The burden of the State’s entire case
was to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner
McCleskey had pulled the trigger.
11. Yet at the crucial moments throughout the trial,
the State acted to deprive petitioner of his federal
constitutional rights. Although the State’s case rested
primarily on the testimony of a jailhouse witness, Offie
Evans, and on ballistics evidence that appears to link
petitioner to the murder weapon, the jury was never told that
Evans had entered into a working relationship as an informant
for Atlanta police and prosecutors, after being placed in a
Fulton County Jail cell in July of 1978, directly adjacent to
‘the cell where petitioner McCleskey. was: awaiting trial.
Evans in fact deliberately lied to McCleskey about his name
and his relationship to a co-defendant, Ben Wright, in order
to gain McCleskey'’s, trust. He then elicited from McCleskey
a series of incriminating statements about which he testified
at trial (See 9 15-26).
12. The jury also failed to learn that an Atlanta
police detective promised to shield Offie Evans from a
federal prosecution if he would agree to testify against
McCleskey. (See 99 38-40 infra). Nor was the jury told that
the ballistics expert =-- who testified at trial that the
bullets found near the victim could have come only from a
pistol like that McCleskey carried -- later would acknowledge
that two other makes of pistol could have produced the
6
identical markings on which he based his expert conclusion.
(See 99 63-65 infra.).
13. Under the Sixth Amendment, the disclosure of Evans’
informant relationship with State officials would have
prevented the State from introducing Evans’ testimony on
petitioner’s alleged statements. Furthermore, the facts
about his relationship with the State would have sufficed
alone to persuade several members of petitioner’s jury, even
had Shey heard Evans’ testimony, that the State has not met
its burden beyond a reasonable doubt, and that petitioner
should not be sentenced to death. (See Exhibits F&G).
14. Yet the State improved its chances of conviction
and of. a death sentence, not only by concealing these crucial
facts. | pak also by engaging in deliberate, Jisdeininatony
acts to exclude prospective black jurors from McCleskey’s
jury (see 49 51-52, infra), and by unlawfully reminding the
jury, Just pefors it retired to deliberate on McCleskey’s
sentence, that his previous life sentences had been reduced
by the appellate courts on prior appeals =-- obviously
implying that only if McCleskey’s jury imposed a death
sentence could it avoid similar appellate review in this
case. (See 9 46-48, infra) In all of these ways, the State
impaired the factfinding ability of petitioner’s trial jury
and deprived petitioner of the federal constitutional rights
to which any capital defendant is entitled.
v
III. CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS ESTABLISHING THE INVALIDITY OF
PETITIONER’S CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES
A. The State’s Use At Trial Of Incriminating Statements Made By
Petitioner To A Jailhouse Informant Acting On Behalf Of The
State
15. The State’s use at trial of incriminating statements
allegedly made by petitioner to jail inmate Offie Evans, who--
newly uncovered evidence demonstrates =-- was acting on behalf of
the State as an informant in the Fulton County Jail, violated (i)
petitioner’s right to be represented by counsel at every eritical
stage in a criminal proceeding against him, guaranteed by the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments; and (ii) his right to the due
Lrdisss “of law, guaranteed by the Due: Process Clause of ‘the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
FACTS SUPPORTING PETITIONER’S CIAIM THAT
THE STATE’S USE OF INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS
ALLEGEDLY MADE BY PETITIONER TO A STATE INFORMANT
VIOLATED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
16. Although a number of the State’s witnesses testified
that petitioner McCleskey participated in the armed robbery of the
Dixie Furniture Store on May 13, 1978, the State produced no one
who witnessed the shooting of Atlanta police officer Frank
Schlatt. The murder weapon itself was never recovered. To prove
that petitioner had personally committed the homicide which
ultimately led to his death sentence, the State relied in part
upon confused and partially contradictory testimony on who had
8
been carrying the likely murder weapon. 1
17. The State also relied upon two witnesses who claimed
that petitioner had confessed to them, after the crime, that he
had shot Officer Schlatt. One of the two witnesses was
petitioner’s co-defendant Ben Wright, -- a dominant actor in the
armed robbery (Tr. T. 651-57) and the most likely suspect in the
shooting. Apart from Wright, the only evidence concerning the
identity of the triggerman came from a detainee at the Fulton
County Jail, Offie Evans, who testified that McCleskey had
admitted the shooting while he was in the Fulton County Jail
awaiting trial.
18. Evans in fact gave crucial testimony on three points:
(1) he told the jury. about = McCleskey’s "confession"; (ii) he
alleged that McCleskey "said ... he would have tried to shoot his
way out ... if it had been a dozen" police officers (Tr. T. 87))-
- a statement which later became a major foundation for the
prosecutor’s argument to the jury that McCleskey had acted with
"malice" (see T. Tr. 974): and (iii) he single-handedly clarified
1 petitioner’s co-defendant, Ben Wright, and several other
witneses testified that petitioner may have been carrying a
pearl-handled, silver .38 pistol linked to the homicide. Yet Ben
Wright was forced to acknowledge on cross-examination that he
himself had personally possessed that weapon for several weeks
prior to the crime. (Tr. T. 682). Moreover, it was revealed that
Wright’s girlfriend told police, on the day Wright was arrested,
that Wright, not McCleskey, had been carrying that .38 pistol on
the day of the crime, (Tr. T. 631-32). Moreover, the State’s
ballistics expert, =-- who indicated at trial that the murder
weapon had been a .38 Rossi -- testified during a deposition
submitted at the initial state habeas corpus proceedings, that
there was a chance that the murder weapon was not in fact a .38
Rossi. (See infra, 99 eeee).
@ | ®
9
a glaring inconsistency in the identification testimony of one of
the State’s principal witnesses. (Tr. T. 301-03; 870-71).
19. Petitioner has recently obtained a 2l1-page statement
made by Offie Evans on August 1, 1978, to State agents including
prosecutor Russell Parker. (A copy of the statement is annexed as
Exhibit E.) This statement describes in great detail a number of
conversations which Evans claims to have had with petitioner and
with one of his co-defendants, Bernard Dupree, during Evans’ one-
month incarceration in a Fulton County jail cell.
20. According to this statement, on July 9, 1978, shortly
after he was placed in solitary confinement in the cell directly
adjacent to that of petitioner, Evans began to elicit
incriminating statements from petitioner about the Dixie Furniture
Store crive by falsely claiming that he, Evans, Vas Ben Wright's
uncle, named "Charles":
eve IT told Warren McCleskey [sic] "I got a nephew man,
he in a world of trouble... McCleskey asked me, "What is
his name." I told him, "Ben Wright." McCleskey said
You Beens’! ([sic] uncle... 1 said, "Yean.! He said
"Whats’ [sic] your name?" I told him that my name was
Charles. McCleskey said, "They got me and Ben on the
same case." I said, "Oh, Ben was telling me about yawl
[sic] the last time that I seen him." He said "When you
see him" I told McCleskey that I had seen him about a
couple of weeks ago.... I said "Ben said that all of
yawl [sic] are trying to put the weight on him trying to
make like he shot the man in the robberty when he did
not do it."... I told them that "Ben told me that you
shot the man yourself." McCleskey said "Can’t nobody
prove that I shot the man, cause the lady can’t identify
me no way."
(Exhibit E, 3-4).
21. Evans also deceived petitioner’s co-defendant, Bernard
10
Dupree =-- who was present in a nearby cell =-- about nis
relationship with Ben Wright in order to assuage Dupree’s
suspicion, and thereby permit Evans to interrogate petitioner and
Dupree further:
"Dupree asked McCleskey "Is your partner still down
there? McCleskey said "Yeah, say he’s Bens’ [sic]
uncle.” Dupree said "I. didn’t no. [sic] nothing abou
[sic] Ben had no uncle man. You don’t know who the hell
you talking to, you could be talking to the man."
McCleskey told Dupree "Naw man, he ain’t no man, cause
he know a lot of people that I know and I’m just about
sure that I know him." Than I started talking to Dupree
about Reidsville. I had just about made Dupree know me
himself from telling him about Reidsville. I talked
about a lot of things that happened down there, a lot of
things Dupree did while he was in Reidsville..., but see
... Was the one who had told me about that hisself.
Thats’ [sic] how I knowed about that cause I had seen
»oe back in 1976 ... Dupreeigot ‘allright then, kind of
talked a little better. Allright then McCleskey started
talking about a job." ip, :
(Exhibit E, 9-10).
22. According to Evans’ statement, both petitioner and
Dupree, having been falsely persuaded that Evans was trustworthy,
discussed in detail the events surrounding the Dixie Furniture
Store robbery. Petitioner allegedly stated that he visited the
store before participating in the robbery (Exhibit E, 4) and that
he had made up his face with pimple-like marks and a scar on the
day the robbery took place. (Id.) Petitioner allegedly recounted
how the participants gathered at Ben Wright’s house with a shotgun
and a pistol, and how they planned to rob the store. The
statement also claims that petitioner shot Officer Schlatt in a
panic when the officer entered the store. (Exhibit E, 5-6).
23. Evans further avers that petitioner and Dupree hoped
11
that Ben Wright would be killed because "it would be better in
their favor, because he know that Ben was mad about them pointing
the killing at him, cause they know that Ben would go and tell the
truth..." (Exhibit E, 12). He also alleges that petitioner told
Evans that "he didn’t give a damn if it had been a dozen of them
[police officers] that he would still have tried to shoot his way
out." (Exhibit ¥,6 16).
24. All of these incriminatory statements, allegedly made by
petitioner McCleskey to Offie Evans, were later introduced against
him, by the State, throush Evans’ testimony at his trial. (See Tr.
T. 870, 871). These statements were allegedly made by petitioner
long after defense counsel had been appointed, and at a time when
counsel obviously was not present to. assist petitioner. No...
warning or disclosure was given by Evans or any other State agent
before the statements were elicited.
25. Evans’ 2l-page statement contains explicit references
demonstrating that he was acting 1 direct concert with State
officials during these conversations. At one point, Evans’ noted
that petitioner asked him to place a telephone call to his
girlfriend. Petitioner wrote down his girlfriend’s telephone
number on a piece of paper for Evans. Evans’ statement reveals
that, after he was led from the cell to another area of the jail,
he "tried to call [petitioner’s girlfriend] while the D.A. and the
detectives were sitting there but I was unable to get an answer...
That’s (sic) what I told [McCleskey] when I got back to the cell.
(Exhibit E, 14) (emphasis added) Additional questioning by Evans
® ®
12
occurred after his return to the cell.
26. Petitioner alleges, on information and belief, that the
State possesses extensive additional evidence, which it has
refused to disclose, which would further demonstrate that Evans
served as an active, State-sponsored informant. Evans’ 21l-page
statement alone is nevertheless sufficient to establish
petitioner’s claim that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and
his due process rights were violated by the State’s resort to
"indirect and surreptitious interrogations," Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964), through Evans.
27. .The' United States Supreme Court has consistently held
that use at trial of an accused’s incriminating statements which
were "deliberately elicited" by a State informant after the
appointment of defense counsel violate an ‘accused’s Sixth
Anendient right to counsel. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206; United
States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 274 (1980); Maine v. Moulton,
U.S. , 86 L.Ed.2d (1985); Kuhlmann v.Wilson, U.S. 91
L.Ed.24 364 (1986). In Kuhlman, the Court expressed its concern
about "secret interrogation by investigatory techniques that are
the equivalent of direct police interrogation." Id. Evans’
successful efforts to deceive petitioner and Dupree, gaining their
trust in order to question them about the robbery, and his
persistent questioning of petitioner over a period of several days
for the purpose of obtaining incriminating statements from him,
demonstrate that "the police and their informant took ... action,
beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit
1:
incriminating remarks." Kuhlmann, 91 L.Ed.2d at 385.
B. The State’s failure to correct key witness’ misleading
testimony at trial
28. The State’s failure at trial to correct the misleading
testimony of Offie Evans violated (i) petitioner's right to be
free of cruel and unusual punishment, guaranteed by the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments; and (ii) his right to the due process of
law, GuarantBel by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
FACTS SUPPORTING PETITIONER’S CLAIM THAT
THE STATE’S FAILURE TO CORRECT EVANS’ MISLEADING
TESTIMONY VIOTIATED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
29. Petitioner repeats and réalleges the allegations of
paragraphs 15-26, supra.
30. The newly-discovered 21-page statement of Offie Evans
reveals significant discrepancies between what Offie Evans told
Atlanta detectives and prosecutors in a sworn statement on August
1, 1978 and what he subsequently told petitioner’s jury under oath
at: trial. Evans carefully suggested to petitioner’s jury that
petitioner, not Evans, had initiated their conversation about the
crime. (Tr. T. 870).
i 31. Although Evans’ trial testimony created the impression
that petitioner had shot Officer Schlatt intentionally and
maliciously, he failed to disclose that his written statement
indicates that petitioner had fired his gun in panic:
"...[McCleskey] said that he did see the police put the
14
hand on his gun. And he said that he knowed right then
that it was going to have to be him or McCleskey one.
Cause the police was headed toward where Ben was back
there. And McCleskey [sic] said that he panicked, he
just shot."
(Exhibit EF, 6)
32. Evans also withheld from the jury the truth concerning
both the genesis of, and the motives for, his cooperation with the
State. At trial, Evans suggested that he had informed the State
about his conversations only after they had been completed, when
hi{tlhe deputy out there heard us talking." (Tr. T. 872).
Questioned further by petitioner’s counsel about when he first
contacted the jailer, Evans answered:
A. " [The deputy] heard us talking about it and
everybody in jail knowed about Ben, so that is
how it come about, and that is why I am here
- right now." :
(Tr. T. 880). Yet, in his statement to police, Evans clearly
indicates that, at least by midway through the month-long series
of conversations, he was actively cooperating with the State,
telephoning petitioner’s girlfriend, in the presence of police and
the district attorney, and then returning for further
interrogation of petitioner.
33. Evans also lied to petitioner’s jury about his motive
for cooperating with the State. In his trial testimony, Evans
indicated that he agreed to speak with the police because he did
not wish to be considered as a "conspirator":
Q. What did you tell [the deputy]?
A. I told him what we was talking about. He said did I
want him to call Homicide, would I tell them that. I
15
said yeah, so he called them.
What were expecting to get out of that?
A, Just like that I had been talking to Ben and something
like that.
Q, Had they considered you as a suspect in this?
A. It could have been led me to one.
Q. What would have led to you being a suspect?
a. Laying around talking with a man about something or
other that went down like that.
How would that make you a suspect?
A. It could make me a conspirator, couldn’t it?
Q. So in short, you were interested in covering up your own
rear end at that point, is that right? |
A. Yeahs a |
Q. So you cooperated with the deputy in order that you
couldn’t have any hassle in this, is that right?
A. Yeah, you can say that.
(Tr. 7... 851),
34. Yet, as Evans has admitted during petitioner’s state
habeas proceeding, Evans in fact had a different and much stronger
interest in acting as the State’s key witness against petitioner.
He deliberately sought incriminating statements from petitioner in
exchange for a police detective’s promise to "speak a word" for
him on his pending federal charges. (St. Hab. Tr. 122). Evans’
testimony at trial, however, left petitioner’s jury with the
erroneous impression that Evans was a disinterested witness, whose
16
only motive for cooperating with the state was to "[tell] it
straight, whoever it helps, it helps," (Tr. T. 881).
35. The United States Supreme Court has consistently ruled
that a criminal conviction may not be obtained by the knowing use
of perjured testimony, nor may a prosecutor permit false or
misleading testimony to go uncorrected. Mooney v. Holohan, 294
U.S. 103 (1935); Pyle v. XKangas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942); Alcorta v.
Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
A conviction obtained through such means must be set aside if
there is "any reasonable likelihood" that the false testimony
could have affected the judgment of the jury. United States v.
Aqurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976); United States v. Bagley, 105 S.
Ct. 3375, 3352 .(1935).
36. '"Materially false testimony" includes not only direct
lies but also statements which convey a false impression to the
jury. Here, petitioner’s conviction and death sentence rested on
the jury’s erroneous belief that Evans was a disinterested witness
to whom petitioner had impulsively confessed. That belief,
carefully nurtured by the State, was materially false. The
prosecutor indisputably knew of these misrepresentations, since he
signed, as a witness, each page of Evans’ 21-page written
statement. The State’s actions and omissions designed to foster
the jury’s mistaken trust in Evans constitute a clear violation of
petitioner’s due process rights, and requires that this Court
vacate his conviction and death sentence.
17
The State’s Non-Disclosure of Critical Impeachment Evidence
37. The State’s failure to disclose its agreement with
jail inmate Offie Evans, a key witness against petitioner,
violated petitioner’s right to the due process of law,
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
FACTS SUPPORTING PETITIONER’S CIAIM THAT
THE STATE’S NON-DISCIOSURE OF CRITICAL
IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE VIOLATED HIS
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
38. Evans was specifically asked at trial, both by the
prosecutor and by the defense attorney, about any promises
made in exchange for his testimony. He denied any deals or 's-
other arrangements. His actual testimony before the trial
court was:
Q: [Assistant District Attorney]: Mr. Evans, have I
promised you anything for testifying today?
A: No sir, you ain’t.
x * %
Q: Have you asked me to try to fix it so you wouldn’t
get charged with escape?
A: No, sir.
Q: Have I told you I would try to fix it for you?
A: No, sir.
(Tr T., 868-69).
39. On cross-examination Evans expanded upon his
statement regarding promises made by the State:
18
Q: Okay. Now, were you attempting to get your escape
charges altered or at least worked out, were you
expecting your testimony to be helpful in that?
A: I wasn’t worrving about the escape charge. I
wouldn’t have needed this for that charge, there
wasn’t no escape charge.
(Pr. 7. 882),
40. Evans, however, later gave flatly contradictory
testimony before the state habeas corpus court, admitting
that "the [Atlanta police] Detective told me that he would--
he said he was going to do it himself, speak a word for me.
That was what the Detective told me." (St. "Hab. Tr. 122).
(emphasis added) . The escape charges were in fact dropped
with the State’s assistance after McCleskey’s trial. (St.
atime; 1299. : az | pt
41. The newly discovered 2l-page written statement of
Evans made to Atlanta police detectives and to the prosecutor
in this case demonstrates a substantial and continuing
relationship between Evans and the State. Petitioner
proffers that Offie Evans will expand upon and clarify his
original state habeas testimony in the present proceedings.
He will testify that Atlanta police detective Sid Dorsey
discussed the benefits to him of providing testimony against
petitioner. Evans understood from the detective that if he
gave testimony implicating petitioner McCleskey in the
shooting, the state would (i) approach federal officials,
(ii) explain Evans’ cooperation, and (iii) request that then-
pending federal escape charges against him -- which carried a
18
potential sentence of $5000 or 5 years imprisonment under 18
U.S5.C.84082(d4) and §751 ~-- be dropped. Evans agreed to
testify in exchange for that promise by the Atlanta
detective. ~
42. At least two of the jurors who actually sat during
petitioner McCleskey’s trial have since given sworn
affidavits. They affirm that evidence of the understanding
between Offie Evans and Atlanta police detective Dorsey would
have crucially affected their assessments of the State’s case
against wecleshey.
43. Specifically, Jill Darmer (who served as a juror
under her married name, Mrs. Marg Darmer), has averred that
"this was a very close case for me on whether to give life or
death. (Exhibit PF 47). "The evidence was not clearcut that
McCleskey had actually been the one who fired the shots at
the officer." (Exhibit F 43). The State’s evidence on the
‘murder weapon "was contradictory at several places," which
"left us with the testimony of Ophie Evans." (Exhibit F qq4-
5). Ms. Darmer testified that she placed special reliance on
Evans’ testimony, because "I didn’t think Evans had anything
to gain.” (Exhibit PF, «5, Ms. Darmer has stated that
"[w]ithout Evans’ testimony, I definitely would not have
voted for a death sentence" (Exhibit F 910), and "had I known
that Ophie Evans had an arrangement with an Atlanta detective
.. I would never have voted to impose capital punishment."
(Exhibit F €q11).
20
ir Juror Robert Burnette also agreed that this "wasn’t
an easy case. We spent a long time discussing the State’s
evidence." (Exhibit G 92). Like Marg Darmer, juror Burnette
discounted Ben Wright’s testimony, placing instead great
weight on what Offie Evans told the jury. After reading
Evans’ state habeas testimony, Burnette has now averred that
he "would definitely not have voted to sentence McCleskey to
death 1f [he] had thought “he might not have ‘been =the
triggerman,” VY[Rinowing ... that Fvans could have lied to
cover his deal with the detective definitely could have made
a big difference to me, and to other jurors, I think -- at
least in deciding to give the death penalty," Burnette has
~ stated (Exhibit G 99).
The State’s Reference To Appellate Review In Closing Argument
45. The prosecutor’s deliberate and misleading
references to appellate review during his closing argument at
the penalty phase of petitioner’s trial, and his specific
invitation to the jury to consider the fact that petitioner’s
prior life sentences had been reduced by the appellate
courts, violated (i) petitioner’s right to be free of cruel
and unusual punishment, guaranteed by the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments; and (ii) his right to the due process
of law, guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States.
21
FACTS SUPPORTING PETITIONER’S CIAIM
THAT THE PROSECUTOR’S CLOSING ARGUMENT
VIOLATED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
46. During the sentencing phase of petitioner’s trial,
the prosecutor invited the jury to focus its attention upon
the following considerations in determining the penalty to be
imposed:
"Ladies and Gentlemen, this is the sentencing phase
of this trial, and 1 ewpect the court is going to
charge you with a couple of points, that you can
return a. verdict of life in prison or you can
return‘: verdict. of death '. . . (Tr.T. 1016). . If
you find a sentence for the man of life for murder,
if you sentence him to life for armed robbery, and
to life for armed robbery, and to life for the
second armed robbery, and if you don’t specify how
these are to run, they are going to run together .
oy {TrJP., 1017).
oie kl
I would also ask you to consider the prior
convictions that you have had with you in the jury
room, and particularly the one where he got three
convictions. I believe if you look at those papers
carefully you are going to find, I think, on one of
those he got three life sentences to begin with,
and then there is a cover sheet where apparently
that was reduced to what, eighteen years or fifteen
years or something, which means, of course, he went
through the appellate process ‘and somehow got it
reduced.
Now, I ask you to consider that in conjunction with
the life that he has set for himself." (Tr.T. 1019-
1020)
(The complete closing argument of the prosecutor appears as
an appendix to Exhibit B.)
47. The prosecutor’s explicit request for the jury to
consider the fact that three 1life sentences previously
imposed upon petitioner had been reduced "in the appellate
22
process" obviously directed the jury’s attention to the fact
that its sentence in McCleskey’s case would be reviewed on
appeal. The remarks strongly implied, moreover, that the
jury in this case should impose a death sentence on
petitioner -- rather than one or even three life sentences--
to avoid the possibility that any life sentence would somehow
be reduced to a term of years by the appellate courts, just
as petitioner’s three prior life Sentences had been.
48. These references, furthermore, were factually
misleading, since the Georgia Supreme Court in fact has no
power to reduce a life sentence to a term of years.
Petitioner’s prior life sentences had actually been reduced
by. the trial ‘court, upon the prosecutor’s agreement, after
cet TLitner’s motion for a new rial had been granted.
49. In Caldwell, the Supreme Court identified a series
of grave risks to the integrity of a Jury’s capital
sentencing decision if there were "state-induced suggestions
that the sentencing jury may shift its sense of
responsibility to an appellate court." 86 L.E4d.2d at 240.
Adopting a very strict standard of review, the Court held
that reversal of Caldwell’s death sentence was required
"[b]ecause we cannot say that this [closing argument] had no
effect on the sentencing decision." 86 L.Ed.2d at 247.
E. The State’s Systematic Exclusion of Black Jurors
23
50. The Fulton County prosecutor’s systematic use of
his peremptory challenges to. strip prospective black jurors
from petitioner’s capital trial -- producing a near all-white
jury of eleven whites and one black -- violated: (1)
petitioner’s right to a representative jury, guaranteed by
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments; (ii) his right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment at the penalty phase
of his trial, guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments; and (iil) his right to the equal protection of
the laws, guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States.
FACTS SUPPORTING PETITIONER'S CILATM THAT
THE SYSTEMATIC EXCLUSION OF PROSPECTIVE
BIACK JURORS VIOIATED HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
51. Petitioner Warren McCleskey is black. He was
charged with the 1978 murder of a white police officer, Frank
Schlatt.: Petitioner’s trial ‘occurred iin Fulton County,
Georgia, in October of 1978. United States Census figures
reveal that in 1970, the population of Fulton County was
60.9% white, 39.1% black. The 1980 census. reveal that the
Fulton County population had shifted to become 48% white, 52%
black.
52. A total of 52 jurors were questioned in McCleskey’s
case. Of the 50 whose race has been confirmed, 40 were
white, and 10 were black. After voir dire was complete, the
24
prosecutor, Russell Parker, and the defense attorney each
exercised their respective peremptory challenges, on the
record. As a portion of the trial transcript indicates, (see
Exhibit H) prosecutor Parker exercised a total of 11 strikes;
at least 6 of those peremptorily excused by Parker were black
jurors. (The race of each of these prospective jurors has
been confirmed not only by a comparison of juror lists with
voter registration lists (see Exhibit I), but also by direct
contact with 5 excluded jurors. Attached as Exhibit J are
affidavits from these five prospective jurors, confirming
their race and their exclusion from Warren McCleskey’s
trial.) The voir dire transcripts of these excluded black
aE jurors reveals absolutely no racially neutral grounds on.
which to distinguish them as prospective jurors from white
jurors who were not struck.
53. This stark pattern of racial exclusions establishes
a prima facie violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. rl 90
L.Ed.2d 69, 87-88 (1986); United States v. Gordon, 817 F.2d
1538, 1541 (11th Cir. 1987) ("under Batson, the striking of a
single black juror for a racial reason violates the Equal
protestion Clause, even where other black jurors are
seated. ")
54. While Batson has been held non-retroactive to those
non-capital cases beyond direct appeal, see Allen v. Hardy,
U.S. +. 22 L.E3.24 199 (1986); Griffith v. Kentucky,
25
U.S. , 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987), petitioner alleges that the
constitutional requirement of special reliability in capital
cases, see, e.d9., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
304-05 (1976); .Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58
(1277); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637 (1980), mandates
that Batson be applied retroactively to capital cases. At a
minimum, because of the "unique opportunity for racial
prejudice to operate but remain undetected" in capital
sentencing proceedings, Turner v. Murray, U.S. 90 ————
L.Ed.2d 27, 35 (1986), Batson is applicable, petitioner
submits, to the penalty phase of his capital trial. But cf.
High v. Kemp, No.85-8989 (11th Cir., June 11, 1987) (holding
Batson non-retroactive to capital cases)
The State’s Intentional Racial Discrimination Against
Petitioner McCleskev
55. The death penalty has been imposed on petitioner
McCleskey pursuant to a pattern and practice of Georgia
prosecutors, courts, judges, and juries, both statewide and
in Fulton County, to discriminate against black defendants
and against those whose homicide victims are white.
Moreover, the decision-makers in petitioner McCleskey’s own
case acted with discriminatory purpose and intent, and their
actions created a "constitutionally significant risk of
racial bias" affecting his capital sentence, all in violation
of the Eighth Amendment and of the Equal Protection Clause of
26
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the Onited
States.
FACTS SUPPORTING PETITIONER’S CIAIM
THAT HIS CAPITAL SENTENCE WAS THE
PRODUCT OF RACIALLY DISCRIMINATION
56. Petitioner repeats and realleges the allegations of
paragraphs 51 through 52, supra.
57. In his prior federal habeas corpus proceeding,
McCleskey Vv. Zant, No. C81-2434A (N.D.Ga.), petitioner
presented extensive statistical evidence, through exhibits
and live testimony, to establish striking patterns of
disparate racial treatment in Georgia capital cases.
Petitioner proffers to this Court, and will produce at an
evidentiary hearing, that body of evidence,
58. While the Supreme Court has held that such
evidence, standing alone, is insufficient to make out a
violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments, see
McCleskey v. Kemp, U.S. ry 9% L.PA.24 .2682, 291-92
(1987), the Court also held that a habeas petitioner could
prevail under the Fourteenth Amendment by proving "that the
decisionmakers in his «case acted with discriminatory
purpose,” Id. at 278.
59. The Supreme Court noted its own "’‘unceasing
efforts’ to eradicate racial prejudice from our criminal
justice system," id. at 289; prominent among the procedural
protections cited by the Court was its "condemn[ation of]
state efforts to exclude blacks from grand and petit juries,"
27
id. n.30, including any attempts by "a prosecutor [to]
exercise peremptory challenge on the basis of race." Id.
60. Prosecutor Parker’s deliberate and repeated
exercise of his peremptory challenges to remove at least six
black jurors from petitioner’s trial jury --especially seen
in combination with petitioner’s powerful statistical showing
of racial discrimination in Fulton County and the State of
Georgia since 1973 -- establishes precisely the kind of
Eighth Amendment and Equal Protection Clause violations which
the Sirens Court held are cognizable under the rule of
McCleskevy v. Kemp.
Petitioner’s Ake v. Oklahoma Claim.
61. The state trial ‘court’s denial of petitioner’s
motion for funds for the employment, jinter alia, of a
ballistics expert violated his right to the due process of
law guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Cosntitution of the United States.
FACTS SUPPORTING PETITIONER'S
AKE v. OKIAHOMA CIAIM
62.. Prior to his trial, petitioner moved in the trial
court to "proceed in forma pauperis and for funds for expert p
witnesses." (Exhibit K). Defense counsel specifically noted
that the State intended to rely at trial upon "numerous
experts, including [a] pathologist, criminologist, criminal
28
investigators, ballistics experts, and others," (id) and he
stated that . "[s]laid ‘experts veo have: contributed
significantly to the State’s case against the defendant." Id.
Petitioner’s motion explained that petitioner was without
money to pay for his defense, and moved the court for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis.
63. The trial court did not grant petitioner’s motion,
and no defense ballistics expert was appointed. During
trial, the State used the testimony of Kelly Fite, an agent
of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation, to link the purported
murder weapon to petitioner. Fite testified that he had"
examined microscopically the markings on the two bullets
recovered from the homicide scene. (Tr. T. 413-14)... Of the:
"several hundred makes of weapons, .38 caliber," (Tr.T.414),
Fite testified -- apparently without doubt -- that the .38
Rossi was "the only one that has [the] type of twist[s] and
lands and grooves" observed on the bullets taken from the
gcene. (I4.) The State then sought to establish that
petitioner Warren McCleskey had been carrying a .38 Rossi on
the day of the crime, and that, therefore, it was he who had
shot Officer Schlatt.
64. However, during a subsequent post-trial deposition,
arranged by volunteer counsel, Fite admitted that the
markings left on the bullet taken from Officer Schlatt could
also have come either from a Taurus revolver (Exhibit L, 6)
or from a Charter Arms revolver. (Id., 7).
29
65. An independent ballistics expert would have
provided defense counsel with these alternative hypotheses,
as did Fite himself during his post-trial deposition. Armed
with evidence that two other pistols, apart from the .38
Rossi, might have been the murder weapon, petitioner’s
defense attorney would have been able to counter the one-
sided impression left with petitioner’s jury by Fite’s
damning and apparently unequivocal testimony, which pointed
directly at McCleskey as the triggerman.
66. Apart £60 the testimony of ‘Ben Wright and Ophie
Evans, Fite’s testimony about the .38 Rossi was the most
critical evidence 1linking McCleskey to Officer Schlatt’s
murder. At least two jurors “have now revealed. that the
central issue facing the Juvyiin this case, both at the guilt
and at the sentencing phases of the trial, was whether
petitioner McCleskey was the triggerman.
IV. PETITIONER’S EXPLANATION FOR WHY THESE CIAIMS ARE NOT
BARRED UNDER RULE 9
é%. PP. Petitioner’s Massiah and Mooney Claims
Petitioner’s claims (i) that the State’s use at trial of
incriminating statements made by him to Offie Evans violated
his Sixth Amendment and Due Process Clause rights, and (ii)
that the State failed to correct Evans’ misleading testimony
at trial, are based on a written statement given by Offie
Evans to the police, describing in detail certain alleged
30
conversations between Evans and petitioner in July of 1978.
68. Before petitioner’s trial, defense counsel
requested from the State all exculpatory and impeaching
information, including "[a]ll written statements of witnesses
in the possession of the prosecutor relating to the charge
against ... defendant.” (See Exhibit WM, VMotion for
Information Necessary to Receive a Fair Trial, and Motion for
Disclosure of Impeaching Information.) Yet Offie Evans’
statement to the police was not made available to
petitioner’s counsel. (St... Hab, Tr, 77). Instead the
prosecutor submitted certain items to the trial court for in
camera inspection. According to prosecutor Russell Parker,
defense attorney Turner was never informed about the nature
of the teens submitted to the trial court for in camera
inspection in response to his motion. (Parker Deposition, 8).
In a one-paragraph order the trial court denied petitioner’s
request, giving no hint what items had been reviewed. (A copy
of the order is annexed as Exhibit N.)
69. Midway during the cross-examination of petitioner
McCleskey by the State, defense attorney Turner orally
renewed his requests for any relevant statements made by
defendant. (Tr... T. 330-31). The trial court denied the
request, observing that "I don’t know that we are talking
about any written statement." (Tr. T. 831) In short, the
trial court, after implying that no written statement existed
at all, denied petitioner ACCess, a second time, to any
31
witness statements, whether written or oral. (A copy of the
transcript of the full interchange between counsel and the
Court is annexed as Exhibit 0.)
70. On direct appeal, Turner urged that the State’s
refusal to turn over what counsel plainly believed was an
oral statement by Evans violated petitioner’s rights. The
Georgia Supreme Court upheld the denial of access to
petitioner without intimating that any written, signed
statement existed. McCleskey v. State, 245 Ga. 108, 263
S.E.2d 146, 150 (1980). On the contrary, perhaps misled
itself, the Georgia Court explicitly stated in its opinion
that "[t]he evidence [the defense counsel] sought to inspect
was introduced to the jury in its entirety," id. (emphasis:
added) -- obviously referring to the oral testimony of Evans.
71. In state habeas corpus proceedings, volunteer
counsel for petitioner once again sought discovery from the
prosecutor. After a deposition of the prosecutor, in a post-
deposition letter to the official court reporter (a copy of
which was forwarded to petitioner’s counsel), an Assistant
Attorney General explicitly represented: "[E]lnclosed is a
complete copy of the prosecutor’s file resulting from the
criminal prosecution of Warren McCleskey in Fulton County.
As agreed by counsel for both parties who attended the
deposition of Mr. Russell Parker ... the enclosed file ... is
to be attached to Mr. Parker’s deposition as joint Exhibit
A." (A copy of the letter is annexed as Exhibit P). No copy
32
of the 21l-page statement by Evans was included among the
documents sent to the court reporter for inclusion as an
official exhibit in state habeas proceedings.
72. Petitioner’s counsel, having thus been repeatedly
misled even as to the existence of a written statement, and
denied access to it after numerous categorical requests for
any such documents, only learned of Evans’ statement
inadvertently, on June 10, 1987, when it was forwarded to
them by an Atlanta City Attorney in response to a request
seeking altogether different documents. (An Sitaneive proffer
of the chain of events leading to the statement’s discovery
is reflected at pages - of the official transcript of
the June 29, 1387 hearing on respondent’s motion to dismiss,
held in the Superior Court of Butts county. See also the
exchange of letters annexed as Exhibit Q.)
73. Federal law is clear that when evidence in support
of a claim has been withheld from a petitioner by the State,
with no inexcusable neglect by petitioner’s counsel, it is
not an abuse of the writ, once the evidence comes to light,
‘to present the new claim in a successive petition. See,
€:0., Price wv. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 291 (1948) (where
State prosecutor introduced false testimony at trial, a
successive petitioner was appropriate once the falsehood was
discovered, since the petitioner "was previously unable to
assert the rights or was unaware of the significance of
relevant facts"); cf. Freeman v. Georgia, 599 F.2d 65, 71-72
33
(5th Cir. 1979) (where defense counsel was misled to believe
that witness would be unfavorable, defendant was not
responsible for failure to attempt to locate witness); Barbee
¥Y. Warden, Marvland Penitentiary, 331 F.2d 842, 845 (4th Cir.
1964) (same). See generally Advisory Committee Note to Rule
9: "There are instances in which a petitioner’s failure to
assert a ground in a prior petition is excusable... newly
discovered evidence [is an]... exampl[e]."
74. Petitioner’s efforts to obtain Evans’ 2l1-page
statement have been timely and in good faith. Petitioner
could not have reasonably obtained this evidence in his first
habeas corpus proceeding, and he is not abusing the writ by
presenting it here.
75. .C. Petitioner’s Giglio Claim. Petitioner did
raise a challenge, in his initial state petition, to the
State’s failure to disclose its arrangement with Offie Evans
in exchange for his testimony, citing Giglio v. United
States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). (Exhibit A, 920). This Court
granted relief on the Giglio claim, 580 F.Supp. at 380-84,
but a majority of the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding
that the understanding with the detective was not a "promise"
under Giglio, and was harmless error. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753
F.24 at 884.
76. The 2l1-page statement of Offie Evans which has just
come to light constitutes newly available evidence, not
reasonably discoverable by petitioner, which further
@ @®
34
clarifies the substantial nature of the relationship between
Evans and State officials.
77. Moreover, the constitutional principles applicable
to this issue have been. clarified in a number of relevant
cases since this Court’s 1983 opinion. Seg, e.9., United
States v. Bagley, 474 U.S. (1985) ; Brown v. Wainwright, 785
F.2d 1457 (11th Cir. 1986); Haber v. Wainwright, 756 F.2d
1520 (11th Cir. 1933), These cases constitute a change in
applicable law that require this Court to redetermine the
validity of petitioner’s claim.
| 78. Alternatively, the affidavits of the trial jurors
who actually determined petitioner’s sentence reveal that,
had the State’s SFvengemonts with Offie Evans been relly
disclosed at trial, petitioner. would not have been Sevterced ¢
to death and would 1ikelv not have been convicted of malice
murder. He has thus been the victim of "a fundamental
miscarriage of justice" within the meaning of Murray v.
Carrier, Dp..." 81 1.74.24 397, 413 (1986), since he is
"actually innocent" of the malice murder of Officer Schlatt
and "innocent" of a death-worthy crime.
79. The State’s arrangement with Evans -- concealed by
a web of lies, misrepresentations and half-truths by Evans
concerning the escape charges =-- clearly gave the jury a
"false" and "misleading" impression under Smith v. Murray,
U.S. / 21. L.BA.24 4834, 447 (1936). These
misrepresentations served, as the attached juror affidavits
35
show, "to pervert the jury’s deliberations concerning the
ultimate question" of petitioner’s sentence. Id. Under such
circumstances, the merits of petitioner’s Giglio claim are
appropriately before this Court for decision.
80. FE. Petitioner’s Caldwell vv. Mississippi Claim-
Petitioner did raise, in his initial state habeas corpus petition
filed in 1980, a constitutional challenge under the Due Process
Clause to the State’s closing argument to his jury, during which
the prosecutor stressed that an appellate court had reduced
petitioner’s previous life sentences. (Exhibit a, 925).
8l. Citing exclusively state law precedents, the state
courts rejected the claim, concluding that "[s]ince the words
referred to a past conviction, the Court cannot conclude that the
words had the inevitable effect of encouraging the jury to attach
diminished consequence to their verdict and take less than full
responsibility for determining life or death." (Exhibit B, 25).
This Court likewise analyzed the claim under available due process
precedents, concluding that "[r]eferences to the appellate process
are not per se unconstitutional unless on the record as a whole it
can be said that it rendered the entire trial fundamentally
unfair." McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F.Supp.at 387-88.
82. It was only in 1985, in Caldwell Vv. Mississippi, that
the Supreme Court first announced a new Eighth Amendment
principle, to be applied to capital sentencing-phase arguments
under a standard far more strict than that which governs due
process claims. The Court of Appeals in this Circuit has recently
36
held . that a Caldwell claim "was not available” +o a habeas
petitioner who filed his initial petition as late as September of
1984. Adame v, Ducaer, 816: F.24 1493. (211th Cir. 1987) (on
rehearing). The Adams court expressly rejected arguments by the
Florida Attorney General, similar to those advanced by the
respondent in this case, that state and federal due process claims
had been available to petitioner Adams. "The mere fact that a
practice may be condemned as a matter of state law ... does not
indicate that the same practice constitutes an Eighth Amendment
violation... [Moreover,] it is clear that not every claim that
implicates the fundamental fairness standards embodied in the due
process clause necessarily implicates the Eighth Amendment as
well." 816 F.2d at 1496 n.2. = Petitioner McCleskey’s Caldwell
claim, as Adams demonstrates, must be addressed and decided on its
merits.
83. Xx. Petitioner’s Batson v. Kentucky Claim Prior to
the United States Supreme Court’s 1986 decision in Batson v.
Kentucky, e.s. ry. 90 L.PA.24 69 (1986), a pattern of
prosecutorial exclusions of prospective jurors -- even a pattern
as strong as that presented by petitioner’s case -- gave a habeas
petitioner no basis for an Equal Protection Clause challenge.
Under the then-controlling authority of Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
202 (1965), a habeas petitioner was required to "show the
prosecutor’s systematic use of peremptory challenges against
Negroes" not simply in one case, but "over a period of time," 380
U.S. at 227 (emphasis added), in order to make out a prima facie
37
Clain.
834. The Supreme Court in 1986, recognizing that the Swain
standard imposed "a crippling burden of proof" on a habeas
petitioner, Batson Vv, Rentucky, 90 L.E4.24 at 83, adopted a. new
standard, under which "a defendant may make out a prima facie
showing ... by relying solely on the facts concerning [jury]
selection in his case." Id. at 87 (emphasis in original).
85. Petitioner’s claim in this case is brought under the new
constitutional standard announced in 1986 in Batson. This new
Batson rule, the Supreme Cour: has held, "is an explicit and
substantial break with prior precedent’" which has " ‘overruled
23
[a] portion of Swain.’" Griffith v. Kentucky, U.S.
L.Ed.2d - 649, 660. (1987). This new rule was not announced until
1986, nearly eight years after petitioner’s 1978 trial, and over
five years after his initial state habeas corpus proceedings.
Under Rule 9(b) and Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963), a
new claim may be asserted in a successive petition if "the
applicant ... show[s] that the ends of justice would be served."
373r U.S, at. 1s, The courts have long agreed that the ends of
Justice are served if "the applicant ... show[s] an intervening
change in the law," id. at 17. provides a justification for the
applicant’s failure to have included the claim in his initial
petition. See Adams v. Dugger, 816 F.2d 1493, 1495-96 (llth Cir.
1987) ;
86. TF. Petitioner’s Claim of Intentional Discrimination.
The standard of proof necessary to make out a claim of racial
38
discrimination in a State’s application of its capital statutes
was not clarified until the Supreme Court decided McCleskevy v.
Bemp, on April 22, 1587. Prior to that time, noi definitive
guidance had ever been provided to habeas litigants on the
elements of such a claim. It was in order to provide such
guidance that the United States Court of Appeals initially agreed
in 1984 to address the issue en banc and the Supreme Court agreed
to grant certiorari in 19836.
87." A majority of the Bupreme Court in MaClaeskey
acknowledged that "the nature of the capital sentencing decision,
and «the relationship of ... statisticl{al evidence] to ‘that
decision are fundamentally different from the corresponding
~ elements in" other Equal Protection claims. McCleskey v. Kemp, 95
L.Ed.2d at 279. Ordinary principles of statistical inference and
proof "simply [are] ... not comparable", id., to those the Court
has now announced will henceforth be applicable in capital cases.
88. The new McCleskey requirement -- that a habeas
petitioner, even one armed with statistical evidence, must
demonstrate that "the decisionmakers in his case acted with
discriminatory purpose," id., and that such proof must include
specific acts directly attributable to such actors --constitutes
"new law". Moreover, the conduct petitioner now proffers as proof
of discrimination =-- the prosecutor’s systematic exclusion of
black jurors in hiw own case -- was not deemed either a violation
of: the Equal Protection Clause or evidence of unlawful
discrimination under the controlling standard of Swain v. Alabama
39
at the time his initial petition was filed.
839, Petitioner, in addition, "did "attempt ‘in his first
federal habeas proceeding to adduce some evidence that the
prosecutor in his case had acted with discriminatory intent in the
selection of petitioner’s jury. During the course of federal
habeas corpus proceedings, petitioner formally moved for
discovery, inter alia, of "[a]ll documents, whether official or
unofficial, and whether for internal or external use or for
publication, which discuss, refer to or otherwise concern, in
whole or in part the issue of ... racial discrimination in any and
all aspects of Jury :selection [or] jury composition."
Petitioner’s First Request for Production of Documents, dated
April- 8, 1983, at 4 94. On June 3, 1983, this Court entered an
order denying this request "as irrelevant." Order at 2.
90. During the federal evidentiary hearing, petitioner
offered the testimony of his sister to establish the racial
composition of his actual jury -- eleven whites and one black.
{Fed. Tr. 1316). When he sought to demonstrate the unlikelihood
that such a jury composition could have S codtned in Fulton County
by chance (Fed. Tr. 1772), this Court asked whether petitioner was
offering the evidence in support of an ordinary jury challenge.
(Id.). After some colloquy, counsel for petitioner responded:
I think we’re in a different realm, Your Honor. I think
we’re in an Eighth Amendment realm where the question is
was Warren McCleskey struck by lightning or was he
discriminated against. And I think this evidence goes
to that question, even if it doesn’t make out a Sixth
Amendment issue.
(Fed Tr. 1776). The Court ultimately admitted petitioner’s expert
40
testimony which established that, in Fulton County, the
probability of an 1l1-to-1 white jury was .03, or three-in-one
thousand. (Fed Tr. 1777).
Sl. In. his post-hearing brief to the District. Court,
petitioner specifically called attention to "the racial
composition of his jury panel -- 11 whites and one black" and
urged the Court to "consider this fact insofar as it finds events
in the individual case relevant to the overall discrimination
issue here." Petitioner’s Post-Hearing Memorandum of Law in
Support of His Claims of Arbitrariness and Racial Discrimination,
dated September 26, 1983, at 89 n.39.
92. Petitioner later noted for the Court: that his
statistical case of racial discrimination "need not stand alone,"
recalling that "(hile has attenpted to obtain and offered to
present other evidence of racial discrimination in Georgia’s
criminal justice system," which "the Court denied ... holding it
irrelevant." Petitioner’s Memorandum at 102.
93. Subsequently, in his brief to the Court of Appeals,
petitioner argued that
in denying as ‘irrelevant’ petitioner’s discovery
requests related to prior discriminatory conduct in the
criminal justice system in Fulton County ... the
District Corut erred ... for such anecdotal evidence is
plainly relevant to an Equal Protection Claim."
The District Court’s insistence that prior discriminatory
conduct =-- especially by actors integrally involved in the
administration of the criminal justice system -- was
firrelevant! to petitioner’s Tqual Protection claim
constitute clear legal error.
En Banc Brief for Petitioner McCleskey as Appellee and Cross-
41
Appellant, dated May 8, 1984, at 26 & n.17.
94. Thus, while petitioner was not apprised prior to the
April 22, 1987 opinion in McCleskey of the legal necessity of
proffering evidence of specific discriminatory acts, or of the
factual significance under Batson of the prosecutor’s peremptory
strikes, he nevertheless had attempted in good faith to proffer
such evidence.
95, GG. Petitioner’s Ake v. Oklahoma Claim. Petitioner did
raise, . in his initial state habeas corpus petition, a
constitutional challenge to the trial court’s refusal to provide
him an independerit ballistics expert. (Exhibit A, ¢ 22). The
state court, following well-established precedent, held that
n[tihe appointment of expert witnesses lies within ‘the discretion
ot the trial Cott" ond that Wratental of the notion , will not
be reversed in the absence of an abuse of that discretion."
(Exhibit B, 10). This Court, citing the state-law abuse of
discretion standard, agreed. McClegkey v. Zant, 530 F.Supp. at
387.
96. Several years thereafter, in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S.
68, 83 (1985), the Supreme Court held for the first time that the
provision of expert assistance is not solely a matter of state
trial court discretion. Instead, a state is required by the
federal Due Process Clause to provide an indigent with an expert
if the matter at issue "is to be a significant factor at trial."
gee, €.9., Moore v. Kemp, 809 ¥F.24 702, 711-12 (11th Cir. 1987)
(en banc) (assumes "that the due process clause could require the
\
42
government , both state and federal, to provide nonpsychiatric
expert assistance to an indigent defendant upon a sufficient
showing of need.")
97. Ake and subsequent cases thus have wrought a change in
law that requires this Court to consider the merits of this
successive claim. See Tucker v. Hemp, 818: P.24 749. (11th Cir.
1987) .
* * * * *
98. Other than a petition for rehearing presently pending in
the Supreme Court of the United States, petitioner has no other
motions, petitions or appeals now pending in any court, state or
federal, as to the judgment under attack.
99. Petitioner was represented by the following attorneys: -
(a) et the preliminary hearing, at trial and on appeal
to Georgia Supreme Court: John Turner, Esq., now with the Fulton
County District Attorney’s Office, Fulton County Courthouse,
Atlanta, Georgia;
(b) on petition for certiorari: Robert H. Stroup, Esq.,
141 Walton Street, Atlanta, Georgia 30303; Jack Greenberg, James
M. Nabrit, III, John Charles Boger, 99 Hudson Street, New York,
New York 10013;
(c) in state habeas corpus proceedings, on application
for certificate of probable cause to appeal to Georgia Supreme
Court, and on petition for writ of certiorari to United States
Supreme Court; Stroup, Greenberg, Nabrit and Boger.
(d) in federal habeas proceedings, by Timothy K. Ford,
43
600 Pioneer Building, Seattle, Washington 98103; Anthony G.
Amsterdam, New York University Law School, 40 Washington Square
South, New York, New York 10012; Julius L.. Chambers, 99 Hudson
Street, New York, New York 10013; and by Stroup, Nabrit & Boger.
(e) in successive state habeas corpus proceedings, by
Stroup, Chambers, Nabrit and Boger.
100. Petitioner was convicted on one count of malice murder
and two counts of armed robbery.
101. Petitioner has no future sentence to serve after
completion of the sentences imposed by the judgments under attack.
WHEREFORE petitioner Warren McCleskey prays that this court:
1. Issue a writ of habeas corpus to have petitioner brought
before it. to. the end that he may be ‘discharged from his
unconstitutional confinement and restraint and/or be relieved of
his unconstitutional sentence of death;
2. Conduct a hearing at which proof may be offered
concerning the allegations of his petition;
3 Permit petitioner, who is indigent, to proceed without
prepayment of costs or fees;
4. Grant petitioner, who is indigent, sufficient funds to
secure expert testimony necessary to prove the facts as alleged in
his petition;
Be Grant petitioner the authority to obtain subpoenas in
forma pauperis for witnesses and documents necessary to prove the
facts as alleged in his petition;
6. Allow petitioner a reasonable period of time subsequent
gh!
to any hearing this Court determines to conduct, in which to brief
the issues of law raised by this petition;
7. Stay petitioner’s execution pending final disposition of
this petition; and
8. Grant such other relief as may be appropriate.
Dated: July 6, 1987 Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT H. STROUP
141 Walton Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
(404) 522-8500
Georgia Bar Number 689175
JULIUS L. CHAMBERS
JAMES M. NABRIT, III
JOHN CHARLES BOGER
99 Hudson Street
New York, New York 10013
(212) 219-1900
Attorneys for Petitioner
By:
EXHIBIT A
A 2 ®
IN TEE SUPERICR COURT QF BUTTS COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA
WARREN MCCLESKrY,
Petitioner,
B.C. No. 490 9
Ve.
WALTFR ZANT, Warden,
Georgia Diagonistic and
Classification Center,
Pesoondent.
PRTITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS,
FOR A STAY OF EXFCUTION, AND FOR
LEAVE TC PRCCEED IN FORM? PAUPERIRS
I. Introduction
(1) . This is a petitfon for. a writ of habeas corous
to relieve the petitioner of restraint under a conviction
and sentence of death imrosed upon him by the State of
Georgia in violation of his rights under the Constitution
of the United States and of the State of Georgia.
| II. Parties
J (2) Petitioner Warren McCleskey is a citizen of the
i United States and a resident of the State of Georgia. He
i 1s presently imprisoned under sentence of death at the Georgia
i Diagonistic and Classification Center in Jackson, Georgia.
(3) Petitioner is a pauper. Because of his poverty,
he is unable to pav the fees and costs of this action or to
give security therefor. Petitioner believes that he is entitle
to redress.
; (4) Pespondent alter Zant is the Warden of the Georgia
Diagonistic and Clacsification Center, Jackson, Georgia,
and has custodv of the petitioner in his official capacity.
Respondent is currently confining retitioner for the
3 |
BE EE a a ia tl A — ro mr ——_ 948 =e" mit ge on Teme we
NECA 1
: Swen -
» i BUNA ———e——. fore yeh ar SL oe 15.500 1 4 + An on are Vane 7 5 nr * . i oxpigm rons, fw res wages pupae 3-3 wwe: Hin
Co
n S
ultimate execution of his death sentence at the Diagnostic
and Classification Center,
III. Prior Proceedings
(55) Or October 12, 1978, petitioner was convicted
in the Superior Court of Fulton County of the murder of
Atlanta police officer Frank Schlatt and was sentenced to
death. He was also convicted on two counts of armed robbery,
and given two consecutive life sentences.
(6) On January 24, 1980, the Supreme Court of
Georgia affirmed petitioner's convictions and sentences.
McClesky v. The State, 245 Ga. 103 (1980).
(7) On June 23, 1980, petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States (Mo. 79-
6830). On October 6, 1980, that court declined certiorari,
McClesky v. Georgia, 0.8. , 249: 0.8.L.V. 3231 (1980) .
(8) On December 19, 1280, the Superior Court for Fult
County set January. 8, 1981, as the date for execution of
petitioner's Keath sentehos on Decatiber 19,1980, petitioner
filed an extraordinary motion for a new trial and asked tue t:
court to delay re-sentencing pending disposition of said
motion, but the trial court denied petitioner's request.
IV. Respects in Which Petitioner's
Richts Were Violated
(9) Petitioner is in custody in violation of the
Constitution of the United States and of the State of Georgie
for the reasons set forth herein.
(10) The death penalty is in fact administered and
applied arbitrarily, capriciously, and whimsically in the
State of Georgia and petitioner was sentenced to die, and wi:
be executed, pursuant to a pattern and practice of wholly
arbitrary and capricious infliction of that penalty in viola
of his rights guaranteed by the Fighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and
“De
ow eregp— oo r—r
D 9
Sections 2-101 and 2-114 of the 1°76 Constition of the State
of Georgia,
(11) Petitioner's death is being exacted pursuant
to a pattern and practice of Georgia prosecuting authorities,
courts, juries and Covernors to discriminate intentionally
and purposefully on grounds of race, sex and poverty in the
administration of capital punishment. For this reason, the
impositon and execution of petitioner's death sentence under
Georgia law and practice violate the Fighth Amendment and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, and Sections 2-101 and
2-114 of the 1276 Constitution of the State of Georgia.
(12) The theoretical justifications for capital
punishment are groundless and irrational in fact, and death
is thus an excessive penalty which fails factuallv to serve
any rational and legitimate social interests that can justify
its unique harshnass, in violation of petitioner's rights
guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States, and sections 2-101 and
2-114 of the 1976 Constitution of the State of Georgia.
(13) Petitioner's punishment is cruel and unusual in
consideration of all factors relating to the offense and
the offender, including mitigating circumstances. For this
reason, the imposition and execution of his death sentence
violates petitioner's rights guaranteed by the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States,
and Sections 2-101 and 2-114 of the 192976 Constitution of the
State of Georgia.
(14) The penalty of death was assessed against peti-
sioner on the basis of fundamentally unfair proceedings in which
he was not afforded adecuate notice and an ovportunity to
present evidence and argument directed to specific issues
determinative of the question of life and death. The impositior
3
— BE Eni cosmene wr ——— - — — ur ; my ea
+ 3
and” execution of the sentence of death under such circumstances
violates petitioner's rights guaranteed by the Pourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and fections
2-101, 2-111 and2-114 of the 1976 Constitution of the State of
Georgia.
{195) Petitioner's trial jury did not constitute a
representative cross-section of the community and was incapable
of reflecting contemporary community attitudes regarding the
appropriateness of the venaltv of death in petitioner's case,
because all persons with conscientious or religious scruples
Sauainet capital punishment were systematically excluded in
violation of petitioner's rights guaranteed by the Sixth, Fighth
,and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United State
and Sections 2-101, 2-111 and 2-114 of the 127¢ Constitution of
J
the State of Georgia. A copy of the relevant portions of the
b
trial transcrint are attached hereto as Ezihibkit A,
; (16) Petitioner's trial jury was unrepresentative
1}
‘and biased in favor of the prosecution on the issue of petitioner
i
.guilt or innocence of the crime with which he was charged, in
'violation of his rights guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth
‘Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and
‘Sections 2-101, 2-111 and 2-114 of the 1976 Constitution of the
| State of Georgia.
i
£17) The Court's failure to adequately instruct
‘jurors with conscientious and/or religious scruples against
| capital punishment of their duty to subordinate their personal
views and to abide by their oath as jurors, and to inquire
further into their beliefs prior to excusing said jurors
contravened petitioner's rights guaranteed by the Sixth and
"Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States
and Sections 2-101, 2-111 and 2-114 of the 1976 Constitution of
| the state of Georgia.
: (18) The introduction into evidence of vetitioner's
post-arrest statement to police obtained after and as a direct
-d
FE iy rm Ewes =m ——————————" A TEV ——y r ne — i
3 “ll yn”
result of his arrest without a valid warraht and without
probable cause, violated petitioner's rights guaranteed by the
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitutic
of the United States, and Sections 2-101, 2-111 and 2-113 of
the Constitution of the State of Georgia.
(19) Petitioner's post-arrest statement to
Atlanta police was involutarily extracted from petititioner
by promises and threats made to petitioner after Atlanta police
had made him aware of the highly emotional context within which
they were conducting the investigation into the death of one of
their fellow police officers. In this context, petititioner
was incapable of either maintaining his right to silence or of
making a Voluntary, knowing and intentional waiver of his rights
Introduction of his statement into evidence under such circum-
| stances violated netitioner's rights guaranteed by the Fifth,
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the Unite
States and Sections 2-101, 2-111, and 2-113 of the 1°76
x Constitution of the State of Georgia.
(20) The State's failure to disclose its arrangement
made with a police agent or informer, who testified at trial anc
who was not prosecuted for an outstanding escape charge Lecause
" of his cooperation and testimony, violated petititicner's rights
guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and Sections 2-101 of the 1976 Constitution of the State of
{ Georgia.
(21) The deliberate withholding from petititioner
of a statement by defendant, allegedly made to a government
agent or informer while petitioner was incarcarated and awaitinc
trial, denied petitioner due process rights guaranteed hy the
due process clause of the Fourteenth 2Zmendment to the United
: tates Constitution and Section 2-101 of the 1976 Constitution
of the State of Georgia.
(22) Prior to trial, the petitioner filed a motion
to proceed in forma pauperis and to have benefit of appointed
“Be
Nee = mpl CURES ew mscprems 1S en —ge = . -r .—— - = d > mr — —1 - TIE (3 W— Tre = ee
: 8 ,
experts to prepare his defense, including an investigator to
contact potential witnesses. Less than three weeks prior to
trial, the State listed 96 additional witnesses which ir night
call at the trial. The Court's failure to permit petitioner to
proceed in forma pauperis and to appoint experts and an investi-
gator contravened the petitioner's Fighth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights and Section 2-101 and 2-114 of the 1276
Constitution of the State of Georgia.
(23) Prior to the commencement of the petitioner's
trial, the State exhibited petitioner and co-defendants, along
with one other person,in a highly suggestive display in the
jury box surrounded by Sheriff's marshals. State witnesses who
had not previously identified petitioner by photograph or in
persondid so during their observation of petitioner (the only
light-skinned person) in the jury box. This display of
: petitioner, without advice of counsel, and the subsequent
introduction of witness identification testimony tainted by
the procedure, violated petitioner's Tights guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Sections
2-101 and 2-111 of the 1976 Constitution of the State of Georgi
(24) The trial court's instructions to the jury on
presumptions of mental states which were elements of the offens
at the guilt-innocence phase of petitioner's trial violated his
rights against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonakrle
doubt of elements of the offense and shifted to him the hurden
of persuasion upon issues relating to his mental state in
violation of his rights under the the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and
Sections 2-101 and 2-113 of the 1276 Constitution of the State
I
n
n
a
vs
of Georgia. A copy of the Court's instructions at both the gu:
and sentencing phase are attached hereto as Exhibit B.
{2%} The Assistant District Attorney's knowing,
calculated and intentional direction to the jury during the
closing argument at the sentencing phase of petitioner's trial
Bw
BT a iP —T——— Tr ———— se = ® CC = een ———e— It CS ———— = ——— TE SG = p———- =
®
that, in reaching their decisicon, they should pay particular
regard te the fact that the aprellate courts had reduced
petitioner's life sentence on a prior conviction, violated
petitioner's rights under the due process clause of the Fourteen
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and Section
2-101 and 2-111 of the 1976 Constitution of the State of Georgia
A copy of the trial transcript felevant hereto is attached as
Exhibit C.
(26) At the trial of the defendant for the murder
of Officer Schlatt, the State introduced into evidence, over
defense counsel's objection, testimony from several witnesses
regarding defendant's alleged participation in other rokberies
not closely connected in time or manner to the Dixie Furniture
Store robbery, and for which defendant had been neither indictec
nor tried. The trial court permitted the State to introduce
such evidence without prior showing of the probative value of
the evidence, and without recuiring adequate proof that petitior
had "engaged -in such independent acts. Further, the trial court
gave the jury no instructions with respect to the State's burder
of showing defendant actually participated in the other acts, ar
gave the jury an overly-broad instruction as to the use the
jury could make of such evidence. The admission of such
evidence of independent acts, and the failure to give proper
limiting instuctions when admitted, contravened petitioner's
due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and Sections
2-101 and 2-111 of the 1276 Constitution of the State of Georgi.
‘a copy of the Court's instructions to the jury are attached
hereto as Exhibit D.
(27) At the guilt phase of the jury's delibera-
tions, the trial court gave the jury overly-broad instructions
with respect to the use which the jury could make of the eviden
of independent acts of crime, and those instructions contravene
the petitioner's rights guaranteed bv the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 2-101 of the 1976
on
° SERENE 0 Shes
Constitution of the State of Georgia.
(29) Georgia statutory privisons and actual
practices governing appellate review of death sentences:
(A.) deny petitione the effective assistance of counse:
(B.) deny petitioner a fundamentally fair hearing and
a reliable determination of the issue of life or
death; and
(C.) deny petitioner the effective assistance of couns:
and the basic tools of an adequate defense and
appeal because of his indigency,
all in violation of his rights guaranteed by the Sixth, Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States and Sections 2-101, 2-109, 2-111 and 2-114 of the 1976
Constitution of the State of Georgia.
(30) The means by which the death penalty will :
administered to petitioner inflict wanton and unnecessary
torture and torment upon him, in violation of his rights
Pay guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
i Constitution of the United States, and Sections 2-101 and 2-1:
of the 1976 Constitution of the State of Georgia.
(31) Petitioner's conviction and the impositio:
upon him of a sentence of death violate the Sixth and Fourtee:
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and Secti
2-101 and 2-111 of the 1976 Constitution of the State of Ceor
because petitioner was denied the effective assistance of
counsel at his trial. Counsel failed to contact witnesses,
failed to seek a continuance when necessary to adequately
prepare for trial, failed to object to improper instructions
to the jury, failed to object to improper arguments to the
jury, and failed to adequately prepare and present evidence
at the sentencing phase.
Vi Previous Proceedings That
: - Petitioner =as uvndertaken
rT To Secure Pelief rrom Conviction
{32) Except as set forth in paragraphs 5-8 of
om
yor -- i bin P-— —— TRO FISD © i TT — WIT) | ST —\ Ty © © ii Fp Sy ————
2 Q
this petition, petitioner has undertaken no other proceedinr
to secure relief from his convictions and sentences.
VI. Necessity for a Stay of Fxecution
{33) Petitioner was sentenced to death, and on
December 19, 1980, the Superior Court of Fulton County set the
date for his execution for January 8, 1981. Petitioner faces
irreparable injury if his execution is not stayed.
Vil. Prayer
(34) WHEREFORE, PETITIONER RESPECTFULLY REQUESTS
(A.) that this Court forthwith issue an order staying
petitioner's execution pending final disposition of this matter
(B.). that a writ of habeas corpus be directed to respor
dents;
(C.) that respondents be reguired to appear and answer
the allegations of this petititn;
(E.) that, after a full and complete hearing, petition
be relieved of the unconstitutional convictions and sentences
"of death imposed on him;
(F.) that petitioner be allowed such other, further an
alternative relief as may seem just, equitable and proper unde
the circumstances, and
{s.) that petitioner be allowed to file this petition
without prepayment of costs, and to proceed in forma pauperis.
Respectfully Submitted,
[ent Frrpsp
ROBERT E. STROUP
1515 Healey Building
57 Forsyth St. N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
JACK GRFENBERG
JAMES M, NABRIT III
JOEM CEARLES BOGER
10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 100
YITORNEYS FOR. THE PETITIC
—~ron
— - —— -
: —~—vo——w rr y— , . PP (1 TRG pu, tmp © Wm =P pp =
EXHIBIT B
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF BUTTS:COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA
WARREN MCCLESKEY,
: HABEAS CORPUS
¥S. : CASE NO. 4909
WALTER ZANT,
SUPERINTENDENT :
GEORGIA DIAGNOSTIC :
& CLASSIFICATION :
CENTER, :
RESPONDENT 2
QRDEDR
This habeas corpus challenges the constitutionality
of Petitioner's destedine Bnd tis imposition of the |
death sentence By the Superior Court of Fulton County.
McCleskey was convicted of Murder and two Armed
Robberies. He was sentenced to death for Murder and
to life imprisonment for each Armed Robbery. His
convictions and sentences were affirmed by the Supreme
Court. McClesky v. State, 245 Ga. 108 (1980).
Certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court of the
United States.
The Petition, as amended, contains 36 numbered
paragraphs, 23 of which allege substantive claims for
relief (10-27; 29-31; 36-36). The Court will rule on those
paragraphs containing claims for relief by paragraphs
corresponding numerically to the paragraphs in the Petition.
The record in this hakeas case consists oi the
transcript of proceedings before this Court on January 30,
1981; the affidavits of Mrs. Emma Owens, Marie Lamar,
Thomas Adger, Mrs. Thomas Adger, Myrtle Bates, Dr.
"William J. Bowers, Kelly Fite, and Russell Parker;
the discovery file of the prosecution; and the
transcript and record of Petitioner's trial in Fulton
County Superior Court commencing on October 9, 1978.
30.
In Paragraph 10, Petitioner claims that the
death penalty is applied arbitrarily, capriciously,
and whimsically in the State of Georgia and thus
violates his constitutional rights.
In support of his contention, Petitioner has
submitted ihe aZSidavie of winLion. 7: Bevery
sociologist and co-author of a study on the
administration of capital punishment in Georgia.
The Court has considered the evidence but declines to
adopt Dr. Bowers' conclusion that the death penalty
is applied in an arbitrary and discriminatory fashion.
The proffered study does not take into account the
myriad circumstances and unique characteristics of
both offenses and defendants which provide impetus
for sentences imposed.
The Georgia capital statute has been declared
constitutional. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96
S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed. 2d 859 (1976). The Georgia Supreme
Court has already reviewed Petitioner's death sentence
and found it was not imposed under the influence of
passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor.
McClesky v. State, supra at 115. Purther, the Court
found the sentence was not disproportionate considering
the crime and the defendant. Id.
Accordingly, the allegation in Paragraph 10 is
found to be without merit.
31.
In Paragraph 11, Petitioner complains that the
death sentence in Georgia is being exacted pursuant to
a pattern and practice of Georgia officials to
discriminate on the grounds of race, sex, and poverty
in violation of Petitioner's constitutional rights.
The Court is not persuaded by the report of Dr.
Bowers. Accordingly, hs raitogart on in Savanah LI
is found to be without merit.
32.
In Paragraph 12, Petitioner alleges that the death
penalty is an excessive penalty which fails to serve
any rational and legitimate social interests.
The Court is not persuaded by the report of Dr.
Bowers. Accordingly, this allegation is found to
be without merit.
13.
In Paragraph 13, Petitioner contends the death
sentence is cruel and unusual punishment in light of
all factors relating to the offense and the offender.
The Supreme Court has already decided this point
4
adversely to Petitioner. McClesky v. State, supra, at
115. Accordingly, the allegation in Paragraph 13
is found to be without merit.
14.
In Paragraph 14, Petitioner complains of
constitutional deprivation due to imposition of the
death sentence stemming from allegedly unfair proceedings.
The Georgia capital sentencing structure has been
declared constitutional. Gregg v. Georgia, supra.
Accordingly, this allegation is found to be without merit.
15.
In Paragraph 15, Petitioner claims he was denied
his Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights
because the jury that convicted him did not constitute
a representative, crosi-santion of ‘the community:
Specifically, Petitioner contends that two jurors were
excused without cause because of their opposition to
the death penalty.
The Court has examined the voir dire examination
of jurors Weston (T. 96-99) and Cason (T. 128-130).
The relevant portions are as follows:
"QO Now, Miss Weston, are
you conscientiously
opposed to capital
punishment?
A Yes.
Q Your opposition towards
capital punishment, would
that cause you to vote
against it regardless of
what the facts of the case
might be?
A* Yes, I would say so,
because of the doctrine
of our church. We have
a manual that we go by.
Q Does your church doctrine
oppose capital punishment?
A Yes.
Q So you would oppose the
imposition of capital
punishment regardless
of what the facts would be?
A Yes.
Q You would not even consider
that as one of the alternatives?
A No, I'wouldn't.
(Tr. 97-98).
Q Mrs. Cason, are you conscientiously
opposed to capital punishment?
a Yes.
20 You are? #
A Yes.
Q If you had two alternatives
in a case as far as penalties
go, that is, impose the
death sentence or life
penalty, could you at
least consider the
"imposition of the death
penalty?
A lI don't think so, no. 1
would have to say no.
Q Under any circumstances
would you consider it?
2 .No.™
{?. 129-130).
Both jurors indicated they could not impose the
- death penalty, regardless of what facts might emerge
in the course of tne trial. Thus, they were properly
excluded under Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
510, 88 S.Ct. 1770,:20 L.BEd.2¢ 776 (1968).
The allegation in Paragraph 15 is found to be
without merit.
16.
The pais ttonen in Paragraph 16 charges that the
jury which convicted and sentenced him was biased in
favor of the prosecution.
The Supreme Court of the United States has
already rejected this "prosectuion prone" argument
in Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 88 S.Ct.
17838, 20 L.Ed.24 797 (1968). See also Douthlit v.
State, 239 Ga. 81, 87 (1977) ; Hawes v. State, 240
gsi WIBYLSINR LS Ts sold
Accordingly, this allegation is found to be without
merit.
7.
In Paragraph 17, Petitioner claims harm from the
trial court's failure to instruct jurors with
conscientious and/or religious scruples against
capital punishment to subordinate their personal views
rather than said jurors being excused.
The Court has concluded that said jurors were
properly excused. (See Paragraph 15). Accordingly,
this allegation is found to be meritless.
18.
In Paragraph 18, Petitioner contends his
constitutional rights were violated by the intoduction
Of his post-arrest statement ver after an allegedly
illegal arrest.
There is no evidence to suggest Petitioner's
arrest was illegal. Additionally, the Supreme
Court has already decided Petitioner's statement
was properly admitted. McClesky v. State, supra,
at 112(3). Accordingly, this allegation is found to
be without merit.
19,
See Paragraph 18.
20.
his constitutional rights because of the State's
failure to disclose its arrangement with an informer
who testified at Petitioner's trial. More specifically,
Petitioner claims that the testimony of Offie Evans
was given in exchange for a promise from an Atlanta
Police Bureau detective that he would give a favorable
recommendation for Evans who had federal escape charges
pending.
Mr. Evans at the habeas hearing denied that he
was promised anything for his testimony. (H.T. 122).
He did state that he was told by Detective Dorsey
that Dorsey would "speak a word" for him. (H.T. 122).
The detective's ex parte recommendation alone is
not sufficient to trigger the applicability of Giglio
v. United States, :405 U.S. 150, 92 8.Ct. 763, 31 L.P&.2é
- a em Pm am em oem
The prosecutor at Petitioner's trial, Russell J.
Parker, stated that he was unaware of any understandings
between Evans and any Atlanta Police Department
detectives regarding a favorable recommendation to be
made on Evans' federal escape charge. (Parker Deposition,
p. 9). Mr. Parker admitted that there was SerorEunity
for Atlanta detectives to put in a good word for Evans
with federal authorities. {1d., p. 19). However, he
further stated that when any police officer has been
killed and someone ends up testifying for the State,
putting his life in danger, it is not surprising that
charges, like those against Evans, will be dropped. (Id.).
In the absence of any other evidence, the Court
cannot conclude an agreement existed merely because
of the subsaquent disposition of criminal charges.
against a witness for the State. See Fleming v.
State, 236 Ga. 434, 438 (1976).
Accordingly, the allegation in paragraph 20 is
found to be without merit.
2.
In Paragraph 21, Petitioner alleges that his
Fourteenth amendment rights were violated by the State's
deliberate withholding of a statement made by Petitioner
to Offie Evans.
This claim has already been decided adversely to
Petitioner. McClesky v. State, supra,at 112 (4).
Therefore, the allegation is found to be without merit.
22.
In Paragraph 22, Petitioner claims he was denied
his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by the
trial court's failure to grant his Motion to proceed
in forma pauperis and for funds to employ experts
to aid in his defense. Specifically, Petitioner
complains of harm from the lack of an investigator
and of a ballistics expert.
Petitioner charges that the need for an investigator
became more critical when the State served him with an
additional list of 96. "may call" witnesses approximately
three weeks prior to trial. Defense Counsel Turner
testified at the habeas hearing that the list was for
all three defendants (H.T. 31) and the State did not
call all of them. (H.T. 40). Further, Counsel went.
over the list with Pevisiohir tolieatn whether ver Lions:
knew any of the witnesses or what their testimony could
be. (H.T. 34).
It is clear that defense counsel had access to the
prosecution's discovery file which included statements
from all witnesses (except Evans) and investigative
reports (H.T. 38; Parker Deposition, p. 4) and Georgia
State Crime Laboratory reports (see Discovery File).
While an investigator may have been helpful, the
Court cannot conclude Petitioner was harmed by the
failure of the trial court to appoint an investigator,
especially in light of Petitioner's defense that he
was not even present at the robbery. (H.T. 57; 58).
As to a ballistics expert, the State's witness,
Kelly Fite, testified that the murder weapon was
probably a .38 Rossi, but no weapon was ever
recovered or introduced at trial. (H.T. 44-45).
Mr. Fite stated that his opinion was based on an
accumulation of data for several years plus a check
with the F.B.I. record file in Washington. (Fite
Deposition, p.. 4). Mr. Fite also stated that only
two other type weapons were possibilities. (1d., Bai 7),
Even if another expert had testified, it is doubtful
that such testimony ua have sufficiently refuted
the totality of evidence against Petitioner.
The appointment of expert witnesses lies within
the discretion of the trial court. Westbrook v. State,
242 Ga. 151 (1978); Crenshaw Vv. Stat=z, 244 Ga. 430 o
f
(1979). Denial of the Motion for the appointment
of experts will not be reversed in the absence of an
abuse of that discretion. Patterson v. State, 239 Ga.
409 (1977); Westbrook v. State, supra.
Here, Petitioner demonstrated no special need
for the appointment of an investigator, nor did
Petitioner request the appointment of a ballistics
expert. In the absence of any evidence of abuse,
the trial court's decision not to grant Petitioner's
Motion appears to be a proper one.
Accordingly, the allegation in Paragraph 22 is
found to be without merit.
23.
In Paragraph 23, Petitioner claims that a highly
suggestive line-up occurred prior to the commencement
of his trial which violated his Sixth Amendment
rights.
This issue has already been decided adversely
to Petitioner. McClesky v. State, supra, at 110(2).
Petitioner has presented no new evidence to indicate
that the Supreme Court's conclusion was in error.
Accordingly, this allegation is found to be
without merit.
24.
In Paragraph 24, Petitioner argues that the Jury
instructions concerning intent impermissibly shifted
the burden of persuasion to Petitions in violation
of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
| mes velevant portion of the jury charge is as
follows:
"Now, in every criminal
prosecution, ladies and
- gentlemen, criminal intent
is a necessary and material
ingredient thereof. To
put it differently, a
criminal intent is a material
and necessary ingredient
in any criminal prosecution.
I will now try to explain
what the law means by
criminal intent by reading
you two sections of the
criminal code dealing with
intent, and I will tell you
how the last section applies
to you, the jury.
One section of our law says
that the acts of a person
of sound mind and discretion
are presumed to be the
product of the person’s
will, and a person of sound
mind and discretion is
presumed to intend the
natural and probable
consequences of his acts,
but “both:of these
presumptions may be
rebutted.
I charge you, however,
that a person will not
be presumed to act
with criminal intention,
but the second code
section says that the trier
of facts may find such
intention upon consideration
of the words, conduct,
demeanor, motive and all
other circumstances
connected with the act for
which the accused is prosecuted.
Now, that second code section
I have read you has the
term the trier of facts. In
this case, ladies and gentlemen,
you are the trier of facts,
and therefore it is for you,
the jury, to determine the
guestion of facts solely irom
your determination as to
whether there was a criminal
intention on the part of the
defendant, considering the
facts and circumstances
as disclosed by the evidence
and deductions which might
reasonably be drawn from those
facts and circumstances. "
(T. 996-997).
The jury instruction in this case clearly indicates
that the presumption could be rebutted so that the
presumption created was merely a permissive one. Such
permissive presumptions have been held valid. Skine v.
State, 244 Ga. 520 (1978); Moses v. State, 245 Ga. 180
(1980). Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 959'S8.Ct. 2450,
61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979), is readily distinguished on the
ground that the jury "were not told that the presumption
could berrebutted....” 61 .1L.Fd.28 at 46.
Accordingly, the allegation in Paragraph 24 is found
to be without merit.
25
Petitioner charges in Paragraph 25 that the
prosecution impermissibly referred to the appellate
process in his argument during the sentencing phase
in contravention of Petitioner's constitutional rights.
The relevant portion of the prosecutor's argument
is set out in the Appendix. (See Appendix).
Ga. Code Ann. 827-2206 prohibits counsel in a
criminal case from arguing before a jury that a
defendant, if convicted, may not be required to suffer
the full penalty imposed because of the possibility :
of executive clensncy. Hote, ihe prosecution Sol.
the talismanic words "appellate process”, but it was in
reference to a prior life sentence Petitioner had
gotten reduced, not to the possibility that a life sentence
could be reduced if the jury decided to impose such a
sentence. Since the words referred to a past conviction,
the Court cannot conclude that the words had the
inevitable effect of encouraging the jury to attach
diminished consequence to their verdict and take less
than full responsibility for determining life or death,
an effect found improper in Prevatte v. State, 233 Ga.
929(6) (1973).
“l3=
The prosecution may argue for a death sentence
and offer plausible reasons for his position. Chenault
v. State, 234 Ca, 216 4{7)41975); Street v. State,
237 Ga. 307, 315 (1976); Cates vy. State, 244 Ga. 587, 595
(1979). Here, the remarks of the prosecutor appear
to be within the bounds of proper argument.
Accordingly, the allegation in Paragraph 25 is
found to be without merit.
26.
In Paragraph 26, Petitioner alleges that the trial
court improperly admitted evidence of other robberies
of which Petitioner had not been convicted and without
adequate jury instructions which violated Petitioner's
rights to due gtocels of law.
‘The Supreme Court has alrezdy decided the 18dne of :
admissibility adversely to Petitioner. McClesky v. State,
supra, at 114(b). In deciding that issue, the Court
also noted that the trial court had charged the jury
as to the limited purpose for which the similar crimes
were admitted. In that the trial court cautioned the
jury as to the limited purpose for which the acts were
admitted at the time of admission (T. 673-674; 885) and
repeated the same cautionary instruction in the jury
charge at the end of the guilt/innocence phase (T. 992-993),
the Court does not find Petitioner's rights were
contravened in any way.
Accordingly, this allegation is found to be without
merit.
27.
In Paragraph 27, Petitioner claims violation of his
rights guaranteed by the due process clause by the
alleged overivibicad instructions regarding the use
which the jury could make of the evidence of
Petitioner's other acts in the guilt phase.
See Paragraph 26.
This allegation is found to be without merit.
29, (sig)
In Paragraph 29, Petitioner charges that the
Georgia appellate caviey process denies him effective
assistance of counsel, a fundamentally fair hearing
and reliable determination of life or death, and the
basic tools to prepare an adequate defense because of
its tndlighrey.. inlet Sindee Lo |
The Georgia capital sentencing structure has been
declared constitutional. Gregg v. Georgia, supra.
Accordingly, this allegation is found to be
without merit.
30.
Petitioner claims in Paragraph 30 that the means by
which the death penalty will be administered will inflict
wanton and unnecessary torture upon him in violation
of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
The Georgia death statute has been declared
constitutional. Gregg v. Georgia, supra.
Accordingly, this allegation is found to be without
merit.
wl Sw
3%:
In Paragraph 31, Petitioner claims that he was
denied effective assistance of counsel in violation
of his constitutional rights.
At trial and on appeal, Petitioner was represented
by Jchn M. Turner. Mr. Turner has been serving as
Assistant District Attorney in Fulton County since
January 8, 1981, (H.T. 24). Prior to joining that
staff, Mr. Turner was in private practice for
appoximately five years (H.T. 24), a practice which
consisted of roughly 80% criminal work wherein he
tried approximately 30 murder cases (H.T. 82).
Prior to entering private practice, Mr. Turner served
as Assistant United States Attorney in the Northern
District of Georgia for two years. (H.T. 24). He was
retained to represent Petitioner a few days after
Petitioner was initially arrested, about one week before
Petitioner's preliminary hearing. (H.T. 26).
The Court has reviewed the evidence and found the
following allegations to be without merit:
1. Counsel failed to contact witnesses. Mr. Turner
testified at the habeas hearing that he had had fairly
extensive pretrial conversations with the prosecutor and
had discussed a good bit of the information contained
in the prosecutor's discovery file. (H.T. 29-30).
He also had access to the discovery file which contained
the statements of all witnesses except Offie Evans (H.T. 34)
and had an agreement with the prosecution to obtain copies
vf actual statements of witnesses for cross-examination
ER [i ~p.
purposes. {H.T. 38). Mr. Turner testified that he
did not interview any employees of the Dixie Furniture
Store prior to trial because he had opportunity to
cross-examine the three employees who testified at the
preliminary hearing (H.T. 35) and that the other
employees who testified at trial gave testimony periphereal
to the main issue and Petitioner's defense at that point
was that he was not at the store during the robbery.
(H.T. 37). Counsel did not interview investigative
officers because he had full access to their
investigative reports contained in the prosecution's
discovery file. (H.T. 37). Purther, Counsel went
over the witness list with Petitioner to see whether
Petitioner knew any of the people .or .the type testimony
they could give.’ (H.T. 34). Finally. Counsel asked
Petitioner for the names of alibi witnesses, and
Petitioner responded with one nickname of a person
with whom he had been unable to get in touch. (H.T. 89).
Decisions on which witnesses to call, whether and how
to conduct cross—examinations, and all other strategies
and tactical decisions are the exclusive province of the
lawyer after consultation with his client. Reid v.
State, 235 Ga. 378 (0975). In light of all the above
factors, the Court cannot conclude Counsel was
ineffective merely because he did not physically
pursue witnesses. Accordingly, this allegation is
without merit.
-l7=
2. Counsel failed to seek a continuance when
necessary to prepare adequately for trial.
Counsel testified that he had "fairly extensive"
contact with Petitioner prior to both the preliminary
hearing and trial, meeting with Petitioner well over
a dozen times, three times prior to the preliminary
hearing. {(H.T. 27). He also stated that from his
extensive discussions with the prosecution, he had
a "pretty good grasp of the facts.” (H.T. 43). He
also said that although he looked at the prosecution's
discovery file only once, he got everything he needed.
Effectiveness is not measured by how another
lawyer might have handled the case. Estes v. Perkins,
225 Ga. 268 (1968); Jones v. State, 243 Ga. 820. (1979).
In addition, the issue of whether dounsel should have
moved for a continuance and for mistrial after an alleged
suggestive line-up occurred on the morning Petitioner's
trial began constitutes the kind of hindsight which has
never provided the basis for ineffective assistance
claids. MacRenna v. Elliz, 290 F.2d 582 (Sth Cir. 1960);
Pitts v. Glass, 231 Ga. 638 (1974).
3. Counsel failed to object to improper
instructions to she jury.
The Court has concluded that the jury instructions
were neither burden-shifting (see Paragraph 24) nor
overly-broad (see Paragraph 27). Petitioner's claim
is meritless.
-18-
evidence that did not exist.
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel means
". ..not errorless counsel, and not counsel judged
ineffective by hindsight, but counsel reasonably
likely to render and rendering effective assistance.
MacKenna v. Ellis, supra; Pitts v. Glass, supra.
Petitioner's trial counsel easily meets this
test. He was experienced in the trial of criminal
cases. He prepared for and advocated Petitioner's
cause in a reasonably effective manner. Counsel's
testimony shows him to have been an intelligent and
concerned defense lawyer. The effort he put forth
for Petitioner was certainly reasonably effective within
the meaning of the standard. |
5 Accordingly, the allegations in Paragraph 31
are found to be without merit.
25.
In Paragraph 35, Petitioner complains that the
introduction of his statements made to Offie Evans
were elicited in a situation created to induce
Petitioner to make incriminating statements in
violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
The Supreme Court has already decided that the
testimony of Evans was properly admitted. McClesky v.
State, supra, at 11214). This Court has concluded
that there was no arrangement made for the testimony
of Evans. (See Paragraph 20). Petitioner has presented
no evidence tending to show that his statements were
elicited in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights.
Accordingly, this allegation is found to be without
4. Counsel failed to object to improper arguments
to the jury.
The Court has concluded that the prosecutor's
remarks were not improper (see Paragraph 25). Petitioner's
claim is meritless.
5. Counsel failed to prepare adequately and
present evidence at the sentencing phase.
Counsel testified that prior to A he went
over Petitioner's background with him, schools he had
attended, who he knew. (H.T. 80). He also asked
Petitioner if he had any witnesses or anyone to
testify as to his character. He also discussed
the same matters with Petitioner's sister, who
declined to testify and told Counsel that her mother was
not able to testify... (H.T. 80). Counsel alsa .
testified that Petitioner refused to testify in
his own behalf during the sentencing phase. (H.T. 94).
Petitioner presented conflicting evidence to the
extent that Petitioner's sister testified she was
not asked to testify or to provide the names of potential
character witnesses (H.T.136-137). Petitioner also
presented the affidavits of five persons who indicated
they would have testified for Petitioner had they been
asked.
Despite the conflicting evidence on this point,
however, the Court is authorized in its role as fact
finder to conclude that Counsel made all inquiries
necessary to present an adequate defense during the
sentencing phase. Indeed, Counsel could not present
=1G
-
36...
Petitioner claims in Paragraph 36 that the
evidence upon which he was convicted was Lneurictiens
to show his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in
violation of his constitutional rights.
The Supreme Court has already decided that the
evidence supports the finding of aggravating
circumstances, the finding of guilt, and the
sentence of death beyond a reasonable doubt. McClesky
v. State, supra, at 115,
Accordingly, this allegation is found to be without
merit.
WHEREFORE, all allegations in the Petition
having been found without merit, the Petition is denied. -
this PP day of april, 1981.
Ge Gide.
ALEX CRUMBLEY
JUDGE SUPERIOR COURTS
FLINT JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
APPENDIX
Now, what should you consider as you are
deliberating the second time here, and I don't
know what you are going to consider.
I would ask you, however, to consider several
things. Have you observed any remorse being exhibited
during this trial by Mr. McClesky? Have you observed
any remorse exhibited while he was testifying?
Have you observed any repentence by Mr. McClesky,
either visually as you look at him now or during the
trial or during the time that he testified? Has he
exhibited to you any sorrow, both visually or during the
time that he was testifying?
Have you seen any tears in his eyes for this
act that he has Sons’ a A |
I would also ask you to consider the prior
convictions that you have had with your in the jury room,
and particularly the one where he got three convictions.
I believe if you look at those papers carefully you
are going to find, I think, on one of those he got three
life sentences to begin with, and then there is a cover
sheet where apparently that was reduced to what, eighteen
years or fifteen years or something, which means, of
course, he went through the appellate process and
somehow it got reduced.
Now, I ask you to consider that in conjunction
with the life that he has set for himself.
You know, I haven't set his goals, you haven't
set his goals, he set his own goals, and here is a
man that's served considerable periods of time in
prison for armed robbery, just like Ben Wright said,
you know, that 1s his profession and he gets in
safely, takes care of the victims, although he may
threaten them, and gets out safely, that is what he
considers doing a good job, but of course you
may not agree with him, but that is job safety.
I don't know what the Health, Education and
Welfare or whatever organization it is that checks on
job safety would say, but that is what Mr. Ben Wright
considers his responsibility.
Now, apparently Mr. McClesky does not consider
that his responsibility, so consider that. The life
that he has set for himself, the direction that he has
set his sails, and thinking down the road are we going
to have to have another trial sometime for another peace
officer, another corrections officer, or some innocent
bystander who happens to walk into a store, or some
innocent person who happens to be working in the store
who makes the wrong move, who makes the wrong turn, that
makes the wrong gesture, that moves suddently and ends
up with a bullet in their head?
(2. 1019-1020).
ii.
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- or of this State otherwise reguires or unless any J
= - the petition is assigned, on considering a sud ubsequant petition, =
Ar ginie ‘grounds. fox relief asserted therein which could not
reasonably have been raised in the original or amended petition.”
OCGA 9-14-51. In considering a successive petitd O bo
| or
oy
]
ty
om
vl
0 nv 7)
court must determine, as a threshold matter, whether esi el TE
petit tioner is entitled to a hearing on the merits of his belated
iG Smith v. Zant, 350 Ga." 645, 647 (2) (1983), citing Dix v.
Zant, 24% Ga. BIO, 811 (1382), and Smith v. Garner, 236 Ga. 81
(1876). In order to be so entitled +thz petitioner must raise
grounds which are either constitutionally nonwaivable or which 3
could no* reasonably have been raised in the orig
Fuller v. Ricketts, 234 Ga. 104 (1975). Ta eo is od
3 _ petitioner -is now before this Court raising seven claims
which } he contends violate his rights as gusrantess by the Georgia
Constitut ien and by the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteen nth zmendments
to the United States Constitution. First, Petitioner alleges
- that the Fulton County rosecut ors - systematic use of his
on
0
‘n
N Le
) 9 4
-
< [1M
]
(o
x
r
py
J
on
)
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e
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tf
[1]
14
)]
4]
QO
= per eRptory challenges to strike
sentative jury, guarantzed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
ho thé United Stas es Const} tution; and that this action by the™
rosacutor also violated hig right to sgual protection of the
laws, guaraniead by the Fourteenth Amandient to the United States
-tern and practice of Georgia pr csecutors; courts, Judges, and -
juries, both statew yids and in Fulton County, to disecr -iminate
against black defendants and against these whose homicide victims
are white, ard that this imposition is in violation of the Eighth
and Fourt epnth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In’
his third claim, Petiticner al
guafanteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Con-
titution, Petitioner alleges in his fourth clzim that the
trial court's denial of Petitioner's motion for funds for the
employment of a ballistics expert Yiciages wi process rights’
guaran teed ‘by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Con-
Prosecutor's deliberate references to appellate review during the
closing argument at the penalty phase of Fetitioner's trial and
his specific invitation to the jury to consider the fact that -
Petitioner's prior life sentence had been reduced by the gppel~
late courts, violated his right tc be free of cruel and unusual
sunizhnent and hi s right to due process of law, guaranteed by the
Eighth and Fodrtesnth dherdments. ot © the United States Constitu-
ad - by counsel at
10 ner to -
- citd do ze
every 1
an xing as y. WOEX I
K -
ac ced
8 inlation © * Novi
enément ss. Lae
at nd Fourteenth Ar fli
b] ly have been ~ = reaso: ous petition or could not i . WV
ich rd y Ta 1 ‘ ' Was y % ; o
- viously since they are founded on "rew law" or on cases wh
bd
ne
Ipus w since Petitioner's first state habeas co -
“de have changed the
£
-
petition.
the doctrine © that
ma rpus hakezs co ble to Ca ta is appl ica
»
eS
ms are based on a change in the
u
ed ¢
ud
the reassert
phi
D
h
“
=f,
:
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i
n
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l
e
ha
pod
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i
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[7)]
0
=~
0
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po
3 ns
4
3
v4
uw
2
lai
ep
Ken- Batson Vv. en
50 jurors, 40 were whit te and 10 were black. ~Fetitioner al
< Ta . ey = XN = d y _ hb
Taclally neutral grounds on which to distinguish tiem 2s proszecs
tive jurors from white jurors who were not struck. Finally,
“Petition er alleges-that "(tihis -stark.pattern of racial exclu-
Respondent argues that, since this claim has never been
raised before, and the claim was available prior to Batson, this
claim could have been raised previously and, therefore, should
‘not be considered. on its merits. Respondent further alleges tha
Batson merely changes the stand rd by which to prove thi .S claim.
Petitioner alleges that he should be 2ble to raise this
claim in his present petition since Batson, supra, represents a
significant change in the Law, citing Jarrell v. Zant, 348 Ca.
492 (1581) and Tucker Vv. Kemp . 236 Ga. 5731 {3387%, Pet itioner .
also asserts that the holding in Allen v. Face, ond BeBe oy $2
Me. E%.24 12 9 J158E0, on the guestion of retrospective application
‘and state courts have considered this issue in capital cases, and
these courts have found wm not to apply retrscactively. High
kad A
Sel
~<e wien v, F
202
a,
‘
0 U.S. 380
-
srior court
dw
SRP,
a a rE
claim to ba
iolation Of the
r Clause of the Fou an
- [3 Rn co+acti io, va
- and of the Eguau
the United § he Const
4d of ion isus o
- to
leges that he In suppert of this claim, Peti
-
ang stical evidence, through exhibits
test live imOny,
a capital cases, eorgi ”~
hd
er
4
£i0 preme Court has held that a habeas peti
RA
d States Su
= -
. could prevail under the Fourteenth Amendn ng. that thé. id
|
DS ent by prov
PCsSe.,
siosn-nikers
tory -
se
ort
5s case ac anni
[]
[1
Rd
pur
-
ts to the prosecutor's deliberate and
~oin
i. Finally, Petitioner
his peremptery ¢ha £
rs exXarc ise Oo
¢ and ed
N
oenam J
Ft ighth E y the kind of cisel
ila | ARSE violas
cl
statutes. was hot clarified-until %he United States Supreme Court
-
and Cecided adversely to Fstitioner, and, therefore, that ft &
now res 3udicata. Respondent alleges that there is no new law
taxe this issue cutside the principles of res iudicata. This
Course egraes. :
< ; | : an
. Petitioner allages that the State's failure to disclose i
[
po
de
decided-¥cCleskay, supra, on April 22, 1987. Patitionar contands
to
ts
_agreenent with jail inmate "Ophie" Evans, a Xey witness against
- Petitioner, violated Petitioner's right to the due process of
- law, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, Petitioner alleges that the State produced no ©
who witnessed the shooting of Officer Schlatt and the murder
weapon was naver recovered, Petiticner's co-defendant Ben Wright
testified that Petitioner may have been carrying the pistol
likely to have been useé in the crime, Further, this same wit
ness, Ben Wright, and Ophie Evans both testified that Petition
admitted to them that he shot Officer Schlatt.
pl
FE Se VEE Roa mdm dm iB a SI ro) lead States Constitution and the law of
- raised and decidad advarsely to Fetitionar, Order, MeCleskey v.
Zant, Butts County Superior Court Case Neo. 4303, april 8,-1381,.
ages 7-8: see also, McCleskey v, Kamp, 753 P.2d 877, at 884
J : 2¢ wl
~ an lileh civ, 13e8iicfen banal, os
Therefore, the court finds this claim to be barred by the
doctrine of res judicata.
: Paha fi
Petitioner alleges that the trial court's denial of his me-
tion for funds for the employment of a ballistics expert violated
> "his right to due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Petitioner alleges
that prior to trial he moved the court for funds for expert wit-
nesses, that the motion was not granted and that no dslense bal-
listics expert was appeinted. "Petitioner alleges that the State
used an expert to link the purported murder wzapon to Petitioner.
- er ue ww wo tr EF OO FU AL II SE) SE WE SIR THE WD am =
‘1. Petitioner has also proffered affidavits of two members OF
Petitioner's trial Jury. (See Petitiocrer'’s Puhibits P &.G). - The
Court has examined these affidavits and finds them toc Ze Inadmis-
sible, OCGA Section 8-10-93. : s : Se Ta
.38 Rossi 12 fact carried in
»
jeionez had
180 t could a
4)
+he olicwed £
= Ss Court as corpus ac 2
iver, evo pe
-~
state han
witnessas ment of expert oint:
[971
§70 U.S.
Fetitioner-alle
o be pr
Yaim po,
vr o>
law. S$ naw
=
$85), dhe
}
(
Yies within the discretion of the court.
s issue can now be raised because Ake Vv. 0 Chi
i
t ec es this -_~
ec
|
Citing this
£
~- “for writ o 1 petition
= de
he
s origina
ent points out tha
Court's Créer on Petiticner'
habeas co x
| 3 Cou his >
=
~
od pus, Respon hod
shen
"Butts County
im. y ton []
dr
Zant,
Hy
rse
uy V. MeCleskey OrSar,
4809, NC.
and that it was decided adve
Case course,
fore, this Court
issue,
950 oa. 518 Stata,
er could not shcw that he ad
-
-
.
io
Tavior Vv.
etit
2 of
nat.»
=
[<4
bl
in)
dhe
he
“.
-
-e88l a
ral Dring
it is .
{€ aka were considersé n
nt. factor at trial,...” ic
es are applicable to reg iter
n
Dl
- prince
signif
Eve
a
stics
[J
3
Rs ssue-of ball
orf demonstrated to the trial court
<«®
never
a.. ho
-
he as
he closing ar-
al,
+he prosecu~er's
1]
-
do
dm
te
+r
es of res sudica
at
uring
in his
é ew
wo
a
&
4
oe
to 1 % 4 a
- 341
=
Ld
significant facto
ty phase of Petitioner's
ntment of a ballisti -appeil
s barred under the
he penal
nces to appellate rev
n
ation to the wit
dence was to be =z avi
requested the
gumnent at t
~al is rights 2s cua
4
-~ tot: x x a 4 - - ion oh ok 2% a ~Y . - . = -
BN Tetitioner NAS DIEVIOUSLY 23.584 LALS JLAD ADR 1% was
XR - . ~~ - 3 4 4 . ET FS J - “a= a a : dacisad advarsely to him in his original pa*itlion for haba3s oor~ -
z — b, of ys Pili. 3 a 3 ena iets ' —- ze im 2 2a a A cS raiiaf, Alter teviewing the Prosecutor's argunent and Jpcid-
ing that the language of which Petitioner complained was in BES,
re
[11
]
’
1
|
{1
3
[4
1
[{1
]
ie
(
9
3
(1
)
eo
Ol
ny
[14
]
‘
a
|
at
l
ct
b
o
oner's previous conviction, tha Court found
this claim to have nc merit and -specifically relied on Prevatte %
Ny, Stats, 233.22, 330 48) (i975). Crler, MocClsshey v, Ishi, ab -
ling on this point. Caldwell concerns the undermining of the
jury's sense of responsibility by the prosecutor commenting upon
“the alleged lack of finality of the jury's verdict due to the ap-
pellate process: The Court in Caldwell recognized that this type
‘of argument has been condemned since Furman v. Georcia, 408 U.S.
228, 33 L.EA.2¢& 246 (1972), citing Eawes v. State, 240 Ga, 327, ~~
335 (10) (1577). and Fleming V. State, 240 Ga. 142, 146 (1977).
- Caldwell, 86 L.Ed.2d4, at 242, n;- 4, Eawes and Fleming specifi-
cally relied on Prevatte, supra. Therefore, the Court finds that’
the holding in Caldwell, supra, is not new law, sufficient to
free this claim from the doctrine of res judicata. -.
4
|
In Petitioner's amendment, he alleges that the State's use
oF
tr
I'S
3
Q
on
o te
a’
1
J r
J
8]
(}
1]
"wn
Ww
bt
J
o
r
(})
]
Ne
v3
4]
O (v)
oi
7]
1]
po
nd
- to. inmate Evans violated his righ
-at every critical stage, as Evans was allegedly working as an - N >
2
~. 7 Respondent alleges that this is merely an extansion of £n
Petitioner cites RaooLz ve Caosele Talivision Co., NO. 44381
(supreme Court of Georgia, decid ed May 6 1987), as new Iaw in
oR this area, and, therefore, why te coud not ‘have reasonably
raised this claim previously. “Rivaver, it is clear since Houston
yok, Rutledge, 237 Ga. 764 (1576), that Petitioner would have access
to the document at issue. _ hid .
Peti ioner, in paragraph 20 cf his first habeas petition, £
z alleged that the State had fal led to disclcse an arrangement with
."Offie" Evans. This Court, in its order of tf April’ 8, 1381, found -
. nc merit tc this cont sgntion,. Orisr, MoCleskey vy. Zant, supra,
In paragraph 21 of his-first habe2s petition, FPatitioner al-.
leced that a statement made by him to Evans, a government agent
._ or informant, was deliberately withh -~
eld. This Court found that =~
+his {ssue nad Feen decided adversely to Petitioner en h
— Ey a Bd Haga, sey
1
ji |
| ni
i]
it
e Fd
\7}
+
-
vt
"
o
s
A
e
hat
}
(1
6)
vr
Af
3
({"
] C
*
[1
] i
vr
$
e
Y/
od
< r
n
!
ve
re
[1
| lg I w
or
or
€. ry
pr
e LL v
r
ry
Ww
~ Fr
e
ou
} *
tr
if
‘ar Tr» Aa
statement, and finds nothing therein to support his-allesgation of
" - = {
es a - 5 : : soll Ply
© "a2wly uncovered evidence! of an arrangement betwaam Zvans and ofr,
= the State, = - ri
- Therefore, this zlzaim is barred by the doctrine of rss -
: judicata. - Ey ¥ 1 ; =
Petitionar allages that the State’ g failure at trial to cor--
t rect the misleading testimony of Ivans violated Petitioner's
-
|] ght to be free from cruel and unusual -punishment and his right, |
TH
|
E
a
[S to due process of law; ih violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments,
Petitioner. statés that there aie significant discrepancies ]
i between Evans' 2l-page statement and Evans’ testimony at trial,
both factually in reference +c what Petitioner allegedly stated
about the. crime and further as to Evans’ motivation for testi fy-
“ing.” . : % a : : =
As shown above, there is Iegal authority giving him the
d ] - [ L]
right to access to this éocument. Eouston v, Rut.e
gh Both trial counsel and inmate Evans testified before £his Court
There is no valid reason why Petitioner could not have obtained
this statément earlier, Therefore, the Court finds that
fr
. EAL CRAIG /
E, SUPLRICR COURTS
FLINT JUDICIRL CIRCUIT
EXHIBIT E
ATLANTA PULLILL UirPARY NX | VARIG Yih re LAE tm
STATEMENT OF OFFIE GENE EVANS RACE SF, SEX pog 8-15-35
HOME ADDRESS 2905 SPRINGDALE RD. APTTP3 CITY/STATE ATLANTA, GA.
BUSINESS ADDRESS UNEMPLOYED PHONES N/A 768-0723
BUSINESS / HOME
DETAILS:
I AM IN THE FULTON COUNTY JAIL CELL # 1 NORTH 14 WHERE I HAVE BEEN SINCE JULY 3,1978
FOR ESCAPE. WARREN MCCLESKY WAS IN CELL # 15, WHICE IS RIGHT NEXT TO MY CELL. BERN
DUPKEE WAS IN CELL 2 NORTH 15 WHICH IS RIGHT ABOVE MY CELL AND MCCLESKY'S. RIGHT B
EACH ONE OF THE CELLS ARE TWO VENT HOLES. YOU CAN TALK THROUGH THESE VENT HOLES.
ON JULY 8, 1978 DUPREE CALLED. MCCLESKY AND HE WAS GETTING ON MCCLESKY ABOUT PUTTING
| HIS NAME IN THE CONFESSION. BUPREE TOLD MCCLESKY "WEY DID YOU PUT MY NAME IN THAT
CONFESSION, WHEN YOU KNOW THAT THE PEOPLE CAN'T IDENTIFY iE?" DUPREE TOLD MCCLESKY
"SUPPOSE THAT I GO AHEAD ON AND TELL THAT YOU WERE THE TRIGGER MAN." MCCLESKY TOLD
DUPREE THAT HE DID NOT HAVE ANY OTHER CHOICE BECAUSE THEY HAD MADE HIM CONFESS TO T:
DUPREE. TOLD MCCLESKY "IE YOU WAS GOING TO CONFESS THEN WHY DID YOU TELL THE TRUTH A
IT, YOU TOLD TOO MUCH OF THE TRUTH ABOUT IT. "wecL ESKY TOLD DUPREE THAT "SOME OFT
PEOPLE AT THE FURNITURE STORE PROBABLY TOLD IT AND THEY JUST MADE ME REPEAT WHAT SC
OF TEE PEOPLE HAD TOLD." DUPREE TOLD MCCLESKY THAT "YOU ARE A CRAZY SON OF A BITCH
DGPREE TOLD MCCLESKY "EVERYTHING YOU TOLD THEM WAS THE TRUTH MAN, ITS' CLOSE TO
EXACTLY WHAT HAPPENED, IT IS GOING TO BE HARD TO GET THAT CONFESSION OFF, YOU MADE
SO PLAIN, SO CLOSE TO EXACTLY WHAT HAPPENED." "YOU KNOW THAT THE WOMAN AND AT THE
FURNITURE STORE COULDN'T IDENTIFY YOU AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING." MCCLESKY SAID
HATS' THE REASON THAT I AM THINKING THAT I AM GOING TO GET MY LAWYER TO CHANGE
I HAVE READ/HAVE HAD READ TO ME/THE ABOVE STATZHENT AND IT IS TRUE TO THE BEST OF
MY BELIEF AND KNOWLEDGE AND HAS BEEN GIVEN FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY BY .HE..
LT
or © kh :
PAE | SIGHATURE ~ +
WITNESS Lr re at DATE_Y ol, /, ZF zu
, -~ sh = or = i a > rv on yw pm ——
WITNESS oer AAR ye VICTIM SOE ATT, FRANK RR. (OFF.
WITNESSE A TL fee COMPLAINT # 463348 TN
a he See
ATLANTA BUREAU ‘0K OLICE SERVICE DATE_ 7s TIE
STATERENT CF OFFIE Covr ruawe RACE SEX LOB
HOME ADDRESS PT___ crTv/sTate
SUSINESS ADDRESS PHONES 3 |
: rr
DETAILS:
|
CONFESSION. DUPREE TOLD MCCLESKY TEAT WAS GOINGTO BE REAL HARD TO DO. MCCLESKY
SAID "THE FIRST STATEMENT I MADE IN COBB COUNTY WHEN THEY PICKED ME UP, I TOLD THE
MAN UP THERE THAT I DID NOT KNOW NOTHING ABOUT IT PERIOD." "LATER ON THREE MEN
FROM ATLANTA HOMICIDE CAME UP HHERE AND GOT ME." MCCLESKY TOLD DUPREE "ON THE
WAY BACK DOWN HERE, HOMICIDE HEN SAID THAT "YOU ARE GOIN G TO TELL US THE TRUTH WHEX
WE GET BACK TO ATLANTA, CAUSE WE BUST HEADS DOWN THERE. MCCLESKY SAID THAT THE
POLICE OFEICER THAT THE OFFICER" SAID THAT HE FELT LIXE STOPPING THE CAR AND BUSTING
HIS HEAD THEN. MCCLESKY TOLD DUPREEL THAT HE WAS SCARED. DUPREE TOLD MCCLESKY,
"YoU SCARED, DON'T YOU KNOW THAT FOR MURDERING A POLICE, YOU GET THE ELECTRIC CHAIR.
MCCLESKY. TOLD DUPREE" 17 THEY: CAN. TRY ME ON THE ONE I MADE IN ATLANTS, . THEY: CAN- TRY
ME ONTHE ONE I MADE IN MARTETTA, TOO." MCCLESKY SAID "HE THOUGHT THAT EE COULD GET
THE ONE IN ATLANTA, PULLED BECAUSE HE SIGNED TO, ONE: IN ATLANTA AND ONE IN MARIETT:
AND THAT HIS LAWYER THOUGHT TEERE HAD TO BE SOME PRESSURE PUT ON EIM IN ORDER FOR
HIM TO SIGN TWO STATEMENTS, THE FIRST ONE SAYING THAT HE DID NOT KNOW ANYTHING ABOU"
IT, AND THE OTHER SAYING THAT HE WAS THERE. THEN THE DEPUTY WAS FIXING TO COME AR!
AND COUNT, SO THEY STOPPED TALKING. MCCLESKY COULD HEAR THE DEPUTY PUT THE KEYS IN
: DOOR, SO HE JUMPED DOWN OFF THE SINK THAT HE STANDS ON TO TALK THROUGH THE VIst T
DEPUTY WENT ON THROUGH MADE THE COUNT AND THEN WENT ON BACK OUT. ABOUT 10 MINUTE!
I HAVE RZAD/HAVE HAG READ TT MZ/THE ABOVE STATEMENT AND IT
i ATEME! 7 IS TRUE ‘THE BEST OF MY BELIEF AND KNOWLEDGE AND HAS EEZN GIVEN FREZLY AND. VOLUNTARILY BY ME,
col al 7 pi STATURE
wo THESS vd
z/, ia
; 2 Zar DATE TINE
WITNESS = he Bru OT ot VICTIM SCHLATT. FRANK R.u(oFrr.)
WIviiess 7 io Col “3 COMPLAINT ¢ Wir a83558
M32 3 § by XQ
ATLANTA BUREAU XX 0fICE SERVICES pare, & ~7° TiUE
STATZHENT OF OFTIE GENE EVANS RACE SEX COB
HOME ADDRESS APT CITY/STATE
BUSINESS ADDRESS PHONES
: : :
BUSINESS
DETAILS:
:
LATER DUPREE CALLED MCCLE SKY BACK AGAIN.
rue
DUPREE TOLD MCCLESKY THAT “Jia STARTED
ALL THAT SHIT UP BECAUSE 49%, ANTS TO GET BEN MESSED UP BECAUSE 4SSH AND SOME DUDE
ROBBED A PLACE IN BENS' CAR AND THE TAG NUMBER OFF TEE CAR WAS GOT OFF." MCCLESKY
TOLD DUPREE "I DON'T THANK THATS' WHAT IT WAS ABOUT THAT." "THAT THUNDERBIRD BEEN
IN A WHOLE LOTS OF ROBBERIES AFTER THEN DUPREE TOLD MCCLESKY “WE PULLED MORE
SHIT THAN BEN DO CAUSE SHE ALWAYS, YOU KNOW SHE PUTS ON MENS' CLOTHES ON AND YOU CA
TELL HER FROM A MAN AND SHE ALWAYS SITTING AROUND BRAGGING ABOUT IT." THEY GOT
QUIET THEN.
THE NEXT DAY, JLY 9, 1978 AFTER BREAKFAST I TOLD WARREN MCCLESKY "I GOT A NEPHEW
MAN, HE IN A {ORLD OF TROUBLE." MCCLESLY SAID YEAR, WHAT THEY GOT EM Toman I
SAID THEY GOT EIM ACCUSED OF MURDER AND ROBBERS. BUT I SAID I DON'T THINK THEY Got
HIM YET. MCCLESKY SAID " I MIGHT KNOW HIM, IS HE BEENI THE PENITENTARY BEFORE?"
1 SAID "YEAH, HE DID A PRETTY GOOD WHILE IR REIDSVILLE." MCCLESKT ASKED ME "WHAT
. BIS NAME." 1 TOLD HIM "BEN WRIGHT". MCCLESKY SAID "you BEENS' UNCLE." I SAID
7 TOLD EIM THAT MY NAME WAS CHARLES. MCCLE!
"YEAH." HE SAID "WHETS' YOUR NAME?"
SAID "THEY GOT ME AND BEN ON THE SAME CASE." I SAID "OE, BEN WAS TELLING ME ABOU
I TOLDMCCLESKY
VAWL THE LAST TIME THAT I SEEN BEIM." HE SAID "WHEN YOU SEE HTM. i
I HAD SZEX EIM ABOUT A COUPLE OF WEEKS AGO. I TOLL HIM "BEN WAS TELLING 'vE ABOUT
I HAYE READ/HAVE HAD READ TO ME/THE & 7 TRUE I Re D READ TU BOVE STATEMENT AND IT E
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STAT! OF OFFTIEZ GENE ZVANS RACE SEX COB
HOME ADDRESS APT CITY/STATE
BUSINESS ADDRESS PHONES
DETAILS: SF
TRYING TO PUT HIM IN THE SET 4. HE SAID "WHAT YOU MEAN BY THAT?" I SAID "BEN SAID
THAT ALL OF YAWL ARE TRYING TO PUT THE WEIGHT ON HIM, TRYING TO MAKE LIKE HE SHOT
TYEMAN IN THE ROBBERY WHEN HE DID NOT DO IT." MCCLESKY SAID "TT MIGHT BE ONE OF
THOSE OTEER oR Cesvse I AIN'T TRYING TO PUT BEN IN NOTHING." 1 SAID "MAN I KNOW
YOU LYING BECAUSE I USED TO STICK UP WITH BEN TOO, AND BEN AIN'T FAST ABOUT SHOOTING
NOBODY." I ‘TOLD THEM THAT "BEN TOLD ME THAT YOU SHOT THE MAN YOURSELF." MCCLESKY
SAID "CAN'T NOBODY PROVE THAT ‘I SHOT THE MAN, CAUSE THE LADY CHN'T IDENTIFY ME NO W!
I TOLD MCCLESKY "I WAS. SUPPOSE TO BEEN IN ON TEE ROBBERY MYSELF, BUT IF YOU WASN'T ¢
GREEDY, ALL OF THAT WOULD NOT HAVE HAPPENE \ED, EHAT I COULD PLAN THINGS OUT BETTER TE
: THEN MCCLESKY cas ON vp AND TOLD. ME ABOUT IT. I SalD MAN "JUST WHATS’ RAPPINED oy
THERE." MCCLE SKY CONE 0 TELL ME " i OVER 10 re PLACE ABOUT A WEEK BEFORE |
ROBBERY, MESSING AROUND. = CHECKED TEE PLACE orT TO SEE WHERE THE MONEY DRAWER
AND ALL LIKE THAT, = 1AID IT OUT-TO ~TM ABOUT HOW MUCH YOU HAVE TO WATCH IN T=
STORE WHEN YOU GO IN. MCCLESKY SAID THAT EE DOUBLE CHECKED THE PLACE TEE SAME DAY
THEY ROBBED THE PLACE. MCCLESKY SAID THAT =P HAD A MAKE-UP KIT AND MADE HIS FACE
THE DAY EE ROBBED THE PLACE. HE SAID SHE PUT SOME PIMPLES LIKE ON HIS TACE AND SE:
PUT A SCAR SOMEWHERE ON HIS FACE, BUT HE DID NOT SAY WHERE BOUTS. MCCLESKY SAID TI:
EE WENT TO THE STCRE AND TALKED TO A LADY ABOUT BUYING SOME MERCHANDISE AND LOOKED
I HAV READ/HAVE HAD READ TG ME/THE ABOVE STA
MY BELIEF AND RNCWLEZSE AMD HAS BEEN GIVEN ally a IL ™ Hii AHD VOLUNTARILY BY RE.
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HOME ADDRESS APT CITY/STATE
BUSINESS ADDRESS PHONES
BITHESS 7 FE
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THE MERCHANDISE AND EVERYTHING, AND LEFT AND WENT BACK TO BENS' HOUSE, BUT BEN WASN'T
AT HOME BECAUSE THE POLICE WAS ALREADY LOOKING FOR BEN, SO BEX WASN'T STAYING AT HOME
MCCLESKY SAID " HE WENT AND PICKED UP DUPREE AND THIS OTHER GUY AND COME BACK TO BE
HOUSE." WHEN THEY COME BACK TO BENS' HOUSE THATS' WHEN THEY GOT SHOTGUN, A PISTOL A
A LEATHER JACKET- A SHORT LEATHER JACKET. HE SAID THAT THE LEATHER JACKET BELONGED
TO ANOTHER DUDE AND THE GUY LET REX USE THE JACKET. MCCLESKY SAID "THATS' WHEN THEY
ALL ¥OBSED UP AND WENT TO GOTO THE PLACE. HE SAID HE STOPPED SOMEWHERE AND ‘BOUGHT
TWO PAIR OF STOCRINGS., mr SHE WAS DRIVING HER CAR DURING THAT TIME. WHEN THEY GC
TO THE PLACE MCCLESKY WENT BACK TO "TALK TO THE LADY ABOUT THE STUFF THAT HE WAS SUPT
TR BUY. MCCLESRY SAID "ER SHE STOOD RIGHT BY THE SHOWCASE WHERE YOU GOT INTO THE
FURNITURE STORE, OUTSIDE THE DOOR, ONTHE STREET’ SIDE LIE, (FOR ER.10 NOTIFY HIM >
IT LOOKED LIKE THERE WAS ANY HEAT COMING ON , OR SOMETHING LIKE THAT." AND HE TOLD
HER IT "YOU SEE ANYTHING THAT LOOKS SUSPICIOUS, YOU. STE? RIGHT INSIDE THE DOOR, DON
SAY ANYTHING, JUST WALK RIGET ON OUT." MCCLESKY SAID THAT EE WENT RIGHT IN FRONT A
THROWED DOWN ON TEE LADY AND SAID BEX AND TWO oR THREE OTHER DUDES COME INTHE BACK.
MCCLESKY SAID THAT HE WAS TRY ING TO WATCH var AND THE LADY TOO AND THE LADY THAT
HAD TEROWED DOWN ON. AND THAT A LITTLE WHILE AFTER HE WAS IN THE STORE THAT HE SEZ
&
MEY STZ® INSIDE THE DOOR AND WALK RIGET BACK OUT. MCCLESKY SAID THAT ABOUT THAT ~
RAVE READ/HAVE HAD READ TG ME/THE 480 : RE VE STATTHEHT AND IT ; BELIEF AND RNCWLEDSE AND HAS BEZH GIVEN FRECLY AD ES he
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SUSINESS ADDRESS | PHONES
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DETAILS: A
THE POLICE WALKED IN THE STORE. BUT THE POLICE DIDN'T ACT LIKE HE WAS COMING IN FOR
NO ROBBERY. BUT HE SAID THAT RE DID SEE THE POLICE PUT THE HAND ONEIS GUN. AND HE
SAID THAT EE KNOWED RIGHT THEN THAT IT WAS GOING TO HAVE TO BE HIM OR MCCLESKY ONE.
CAUSE THE POLICE WAS HEADED TOWARD WHERE BEN WAS BACK THERE. AND MCCLESKY SAID THAT
HE PANICKED, HE JUST SHOT. MCCLESKY DID NOT SAY HOW MANY TIMES HE SHOT OR NOTHING.
MCCLESKY SAID WHEN THEY GOT TOTHE CAR, WHEE WAS UNDER THE WHEEL AND DUPREEE PUSHED
HER OVER. THEY WAY HE TALKED SOMEBODY WAS LATE GETTING TO THE CAR, I DON'T KNOW WHI
ONE IT WAS. MCCLESKY SAID iii we 3, IT WAS A GOOD TEING THAT DUPREE TOOK TH
WHEEL CAUSE THAT BITCH WOULD HAVE RUN OFF AND LEFT SOMEBODY." AND THEN I TOLDMCCLESK
“DID YOU ,. IS TEIS THE WAY YOU TOLD THIS CONFESSION?" MCCLESKY SAID "SOME OF IT IN
THERE I TOLD, AND SOME OF IT 1 DIDN'T." ABOUT 2-3 MINUTES LATER DUPREE CALLEC MC
CLESKY UP TO THE VENT. DUPREE SAID "WHATS' GOING ON." MCCLESKY SAID "AWL, WE AIN'T
DOING NOTEING BUT JUST TALEING." DUPREZ TOLD MCCLESKY TOLD "I'M GOING BACK TO SLEE:
YOU KNOW I STAY UP ALL KIGET." DUPREE TOLD ME, WELL HE DONE GONE BACK TO SLEEP. A
THEN ME ANDMCCLESKY STARTED TALKING .BACK AGAIN. AND THEN I ASKED MCCLESKY WHAT KIN
FVTDENCE DID THEY HAVE ON HIM. MCCLESKY SAID "THEY AIN'T GOT NO EVIDENCE, NO MORE
WHAT I TOLD THEM DOWN THEFE, AND I AIN'T GONE TO PLEAD GUILTY TO THAT." MCCLESKY TC
ve "QB NER COULDN'T HAVE TOLD THEM TOO MUCH, CAUSE IF SHE DID, SEE WOULD HAVE EI
I HAVe RIAD/HAYE HAD READ TU ME/THE ABOVE STATCMENT : =! Tos ning F me/ihe I STATEMERT AD 17 IS 7 : 5 F PY BELIEF AND KNCHLETEZ AND HAS BESH GIVEN FREZLY AND RE a JasTpy
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DETAILS:
IN JAIL HERSELF. MCCLESKY SAID "4IN'T NOBODY COULD HAVE PUT THE HEAT ON THEM BUI
vo 8 SHE WAS THE ONLY ONE WHO COULD HAVE TOLD THEM THE NAMES OUT AND TELL THEM ABOU”
THE GUNS THAT THEY HAD PICKED UP AT HER HOUSE, CAUSE SHE WAS TRYING TO CLEAR HERSELF
FOR SOME REASON. THE MAN CAME AROUND TO MAKE A COUNT UP AGAIN. WE STOPPED TALKING.
I WENT ON TO SLEEP. --
THE NEXT DAY » JULY 10,1978 AROUND 9:00 A.M. WE STARTED Touring AGAIN. MCCLESKY
SAID THAT THE MAN WHO OWNED THE JACKET SHOULD BAVE BEEN IN JAIL, HE DIDN'T KNOW WEY
THEY PICKED EIM UP AND QUESTIONED KIM AND TURNED HIM ALOOSE. THEN I TOLD WogLgenY
"THAT MAN MUST HAVE KNOWN SOMETHING, 700." MCCLESKY SAID "THE MAN WHO OWNED THE
JACKET COUL LDN'T HAVE" KNOWN NOTHING ABOUT IT UNLESS: _— TOLD HIM. " THEN 1 SAID "TEE
AIN'T GOT NO GINS OR NOTHING MAN?" MCCLESKY SAID "wo." MCCLESKY SAID id T KNOW TREY
NEVER WILL FINI THE GUNS THAT I HAD, BECAUSE WHEN HE WAS ON HIS WAY BACK TO
MARIETTA, FROM DUPREES' OLD LADY HOUSE, HE THROWED THE PISTOL: OVER TET BRIDGE OVER
THE CHATTAHOOCHE." MCCLESKY SAID TEAT HE DIDN'T SEE BEN NO MORE AFTER THEN UNTIL
MAY 28, 1578. MCCLESKY SAID THAT BEN COME TO MARIETTA AND CALLED HIM FROM A SERVI
STATION AND EE WENT TO THE SERVICE STATION AND PICKED BEN UP. MCCLESKY SAID THAT B
TOLD EIM THAT HE THOUGHT THERE WAS GOING TO BE SOME SHIT ABOUT THAT LATER ON, BECAU
WF THOUGHT THAT THEY HAD BURNT SOME OFF THE MONEY OFF SOMEWHERE AND THAT HE AND &
I HAVE READ/HAVE HAD READ TG ME/THE ABOVE STATEMENT AND IT IS TRUE TO ‘THE BEST OF
MY BELIEF AND KNOWLEDGES AND HAS BEEN GIVEN FREZLY AND VCLUNTARILY BY ES
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ATLANTA BUREAU OF. OLICE SERVICES DATE 8-:-78 TIME
STATEMENT OF OFFIE GENE EVAwe RACE SEX DOB :
HOME ADDRESS APT CITY/STATE
BUSINESS ADDRESS PHONES
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HAD BEEN HAVING AN ARGUMENT ABOUT THAT. MCCLESKY SAID THAT HE TOOK BEN 10 A FRIENDS'
OF EIS HOUSE, BUT BEN DECIDED TO GO TO A MOTEL AND STAY THAT NIGHT. MCCLESKY SAID
THAT HE WENT TO THE MOTEL THE NEXT MORNING AND PICKED BEN UP, AND BROUGHT BEN OVER TC
EIS HOUSE. AND KIM AND BEN PAINTED THE KITCHEN AND DUG THE YARD UP AND HIS BROTHER-.
LAW WENT AND BOUGET SOME SEER, AND THEY SAT DOWN AND DRUNK THAT. MCCLESKY SAID THAT
HE HADN'T SEEN BEN SINCE THEN, NO MORE THAN TALK TO HIM ON THE TELEPHONE . DUPREE CALL:
MCCLESKY. HIM AND DUPREE WAS TALKING. THEY WASN' T TALKING ABOUT THIS ROBBERY. DU
WAS SAYING THAT HE NEVER COULD UNDERSTAND WHY HIS OLD LADY DIDN'T NEVER COME UP THER
AND SEF KIM. DUPREE TOLD MCCLESKY THAT SHE MIGHT BE SCARED CAUSE WEN COULD HAVE IC
THE POLICE ABOUT TEE MONEY BEING SPLIT UP AT HER HOUSE. ME AND MCCLESKY DIDN'T TAI
S—
NO MORE FOR A COUPLE OF DAYS. BUT DURING THIS COUPLE OF DAYS DUPREE AND MCCLESKY T=
. TO EACZ OTHER.
DURING TZIS COUPLE OF DAYS THAT ME AND MCCLESKY DIDN'T TALK, MCCLESKY AND DUPREE WA!
-be
TALKING ABOUT THE LAWYER. DUPREE ASKED MCCLESKY "HOW DID HE THANK THAT THE LAWYER
FTLT ABOUT HIS CONFESSION?" MCCLESKY SAID THAT "THE LAWYER WAS FILING SOME MOTIONS
TO TRY AND GET THAT CONFESSION PULLED." DUPREE TOLD MCCLESKY THAT HE HAD TOLD HIM T
bod ae ¥ ¢
WAS GOING TO BE HARD TO DO. MCCLESKY SAID " I TOLD MY LAWYER THAT I WOULD GIVE H
I HAVE READ/HAVE HAD READ TG ME/T PSY TRUE TO THE BEST Eins AD READ TO ME/THE ABOVE STATEMENT AND IT I
bY > v ) pup : i Mt BELIEF AND KNGHLEDGE AND HAS BEEN GIVEN FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY BY to mes Bn
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STATZHENT OF OFTITZ GENE EVANS RACE
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HOME ADDRESS APT CITY/STATE
BUSINESS ADDRESS PHONES
DETAILS:
$2,000.00 IF HE COULD GET THAT CONFESSION PULLED @UT. MCCLESKY SAID THAT THEY WOULDY
KNOW NOTHING UNTIL AFTER THEY GO TO THE ARRAIGNMENT. MCCLESKY SAID THAT THE WAY THE
LAWYER TALKED, THEY HAD A GOOD CHANCE OF BULLING THAT CONFESSION OUT, BECAUSE HE MADE
TWO. THEN DUPREE ASKED MCCLESKY "WHAT DID HE THANK ABOUT THAT CONFESSION THAT THE
OTHER GUY MADE?" MCCLESKY SAID "IT WOULD HAVE TO GO FOR THE SAME THING, BECAUSE
THE OTHER GUY WAS YORCED INTO TELLING THE CONFESSION TOO." MCCLESKY SAID THAT THE
OTHER GUYS' CONFESSION RESEMBLED THE SAME THANG. DUPREE SAID " IF THEM TWO CONFESSIC
RESEMBLE THE SAME THANG AND YOULL WASN'T IN THE SAME ROOM GIVING THEM OUT, THEN IT
IS GOING TO BE HARD GETTING THEM PULLED, CAUSE YEWL TOLD TOO MUCH OF THE SAME THING.
Pu A og MCCLESKY SAID THAT IT WOULD JUST HAVE TO BE A CHANCE HE WOULD HAVE TO TAKE.DUPREE AS:
MCCLESKY "IS YOUR PARTNER STILL DOWN THERE?" MCCLESKY SAID NYEAR, SAY HE'S BENS' UN
DUPREE SAID "I DIDN'T NO NOTHING ABOU BEN HAD NO UNCLE MAN, YOU DON'T KNOW WHO THE X
YOU TALKING TO, Y0U COULD BE TALKING TO THE MAN." MCCLESKY TOLD DUPREE "NAW MAX, E:
aiid MAN, CAUSE HE KNOW A LOT OF PEOPLE THAT IKNOW AND I'M JUST ABOUT SURE THAT
K NOW HIM." THEN I STARTED TALKING TO DUPREE ABOUT REIDSVILLE. I HAD JUST ABOUT M:
DUPREE KNOW ME HIMSELF FROM TELLING EIM ABOUT REIDSVILLE. I TALKED ABOUT A LOT OF
THINGS THAT HAPPENED DOWN THERE, 4 LOT OF THINGS DUPREE DID WHILE HE WAS IN REIDSYVI
AND WHO EE WAS RUNNING WITH, AND ABOUT A SAWED OFF SHOTGUN TEAT HE AND A GUY NAMED
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HOME ADDRESS APT CITY/STATE
SUSIRESS ADDRESS PHONES
: BUSINESS / HORE
DETAILS:
|
SEES HAD GOT CAUG HT WITH BACK IN 1973 , BUT SEE SNEEEESRS WAS THE ONE WHO
| HAD TOLD ME ABOUT THAT HISSELFT. THATS' HOW I KNOWED ABOUT THAT CAUSE I HAD SEEN $=
BACK IN 1976, DOWNTOWN, ONE DAY AND WSSWERS WAS TELLING ME ABOUT HE AND DUPREE GOT
BUSTED TOGETHER. DUPREE GOT ALLRIGHT THEN, KIND OF TALKED A LITTLE BETTER. ALLRIGH"
THEN MCCLESKY STARTED TALKING ABOUT A JOB. MCCLESKY SAID "YOU KNOW WHAT, THEY MIGET
END UP WITH ANOTHERROBBERY ON ME?" I ASKED MCCLESKY WHY. MCCLESKY SAID "WE TOOK OF
A PLACE ox MCDANIEL ST., A LIQUOR STORE AND HE SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THAT SOMEBODY W.
GOING TO TELL THAT, CAUSE HE KNEW ONE OR TWO GUYS WHO KNEW. I SAID MAN, COULD YOU
IDENTIFY YOU FROM THE LIQUOR STORE. MCCLESKY SAID THAT HE DID NOT KNOW. BUT MCCLES
SAID THA T HE WAS SCARED THAT IT WIGHT COME AT ANY TIME. MCCLESKY ‘GOT BACK ON #EERY..
MCCLESKY SAID THAT THEY WAS ALL SITTING OVER TO BENS' HOUSE ONE DAY SMOKING REEFERS
AND DRINKING BEER AND WB TOOK THE CAR AND WAS SUPPOSED TO BEEN GOING TO THE STO:
SAID SHE STAYED GONE SO LONG TEEY STARTED WORRYING ABOUT HER. AND SAID THEY DIDN'T
KNOW WHERE SEE WAS AT, BUT LATER ON SHE COME BACK HOME AND TOLD THEM THAT THE POLIC
aD STOPPED THE CAR AND BROUGET HER TO JAIL AND TOLD THEM THAT THE POLICE SAID TE
CAR HAD BEEN IN A ROBBERY. MECLESKY SAID THAT THEY DAMX NEAR HAD HER BUT BETWEEN
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BUSINESS ADDRESS PHONES
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DETAILS:
HER COMING IN LOOKING LIKE A OMAN, PULLING THE WIG OFF LOOKING LIKE A VAN, SHE BLIPP:
THROUGETHOSE SUCKERS' HANDS. AND SAID THAT BEN ASKED HER WHAT DID SHE TELL. MCCLESKY
SAID THAT #%8 DIDN'T TELL THEM NOTHING, BUT SHE DIDN'T. KNOW NOTHING ABOUT IT. MCCLE:
SAID THAT HIM AND DUPREE TRIED TO FIGURE OUT WHAT ROBBERY IT COULD HAVE BEEN HHERE TE
GOT THE TAG NUMBER OFF THE CAR. MCCLESKY SAID THAT THE ONLY THING HE COULD THINK OF
WAS WHERE . AND » THEM HAD PROBABLY TOOK THAT CAR AND DID SOMETHING IN. IT.
WARREN SAID BUT " I DON®T KNOW, THAT JOB THAT I WAS TELING YOU ABOUT THE LIQUOR STORE
PETERS ST., SAID THAT THEY MIGHT EAVE GOT IT FROM THERE. : DUPREE CALLED MCCLESKY
AND HIM AND MCCLESKY WAS TALKING ABOUT " . HAD TWO DIFFERENT KINDS ‘OF MONEY ORDERS
AND SAY THAT THE ONE TREAT THEY HAD GOT FROM OUT. TO BOLTON: RD. VERE TWO DIFFERENT KINDS
or MONEY ORDERS AND HE DIDN'T EVER FIND OUT WHERE THEM OTHERS COME FROM, WHERE THEY C
OUT CF A ROBBERY OR WHAT, BUT HE KNOWED TEE ONES THAT THEY HaD THAT HE a He
TEEM WAS SUPPOSED*TO BEEN DONE AWAY WITE, SAY EF CALLED THEM ABOUT 5 : 004-6: :00a "on
SATURDAY MORNING AND ASKED THEM TO RIDE HER AROUND SO THAT SHE COULD CASE SOME OF TH:
MONEY ORDERS AND HE TURNED HER DOWN. MCCLESKY SAID THAT HIM AND HER "wil GETTING
! H
ALONG TOO GOOD, THAT COULD BE ONE REASON WHY THAT SEE TOLD THAT ON E=X. MCCLESKY SA:
THAT THE REASON THAT SHE HAD TOLD IT WAS THAT SHE WAKTED TO GET SOME OF TEE PRESSURE
HER CAUSE SEE HAD DONE A WHOLE LOTS OF ROBBERIES HERSELF., AND THAT SHE AND JRSHISCSIE
! HAVE READ/HAVE HAD READ TG MS/THE ABOVE STATEMENT AND IT I
AD 13 z S TRUE T0 TH MY BELIEF AND KNOMLELEE AND HAS BEEN GIVEN FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY £To Tie ph
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ATLANTA BUREAU Qn 20LICE SERVICES DATE TIME
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HOME ADDRESS APT CITY/STATE
BUSINESS ADDRESS PHONES
TTR
DETAILS: |
WHO WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE BEEN HER EUSBAND, HAD DONE 4 LOT OF ROBBERIES TOGETHER. AND
THEX-MCCLESKY ASKED ME IF I EVERY KNOWED A GUY BY THE NAME OF , ANYWAY HE GOT KILLED
NAMED LEGS, SAID THAT HE AND GEN AND JCESMERNNWEW® USED TO DO A LOTS' OF ROBBERIES.
MCCLESKY SAID THAT BECAUSE "RNR AND USENENNSNNR AND SNM HAD PULLED A ROBBERVON
GORDON RD. AT A LIQUOR STORE WHERE SOME MAN WAS KILLED, SAID #38 DID THE KILLING,
BUT WER WAS IN ON IT. MCCLESKY SAID THEY LOCKED @EP UP AND @B¥ ESCAPED OUT OF THE
BIG ROCK JAIL AND WENT TO A DUDE'S HOUSE, I THINK THEY SAID EIS NAME FAS GEGEESZEN, AND
HE SAID THAT REP WAS ONE OF THE PEOPLE WHO KNEW THAT {NB WAS AT ASENEGS HOUSE AND T
POLICE SURROUNDED THE HOUSE AND KILLED GENB IN A SHOOTOUT. AND HE SAID THAT 1S XHE
| PROBABLY THE REASON THAT QP KEEP RUNNING BACK AND FORTH. DUPREEZ END MCCLESKY STA
TALKING AGAIN SAVING "THAT THEY HOPED THAT ENOUGH HEAT WAS ON BEN, SO THAT TEEY WOULD
BEN WHEN THEY RAN DOWN ON IT, AND IF THEY DOKILL KIM, IT WOULD BE BETTER IN TEEIR FAV
BECAUSE HE KNOW THAT BEN WAS nd ABOUT THEM POINTING THE KILLING AT HIM, CAUSE THEY
KNOW THAT BEN WOULD GO AND TELL THE TRUTH TO KEEP FROM GETTING TIED UP IN THAT MURDEF
DUPREE TOLD MCCLESKY § TIMES OUT OF 1@, THEY ARE GOING TO KILL KIM ANYWAY BECAUSE BEN
WASN'T AS SMART AS. HE THOUGHT THAT HE WAS, CAUSE HE BET THAT BEN WASN'T 200 MILES FR
| ATLANTA, AND COMING IN AND OUT OF ATLANTA, CAUSE HE SAID THAT THE NIGGER DON'T KNOW
NOBODY BUT SOMEBODY EIEN IX AND OUT OF THE PENIIENTARY, CAUSE EE BEEN IN JAIL JUST AE
AD ! HAVE READ/HAVE H AC READ TO ME/THE ABOVE STATEMENT AND IT IS TRUE TO -THE BEST OF MY BELIEF AND KNOWLEDSE A AND HAS BEZX GIVEN FREZLY AND VOLUNTARILY BY HE..
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BUSINESS ADDRESS PHONES
BUS HESS 7 Tee
- DETAILS: |
HIS LIFE. MCCLESKY SAID THAT "NO HE AIN'T HARDLY AROUND NONE OF THEM PEOPLE WHO
BEEN AROUND THE PENITENTARY, CAUSE THEY WOULD HAVE BEEZIN TURNED HIM IN AND GOT THAT
REWARD OFF HIM. DURREE ALWAYS SAY ''YOU GET IN TROUBLE, YOU CAN GO TO HARLEM AND
STAY 20 YEARS, JUST DON'T GET IN NO TROUBLE. MCCLESKY SAID "I GUESS YOU RIGHT ON
THAT, BUT THAT BEN AIN'T GO STAY OUT OF TROUBLE, CAUSE BEN DON'T KNOW HOW TO DO
NOTHING BUT STICK UP. MCCLESKY SAID "YOU BETTER SHOW HOPE THAT HE GET KNOCKED OFF
AND TEEY DO CATCE HIM CAUSE HE WILL DO ANYTHING TO KEEP FROM GETTING THAT ELECTRIC
CHAIR CAUSE HE KNOW THATS' WHAT CRIMES LIKE THAT RUN TO. ABOUT THAT TIME SOMEBODY
ELSE CAME IN, I DON'T KNOW WHO IT WAS, AND THEN MCCLESKY STOPPED TALKING.
SOME or fi OTHER THINGS TEAT MCCLESKY AND DUPREE SAID DURING THEIR CONVERSATIONS
WERE:
A) MCCLESKY SAID THAT HE HAD A GIRL FRIEND NAMED go} HE SAID THAT HE HAD
A GIRL FRIEND FOR A WITNESS, HIS SISTER, AND KE SAID THAT HE HAD ANOTEZR ONE,
BUT I CAN'T TEINK OF THE NAME, BUT HE SAID THEY WERE GOING TO TESTIFY THAT
DURING THI DAY WHEN THE ROBBERY JUMPED OFT, THAT HE WAS IN MARIETTA THAT DAY
AND THAT EE DIDN'T COME TO ATLANTA UNTIL ABOUT 3:30 P.M.-4:00 P.M. AND SAY
THAT HE HAD ALREADY GOT A MAN IN MARIETTA TO WRITE A LETTER SAYING THAT ON
ANOTEER ROBBERY UP THERE, THAT HE WAS AT TEE PLACE WORKING WHEN THAT ONE CAME
I KRAVE READ/HAVE HAD EAS os /THE ABOVE STATEMENT AKD IT IS TRUE 0 ‘THE BEST OF
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WIihzSS Pca Li COMPLAINT # at A548 VLE
FM: 73
ATLANTA BUREAU O JSOLICE SERVICES pate LL 157%. yom Le
STATZHENT OF QFTIT GENE EVANS RACE Sey DOB
HOME ADDRESS APT CITY/STATE
BUSINESS ADDRESS PHONES
: BUSTRESS / Pome
DETAILS:
.
OFF IN MARIETTA. THAT HE WAS GOING TO TRY AND GET THXT SAME MAN WHO GAVE KEIM
ALIBI IN MARIETTA, TO GIVE HIM AN ALIBI FOR THE ROBBERY THAT HAPPENED IN ATLANT:
THAT HE HAD SEEN HIM THAT DAY THAT THE ROBBERY CAME OFF. MCCLESKY SAID "NOW TH:
AIN'T GO LET ME MAKE NO PHONE CALL, BLT THEY WILL LET YOU MAKE ONE, NOW I WANT
YOU TO CALL Tham, ASK BER IT EVERY THING WAS ALLRIGHT AND CHECK WITH THE PECP.
AND FOR HER TO CHECK WITH THE PEOPLE AND COME OUT THERE SUNDAY AND ‘LET HIM KNOW
SUNDAY WHEN SEE CAME TO VISIT HIM, AND LET HIM KNOW WHAT WAS GOING ON. MCCLISK
WROTE THE NUMBER ON A PIECE OF PAPER AND TEROWED THE NUMBER OUT ON- THE HALLWAY
AND PUT THE BLANKET OVER THE PIECE OF PAPER UNTIL I GOT Zi. THIS IS THE SAME
prECE OF PAPER THAT ‘I GAVE TO DET. HARRIS, .DET. "DORSEY AND DIST. ATTORNEY. PARK:
WHEN THEY CAME TO INTERVIEW ME. THERE WAS TWO PIECES OF PAPER WITH SI Ne
ON IT. I TRIED TO CALL @E=mus® WHILE THE D. A. AND THE DETECTIVES WERE SITTING
TESRE BUT I WAS UNABLE TO GET AN ANSWER, THE PHONE JUST, RANGED. THATS' WHAT 1
TOLD MAC WHEN I GOT BACK TO THE CELL. HE SAID "OK, SHE'LL PROBABLY BE OUT BER
(MCCLESKY)
bs sa ha uiag
SUNDAY. THEN MCCLESKY SAID THAT "WHEN THE POLICE COME TO KIS HOUSE IN MARIZTT
dnd bo
HE SAID THAT THEY JUST DID OVE VERLOOK SOME MONEY ORDERS, THAT THEY LOOKED IN
rd ~~
WEEEEEEP POCKETBOOK AND FOUND TWO OR THREE REEFERS, AND OVERLOOKED A GUN, I T
I HAVE READ/HAVE HAC READ TO MS/T :
HY BELIEF U ME/THE ABOVE STATEMENT AND IT ;
BELIEF AND KNOWLEDGE AND HAS BEEX G7 IVEN FREZLY AND CLONTARILY BY HE i
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Mn ey
ATLANTA BUREAU ‘OLICE SERVICES DATE \-1o7s TINE :
STATZHENT OF OFFIE GENE EVANS RACE: sey DOB
HOME ADDRESS APT CITY/STATE
SUSINESS ADDRESS PHONES
DETAILS:
BUSIRESS / nOME
THAT EE SAID IT WAS A 25 AUTOMATIC THAT BELONGED TO HIS OLD LADY, THAT IT WAS
— IX THE REFRIGERATOR. HE SAID THAT ZS HAD GOT $500.00 BOND FOR THE REEFERS
THAT WERE FOUND IN HER POCKETBOOK. MCCLESKY SAID .THAT HE WASN'T TOO MUCH
WORRIED ABOUT THOSE CASES CAUSE TEE D. A. WAS TRYING TO GET SOMEBODY TO TURN
STATES' EVIDENCE, THAT THERE WASN'T NOBODY TO TESTIFY BUT JE AND SHE WAS IN
ON IT HERSELF TOO. LATER OK MCCLESKY SAID THAT HE WENT TO COURT TO BE INDIC TFT he eh nd
ON A RUBBERY, MURDER CHARGE AND HE BE GOT DAMN IF THE D. A DIDN'T COME UP WITE
A SECRET INDICTMENT ON HIM. TI TOLD HIM "YOU KNOW YOU CAN'T GET NO TIME FOR NOT
LIKE TBAT." MCCLESKY SAID THAT HE DIDN'T KNOW THAT HE THOUGHT THAT HE SEEN SOX
BODY IN THE COURTROOM THAT HE KNOWED THAT COULD HAVE PINPOINTED HIM ON THE SCEY
h]
**x%x% DUPREE SAID THAT HE HAD A SHOTGUN CASE OUT IN DEKALB COUNTY, A SAWED OFF SHOTGL
AND TEAT SHOTGUN HAD BEEN IN ON SOME ROBBERIES, TOO.
*** MCCLESKY TOLD ME "MAN THE SHERIFF IN COBB COUNTY TOLD ME THAT HE DIDN'T LIKE K(
THEY WAS DOING HIM, THE ONES WHO HAD WENT TO PICK HIM UP, AND THAT ON HIS WAY !
3
EE FIBURSD THAT IT WAS GOING TO BE SOME SHIT WHEN TEEY GOT HERE IN ATLANTA &
WHEN THEY GOT HERE IN ATLANTA, AND STARTED QUESTIONING. THAT HE WAS INTENDED °
MAKE THE SAME CONFESSION THAT HE HAD MADE IN MARIETTA. HE SAID THAT THEY -QUES
- am -bbaw
l 1A\000 and 3 a = pep gow HAVE READ/HAVE HAD READ TG ME/THE ABOVE STATEMENT AND IT IS TRUE TO ‘THE BEST OF RY BELIEF AND KHOWLEDSZ AND HAS SEEX GIVEN
wa THESS 1 7! er ay
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SIGRATURE / ,
DATE © Pf Sa TINE
VICTIM SCHILTT. TRANR. RP. rave
COMPLAINT # . 4623548 yo.
» )
oF
ATLANTA BUREAU 3 JLICE SERVICES DATE (Fore TINE :
STATEMENT OF OFFIE GENE EVANS RACE SEX DOB :
HOME ADDRESS APT . CTTY/STATE
SUSINESS ADDRESS PHONES
TRIES WE
DETAILS:
HIM A WHILE. MCCLESKY SAID THAT THIS GREAT BIG SON OF A BITCH GRABBED IE BY
MY COLLAR AND SNATCHED ME OUT OF THE CHAIR, SNATCHED ME OUT OF THE CHAIR,
AND HIT HIM UP SIDE HIS HEAD, AND SAID "YOU KNOW YOU SHOT THAT MAN, DIDN'T
YOU DO IT.? MCCLESKY SAID THAT HE SAID "NAW." MCCLESKY THAT THE DETECTIVE
KEPT ON. MCCLESKY SAID THAT HE TOLD THE DETECTIVE THAT ANYTHING THAT YAWL
WANT ME TO SAY, I'LL SAY IT. MCCLESKY SAID THAT THE DETECTIVE WENT ON TO TELLINC
HIM ALL THAT HE WANTED KIM TO SAY AND THAT ALL HE DID WAS SAY YEAH. I TOLD
HIM THAT HE WAS JUST A FOOL, THAT IF I DIDN'T KILL A POLICE, I WOULDN'T SAY IT.
MCCLESKY SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT EE WOULD HAVE A BETTER CHANCE IF HE WOULD.
GO AHEAD AND SAY IT THE WAY THEY WANTED HIM TO SAY IT, AND .GONE AND TELL HIS
LAWYER ABOUT IT, AND SEE COULDN'T HIS LAWYER DO SOMETHING ABOUT THAT." MCCLESK
SATD THAT THE LAWYER SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT HE COULD HANDLE IT, BECXUSE TE
DIDN'T HAVE 'NO SMART D. A.'S OVER THERE NO WAY.
*** MCCLESKY TOLD DUPREE AND TOLD ME LATER ON. THAT WHEN HE WAS GOINGTO ROB THAT
HE WAS LOOKING FOR LIFE AND DEATH, THAT HE WOULD RATHER LIVE ALL HIS LIFE IN
THE PENITENTARY THAN TO BE DEAD. THAT HE DIDN'T GIVE A DAMN IF IT HAD BEEN A
DOZEN OF THEM SON OF A BITCHES THAT HE WOULD STILL EAVE TRIED TO SHOOT EIS WAY
DUPREE SAID THAT WHEN IT COME DOWN TG KILLING, THAT'S IT. DUPREE "YOU DAMN SU:
Sd Pia
I HAVE KZXD/HAYE HAG READ TO ME/THE A30vs } HAVE READ/FAVE HAD READ TO ME/THE AS0VE STATEMENT AND A BELIEF AMD KNOWLEDGE AND HAS EEN GIVEN FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY Evi ooo! OF
- .
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S$ iGIATURE 2.4
WITNESS Adu
DATE SS TINE
: -o
HITHDSS
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ii} VICTIM SCuLATT, TRANK R. (OFF.
COMPLAINT # 463348 od
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23 oF :
ATLANTA BUREAU OF ~OLICE SERVICES DATE %-1-78 TImt :
STATEMENT OF ATTTIT ATUT TITANS RACE SEX DOB
HOME ADDRESS APT CITY/STATE
BUSINESS ADDRESS PHONES
ST
DETAILS:
RIGHT.
x*%* 1 OVERHEARD MCCLESKY AND DUPREE TALKING ABOUT ANOTHER GUY WHO HAD BEEN
ARRESTED. THEY CALLED HIM SES OR BR, I DON'T REMEMBER WHICH ONE. TEEY
WERE TRYING TO FIGURE OUT HOW THEY COULD GET TO HIM AND TALK TO HIM AND
TELL HIM TO GET HIM SOME WITNESSES AND NOT TO MAKE A DEAL WITH THE D. A.
BECAUSE THEY NOT GOING TO DO NOTHING BUT TRICK HIM. ALL THE D. A. IS GOING
TO DO IS TELL EIM WHAT HE GOING TO RECOMMEND AND SAY AFTER HE RECOMMEND, THE
JUDGE NOT GOING TO GO ALONG WITH THE RECOMMENDATIONN. MCCLESKY AND DUPREE
| SAID THEY HOPED THAT THIS OTHER MAN feo Ri: GET WEAK AND STICK TO HIS
STATEMENT. TEEY SAID THAT THE OTHER MAN HAD A PLATE IN HIS HEAD AND THEY WERE
GOING TO TELL HIM THE REASON HE PLEAD GUILTY WAS BECAUSE HE DID NOT WANT TO GET
BEAT BECAUSE OF THE PLATE IN HIS HEAD. MCCLESKY SAID THAT HIS LAWYER, JOHN
TURNER TOLD HIM THAT THE D. A. WAS GOING TO TRY AND GET ONE OF THEM, © Z |
0) Z TO TURN STATES' EVIDENCE SO HE WANTED TO GET IN TOUCH WITH THIS OTHER
MAN SO HE WOULDN'T FALL FOR TEIS. DUPREE SAID THEY DIDN'T THANK THEY COULD
BE PUT IN THE PENITENTARY OFF OF WHAT {We SAID BECAUSE IF SHE KNOW TOO MUCH
IT WOULD SHOW THAT SHE WAS ON THE SCENE, OR WAS A CONSPIRACY TO WHAT HAPPENED.
!H DUPREE SAID THAT &SE® TOLD EIS LAWYER THAT TEEY DID NOT HAVE NOTHING TO DO WIZE
AVE READ/HAVE H - I (1 HAVE RERD/HAVE HAD READ TC ME/THE ABOVE STATEMENT AND IT IS TRUE TO ‘THE BEST OF dey} dog MY BELIEF AND XNOMLEDGE AND HAS BEEN GIVEN FREZLY AND VOLUNTARILY BY NE..
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WiTHoes TS = ; mete | "4 A,
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ATTANTA BUREAU OF'.OLICE SERVICES DATE b- 1-7 TIME d
STATEMENT OF SALA RACE SEX DOB
HOME ADDRESS APT CITY/STATE
BUSINESS ADDRESS PHONES
: 7 roe
DETAILS: |
THE ROBBERY. THAT WAS THE FIRST LAWYER THAT DUPREE SAID. THE LAWYER SAID
_. THAT HE COULD NOT TESTIFY U0 THAT AND REPRESENT THEM TOO, SO HE WOULD JUST
GET OFF THE CASE. SO THATS' WHAT HAPPENED TO THE FIRST LAWYER.
x% ONE DAY DUPREE TOLD MCCLESKY "YOU KNOW I ALWAYS BEEN DOING YOU RIGHT, BUI
YoU PUT MY NAME IN THE CONFESSION AND YOU KNOW THEY COULDN'T IDENTIFY ME
OR NOTHING. AND WHAT WOULD YOU THINK IF I JUST GO ON LATER AND COME OUT
AND TELL THEM THAT YOU WERE TE TRIGGER MAN. THEN MCCLESKY TOLD DUPREE
"gor KNOW THAT I DIDN'T HAVE A CHOICE BUT TO PUT YOUR NAME IN IT, CAUSE =
~ TOLD THEM ALL OF OUR NAME ANYWAY." DUPREE SAID "EE HAD A BAD RECORD AND
WHEX SHE GET ON THE STAND, SEE GOING TO INDICATE HERSELF BEGAUSE SHE KNOWS |
TOO MDCH, THAT SHE WOULD HAVE TO BE IN ON IT TO KNOW THAT MUCH, THAT A MAN
WOULDN'T GO AND TELL HER ALL OF WHAT SHE IS GOING TO TELL, THE WAY SHE IS GOING
T0 TELL IT. MCCLESKY SAID THAT "WITNESSES CAN GET YOU IN THE PENITENTARY aD
WITNESSES CAN GET YOU OUT, CAUSE HE HAD THREE WHO WERE GOING TO TESTIFY WHERE
HE WAS AT DURINGTHE TIME THAT THE ROBBERY HAPPENED. MCCLESKY TOLD DUPREE THAT
WISHED THAT HE KNOWED SOMEBODY IN THE STREET THAT HE COULD MAKE SOME ARRANGEME
FOR o—>0 COME TO COURT. THAT HE DIDN'T BELIEVE THAT SHE WAS COMING ANYWAY
/ ~
.
z
I HAVE READ/HAVE HAD READ TO ME/T . wh
MY BELIEF oid } ME/THE ABOVE STATEMENT AND I
BELIEF AND KNOWLEDGE AMD HAS BEEN GIVEN FREELY AND DARL uRg rae BEST OF
Pri,
kiln “i “ he
SIGNATURE L/ ——-
Wi TNESS - 7a gives Hr oes,
Tobe cnt Mer TGa ie VUE " NR
> = VICTIM SCELATT, FRA RR. AQF
SITHEESE al Te Bn 1biy — >A COMPLAINT 6 SCHRLATT., TRANK R. 10 Tiida ay
Se1-78
ATLANTA BUREAU oF SOLE FE SERVICES DATE =1-78% TIME
STATEMENT OF NE RACE” . ‘soy DOB 2
HOMZ ADDRESS APT CITY/STATE
BUSINESS ADDRESS PHONES :
[ RoR
DETAILS:
x** DUPREE TOLD MCCLESKY "IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN A BETTER THANG IF BEN, HAD GON: ON AND
— KILL YOU WHEN WE WAS OVER IN TECHWOOD. I ASKED MCCLESKY LATER ON WHAT DUPREE
WAS TALKING ABOUT. AND HE SAID "YEAH ME AND BEN HAD A LITTLE RUN IN, I THANK
sald WAS THE CAUSE OF BEN JUMPING ON ME " MCCLESKY SAID THAT HE WAS SAVING
6 f
BENS' LIFE #AS WELL AS HE WAS SAVING HIS OWN. MCCLESKY SAID THAT BEN HAD JUMPED
~ON HIM ,THAT HE CAME UP TO HIM AND SNATCHED HIM OUT OF THE CAR AND TOLD HIM
"MAN WHAT THE HELL YOU DO THAT FOR, DON'T YOU KNOW THAT YOU DONE GOT ALL OF TS
FUCKED UP CAUSE YOU SHOT THE GOT DAMN POLICE."
k*% MCCLESKY SAID THAT WHEN THEY WENT TO THE PRELIMINARY HEARING THEY TALKED TO
' 7, £E . .
THE DUDE, ag OR ¥E8R AND TOLD HIM NOT TO FALL FOR Ses OF THAT SHIT.
zo
ARATHE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ARE BEING ASKED OF MR. EVANS BY DET. W. HARRIS, -
OF THE ATLANTA POLICE DEPARTMENT HOMICIDE SQUAD AND BEING WITNESSED BY
RUSS PARKER AND INV. GRADY ESKEW OF THE FULTON COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEYS
OFFICE:
Qs EARLIER IN YOUR STATEMENT YOU TOLD US ABOUT . LENGTHY CONVERSATIONS YOU HAD
: WITE WARREN MCCLESKY, HOW WERE YOU ABLE TO CARRY ON THESE CONVERSATIONS WITHOUT
Dore SEAS ABLE TOC EEAR? HOW COTLD YOU HEAR TEE CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN MCCLES
As TET ONLY WAY THAT DUPREE COULD HEAR US T "TNC WAS THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO BE UP
! HAVE READ/HAVE HAD READ TO MS ;
k ‘ TC MZ/THE aBOVS STATEMENT AN e
MY RELIES ' ERA = ¥Z SIATEMERT AND IT IS TRUE TO ‘THE BEST OF AND RNOWLEDSZ AND HAS BEEN GIVEN FREELY AND VCLUNTARILY BY ME..
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WETHESS Ad 0 Re TRESS ol id ol fai COMPLAINT # 463548 VLIW
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ATTANTA BUREAU OF JOLICE SERVICES DATE &-.-78 TINE
STATEMENT OF OFFIE GENE EVANS RACE sey DOB
HOME ADDRESS APT CITY/STATE
BUSINESS ADDRESS PHONES
: STRESS 7 ot
DETAILS:
TO THE VENT CAUSE HE WAS OVER US, SO WE LAID DOWN ON TEE FLOCR, MCCLESKY WAS ON
__ THE FLOOR AND I WAS ON MY BED, AND WE TALKED AROUND THE BARS FROM THE FRONT PART
OF THE CELLS. THE BACK PART OF THE CELLS HAVE VENTS TO IT ABOUT 9 FEET HIGH ANI
THRE IS A SINK RIGHT UNDER THE VENT FOR MCCLESKY AND DUPREE X . Y E TO UNDERSTAND ONE
ANGTEER AND TALK TO ONE -ANOTHEREASH ONE OF THEM WOULD HAVE TO STAND UP ON THE 8:
AND TALK AND LISTEN. AND THEN I COULD STAND UP ON MY SINK IN MY CELL AND I COU
EEAR EVERYTHING THEY SAY..
Q: DID YOU OVERHEAR MCCLESKY OR DUPREE SAY ANYTHING THAT WAS TAKEN IN THE ROBBERY
OF THE FURNITURE STORE? |
A: MGCLESKY SAID THAT THEY GOT ABOUT ‘$2,200.00 SOME OF THAT WAS CHECKS. AND THAT
THEY WENT TO DUPREES' OLD LADYS' HOUSE AND SPLIT THE MONEE UP. AND EE SAID TE
blo
HE DIDN'T TEINK THAT @SE® WAS SATISFIED BECAUSE SHE THOUGHT THAT IT WAS SUPPOS
TO BE MORE THAN THAT.
THE PEOPLE MENTIONED IN YOUR STATEMENT, WHICH ONES DID YOlL KNOW PRIOR TO
ed
Q: 0
BEING ARRESTED AND SENT TO THE FULTON COUNTY JAIL?
A: BEN WRIGHT AND BERNARD DUPREL ARE THE ONLY TWO THAT I KNOW. I DON'T RNOW MCC
SUT T KNOW EDM BY SIGHT BECAUSE HE PASSED MZ CELL ONE DAY WHER HE WAS TAREN
oT XZ TO TAKE A SHOWER
I HAVZ READ/HAYE HAD READ TO ME n
"AVE READ/HAYE HAD READ TO ME/THE ABOVE STATEMENT AND IT IS
AND KNOMLEDGE AND HAS BEEN GIVEN FREELY AND VOL Is TRUE TO THE BEST OF
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, PAGE 27 ® Jr “OLICE szpvrces DATE & .-75 TIME 1657 HRs!
STATDHENT OF___ OFr1r ory +
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HOME ADDRESS
Fon i SUSINESS ADDRESS
PRONES
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:
BUSTRESS / FOE
DETAILS:
: Q? IS TH: ABOVE STATEMENT TRUTEFUL TO THE BEST OF YOUR KNOWLEDGE AND GIVEN FREELY
— WITHOUT Any PROMISES RENDERED TOWARD you?
A: YES. S— &
Fd
END or STATEMENT a
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1 SCEIATT, TRANR RS (OFF.) |
CCHPLAINT £ £63548 ¥L
Ala
EXHIBIT F
STATE OF GEORGIA ) ;
COUNTY OF FULTON |) SS°
JILL DARMER, being duly sworn, states:
l. I am a citizen of the State of Georgia. I reside at 1445
Monroe Drive, N.E., in Atlanta, Georgia. In 1978, under my former
married name, Marg Darmer, I served as a juror in the trial of Warren
McCleskey.
2. Our jury had a hard struggle with the evidence in this
case. We discussed the issue of guilt or innocence for a long time.
We were able to agree without alot of difficulty that all four men,
including Warren McCleskey, had at least participated in the armed
robbery. But the issue of tesionsinlitty for the shooting was
different.
3. The evidence about who fired at Officer Schlatt struck
me as far too pat. ‘The Atlanta Police Department was obviously disturbed
that one of its officers had been killed. I had the feeling, however,
and other jurors did as well, that the State had decided to pin the
shooting on Warren McCleskey, even though the evidence was not
clearcut that McCleskey had actually been the che who fired the shots
at the officer.
4. The testimony from Ben Wright, the other co-defendant,
didn't impress us much, since he obviously could have committed the
shooting himself and had everything to gain by blaming McCleskey.
The evidence on who was carrying the silver gun seemed to point to
McCleskey, but it was contradictory at several places. Several
witnesses stressed McCleskey had been the one to come into the front
of the store, but three of the robbers gathered all the store personnel
together in the middle of the store, and nobody even saw which one of
the three ran toward the front when Officer Schlatt arrived.
5. That left us with the testimony of Offie Evans, who had
been in the cell next to McCleskey. Evans told us that McCleskey had
admitted to him that he had shot Schlatt; McCleskey even said he would
have shot his way out no matter how many police had been there. This
testimony made a real difference in my opinion. Unlike Ben Wright, I
didn't think Evans had anything to gain. I knew Evans had a prior
criminal record -- they brought that out during the trial -- but,
despite that, I didn't see any reason why he would deliberately tell
a lie to get McCleskey into trouble.
6. We finally decided to convict McCleskey of malice
murder, even though some of us continued to have some doubts about
the evidence.
7. I was surprised after we gave our verdict when they told
us we wold have to SEA Ting Shad sentences I thought the Sudgs would
do that; so did some of the other jurors, I remember. During the
penalty phase, some of us talked alot about our doubts on who did the
shooting. This was a very close case for me on whether to give life
or death. If we had found any valid reason not to give death, I am
certain that I, and a number of other jurors, would never haven given .
McCleskey a capital sentence. But the defense attorney, honestly, just
wasn't nearly as good as the prosecutor. We weren't given any real
reasons we could stand by, except our doubts about who did it, to vote
for a life sentence. On the evidence we had, even though it was
very, very close, I think we did the right thing.
8. Earlier this week, two persons involved with McCleskey's
defense came to see me at my apartment. They asked me what I remembered
and I told them. I was very disturbed when I learned that a police
detective had promised Offie Evans in 1978 to speak with federal
authorities on his pending escape charge.
9. My own vote depended alot on Evans' testimony. The
idea that Evans might have testified hoping to avoid conviction on
federal escape charges changes my view of the whole trial. It gave
Evans a strong motive to lie that we didn't recognize at the time.
10. As I said, this was for me a very close case. It took
Evans' testimony for the State to prove to me, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that McCleskey was the triggerman. Without Evans' testimony
I definitely would not have voted for a death sentence, and I believe
at least a few other jurors would have agreed.
ll. Let me go further. I knew then that it only takes one
juror to hold out against the rest. I am certain that had I wrloim
that Ofsie Evans had an SvTanggmens with an Atlanta detective -- if
I ‘had Heard Evans testimony in the state Habeas corpus procseaitis ei
I would never have voted to impose capital punishment. I believe I
could have remained firm in my vote no matter what other jurors may
have decided. It would have been enough to leave a big question in
my mind about who actually killed Officer Schlatt.
12. The crime McCleskey and his three friends were involved
was very serious, but so is a death sentence. Our Surry
tried hard to do the right thing in a very difficult case. I think
we were entitled to all the evidence. It ii we didn't get it.
3 : ot TE
AAA Aria =
Ji11 Darmer
Sworn to and subscribed before me
FZ
this. i1"” day of May, 1987
FIle ui
Notary Public. Fulton Ccunty. Georgia
My Commission Expires May 30, 1950
EXHIBIT G
STATE OF GEORGIA )
COUNTY OF GWINNETT )
SS:
ROBERT F. BURNETTE, being duly sworn, states:
1. II am a citizen of the State of Georgia. I reside
at 213 Kenvilla Drive, Tucker, Georgia 30084. In 1978, I served
as a juror during the trial of Warren McCleskey in the Superior
Court of Fulton.County, Georgia. If I had known during the trial
what I have recently learned about one of the State's key witnesses,
Offie Evans, I believe it could have made a difference in whether I
voted for a death sentence, and I believe it would have affected
some of the other jurors too.
2. It wasn't an easy case. We spent a long time
discussing the State's evidence. All of the jurors in our case
were very responsible and concerned to be fair. It did seem clear
thet, from she evidence we HORE, McClesiey Hadibess one of the four
men who robbed the Dixie Furniture Store. The hard question for us
was whether he was actually the one who shot the police officer,
and whether it had been with malice.
3. Ben Wright, the other robber who testified for the
State, said that Warren McCleskey had admitted the shooting. I
honestly never trusted Wright and I don't think the other jurors did
either. He seemed like a man without a conscience. He was very
cool and arrogant when he testified. I had the feeling that if he
had done the shooting himself, he wouldn't have had any remorse at all.
4, I also remember Offie Evans, who had been in jail, and
who testified that McCleskey had admitted to him that he had done it.
Evans also said, I remember, that McCleskey told him he would have
shot other policemen to get out of there. That was important
evidence to us. It looked like Evans had nothing to gain from what
he said.
5. We finally decided that whoever shot the policeman
had deliberately tried to take his life. TI was not 100 percent sure
that McCleskey was the triggerman since there was nothing that
absolutely proved he was the one -- but on the evidence we were given
he seened to be the one.
6. When we started to discuss the sentence, our decision
got even harder. It seemed we took a very long time, and some of us
were looking for a good reason, any reason, to give McCleskey a life
sentence. I come from a broken home myself; I was passed around from
relative to relative coming up, and I spent a year and a half in the
Methodist Orphanage. I know that what a person's been through can
affect his view of life. But no one in this case gave us any real
reason to yoke Pr 14s, | | wy
7. Even without any background on McCleskey, it was a
very hard thing to vote for death. I remember I did so only because
I thought, based on the evidence we had, that McCleskey had
deliberately taken that officer's life.
8. On May 7, 1987, two people representing McCleskey came
to ask me about the case. After I told them what I remembered, they
told me about the Atlanta police detective who had promised to speak
to federal people about Offie Evans' escape charge that he had at
the time of the trial. Nobody ever told us about that during the
trial. It puts a very different light on Evans' testimony. It
sounds like he was probably hoping to get off of his escape case by
testifying against McCleskey. The jury should have known that, I
think. It changes the State's whole case.
9. Like I said, we had a hard time deciding who did the
shooting, and a hard time deciding to impose the death sentence. I've
read the part of the trial transcript where Evans testified, and
I've also read what Evans said in the state hearing in Butts County.
I would definitely not have voted to sentence McCleskey to death if
I had thought he might not have been the triggerman. Even without
Offie Evans' testimony, I've naturally wondered alot if I did the right
thing. Knowing now that Evans could have lied to cover his deal with
the detective definitely could have made a big difference to me, and to
other jurors, I think -- at least in deciding to give the death
penalty. It keeps me from being sure, and I don't see how you can
impose the death penalty if you're not very sure.
10. Apart from Ben Wright, who might have done it himself,
and thon so.8 evidence po who had the aurdsy weapon; which NEvets
quite added up, the whole case against McCleskey for shooting the
policeman came down to Offie Evans. If he was just testifying to
save his own skin, I couldn't have trusted that. No one can always be
certain, but I honestly do think knowing about his deal with the
detective could have made the difference to me. It doesn't seem
fair that we weren't told about it.
Robert F. Burnette
Sworn to before me this 3-* day
of May, 1937
oy - EN 2 TN i. a Sn emi ee The Notary Pantie Fotnme fms 00 TS
My Commigsich Dusirns 0, $2. 15850
EXHIBIT H
name, please stand and rexain standing until both sides
heve an opportunity tc pass upon you,
Phili: 35.
CLERNS
PAXKEK?
TURLLRS
CLLERN?
PARKLX:
CLERK:
MNOYTis,
Tlie State will sccert Hr. Morris,
Excusea by the defendant,
Fe. walters,
The State will excuse Mrs, rnalters,
vie Eo wie Marehall,
The State will accept Mr. Marshall.
Excused by the defendant,
Mrs. Lucile Shively.
The State will accept irs. Shively,
Excused by the defendant.
Leonard Larson.
The State will accept Kr. Larson.
CLxcused by the defendant.
cna walls.
Ti.e State will excuse FHrs., walls.
Mrs, Marguerite P. Bohler.
-168~-
« PARKER: The Ctate will accept Hrs. Bohler.
fF. TULLER: Acceptable to the defendant.
Ronalo CG. Hudelns,
hide PARFLE: Tne State will accept Mr. budc ins,
#FRe TURKER: Acceptable to the derendant.
“EE CLLRhs Mis. Hildreé Glover.
Re PARKER: The State will accept lirs., Glover.
FE. TUshIR: Lxcused¢ by the defendant.
“UE CLEAL: Paul J. Reale.
Mil. PARRER: The Stete will accent Hr. keale,
nike TURLEEK: Acceptable to the defendant,
8 CLERK: John KH. Holder.
Elke PARKER: The State will accent kr, Helder,
MR. TURNEM: Lxcused by the defendant.
TuE CLLRh: Wayne F, martin.
Mho PARRER: The State will accept Br. Martin,
MPR, TURLER: Excused bv the dufendant.
TRE CLLRK: Fobert iL, Hamilton,
Hk. PARKER: The State will accept ¥r. Hamilton,
-16%-
UsERt Acceptable to the defendant,
THESCLERN: Hrs. Carolyn J. Bzlliard,
YK. PAFKKER: Tue State will accept Krs. ballard.
ME, TURNER: Mrs. Ballard 1s acceptable to the
TEL CLL#R: MNrs., Hildred Moore,
MR, PARKEE: The State will accept ¥rs. ore.
¥Re TURIFR: Excused by tne defendant,
muE CLEAN Pobert FE. Smith,
Fe: BAREDRY. "he State will accept Rr. Smith,
¥R. TURKEl: Excused by the defendant,
HL CLIRR: Mrs. Florence R. #olley.
YR, PARKLCR: The State will excuse irs, lcbley.
TEE CLERK: Janes L. Rimbell,
MR. PARRECP: The State will accept Mr. Kimball.
- MR. TUERILiER: Excused by the defendant.
Hi CLERK: Fopert L. lLagle,
. }iR. PARKER: The State will accept Kr. kagle,
#“R TURNER: Acceptable to the defendant.
-17C-
CLER
PAFREXLAS
TURLER
CLLRK:
Donald Ge Gosden.
‘he State will accent Mr, Losden,
AcCcep tan
Robert CC,
le to the
tears,
defendant,
The (tate will accept Mr. Scarc,
xcused uy the defendant.
iss Jessie Rorne °
The State will excuse Kiss Horne,
Hrs, Aghne
Te Stat
[3]
[~4 Ce.
will accept Mr
Awtrey,
wn
Acceptable to the defendant,
Krs. Marianne i. Hasher
The State will accept
Ed
XLS, hasher.
Acceptable to the defendant,
Ocell Watkins, Jr.
The State will accept Mr. Watkins,
Excused by the defendant.
rollin CC. sha Cpe.
{Rs PARKELR:t The State will accept Fr. Sharpe.
Ke LURKER: Excused by the defendant.
THE CLERK: Miss Carol A. dares,
MRe PARKLK: The State will accept Hiss Cames,
MRe TURNKNZR: EXcused by the defencant.,
“hi. CLERRs John FF, ¥doCadlan,
BR. PARERER: Zhe Ltate will excuse Mr, McCadden,
HE CLERF: PoLert FP. hurnette,
HR. PARKLR: The State will accei.t Mr. Burnette,
MR. TURUL:: Acceptable to the defendant.
THE QLZkE: Erec. Clifford Le ilutton, Jr.
Mi, PAEKEN®: The State will excuse Mrs. Lutton.
THE CLIRR? Nrs. Dorothy Smith,
KK. FPARKER: The State will accept Mrs. Smith.
MR. TURKER: Excused by the defendant,
THE CLERK: Mrs, Mary G. Darmer.
MRe PARKER: The State will accept Mrs. Darmer.
MR. TURNER: Acceptable tc the defendant,
-172=
Pt IE RE
- eaANER $
CLERK:
PARKER:
CLERK: The following four jurors will be called
MIPS. waldtrsut I. Lavroff.
TLe State will excuse Mrs
Joseph C, League, Jr,
Tue Late will sccerpt Mr.
Lxcused by tae cefendent.
Pd
HIS. fuzenne He, Filgc,
The State will excuse ars.
Juscyh Lene.
The rete will excuse Mr.
%illiei 2: Lane.
The Stete will accept Er,
Excused Liv the defencant,
cohLasecn BF. Mason,
Ed
The State will accerst rr,
Excused by the deferncant.
¥rs. He. H, Eickey.
cane,
Mason.
. The: State will accept Mrs. Eickey.
Acceptable by the defendant,
-173~-
for the purpose of selection of the first alternate.
Patricia
CLEIUG
PARLE:
TUKLLES
CLK:
first. alternata.
of selecting the second
-
The next four jurors: will be called for
~ s
=a 5, Thaetls Juror Lumber 107.
tate will excuse 7,
-ri scm ®
Villard E. Beavers.
hie State will accept Hr. Beavers,
by the defendent.
t:illier J. Greene, Jr.
“he State will accept lir. Greene,
defendant,
cohn 4, Abernathy, Jr., will be the
the purpose
alternate,
¥rs. Mary J. Cox,
CLERK:
PARKER:
COURT:
twelve jurors and
names and you are
The State will excuse Krs. COX.
Ordney C. Eeldwin,
The State will accept Fr. Baldwin,
Acceptable to the defendant.
All rignt, gentlemen, we have our
We cidn't reach your
- oh
excused until in the morning at S:30.
twC alternates.
-174-
Report hack to the jory assembly room at 9:30 in the
morning,
YE,
proceed
&nd 1 need
THE COURT: let's
I guess sc
acconr lish
either way
Thank you
PARARERS
this evening?
very much for vour petience,
‘
Does Your Honoy rnow how late we will
I have releasec soe witnesses
to start getting therm Lack down here,
have the opening statements, and
jurcrs won't feel thet thev didn't
anything, let's plan to go until 5:08 or 5130,
you want to. 1 will let vou decide how Rany
vitnesses you need.
211 rioht, gentlencen,
the rule,
jn
THE COURT:
FAPKL X3
the Court is going to imnose
.
3 Are Vou Treacy?
Yes, Your Honor,
All richt, will 211 the witnesses in
the courtroom who expect tc testify in this case please
with 3C
ty testify
the sheriffs tC the witness roor. If vou expect
at all for the State or the defendant, please
leave the courtroon.
Gentlemen, do vou cibject to tle sheriff goine in and - - 3
finding out if anybody is coing to need him to go vet their
clothes or =~ we know we have one juror that wants his
blood pressure vills, Do you mind the sheriff voing into
‘the jury roox and asking those quections so he can get a
nurter on how many people ae will need?
HR, TURNER: ko objection from us.
-175~
EXHIBIT I
STATE OF GEORGIA
COUNTY OF FULTON
AFFIDAVIT
1a My name is Harriet P. Morris. I reside at 4655 Jett
Road, N.W., Atlanta, Georgia 30327.
24 On Wednesday, May 20, 1987, I visited the Fulton County
Voter Registration Office, Room 106, 165 Central Avenue, S.W.,
Atlanta, Georgia 30335 to view the Master Voter Registration List
in use at the time of Warren McCleskey's trial in Fulton County
in October, 1973. The Voter Registration List is preserved on
microfiche, and is available for public viewing in the
Registrar's office. The List which I viewed was current as of
July: 28, 1978,
3. The Voter Registration List contains the following in-..
formation: Name of Voter, Current Address, Voting Precinct, Con-
gressional District, State Senate District, State House District,
City Council District, Year of Birth, Race, Sex, and Date of
Oath.
4, By reviewing the Voter Registration List, I was able to
determmine the race of sixty-nine (69) of the seventy-two (72)
jurors who comprised the six (6) panels from which Warren
McCleskey's jury was chosen. See, Exhibit A.
Be The names of three (3) jurors whose names appear on the
jury list which is a part of the McCleskey record and who were
voir dired prior to the selection of the jury which heard the
case do not appear on the Voter Registration List which I viewed.
Jessie D., Horne, Panel No 8, Juror #85; Mary J. Cox, Panel 10,
Juror #111; Autry A. Dennis, Panel 11, Juror #127.
6. In an attempt to determine the race of these persons, I
viewed the Master Voter Registration List which immediately
preceded the July 28, 1978 list. This list, dated September 17,
1977, did not contain the names of these persons.
Tw I reviewed the Trial Transcript of the Voir Dire and
Jury Selection to determine which prospective jurors had been
excused, which had been peremptorily stricken by the State and
the Defense, and which had ultimately been seated as jurors.
Further Affiant saith no more.
' — FS 3
I #5 a8 oi, 0 tly” 3.2% nile
Harriet P. Morris
Sworn to and subscribed before me,
this the. NV. day of Nays 1987.
Notary Public
My Commission expires: ¢/i5/77
SA-#
DA-#
Alt. i
KEY 7c JURY rIsT
Defendant's Peremptory Strikes
State's Peremptory Strikes
Jurors Seated To Hear Case
Jurors Excused From Case
Jurors Who Were Voir Dired But Omitted From
The Striking Process; Trial Transcript Silent
As To Reason
State's Peremptory Strikes for Alternate
Jurors
Defendant's Peremptory Strikes for Alternate
Jurors
Alternate Juror
EXHIBIT A
JURORS IMPANELED FOR STATE v. McCLESKEY, A-40553
JUROR RACE JURY JUROR RACE JURY
PANEL NO 6 PANEL NO 9
Philip S. Morris W D-1 Darmer, Mary G. Ww #11
Walters, Doris S. B S-1 Lavroff, Waldtraut Ww S-7
Marshall, W. B., Ire W D-2 League, Joseph C. W D-16
Thompson, W.M. Ww Exc. Kilgo, Suzanne BH. W S-8
Hurd, Windle W. Ww Exc. Dane, Joseph R. Ww S=9
Shively, Lucille T. W D-3 Lane, William A. Ww D-17
Larson, Leonard J. Ww D-4 Mason, Johnson B. W D-18
Walls, Edna B S-2 Hickey, Mrs. H.H. ¥W #12
Bohler, MargueriteP. W #1 Montgomery, BruceE.W 7?
Hudgins, Ronald O. Ww #2 Kirbo, Margaret L. W 2
Glover, Mildred F. Ww D-5 Dukes, Patricia J. B SA-1
Reale, Paul J. Ww #3 Beavers, WillardE. W DA-1
PANEL NO 7 : PANEL NO 10
Holder, John M. Ww D-6 Greene, William J. W DA-2
Martin, Wayne F. Ww D-7 Abernathy, John M. W Alt.1
Hamilton, Robert L. B #4 Cox, Mary J. SA-2 :
Ballard, Carolyn Jo Wie 45 - Baldwin, Rodney CO, -B.: . Alt.2 -
Moore, Mildred. R. Ww D-8 Johnson, Wiley r. B
Smith, Robert E. Ww D-9 Williams, Clarence W
Mobley, Florence R. B S-3 Conner, Robert L. W
Kimball, James L. Ww D-10 Turner, Marian D. W
Nagle, Robert L. Ww #6 Ross, Marian C. B
Gosden, Donald G. Ww #7 Underwood, Jean Ww
Weston, Barbara J. B Exc. McKibben, Mary W. B
Sears, Robert C. Ww D-11 Parrish, Judy K. B
PANEL NO 8 PANEL NO 11
Horne, Jessie D. S-4 Vaughn, Agnes C. B
Awtrey, Agnes C. Ww #8 Alvarado, David Ww
Nahser, Marianne W. W #9 Blackmon, Thomas F.W
Watkins, Odel, Jr. B D-12 Grove, Samille T. W
Sharpe, Rollin C. Ww D-13 Guthrie, Nancy R. W
James, Carol A. Ww D-14 Becker, Cornelia V.W
McCadden, John F. B S-5 Dennis, Autry A.
Hiles, Joseph W. Ww Exc. Walker, Leda L. Ww
Burnette, Robert F. W #10 Young, Margaret E. W
Lutton, Jeannette Ww S-6 Buchanan, James F. W
Cason, Emma T. Ww Exc. Stansberry, Jeanne W
Smith, Dorothy W. B D-15 Jeter, Betty G. Ww
EXHIBIT J
AFFIDAVIT OF DORIS F. WALTERS
STATE OF GEORGIA)
}SS:
COUNTY OF FULTON)
Personally before the undersigned officer duly authorized
by law to administer oaths, appeared DORIS F. WALTERS, who,
after being duly sworn, deposed and stated as follows:
1. My name is DORIS F. WALTERS. I am more than eighteen
years of age, and am under no legal disability of any kind.
This affidavit is given voluntarily and without coercion of
any kind.
2. I was a resident of Fulton edunty during 1978, and
was called for jury duty during the week of October 9, 1978.
I recall being questioned individually as one of a number of
jurors called as a potential juror in the trial of a man
[Warren McCleskey] accused of shooting a City of Atlanta
police officer.
- -—
le Iwas not chosen 48 & juror ln that case.
4, My race is Black.
3 SI fri / 7
This ~: l GAY of. lyre cai , 1986,
or L
, Ea Fo J : Shee’
Lil 5 yu 2 {Zh. 8.)
DORIS F. WALTERS
Sworn to and subscribed
before me, this AG
NOTARY PUBLIC: =)
< - sia yay ; AI
3p amma S Sion LA HES JUIN Way Wit tat : x
AFFIDAVIT OF EDNA WALLS
STATE OF GEORGIA)
}§8:
COUNTY OF FULTON)
Personally before the undersigned officer duly authorized
by law to administer oaths, appeared EDNA WALLS, who, after
being duly sworn, deposed and stated as follows:
1. My name is EDNA WALLS. I am more than eighteen years
of age, and am under no legal disability of any kind. This
affidavit is given voluntarily and without coercion of any
kind.
2... I was a resident of Fulton County during 1878, and
was Jailed tor jury duty during che week of October 9,-1978.
I recall being questioned individually as one of a number of
jurors called as a potential juror in the trial of a man
[Warren McCleskey] accused of shooting a City of Atlanta
police officer.
3. ‘1 was not chosen as o juror in that case.
4. My race ls Black.
; Y nl
This Lin, 3), day of [7 5% , 1986.
chi Ale w-blr (LL. Gq)
EDNA WALLS
Sworn to and subscribed
= 3 a
before me, this
$6. 7 ow
NOTARY PUBLIC i
AFFIDAVIT OF FLORENCE MOBLEY
STATE OF GEORGIA)
}§S3
COUNTY OF FULTON)
Personnally before the undersigned officer duly authorized
by law to administer ocaths, appeared FLORENCE MOBLEY, who, after
being duly sworn, deposed and stated as follows:
1. My name is FLORENCE MOBLEY. I am more than eighteen
years of age, and am under no legal disability of any kind.
This affidavit is given voluntarily and without coercion of any
kind.
2. I was a resident of Fulton County during 1978, and was
called for jury duty during the week of October 9, 19787 I
recall being questioned individually as one of a number of jurors
called as a potential juror in the trial of a man [Warren
McCleskey] accused of shooting an City of Atlanta police officer.
3. I was not chosen as a juror in that case.
4, My race is Black.
This... daviof. .! 5195864
FLORENCE MOBLEY
Sworn to and subscribed before me,
this ro vday of ; 1986.
Notary Public
tas only, Leorg1a.
cLNIR TN on pa Pi
» i
AFFIDAVIT OF JESSIE D. HORNE
STATE OF GEORGIA)
) $8:
- COUNTY OF FULTON)
Personally before the undersigned officer duly authorized
by law to administer oaths, appeared JESSIE D. HORNE, who,
after being duly sworn, deposed and stated as follows:
l. My name is JESSIE D. HORNE. I am more than eighteen
years of age, and am under no legal disability of any kind.
This affidavit is given voluntarily and without coercion of
any kind.
2. 1 was a resident of Fulton County during 1978, and
was called for jury duty during the week of October 9, 1978.
I recall being questioned individually as one of a number of
jurors. called: as a. potential juror in the trial of a man
[Warren McCleskey] accused of. shooting a City of Atlanta
police officer. : ew
3. I was not chosen as a juror in that case.
4, My race is Black.
This 254 day of “Mice TED r= 1984,
Nn £ Ng. S.)
als D. HORNE
Sworn to and subscribed
before me, this
day of ,. 1987.
notary Public, Georgia, State st Largs
5, 1987
NOTARY PUBLIC 'ssian Expires Seat.
AFFIDAVIT OF PATRICIA DUKES
STATE OF GEORGIA)
}SS;
COUNTY OF FULTON)
Personnally before the undersigned officer duly authorized
by law to administer oaths, appeared PATRICIA DUKES, who, after
being duly sworn, deposed and stated as follows:
1. My name is PATRICIA DUKES. I am more than eighteen
years of age, and am under no legal disability of any kind.
This affidavit is given voluntarily and without coercion of any
kind.
2. I was a resident of Fulton County during 1978, and was
called for jury duty during thé week of October g. 1978... .1T-
recall being questioned individually as one of a number of jurors
called as a potential juror in the trial of a man [Warren
McCleskey] accused of shooting an City of Atlanta police officer.
3. I was not chosen as a juror in that case. I was excused
by the prosecutor.
This 5 day of ers , 1986.
PATRICIA DUKES
Sworn to and subscribed before me,
this ¢ "any of an ; 1986,
—— pm *
Notary Public Notary Pubiic. Georgia State ar WUfEE
My Commission Expires March 1 16987
EXHIBIT K
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA
STATE OF GEORGIA
versus INDICTMENT NO. A-40553
i
WARREN MCCLESKY, et:al
MOTION AND BRIEF TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
AND FOR FUNDS FOR EXPERT WITNESSES
|
! Comes Now the defendant and moves the court to allow the
defendant to proceed in forma pauperis and to require the state to
) roids the defendant with reasonable funds to employ experts, as
set out below, to enable him to have an adequate defense, due
Vorooess of law, and a fair trial under the Fifth, Sixth, and Four-
Me centn Amendments to the United States Constitution.
&s grounds for this motion, defendant shows the court |
las follows:
Defendant is a black man who stands indicted for the
crimes of murder. and robbery, potentially darsying the death. pen--
alty. :
-2-
Defendant is without money to pay for his defense and
moves the court for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
“3
The State has used the services of numerous experts,
including pathologist, criminologist, criminal investigators, ball-
isticic experts, and others, in the investigation and preparation
lof this case for trial. Said experts, many of whom will be sub-
poenaed by the State Wh as witnesses against the defendant,
were paid by the State and have contributed significantly to the
State's case against the defendant.
-4-
The defendant is in dire need of the services of a pro-
fessional criminal investigator to assist his counsel in the
i'development of exculpatory and impeaching evidence in this case.
FILED IN OFFICE
| SEP 61978 0 oo “
PRY AVY sok (OS { praed 70
QEPUTY CLERK SUPERIOR COURZ
BULTON COUNTY GEGRGIA
- Sse
n addition to the above, defendant is also in need of
nds to secure the services of a trained psychologist or psychia-
ist to testify on and scientifically demonstrate the manner in
which statements were coerced from the defendant by law enforce-
ment officials against his will.
-6=
Defendant is also in need of funds to pay for the costs
|
of court transcripts previously incurred in this case.
: WHEREFORE, defendant prays..the Court for the relief re-
i
quested above.
a Respectfully submitted,
: ‘JOHN M. TURNER, 1I/%
: (3 tarney for Warren McClesky
wet 187 55:371
4
EXHIBIT L
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF BUTTS COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA
| ie ee re -X
| :
WARREN McCLESKEY, :
| : |
Petitioner 2
| :
|
vs. : Civil Action No. #4509 |
WALTER ZANT, Warden, : HABEAS CORPUS |
Georgia Diagnostic and :
classification Center, :
Respcendent :
sR a cual Ron me meer SO
The devosition of RELLY PITE, Devonent, taken
at the instance of the petitioner: all formalities,
includina the readina and signina of the deposition,
waived refore Cdward H. Lieberman, Certified Court
Reporter, at 959 East Confederate Avenue, Atlanta,
Tulton Countv, Georaia, commencing at annroximately
14:20 a.m., Faprvary 20, 1331.
-00o0-
a nn mm ez mat a an mt an a sa 3 mit | | | | | | | | | | |
CorpBIN & LIEBERMAN
CERTIFIED COURT REPORTERS TESS, 1293 PEACHTREE STREET. N.E.
ATLANTA. GEORGIA
(404) 892-3699
30309
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL:
For the Petitioner:
. ROBERT H. STROUP, Esquire
1515 Healey Building
57 Forsyth Street, N.W.
So ~ ~~
Atlanta, TSeorgiz 37253
Tor the Resnondent:
NICHOLAS G. DUMICH, Esquire
112 State Judicial Building
- 40 Capitol Square, S.VW.
Atlanta, Georgia 37334
CONTRNDS
WITNESS. a 0 on Vl eyrpwems ll aetunne
KELLY FPITE
Bv Mr. Stroup 3
(9
2)
By Mr. Dumich
. REDIRECT - RECROSS
Ca
)
Whereunon,
was called as a witness ang, having heen first duly
sworn, was examined and deposed as follows: |
MR. STROUP: All right. This is tha deposition of
Kelly Fite, taken by the petitioner by agreement of the
parties, for use in lieu of Mr. Fite's testimony at the
hearing. Mr. Fite has waived signature, and you have sworn |
the witness, so let me begin.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY ‘Mm, STROUP
4. Would you. lor the record State your full Ans,
please? |
a Kelly Fite.
Q And whereas are you amploved?
A. I work for the State Crime Laboratory, Department
of Torensic Science.
Q Okay. How long have you worked for the State Crime
Lab?
A Almost thirteen years.
Q All right. Did you have occasion to testify at the
trial of warren “cClesky related 4c the shooting of Atlanta Police officer Frank Schlatt? |
A. Yes, I.414,
|
4
1 | Q Was vour testimonv in that trial based on your
2 inspection of two bullets or bullet fraoments that were
3 recovered from the scene of the shooting?
4 A, That's correct,
5 | 0 And wag vour testimony that based on vour inspection
§ of bullets or hullet fragments that the murder weapon was
7 | probably a .38 Rossi?
8 A, That's correct.
9 Q Whan vou testified that it was probably a .38 Rossi|
10 | what did you mean bv prohablr?
1 a, 'e11l, based on the land and groove structure of the
12 | bullet, six aroovr=s with a right-hand twist, the groove width
13 being somewhere around .Jiheh, the diameter of the groove. =
14 | and the bullet and the slippage pattern oh. the bullet as it
15 | nassed through the hore of this weanon indicated oe ne--
16 | these measurements plus the slippage indicated to me that
17 | the weapon was probably a Rossi. This is also based on my
18 | accumulation of data over the past several yeare, plus a
19 | check with the PBI record file in Washington. 20 a Nkav. Put when vou say probably, can you put that
21 | in terms of some percentage chances? Over 50 per cent? |
22 A, T would savy between 51 and 9°. |
23 0 All richt. Somewhere over 51 per cent is what vou're
24.1 £=lking abont.
28 A, Vaa,
— 5 Se——————— wae a IRL . - a —t——————— — ——+ —— ce —— eo ———— en — —— — a — ——— St ———t: 0. Sn]
general practice in talking with defense counsel who would be
|
¢ All right. Is it also nossible that the murder
Weapon was some weanon other than a .38 Rossi?
A That's possible, ves.
Q Okay. And then let me ask vou just about vour
interested in talking to vou about vour anticinated testimony
prior to that testimony. Is it your usual practice to talk
with defense counsel who call vou un and want to discuss the
case with you and your testimony?
A Yes. T usually ask them to get the ckay from the
D.A., but I have no objections to ever talking to a defense
attorney.
- MR. STROUP: All right. That's all I have, Nick: -
| CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. DUMICH:
0} You indicated that there was some possibility that
the murder weaobon may have bean something other than a--
what 1a /ie7.- .38 Poses! special? Is thae how it's tarmed?
A Uh-huh (affirmative).
4 If you can recall, based on your examination of
those bullets, could you nut any kind of percentage on what
you believe the possibility might have baen it was something
A. Well, it would be less than 50 per cent. There are
2 counle more quns that have the same groove gtructure as a
rossi. one being a Taurus revolver. The grooves are identical,
but the slippage pattern in all I've ever examined is a
1ittle hit different from a Rossi, and that's why I say it
wa3 nrobably a Rossi rather than a Taurus, but I'Z put a
Taurus in the realm of a possibility.
A oid you have any reascon-- well, I'll withdéraw that.
nid vou use a computer in your analysis of these bullets? Do
vou recall using a computer on that?
A. It's standard procedur= to run the results through
mY {nf ovriation bank, and also on the computer through the
TBT's information bank. I don't know whether I did it in thisg
case. I probably aid.
0 -.0kavy. 2ased on the information that vou had. in
regard to these two bullet fragments, if the defense counsel
would have coma out and sooken to you, ¢ould you have told
him anvthing different than that these bullets were nrobably
both fired from he same Rossi?
A, T wouldn't think so. I usually testifv what my
TaInork gays, ECV EO.
efx I don't have anvthing else.
MR. 3TPOT: That's all I have.
BY MR: DUMICTH:
0 Can I zsover just one other thing. Okav. You have
indicated that the percentage that it was not a Rosai would
ha somawhere less than 50 per cent. Within that range of zerg
24
25
|
H
to 50 per cent, can you narrow that down anv better, as far
as would it be closer to zero or would it be closer to S50
per cent, based on the information that vou had?
A Well, I'd state {t was probably a Rossi, and that
leaves another weavon as being a posgibility only. I don't
think I can narrow it down anymor= than that.
0 Okay. Do you know of any other weapons that have
six grooves with a right-hand twist that have .1125 inches
that you testified at trial?
A That's the groove width of the bullet.
ol Do vou know of any other weavons that have that
¥ind of configuration?
L Yes. Some Tauruses are similar to this; some. early
Charter Arms are similar to this.
YR. DUOMICB: Okay. That's all I have.
MR. STROUP: I don't have anything further.
[Whereaupon, the above-entitled matter was concluded.]
-ofo-
30 RG TIA )
)
FULTON COUNTY )
I, BEdward H. Lieberman, Certified Court Reporter,
do hereby certify that ZZLLY FITE, Deponent, was by me first
wn
duly sworn and the above, pages 1 through 8, inclusive, is =
true and complete transcription of my stenographic notes
taken at the said proceedings and was reduced to typewritinc
by me personally.
I further certify that I am neither of kin nor
counsel to any of the parties, nor am T financially interest
in the matter.
WITNESS my hand and official seal at Atlanta, Fult
County, Georgia, this the 20th day of February, 1981.
EDWARD H. LIEBERMAN
[SEAL]
EXHIBIT M
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA
STATE OF GEORGIA | )
)
versus
) INDICTMENT NO. A-40553
)
WARREN MCOLISKY, ‘et: al
MOTICN FOR INFORMATION NECESSARY TO
RECEIVE A PAIR TRIAL
Now Comes the defendant in the above-stated case, without
waiving formal arraignment and moves the Court to require the
State through the District Attorney of this Circuit to produces
at the trial of the above-styled case, and at any and all non-
jury hearings of the abova-styled case, the following documents,
pictures and articles:
Fi,
Copies of all reports and memoranda connected with the sai
charge against the named defendant.
mr £ -2-
‘All written statements 62 witnssses in the poszession
of the prosecutor relating to the charges against thas named
np——
defendant in the above-atyled cass, as wall as all statements
relating to any other defendants in the above-styled case.
l=
Mamas, addresses and telephone numbers and whereabouts
of all witnesses to be called by the State in the trial of the
named defendant and any other dsfendants named in the above
styled case,
-don
Statepents of all persons including memoranda, summaries «
——,
recordings of such statements of any person, made to any law
Nye
{
enforcement officer or the investigative staff of any prosecut
ny
in any way connected with the abova-stylad casa.
-—F-
All memoranda, documents and reports to all law eniorceme
officars connacted with subject matter of the indictment refer
to above as well as the same of the investigative staff of all
prosecutors.
& . nA ae nat nseeih a
oe
Names and addresses of all persons who may have some knowle:
or facts of the present case in addition to names and addresses
given to the attorney for the named defendant.
-7=
The criminal racoxds and any list or summary reflecting
criminal records of all persons whom the State intends to call a
a witness in the trial of tha named defendant.
=f
All written or recorded statements and all summaries or
a ————
mamoranda of any oral (6=\writton statements made by the named
——, a
defendant and all other defendants named in the above-styled cas
Dw
Regults of all reports of any scientific teats or axperimer
or studies made in connsction with ths above-styled case and all
copies of such reports.
| Li Seles a
All racords of the rEOseRusor Showing or tending to show hc
the persons named on the jury panels sent to the courtroom for
the trial of this defendant hava voted in the past on criminal :
civil cases.
lle
All diagrams, sketches and pictures which have been made b:
or shown to any witness or prospective witness in the above-
styled case.
-13-
A detailed description of all physical items other than
documents and pictures which the prosecutor anticipates using i:
the trial of the named defendant and the exact place where and
under whose custody such items are being held.
This motion is made under the authority of Brady v. Marvla:
37.3 v.83, 38), 10 L.28, 248 215, Gilaos v. Morvland, 336 C.S. 65,
17 L.EA 22 737; and Williams wv, Dutton, 400 F.28 7927 (5¢h Cir, ,
1968). In support of his motion, defendant states:
The aforesaid documents are in the possession of the State
are available to the District Attorney.
‘A : i AN bes ae
All of said documents, pictures and articles are relevant,
significant and constitute substantial material evidence and will
be useful to and favorable to the namad defendant as evidenca
upon his trial.
The named defsandant cannot safely go to trial in this case
without the production of said documents and in their absence wil
be denied due process of law as guaranteed by Article I, Section
Paragraph III, of the Constitution of the State of Georgia (Ga.
Code §2-103) and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States,
Without tha production of the documants referred above, the
defendant's counsel will not be able to effectively represent hic
in the above-styled casa; and thus the defendant will be denied
the right of counsel which is guaranteed to him under the provisi
of Article I, Section I, Paragraph V of the Georgia Constitution
(Ga. Code §2-105) and the Sixth and Fourteenth Anendrent to the
United States Constitution. : ic
ye WHEREFORE, the defendant prays:
(a) That the State ba required to produce all documents anc
other evidence refarrad to abova,
(b) Without waiving his right to have his counsel examine
siad documents, pictures and articles, if the Court does not per:
this to be done, that tha Court conduct an in camera examination
of said documents, pictures and articles and his counsel ba
permitted to sea and copy of reproduce any of said documants,
picturas and articles favorable to the namad defendant as to the
question of quilt or punishment or for the purzose of impeaching
any of the witnesses to be called by the State in the trial of ©
named defendant,
(c¢) That if any part of said documentary evidence isn't mac
available to the named defendant Prior to tha commencement of hi:
trial, then without waiving his right to the production of said
evidence prior to his trial, he respectfully moves the Court for
an order directing the Distirct Attorney to produce all statemen-
and other impeaching evidence of each witness testifying for +he
State at the conclusion of the diract examination of that partic
ular witness and in sufficient time so that sald material will be
available to counsel for defendant to use while cross—-examining
the particular witness.
(d) Without in any way waiving the right of this defendant
to have his counsel examine said documents, pictures, and articl:
prior to trial and to have his counsel examine all of said
documents relating to the impeachment of cach witness before cro.
examining that particular witness, this defendant without waivin
his right to hava said Aatorial produced earlier, moves the Cour
for an order directing the District Attorney to produce all such
documents and evidence and to submit the same to his counsel at
the close of the Stata's evidence.
Respectfully submitted,
SILVER, ZEVIN, SEWELL & TURNER
~ JOEBW M. TURNER, II
Attorney for Defendant
p
—
—
—
—
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA
STATE OF GEORGIA
INDICTMENT NO. A-40553
versus
WARREN MCCLESKY, et al
MOTION FOR DISCLOSURE
OF I!PEACHING INFORMATION
The defendant respectfully coves this Court for entry of
an order dirscting the State to investigate and disclose all of
the following within the possession, custody, control, or the
existence of which is known or by the exercise of due diligenca
could become known to the State.
1. Any and all consideration or promises of consideratior
given to or made on behalf of government witnesses. By "consic
ation”, defendant refers to absolutely anything of value or us:
including but not limitad to immunity grants, witness fees, 3p¢
witness fees, transportation fgeissance assistance to. ‘mexbers
witness’ family or assoclates of withesss assistance or favor
treatment with respect to any criminal, civil or adninistrativ
dispute with +he State or the United States, and anything else
which could arguably create an interest or bias in the witness
Sai favor of the State or against the defense or acts as an inc
nent to testify or to color testimony;
2. any and all prosecutions, investigations or possible
prosacutions pending or waich could be brought against the wi:
and any probationary, parole or deferred prosecution status o:
the witness;
3. Any and all records ané information revealing felony
convictions attributed to tnis witness.
4. Any and all records and inforzation showing prior mi
or bad acts committed by the witness.
5. Any and all personnel filss for the witness,
Respectfully submitted,
SILVER, ZEVIYM¥, SZWELL & TURNZR
JOHN M. TURNER, 11
Attorney for Defendant
impeaching nature. United States v. Deutsch, 475 F.2d 55, 58
(Sth Cir. 1973). This duty of disclosure and production should
obviously extend to any personnel files of a witness which the
State itself has access to.
Respectfully submitted,
SILVER, ZEVIN, SEWELL & TURNER
JOHN 4, TURNER, II
Attorney for Defendant
EXHIBIT N
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF FULTON
STATE OF GEORGIA
STATE OF GEORGIA INDICTMENT NO. A-40553
Vs. H
DAVID BURNEY, JR., :
BERNARD DEPREE,
alias Bernard Dupree, s
WARREN McCLESKY, MURDER and
and BEN WRIGHT, JR. : ARMED ROBBERY (2 CTS.)
: ORDER
The above-captioned matter came before this Court on
September 25, 1978.
After conducting an in camera inspection of certain items
of evidence in the State's possession, the Court finds that
although the documents might become material for rebuttal at
trial, they are not.now subject to discovery.
It is further ordered that counsel may, at the proper
time, ask the Court for a further ruling if the circumstances
make it appropriate to do so.
IT Is SO ORDERED.
This 27 day of September, 1978.
/
. SAM PHILLIPS MCKENZIE i
pita JUDGE, SUPERIOR COURT :
: ATLANTA JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
eA i Ti Ze FILED IN OFFICE
I
UF CLERK sy ng
FULTON hii 58 i / :
= Respondent's Exhibit YG i bs i733 nt263 nh
ZIRE case NO. E08
.
EXHIBIT O
sirply told you he was a cousin of Ben lrigL
officer?
A daha
Br
zN
r
y
he
fo
y GO
5.
2 Specifically, lr. HeClezky, have you ever nad a
4
rsaticn when you were in that Jail cell, cne north fiftece
A 10, sir, I have. noc.
TUR{ILER: Your donor, Lefors ve GO eny further,
could we approach the Lench for a minute, ole:
t recall anyone telling me he is a cousin cf
Rer with Or. Cupree, who was over above YCUy Or with the man
= 3 > (ny Ts Li - “rr ste oo Ny he . ” - ., - bY
“aE in the Cell rezt to Fou, ztatln that vou shet the Foilce
Sanioaing LORENA a ER TE ERP SPRL As LBS STR BS SP WL ARERR SRR Sets BFE CRSA SL LAR i
Court and counsel at tie £eNRCa, Aut Of the nearing of the
Jury.) -
“Re TURNER: | Your ilonor, I think that from the
a fe
i [f
G (a
d
[™
en of things from what Nr, Parber is saving it
- - iy, ~ 40d rym eae, - . = en SRN REars hat Lio ngst havo: gory DLT grtakenc
dafendant., i asked for all written and oral statements
in % LUTLICHG. Il BE Las soretbing he hagn't
Siggy re: 3 .
> ™ i re s vu N Y 4 Tyee
Burnished 14 CLject to gettin; inte it now.
>
Sut it Soosn't helr vour Cliont, 1S ow
—
mating
; rast ow hd ls I a S&LYINY 1 awokey Lin =e
not dealing wit that part of ir,
nat As ckdowet
It's not sxculgiatory.
Tae COURY: You are not even =2ntitlec to this one.
3 ain statements he nade,
g—
That is enat the motion was £ilaC about,
This is not a statement of the defendant.
TE
like TURLLLk: We are not talking about a statement of
tlie defendant.
st "THE COULT: J I don't know that we ‘are talking about
-any written statecent, -
Nhe I an saving I filed for coral and written
Statements, I asked for all statcrents tne delendant,
You and nade
it of record, what he is doing is
in the Court's opinion pruer.
HR, PARAELX: I would like tc lace in the record at
this tire, IE Hr. Turaer doesn't mind, that I have furnished
hii corplete coplas Or evervtniag except hat we are about
LC yet inte, pilus sone Grand Jury testinen:, and he has had
ad of jerduring this trisli.
HR. TUREZR: 1 don't object or argue about chat, I
Am singly saving ==
Pike PANEER: JT want the reeord to reflect Shar,
tie TUiskiiz I am saying he <éidn't furnish ne winn
evaerctulng, and that in one of the voqulireonente of tre law
1a teres of furnishing all statements that a Jufomiant makes
m331=
THE COURT: well, that will be a defense that you
Can use in the fppellate Courts if he has viclated the law.
oi. “Re TURNEN: 1 would object at this tiie on that
—_———
rary Pur. C T: I will let the record show ac has not
He DUREER: I will let tne recora show ue nes
furnished me everytning, and for the first tice here today
om eval oY Shen at trial he may have scone oral or written statement fon
my client that Le has never furnished n —c
) e * | a
] 7 GC c ¥ c 0 c E
L
[i
a]
A 8
frm ny Je X to any introduction or adnicsion Cf those statements,
THz CCUR%Y: I will overrule the cojection,
tRe PANZER: This would be within Lefendant
MeClesky'!s oun rnowledye, s6 there is nething exculpatory
anpous ir,
: I understand that. La2t's proceed.
(whereureon, the following sroceedinus continuen in
L$ {Ju lr. Parker) fir. BeClesky, have YCu ever had a
fendant Dupree out at the jail while You wero
in cell one north fifteen, oritc tha Sen In tha cull next to vou ’
?
Pe
that © SET AR voit: . ie ‘TN tin ERR v 2 wbdte couldn't grove that vou killed that officer ;
: a TE Tye - x - ra - PEE Yn . womeal fi 3a Bib, NOL Lo Lnet oxtont, no, sir, qd OoVEanX a
Conversation With moevinsru Lunfee, but 1t wasn't aaviiin:, Of that by EO — “se
EXHIBIT P
The Hepartment af Urata
State of Georgia
Atlanta
30334 >
ARTHUR K. BOLTON 132 STATE JUDICIAL BUILDING
ATTORNEY GENERAL
TELEPHONE 656-3300
February 17, 1981
Mr. Foster Corbin
Certified Court Reporter
1293 Peachtree Street, N. E.
Suite 828
Atlanta, Georgia 30309
Re: Warren McClesky v. Zant, habeas corpus -
deposition of Russell Parker.
Dear Foster:
Enclosed is a complete copy of the prosecutor's file resulting
from. the criminal prosecution of Warren McClesky in Fulton
county. | As agreed by counsel for both parties who attended
the deposition of Mr. Russell Parker on February 16, 1981,
the enclosed file (including cover sheet) is to be attached
to Mr. Parker's deposition as joint Exhibit A and forwarded
along with the deposition to the Superior Court of Butts
County.
If you have any questions concerning the aforesaid, please
contact me at 656-3499.
Sincerely, 4
Vi
oe Hies 1 9 0 fn AP
NICHOLAS G. DUMICH
Assistant Attorney General
NGD/cab
cc: Mr. Robert Stroup
Attorney at Law
1515 Healey Building
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
EXHIBIT Q
ROBERT H. STROUP
ATTORNEY AT LAW
141 WALTON STREET N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303
(404) 522-8500
June 1, 1987 COPY
Chief Morris Redding
Atlanta Bureau of Police Services
175 Decatur: St.; S.E.
Atlanta, Georgia 30335
Dear Chief Redding:
Pursuant to 0.C.G.A. §50-18-70, et seq., this is to request
the opportunity to inspect and copy all records in the
possession and/or control of the Atlanta Bureau of Police
Services related to the investigation into the slaying of
Officer Frank Schlatt in May, 1978. This request is
designed to include not only all investigative files, but
also all records in the Bureau's possession related to the
prosecution of persons for that crime, in the event those
records are maintained separate from the investigation files
themselves.
I would like to inspect those documents at the earliest
possible time, but no later than June 8, 1987.
I appreciate very much your cooperation in this matter.
Very truly yours,
Robert H. Stroup
RHS/1
cc: Marva Jones Brooks, Esq.
DELIVERY BY HAND
CITY OF ATLANTA
ANDREW YOUNG
1100 SOUTH TOWER
MAYOR
ONE CNN CENTER
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-2705 DEPARTMENT OF LAV
404 - 658-1150 MARVA JONES BROOK:
City Attorney
June 4, 1987
Mr. Robert H. Stroup
Attorney at Law
1417 Walton Street, N. W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
RE: Your June 3, 1987 letter to City of
Atlanta Police Chief Morris Redding
Dear Bob:
This is to confirm our conversation of this morning
regarding the referenced letter, in which you request an oppor-
tunity to review investigatory files on the slaying of Officer
Frank Schlatt, pursuant to the Open Records Act, 0.C.G.A. §50-18-70
et. seq. As I stated this morning, the Supreme Court's ruling
of yesterday, June 3, 1987 on the motion for reconsideration
in Napper v. Georgia Television Company, et al., No. 44831 will
have some impact upon your Open Records Act request. Accordingly,
we have requested, and you have agreed to, an extension on the
time for us to respond to your request.
Thank you for your cooperation in this regard. 1
anticipate being able to begin reviewing the file tomorrow morning
and hope to be able to formally respond to your request by Monday,
June:8, 1987.
Sincerely,
nl Ly, aN “Nexon Vinge
Deborah McIver Floyd
Associate City Attorney
DMF / sw
CC: Marva Jones Brooks
Chief Morris Redding
Beverly Harvard
Major Neikirk
“is
si=:
® »
ROBERT H. STROUP
ATTORNEY AT LAW
141 WALTON STREET, N.W,
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303
(404) B22-83<
June 10,1987
W. Roy Mays, III, Esq.
City Attorney's Office
1100 Omni South
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Dear Roy:
This will confirm our telephone conversation of this morning
regarding my request to inspect the files related to the
police investigation of the Officer Frank Schlatt killing.
You advised me that the plaintiffs in Napper v. Georgia
Television Co. have filed a petition for rehearing in the
Georgia Supreme Court, and you wish to hold my request in
abeyance pending a ruling from that Court.
As a courtesy to me, in light of the severe time pressures I
am under, you agreed to provide me with one memorandum which
Debra Floyd happened to recall was in the file and fell
within the category of items which are the first priority of
my search. I understand that there may or may not be other
such documents; this happened to be one which she recalled
without doing an exhaustive review. The memorandum you are
providing will, I understand, have certain names deleted in
accord with your understanding of current law.
We agreed that my request to inspect the entire file remains
pending before you; you advised that you would be back in
touch after a ruling from the Georgia Supreme Court on the
plaintiffs' motion for rehearing.
Very truly yours,
Boo oun —
Robert H. Stroup
RHS/1